Volume 4 • Number 4 • 2018

intersections

East European Journal of Society and Politics

Intersections.

EEJSP

H-1453 Budapest,
PO Box 25.

The current issue was supported by:

Centre for Social Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
mtatk

PUBLISHED BY:
Centre for Social Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Tamás Rudas
Director General

intersections.tk.mta.hu

Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics
is an Open Access, double blind peer-reviewed online journal.
When citing an article, please use the article's DOI identifier.

Table of Contents

Book Reviews

ALPER BAYSAN *

Taking Signals Seriously: EU Membership Credibility and Rule Transfer from the Acquis Communautaire to Candidate Countries

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 4-25.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.410
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [alper.baysan@eup.gess.ethz.ch] (European Politics Research Group, Switzerland)

Abstract[1]

While researchers broadly agree that a credible EU membership perspective is vital for effective rule transfer to candidate countries, scholarship has so far conceived of membership credibility in formal terms. This is emblematic in the empirical focus on official EU announcements, accession stages and types of EU incentives. As a result, the literature has not taken seriously the role of political signals in shaping the credibility of EU membership offers. This article develops and systematically tests a novel argument: EU membership credibility hinges on whether a given country believes in the EU's ability to deliver on its promises. This depends on both formal and informal signals sent by EU actors. Specifically, it is argued that EU credibility is influenced by official EU announcements (e.g. relating to advancement in the stages of accession) and also by political signals from the 'big three' (France, the UK and Germany). The argument finds empirical corroboration in a regression analysis based on a dataset pertaining to rule transfer from the acquis communautaire involving 16 candidate countries from 1998 to 2009. While future research should assess the veracity of the hypotheses across countries, time, and policy areas, the findings suggest that the issue of political signals should be taken more seriously when gauging the EU's membership credibility.

Keywords: EU Enlargement, Conditionality, Credibility, Political Signals, Acquis Communautaire.

[1] The author would like to thank Frank Schimmelfennig, Guido Schwellnus and Asya Zhelyazkova for constructive comments on earlier versions of this article. All remaining errors are my own.

Political conditionality is the European Union's (EU) most powerful foreign policy instrument for bringing about change in enlargement countries (Börzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017). The EU thereby offers third countries incentives such as financial aid, visa liberalization and membership in return for domestic reforms and policy adoption (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 8). Arguably, enlargement has lost momentum in recent years. Headwinds such as the discourse on 'enlargement fatigue' have become strong (O'Brennan, 2014). And yet, EU conditionality as a political impact mechanism is here to stay, not least because it represents the bread and butter of the EU's enlargement and neighborhood policies.

The prevailing academic theory in the field that conceptualizes the workings of EU conditionality is the external incentives model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). While this has obtained wide empirical support over time (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; Börzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017), only a few scholars have put under close scrutiny its central premises (Saatcioglu, 2011; Huszka and Körtvélyesi, 2017). First, it is based on the unitary-actor assumption (Freyburg and Richter, 2014) – that is, it treats the EU as an actor speaking with one voice in matters related to enlargement. Arguably, such a predisposition misses the fact that the Commission, Parliament and Member States tend to maintain and communicate different positions (Thomson, 2011). Second, membership credibility, a key criterion for effective rule transfer, has been conceived in rather formal terms. This is emblematic in the empirical focus on static accession stages – e.g. pre-candidacy, candidacy, negotiations and accession – (Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007; Böhmelt and Freyburg, 2012) and types of EU incentives (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; Börzel and Schimmelfennig, 2017). Doing so, however, disregards the circumstance that membership credibility is a dynamic phenomenon and thus is also influenced by political signals sent by EU actors (cf. Freyburg and Richter, 2014).

This is precisely the point of departure for the present paper, which takes issue with the undertheorized nature of informal credibility signals. Correspondingly, the following research question guides this inquiry: What is the relative effect of formal and informal EU credibility on the comprehensiveness of rule transfer from the acquis communautaire to candidate countries?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that political signals matter with respect to the credibility of the EU's membership offer. A paradigmatic case in point is Turkey. For instance, German Chancellor Merkel's repeated insistence on 'privileged partnership' and an 'open-ended process'2 and French President Sarkozy's blocking of accession negotiation chapters3 undermined not only the official process led by the Commission but also Turkey's trust in EU membership down the road. A more issue-specific example comes from Serbia. Despite consistent criticism in the Commission's progress reports about press freedom in the country, EU Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement, Johannes Hahn, went public, questioning his own organization's claims about violations of press

[2] EU Business (2010) Merkel Wants 'Privileged Partnership' between Turkey, EU. Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/turkey-germany.3st . Accessed: 20-08-2017.'

[3] Bilefsky, D. (2017) Sarkozy Blocks Key Part of EU Entry Talks on Turkey. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/europe/25iht-union.5.6325879.html . Accessed: 23-08-2017.

freedom and self-censorship in a public statement, thereby effectively undermining the EU's own efforts at democratization in Serbia (Huszka and Körtvélyesi, 2017: 11). While descriptive analyses suggest that these developments can negatively affect the pace and extent of rule adoption in candidate countries (Ugur, 2010; Yildirim et al., 2013), there has been no systematic study of this issue to date – the present study is intended to fill this research desideratum.

The research for this paper finds statistical corroboration for the argument that the credibility of EU membership offers hinges on both formal and informal political signals.[4] To be sure, the results show that the effect of formal credibility is larger than that of informal credibility in terms of affecting the comprehensiveness of rule transfer to candidate countries. Thus, informal signals are best understood in terms of a supporting pillar that strengthens the overall membership credibility of the EU. The hypotheses are tested through a regression analysis based on a dataset on acquis-related rule transfer involving 16 candidate countries and spanning the period 1998 to 2009. The results remain robust when including alternative indicators and changing model specifications.

Overall, this paper's contribution to the literature is twofold: a) it extends theory on EU rule transfer to candidate countries and develops hypotheses and measurements about the informal signals which influence the credibility of EU membership offers, and b) it subsequently puts these arguments to an empirical test. This opens up a variety of avenues for future research which are discussed in the concluding section of this paper together with the policy implications that follow from the findings.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows: first, I review the quantitative literature on EU rule transfer to candidate countries. Special emphasis is put on methodological aspects, operationalization strategies and empirical findings. Then, the argument about informal credibility is developed by engaging critically with the literature and the external incentives model. This section derives testable hypotheses and tackles core conceptual issues. Subsequently, and based on the previous literature review, the research design is presented. After this follows a discussion of the empirical findings. The concluding section summarises key findings as well as implications in terms of theory and policy-making.

1. Review of the quantitative literature on EU rule transfer to candidate countries

Below, I scour the literature for key findings and explain how the authors of the former have hitherto gone about research and measurement. In line with the present article's outlook, this section focuses on quantitative scholarship about rule adoption from the acquis communautaire – the EU's vast body of law and legislation. Because systematic research in the field is rare, I review different strands of the empirical literature on EU rule transfer, both to candidate and non-candidate countries.

Existing quantitative scholarship on EU rule transfer to third countries has followed standard practice and mainly adopted a formal and dichotomous understanding of EU credibility – with minor variations, as will be shown below. In

[4] The terms 'credibility' and 'signals' are used interchangeably in this paper.

the operationalization of concepts, studies differ on at least two accounts: with respect to the data used, and indicators employed.

Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008) investigate the efficacy of political conditionality vis-à-vis both candidate and non–candidate countries in the neighborhood of the EU. They differentiate between different EU reward offers: partnership, association, and membership. In addition, they a priori construct a credibility scheme based on whether the EU incentives for a given country at a given point in time are (1) sizeable, and, (2) credible. The incentive structure is conceived to be most sizeable and credible when a clear membership perspective is offered. Conversely, incentives are considered least sizeable and credible when only partnership is offered, absent compensating financial or economic measures (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 195–196). The authors' hypothesis is tested on panel data comprising 36 countries from the EU's neighborhood (1988–2000). The article's key finding is that membership conditionality provides by far the most substantial incentive for rule adoption in third countries (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 207).

Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) conceptualize accession negotiations as a series of bargaining episodes (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) and resort to game–theory and utilize the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' to understand the rule adoption dynamics underlying EU conditionality. The authors split membership negotiations into two stages: pre– vs. post–accession date announcement. From rational choice–theory, Steunenberg and Dimitrova deduce that the degree of compliance should be highest prior to the EU announcing an accession date because defection at this stage is disincentivized, while transposition rates may be expected to significantly slow down once the candidate country has secured a membership date. Methodologically, the authors compute a 'conditionality index' based on the total number of conditions for each candidate country as set out in the Commission's progress reports during each year, divided by the actual number of conditions the candidate country fulfilled (Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007: 12). A plausibility test of Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is said to corroborate the argument.

Hille and Knill (2006) study the variance in acquis rule adoption patterns in candidate countries. Their focus is on the variable administrative capacities of candidate states. In terms of data, they use the Commission's progress report data on 13 candidate countries spanning the time period 1999 to 2003. Hille and Knill's (2006) most central finding is that administrative capacity increases the likelihood of EU rule transfer, absent a significant number of veto players and in the presence of high levels of bureaucratic strength. While the authors make a strong contribution with regard to examining the role of institutional factors such as administrative and bureaucratic capacities – which they borrow from the broader EU compliance literature –, an account of the influence of EU credibility is lacking.

Toshkov (2008) analyzes the timeliness of transposition patterns in candidate countries. In doing so, he resorts to a sample of 119 directives drawn from the CELEX database. He reports a significant and positive effect for bureaucratic regulatory quality, while adding thereto the facilitating role of right–leaning governments. By contrast, the type of the directive (e.g. whether it is implementing legislation by the Commission) and the number of parties in government are reported to have a significant negative effect (Toshkov, 2008: 393). The differential impact of

policy fields represents another key finding: internal market legislation is more likely to be adopted, whereas the reverse applies to environmental legislation (Toshkov, 2008: 395). Overall, Toshkov's study is strong with regard to controlling for a series of potential confounding variables. However, here, too, a crucial shortcoming remains: that the effect of EU credibility is not accounted for.

Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012) were the first to assess the impact of EU credibility on acquis rule transfer to candidate countries. The authors assigned different EU credibility values to candidate countries contingent on their progress in the overall EU membership accession process: pre-candidacy (0), candidacy (0.25), accession negotiations (0.5) and accession (0.75). The idea: the farther a country progresses in the accession process, the stronger its belief in membership down the road – this approach reflects what I earlier referred to in terms of formal credibility. Advancement in the accession stages, in turn, is expected to translate into speedier and more comprehensive EU rule adoption patterns. In testing the argument, Böhmelt and Freyburg draw on a sample of 16 candidate countries (1998–2009). The Commission's progress reports on candidate countries' compliance are their main data source. The authors' findings partly contradict the results of previous studies. They find a significant and positive effect for formal EU credibility as well as political (Polity IV) and economic liberalization (Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedoms Index).[5] Surprising is the finding that candidate country government position (which is an indicator used by the authors to capture the socialization mechanism: perceived legitimacy of EU rules), its bureaucratic strength, and GDP per capita exercise a significant and negative effect on EU rule transfer. Furthermore, the effect of veto players (PolCon III Index) turns out to be insignificant and negative. This is in line with Toshkov's (2008) results, yet runs counter to Hille and Knill's (2006) findings.

In sum, while the empirical literature on EU rule transfer to candidate countries has come a considerable distance in recent years, findings remain somewhat ambiguous. There are two reasons for this: first, most studies do not assess the effect of EU credibility – the only exception is Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012) which also lacks an assessment of the role of informal credibility. Second, the empirical indicators that were used in the statistical analyses differ and are at times erratic. For instance, many researchers use variables that capture levels of economic freedom and democracy but mean to capture rather different concepts – I use these insights to inform my own research design, and also later when I discuss data, variables and methodology. First, however, I shall turn to the development of the main argument of this paper.

2. Theory and hypotheses about EU rule transfer to candidate countries

In what follows, testable hypotheses are derived about the theorized link between political signals, membership credibility and rule transfer. What is referred to as conditionality in policy jargon has been elaborated by the scholarly literature in terms of the so-called external incentives model. In essence, the theory posits that EU rule

[5] The utilization of Polity IV regime data and the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedoms Index may be problematic insofar as it remains unclear how the chosen indicators theoretically relate to the concept of domestic adoption costs.

transfer to third countries works most effectively if there is 1) a credible membership prospect and, 2) domestic adoption costs are not prohibitively high (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

In this paper I focus on a key concept of the external incentives model: EU credibility – thus, I bracket the discussion of domestic adoption costs but will come back to them later in the section on the research design as they are included as controls in the regression models. To this end, I distinguish two sub-concepts, which can essentially be comprehended as representing two sides of the same coin: formal credibility (official membership perspective), and informal credibility (political signals).

2.1 Formal credibility: membership perspective

What is formal credibility? In the context of acquis rule transfer to candidate countries, formal credibility revolves around the EU making an official membership offer (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 672-674; Freyburg and Richter, 2014: 9). This is the standard approach in gauging the EU's membership credibility. The most general hypothesis that can be advanced from this perspective thus reads:

Hypothesis 1: The offer by the EU of an official membership perspective makes acquis rule transfer to candidate countries more comprehensive.

2.2 Informal credibility: political signals

What is informal credibility? In this paper, I define informal credibility in terms of political signals (for a slightly different view, see: Freyburg and Richter, 2014).[6] According to this perspective, the credibility of EU membership hinges on informal political signals sent by EU actors. Developments on the ground and findings from EU scholarship lend support to this view. For one thing, enlargement brings to the fore distributional conflict (Schneider, 2009). As such, it is a politically salient field comparable to monetary policy. For another, in the wake of the big round of enlargement in 2005 a political discourse developed that is also known as 'enlargement fatigue' (O'Brennan, 2014), which emphasizes the limited absorption capacity of the EU. This argument is regularly used by national and European officials who are skeptical of the EU's further expansion. For another, Member States increasingly play the domestic card in policy decisions. Hillion calls this a 'nationalization of enlargement policy' (2010). An illustrative case is the threat of France and the Netherlands to initiate a referendum on the ratification of the accession treaty of Turkey. Acts such as these are crucial political signals vis-à-vis a third country. After all, deriving binding EU decisions about granting a third country

[6] Note that this paper, working from the angle of political science, centers on signals and brackets the issue of perceptions (for an in-depth discussion of this topic, see for instance Jervis, 2017. Measuring perceptions would involve examining the perceptive process of selectively absorbing and processing external information which unfolds on the basis of a very complex cognitive mechanism. What actors actually perceive (attended stimuli) often represents only a fraction of a series of simultaneously happening events (environmental stimuli).

candidate status, initiating accession negotiations, opening negotiation chapters or pronouncing accession dates all have to be unanimously approved by Member State governments in the EU Council.[7] Against this backdrop, Freyburg and Richter convincingly argue that credibility is shaped by 'pieces of information such as threats and promises made by individual actors involved' (2014: 9).[8]

Given the political saliency of enlargement policy, and the pivotal role of Member States therein, I argue that the 'big three' – Germany, France and the UK – will be the most decisive political signaling agents due to their relative economic and political power (Moravcsik, 1998; Müftüler–Bac and McLaren, 2003). In addition to tangible assets, these countries also possess significant informal power. For instance, Naurin and Lindahl (2010) find that Germany, France and the UK on average possess the highest network capitals. This is an informal measure of influence, describing the strength of informal network ties at Member State representatives' disposal during EU negotiations. Since the big three are endowed with immense formal and informal political power, third countries will be particularly sensitive about their policy signals. Based on this reasoning, I deduce the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The greater the support of the 'big three' (Germany, France, the UK), the more comprehensive acquis rule transfer to candidate countries.

Two alternative sources of credibility signaling are furthermore conceivable and their relative effect shall be assessed along the way: EU public opinion, and the position of the EU Council Presidency. First, while Member State governments have the right to conclude binding decisions about enlargement policy, they are mandated to do so by their citizens. European public support for enlargement may convey positive credibility signals and therewith ultimately facilitate acquis rule adoption in candidate countries.[9] The dissemination of the respective information in the candidate country is thought by some to occur through mass media (Linos, 2011). Second, the EU Council Presidency might influence perceptions of the EU's membership credibility as well. After all, the Presidency chairs the meetings of EU ministers, sets agendas and working programs, and leads dialogue with other EU institutions. The position rotates among EU Member States every six months. Tallberg argues that '[p]residencies are tempted to use the privileged resources for national gain, and typically exploit the position as broker to favour the outcomes they desire' (2004: 1000). For enlargement policy this would imply that the EU Council Presidency incumbent has the means and standing to influence the EU's overall membership credibility. Based on the preceding reasoning, I formulate two additional hypotheses:

[7] To put this into perspective: in other policy fields researchers have found that Member States tend to avoid excessive conflict and follow the Commission's leading role (Hill, 2004; Emerson et al., 2005: 201; Smith, 2003: 105).

[8] Alas, with regard to the question which actors' threats and promises should be examined, Freyburg and Richter remain rather vague. They merely point at the 'domestic politics at the level of EU Member States and EU institutions' (Freyburg and Richter, 2014: 10).

[9] Arguably, the direction of the causal 'arrow' – i.e. whether public perceptions are created through 'cueing' or whether elites react to existing public sentiments – may differ. For present purposes it suffices to assume that negative public support for enlargement in Member States has the capacity to undermine the credibility of the EU's reward promise in candidate countries.

Hypothesis 3: The higher public support for enlargement in EU member states, the more comprehensive acquis rule transfer to candidate countries.

Hypothesis 4: The more positive the enlargement attitude of the EU Council Presidency, the more comprehensive acquis rule transfer to candidate countries.

3. Research design

The dependent variable in the dataset is the degree of compliance with EU law in a given candidate country and year.[10] In coding the variable, I follow standard practice and take data from the European Commission's yearly progress reports on candidate countries (Saatcioglu, 2011; Böhmelt and Freyburg, 2012).[11] Compliance was coded along a 0–3 scale: a value of 0 was assigned when a country did not comply with the acquis in a given policy area and year; a value of 1 if it partly complied; a value of 2 if it almost fully complied, although more effort was necessary; and a value of 3 when it fully complied. Policy-area based values so obtained were then averaged to yield an overall compliance figure for each candidate country and year.[12]

3.1 Main explanatory variables

To capture formal credibility, I follow Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012: 254–255) who have suggested splitting the accession process into successive stages (pre-candidacy, candidate status, accession process, accession date). Each of these stages are assigned probability values from 0 to 1, increasing in quarter-steps.

Informal credibility is measured via the enlargement policy positions of the political elite in the 'big three': Germany, France and the United Kingdom. To this end, I resort to the comparative manifesto project database (CMP).[13] The item 'per108', inter alia, measures for a given party and legislative period the extent to which it desired to expand the European Community/Union. Because there is no candidate country-specific data, this indicator of parties' general preferences for EU enlargement was chosen as the best available option. Specifically, for each of three countries of interest (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) I took the enlargement preferences of all political parties for which data is available and weighed

[10] In this study, I resort to a dataset by Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012) which has been updated and extended substantially for the purposes of the present study. I extend my thanks to the authors for sharing this.

[11] Three qualifications are in order: first, to avoid misunderstanding, the degree of compliance does not equal the *rate* of compliance. Second, the focus here is on formal rule adoption as embodied in the implementation of EU directives. While practical compliance is an important matter in itself, to date there has been little related data with which this issue could be analyzed. Finally, note that it is difficult to entirely rule out political bias when using the Commission's progress reports. After all, the Commission itself is an organization which pursues certain goals and interests. Nevertheless, the progress reports currently stand as the only comprehensive data source. As soon as better data becomes available, the arguments presented herein should be made subject to additional tests.

[12] At the time of writing, the number of accession negotiation chapters amounted to 35.

[13] CMP contains details of the policy positions of political parties on a variety of issues which are derived through comparative content analysis of election programs, parliamentary speeches, and government policy statements (Volkens et al., 2013).

the respective party's preferences by the percentage of votes it obtained in the preceding election. This measurement strategy avoids capturing merely the position of the incumbent and/or strongest parties and incorporates a broader set of potentially influential political actors that may influence perceptions of membership credibility in third countries. The country-specific values so obtained were then re-aggregated to create a single overall score for the enlargement preferences of the political elite in the 'big three' (GER, FR, UK).14 In the present sample, this indicator ranges from 2.621 to 6.414, where higher values denote more positive enlargement stances.

The two alternative political signaling sources, public support and EU Council Presidency, are measured as follows: EU public support is measured via an item from the Eurobarometer (EB) that posed the following question to EU residents: 'For each of the following countries (country name), are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?' Where surveys were run twice or more often for a given year, I took the average of the results to obtain a single figure. Missing data for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004 are dealt with via multivariate imputation, a technique which is said to be more appropriate than basic interpolation, best-guessing, or list-wise deletion (Honaker and King, 2010). The position of the EU Council Presidency is measured via Schimmelfennig's coding scheme (2001: 49f.). A value of 1 was assigned to any year under study in which at least one pro-enlargement country (that is, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden or the UK) held the position of Presidency, as there is evidence that these countries used their chair positions to steer the accession negotiations. Following common practice, I also code new Member States which joined the EU after 2004 as pro-enlargement (Böhmelt and Freyburg, 2012).

3.2 Control variables

So-called domestic adoption costs figure prominently in the literature as possible explanations for EU rule transfer (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Generally speaking, they relate to factors located within the candidate country. Following the literature, I included two such variables as key controls in the regression analysis: veto player and public opinion.

For one thing, veto players are 'actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 667). For the incumbent government in the candidate country this means that the difficulty for policy transfer increases with the number of ideologically distant veto players (Tsebelis, 2002: 37). As a measure of veto players I take the PolCon III Political Constraints Index (Henisz, 2002). In this study sample, the variable ranges between 0.67 and 1.75, where higher values signify a higher number of veto players in the domestic institutional setting. Missing data for the years 2008 and 2009 were derived through multivariate imputation (Honaker and King, 2010).

Additionally, public opinion can constrain or enable policy-making. This is widely acknowledged by electoral research on EU integration (McLaren, 2006;

[14] It was not deemed necessary to weigh this figure once again because of the unanimity rule in the EU Council which effectively sets those countries on equal ground with regard to their voting influence.

Hooghe and Marks, 2009).15 Public opinion is captured by using survey data from Eurobarometer. This database contains a survey item which poses the following question to residents in candidate countries: 'Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing?' During the years when the survey was run twice or more often, the arithmetic mean was computed to obtain a single figure. Here, too, missing data for the years 2002 to 2004 was derived through multivariate imputation

A further series of control variables are included in the estimation to rule out statistical bias. First, administrative capacity is measured by drawing upon a pertinent World Bank governance indicator (Kaufmann et al., 2010). This index of bureaucratic quality is based on data derived from expert assessments about the independence of the civil service from political pressure, political stability, bureaucratic accountability, transparency and rule of law (Hille and Knill, 2006: 544). Second, a candidate country's level of economic development was measured via GDP per capita and the level of economic liberalization. GDP data was taken from the World Bank development indicators database, whereas the data on economic liberalization was taken from the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom (Miller and Holmes, 2011).16 Third, to account for the impact of 'enlargement fatigue', I generated a binary variable which takes the value of 1 for all country–year observations after the 'big bang' enlargement round of 2004. Enlargement fatigue is a term referring to a political discourse which surfaced in the aftermath of the 2004 'big bang' enlargement round.17 The former discourse was introduced by 'enlargement–skeptics' and is generally utilized to make a case for the EU's limited capacity to absorb new Member States (Szolucha, 2011; O'Brennan, 2014). Fourth, I included a regime indicator from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) which ranges from –10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy) to assess the effect of political liberalization on compliance. Fifth, a time variable was added to control for temporal dependencies because in the sample there seems to be a general trend towards greater compliance the further the accession process advances. This control makes sure that the main explanatory variables do not falsely pick up time effects. Sixth, I controlled for the membership preferences of the incumbent government in the candidate country (Benoit and Laver, 2006).18 Based on expert surveys, this variable ranges

[15] There currently exists only one study about Central Eastern European countries which finds some empirical evidence for a positive relationship between public support and timely EU law transposition (Toshkov, 2010). During enlargement, according to Toshkov, 'candidate countries are sensitive to societal EU support and adapt faster to the EU requirements when support is higher' (Toshkov, 2010: 29). Note, however, that this finding is based on a statistical analysis that focuses on a different dependent variable: the timeliness of the transposition of a given EU law. By contrast, the present paper analyzes the degree of compliance with EU law in a given policy area.

[16] This index is measured by way of 10 components, assigning a grade to each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents maximum economic freedom. The 10 components of economic freedom are: (a) business freedom; (b) trade freedom; (c) fiscal freedom; (d) government spending; (e) monetary freedom; (f) investment freedom; (g) financial freedom; (h) property rights; (i) freedom from corruption; and (j) labor freedom. The component scores were averaged to provide an overall score for economic freedom.

[17] The 'big bang' enlargement round refers to the simultaneous accession of 10 countries in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

[18] Note that this indicator has previously been used for different ends. While Hille and Knill (2006) have used it as an indicator of 'political willingness', Böhmelt and Freyburg (2012) have employed it as a control variable for the socialization mechanism.

from 1 to 20 for the various political parties in the country in question, where a value of 1 means strict opposition to the country's EU membership and a value of 20 denotes that a party is totally in favor of accession.

3.3 Methodology

Combining the variables listed above, a statistical model was estimated where the degree of compliance is the natural logarithm of the alignment with acquis law (average compliance value taking all accession chapters for each candidate country in a given year). The dependent variable is furthermore lagged as a means of ameliorating autocorrelation and capturing dynamic effects. Specifically, there is reason to believe that a country's degree of compliance with EU law at time point t–1 can be expected to be related to its performance at later time points (Böhmelt and Freyburg, 2012).

The regression was conducted as a time–series cross–sectional (TSCS) model which corrects for panel heteroscedasticity, temporally and spatially correlated errors and autocorrelation (Beck and Katz, 1995; Plümper et al., 2005). This technique deploys Prais–Winsten coefficients with panel–corrected standard errors and estimates a single AR parameter for all panels to alleviate problems of serial autocorrelation (Beck and Katz, 1995: 645). As Wooldridge states (2002), whenever we expect serial correlation, Prais–Winsten estimations are to be preferred over OLS because they ensure that standard errors will be more robust, thus minimizing the likelihood of finding associations where there are really none (Type I error).

4. Empirical results

The statistical analysis was conducted on time–series cross–sectional data concerning EU rule transfer from the acquis communautaire to 16 candidate countries spanning the period 1998 to 2009 (for a list of countries included in the study sample, see: Table 2, Appendix). To ensure the robustness of the findings, a series of additional sensitivity checks were applied to the models (see: Table 4, Appendix). Table 3 (Appendix) lists the descriptive statistics. Table 1 presents the different models and estimates of the regression analysis. Table 2 gives an overview of the countries included in the sample.

Table 1: Determinants of acquis rule transfer to EU candidate countries (1998–2009).

	Baseline Model: Compliance (log)[1]	Model 1: Compliance (log)[1]	Model 2: Compliance (log)[1]	Model 3: Compliance (log)[1]
Formal EU Credibility	0.446*** [0.0848]	0.533*** [0.0685]	0.490*** [0.0692]	0.389*** [0.0962]
Informal EU Credibility (Political Signals: GER, FR, UK)		0.0372** [0.0128]	0.0435*** [0.0130]	0.0391** [0.0143]
EU Public Support		0.00367 [0.00253]	0.00285 [0.00249]	0.00448 [0.00272]
EU Council Presidency		0.0174 [0.0195]	0.0319 [0.0207]	0.0260 [0.0211]
Veto Player		0.218 [0.142]	0.196 [0.143]	0.213 [0.158]
Candidate Country (CC) Public Support		−0.00144 [0.000926]	0.000139 [0.000965]	0.0000784 [0.00103]
Enlargement Fatigue		−0.556*** [0.0722]	−0.481*** [0.0814]	−0.712*** [0.183]
Enlargement Fatigue* CC Public Support		0.00501*** [0.000988]	0.00391*** [0.00105]	0.00904* [0.00421]
Administrative Capacity			0.145*** [0.0437]	0.144** [0.0469]
GDP per Capita (log)			−0.0569 [0.0295]	−0.0519 [0.0320]
Government Position CC				0.000123 [0.00411]
Time	0.0358*** [0.00881]	0.0584*** [0.00752]	0.0641*** [0.00764]	0.0684*** [0.00986]
Constant	−71.3*** [17.59]	−116.9*** [15.09]	−127.9*** [15.28]	−136.7*** [19.77]
N	85	85	85	78
R^2	0.841	0.879	0.891	0.885
df	2	9	11	12
chi2 (Wald)	127.5	311.8	393.2	347.2
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

[1]Dependent variable lagged by one year.

Prais–Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

$^{*}p<0.05$, $^{**}p<0.01$, $^{***}p<0.001$

At the most general level, the findings lend empirical support to the hypothesis of the relevance of both formal and informal credibility.19 To be sure, while these results corroborate H1 and H2, there exist differences in terms of effect sizes. Specifically, formal credibility exerts a substantially greater effect on EU rule transfer to candidate countries (advancement in the accession process increases compliance with EU law in candidate countries by 63 per cent) as compared to informal credibility (one unit increase in positive signals raises compliance by roughly 4.5 per cent).20 Substantively speaking, this suggests that formal credibility is highly important and that informal credibility (in terms of big country positions) is an additional element in the credibility of EU conditionality.

By contrast, other EU-level factors, including public support in the EU (H3) and the preferences of the EU Council Presidency (H4), turn out to be insignificant. A possible explanation for this non-finding might be that EU public opinion and the EU Presidency are only secondary factors compared to the signals made by Member State governments. This conjecture would seem plausible insofar as Member States possess, relatively speaking, the greatest de jure and de facto power over EU enlargement policy.

Table 2 Countries included in the study sample.

Enlargement wave	Country and years
Accession to the EU on 1 May 2004	Cyprus (1998–2003), Czech Republic (1998–2003), Estonia (1998–2003), Hungary (1998–2003), Latvia (1998–2003), Lithuania (1998–2003), Malta (1999–2003), Poland (1998–2003), Slovakia (1998–2003), Slovenia (1998–2003).
Accession to the EU on 1 January 2007	Bulgaria (1998–2005), Romania (1998–2005).
Accession to the EU on 1 July 2013	Croatia (2005–2009).
Other	Macedonia (2005–2009), Montenegro (2006–2009), Turkey (1998–2009).

Furthermore, veto player and public support in the candidate country are insignificant variables. This finding may be explained due to acquis implementation being mostly overseen by specific ministries or government agencies – many candidate countries have established EU ministries of some sort to oversee the rule adoption process. This finding is in line with those of authors who found that veto players do not matter so much during accession negotiations but rather come into play after a candidate country has joined the EU (e.g. Dimitrova, 2002).

[19] Here operationalized with respect to the enlargement preferences of the political elite in the 'big three' (Germany, France and the UK).

[20] Calculations based on estimates from Model 2 because it has the best model-fit parameters.

A rather intriguing result pertains to enlargement fatigue, which exhibits a negative and significant effect. In essence, this means that negotiating accession between 2004 and 2009 decreases a candidate country's compliance with EU law by 38 per cent.21 A related and interesting finding pertains to the interaction of enlargement fatigue and public support in candidate countries. Substantively speaking, this finding suggests that unfavorable external conditions such as enlargement fatigue seem to be alleviated by higher levels of public support for EU membership in candidate countries.22 That is, the higher the public support, the smaller the detrimental impact of enlargement fatigue on compliance (Figure 1), holding all other variables constant at their mean values.



Figure 1: Conditional marginal effect of enlargement fatigue and public support for EU membership in candidate countries on acquis rule transfer.

5. Concluding remarks

This article has investigated the link between EU membership conditionality and rule transfer to candidate countries. The results show that the credibility of EU membership offers are dynamic in nature: they are shaped by official EU announcements that affirm the advancement of a given country in the accession process (formal credibility) and, to a lesser extent, by political signals (informal

[21] Calculations based on estimates from Model 2 because it has the best model-fit parameters.
[22] For public support values greater than 85 per cent, the effect is not significant. This, however, is most likely due to the limited data in this band range.

credibility) – most notably, from the powerful countries the UK, France and Germany.[23] Thus, informal signals are best understood in terms of a supporting pillar of overall EU membership credibility. An open question for the future concerns the role of the UK once it leaves the Union. Which country is going to fill the power vacuum? And how is this going to affect the positions of Germany and France? Given that the UK, a traditionally pro-enlargement Member State, is leaving the stage this may have substantial implications for enlargement policy in general and rule transfer to candidate countries in particular.

In terms of policy-making, there are a variety of implications. On the one hand, the opportunities for influencing informal signals are arguably limited within the complex political architecture of the EU. However, a partial remedy for credibility issues and membership uncertainty may reside within candidate countries themselves in the form of mobilizing public support. As the empirical results of the statistical analysis suggest, supportive domestic publics can alleviate the detrimental impact of enlargement fatigue. Pro-EU forces might, for example, initiate media campaigns and other grassroots-targeted activities to convince a broader elite base and public of the potential merits of EU membership. Against this background, EU civil society support and programs such as Twinning or Sigma remain important. One caveat, however, is that such measures may buy time and facilitate continued rule transfer temporarily but do not represent a sustainable solution in the long term. In short, there is no way around a credible reward perspective in the mid- and long-term, be this in the form of membership, financial payments, visa-free travel, or other attractive incentives (Trauner, 2009). On the other hand, and from the EU's vantage point, the ongoing accession process in the Western Balkans (and also Turkey) may benefit from both strong formal and informal credibility signals. While the Commission is habitually in favor of enlargement, the challenge will lie in bringing relevant Member States on board, too. What is more, during the increased politicization of EU politics (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), it may perhaps be time to put up for debate whether the unanimous consent of all Member States is truly necessary for the accession of a candidate country. This represents a huge factor of uncertainty for a third country that is negotiating accession and, as a corollary, can negatively affect its willingness to adopt potentially costly EU law and domestic reforms.

Referring back to the theory and the research community, a key point to drive home is that the external incentives model has hitherto left informal political signals undertheorized. Acknowledging their role opens up several new research opportunities for future studies. First, it would be interesting to see whether the findings hold for different enlargement rounds. The present study has zoomed in on the time period 1998 to 2009. Future research may extend the time frame beyond 2009 and include additional country-observations in any examination (e.g. Macedonia, Montenegro, and Turkey post-2009; Serbia and Albania, if not perhaps also potential candidate countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). Second, once a big enough sample can be compiled, researchers may also test the relative effect of policy areas or the level of issue-politicization on the effectiveness of rule transfer. The following questions could be addressed in follow-up studies: Do

[23] After all, the 'big three' not only possess strong voting rights within the Council, but also dispose of vast social networks and informal political capital.

(informal) political signals matter in transport policy as much as, for example, issues related to judiciary and fundamental rights; and how does the level of politicization of a given issue in a candidate country affect EU rule adoption; does a 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009) in the target state thwart rule adoption even if there is a reassuring credibility structure? Third, scholars may explore more direct ways of measuring informal credibility signals. Alternative measures may be extracted from political speeches, parliamentary debates, social and printed media[24] and collected for the entire set or a sample of Member States. This would allow for the dissection of 'significant' sender countries, if not regions, other than the 'big three'. Building up a large database of policy signals may not only allow for a more fine-grained analysis but also enable researchers to examine political signals as both dependent and independent variables.

References

Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (1995) What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data. *American Political Science Review*, 89(03): 634–647. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2082979

Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006) *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*: Taylor and Francis. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203028179

Böhmelt, T. and Freyburg, T. (2012) The Temporal Dimension of the Credibility of EU Conditionality and Candidate States' Compliance with the Acquis Communautaire 1998–2009. *European Union Politics*, 14(2): 250–272. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116512458164

Börzel, T. A. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2017) Coming Together or Drifting Apart? The EU's Political Integration Capacity in Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(2): 278–296. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1265574

Cengiz, F. and Hoffmann, L. (2013) Rethinking Conditionality: Turkey's European Union Accession and the Kurdish Question. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(3): 416–432. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12010

Dimitrova, A. (2002) Enlargement, Institution Building and the EU's Administrative

Capacity Requirement. *West European Politics,* 25(4) :171–190. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/713601647

Emerson, M., Aydin, S., Noutcheva, G., Tocci, N. and Vahl, M. (2005) *The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in Its Neighbourhood. CEPS Working Document: Vol. 223*. Brussels: CEPS.

[24] In relation, scholars may also take issue with the question whether there is a two-way causal relationship between informal signals and rule adoption. It is not only conceivable that positive signals provoke more comprehensive rule adoption; the dynamics of rule adoption in a given candidate country may provoke EU actors to send signals (reassuring/criticizing) as well.

Freyburg, T. and Richter, S. (2014) *The Devil Lies in the System: Perceived Credibility and Effectiveness of European Union Accession Conditionality*. Paper prepared for presentation at the ETH Zurich CIS EUP Colloquium, 2 April 2014, Zurich.

Henisz, W. J. (2002) The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment. *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 11(2): 355–389. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/11.2.355

Hille, P. and Knill, C. (2016) 'It's the Bureaucracy, Stupid': The Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in EU Candidate Countries, 1999–2003. *European Union Politics*, 7(4): 531–552. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116506069442

Hillion, C. (2010) *The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. Available at: http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2010/the-creeping-nationalisation-of-the-eu-enlargement-policy-20106/Sieps_2010_6.pdf . Accessed: 11-08-2017

Honaker, J. and King, G. (2010) What to Do about Missing Values in Time-Series Cross-Section Data. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2): 561–581. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00447.x

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(01): 1–23. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000409

Huszka, B., and Körtvélyesi, Z. (2017) Conditional Changes: Europeanization in the Western Balkans and the Example of Media Freedom. *Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 3(2): 8–32. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i2.367

Jervis, R. (2017) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400885114

Kraay, A., Kaufmann, D. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010) *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*: The World Bank. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-5430

Linos, K. (2011) Diffusion through Democracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3): 678–695. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00513.x

Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., Davenport, C. and Jaggers, K. (2016) Polity IV, 1800–1999. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1): 40–45. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414002035001O3

McLaren, L. M. (2006) *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230504240

Moravcsik, A. M. (1998) *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*: *Cornell Studies in Political Economy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315072258

Müftüler-Bac, M. and Mclaren, L. (2003) Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey. *Journal of European Integration*, *25*(1): 17–30. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0703633031000077181

Naurin, D. and Lindahl, R. (2010) Out in the Cold? Flexible Integration and the Political Status of Euro Opt-Outs. *European Union Politics*, 11(4): 485–509. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116510382463

O'Brennan, J. (2014) On the Slow Train to Nowhere? The European Union, Enlargement Fatigue and the Western Balkans. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *19*(2): 221–242.

Plümper, T., Troeger, V. E. and Manow, P. (2005) Panel Data Analysis in Comparative Politics: Linking Method to Theory. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(2): 327–354. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00230.x

Saatcioglu, B. (2011) Revisiting the Role of Credible EU Membership Conditionality for EU Compliance: The Turkish Case. *Uluslararası İlişkiler [Journal of International Relations]*, 31(8): 23–44.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*, *55*(1): 47–80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801551414

Schimmelfennig, F. (ed.). (2005) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Cornell University Press.

Schimmelfennig, F. and Scholtz, H. (2008) EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood. *European Union Politics*, 9(2): 187–215. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116508089085

Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4): 661–679. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176042000248089

Schneider, C. J. (2009) *Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511575235

Smith, K. (2003) The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality. In: Cremona, M. (ed.) *The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law: Vol. 12,1. The Enlargement of the European Union.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 105–140. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199260942.003.0005

Steunenberg, B. and Dimitrova, A. L. (2008) Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of Conditionality. *European Integration Online Papers*, 11(5): 1–18.

Szolucha, A. (2010) The EU and 'Enlargement Fatigue': Why Has the European Union Not Been Able to Counter 'Enlargement Fatigue'?. *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 6(1): 107–122. Available at: https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/download/124/192

Tallberg, J. (2004) The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *42*(5): 999–1022. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021–9886.2004.00538.x

Thomson, R. (2011) *Resolving Controversy in the European Union: Legislative Decision–Making Before and After Enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139005357

Toshkov, D. (2008) Embracing European Law. *European Union Politics*, *9*(3): 379–402. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116508093490

Toshkov, D. (2010) *Taking Stock: A Review of Quantitative Studies of Transposition and Implementation of EU Law.* Vienna: Institute for European Integration Research (EIF), No. 1.

Trauner, F. (2009) From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality: EU External Governance in South Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *16*(5): 774–790. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983564

Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456

Ugur, M. (2010) Open–Ended Membership Prospect and Commitment Credibility: Explaining the Deadlock in EU–Turkey Accession Negotiations. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4): 967–991. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468–5965.2010.02082.x

Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Matthieß, T., Merz, N., Regel, S. and Werner, A. (2013) *The Manifesto Data Collection: Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR).*

Wooldridge, J. M. (2002) *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press.

Yildirim, C., Baysan, A. and Ediger, V. S. (2013) Europeanization under Membership Uncertainty: The Cases of Environmental and Energy Policy in Turkey. *Uluslararası İlişkiler [Journal of International Relations]*, 39(10): 131–152.

Appendix

Table 3: Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Year	2001.96	3.079	1998	2009	101
Compliance with Acquis (log)	0.439	0.218	–0.111	0.799	101
Formal EU Credibility	0.507	0.254	0	1	101
Informal EU Credibility (Political Signals: GER, FR, UK)	4.928	1.465	2.621	6.414	101
EU Public Support	40.026	5.695	28	52	101
Candidate Country Public Support	55.568	15.113	20.633	99.445	101
Veto Player	0.463	0.085	0.27	0.67	101
Bureaucratic Quality	0.383	0.484	–0.940	1.35	101
GDP per capita (log)	8.487	0.618	7.098	9.666	101
Government Position Candidate Country	14.259	3.748	6.165	19.8	92
Economic Liberalization (Heritage Found.)	60.671	6.99	45.7	77.7	98
Political Liberalization (Polity IV)	8.931	1.061	6	10	101
EU Council Presidency	0.713	0.455	0	1	101
Enlargement Fatigue	0.208	0.408	0	1	101

Table 4: Robustness checks. Determinants of acquis rule transfer to EU candidate countries (1998–2009).

	Model 4: Compliance (log) No lag	Model 5: Compliance (log) 1–year lag	Model 6: Compliance (log) 1–year lag	Model 7: Compliance (log) 1–year lag
Formal EU Credibility	0.512***	0.436***	0.486***	0.604***
	[0.0537]	[0.0858]	[0.0643]	[0.0831]
Informal EU Credibility (Political Signals: GER, FR, UK)	0.0375*	0.0299*	0.0301*	0.0565***
	[0.0149]	[0.0131]	[0.0124]	[0.0140]
EU Public Support	0.00144	0.00290	0.000860	0.00687**
	[0.00251]	[0.00270]	[0.00236]	[0.00219]
EU Council Presidency	0.0248	0.0273	0.0201	0.0303
	[0.0223]	[0.0206]	[0.0200]	[0.0304]
Veto Player	0.151	0.132	0.161	0.310**
	[0.136]	[0.133]	[0.137]	[0.115]
CC Public Support	–0.00169	0.000603	–0.00128	0.000524
	[0.000921]	[0.00105]	[0.00116]	[0.00106]
Enlargement Fatigue	–0.526***	–0.466***	–0.492***	–0.546***
	[0.0889]	[0.100]	[0.0731]	[0.0750]
Enlargement Fatigue* CC Public Support	0.00422***	0.00337*	0.00382***	0.00561***
	[0.00124]	[0.00136]	[0.00105]	[0.00112]
Bureaucratic Quality		0.0616	0.0157	0.0801*
		[0.0354]	[0.0435]	[0.0370]
Economic Liberalization (Heritage Foundation)		0.00380		
		[0.00241]		
Political Liberalization (Polity IV)			0.0416*	
			[0.0180]	
Time	0.0646***	0.0591***	0.0561***	0.0610***
	[0.00792]	[0.00837]	[0.00754]	[0.0104]
Constant	–129.4***	–118.5***	–112.6***	–122.6***
	[15.93]	[16.76]	[15.11]	[20.93]
N	101	82	85	85
R^2	0.752	0.878	0.889	0.778
df	9	11	11	10
chi2 (Wald)	365.2	307.5	357.7	
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Estimation	Prais–Winsten[1]	Prais–Winsten[1]	Prais–Winsten[1]	OLS[2]

Note: standard errors in brackets;
[1]heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors; [2]robust standard errors;
$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

To ensure the robustness of the findings, I ran a series of sensitivity checks on the models (see Table 4, Appendix). First, I took out the one-year lag of the dependent variable (Model 4).[25] Second, I changed the economic control variable using the economic freedom index instead of the GDP per capita (log) measure (Model 5). Third, I controlled for the level of democracy (polity IV) (Model 6). Fourth, I changed the estimation technique and ran a standard OLS regression with robust standard errors (Model 7). These modifications did not substantially affect the coefficient sizes or significance levels of seminal explanatory variables (EU Credibility, Government Positions, Enlargement Fatigue, Enlargement Fatigue*Public Support in CC, Bureaucratic Quality).

[25] Running the estimation *without* a time lag on the dependent variable, key estimates remain significant. One may argue that this could indicate a spurious relationship on the grounds that it should take time for credibility signals to translate into policy developments in candidate countries. The reason for this result, in my view, most probably is related to the fact that European Commission Progress Reports have a 'built-in' time delay themselves. These reports are published at the end of every year which means that the period they refer to is *not* convergent with the standard calendar year. The reference period exceeds the latter, meaning that a report from year *t* also entails assessments related to developments in year *t-1*. Thus, it can be argued that the overall setup makes for a conservative estimation strategy which will rather tend to underestimate rather than overestimate the effect of informal political signals.

RADU MEZA, HANNA ORSOLYA VINCZE AND ANDREEA MOGOŞ*

Targets of Online Hate Speech in Context. A Comparative Digital Social Science Analysis of Comments on Public Facebook Pages from Romania and Hungary

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 26-50.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.503
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [meza@fspac.ro] (College of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania); [vincze.orsolya@fspac.ro] (College of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania); [mogos@fspac.ro] (College of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

Abstract[1]

Online hate speech, especially on social media platforms, is the subject of both policy and political debate in Europe and globally – from the fragmentation of network publics to echo chambers and bubble phenomena, from networked outrage to networked populism, from trolls and bullies to propaganda and non-linear cyberwarfare. Both researchers and Facebook Community Standards see the identification of the potential targets of hateful or antagonistic speech as key to classifying and distinguishing the latter from arguments that represent political viewpoints protected by freedom of expression rights. This research is an exploratory analysis of mentions of targets of hate speech in comments in the context of 106 public Facebook pages in Romanian and Hungarian from January 2015 to December 2017. A total of 1.8 million comments were collected through API interrogation and analyzed using a text-mining niche-dictionaries approach and co-occurrence analysis to reveal connections to events on the media and political agenda and discursive patterns. Findings indicate that in both countries the most prominent targets mentioned are connected to current events on the political and media agenda, that targets are most frequently mentioned in contexts created by politicians and news media, and that discursive patterns in both countries involve the proliferation of similar stereotypes about certain target groups.

Keywords: Social Media; Hate Speech; Romania; Hungary; Digital Social Science; Text Mining.

[1] This work was supported by a grant of Ministry of Research and Innovation, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-TE-2016-0892, within PNCDI III.

1. Introduction

As digital communication becomes a bigger part of our lives and both the real and virtual world become increasingly globalized and diverse, new issues such as studying online hate speech make their way onto the scientific and policy agenda. With new networked digital platforms, collapsed public, semi-public, and private contexts and a wealth of data in public online conversations, digital social science methodologies are increasingly adopting computational approaches.

In the international and European socio-political context, associated with economic migrants, refugees and increasing waves of extremism and xenophobia, hate speech is becoming an increasingly important topic. Where the fundamental human right to freedom of speech and expression collides with the increasing need for tolerance and mutual respect demanded by life in racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse, multicultural societies, hate speech becomes an important preoccupation for researchers, law-makers, civil society and stake-holders in public-mediated communication.

The issue of online hate speech has risen in importance in global and European debate over the past few years. Although European laws regulate hate-speech acts, computer-mediated communication through digital platforms owned by businesses outside users' countries may be subject to different legislation. At the heart of the most heated debate is the social media giant, Facebook, whose platform is used by approximately 2.2 billion people globally. Governments and NGOs look to this company to create mechanisms that properly deal with antagonistic speech, in accordance with national policies. The case of Germany, a country with one of the strictest regulatory frameworks in Europe concerning antagonistic speech, is well known. Against the backdrop of the European refugee crisis, Facebook was pressured to take action and announce an initiative to deal with racist content on its German website.[2] In early 2016, the company reacted to public criticism over its reluctance to deal with hate speech within EU and European national legal frameworks by outsourcing the moderation of racist posts.[3] At the end of 2016, social media activity and social or political effects associated with the former had driven lawmakers in both Europe and the United States to further increase pressure on Facebook to '*clamp down on hate speech, fake news and other misinformation shared online, or face new laws, fines or other legal actions.*'[4]

Romania and Hungary provide interesting cases for comparative research on the issue of online hate speech in Central and Eastern Europe for several reasons. As neighboring countries, the two share history and culture, and throughout the past century the two modern national states have had conflicting territorial claims.

[2] Donahue, P. (2015) Merkel Confronts Facebook's Zuckerberg Over Policing Hate Posts. *Bloomberg.com*, 26 September. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-26/merkel-confronts-facebook-s-zuckerberg-over-policing-hate-posts . Accessed: 06-01-2018.

[3] Auchard, E. (ed.) and ten Wolde, H. (2016) Facebook Outsources Fight Against Racist Posts in Germany. *Reuters*, 15 January. http://www.reuters.com/article/facebook-germany-idUSKCN0UT1GM . Accessed: 06-01-2018.

[4] Scott, M. and Eddy, M. (2016) Facebook Runs Up Against German Hate Speech Laws. *The New York Times*, 28 November. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/technology/facebook-germany-hate-speech-fake-news.html . Accessed: 06-01-2018.

Transylvania, a region of Romania since 1918, is inhabited by a substantial Hungarian minority. The two countries also share the recent common experience of communist regimes and propaganda until 1989, both being part of the bloc behind the Iron Curtain. The two languages are significantly different – Romanian is an Eastern Romance language, while Hungarian is a Finno–Ugric language – and are hence well suited for an exploration of differences in methodological approaches to studying the linguistic aspects of hate speech. Last, recent social and political developments in the two countries – from the use of Facebook in relation to political debate and participation, the use of social media by media institutions, alternative media and activism groups, and the content of media and political agendas – drive research interest in a comparative approach. Comparative research traditionally aims to highlight differences between cases worth comparing, such as the situations in our two countries. However, similarities are also sometimes interesting as they may be indicative of trends and phenomena that transcend the national context or linguistic boundaries. Whether hate speech has such components that extend beyond the obviously context–specific ones is an issue central to our paper and worth investigating further.

2. Approaches to Studying Hate Speech

A 2015 UNESCO study (Gagliardone et al., 2015) outlines the key issues relevant to countering online hate speech:

Definition: There are multiple, differing definitions of hate speech, some mixing concrete threats to the security of individuals and groups with expressions of frustration and anger. Digital media communication platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Google each define their own policies towards admissible content published by their users. However, as recent tensions have shown, these often clash with national legislation, and consensus seems unlikely.

Jurisdiction: Online networked communication platforms have given private spaces of expression a public function and the combined speed and reach of internet communication raise new issues for governments trying to enforce national legislation in the virtual public sphere, often in contexts managed by companies located in other states.

Comprehension: There seems to be a lack of comprehension about the relation between online hate speech phenomena and offline speech and action or, more precisely, violent action. In Gagliardone et al. (2015) the authors highlight the lack of studies that examine the links between hate speech online and other social phenomena.

Intervention: Different contexts for online communication have given birth to different intervention strategies – from user flagging, reporting or ranking to monitoring, editorializing and counter–speaking. However, popular online social–network–type platforms seem reluctant to publish aggregate results that would allow an overview of the phenomenon.

The academic approach towards studying hate speech defines the phenomenon as an act of communication. An overview of the issue in the Romanian national context (Angi and Bădescu, 2014) recommends focusing on: content (what is being

said); emitters (who is communicating); targets (who the message is about); and context (including when the act takes place).

A similar point is made in the context of Hungarian legal case studies by Peter Smuk, who argues that hate speech, understood as speech that incites hatred against persons or social groups, can be defined in terms of 'actors (orators), the contents, targets (victims) and social dangers posed' (Smuk, 2015: 64).

For the purposes of this research, the main focus will be studying the mentions of targets, defined here as vulnerable groups in each national case (as identified by previous scientific literature) and the context – virtual space, temporal coordinates and conversational themes.

2.1 Defining Hate Speech

For the purposes of this research, the definition of hate speech is the most important issue. According to Gagliardone et al. (2015: 19), '[the] ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] is the legal instrument most commonly referred to in debates on hate speech and its regulation, although it does not explicitly use the term.' The problem of defining hate speech has been approached by researchers in various fields. In the case of online hate speech, the issue is particularly linked to jurisdiction – although there seems to be a consensus that it targets disadvantaged social groups in potentially harmful ways. Definitions exist in different national contexts but may differ substantially from each other and those used by social media platforms in their content policies and community guidelines.

Although Facebook has been under criticism since 2015 for not blocking some content, especially by institutions and policy groups in the EU, the company released its Community Standards on April 24, 2018,[5] stating that its policy rationale for blocking hate speech is because it 'creates an environment of intimidation and exclusion and in some cases may promote real-world violence.' Its choice of definitions and approach were discussed as early as June 2017.[6]

Facebook defines hate speech with respect to 'protected characteristics':

> We define hate speech as a direct attack on people based on what we call protected characteristics – race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or disability. We also provide some protections for immigration status. We define attack as violent or dehumanizing speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for exclusion or segregation.[7]

[5] Constine, J. (2018) Facebook Reveals 25 Pages of Takedown Rules for Hate Speech and More. *TechChrunch*, 24 April. Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/24/facebook-content-rules/ . Accessed: 13-10-2018.

[6] Allen, R. (2017) Hard Questions: Who Should Decide What Is Hate Speech in an Online Global Community?. *Facebook Newsroom*, 27 June. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/hard-questions-hate-speech/ . Accessed: 10-06-2018.

[7] *Community Standards*. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech . Accessed: 13-10-2018.

The categories of hate speech are defined under three tiers and a supplementary category:

> Tier 1 attacks, which target a person or group of people who share one of the above-listed characteristics or immigration status [...]
> Tier 2 attacks, which target a person or group of people who share any of the above-listed characteristics [...]
> Tier 3 attacks, which are calls to exclude or segregate a person or group of people based on the above-listed characteristics. We do allow criticism of immigration policies and arguments for restricting those policies.
> Content that describes or negatively targets people with slurs, where slurs are defined as words commonly used as insulting labels for the above-listed characteristics.[8]

The company's policy explicitly mentions that the above criteria apply to both verbal and visual content, and also defines special cases of admissibility such as raising awareness, education, self-referentiality, empowering expressions, humor and social commentary with clearly identifiable intent.

2.2 Studies of Online Hate Speech in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe

Although still relatively scarce, scholarship on online hate speech in Central and Eastern Europe has been emerging at a fast pace in the past decade from both academics and NGOs.

An overview of the issue mentioned above (Angi and Bădescu, 2014) finds that the most frequent targets of hate speech in the Romanian national context are the Roma, Hungarians and Jews, and members of the LGBTQ+ sexual minorities. Similarly, in Hungary, the most frequently targeted groups are reported to be the Roma, Jews, the LGBTQ+ community, and, in recent years, refugees and migrants (Article 19, 2018: 8). In Hungary, the very definitions of hate speech or incitement to hatred have also been the topic of highly politicized debates, an overview of which is beyond the scope of this paper (see: Boromisza-Habashi, 2011; Pál, 2015).

The NGO sector has taken increasing interest over the past two years in analyzing and developing strategies for countering hate speech in the traditional and online media. Reports and academic work emanating from these initiatives are starting to shape the emerging scholarship on the issue (Răileanu et al., 2016; Hann and Róna, 2017).

Existing academic research and the numerous reports from the NGO sector focus mainly on legislation, media self-regulation and intervention strategies, while the actual content of hate speech acts in the online media, especially in social media, are the subject of analysis mostly through case study methodology, potentially leading to hasty generalizations and the overlooking of some targets, contexts or emitters. The issue of hate speech in the Central and Eastern European context has been approached mostly from a regulatory or normative perspective in relation to Western

[8] *Community Standards*. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech . Accessed: 13-10-2018.

Europe and the United States in comparative studies (Heinze, 2013). However, it is only very recently that academic researchers have started investigating the niche topic of online hate speech by making use of computational approaches in the collection and analysis of large datasets of comments from news web sites, blogs, and especially social media (Meza, 2016).

Other recent multi-country initiatives have investigated the issue of online hate speech in the Southeastern European region in countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, following international standards related to raising issues such as the broader socio-historical context of the expression, the identity and intent of the speaker, the content of expressions, and the magnitude of distribution and likelihood of ensuing discrimination.[9]

A report on hate speech against Jewish and Roma groups on social media proposes an analysis of types of antisemitism using the following dominant categories: religion, racism, conspiracy, economy, anti-Israeli, demonizing.[10] For the analysis of the stereotypes associated with the Roma community, the authors appeal to different categories such as: inferior race, criminals, uneducated/uncivilized, demographic threat, cultural threat, social welfare recipients, prejudicial to the image of Romania. In Hungary, sociological research into antisemitic attitudes, although not directly involving an investigation of online discourses, also points to the importance of the online environment in the rise of antisemitism after 2010, as this appears to enable the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation in an age of post-truth (Hann and Róna, 2017: 38).

3. Networked Agendas – The media, politicians, and the networked public

Over the last 50 years agenda setting has evolved from an initial focus on media effects on the public's perception of the most important issues to a more complex, hierarchical approach to understanding the effects of communication.

News media transmit the salience of relationships between sets of objects and attributes to the public. These sets of relationships between elements of the media and public agendas are the third level of agenda-setting (Guo, 2014). This perspective on the bundling of agenda elements – the third level of agenda-setting – tests an agenda-setting hypothesis that the salience of relationships on the agenda of media networks can be transferred to the public network issue agenda (McCombs et al., 2014).

The Network Agenda Setting Model borrows concepts from the associative network model of memory and asserts that individuals' cognitive representation of

[9] Lani, R. (ed.) (2014) *Hate Speech in Online media in South East Europe*. Tirana: Albanian Media Institute. Available at: http://www.institutemedia.org/Documents/PDF/Hate%20speech%20in%20online%20media%20in%20SEE.pdf . Accessed: 10-06-2018.

[10] 'Elie Wiesel' National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania (2016) *Raport cu Privire la Discursul Instigator la Ură Împotriva Evreilor şi Romilor în Social Media (English: Report on Hate Speech against Jews and Roma in Social Media)*. Report. Bucharest: Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România 'Elie Wiesel'. Available at: http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/files/proiecte/DIU/DIU_social_media_1.pdf . Accessed: 10-10-2018.

objects and attributes may be thought of as a network-like structure, where any particular node will be connected to numerous other nodes. This recent theoretical approach asserts that in order to describe an individual a person generates a network-shaped picture composed of various attributes which are connected to each other in their mind (Guo et al., 2012).

In the context of this research, beyond identifying and quantifying the mentions of targets of hate speech in comments on Facebook posts by news media, political leaders and political parties, an analysis of co-occurrence networks between such mentions, negative qualifiers, and institutions connected to recurrent themes in society may reveal directions for further exploration. Beyond the target groups identified by researchers who previously studied hate speech in the Romanian and Hungarian national contexts, the present research tries to identify mentions of social groups such as refugees, welfare recipients and pensioners who were salient in the media and political agenda in the two countries within the timeframe of the analysis.

4. Terms in Context and Co-occurrence Analysis

Although text mining and natural language processing tools are increasingly being used by social scientists to study digital documents, there is still a considerable gap between the tools available for international languages such as English, French, Spanish, Italian and German and languages which are spoken only in national contexts such as Hungarian or Romanian. Although in past years resources for languages such as Romanian and Hungarian have been increasingly made available, and newer approaches based on machine-learning applied to large enough corpora are ever more language independent, social investigations into online hate speech in the two national contexts have mostly applied traditional qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis.

The exploratory approach presented here is based on researcher-defined niche dictionaries (of targets/vulnerable groups, issues/concepts/institutions and qualifiers defined as semantic families) and descriptive statistics in relation to contextual variables (Facebook page source and category, time frame of the comment thread). Furthermore, the research uses semi-automated coding based on the above-mentioned niche dictionaries (for targets and issues/concepts) to map co-occurrences between the two categories. This approach allows for the identification of contexts where antagonistic speech has the potential to appear. Large-scale research studies such as this require more advanced natural language processing tools (and machine learning techniques) for Hungarian and Romanian that can automatically classify content. It is worth noting that even Facebook relies on the decision-making ability of over 7,000 content moderators to classify and potentially block such content from the platform.

Co-occurrence analysis is used to identify relations between the target groups and social institutions, issue concepts or qualifiers related to stereotypes (based on semantic families). This method combines quantitative content analysis approaches (code/term frequencies) with network analysis (relations based on the co-occurrence of terms/codes in the same context – e.g. in the same comment) (Danowski, 1993). The merits of the method are particularly notable when analyzing content produced in computer-mediated communication, especially in the case of short text

messages/documents such as user comments where the significance of two terms co-occurring in the same text is greater. Furthermore, by applying network analysis methods groups of well-connected terms or concepts may be detected using algorithms for community structure detection in graphs (Clauset et al., 2004). As edges are defined based on the co-occurrence of a relationship (two terms or coded concepts appear in the same message), edges connecting separate (or loosely connected) parts of the graph will have high betweenness scores (they will frequently be found on the shortest path connecting those parts of the graph). A hierarchy of well-connected modules can be established by identifying edges with high betweenness scores, eliminating them, and then reiterating multiple times. As a result, communities will emerge as dense, well-connected groups of nodes, or in this case terms or concepts coded from the comments corpus. This approach may reveal latent connections.

5. Method

As Facebook's definition focuses on the 'protected characteristics' that define several categories of target groups, it becomes important to identify and analyze the incidence of mentions of categories qualified as vulnerable groups by the platform's policy guidelines and previous research in the Romanian and Hungarian national context.

The goal of the research is to identify the vulnerable groups that are most frequently mentioned in Facebook comments to posts on public pages owned by politicians, political groups and media in the two countries.

This exploratory research is guided by the following research questions:

RQ1: Which are the most frequently mentioned targets (vulnerable groups)?

RQ2: What are the contexts (community, temporal, discursive) in which mentions of targets (vulnerable groups) appear frequently?

RQ3: How do Romanian and Hungarian Facebook Pages compare in terms of frequency of mentions of targets (vulnerable groups) and contexts for such mentions?

5.1 Data Collection and Sampling

Some of the most recent research into the issue of online hate speech has improved on previous approaches in terms of adopting sampling strategies that are a better fit for social media and defining a more nuanced conceptual framework by distinguishing between three categories of antagonistic speech: dangerous speech, hate speech, and offensive speech (Gagliardone et al., 2016). The cited study uses purposeful sampling as a preliminary step to identifying patterns in online hate speech. This research takes a similarly purposeful sampling approach in this exploratory comparative study with respect to the two cultural, linguistic, social and political contexts – Romania and Hungary.

This analysis is based on a total of 106 public Facebook Pages (55 from Romania and 51 from Hungary). The sample of pages was selected purposefully to include the most prominent, popular and relevant news media, online communities, political parties and political leaders. For both countries, the sample includes all the pages of the parliamentary parties and their leaders, the news media with the largest

Facebook audience, the largest online communities focused on entertainment, as well as alternative media pages and political activist communities. The Romanian sample also includes two entries for the most prominent satirical online news outlets. Audience sizes were evaluated using socialbakers.com and facebrands.ro, services which retrieve and update Facebook page audience data.

Data was gathered through Facebook Open Graph API (Application Programming Interface) interrogation using the Facepager tool (Keyling and Jünger, 2013). The time frame for the analysis was three years – from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2017. Table 1 lists the categories of pages and the number included in the sample for each language. The pages of The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania and its leader Hunor Kelemen were included in the Romanian sample, but due to the fact that both the page messages and comment messages are in both Romanian and Hungarian, it was only analyzed in the preliminary steps of the analysis.

Table 1. Sample Facebook Page categories

Romanian sample		Hungarian sample	
News media	11 pages	News media	12 pages
Online Community	14 pages	Online Community	16 pages
Political Party	7 pages	Political Party	9 pages
Political Leaders	19 pages	Political leaders	14 pages
Satire	2 pages		
The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	2 pages		
Total	55 pages	Total	51 pages

A total of 1,880,750 comments were collected from 144,396 public posts. The distribution of comments in the two languages is 1,031,866 comments from Romanian pages and 848,884 comments from Hungarian pages.

The 1.88 million comments were filtered using two niche dictionaries which contained multiple forms of the terms used to refer to the targets of hate speech identified as vulnerable groups by the literature on the subject in the two national contexts. As comments are moderated by Facebook content reviewers, some comments that did not abide by the platforms' community standards had been deleted and, as a result, were impossible to collect. However, it is only in the past year and a half that the company has made a considerable effort to increase the number of content reviewers thus the review process will most likely be triggered by user reporting and focus more on new comment threads. Even though the latency of the research topic may be high (with no exact way of measuring it), detecting mentions of target groups may still be relevant when identifying threads that served as a context for hate speech, even if most of the comments which contained hate speech have been removed.

Table 2. Target groups used as filters in two niche dictionaries

Roma/Gipsy	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Hungarian/Romanian	Romanian dictionary/Hungarian dictionary
Transylvanian	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Szekler	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Jewish	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Muslim	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Religious	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Atheists	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
LGBT	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Refugee/migrants	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Poor/welfare recipients	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Pensioners	Hungarian and Romanian dictionary
Hungarians outside borders	Hungarian dictionary

Table 2 lists the groups that were considered. Most groups were included in both dictionaries. Hungarians were included only in the Romanian dictionary, whereas Romanians were included only in the Hungarian dictionary. Terms and phrases referring to '*Hungarians outside borders'* were included only in the Hungarian language dictionary. In all cases, the stems for the most common terms (including explicitly offensive terms) referring to each target group were included in each dictionary.

The categories sex and gender, as featured in definitions of protected characteristics for potential targets of hate speech, were not included due to linguistic characteristics that make it difficult to detect such targets through keyword filtering. For example, in Romanian, the use of grammatical gender allows reference to women without explicitly using any noun from the semantic family of the word 'woman'. However, as explained in a previous section, groups such as welfare recipients, pensioners and refugees/migrants were included due to their prominence in the media and political discourse in the time frame of the analysis, even though they are not on Facebook's list of protected groups.

The results of the filtering process revealed that 25,912 (2.51 per cent) of the total comments for Romania contained terms referencing target groups and 26,026 (3.06 per cent) of total comments in Hungary contained terms referencing target groups.

Previous research on hate speech in online comments on Facebook in the Romanian national context (Meza, 2016) shows that although mentions of target groups are usually found in around two per cent of comments, in less than half of these comments (below one per cent) these terms co–occur with negative qualifiers, obscenities, etcetera.

Primary descriptive statistics were generated using Tableau software. Co–occurrence networks were generated using KH Coder (Higuchi, 2001) to show the conversational context for mentions of the target groups in the comments posted on Facebook. The two niche dictionaries used for filtering comments based on references to target groups were supplemented with additional definitions for concepts

based on semantic families (containing semantically related terms referring to social institutions, frequently featured on the media and public agendas, and qualifiers often employed in group stereotypes). Codes based on semantic families were defined for concepts such as: *Church, religious holidays, religion, money, corporations, business, government, education, political parties, EU, sex and sexuality, alcohol, theft, stupidity, laziness, violence*. The coded concepts allow the exploration of the dataset for associations with key institutions/organizations in society and for stereotypical representations of social groups.

This approach aims to explore connections between target groups and the media and political agendas in Facebook user comments under the Networked Agenda Setting framework, as well as the prevalence of negative stereotypes in a comparative perspective.

6. Findings

The analysis of mentions of target groups in the Romanian language sample (Figure 1) reveals that the most frequently mentioned category is welfare recipients, followed by the Roma and Hungarian groups. The largest number of mentions was detected in comments posted on the pages of political leaders and news media outlets. There are also significant mentions of other categories such as Muslims, refugees/migrants, pensioners and sexual minorities.

Comments containing references to target groups (RO)

	Facebook Page Categories				
Targets (RO)	News Media	Online Communities	Political Parties	Politicians	Satire
Null	98,03%	98,58%	98,15%	95,93%	97,56%
welfare/poor	0,50%	0,26%	0,53%	0,85%	0,36%
Roma/Gipsy	0,50%	0,16%	0,14%	0,38%	0,50%
Hungarian	0,19%	0,18%	0,30%	0,64%	0,46%
Muslim	0,24%	0,18%	0,14%	0,50%	0,17%
refugees/migrants	0,15%	0,07%	0,16%	0,48%	0,09%
LGBT	0,11%	0,10%	0,09%	0,43%	0,21%
pensioners	0,13%	0,03%	0,35%	0,38%	0,30%
religious	0,05%	0,20%	0,02%	0,12%	0,07%
Jew	0,05%	0,12%	0,04%	0,13%	0,05%
Transylvanian	0,02%	0,05%	0,05%	0,06%	0,13%
atheists	0,01%	0,05%	0,01%	0,07%	0,03%
Szekler	0,02%	0,01%	0,02%	0,04%	0,06%

Figure 1. Mentions of target groups in comments in Romanian

In the Hungarian sample (Figure 2), mentions of refugees and migrants are by far the most frequent, followed, as in the Romanian sample, by mentions of the Roma. Mentions of Muslims, pensioners and Jews are also significant.

Comments containing references to target groups (HU)

	Facebook Page Categories			
Targets (HU)	News Media	Online Communities	Political Parties	Politicians
Null	97,39%	99,23%	95,48%	95,74%
refugees/migrants	1,29%	0,19%	2,58%	2,05%
Roma/Gipsy	0,34%	0,11%	0,44%	0,61%
Muslim	0,33%	0,05%	0,42%	0,46%
pensioners	0,13%	0,04%	0,43%	0,39%
Jew	0,17%	0,06%	0,24%	0,26%
LGBT	0,19%	0,20%	0,12%	0,17%
welfare/poor	0,08%	0,03%	0,17%	0,15%
Szekler	0,05%	0,06%	0,05%	0,07%
Transylvanian	0,03%	0,02%	0,06%	0,07%
atheists	0,01%	0,01%	0,01%	0,02%
Romanian	0,00%	0,00%	0,01%	0,01%
religious	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%	0,00%
Hungarian outside borders	0,00%		0,00%	

Figure 2. Mentions of target groups in comments in Hungarian

In both cases, the largest number of mentions of target groups appears in the context of political leaders' Facebook pages, reflecting a connection between the public communication of politicians and user conversations revolving around topics that include groups often targeted by antagonistic speech. However, the second largest number of conversations mentioning these groups are found on the pages of Romanian news outlets, while in the Hungarian case the second most numerous mentions of target groups are found on the pages of political parties (closely following the number of mentions on politicians' pages) to provide a context for such conversations, while news media outlets generate fewer mentions.

Another interesting result is the difference in the incidence of mentions of Hungarians in the Romanian sample (the third most frequently mentioned target group) and the incidence of mentions of Romanians in the Hungarian sample (11th position). References to Transylvanians or *Hungarians outside borders* are also not amongst the most prominent terms.

Analysis of mentions by time distribution reveals that in the Romanian sample mentions of welfare recipients peaked in the fourth quarter of 2016. This coincides with the Romanian Parliamentary elections in which the Social Democrat Party gained 45 per cent of the seats after a campaign based on a program that promised prosperity and higher pay for several social groups, including state employees and pensioners. Some of the oppositional discourse attributed the result of the elections to the mobilization of pensioners and welfare recipients from the poorer regions of the countries. Figure 3 also shows peaks for the mention of refugees in the third quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016, coinciding with the peak of the European refugee crisis and its aftermath. Mentions of other prominent target groups in the

corpus (Roma, Hungarians) show little fluctuation over the time frame analyzed. References to Muslims coincide with the peaks for refugees/migrants, but also peak during the fourth quarter of 2016 – which may be explained by the Social Democrats' initial controversial proposal of Sevil Shhaideh (a Muslim) for Prime Minister of Romania in December 2016. Many of the mentions of target groups peak in the last part of 2016, which may be due to electoral campaigning.



Figure 3. Mentions of target groups in the Romanian sample by time frame quarter

The time distribution of mentions of target groups in the Hungarian corpus in Figure 4 shows references to refugees and migrants peaking in the third quarter of 2015 (the height of the European refugee crisis) and in the third quarter of 2016, when European countries were dealing with a second wave of refugees. No significant fluctuations for other target groups appear over time. It is worth noting, however, that similarly to the Romanian case, the peaks for mentions of Muslims match the peaks for the mentions of refugees/migrants. Whereas in the Romanian corpus mentions of refugees/migrants decrease significantly by the beginning of 2017 to well below those for other target groups, in the case of the Hungarian corpus these mentions remain the most frequent by far even at the end of the period of analysis (Quarter 4 of 2017), indicating that topics related to refugees and migrants were still on the news media and political agenda.



Figure 4. Mentions of target groups in the Hungarian sample by time frame quarter

Delving further into the context of mentions of target groups, co-occurrence analysis was used to trace the connections between targets of hate speech and other concepts. Communities were identified as modular, better connected components of the graph created by defining edges between concepts (targets, institutions, negative qualifiers, current themes as defined by codes based on semantic families) and using semi-automated coding in KH Coder. These communities may be interpreted as discursive patterns that define connections between targets of hate speech and the concepts

represented thereby. Jaccard distance/similarity coefficients lower than 0.1 indicate low significance for the edges represented as dotted lines.



Figure 5. Co-occurrence network of terms referring to targets, negative qualifiers, institutions and current themes in the Romanian corpus

In the Romanian corpus, codes in the niche dictionaries that were used cover approximately 60 per cent of all comments. The three most frequently mentioned targets of hate speech are connected to political themes, in the context of elections, public spending, and corruption and theft. Hungarians are most likely to be mentioned in the context of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania's participation in government or the ruling party coalition. It is worth investigating further whether mentions of *Roma* target the ethnic minority group or other groups by association. Unsurprisingly, mentions of *LGBT* minorities are linked to the concept of sexuality and sexually charged terms, whereas refugees seem to be mentioned mostly in the context of the EU. Religious themes and religious minority targets are connected, but have few and weak connections with other targets or concepts. Connections between mentions of *the Church* and *money* or *education*, *Muslims* and *refugees*, and the *faithful*, *priests* and *LGBT* are also worth investigating further.



Figure 6. Co-occurrence network of terms referring to targets, negative qualifiers, institutions and current themes in the Hungarian corpus

In the case of the Hungarian corpus, codes in the niche dictionaries that were used cover approximately 48 per cent of all comments. The communities that were detected indicate prominent discursive patterns connecting the issue of refugees and migrants with the EU, government and political party. It is worth noting that negative qualifiers associated with stupidity often co-occur in these contexts, which may mean that offensive expressions were being used towards the target groups or were associated with the activity of the EU, the government or political parties in Hungary. Mentions of *alcohol* in this subgraph are perhaps worth investigating further to check for potential coding errors. The community of religious institutions and religion-related positioning is connected to *violence*, but references to *Muslims* appear more closely linked to conversations including mentions of refugees. It is worth noting that mentions of *violence* appear in contexts related to *refugees*, *Muslims*, *religious holidays*, *government* and *stupidity*. These may be connected to the coverage and aftermath of the Cologne 2015/2016 New Year's Eve attacks but require further investigation. The second most often mentioned of the target groups, the *Roma*, are connected with expressions of sexuality (possibly explicit insults) and the concept of theft, mirroring a negative stereotype about the target group. Mentions of Romanians also appear in the same cluster as the Roma group. Most frequently, the co-occurrence of the two targets – Romanians and Roma – indicate members of the Roma community who live or travel abroad and are associated with theft – commonly referred to during the last decades as Romanian Gypsies by both international media and Romanian citizens. Mentions of LGBT, although relatively frequent, do not co-

occur frequently with other targets or concepts defined in the niche dictionaries for this analysis.

To summarize the findings, frequent targets of hate speech vary in importance in the two national contexts and their prominence is most likely influenced by the news media and political agenda – as pointed out by the analysis of the temporal contexts. However, the Roma group is the second most frequently mentioned in both corpora, and is discursively connected with the concept of theft, which may be interpreted as a prominent negative stereotype in both national/linguistic cultures. For the Hungarian pages, Transylvanians, Szeklers and Hungarians living abroad are categories that have some prominence, but little connection to the main discursive areas. However, for the Romanian pages, Hungarians are connected to the most prominent discursive area, probably due to the activity of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, but also likely due to some incidences of nationalist discourse directed at the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. The issue of refugees and migration is in both cases connected to the EU, but in the case of the Hungarian corpus it appears in central discursive patterns, whereas in the Romanian corpus it is marginal.

7. Conclusion

The analysis of targets of hate speech using computational or digital social science approaches and a large corpora of texts collected from social media platforms requires flexible, innovative research approaches, especially for languages such as Hungarian and Romanian, in the context of which natural language processing tools and resources adapted for the specific needs of social science researchers are still scarce. However, by using a niche dictionary text-mining approach coupled with co-occurrence network analysis this research has generated relevant insights into discourses involving groups which are frequently targeted by hate speech in the Romanian and Hungarian national contexts. Furthermore, placing this approach in the broader emerging theoretical framework of Network Agenda Setting allows for interpretations that relate discursive patterns in user comments with the media and political agendas as communicated by news outlets, politicians and political groups.

The comparative overview of the findings revealed by the analysis of the two corpora using the same methodology indicates connections between the media and political agendas and discursive patterns as manifested in Facebook comments. Furthermore, it indicates connections between specific targets and concepts that highlight broader issues or negative qualifiers that indicate common stereotypes. This exploratory research opens up questions for further research that may involve improved semi-automated coding, qualitative analysis of significant cases and methodological developments driven by the future development of machine learning for automated text classification and entity recognition based on linguistic resources for the two languages. Further improvement of sampling strategies and concept-definition through niche dictionaries should be considered in future work. However, similar such work by researchers may be hindered by Facebook's increasing restrictions on accessing content (such as comments) posted in public contexts through its API.

References

Angi, D. and Bădescu, G. (2014) *Discursul Instigator la Ură în România ((English: Hate speech in Romania), Fundaţia pentru Dezvoltarea Societăţii Civile (English: Foundation for the Development of Civil Society),* Research report. Available at: http://www.fdsc.ro/library/files/studiul_diu_integral.pdf . Accessed: 06–01–2018

Boromisza–Habashi, D. (2011) Dismantling the Antiracist 'Hate Speech' Agenda in Hungary: An Ethno–Rhetorical Analysis. *Text and Talk*, 31(1): 1–19. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/text.2011.001

Clauset, A., Newman, M. E. and Moore, C. (2004) Finding Community Structure in Very Large Networks. *Physical Review E*, 70(6): 66111. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.70.066111

Danowski, J. A. (1993) Network Analysis of Message Content. *Progress in Communication Sciences*, 12, 198–221.

Gagliardone, I., Pohjonen, M., Zerai, A., Aynekulu, G., Stremlau, N., Bekalu, M. A., Moges, M. A. and Taflan, P. (2016) *Mechachal: Online Debates and Elections in Ethiopia.* Final Report: From Hate Speech to Engagement in Social Media. University of Oxford, Oxford. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2831369

Gagliardone, I., Gal, D., Alves, T. and Martinez, G. (2015) *Countering Online Hate Speech.* Paris: UNESCO Publishing.

Guo, L. (2014) Toward the Third Level of Agenda–Setting Theory: A Network Agenda Setting Model. In: Johnson, T. (ed.) *Agenda Setting in a 2.0 World: New Agendas in Communication.* New York, NY: Routledge. 12–133. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203735879

Hann, E., & Róna, D. (2017). Antiszemita előítéletesség a mai magyar társadalomban. Research report. Budapest: Tett és Védelem Alapítvány, Medián. Available at: http://tev.hu/wp–content/uploads/2017/04/TEV_Antiszemitizmus–tanulmany_2016.pdf. Accessed: 06–01–2018.

Heinze, E. (2013) Hate Speech and the Normative Foundations of Regulation. *International Journal of Law in Context*, 9(4): 590–617.

Higuchi, K. (2001) *Kh Coder: A Free Software for Quantitative Content Analysis or Text Mining.* Available at: http://khc.sourceforge.net/en . Accessed: 06–01–2018.

Keyling, T. and Jünger, J. (2013) *Facepager: An Application for Generic Data Retrieval Through APIs.* Source code Available at: https://github.com/strohne/Facepager . Accessed: 06–01–2018.

McCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L. and Weaver, D. H. (2014) New Directions in Agenda–Setting Theory and Research. *Mass Communication and Society*, 17(6): 781–802. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2014.964871

Lani, R. (ed.) (2014) *Hate Speech in Online media in South East Europe.* Tirana: Albanian Media Institute. Available at: http://www.institutemedia.org/Documents/PDF/Hate%20speech%20in%20online%20media%20in%20SEE.pdf . Accessed: 10–06–2018.

Meza, R. (2016) Hate Speech in the Romanian Online Media. *Journal of Media Research*, 9(3): 55–77.

Pál, G. (2015) A vitathatóság keretei: A gyűlöletbeszéd fogalmának jelentésmezői és a kérdéskör metaforizációja a magyar politikai diskurzusban (English: Frames of Disputeability: Fields of Meaning of Hate Talk and Metaphorization of Issues in Hungarian Political Discourse). *Studies in Political Science No.2*. Budapest: MTA–TK–PTI.
Available at: https://politologia.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/SPS_PG2.pdf Accessed: 06–01–2018.

Smuk, P. (2015) Combating Nationalist Hate Speech by Legal Means – European Standards and Selected Case Studies from Hungary. In: Cordell, K. and Jajecznik, K. (eds.) *The Transformation of Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe*. Warsaw: University of Warsaw. 63–77.

Non academic sources:

Allen, R. (2017) Hard Questions: Who Should Decide What Is Hate Speech in an Online Global Community?. *Facebook Newsroom*, 27 June. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/hard–questions–hate–speech/. Accessed: 10–06–2018.

Auchard, E. (ed.) and ten Wolde, H. (2016) Facebook Outsources Fight Against Racist Posts in Germany. *Reuters*, 15 January. http://www.reuters.com/article/facebook–germany–idUSKCN0UT1GM. Accessed: 06–01–2018.

Community Standards. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech Accessed: 13–10–2018.

Constine, J. (2018) Facebook Reveals 25 Pages of Takedown Rules for Hate Speech and More. *TechChrunch*, 24 April. Available at: https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/24/facebook–content–rules/ Accessed: 13–10–2018.

Donahue, P. (2015) Merkel Confronts Facebook's Zuckerberg Over Policing Hate Posts. *Bloomberg.com*, 26 September. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–09–26/merkel–confronts–facebook–s–zuckerberg–over–policing–hate–posts . Accessed: 06–01–2018.

'Elie Wiesel' National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania (2016) *Raport cu Privire la Discursul Instigator la Ură Împotriva Evreilor şi Romilor în Social Media (English: Report on Hate Speech against Jews and Roma in Social Media)*. Report. Bucharest: Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România 'Elie Wiesel'. Available at: http://www.inshr-ew.ro/ro/files/proiecte/DIU/DIU_social_media_1.pdf . Accessed: 10-10-2018.

Hungary: Responding to 'Hate Speech' Country Report. London: Article 19, 2018. Available at https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Hungary-WEB.pdf. Accessed: 06-01-2018.

Răileanu, R., Tabă, O., Szelmenczi, A., Codreanu, I., Diaconescu, L. and Martin, R. (2016) *Raport Anual cu Privire la Discursul Instigator la Ură 2014 – 2015 (English: Annual Report on Hate Speech 2014-2015)*. Bucharest: Activewatch. http://activewatch.ro/Assets/Upload/files/Raport%20anual%20cu%20privire%20la%20discursul%20instigator%20la%20ura%202014%20-%202015(1).pdf . Accessed: 06-01-2018.

Scott, M. and Eddy, M. (2016) Facebook Runs Up Against German Hate Speech Laws. *The New York Times*, 28 November. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/technology/facebook-germany-hate-speech-fake-news.html . Accessed: 06-01-2018.

Appendix

Table 3. Sample of Romanian Facebook Pages.

Sample of Romanian Facebook Pages		
Pages	*Sources groups*	*Number of comments containing mentions of targets*
StirileProTV	*News Media*	*3214*
Romania TV	*News Media*	*203*
Realitatea.NET	*News Media*	*338*
Observator	*News Media*	*156*
Libertatea.ro	*News Media*	*196*
HotNews.ro	*News Media*	*452*
Gandul	*News Media*	*408*
Digi24	*News Media*	*861*
Cancan.ro	*News Media*	*111*
B1.ro	*News Media*	*681*
Adevărul	*News Media*	*552*
Trezirea la Realitate	*Online Communities / Other*	*457*
Sfantul Nectarie	*Online Communities / Other*	*105*
Romania, tara ta	*Online Communities / Other*	*9*
Romania mea	*Online Communities / Other*	*275*
Piata Universitatii	*Online Communities / Other*	*4*
Părintele Arsenie Boca	*Online Communities / Other*	*580*
Opriţi finanţarea cultelor religioase	*Online Communities / Other*	*640*
Made in Romania	*Online Communities / Other*	*95*
Junimea	*Online Communities / Other*	*177*
Historia	*Online Communities / Other*	*399*
Frumusetile Romaniei	*Online Communities / Other*	*141*
Dracusorul Vesel	*Online Communities / Other*	*61*
BRomania	*Online Communities / Other*	*136*
Anonymous Romania	*Online Communities*	*116*

Sample of Romanian Facebook Pages		
Pages	*Sources groups*	*Number of comments containing mentions of targets*
	/ Other	
Uniunea Salvaţi România – USR	*Political Parties*	*208*
Platforma România 100	*Political Parties*	*15*
Partidul Social Democrat	*Political Parties*	*185*
Partidul Naţional Liberal	*Political Parties*	*521*
Partidul Mişcarea Populară	*Political Parties*	*155*
ALDE – Partidul Alianta Liberalilor si Democratilor	*Political Parties*	*83*
Victor Ponta	*Politicians*	*1319*
Remus Cernea	*Politicians*	*1984*
Raluca Turcan	*Politicians*	*354*
Ninel PEIA	*Politicians*	*350*
Monica Luisa Macovei	*Politicians*	*425*
Mircea Geoana	*Politicians*	*299*
Liviu Dragnea	*Politicians*	*579*
Klaus Iohannis	*Politicians*	*1166*
Gabriela Firea	*Politicians*	*119*
Elena Udrea	*Politicians*	*262*
Daniel Ghita	*Politicians*	*586*
Dacian Cioloş	*Politicians*	*604*
Cristian Ghinea	*Politicians*	*304*
Cosette Chichirău	*Politicians*	*50*
Calin Popescu Tariceanu	*Politicians*	*462*
Bogdan Diaconu	*Politicians*	*3024*
Alina Gorghiu	*Politicians*	*680*
Adrian Nastase	*Politicians*	*310*
Times New Roman	*Satire*	*768*
kmkz.ro	*Satire*	*577*
Kelemen Hunor	*Kelemen Hunor & RMDSZ*	*475*
RMDSZ	*Kelemen Hunor & RMDSZ*	*519*

Table 4. Sample of Hungarian Facebook Pages.

Sample of Hungarian Facebook Pages		
Pages	*Sources groups*	*Number of comments containing mentions of targets*
24.hu	*News Media*	*483*
444	*News Media*	*1035*
777	*News Media*	*90*
Alfahír Hírportál	*News Media*	*1157*
Blikk	*News Media*	*466*
Borsonline – Bors Szórakoztató Napilap	*News Media*	*193*
HVG	*News Media*	*921*
Index.hu	*News Media*	*1186*
Magyar Hírlap	*News Media*	*528*
ORIGO	*News Media*	*202*
Rádió 1	*News Media*	*61*
TV2	*News Media*	*54*
5perc.es	*Online Communities*	*5*
A magyar lányok a legszebbek	*Online Communities*	*13*
Ablak – Zsiráf	*Online Communities*	*163*
Gondoltad volna?	*Online Communities*	*470*
I ♥ ALVÁS	*Online Communities*	*23*
Közös Ország Mozgalom	*Online Communities*	*35*
Kvíz Játékok	*Online Communities*	*9*
Love.hu	*Online Communities*	*10*
Mi folyik itt?	*Online Communities*	*7*
Szeretlek Magyarország	*Online Communities*	*40*
Tibi atya	*Online Communities*	*451*
Tiltakozás a sok értelmetlen tüntetés ellen	*Online Communities*	*222*
TrollFoci	*Online Communities*	*452*
Tudtad-e?	*Online Communities*	*403*
Ütős	*Online Communities*	*22*
Viszlát, kétharmad	*Online Communities*	*13*
Demokratikus Koalíció	*Political Parties*	*311*
Együtt	*Political Parties*	*1173*
Fidesz	*Political Parties*	*3532*
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	*Political Parties*	*1960*
KDNP és Frakciója	*Political Parties*	*98*
LMP – Lehet Más a Politika	*Political Parties*	*330*
Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya	*Political Parties*	*799*

Sample of Hungarian Facebook Pages		
Pages	*Sources groups*	*Number of comments containing mentions of targets*
Párt		
MSZP	*Political Parties*	*565*
Párbeszéd Magyarországért	*Political Parties*	*56*
Fodor Gábor	*Politicians*	*618*
Gyurcsány Ferenc	*Politicians*	*870*
Hadházy Ákos	*Politicians*	*527*
Juhász Péter	*Politicians*	*805*
Karácsony Gergely	*Politicians*	*511*
Molnár Gyula	*Politicians*	*104*
Niedermüller Péter	*Politicians*	*427*
Orbán Viktor	*Politicians*	*454*
Semjén Zsolt	*Politicians*	*3*
Szabó Tímea	*Politicians*	*473*
Szél Bernadett	*Politicians*	*521*
Toroczkai László	*Politicians*	*2526*
Volner János	*Politicians*	*349*
Vona Gábor	*Politicians*	*2232*

Comments containing references to target groups (RO)

Facebook Page Categories	Page	Null	welfare/poor	Roma/Gipsy	Hungarian	Muslim	refugees/migrants	LGBT	pensioners	religious	Jew	Transylvanian	atheists	Szekler
		Targets (RO)												
News Media	Adevărul	96,61%	0,69%	0,42%	0,51%	0,61%	0,32%	0,33%	0,18%	0,05%	0,15%	0,04%	0,04%	0,07%
	B1.ro	97,52%	0,43%	0,46%	0,44%	0,45%	0,19%	0,12%	0,20%	0,06%	0,05%	0,04%	0,02%	0,02%
	Cancan.ro	98,86%	0,29%	0,67%		0,02%	0,02%	0,07%	0,03%	0,03%	0,01%			
	Digi24	96,59%	0,64%	0,34%	0,47%	0,61%	0,66%	0,13%	0,29%	0,06%	0,14%	0,06%	0,00%	0,02%
	Gandul	96,88%	0,60%	0,63%	0,50%	0,36%	0,37%	0,18%	0,20%	0,06%	0,11%	0,02%		0,09%
	HotNews.ro	97,63%	0,69%	0,23%	0,30%	0,23%	0,20%	0,22%	0,28%	0,08%	0,07%	0,04%		0,03%
	Libertatea.ro	98,51%	0,30%	0,61%	0,08%	0,05%	0,02%	0,11%	0,23%	0,04%	0,07%			
	Observator	98,59%	0,38%	0,34%	0,05%	0,25%	0,09%	0,15%	0,04%	0,08%	0,01%			0,02%
	Realitatea.NET	97,76%	0,53%	0,46%	0,26%	0,42%	0,11%	0,11%	0,16%	0,06%	0,07%	0,05%	0,01%	
	Romania TV	97,46%	0,49%	1,44%	0,08%	0,06%	0,01%	0,19%	0,15%	0,08%	0,01%	0,03%		0,01%
	StirileProTV	98,44%	0,48%	0,51%	0,09%	0,15%	0,08%	0,08%	0,09%	0,04%	0,02%	0,02%	0,00%	0,01%
Online Communities	Anonymous Romania	97,48%	0,33%	0,35%	0,28%	0,28%	0,15%	0,24%	0,09%	0,07%	0,65%		0,09%	
	BRomania	99,43%	0,05%	0,06%	0,07%	0,01%	0,02%	0,19%	0,01%	0,03%	0,02%	0,09%		0,01%
	Dracusorul Vesel	99,75%	0,08%	0,06%	0,03%	0,00%	0,02%	0,03%	0,02%	0,01%		0,01%		
	Frumusetile Romaniei	99,35%	0,28%	0,06%	0,04%	0,01%	0,01%		0,08%	0,08%		0,08%		0,00%
	Historia	95,60%	0,47%	0,64%	1,23%	0,33%	0,09%	0,09%	0,04%	0,09%	1,23%	0,09%	0,01%	0,08%
	Junimea	99,53%	0,01%	0,10%	0,17%	0,00%	0,01%	0,03%	0,00%	0,01%	0,02%	0,12%	0,01%	0,00%
	Made in Romania	99,23%	0,32%	0,10%	0,06%	0,07%	0,09%	0,01%	0,05%	0,03%	0,02%	0,02%		
	Opriți finanțarea cultelor ..	95,36%	1,17%	0,26%	0,09%	0,62%	0,06%	0,46%	0,09%	1,27%	0,12%	0,01%	0,47%	0,01%
	Părintele Arsenie Boca	95,66%	0,76%	0,18%	0,17%	1,03%	0,19%	0,35%	0,07%	1,06%	0,23%	0,04%	0,25%	
	Piata Universitatii	96,99%	2,26%		0,75%									
	Romania mea	98,73%	0,30%	0,36%	0,10%	0,23%	0,03%	0,02%	0,04%	0,10%	0,05%	0,02%	0,01%	0,01%
	Romania, tara ta	98,06%		1,08%	0,22%		0,43%			0,22%				
	Sfantul Nectarie	99,69%	0,09%	0,02%		0,00%	0,01%	0,01%	0,01%	0,15%	0,01%		0,01%	
	Trezirea la Realitate	93,76%	0,52%	0,56%	1,62%	0,87%	1,15%	0,48%	0,07%	0,11%	0,67%	0,03%	0,04%	0,12%
Political Parties	ALDE - Partidul Alianta Lib..	99,02%	0,26%	0,11%	0,22%		0,04%	0,01%	0,22%	0,02%		0,05%	0,01%	0,04%
	Partidul Mișcarea Populară	98,47%	0,34%	0,19%	0,27%	0,26%	0,23%	0,03%	0,17%		0,01%	0,03%	0,01%	0,01%
	Partidul Național Liberal	97,91%	0,73%	0,18%	0,23%	0,16%	0,23%	0,04%	0,36%	0,03%	0,06%	0,06%	0,01%	
	Partidul Social Democrat	97,65%	0,56%	0,04%	0,51%	0,17%	0,06%		0,83%	0,03%	0,08%	0,01%		0,08%
	Platforma România 100	98,54%	0,39%		0,10%	0,10%	0,19%	0,19%	0,29%			0,10%	0,10%	
	Uniunea Salvați România -..	98,06%	0,44%	0,12%	0,45%	0,07%	0,12%	0,35%	0,25%	0,02%	0,03%	0,06%	0,01%	0,02%
Politicians	Adrian Nastase	98,14%	0,58%	0,17%	0,36%	0,17%	0,20%	0,03%	0,14%	0,05%	0,05%	0,04%	0,02%	0,04%
	Alina Gorghiu	97,88%	0,86%	0,17%	0,21%	0,09%	0,12%	0,05%	0,47%	0,04%	0,04%	0,05%	0,01%	0,02%
	Bogdan Diaconu	88,07%	0,72%	2,22%	4,09%	1,75%	1,59%	0,64%	0,17%	0,05%	0,41%	0,05%	0,01%	0,22%
	Calin Popescu Tariceanu	97,57%	0,77%	0,18%	0,36%	0,12%	0,18%	0,07%	0,52%	0,04%	0,12%	0,03%	0,01%	0,02%
	Cosette Chichirău	98,88%	0,61%	0,07%	0,11%		0,02%	0,04%	0,13%		0,07%		0,02%	0,04%
	Cristian Ghinea	97,83%	0,56%	0,18%	0,42%	0,14%	0,25%	0,25%	0,17%	0,06%	0,01%	0,02%	0,08%	0,03%
	Dacian Cioloș	93,67%	2,35%	0,38%	0,39%	0,48%	0,99%	0,08%	0,87%	0,14%	0,12%	0,49%	0,03%	0,02%
	Daniel Ghita	96,06%	0,64%	0,36%	1,08%	0,48%	0,56%	0,24%	0,09%	0,07%	0,17%	0,07%	0,04%	0,13%
	Elena Udrea	98,01%	0,76%	0,09%	0,06%	0,24%	0,25%	0,02%	0,22%	0,27%	0,04%	0,01%	0,03%	
	Gabriela Firea	99,52%	0,08%	0,02%	0,03%	0,03%	0,02%	0,01%	0,17%	0,08%	0,04%	0,01%	0,00%	
	Klaus Iohannis	92,66%	1,98%	0,55%	0,64%	1,19%	1,61%	0,13%	0,47%	0,11%	0,39%	0,17%	0,04%	0,08%
	Liviu Dragnea	95,41%	1,55%	0,25%	0,45%	0,48%	0,31%	0,06%	1,22%	0,03%	0,18%	0,05%		0,01%
	Mircea Geoana	97,21%	0,74%	0,29%	0,20%	0,56%	0,63%	0,07%	0,14%	0,05%	0,08%	0,04%	0,01%	
	Monica Luisa Macovei	97,65%	0,47%	0,18%	0,28%	0,48%	0,55%	0,08%	0,10%	0,07%	0,04%	0,03%	0,02%	0,06%
	Ninel PEIA	96,27%	0,87%	0,31%	0,71%	0,22%	0,51%	0,22%	0,27%	0,22%	0,22%	0,04%	0,11%	0,01%
	Raluca Turcan	98,10%	0,87%	0,09%	0,14%	0,09%	0,06%	0,08%	0,41%	0,02%	0,01%	0,10%	0,01%	0,02%
	Remus Cernea	90,87%	0,56%	0,40%	0,17%	1,20%	0,46%	4,48%	0,06%	0,74%	0,27%	0,02%	0,78%	0,01%
	Victor Ponta	96,25%	1,10%	0,17%	0,44%	0,51%	0,37%	0,05%	0,88%	0,08%	0,07%	0,05%	0,00%	0,03%
Satire	kmkz.ro	98,01%	0,42%	0,46%	0,21%	0,15%	0,06%	0,19%	0,30%	0,06%	0,04%	0,06%	0,01%	0,03%
	Times New Roman	97,07%	0,29%	0,53%	0,74%	0,19%	0,13%	0,24%	0,31%	0,08%	0,06%	0,22%	0,05%	0,09%

Figure 7. Percentages of comments containing mentions of targets on Romanian pages.

Comments containing references to target groups (HU)

Facebook Page Categories	Page	Targets (HU)													
		Null	refugees/migra..	Roma/Gipsy	Muslim	pensioners	Jew	LGBT	welfare/poor	Szekler	Transylvanian	atheists	Romanian	religious	Hungarian outside borders
News Media	24.hu	97,96%	0,93%	0,22%	0,27%	0,12%	0,16%	0,21%	0,08%	0,03%	0,01%	0,00%			
	444	96,52%	1,72%	0,38%	0,46%	0,14%	0,28%	0,30%	0,06%	0,07%	0,03%	0,02%			
	777	97,18%	0,53%		0,86%	0,03%	0,30%	0,76%		0,10%	0,03%	0,20%			
	Alfahír Hírportál	94,87%	2,17%	1,14%	0,71%	0,29%	0,24%	0,14%	0,22%	0,12%	0,05%	0,02%	0,02%	0,01%	
	Blikk	98,25%	0,73%	0,34%	0,11%	0,08%	0,12%	0,29%	0,04%	0,00%	0,02%	0,01%			
	Borsonline - Bors Szórako..	98,96%	0,40%	0,22%	0,08%	0,08%	0,06%	0,15%	0,02%	0,02%	0,01%		0,01%		
	HVG	96,27%	2,19%	0,38%	0,33%	0,24%	0,16%	0,19%	0,11%	0,05%	0,07%	0,00%			0,00%
	Index.hu	96,35%	1,97%	0,35%	0,62%	0,16%	0,20%	0,14%	0,13%	0,04%	0,02%	0,02%			
	Magyar Hírlap	93,98%	3,50%	0,37%	0,87%	0,15%	0,61%	0,29%	0,08%	0,12%	0,02%		0,01%		
	ORIGO	98,82%	0,60%	0,13%	0,08%	0,05%	0,08%	0,14%	0,04%	0,03%	0,01%	0,03%			
	Rádió 1	99,84%	0,03%	0,01%	0,00%	0,00%		0,02%		0,05%	0,02%	0,00%			
	TV2	99,77%	0,08%	0,07%		0,03%	0,01%	0,05%							
Online Communities	Sperc.es	99,92%		0,04%						0,04%					
	A magyar lányok a legsze..	99,86%	0,01%	0,03%	0,02%	0,01%		0,02%		0,02%	0,01%				
	Ablak - Zsiráf	98,76%	0,27%	0,26%	0,21%	0,10%	0,04%	0,18%	0,13%	0,02%	0,01%	0,02%			
	Gondoltad volna?	99,05%	0,26%	0,15%	0,04%	0,03%	0,12%	0,24%	0,01%	0,07%	0,01%	0,01%			
	I ♥ ALVÁS	99,29%	0,23%	0,19%	0,08%			0,15%	0,04%	0,04%					
	Közös Ország Mozgalom	99,03%	0,45%	0,08%	0,08%	0,08%		0,08%	0,04%	0,04%	0,08%	0,04%			
	Kvíz Játékok	99,87%	0,02%	0,05%		0,04%				0,02%					
	Love.hu	99,88%	0,02%				0,02%	0,02%		0,06%					
	Mi folyik itt?	99,84%						0,11%		0,05%					
	Szeretlek Magyarország	99,57%	0,10%	0,04%	0,10%		0,08%	0,06%	0,03%	0,01%	0,01%				
	Tibi atya	99,20%	0,11%	0,18%	0,04%	0,05%	0,04%	0,25%	0,01%	0,07%	0,03%	0,01%	0,00%		
	Tiltakozás a sok értelmetl..	96,53%	1,79%	0,15%	0,39%	0,20%	0,37%	0,28%	0,18%	0,07%	0,05%				
	TrollFoci	99,51%	0,04%	0,03%		0,02%	0,00%	0,29%	0,00%	0,07%	0,02%		0,01%		
	Tudtad-e?	99,23%	0,19%	0,10%	0,04%	0,05%	0,09%	0,19%	0,03%	0,05%	0,02%	0,00%		0,00%	
	Ütős	99,76%	0,04%	0,02%		0,02%		0,11%		0,06%					
	Viszlát, kétharmad	98,66%	0,45%	0,22%	0,45%				0,22%						
Political Parties	Demokratikus Koalíció	98,43%	0,59%	0,07%	0,06%	0,66%	0,02%	0,01%	0,06%	0,04%	0,06%		0,01%		0,01%
	Együtt	96,15%	1,95%	0,51%	0,37%	0,26%	0,30%	0,17%	0,16%	0,03%	0,07%	0,01%	0,01%		0,00%
	Fidesz	89,94%	7,21%	0,37%	1,24%	0,39%	0,25%	0,14%	0,29%	0,07%	0,06%	0,04%	0,00%		
	Jobbik Magyarországért ..	94,48%	2,12%	1,20%	0,35%	0,61%	0,57%	0,22%	0,24%	0,10%	0,08%	0,01%	0,02%		
	KDNP és Frakciója	96,65%	1,83%	0,15%	0,53%	0,27%	0,34%		0,04%	0,04%	0,11%	0,04%			
	LMP - Lehet Más a Politika	96,92%	1,38%	0,48%	0,23%	0,40%	0,13%	0,16%	0,22%	0,03%	0,04%	0,01%			
	Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya P..	97,41%	1,76%	0,10%	0,16%	0,18%	0,18%	0,10%	0,04%	0,04%	0,02%	0,00%			
	MSZP	98,09%	0,79%	0,18%	0,10%	0,60%	0,02%	0,01%	0,14%	0,01%	0,04%		0,01%	0,00%	
	Párbeszéd Magyarország..	98,24%	0,60%	0,25%	0,07%	0,42%	0,07%	0,14%	0,14%		0,07%				
Politicians	Fodor Gábor	95,69%	2,53%	0,46%	0,67%	0,07%	0,16%	0,28%	0,09%	0,02%		0,01%	0,01%		
	Gyurcsány Ferenc	96,15%	2,10%	0,28%	0,24%	0,72%	0,10%	0,01%	0,13%	0,07%	0,18%	0,01%	0,01%		
	Hadházy Ákos	97,05%	0,62%	1,71%	0,04%	0,29%	0,05%	0,04%	0,09%	0,02%	0,06%	0,01%	0,01%	0,01%	
	Juhász Péter	97,47%	1,29%	0,29%	0,19%	0,27%	0,10%	0,26%	0,05%	0,03%	0,04%	0,01%	0,00%	0,01%	
	Karácsony Gergely	98,05%	0,67%	0,29%	0,11%	0,29%	0,17%	0,07%	0,21%	0,09%	0,04%		0,00%		
	Molnár Gyula	97,93%	1,01%	0,07%	0,17%	0,63%		0,05%	0,02%		0,10%	0,02%			
	Niedermüller Péter	91,95%	5,04%	0,90%	0,82%	0,33%	0,45%	0,14%	0,16%	0,02%	0,16%	0,02%	0,02%		
	Orbán Viktor	97,47%	1,34%	0,12%	0,33%	0,24%	0,10%	0,11%	0,05%	0,15%	0,07%	0,02%			
	Semjén Zsolt	98,60%	1,40%												
	Szabó Tímea	96,67%	1,56%	0,46%	0,16%	0,54%	0,13%	0,17%	0,25%	0,02%	0,03%	0,02%		0,01%	
	Szél Bernadett	97,79%	0,91%	0,30%	0,17%	0,21%	0,11%	0,16%	0,20%	0,06%	0,08%	0,00%			
	Toroczkai László	89,66%	6,02%	0,78%	1,97%	0,08%	0,75%	0,27%	0,28%	0,09%	0,05%	0,05%	0,00%	0,01%	
	Volner János	94,25%	1,87%	1,45%	0,28%	0,97%	0,55%	0,28%	0,21%	0,11%			0,04%		
	Vona Gábor	94,35%	2,24%	1,07%	0,48%	0,74%	0,48%	0,22%	0,16%	0,11%	0,11%	0,03%	0,01%	0,01%	

Figure 8. Percentage of comments containing mentions of targets on Hungarian pages.

VENDULA PROKUPKOVA *

Two Mobilization Waves of the Czech Anti-Islam Movement. Collective Actors and the Identity Change of the Movement 2015-2016

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 51-71.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.478
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [vendula.prokupkova@fsv.cuni.cz] (Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Science, Charles University)

Abstract[1]

In 2015 and 2016, the Czech Republic experienced a massive mobilization of a new anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement. Drawing on the concepts of the post-foundational discourse theory of the Essex School, the theory of populism of Ernesto Laclau and the model analysis of the EuroMayDay Movement provided by the German philosopher Oliver Marchart, this paper engages with the question of how the identity of this movement changed during the initial and later phases of the mobilization. The author distinguishes between two waves of mobilization, which differ regarding the construction of the identity of the movement as well as the number and variety of the collective actors, who succeeded in mobilizing. Whereas at the beginning of the year 2015 the identity of the movement was constructed against Islam as an antagonistic Other, in the middle of the same year a deep chasm between the movement (representing the 'people') and the 'powerful' emerged. At this point, following Ernesto Laclau's definition of populism, the movement transformed into a populist movement. Moreover, this transformation was accompanied by the mobilization success of new organizations participating in the movement, including the exponents of the extreme right.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Czech Republic, Discourse theory, Right-wing extremism, Populism.

[1] The work was financed by the grant SVV number 260 461/2018 Interests, power, and institutions in political decision-making.

1. Introduction

At the turn of 2014/2015, Europe faced the rise in a new anti-Islam movement. Ensuing the success of the German Pegida, many European cities witnessed massive mobilizations against so-called Islamization and immigration. In this respect, the Czech Republic formed no exception. Anti-Islam organizations already existed in the Czech Republic before 2014/2015, but their activities were mostly restricted to the virtual domain, and their impact and their numbers of supporters were of even less importance. This changed with the turn of the year 2014/2015 when the anti-Islam movement in the Czech Republic grew at an unprecedented rate. One of the flagships of this success was the anti-Islam organization *Islám v České republice nechceme* (IvČRN, 'We Don't Want Islam in the Czech Republic'), which originally emerged as a relatively unknown Facebook group in 2009. In January 2015, though, IvČRN reported 100,000 supporters on its Facebook profile and managed to mobilize thousands of people in the streets. During the following months, a growing number of new anti-Islam virtual platforms appeared on the social network Facebook, and the issue was also adopted by several political parties, including the traditional exponents of the extreme right. The entry of new actors into the movement as well as its reflections on the progressing migration crisis brought a significant change of the movement's demands and the construction of the opponents whom the movement was defined against changed. In the early months of 2015 (for the purposes of this text defined as the 'first wave of mobilization'), the central demands of the anti-Islam movement were focused on banning or restricting Islam as a religion; since the middle of the same year (in this text referred to as the beginning of the 'second wave of mobilization'), the anti-Islam agenda was already inseparably mixed with anti-immigrant topics. Besides this, the requests for the resignation of the government and an EU membership referendum started to resonate. The mobilization success of the Czech anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement persisted until winter/spring 2016. From this point onward, it gradually abated.

Despite the number of recent publications concerning the topic of Islamophobia (e.g. Černý, 2015; Mareš et al., 2015; Beránek and Ostřanský, 2016; Dizdarevič, 2016; Topinka, 2016; Dizdarevič, 2017; Rosůlek et al., 2017), only few studies engage with the 2015-2016 mobilization of the Czech anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement in a mere detail. One of the first publications was the collective monograph by Miroslav Mareš et al. (2015), which elaborates the basic political and legal aspects of the existence of the Czech anti-Islam groups and provides a very detailed descriptive account of the history of the Czech anti-Islam movement until 2015. The study by Přemysl Rosůlek (2017; 2018) focuses on the activities of Czech singers critical of Islam and refugees on the Facebook social network in the period 2015-2017 and in her study Vendula Prokůpková (2018) investigates the cooperation between the Czech anti-Islam movement and Pegida of Dresden in the 2015-2016 period.

Although some of these publications (Dizdarevič, 2016; Prokůpková, 2018) mention the movement's shift from the originally anti-Islam agenda toward anti-immigration, anti-EU and anti-Government issues, none of these texts explains this transformation in detail. Drawing on the concepts of the post-foundational discourse

theory of the Essex School (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Torfing, 1999; Howarth, 2000; Laclau, 2005), the theory of populism of Ernesto Laclau (2005; 2015) and the model analysis of the EuroMayDay Movement provided by the German philosopher Oliver Marchart (2017), this paper engages with the question of how the identity of the movement was constructed by activists from the main organizations participating in the movement during the initial and later phases of the mobilization.

The structure of the text proceeds as follows: first, the construction of identities of social movements will be explained on the grounds of the post-foundational theory of discourse of the Essex School. Second, the data on participation and organizers of the rallies collected during participant observations of 19 rallies conducted by the author will be introduced as well as the analyzed corpus and the methods of analysis. Third, the contextual information containing a description of the outset of the Czech anti-Islam movement before the mass mobilization in 2015 will be provided. Following that, the context and actors of the 'first wave of mobilization' of the Czech anti-Islam movement will be introduced, and the discourse of the IvČRN analyzed. Finally, after the introduction of the triggers and actors of the 'second wave of mobilization,' the protest discourse will be analyzed and the major changes in the movement discourse discussed.

2. The construction of the identity of the social movement

Each social movement shares a distinct collective identity (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 21-22), which is always of a discursive nature (Laclau, 2005: 80). The post-foundational theory of discourse understands social identities as contingent constructs and as products of articulatory practices. Identities are products of identification with the subject's positions, which are constructed within historically produced discourses (Howarth, 2000). The discursive construction of identities is based on a twofold logic complex: the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence. Identities are always doubly differentiated, which means that they are at the same time internally related to a different subject position within a discourse and defined against other identities, against the Others, who are not them (Howarth, 2013: 250). Within a discourse, the identities are constituted through chains of equivalence, where signs are sorted and linked together in opposition to other chains, defining 'how the subject is, and how it is not' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 43). To put it simply, the collective 'We' of the protesters may comprise a variety of subject positions (the Czechs, the Christians, the Patriots etc.), which are linked together in opposition to the Other (those adhering to the Islam faith).

Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 122-127) came with a radical thesis that social identity can never be fully attained by the subject because the presence of the antagonistic Other constitutes the limits of its full constitution. With reference to the theory of Jacques Lacan, they understand the subject as fundamentally split, as never becoming 'itself' (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 42-43). In other words, the subject (i.e.: the anti-Islam activist) cannot exist without referring to the Other (those adhering to the Islam faith). The subject's experience of absence caused by the presence of the Other forms the very precondition for the emergence of social identity. The construction of identity via the creation of boundaries involves the production of

empty signifiers, which represent this lack of fullness and at the same time express and constitute the totality of the equivalential chain (Laclau, 2005: 129).

As each identity is a product of an articulatory practice, the identity of the social movement is constructed through the discursive articulation of the protest (Marchart, 2017: 60). According to Laclau, at the primary level, the unity of the protest group arises from the articulation of demands, which may acquire two basic forms: (weak) requests and (strong) claims (Laclau, 2005: 73-74; Laclau, 2015: 154). The demand emerges as the result of a three-stage process that begins with the moment of dislocation, the experience of absence or lack, a situation when the harmonious continuity of the social is disrupted. During the second stage, a request to fill this lack is addressed to those in charge. When the demand is not fulfilled, it may, under specific conditions, be articulated into a chain of equivalence with other unfulfilled (and possibly unrelated) demands. At this moment, the original request transforms into a political claim. The equivalential articulation of the demands constitutes a broader social subjectivity, the identity of the protest group. The emerging totality of the chain is represented by a particular demand, which as an empty signifier represents the unity of the protesting group against the antagonistic outside (Laclau, 2005: 73-74; Laclau 2015: 154-155).

Building on Ernesto Laclau's assertions, Oliver Marchart (2017) understands the process of identity building in social movements in a more complex way, where the articulation of demands forms only one part of a greater process. According to Marchart (2017: 70), the subjects position themselves by raising their demands, and simultaneously by their delimitation against other demands and subject positions. The identity of the social movement is then to be understood as the intersection of three structures: 1) a constellation of multiplicity of contesting demands, which stand to each other in a hierarchical relation and which are represented by an empty demand, 2) a constellation of contesting subject positions of the protagonist chain, where imaginary unity is created by various forms of invocation of the 'Us', and by the addressing of 'Them' and, 3) the structure of contrariety, the constellation of signifiers which are antagonistic to the protagonists' demands, subject names, subject positions, etcetera. This constellation of signifiers creates the barrier to the fulfillment of the substantial lack experienced by proponents of the movement (Marchart, 2017: 64-69).

3. Data and methods

The first source of data used is composed of selected records on public protest, including estimated numbers of participants and organizers of rallies, which were collected by the author during participant observations. In 2015 and 2016, the author observed 19 demonstrations (see: Table 1 below), which were invoked under the motto 'against Islam', 'against Islamization' or 'against immigration'. During these demonstrations, the author took on the role of the observer as a participant (Hendl, 2005: 191). The identity of the author was generally hidden from the participants, and only revealed when approached by other participants at the rally.

To provide an account of the movement's mobilization and the main collective actors involved, collected documents (webpages, press releases, news articles, reports) are used. The author has drawn from the database of the Czech Press Agency and websites operated by the respective political parties or social movement organizations.

The corpus for the discursive analysis consists of transcripts of speeches held on the 15 biggest protest events, which took place during the first and second wave of mobilization, between January 2015 and February 2016, when the mobilization success of the movement reached its peak. In 12 cases, audio-recordings were made by the author and complemented with transcripts of speeches from YouTube video reports of three large demonstrations.[2]

Following the above-depicted theoretical framework, the discourse analysis focuses on the interrelated structures of demands, subjectivization, and contrariety within the protest discourse. As many demands placed by the movement were directed toward the protection of fundamental values and ideals articulated by the movement, the structure of 'paramount values' constitutes a further, interrelated dimension of analysis. The corpus was analyzed using the method of theoretical coding, proposed by the German sociologist Thomas Marttila (2015) and interpreted using concepts of the post-foundational discourse theory of the Essex School.

Table 1. List of the demonstrations observed by the author.

Date	Place	Organized by	Estimated number of participants	Transcript of speeches analyzed
16.01.2015	Prague	IvČRN	2000	Yes
31.01.2015	Prague	coorganized by IvČRN	500	Yes
21.02.2015	Prague	DSSS	50	No
26.06.2015	Brno	DSSS	>500	No
18.07.2015	Prague	ND+SPD	>1000	Yes
08.08.2015	Prague	DSSS+ND	200	Yes
15.08.2015	Prague	ND	500	Yes
12.09.2015	Prague	ZNKaBZ+BPI+SPD	>3000	Yes
28.10.2015	Prague	BPI+ÚSVIT+ guest Pegida Dresden	>500	Yes
17.11.2015	Prague	DSSS	200	Yes

[2] 14.02.2015 (IvČRN, Brno), 30.06.2015 (BPI+ÚSVIT, Prague), 01.07.2015 (ND+SPD, Prague)

Date	Place	Organized by	Estimated number of participants	Transcript of speeches analyzed
17.11.2015	Prague	ZNKaBZ+SPD	5000	Yes
17.11.2015	Prague	ND	1000	Yes
06.02.2016	Prague	BPI+ÚSVIT+Fortress Europe	>3000	Yes
06.02.2016	Prague	ND+ZNKaBZ	500	Yes
26.03.2016	Prague	ND+ZNKaBZ	200	No
01.05.2016	Prague	ex-BPI	200	No
01.05.2016	Prague	ND	150	No
14.05.2016	Prague	SPD	600	No
28.09.2016	Most	Blok proti islamizaci	100	No

4. The outsets of the anti-Islam movement in the Czech Republic

The first organizations promoting an anti-Islam ideology and engaging in activities directed against Muslims or Islam as a religion in general, emerged in the Czech Republic in the 1990s. However, anti-Islam ideology was not yet the main source of the political profile of these organizations (Mareš, 2015: 84-85) and it is not possible to speak about the existence of an anti-Islam movement in general at that time.

In 1998, the first Czech Mosque was opened in Brno. The plans for its construction raised a public discussion and disagreement among some of the citizens of Brno. However, the negative stance against the mosque did not result in any mass mobilization. The agitation against the mosque was foremost pursued by extreme-right organizations.

After 11 September 2001, the increasing media coverage and following public thematization of Islamic terrorism contributed to the expansion of Islamophobic discourses in the Czech Republic (e.g.: Křížková, 2006). First of all, the adoption of new discourses about Islam and migration by the conservative spectrum was significant for this period (Mochťak, 2015). The extreme right reacted to the events of 11 September 2001 in various ways. The dominant part of the extreme right held a radical anti-American and anti-Israel position. The terrorist attacks were interpreted as the 'weakening of a traditional enemy' (Mareš and Vejvodová, 2015: 108) and celebrated or at least not condemned by the majority of the exponents of the extreme right. The only extreme-right subject at that time that started a systematic campaign

against Islam and Muslims was the Národní strana ('National Party', hereafter: NS). However, NS was a party with minor electoral success and the impact of its campaign was minimal (Smolík, 2013).

One of the most important milestones for the development of the Czech anti-Islam movement was the launch of the server *Eurabia.cz* in 2005, which was the first Czech website devoted exclusively to critical themes connected with Muslims and Islam. In 2009, the Facebook group *Islám v České republice nechceme* (IvČRN, in English: 'We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic') was founded. Inspired by the *English Defence League*, the core activists of IvČRN founded the *Czech Defense League* (CZDL) in 2011 (Mrva, 2014). The activities of the CZDL comprised the campaign directed to ban halal food in the Czech Republic, campaigns against the construction of new mosques or the monitoring of new Muslim prayer rooms. In 2014, the CZDL launched a campaign, which was directed against the approval of special religious rights to the biggest Czech Muslim organization *Center of Muslim Religious Communities* (CMRC). CMRC was established in 1991 and in 2004 obtained as the only Czech Islam organization the status of a registered religious organization from the Ministry of Culture. In 2014, 10 years after the registration, the CMRC acquired the right to apply for a second stage registration, by which it could obtain special religious rights, like the participation in religious education in public schools, the solemnization of marriages, etcetera.[3] The campaigns of the CZDL, however, were mostly restricted to the virtual realm and remained almost unreported by the public media.

In the middle of 2014, the activity of CZDL declined, while IvČRN began to grow. IvČRN already operated its own webpage, and its Facebook profile gathered almost 70,000 likes by July 2014 (Havlíček, 2015: 483). The university teacher Martin Konvička became the leading spokesperson of IvČRN; he was also one of the active members of CZDL (Mrva, 2014). In autumn 2014, IvČRN obtained public and media attention with a petition against the granting of special religious rights to Czech Muslims, the same topic CZDL had campaigned on before. IvČRN also elaborated a proposal for an amendment to the Czech Church Law intending that "special religious rights could only be granted to a registered church, which does not raise a concern that it threatens the foreign policy interest or national security of the Czech Republic" (IvČRN, 2015b). In April 2015, this proposed amendment was submitted for voting in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament by the opposition political movement *Úsvit přímé demokracie* (hereafter: Úsvit, 'Dawn of a direct democracy'). The proposal was rejected after the first reading.

Since 2014, migration- and Islam-related topics were adopted by the extreme-right *Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti* (hereafter: DSSS, 'Workers Party of Social Justice'), which, until then, had mostly focused on anti-Romani agitation. In September 2014, DSSS organized the first protest 'against Islamization' in Teplice, a small North-Bohemian spa town, which is much sought after by clientele from Arabic states. The rally attracted about 130 participants (Kramáreková et al., 2017: 11).

[3] The CMRC has, however, not completed all administrative requirements for the application.

5. The first wave of mobilization (January - early Spring 2015)

5.1. The protest events and their participants

IvČRN already received media attention before 2015 with its campaigns as well as its growing popularity on social networks. However, any of its efforts to mobilize outside the virtual realm remained unsuccessful. This situation changed on 16 January 2015, a few days after the terrorist attacks on the editors' office of the French magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and the Porte de Vincennes kosher market, when up to 2,000 participants attended an IvČRN demonstration in the historical center of Prague. The progress of the so-called 'Islamic state', the geographical and cultural proximity of the terrorist target, together with the reflection of the growing German Pegida movement may have been the triggers for the mobilization. As in 2014 the discussion on granting new religious rights to the CMRC, the security threats connected with the so-called 'Islamic state' and Islam terrorism can be understood as a new moment of dislocation. Experience of crisis, when for many people their national, religious or other identity was put into question, led many to support IvČRN in the streets.

During winter and early spring, IvČRN (co-)organized three other demonstrations in Prague, Brno, and České Budějovice, each with more than 500 participants.[4] The protest events were attended by people of all ages, as well as by families with children. The demonstrations were also supported by several members of the Czech Parliament, some of whom also held speeches.

Besides IvČRN, the extreme right DSSS also strived to mobilize against the so-called 'Islamization'. Its mobilization success was low, however; their rally on 21 February 2015 in Prague attracted fewer than 50 participants.

5.2. Structures of contrariety within the IvČRN discourse

At the beginning of 2015, the IvČRN placed several demands, which included 1) the amendment of the Czech Church Law in order to restrict and complicate the operation of Islam in public spaces, 2) cancellation of the legislative exceptions, which permit halal slaughter as well as the import of halal food, 3) a ban on Islam's religious symbols, including wearing headscarves in public spaces (IvČRN, 2015a). During the first winter IvČRN rallies, further demands to enforce measures which prevent Muslim immigration and to decline the proposed amendment for expanding the power of the Czech ombudsman, who was regarded as an 'ally' of the Czech Muslim minority, were placed by the movement. The constellation of these demands can be represented by the empty demand 'we don't want Islam in the Czech Republic', which is also the name of the social movement organization. By articulation of the demands, the protest movement acquired a unity (Laclau, 2005). The 'unity' of the movement

[4] The unprecedented scale of the mobilization of the anti-Islam movement can be demonstrated by the figures offered by Ondřej Císař's (2008: 47) study of political activism in the Czech Republic. According to this study based on data from 1993 to 2005, only 10.9 per cent of the protest events were attended by more than 500 participants.

was simultaneously delimitated against the antagonistic Other, those adhering to the Islam faith.

During the speeches, Islam was presented as violent, hateful, misogynic, and undemocratic in its nature:

> '*We protest against the zero tolerance, against the hatred that Islam is full of.*' (Hošek, an IvČRN supporter, 14.02.2015)

> '*We do not want to allow an ideology to enter this country, that hinders our children, our daughters, from dressing as they wish, from thinking freely or to be told that they have only half the brain of a man.*' (Vítek, an IvČRN supporter, 16.01.2015)

Islam was referred to as a 'bad religion', inextricably bound to the strict interpretation of Shari'a law and thus incompatible with the Western democracies of the 21st century. To support this argument of incompatibility, examples of Shari'a law or details from the prophet Muhammad's biography were quoted during the speeches. Islam (portrayed as identical to a literary reading of Shari'a law) was referred to as a political ideology, equivalent to both the ideologies of the Nazi and the communist regimes that the Czechs had survived:

> '*Islam does not mean peace, but subordination. Subordination of women to men, non-Muslims to Muslims, the subordination of Muslims to the crazy ideas of their prophet and clerics. I want to repeat here in Brno, the place of the first mosque and the first city of Czech-Moravian Islam, that this nation has neither survived the Nazis nor gotten rid of communists to submit to Islam.*' (Konvička, IvČRN, 14.02.2015)

The complex of enemy values and practices represented by the empty signifier 'Islam' was presented as an ultimate threat for attainment and sustainment of the paramount values of the movement, which are articulated as a chain of equivalence consisting of freedom, democracy, Czech cultural customs, and traditions. 'We don't want any Islam in the Czech Republic' thus stood for the constellation of demands, which were directed to preserve these paramount values of the movement.

The construction of the imaginary collective subject of the movement, of the 'We', proceeded by various articulatory practices like public speeches, writing of blogs, sharing invitations to demonstrations, setting up lists of speakers and a program for a demonstration, participation in demonstrations, etcetera. By involving speakers of various faiths and from different minorities (Catholic priests, Jews, Roma, representatives of the Kurdish minority, ex-Muslims) and by the content of the speeches, the inclusive nature of the movement was emphasized:

> '*IvČRN is supported by the faithful, the atheists, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Arabs, Kurds, Syrians, Indians, Czechs, Slovaks, Roma, Jews, Vietnamese, and others, regardless of their political opinions or views.*' (Kubík, an IvČRN supporter, 14.02.2015)

'We' as a collective subject stood in an antagonistic position against those who were through their adherence or protection of 'Islam' endangering the collective's paramount values. These opponents were Muslims and their organizations like the CMRC, but also the 2014-2016 Minister for Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Legislation, Jiří Dienstbier, the Ombudsman Anna Šabatová (since 2014) and other so-called 'multiculturalists,' 'do-gooders' or 'naive humanists'. The position of immigrants and refugees was, however, articulated differently by individual speakers. Only a few of them presented their negative stance against any presence of immigrants on Czech territory:

> '*Let us be grateful for the fact that the Czech society is still national as well as culturally homogenous and let us preserve it so for the future. This is the only reason we don't have any ethnic conflicts here, while immigrants from the countries of different cultures and their descendants (elsewhere) are ravaging and burning whole city districts.'* (Okamura, Úsvit, 31.01.2016)

Some of the speakers (first of all, Martin Konvička and other IvČRN activists) held the position that the presence of immigrants on Czech territory was acceptable, if they were not Muslims and they were accepting 'our' values. Some of the IvČRN activists, for example, supported the admission of Syrian Christian refugees or cooperated with the Czech Kurdish minority. Furthermore, the Muslims' identity was presented as a 'matter of choice', rather than something one is born into by Konvička and other activists. In this sense, Muslims were not portrayed as primordial enemies, but rather as victims of a hateful ideology who still have a chance to 'wake up', abandon their faith and each become 'one of us':

> *'European Muslims, you are not out enemies, you are only victims of a nasty ideology, which makes you our enemies. Find the courage in yourself, stand up against the Islamic yoke, stop behaving like the slaves of the long dead sadistic crook!'* (Konvička, IvČRN, 16.01.2016)

Based on this analysis, the structures of contrariety within the IvČRN Discourse (the first wave of mobilization) can be depicted as follows (see: Figure 1). The first three rows depict the protagonist chains of equivalence (consisting of articulated chains of demands, paramount values and ethic ideals and subject positions) represented by the empty signifier 'We don't want any Islam in the Czech Republic'. The three rows below depict the antagonistic chains of equivalence (enemy subject positions, enemy values, and ethic ideals) represented by the empty signifier 'Islam'.



FIGURE 1. Structures of contrariety within the IvČRN discourse (the first wave of mobilization). Source: author.

6. The second wave of mobilization (June 2015 - Winter/Spring 2016)

6.1. The mobilization and its triggers

In May 2015, the European Commission introduced a proposal for a new EU migrant relocation and resettlement scheme as a part of the *First implementation package* (European Commission, 2015). The states of the Visegrád Group rejected the first proposal for mandatory quotas in June 2015. But later the Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka (Social Democratic Party) announced the decision of his government to accept 1,500 refugees in the years 2015-2017 (Vláda ČR, 2015).

According to the opinion polls carried out in June 2015, more than 70 per cent of Czech citizens above 15 years objected to the admission of refugees from Syria and North Africa. About 80 per cent of the citizens were at least roughly informed about the discussed quotas, but only 18 per cent of them expressed a positive stance toward their introduction (Buchtík, 2015). In May 2015, IvČRN organized a petition against the quotas, which was signed by 150,000 people within the first five weeks (IvČRN, 2015c). The refusal of the quotas as well as the disapproval of the government's decision to accept refugees can be regarded as the main triggers for the new mobilization wave of the movement. The fear of a coming influx of (Muslim) immigrants caused a new situation of dislocation, a new crisis of cultural and social identity connected with the expected arrival of the Others.

Starting in July 2015, many new subjects succeeded in mobilizing against Islam and immigration as well as the number of participants in the protest rapidly grew. The main organizers of the protests were *Blok proti islámu* (hereafter: BPI, 'Bloc against Islam'), the political movement *Úsvit - Národní koalice* (Úsvit, 'Dawn - National

Coalition')[5], *Svoboda a přímá demokracie* (SPD, 'Freedom and Direct Democracy')[6], the Facebook group *Za naši kulturu a bezpečnou zem* (ZNKaBZ, 'For our culture and a safe country') and the extreme right parties ND and DSSS. During the second wave of mobilization, ND and DSSS achieved a big mobilization success, when DSSS was able to mobilize around 500 people in Brno on 26 June 2015, and ND more than a thousand people to attend its first rallies in summer 2015.

In April 2015, the IvČRN was in its organizer's role replaced by a newly established BPI. BPI served as a new formal umbrella organization incorporating IvČRN activists and activists from other organizations and political parties. In August 2015, BPI signed a contract with Úsvit, in which both subjects agreed to set up a common candidate list for the 2016 Senate and regional elections (BPI, 2015). Until spring 2015, Úsvit was led by Tomio Okamura, who left the movement due to internal disputes and founded the SPD.

The engagement of the new organizations in the protest was accompanied by a growing disunity of the movement. Although sharing similar demands, some of the biggest organizations participating in the movement never cooperated in organizing the public protests. This disunity was partially caused by internal conflicts in Úsvit and the unwillingness of parts of its membership to further collaborate with Tomio Okamura. The second reason for the disunity was the refusal of BPI to cooperate with the extreme right (Prokůpková, 2018). As one of the results of this disunity and internal rivalries many protests were organized simultaneously on the same days. While Úsvit representatives (Marek Černoch, Olga Havlová, Karel Fiedler, etc.) attended BPI demonstrations exclusively, Tomio Okamura's SPD in summer 2015 initially cooperated with ND and, in autumn 2015 with the platform ZNKaBZ. ZNKaBZ, on the other hand, also cooperated intensively with ND. In October 2015, BPI also started to cooperate with *Pegida Dresden*, which led to the foundation of *Fortress Europe,* a platform associating organizations of the European anti-Islam movements (Prokůpková, 2018).

The organizational logic of the public rallies followed two basic patterns: they were called together in reaction to specific affairs (discussions about the quotas, terrorist attacks in France) or on days of remembrance and national holidays. The mobilization reached its peak on 17 November 2015, when, just in Prague, four anti-Islam demonstrations took place. The biggest of them was organized by ZNKaBZ and was attended by approximately five thousand participants. Thousands of people also attended a series of demonstrations against Islam and immigration, which were held in Prague on February 6, 2016. After this, the mobilization potential of the movement gradually decreased and further activities of the anti-Islam organizations shifted back to the virtual space. The reasons for the decline may include the criminal prosecution of ND leader Adam Bartoš for his racist statements, the break-up of BPI in April 2016 and the disappearance of the supposed urgency of the topics the movement mobilized against.

[5] Before August 2015, it was called *Úsvit přímé demokracie* ('Dawn of the direct democracy').
[6] In March 2016, the movement was renamed to *Svoboda a přímá demokracie - Tomio Okamura (SPD).*

6.2. New demands and the emergence of the populist movement

Starting in June 2015, the movement expressed new grievances related to unfulfilled demands. Neither the demands for measures to stop or at least restrict Islam placed at the beginning of the year were met by the authorities, nor was the following petition against the quotas acted upon. Additionally, the government did something the activists regarded as quite the opposite; it accepted 1,500 refugees within the next two years:

> *'We appealed to the government to start to handle the immigration wave that is rushing to us. We asked them how they are going to control the borders, which measures will be undertaken to protect our citizens.'* (Borkovcová, BPI, 30.06. 2015)

While at the beginning of 2015 parts of the IvČRN activists welcomed the idea to accept non-Muslim refugees, by mid-2015 this radically changed with the (re)articulation of refugees, illegal immigrants and Muslims into an equivalential chain. Thus, each refugee was newly seen as a potential Muslim, a potential soldier or terrorist and as a threat to the security of the country and its citizens. Besides that, openly racist nominalizations like 'colonizers' (Konvička) or 'aliens' (Okamura, Bartoš) appeared more and more frequently during the speeches. The involvement of Kurds or ex-Muslim Syrians in the rallies was no longer possible and the movement got a more exclusive character.

The migration crisis feared to hit the Czech Republic if no measures to stop the immigrants were to be taken, was interpreted by the leaders of the movement as an accelerator of the already ongoing process of 'Islamization'. The movement called for the closure and protection of the Czech borders as well as the general tightening of refugee and immigration policy.

The categorical refusal to accept any refugees or immigrants was already expressed by a few of the speakers at IvČRN winter rallies, but since mid-2015 the admission of all refugees was rejected uniformly across the movement:

> '*How long will we commemorate the day of the (Czech) statehood, when we don't stop the influx of immigrants from the countries of different cultures, different ways of life?'* (Doubrava, BPI, 28.10.2015)

> *'We meet to make it clear that we say no to the immigrants, no to the trampling on and destruction of our culture, the plundering of our achievements and the parasitism in our social and healthcare systems!'* (Drvotová, ND, 15.08.2015)

Since the authorities did not meet the demands placed by the movement to stop the alleged 'influx' of the refugees and to undertake measures against the so-called 'Islamization', the movement reacted with grievances and the articulation of new so far unrelated and unsatisfied demands into an equivalential chain. These included, for example, the resignation of the government, the abolition of the compulsory fees for the public television or the right to decide on important issues through direct democratic means, including a referendum on leaving the European Union, which

was perceived as either unable to handle the current migration crisis or was even thought to be responsible for it.

The extension of the logic of equivalence in a movement discourse was accompanied by the identity change of the movement. Standing in opposition against those who were considered to hinder the fulfillment of the demanded claims, the constitution of a broader subjectivity, the 'people' was initiated (Laclau, 2005: 162). The 'people' became an empty signifier representing fullness of community, which is actually missing due to the presence of a substantial lack, linked to the demands, which were not met. Since mid-2015 a new, deep chasm between the movement (representing the 'people' deprived of power), the Czech government and the leadership of the European Union seen as 'treacherous' and 'irresponsible' holders of power emerged:

> '*We are the people of this country. We are the people of this republic. We have the power to create an atmosphere that will make the three (leaders of the governing parties) require tranquilizers, whenever they remember the years 2015 and 2016.'* (Hampl, BPI, 30.06.2015)

> '*We will fight to bring back our republic, which was sold by our politicians to Brussels and Washington. We will build a democracy where the thieves will not become ministers or prime ministers and will be punished hard for their crimes.*' (Okamura, SPD, 17.11.2015)

According to the exponents of the movement, the country was governed by elites, who were misusing their power and did not listen to the people's will. The people were deprived of democracy and robbed through taxes, which were not relocated to those in need, but to non-governmental organizations or immigrants and refugees. Alongside the public media, non-governmental organizations were perceived as protectors of the government's interests.

On rallies organized by BPI, ÚSVIT, ZNKaBZ or SPD, sympathy with the Czech president Miloš Zeman was expressed by chanting or banners. Miloš Zeman is known for his negative stance against immigration and for Islamophobic speeches (e.g. Ostřanský, 2016). The support for the president, who was regarded as the 'true' representative of the people's will, was heavily communicated by BPI, which, among others, participated in the demonstration for his support on 17 November 2015. Within the discourse of BPI, president Miloš Zeman functioned as an empty signifier.

Based on this analysis, the structures of contrariety within the BPI discourse (the second wave of mobilization) can be depicted as follows (see: Figure 2). The first three rows depict the protagonistic chains of equivalence (consisting of articulated chains of demands, paramount values, ethic ideals, and subject positions) represented by the empty signifier 'Miloš Zeman,' the name of the Czech president. The three rows below depict the antagonistic chains of equivalence (enemy subject positions, enemy values, and ethic ideals) represented by the empty signifier 'Islamization'.



FIGURE 2. Structures of contrariety within the BPI discourse (the second wave of mobilization). Source: author.

As already mentioned above, during the second wave of mobilization the traditional exponents of the extreme-right DSSS and ND also succeeded in mobilizing. Moreover, ND was able to establish temporary cooperation with the populist SPD and thus to address a broader spectrum of the public. The reasons for the mobilization success of these two parties can be explained through the radicalization of the movement, which no longer only fought against Islam (an ideology, articulated as equal to Nazism and thus the opposite of democracy), but rejected anyone of different origin and culture. Besides that, the emergence of the fundamental split between the powerless 'people' and 'elites' in the movement discourse opened a space for the promotion of anti-systemic solutions, the questioning of the legitimacy of the system as such.

7. Conclusion

For the period of 2015-2016, the author of this text identifies two waves of mobilization of the Czech anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement. Within each of these mobilization waves, the identity of the movement was constructed differently in the speeches of the activist participating in the protests.

The first wave of mobilization took place from January to early spring 2015. The main organizers of the protest were activists connected with the Internet platform IvČRN. In cooperation with IvČRN, members of the political movement Úsvit regularly and actively took part in the rallies. During the first wave of mobilization, the identity of the movement was constructed against 'Islam' as an antagonistic Other, representing a wide chain of enemy practices and values, which were articulated in direct opposition to democracy, freedom and Czech cultural customs and traditions,

which the movement strived to protect and preserve. The collective 'We', comprising a wide variety of subject positions, the movement values, and demands were represented by the empty signifier 'We don't want any Islam in the Czech Republic', the name of the mobilizing social movement organization.

The second wave of mobilization, which began in mid-2015, brought several changes. A new development of the migration crisis and the discussion on migration quotas brought a new moment of dislocation of the social and cultural identity. Furthermore, the demands placed by the movement to ban or restrict Islam and to introduce measures to restrict the influx of refugees were not met by the authorities. Because of this frustration, a plurality of new demands was articulated into an equivalential chain. By the articulation of a new extended chain of unfulfilled demands, standing in opposition against the government and others, who were considered to hinder their fulfillment, the constitution of a broader subjectivity - the 'people' was initiated. It was no longer just 'Islam' representing the antagonistic Other that the movement defined itself against, but rather the elites in power, whose legitimacy was put into question and who were blamed for the alleged 'Islamization'. The extension of the logic of equivalence in a movement discourse led to an emergence of what Ernesto Laclau (2005: 93) calls 'popular identity' and the transformation of the previously monothematic anti-Islam movement into a populist movement.

The second wave of mobilization also brought an emergence of new collective actors participating in the movement, including traditional exponents of the extreme right. The mobilizing success of the extreme right can be explained regarding the radicalization of the movement, which no longer fought only against Islam, but rejected anyone of different origin and culture. Further, the emergence of the fundamental split between the powerless 'people' and 'elites' in the movement discourse opened up a space for the promotion of anti-systemic solutions and employment of the nationalist discourses in the construction of 'the people.'

There are two important remarks to the presented results of the analysis. First, while the mode of articulation of the Czech anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement corresponds in its later phase (since July 2015) to what Ernesto Laclau calls 'populist movement', the question is how to categorize the movement during the first wave of mobilization. To what extent was the movement already populist (Laclau, 2015: 161)? The second problem emerged with the detection of the particular demand, which, according to Laclau (2015: 157), starts to function as an empty signifier representing the equivalential chain as a totality. While in the IvČRN discourse the name of the organization 'We don't want any Islam in the Czech Republic' can be regarded as representing the chain of demands and subject positions, none of such empty demands was clearly identified by the author during the analysis of the speeches taken by the activists during the second wave of mobilization.

References

Beránek, O. and Ostřanský, B. (eds.) (2016) *Stíny minaretů: Islám a muslimové jako předmět českých veřejných polemic (English: Shadows of Minarets: Islam and Muslims Objects of Czech Public Polemics)*. Prague: Academia.

Buchtík, M. (2015) *Postoj české veřejnosti k přijímání imigrantů a uprchlíků červen 2015 (English: Attitudes of the Czech Public to the Reception of Immigrants and Refugees in June 2015).* Prague: Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění (Public Opinion Research Center). Available at: https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c2/a1927/f9/pm150723.pdf . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Císař, O. (2008) *Politický aktivismus v České republice: Sociální hnutí a občaská společnost v období transformace a evropeizace (English: Political Activism in the Czech Republic: Social Movement and Casual Society in Transformation and Europeanization).* Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture).

Černý, K. (ed.) (2015) *Nad Evropou půlměsíc I. Muslimové v Česku a v západních společnostech (English: Over Europe, the Half-Moon Muslims in the Czech Republic and Western Societies).* Prague: Karolinum.

Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006) *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Malden: Blackwell.

Dizdarevič, S. M. (2016) Czech Republic. In: Bayrakli, E. and Hafez, F. (eds.) *European Islamophobia Report 2015*. Ankara: SETA. 115-130.

Dizdarevič, S. M. (2017) Czech Republic. In: Bayrakli, E. and Hafez, F. (eds.) *European Islamophobia Report 2016*. Ankara: SETA. 145-164.

Havlíček, J. (2015) Kritika Islámu na českém internetu - možnosti interpretace: Případ facebookové stránky Islám v České republice nechceme (English: Criticism of Islam on the Czech Internet - Possibilities of Interpretation: We Do Not Want to Face the Islamic Facebook Page in the Czech Republic). *Lidé města,* 17(3): 475-511.

Hendl, J. (2005) *Kvalitativní výzkum: Základní metody a aplikace (English: Qualitative Research: Basic Methods and Applications)*. Prague: Portál. 2005.

Howarth, D. R. (2000) *Discourse*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Howarth, D. R. (2013) *Poststructuralism and After: Structure, Subjectivity and Power.* New York: Palgrave Macmillian. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137266989

Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002) *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage Publications. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849208871

Kramáreková, V., Kostková, P. and Jiráčková, K. (2017) Politizace tématu 'Arabové v Teplicích' na místní úrovni (English: Politization of the Topic 'The Arabs in Teplice' at the Local Level). In: Rosůlek, P. et al. (eds) *Sondy do studia (o) islámu v období 'migrační krize' (English: Probes to Study (of) Islam in a 'Migration Crisis')*. Plzeň: Dokořán. 109-142.

Křížková, M. (2006) *Neviditelná menšina - analýza mediálního obrazu českých muslimů (English: Invisible Minority - An Analysis of the Media Image of Czech Muslims)*. Prague: Multikulturní centrum (Multicultural Center). Available at: http://migraceonline.cz/cz/e-knihovna/neviditelna-mensina-analyza-medialniho-obrazu-ceskych-muslimu . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics.* London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2005) *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2015) Populism: What's in a Name? (2005). In: Howarth, D. (ed.) *Ernesto Laclau. Post-Marxism, populism and critique*. Abingdon: Routledge. 152-164. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203762288

Marchart, O. (2017) Die Diskursanalyse der Essex School: Modell und Methode (English: The Discourse Analysis of the Essex School: Model and Method). In: Marchart, O. (ed.) *Ordnungen des Politischen: Staat - Souverenität – Nation (English: Orders of the Political: State - Sovereignty – Nation).* Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH. 57-79. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-17259-6_4

Mareš, M. (2015) Monotematická protiislámská uskupení v České republice (English: Monothematic Anti-Islamic Committees in the Czech Republic). In: Mareš, M. et al. (eds.) *Ne islámu! Protiislámská politika v České republice (English: Not Islam! Anti-Islamic Policy in the Czech Republic).* Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture). 81-97.

Mareš, M. et al. (eds.) (2015) *Ne islámu! Protiislámská politika v České republice (English: Not Islam! Anti-Islamic Policy in the Czech Republic).* Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture).

Mareš, M. and Vejvodová, P. (2015) Pravicově extremistická protiislámská politika (English: Right-Wing Extremist Anti-Islamic Politics). In: Mareš, M. et al. (eds.) *Ne islámu! Protiislámská politika v České republice (English: Not Islam! Anti-Islamic Policy in the Czech Republic).* Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture). 99-123.

Marttila, T. (2016) *Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis: From Political Difference to Empirical Research.* New York: Palgrave Macmillian. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137538406

Mochťak, M. (2015) Konzervativní protiislámská politika (English: Conservative Anti-Islamic Policy). In: Mareš, M. et al. (eds.) *Ne islámu! Protiislámská politika v České republice (English: Not Islam! Anti-Islamic Policy in the Czech Republic).* Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture). 147-171.

Mrva, D. (2014) Czech Defence League v kontextu antidžihádistického hnutí (English: Czech Defense League in the Context of the Anti-Jihadist Movement). *Rexter*, 2014(2). Available at: http://www.rexter.cz/czech-defence-league-v-kontextu-antidzihadistickeho-hnuti/2014/12/08/ . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Ostřanský, B. (2016) Islám a muslimové českýma očima - dialog nebo míjení? (English: Islam and Muslims with Czech Eyes - Dialogue or Passage?). In: Beránek, O. and Ostřanský, B. (eds.) *Stíny minaretů. Islám a muslimové jako předmět českých veřejných polemic (English: Shadows of Minarets: Islam and Muslims as Objects of Czech Public Polemics).* Prague: Academia. 14-57.

Prokůpková, V. (2018) Společně proti islámu: Spolupráce hnutí Pegida s českým protiislámským hnutím (English: Together against Islam: The Pegida Peace Movement with the Czech Anti-Islamic Movement). *Politologická Revue*, 24(1).

Rosůlek, P. (2017) Čeští zpěváci a kritika islámu na Facebooku (2015-2017) (English: Czech Singers and Critics of Islam on Facebook (2015-2017)). In: Rosůlek P., et al. (eds.) *Sondy do studia (o) islámu v období 'migrační krize' (Enlish: Probes into the Study (of) Islam during the 'Migration Crisis').* Plzeň: Dokořán. 172-213.

Rosůlek, P. (2018) The Czech Singers Critical of Islam and Refugees on Facebook in the Age of the 'Migration Crisis' (2015-2017). *Politics in Central Europe*, 14(1): 35-62. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2018-0002

Rosůlek, P., et. al. (eds.) (2017) *Sondy do studia (o) islámu v období 'migrační krize' (Enlish: Probes into the Study (of) Islam during the 'Migration Crisis').* Plzeň: Dokořán.

Smolík, J. (2013) *Národní strana v kontextu krajní pravice: 2003-2012 (English: National Party in the Extreme-Right Context: 2003-2012).* Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury (Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture).

Topinka, D. (ed.) (2016) *Muslimové v Česku: Etablování Muslimů a Islámu do veřejnosti (English: Muslims in the Czech Republic: Establishment of Muslims and Islam in Public).* Brno: Barrister & Principal.

Torfing, J. (1999) *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Sources

BPI (2015) Úsvit začal jednat s Kovičkovým blokem o společných volbách (English: Úsvit Began to Negotiate with the Kovičkov Bloc on Joint Elections). *Blok proti islámu (Block against Islam)*, 8 August. Available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20150822184935/http://www.blokprotiislamu.cz:80/usvit-zacal-jednat-s-konvickovym-blokem-o-spolecnych-volbach/ . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Czech Press Agency Database. Available at: http://www.ctk.eu/ .

European Commission (2015) *Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece*. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1502372454883&uri=CELEX%3A52015PC0286 . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Hucek, F. (2015) Ne islámské imigraci - 1/5-5/5 (English: No Islamic Immigration - 1 / 5-5 / 5). *YouTube*, 30 June. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Twcz1vNRlMw . Accessed: 28-02-2018.

IVČRN (2015a) Islám v České republice nechceme - nárh program (English: We Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic - The Agenda of the Program). *IVČRN*, 13 February. Available at: https://www.ivcrn.cz/islam-v-ceske-republice-nechceme-navrh-programu/ . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

IVCRN (2015b) Naše novela zákona o církvích projednávána ve vládě (English: Our Amendment to the Churches Act is Being Discussed in Government). *IVCRN*, 4 April. Available at: http://www.ivcrn.cz/nase-novela-zakona-o-cirkvich-projednavana-ve-vlade/ . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

IVČRN (2015c) Petice proti povinným imigračním kvótám (English: Petitions against Mandatory Immigration Quotas). *IvČRN*, 15 May. Available at: https://www.ivcrn.cz/petice/ . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Peš, J. (2015) Islám v ČR nechceme - demonstrace 14.02.2015 – Brno (English: We Do Not want Islam in the Czech Republic - Demonstration 14.02.2015 – Brno). *YouTube*, 2 February. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ClgpSdqqFVo&t=2732s . Accessed: 28-02-2018.

Press Net TV (2015) Demonstrace proti imigraci - 1.7.2015 - část 1 - Václavské náměstí (English: Demonstration against Immigration - July 1, 2015 - Part 1 - Václavské Square). *YouTube*, 2 July. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IBx6d6_tmI . Accessed: 28-02-2018.

Vláda ČR (2015) Česká republika přijme do roku 2017 celkem 1500 migrantů (English: The Czech Republic Will Adopt a Total of 1500 Migrants by 2017). *Vláda ČR*, 9 July. Available at: https://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/ceska-republika-prijme-do-roku-2017-celkem-1500-migrantu-132704/ . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

PIOTR KOCYBA *

Pegida: A Movement of Right-Wing Extremists or Simply 'Concerned Citizens'?

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 72-88.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.459
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [piotr.kocyba@phil.tu-chemnitz.de] (Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany)

Abstract

The following paper will discuss whether Pegida participants can be accused of having extreme right-wing attitudes or, on the contrary, the movement should be acknowledged as a legitimate form of protest by 'concerned citizens'. To answer this question, the paper will refer to data collected at demonstrations and to general population polls. It transpires, despite other claims (also formulated by experts on Pegida), that Pegida demonstrators indeed lean sharply to the extreme right of the political spectrum. This is indicated both by the party's electoral preferences (after all, a vast majority of the protesters would vote for the AfD) and the worldview of Pegida's supporters that indicates their proximity to the extreme right.

Keywords: Protest Surveys, Right-Wing Extremism, Pegida, Attitude Research.

1. Introduction

The demonstrations organized by *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident, or Pegida) were among the most controversial and important topics in German public debates in 2015. Especially before the onset of the so-called refugee crisis, these 'patriotic Europeans' dominated the German political discourse. At the core of the dispute regarding Pegida was a fundamental question: Are we dealing with Islamophobic agitation, or legitimate criticism of immigration policy? Pegida anticipated the division of German society over the federal government's September 2015 decision to open Germany's borders to refugees. This division is of vital relevance to the present moment, and is the central reason for the political rise of *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD).[1] The depth of this division in German society explains why reactions to Pegida's demonstrations (that take place every Monday in the old town of Dresden) could not have been more polarized. One the one hand, Pegida was accused of being a quasi-Nazi movement (for instance, by the former minister of justice and present minister for foreign affairs, Heiko Maas). On the other hand, local conservative authorities promulgated the view that, despite the Islamophobic appearance of Pegida, its demonstrators were mostly 'ordinary citizens', merely 'concerned' about immigration, and had nothing to do with extreme right-wing attitudes or racism. The latter interpretation was primarily, but not exclusively advanced by the (now former) director of Saxony's State Agency for Civic Education, Frank Richter, who regularly organized discussion forums with Pegida's demonstrators and soon became a prominent expert on Pegida, and who made a sharp division between the organizers and the followers of Pegida, the latter which he defended in public German discourse. He expressed his main understanding of Pegida's participants in a quite famous statement made in January 2015 on public television: 'To my perception, 90 per cent of those joining the marches are actually concerned citizens, who are wondering about things.' By far the most famous scientist working on Pegida, Werner J. Patzelts, offered empirical support for such interpretations, stating that the vast majority of the demonstrators may be cleared of accusations of racism or extremism. In fact, Patzelt's team entered Pegida events on four occasion and conducted a total of 1332 short on-the-spot interviews. But Patzelt was not the only person to survey Pegida's participants. Considering the significance for the public discourse and political landscape, along with Pegida's astonishing mobilization and persistence,[2] it comes as no surprise that

[1] The political rise of the AfD was associated with continuous radicalization. Starting as a Euro-critical party, today it is discussed whether the AfD can now be categorized as an extremist party. While Alexander Häußler uses the term 'folkish-authoritarian populism' to emphasize that the AfD has become a collection of supporters of former extreme right-wing parties which have failed (Häußer, 2018), Armin Pfahl-Traughber argues – on the basis of statements from party members – that the AfD has already reached the point of extremism (of low intensity) (Pfahl-Traughber, 2018). With a specific focus on the Saxon AfD, which is assumed to be one of the most radical German fractions, see also: Steffen Kailitz (2019).

[2] Despite only having 350 protesters at the first demonstration (20th October, 2014), the number of participants nearly doubled each week – with a peak on 12th January 2015 of 2,500 demonstrators according to police, and 17,000 demonstrators according to a team from the Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb). Even though the numbers declined, with an intermediate peak for Pegida's first

Pegida was very frequently surveyed. So far, a total of five different teams have collected data from pro-Pegida demonstrators on eleven occasions:

Table 1: Surveys of Pegida.

Vorländer	ipb	Institute for Democracy Research	Patzelt	Reuband
12th Jan. 2015	12th Jan. 2015	12th Jan. 2015 30th Nov. 2015	25th Jan. 2015 27th Apr. 2015 4th May 2015 18th Jan. 2016	14th Dec. 2015 6th Feb. 2016 25th April 2016

On the basis of this data, this article will argue that terms like 'concerned citizens' are conscious or unconscious attempts to disguise the proximity of the attitudes of Pegida demonstrators to those of the extreme right wing.

2. The socioeconomic composition of Pegida's population and its interpretation

Although all of the research teams which surveyed Pegida demonstrations collected similar data, a major dispute has arisen regarding the question of who protests with Pegida, and why. The first important observation is that Pegida participants are not a socioeconomically marginalized group consisting mainly of unemployed people who have been neglected by state and society. On the contrary, they have relatively high incomes and are much better educated than average Germans (being three times more likely to be university graduates than members of the general population, see: Daphi et al., 2015: 13). This finding diverges sharply from the assumption that Pegida is comprised of the 'concerned public', which would predict that participants of an Islamophobic movement would be on the social periphery. As Vorländer has emphasized, he was astonished by the 'striking' fact that the demonstrators are not recruited 'from the social and socio-economical [sic] margins' (Vorländer et al., 2015: 50). Worryingly, this impression of 'normality' was also one of the first arguments employed to defend Pegida against accusations that they fall on the extreme right of the political spectrum. We can recall here Richter's perception of 'concerned citizens', or refer to Patzelt's claim that Pegida demonstrations are attended by 'normal people' (Patzelt, 2015: 14) who have 'worries, but are good-willed citizens' (ibid., 2015: 22). In reference to this claim, it is noticeable that Patzelt uses the word 'normal' 30 times in his 32-page long publication.

Such interpretations are problematic in a multitude of ways. First, there is no reason why people who are better educated and more well-off than the general population cannot adopt problematic worldviews. Racism, antisemitism and xenophobia are not restricted to poor and uneducated people, or to open skinheads or violent hooligans. In the following account we will see that Pegida is an illustrative example of the so-called normalization of extreme right-wing attitudes within German

birthday of 15,000-20,000 participants, Pegida's persistence is remarkable: Even today, Pegida mobilizes up to several hundred supporters for their events which presently take place each second week.

society. Second, the assumption that having a higher socioeconomic status protects against extremist attitudes is derogatory towards socioeconomically marginalized groups and confirms prejudices. Furthermore, attempts to define societal 'normality' are ethically questionable. Third, the description of Pegida's demonstrators as 'normal' or 'good-willed' ignores their aggressiveness, which is even more striking in Patzelt's case, because it was particularly his team that reported aggressive reactions to their attempts to collect data from Pegida. In his last survey in January 2016, around 22 per cent of Patzelt's interviewers were physically attacked during their time in the field (Patzelt, 2016b: 8).[3]

3. Why self-declarations must be contextualized

Patzelt does not advocate for releasing Pegida from accusations of extremism merely because of the sociodemographic composition of its attendees. It is especially the self-evaluations of protesters (who locate themselves at the center of a five-point left-right scale) which justifies his sympathetic interpretation. In Patzelt's first sample, 62.5 per cent of respondents self-identified with the political center, while only 7.9 per cent self-identified as left of center and 26.9 per cent to the right of it (Patzelt, 2015: 7). Patzelt takes this self-evaluation at face value and states that the protesters at Pegida demonstrations are approximately made up of a two-thirds majority of 'good-willed but worried' people (=center) and nearly 10 per cent 'good-willed but indignant' (=left of the center) citizens. Patzelt only classifies people who *self-reported* being politically right of center as 'right-nationalist xenophobes', claiming that this group constitutes one-third of demonstrators (Patzelt, 2015: 27). This equates not only to a total population of Pegida of 110 per cent, but more importantly appears to defend Pegida against accusations of being an extreme right-wing movement – after all, only a minority can be called 'xenophobic' while the majority are categorized as 'good-willed'. Simultaneously, it illustrates an omission of the special context in which Pegida demonstrations occur: one which is full of (mainly verbal) aggression and Islamophobia. This Islamophobia is openly flaunted not only in the name of the movement (referring to the alleged Islamization of Europe) but also in speeches and on banners at demonstrations.[4]

Moreover, it is very easy to work out where Pegida's political center lies by looking at the protestors' preferences in national elections. Even though more than 60 per cent of respondents in Patzelt's samples claim to represent the political center, up to 92.57 per cent of respondents declared that in the next federal elections they intend to vote for the AfD (Patzelt, 2016: 172, 184). The following table, based on the

[3] Most teams that surveyed Pegida reported (mainly verbal) aggressive reactions from demonstrators. But there were also physical attacks (here we may recall the above-mentioned experience of Patzelt). However, two female students and a scholar, all from the University of Technology Chemnitz, were also attacked while observing the demonstration to celebrate 'the first birthday' of Pegida. The only exception here is Reuband, who claims that the atmosphere was never tense during his research (Reuband, 2016: 53).

[4] The ipb team found that the largest group of posters, billboards and banners broach the issues of Islam, race, foreigners and migration, and often promote sedition, which in Germany is forbidden by law (Daphi et al., 2015: 44-46). Among speakers at the demonstrations, one could point, for instance, to Jürgen Elsässer, the editor-in-chief of the Querfront magazine Compact, or the internationally known leader of Austria's Identitarian Movement, Martin Sellner.

findings of a team consisting of members from the Berlin-based Institute for Social Movement Studies (ipb) and from the Chemnitz University of Technology (TUC), shows the rapid radicalization of the already right-leaning party preferences of the demonstrators:

Table 2: Party preferences.

	PEGIDA	Actual results	PEGIDA	Actual results	PEGIDA
AfD	39.8	4.7	59.8	9.7	89
CDU/CSU	25.3	41.5	14.6	39.4	-
Linke	14.5	8.6	6.1	18.9	3
SPD	7.2	25.7	4.9	12.4	2
FDP	4.8	4.8	6.1	3.8	-
NPD	3.6	1.3	4.9	4.9	5
Grüne	1.2	8.4	1.2	5.7	-

A simple comparison of the self-evaluation of Pegida's demonstrators at the political center and their party preferences illustrates clearly that either they give socially appropriate answers, or that the protesters are really of the opinion that they have a moderate worldview. The fact that they share very similar political attitudes and, in political contexts, interact largely only with one another (i.e. in an echo chamber) probably helps to bolster and reinforce their self-perception as moderates.

4. The worldview of Pegida's 'good-willed' demonstrators

Taking a closer look at the attitudes of Pegida's participants shows that they not only have party preferences to the right of the Union Parties (CDU and CSU), but also the corresponding worldview. This is best shown by the ipb survey that included items used in nationwide polls for investigating right-wing extremist attitudes (namely, the *Center-Studies* [Mitte-Studien]). One of the Center-Studies surveys has been conducted every two years since 2002 by a team from the University of Leipzig (Decker et al., 2013). Meanwhile, the second one has been carried out since 2014 by a team from the Institute for Interdisciplinary Conflict and Violence Research (IKG) at Bielefeld University (Zick and Klein, 2014a: 13). Both *Centre-Studies* follow the so-called consensus definition agreed on by several experts in the research field of right-wing extremism during a conference in 2001. This definition includes six dimensions of extreme right-wing attitudes: 1) affinity towards authoritarian regimes, 2) chauvinism, 3) the downplaying or justification of National Socialism, and 4) anti-Semitic, 5) xenophobic and 6) pro-social-Darwinist attitudes. Each of the dimensions includes three statements, making a total of 18 items (Kiess et al., 2016: 15). Due to the scope of the ipb research, which not only broached the issue of right-wing extremism but also looked at the conditions of participation and means of mobilization more generally, the ipb questionnaire adopted nine of the 18 items

included in the consensus definition.[5] This not only allowed them to collect data on right-wing extremism, but also allowed comparisons of Pegida protestors' attitudes to be made with the German average.[6] This data shows that the approval of even a moderate segment of Pegida protesters (those willing to cooperate with researchers)[7] of right-wing extremist statements 'in general lies above the average of the overall population' (Daphi et al., 2015: 29). Looking closer at the specific dimensions of the extreme right-wing worldview (understood by the consensus definition) the following picture emerges.

The ipb sample very clearly indicates the presence of chauvinism. A strikingly high percentage of Pegida demonstrators agreed with the statement that 'We should dare to have strong nationalist feelings again.' At 81 per cent, this number is more than twice as high as the German average of 29.8/35.9 per cent, respectively. Concerning a statement positing that the German national interest should be vigorously fought for, approbation within Pegida is (at 34.5 per cent) much higher than that found by the *Centre-Studies* (21.5 per cent and 17 per cent). Especially notable is the high percentage of respondents who did not express a clear preference: nearly half of the demonstrators (and thus approximately twice as many as the German average) reacted to this statement elusively.[8]

We can observe the same phenomenon of giving elusive answers when it comes to xenophobic items. A total of 53.8 per cent of respondents avoided giving a clear answer to the question whether foreigners only move to Germany to exploit its social systems. In the German-wide poll, less than one-third were not sure about this question. In spite of these responses, the data still show comparatively high approval ratings for statements such as 'Foreigners only come here to abuse the welfare system' (34.2 per cent within Pegida vs. 27.2/17.4 per cent in the *Centre-Studies*' general

[5] The ipb questionnaire adopted two questions from each dimension with the exception of anti-Semitic attitudes, where only one question was included. Questions about social-Darwinist attitudes were left out.

[6] From here on, the dataset of the ipb team is mainly used simply due to the fact that none of the other teams systematically queried items that indicate right-wing extremism, racism or islamophobia, even though this was one of the most commonly discussed topics concerning Pegida. Vorländer's questionnaire, for instance, did not include any questions of use in exploring those kinds of attitudes. Patzelt, however, in his last survey from January 2016, introduced one question concerning the dimension 'belittling the crimes of National Socialism.' Reuband, for instance, in one of his surveys, used one question concerning 'support for a right-wing dictatorship' and in two of his questionnaires questions from the chauvinism and antisemitism dimensions were used.

[7] Except for Reuband's team, all teams reported encountering problematic groups of young males with a specific dress code (Geiges et al., 2015: 36f.; Patzelt, 2015b: 6). Due to security concerns, Vorländer's interviewers were even instructed not to address demonstrators who had an aggressive appearance (Vorländer et al., 2015: 32). However, even his team reported meeting groups of young (aggressive) males who disproportionately refused to cooperate with the interviewers (ibid., 2015: 27).

[8] This is the reason why the authors of the Bielefeld *Centre-Study* criticize the five-point scale. The undecided category can be indeed a 'hidden approval of the statements [...], because the respondents were potentially aware of the fact that those statements were undesirable.' That was also proven by a group discussion carried out by Decker and his team in 2008. Here it appeared 'that the respondents who chose in the five-point scale the middle category (partially agree/disagree) in fact tended to approve xenophobic statements.' (Groß, 2014: 27f.) If we consider that Pegida demonstrators felt unjustifiably accused of being members of a 'quasi Nazi movement', this presumably had a great influence on their response behavior. This is especially the case if we keep in mind that with the Pegida sample we are dealing with a highly educated group which was aware of the social norms that are expected to be respected.

population polls) or 'Germany is losing its identity because of the large number of foreigners' (41.4 per cent within Pegida vs. 27.5/17.7 per cent, respectively, in general population polls).

Table 3: Extreme right-wing attitudes I.

Statement	Pegida[I]		*Center-Study* Leipzig[II]		*Center-Study* Bielefeld[III]	
Chauvinism	**Approval[IV]**	**Undecided**	**Approval[IV]**	**Undecided**	**Approval[IV]**	**Undecided**
We should dare to have strong nationalist feelings again.	81	15,5	29,8	28,3	35,9	25,8
Today our country needs to firmly and energetically enforce its interests against other nations.	34,5	46,6	21,5	28,1	17	24,6
Xenophobia						
Foreigners only come here to abuse the welfare system.	34,2	53,8	27,2	31,5	17,4	30,6
Germany is losing its identity because of the large number of foreigners.	41,4	37,1	27,5	25,3	17,7	19,6

[I] Daphi et al., 2015: 30
[II] Decker et al., 2014: 32
[III] Zick and Klein, 2014b: 36 f.
[IV] Here the statements 'Mostly agree' and 'Completely agree' are merged.

Aside from these above-average approval ratings, there are also dimensions in which Pegida does not seem to differ so much from the German average. There are no striking differences in approval for an authoritarian right-wing regime, belittling the crimes of National Socialism, and antisemitism. Here, there are even two items where

Pegida demonstrators have lower approval ratings than average; namely, for the statements 'We should have a leader that rules Germany with a firm hand to the benefit of all' (4.3 per cent vs. 9.2/11.4 per cent, respectively) and 'National Socialism also had positive aspects' (5.2 per cent vs. 9.3/10.1 per cent, respectively). This was interpreted by Vorländer to mean that extreme right-wing attitudes are not more commonly held by participants of Pegida demonstrations than the national average (Vorländer et al., 2016: 102). The characteristics of pro-Pegida individuals may then match what Aribert Heyder and Oliver Decker define as the ethnocentric dimensions of an extreme right-wing syndrome, a dimension including chauvinism and xenophobia (Heyder and Decker, 2011). An illustration of the remaining dimensions is shown in the following table:

Table 4: Extreme right-wing attitudes II.

Statement	**Pegida**[I]		***Center-Study* Leipzig**[II]		***Center-Study* Bielefeld**[III]	
Approval of an authoritarian right-wing regime	**Approval**[IV]	**Undecided**	**Approval**[IV]	**Undecided**	**Approval**[IV]	**Undecided**
Under certain circumstances a dictatorship better serves the national interest.	7,8	27	6,7	14,8	6,4	12,4
We should have a leader that rules Germany with a firm hand to the benefit of all.	4,3	12,2	9,2	13,8	11,4	7,3
Trivialisation of the National Socialism						
The crimes of National Socialism have been greatly exaggerated	11,4	15,8	6,9	15,3	7,1	11,4
National Socialism also had positive aspects.	5,2	21,7	9,3	20,5	10,1	16,7
Antisemitism						
The influence of the Jews is still too strong.	14,8	17,4	11,6	21,4	8,6	12,1

[I] Daphi et al., 2015: 30
[II] Decker et al., 2014: 32
[III] Zick and Klein, 2014b: 36 f.
[IV] Here the statements 'Mostly agree' and 'Completely agree' are merged.

Despite this first impression, after a brief look at the table we cannot release Pegida from the claim that they lean to the extreme right wing of the political spectrum. Such interpretations come off badly because they ignore the nature and quality of ipb's sample. A simple comparison of the data collected by the ipb at Pegida demonstrations with that collected by the *Centre-Studies* (which surveyed the general population) is problematic because in the ipb study only 9 of 18 items were applied, and additionally because in each of the studies samples were generated differently.[9] More importantly, the sociodemographic composition of the Pegida sample differs substantially from the German-wide average. This divergence can be explained not only by the very specific population attracted to demonstrations, but also by the low willingness to respond among Pegida's attendees. What is important here is that these differences have a substantial influence on the approval of items that indicate right-wing extremism.

First and foremost, the education level of the respondents at Pegida demonstrations should be mentioned. In the Leipzig *Centre-Study*, for example, we can read that 'Education is still the most important protection against extreme right-wing attitudes' (Decker et al., 2014: 60). Compared to respondents with an Abitur, non-Abitur respondents endorsed dictatorship more than two times more often, were three times more likely to have chauvinistic, xenophobic and pro-social-Darwinist attitudes, to play down crimes committed by the National Socialists seven times more often, and also seven times more likely to be anti-Semitic (education is of similar influence in the Bielefeld study). At the same time, the ipb sample measured the highest level of education ever at a demonstration in Germany. More than one-third of Pegida respondents had a university degree – three times higher than the German average (Daphi et al., 2015: 13). Respondents with an Abitur make up 19.3 per cent of the sample of the Leipzig *Center-Study* and 27.5 per cent of the Bielefeld *Centre-Study* – in the case of the Pegida sample generated by the ipb, 62 per cent of respondents have an Abitur. This is not only a consequence of the mere fact that better educated individuals are more likely to take part in demonstrations. It can be assumed that – considering the low response rate of 18.4 per cent – better educated Pegida supporters were more open-minded towards researchers and thus more willing to take part in a (quite time-consuming) online survey. After all, Pegida is a highly emotional and aggressive anti-elitist movement that also accuses the social sciences of betraying 'ordinary people'. In consequence, we can assume that less educated Pegida demonstrators are disproportionately frequently underrepresented in the ipb sample.[10]

[9] The phenomenon of social desirability has, depending on the survey procedures, different effects on the datasets. The findings of the Bielefeld study, which was conducted as a telephone survey, will be more strongly influenced by the effect of social desirability than those of the Leipzig study, which was conducted as a questionnaire-based, face-to-face interview (Reuband, 2017: 102). Moreover, in the dataset of the ipb which used an online survey there is a specific 'Pegida bias' that mainly results from the highly emotional reaction of demonstrators to accusations of being a movement of racists and Nazis (Daphi et al., 2015: 8).

[10] This also indicates the date of the Bielefeld *Centre-Study*. Here, those who declared that there was a chance they would take part in an anti-migration protest action are characterized by lower education (Klein and Müller, 2016: 198). It is not possible to directly extrapolate from a general population poll to the sociodemography of a concrete demonstration, but it seems to be another sign that the demonstrators in Dresden were less educated than the biased Pegida sample indicates.

Consideration of the impact of education on the approval of the items in the consensus definition therefore fundamentally influences estimations of the right-wing extremism of Pegida: To begin with, Pegida may be less educated and thus more inclined to right-wing extremism than the ipb sample suggests. However, regardless of such (quite plausible) assumptions, the fact that such a well-educated segment of the population agrees so much more often with chauvinistic and xenophobic statements is alarming. Additionally, that this well-educated group from the Pegida demonstrations shows levels of antisemitism, affinity with authoritarian regimes and downplaying of National Socialism compared to both of the significantly less-educated *Centre-Studies* samples seems to confirm the idea that Pegida demonstrators hold views that are in close proximity to right-wing extremism. To illustrate this, we can compare approval with the dimensions of the consensus definition by Pegida and with general population polls – but only for those respondents with Abitur.[11]

Table 5: Extreme right-wing attitudes at Pegida and in general polls (only with Abitur).

Statement	Pegida	*Center-Study* Leipzig[II]	*Center-Study* Bielefeld[III]
Approval of an authoritarian right-wing regime	2,8	1,9	0,8
Chauvinism	51,4	4,9	3,9
Trivialisation of the National Socialism	1,4	0,4	0,2
Xenophobia	27,78	6,8	2,4
Antisemitism	15,5	0,9	0,3

[I]Percentage of respondents who, regardless of the queried items per dimension, on average no less than agreed to a statement (summed index).
[II] Decker et al., 2014: 38.
[III]Zick et al., 2016b: 133; here the numbers from 2016 were used because the 2014 study did not publish the corresponding data.

The differences here are now striking.[12] They also demonstrate, once more, that despite the poor quality of the ipb data, certain important conclusions can be made. The demonstrators trivialize National Socialism 3.5 times more often, display xenophobic attitudes 4 times more often, display chauvinistic attitudes more than 10

[11] The following table can only illustrate the differences between Pegida's demonstrators and the general population because the datasets of both *Centre-Studies* are not available to the author. Thus, the numbers in both *Centre-Studies* represent responses to all 18 items whereas the ipb sample represents only half of the items. But looking closer at the responses to all of the items in both *Centre-Studies*, we can assume that the differences would not diverge too much were the nine items queried at Pegida to be used for comparison.

[12] Unlike the Leipzig *Centre-Study*, the data from Bielefeld suggest that income also has a significant influence on approval for extreme right-wing statements (Zick et al., 2016b: 134). If we also include income in our comparison between Pegida and the national average, the result would similarly be striking due to the high income of Pegida demonstrators. But because the Leipzig study did not find a statistically significant influence for income, the picture is not clear in this case and hence we forego a comparison that takes income into account.

times more often, and are more than 17 times more likely to be anti-Semitic than the German average (according to the *Centre-Study* from Leipzig). The difference from the Bielefeld *Centre-Study* is even more striking: Those demonstrators with Abitur are 3.5 times more likely to support an authoritarian regime, 7 times more likely to minimize the crimes of National Socialism, 12 times more likely to be xenophobic, 13 times as likely to be chauvinistic, and 51 times more likely to be anti-Semitic than the similarly educated part of the sample of the Bielefeld *Center-Study*. The especially high approval for chauvinistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic statements of the well-educated demonstrators is remarkable if we consider the presumably high impact of their wish to give socially desirable answers. This is not only due to demonstrators' aforementioned wish to avoid being stigmatized as a 'right-wing mob'.[13] According to empirical evidence, it is education which makes respondents more likely to answer in a way that fits societal norms (Zick et al., 2016: 62). Whereas in the overall population education is negatively correlated with proximity to right-wing extremist attitudes, this relationship seems not to apply to the demonstrators in Dresden.

However, the data collected using the consensus definitions does not merely allow one to see the tendency of the surveyed group to display anti-Semitic, xenophobic, chauvinistic, etc. attitudes. Using the data, we can also say which individuals within the surveyed group have extreme right-wing attitudes and determine how many of the former the surveyed group contain. A comparison between Pegida and the German average confirms the picture of a protest consisting of more individuals with an extreme right-wing worldview than average.[14] While according to the Leipzig *Centre-Study* in terms of the national average 5.6 per cent of respondents have a 'manifest extreme right-wing world-view', the proportion at Pegida is nearly twice as high (9.6 per cent). According to the dataset of the Bielefeld *Centre-Study*, only 2.4 per cent of respondents could be called right-wing extremists – while at Pegida there were than nearly four times more extremists than in the German average. Thereby, we can speak of a significant discrepancy which should not be underestimated because young males, presumably extremists, refused to take part in the survey. This is why it is highly plausible to assume that at Pegida there are many more individuals with extreme right-wing attitudes than the sample indicates.

[13] Social desirability plays a central role in the response behaviour of the demonstrators because they feel insulted by an unjustified media image. This finding also confirms that of other researchers of Pegida. Vorländer, for instance, points out: 'As a rule [...] respondents reject insistent[ly] the accusation [of] being a "Nazi" or [...] cooperat[ing] with such. As "completely normal citizens" they feel not only misunderstood by media and publicity but regularly defamed' (Vorländer et al., 2015: 67).

[14] In both *Centre-Studies*, to identify right-wing extremist attitudes, an 'average value was generated, displaying the percentage of respondents who agreed with all 18 statements in the questionnaire. The possible answers, 1 ("completely disagree") to 5 ("completely agree"), were added up (maximum possible value = 90). Any value above 63 represents average approval of the statements and thus a closed, far-right world view' (Decker et al., 2016: 98). Aware of the critical methodological implications, we assume that regarding the ipb sample, which only used half of the statements of the former, the cut-off limit should be also halved to identify individuals with a closed extreme right-wing worldview. The limit for the Pegida sample lies therefore at 31.5.

5. Counter-argument: Who supports Pegida in Germany-wide polls?

The plausibility of the above-formulated interpretation, that Pegida's demonstrators are more clearly leaning to the extreme right-wing of the political spectrum than it seems at first glance, can be supported by a reverse approach. We can both compare the data generated at Pegida with findings from nationwide polls, and also check for expressions of sympathy for Pegida or willingness to participate in anti-immigration demonstrations in national representative surveys. Even if this approach does not examine the attitudes of Dresden's demonstrators, it shows who supports Pegida. By doing this, the *Centre-Study* team from Leipzig revealed that there are only two correlations in their dataset when it comes to support for Pegida; namely, between Pegida support and right-wing extremism, and between Pegida support and Islamophobia (Yendell et al., 2016: 139f.). But the authors emphasize that 'The strongest explanatory variable was the manifestation of an extreme right-wing attitude: the higher [sic] the extreme right-wing attitude was, the more probable it was that the goals of Pegida were supported (ibid., 2016: 145).'

For this reason, it remains to be pointed out that other explanations for support for Pegida, especially those that emphasize political deprivation as a main motive for sympathizing with the movement from Dresden, are statistically not really of importance. Individuals who are disappointed by their opportunity to influence or participate in the political decision-making processes in Germany are not statistically significantly more likely to support the goals of Pegida. What are significant, however, are Islamophobic and extreme right-wing attitudes.

The authors of the Bielefeld *Centre-Study* arrived at a similar finding. In this survey, the question concerned willingness to participate in anti-immigration demonstrations. The outcome was that respondents who were willing to take part in such protests showed high approval ratings for the items indicating extreme right-wing attitudes and were furthermore ready to use violence (Klein and Müller, 2016: 194). Because of this, the Bielefeld team speaks of a 'bad civil society' (ibid., 2016: 196f.). General population polls therefore clearly show how intertwined Pegida and right-wing extremism are.

6. Conclusion

In 2015, Pegida's emergence hinted at the division of German society, which eventually became visible with the onset of the so-called Refugee Crisis. This division is of fundamental relevance to Germany society and politics. After all, the AfD took quickly to the discourse set up by Pegida, and may now have become the second largest party in Germany – at least this is what election polls indicate in the middle of 2018. In Saxony, the AfD even won the majority of votes in the last federal elections (09/2017). As with the case of the AfD, the German public was (and partially still is) struggling over whether Pegida is a 'quasi-Nazi movement' or the expression of legitimate concerns of conservative but 'normal' and even 'good-willed' citizens.

A look at the 11 surveys conducted at Pegida demonstrations can help to find an answer to this debate. All of them indicate a paradox: while (up to two-thirds of) the demonstrators locate themselves in the political center, their political preferences

are mainly for parties to the right of the Christian-Democratic Party. The AfD can count on the support of around 90 per cent of Pegida's demonstrators, while the NPD is far behind but still the second strongest party preference. This observation indicates that, despite Pegida's self-perception as 'centrist', it is worth taking a closer look at the attitudes of the demonstrators. Here especially, the data collected by ipb allow close comparison between the attitudes of Pegida demonstrators and the German average because the ipb questionnaire was the only one to include items from general population polls about right-wing extremism (following the consensus definition used in the so-called *Centre-Studies*).

Direct comparison of the Pegida sample with both *Centre-Study* samples, however, turns out to be difficult. This is due to the poor quality of the dataset generated from among the demonstrators. First, the ipb sample is not representative because of the high refusal rate (particularly among young and aggressive males). The Pegida sample is thus particularly biased, and mainly represents the moderate segment of the demonstrators. Additionally, we can assume that it was primarily better educated protesters who participated in the survey. If those moderate, well-educated demonstrators 'only' expressed above-average approval for statements relating to the dimensions of chauvinism and xenophobia (see: Table 3) and in the remaining dimensions showed values similar to the general population (see: Table 4), then we should not simply conclude that the demonstrators do not disproportionately often harbor extreme right-wing attitudes. On the contrary: the Pegida sample shows worrying approval ratings for extreme right-wing attitudes because it under-represents open extremists and over-represents well-educated protesters. Here we should recall that general population polls indicate that it is mainly education which helps to defend against extreme right-wing attitudes. In contrast to average general respondents, those demonstrators who took part in the ipb survey constitute a group which – despite their high level of education – lean to the extreme right-wing. This discrepancy between the well-educated segment of the German average and Pegida demonstrators becomes strikingly visible if we compare the segments of both groups who graduated with Abitur (see: Table 5). Additionally, the number of demonstrators who showed a 'manifest extreme right-wing worldview' is, at nearly 10 per cent, two (four) times as high as in the population average, according to the two *Centre-Studies*, respectively. This is especially alarming because open extremists refused to take part in the survey. Moreover, independent from the ipb sample, the two *Centre-Studies* clearly show that it is mainly respondents with extreme right-wing views who support the goals of Pegida. Against other claims, the data collected at Pegida, as well as the data from general population polls, prove that Pegida is attractive primarily to individuals who are at least sympathetic to an extreme right-wing worldview.

References

Daphi, P. et al. (2015) *Protestforschung am Limit. Eine soziologische Annäherung an Pegida (English: Protest Research at its Limits. A Sociological Approach).* Berlin: ipb Working Papers. Available at: https://protestinstitut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/protestforschung-am-limit_ipb-working-paper_web.pdf . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Decker O., Hinz, A., Geißler, N. and Brähler, E. (2013) Fragebogen zur rechtsextremen Einstellung – Leipziger Form (FR-LF) (English: Questionnaire on Right-Wing Attitudes. Leipziger Form (FR-LF)). In: Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Brähler, E. (eds.) *Rechtsextremismus der Mitte: Eine sozialpsychologische Gegenwartsdiagnose (English: Right-Wing Extremism of the Middle: A Socio-Psychological Diagnosis of the Present).* Leipzig: Psychosozial-Verlag. 197-212.

Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Brähler, E. (2014) *Die stabilisierte Mitte: Rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland 2014 (English: The Stabilized Center: Right-Wing Attitude in Germany 2014).* Leipzig. Available at: http://research.uni-leipzig.de/kredo/Mitte_Leipzig_Internet.pdf . Accessed: 27-03-2018.

Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Brähler, E. (2016) 'Fertile Soil for Ideological Confusion'? The Extremism of the Centre. In: Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Brähler, E. (eds.) *German Perspectives on Right-Wing Extremism. Challenges for Comparative Analysis.* London: Routledge. 83-103. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315625386

Häußler, A. (2018) Die AfD: Partei des völkisch-autoritären Populismus (English: The AfD: Party of the Folkish-Authoritarian Populism) In: Häusler, A (ed.) *Völkisch-autoritärer Populismus: der Rechtsruck in Deutschland und die AfD (English: Folkish-Authoritarian Populism: The Shift to the Right in Germany and the AfD.* Hamburg: VSA. 9-20.

Heyder, A. and Decker, O. (2011) Rechtsextremismus – Überzeugung, Einstellung, Ideologie oder Syndrom? Eine theoriegeleitete empirische Überprüfung mit repräsentativen Daten (English: Right-Wing Extremism – Conviction, Attitude, Ideology or Syndrom? An Empirical Verification with Representative Data) In: Langenohl, A. and Schraten, J. (eds.) *(Un)Gleichzeitigkeiten: Die demokratische Frage im 21. Jahrhundert (English: (Un) Simultaneities: The Democratic Question in the 21st Century).* Marburg: Metropolis Verlag. 223-259.

Geiges, L., Marg, S. and Walter, F. (2015) *Pegida: Die schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft (Pegida: The Ugly Face of Civil Society?).* Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839431924

Groß, E. (2014) Untersuchungsanlage, Methodik und Stichprobe der Analyse (English: Research Design, Methodology, and Sample of the Analysis). In Zick, A. and Klein, A. (eds.) *Fragile Mitte – Feindselige Zustände: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2014 (English: Fragile Center - Hostile States: Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in Germany 2014).* Bonn: Dietz. 24-31.

Kailitz, S. (2019) Die AfD in Sachsen: rechtspopulistisch, rechtsextremistisch oder was sonst? (The AfD in Saxony: Right-Wing Populist, Extremist or What Else?). In: Backes, U. and Kailitz, S. (eds.) *Hochburg des Rechtsextremismus? Sachsen im Vergleich (English: Stronghold of Right-Wing Extremism? Saxony in Comparison*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. [forthcoming].

Kiess, J., Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (2016) Introduction: German Perspectives on Right-Wing Extremism: Challenges for Comparative Analysis. In: Kiess, J., Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (eds.) *German Perspectives on Right-Wing Extremism Challenges for Comparative Analysis*. London: Routledge. 1-8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315625386

Klein, A. and Müller, M. (2016) Demokratische Mitte oder Bad Civil Society? (English: Democratic Center or Bad Civil Society?). In: Zick, A., Küpper, B. and Krause, D. (eds.) *Gespaltene Mitte – Feindselige Zustände: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016 (English: Split Center - Hostile States: Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in Germany 2016)*. Bonn: Dietz. 185-202.

Patzelt, W. J. (2015) *Was und wie denken PEGIDA-Demonstranten? Analyse der PEGIDA-Demonstranten am 25. Januar 2015. Ein Forschungsbericht (English: What and How Do Pegida Protestors Think? An Analysis of the Protestors from January 25, 2015. A Research Report).* Dresden. Available at: https://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/philosophische_fakultaet/ifpw/polsys/for/pegida/patzelt-analyse-pegida-2015.pdf . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Patzelt, W. J. (2015b) *Drei Monate nach dem Knall: Was wurde aus PEGIDA? Vergleichende Analyse der PEGIDA-Demonstrationen vom 25. Januar, 27. April und 4. Mai 2015 in Dresden (English: Three Months after the Big Bang: What Happened with PEGIDA? A Comparative Analysis of the Demonstrations from January 25, April 27, and May 4, 2015 in Dresden).* Dresden. Available at: https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/phil/powi/polsys/ressourcen/dateien/forschung/pegida/patzelt-analyse-pegida-2015-05.pdf?lang=de . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Patzelt, W. J. (2016) Wer sind und wie denken Pegidianer (Who Are PEGIDA Protestors and What Do They Think?) In: Patzelt, W. J. and Klose, J. (eds.) *PEGIDA: Warnsignale aus Dresden (English: PEGIDA: Warning Signals from Dresden)*. Dresden: Thelem. 149-294.

Patzelt, W. J. (2016b) *Feldbericht zur anonymisierten Teilnehmerbefragung bei PEGIDA am 18.01.2016 auf dem Dresdner Neumarkt (English: A Field Report of the Anonymized Participant Survey at PEGIDA on January 18, 2016 in Dresden Neumarkt)*. Dresden. Available at: https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/phil/powi/polsys/ressourcen/dateien/forschung/pegida/patzelt-feldbericht-pegida-2016-02.pdf?lang=de . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Pfahl-Traughber, A. (2018) Ist die AfD (rechts-)extremistisch? (English: Is the AfD an Extreme (Right-Wing) Party?). *Blick nach rechts*, 23 March. Available at: https://www.bnr.de/artikel/hintergrund/ist-die-afd-rechts-extremistisch Accessed 26-11-2018.

Reuband, K. H. (2016) Pegida im Wandel? Soziale Rekrutierung, politisches Selbstverständnis und Parteipräferenzen der Kundgebungsteilnehmer (English: Is PEGIDA Changing? Social Recruitment, Political Self-Perception, and Party Preference of Participants). *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Parteienrecht und Parteienforschung (Communications of the Institute for Party Law and Party Research),* 22: 52-69. Available: https://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Institute/Sozialwissenschaften/Soziologie/Dokumente/Reuband/Reuband_MIP_2016_Pegida_im_Wandel.pdf . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Reuband, K. H. (2017) Analyse: Pegida, Sachsen und die Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Warum es komplexerer und regionalspezifischer Analysen bedarf (English: Analysis: Pegida, Saxony, and Xenophobia. Why We Need More Complex and Region-Based Analyses). *Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen (Research Journal Social Movements),* 30(1): 101-106. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/fjsb-2017-0014

Vorländer, H., Maik, H. and Schäller, S. (2015) *Wer geht zu PEGIDA und warum? Eine empirische Untersuchung von PEGIDA-Demonstranten in Dresden. Dresden: Schriften zur Verfassungs- und Demokratieforschung (English: Who Attends PEGIDA and Why? An Empirical Study of PEGIDA Protestors in Dresden).* Dresden: Schriften zur Verfassungs- und Demokratieforschung (Writings on Constitutional and Democratic Research). Available at: https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/phil/powi/poltheo/ressourcen/dateien/news/vorlaender_herold_schaeller_pegida_stu die?lang=de . Accessed: 30-03-2018.

Vorländer, H., Maik, H. and Schäller, S. (2016) *PEGIDA: Entwicklung, Zusammensetzung und Deutung einer Empörungsbewegung (English: PEGIDA: Development, Constitution, and Interpretation of a Movement of Outrage).* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Zick, A. and Klein, A. (2014a) Fragile Zustände (English: Fragile Conditions). In: Zick, A. and Klein, A. (eds.) *Fragile Mitte – Feindselige Zustände: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2014 (English: Fragile Middle - Hostile states: Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in Germany 2014).* Bonn: Dietz. 12-23.

Zick, A. and Klein, A. (2014b) Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in einer fragilen Mitte (Right-Wing Attitudes of a Fragile Center) In: Zick, A. and Klein, A. (eds.) *Fragile Mitte – Feindselige Zustände: Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2014 (English: Fragile Middle - Hostile states: Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in Germany 2014).* Bonn: Dietz. 32-60.

Zick, A., Krause, D., Berghan, W. and Küpper, B. (2016a) Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit in Deutschland 2002-2016 (English: Group-Focused Enmity in Germany 2002-2016). In: Zick, A., Krause, D. and Küpper, B. (eds.) *Gespaltene Mitte – Feindselige Zustände Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016 (English: Split Center - Hostile States Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in Germany 2016).* Bonn: Dietz. 33-82.

Zick, A., Krause, D. and Küpper, B. (2016b) *Rechtspopulistische und rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland (Populist and Right-Wing Attitudes in Germany)* In: Zick, A., Krause, D. and Küpper, B. (eds.) *Gespaltene Mitte – Feindselige Zustände Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016 (English: Split Center - Hostile States Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in Germany 2016).* Bonn: Dietz. 111-142.

Yendell, A., Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (2016) Wer unterstützt Pegida und was erklärt die Zustimmung zu den Zielen der Bewegung? (English: Who Supports Pegida and What Can Explain Their Approval of the Movement's Goals?). In: Decker, O., Kiess, J. and Brähler, E. (eds.) *Die enthemmte Mitte. Autoritäre und rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland: Die Leipziger Mitte-Studie (English: The Uninhibited Middle. Authoritarian and Extreme Right-Wing Attitudes in Germany - The Leipzig Center Study).* Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag. 137-152.

MICHAL VÍT AND JUDIT TÓTH *

The Changing Dynamics of the Effective Protection of EU External Borders or/and Forced Migrants

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 89-106.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.502
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [vvit.michal@gmail.com] (Metropolitan University Prague);
[skulajuris@u-szeged.hu] (University of Szeged)

Abstract

The experience of a migration crisis (2015 and 2016) on the edge of Schengen and EU territory has demonstrated two divergent development perspectives. From both the EU and its Member States, there has been increasing demand to protect the EU's external borders. This requires trust in both national and EU (Frontex) authorities that are supposed to be the guardians of national and European security. At the same time, however, negative sentiments towards migrants have increased and continue to arise from different cultural backgrounds within Member States. These diverging perspectives are struggling to develop hand in hand with the current and requested role of the Frontex agency. There are rising tensions concerning the legality of measures introduced on external borders in order to protect the EU territory effectively. There is enormous disparity between the requested norms and standards, and EU and international law, which mirrors the strong anti-migrant sentiment within CEE Member States. This paper analyses the disparity between EU and international norms with the measures being introduced on the EU's external border with the Western Balkan states. It also aims to analyze the medium-term impact of this disparity at a national and EU level from the perspective of efficiency, solidarity and legality. The migrant influx may be addressed as an example of crisis management in the context of how these three principles of EU law are implemented within CEE Member States as a part of the (political, geographical and cultural) map of Europe.

Keywords: Rule of law, Migration, Frontex, Schengen, Schengen Border Code, International law, EU.

1. Introduction

Between 2010 and 2015, Hungarian authorities overlooked the fact that asylum-seekers and recognized refugees had not formally left the country and travelled to another Member State (MS) of the EU as a consequence of tightened procedural, reception and integration opportunities that were mainly financed using EU funds. Hence, even in the summer of 2015, hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees heading to Austria and Germany were allowed into Hungary and assisted with transportation by the authorities, who could not envisage their return to Greece due to the non-application of the Dublin rules (Nagy, 2016). After 2015, Hungary, in an attempt to protect Schengen's external borders, built up fences and legal barriers, as well as atomized and isolated the asylum-seekers/displaced persons in transit zones (Kallius, 2016) to externalize the buffer zone and the burden of refugee admission and offload it onto Serbia and other Balkan countries. In parallel with this, a Turkish-EU agreement was concluded, so the EU did the same - while also giving space to nationalist and intolerant voters and governments wishing to maximize votes. We witnessed these dynamics (in the words of Geddes and Scholten (2016: 282): the 'institutionalization of Europe' and the 'Europeanisation of institutions') that involve the link between migration policy and EU external-relations-related policy, making this migration a definite security issue (securitization),[1] and leading to the development of a new generation of asylum and migration protection rules, the widespread introduction of biometric identifiers, the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the extension of the mandate of Frontex and the sending of professionals and resources to Western Balkan countries, increases in the income of human traffickers due to the establishment of alternative Balkan routes, and attempts to combat trafficking in human beings through stronger European action. The authors examine these particular dynamics: namely, how the migration and EU migration policies of the Member States (MS) interact with each other, and what elements were adopted due to recent events, rules and data in CEE.

For the purpose of this article, we identify the years 2015 and 2016 as the crisis period, this time being associated with a huge increase in migrants and refugees crossing the Serbian-Hungarian border. The years 2017 and 2018 we identify as post-crisis period with a focus on the reforms of the Schengen system.

2. Contradictions in the System

The Schengen system is somewhat conflictual in nature. To outsiders, it means that the external borders of the EU are checked in an integrated manner, based on common standards, resulting in those inside not being subject to internal border controls and subsequently being free to travel and move. However, this reality is now fading: five countries have restored their regular internal border controls and at their external borders have erected fences based on national decisions which undermine the principles of common trust and solidarity and have introduced a system of bilateral and unilateral nation-state decisions instead of joint border management. Is this a simple case of bad management of the migration and asylum crisis, or an

[1] As developed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998).

indicator of a more profound internal paradox? - It could be argued that the wave of migrants and refugees overwhelmed the security and sovereign discourse and weakened the principles of solidarity and the Schengen regime. However, perhaps it is only the weak integration of the Central and East European (CEE) countries that has hindered the capacity of these states to deal with the crisis and led to a perceived political crisis in the EU.

The migrant crisis of 2015 and 2016 led the EU to undergo significant transformative processes in terms of developing the EU's security institutions in terms of foreign relations, as well as internally. The long-term aim of the EU of developing an integrated security and migration policy has been driven by the need to provide a coordinated response to the ever-increasing complexity of global issues: this has resulted in initiatives to integrate migration into external relations and EU foreign policy (see: the New Partnership Framework, and the Eastern Neighborhood Policy). These initiatives aim to transpose development, cooperation programs and the externalization of asylum processing to the buffer zone in order to remove conflict zones from EU border areas. This is how the role of the Western Balkans has been evaluated. The integration of internal security in the EU has been driven by an understanding that individual Member States are unable to tackle issues such as international organized crime or migration on their own. Therefore, the EU, which was firstly an umbrella framework for cooperation, has been transformed into a guardian of internal security sui generis, while still leaving key security competences in the hands of EU Member States (Kaunert, 2011; Bossongl, 2016). The migration crisis has led to breaking point for the aims of integration in the field of internal security. Despite the fact that migration is a global and very complex phenomenon, the response is very political one. Since the political space is still defined by state borders, this isolates effective measures in terms of (national) decision making so that they are political in nature by definition.

These years-old hidden paradoxes or clandestine internal contradictions are becoming more visible due to the recent migrant crisis. That said, the problem is not an issue of security, but of politics. The perception of *internal security* is that it has developed over the past decades into a complicated system in which the EU and Member States seek equilibrium between security and sovereignty. Considering the development of cooperation for the purpose of strengthening internal security, Member States have since the 1970s continuously responded to growing interdependence as well as international threats with increased cooperation. In this context, it should be mentioned that Central and Eastern European countries such as Slovenia, Hungary, and Poland have experienced rapid changes and reorganization since 1989, becoming EU members as well as Schengen countries. Accordingly, they also assumed responsibility for the protection of external Schengen borders – meaning responsibility for the enforcement of the EU legal system. This swift development has created significant pressure on the institutions of CEE countries. As the migrant crisis has shown, it is extremely difficult to enforce norms that are not a matter of political identification. In other words, CEE countries have not felt responsibility for the migrant crisis, which has resulted in a limited ability to enforce

EU norms.[2] At the same time, there has been a rapid rise in the politicization of security issues in domestic politics.

The development of cooperation among Schengen countries is the result of two contradicting trajectories. On one hand, the European Commission (EC) seeks to promote deeper integration and better coordination of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), while Member States still prefer to be the primary actors in guaranteeing the security of their citizens (Mitsilegas et. al., 2003; Carrera and Marko, 2018). These divergent processes have been accelerated by the migrant crisis that has had a significant impact on the understanding of the EU as facilitator of international threats, while individual Member States have developed policies that contradict the legal substance of the AFSJ. That said, the experience of 2015 and 2016 has revealed the unclear competences of Member States and the EU when it comes to Schengen cooperation, as well as both the legal and political implications for the AFSJ as such. This paper thus examines the impact of the migrant crisis from a political and legal perspective regarding political cooperation under Schengen regulations, and from a legal perspective in the case of the implementation of the Schengen Border Code (SBC) and participation in the development of the AFSJ.

This paper aims to analyze the impact of the migrant crisis on the functionality of the Schengen cooperation area. It focuses on substantive cooperation between the European Commission and Member States in the context of the increased political sensitivity of the migrant crisis. The main point of analysis is the issue that within the Schengen cooperation area the system is encountering its limited ability to enforce EU law in contrast to a growing preference for self-oriented solutions.

3. The context of the migrant crisis (2014 - 2016)

Since 2014, the number of migrants entering Hungary via Serbia using so the so-called Balkan Route increased dramatically in comparison to 2013. See the complete overview below:

[2] Under this term we understand the current legal basis of the Schengen system that incorporates the norms of international law such as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950).

Table 1: Number of Third-Country Nationals (TCN) whose entry was refused to the EU, and asylum-seekers (2014-2017).

Country	Refused entry TCN in 2014	Asylum seekers in 2014	Refused entry TCN in 2015	Asylum seekers in 2015	Refused entry TCN in 2016	Asylum seekers in 2016	Refused entry TCN in 2017	Asylum seekers in 2017
Czech Republic	330	905	465	1 235	365	1 200	230	1 140
Slovakia	455	230	465	270	750	100	1 085	150
Hungary	13 325 (4.6% of EU28)	41 215	11 505 (3.9% of EU28)	174 435 (potential applicants, in part registered)	9 905 (2.6% of EU28)	28 215	14 010 (3.2% of EU28)	3 115 (recognized 1291, and rejected 2880 due to pending cases)
Croatia	8 645 (3% of EU28)	380	9 355 (3.1% of EU28)	140	9 136 (2.4% of EU28)	2 150	10 015 (2.3% of EU28)	880 (recognized 150, and rejected 325)
Slovenia	4 410 (1.5% of EU28)	355	4 411 (1.5% of EU28)	260	4 455 (1.1% of EU28)	1 265	3 680 (0.8% of EU28)	1 476 (recognized 152, and rejected 89)
Serbia								6199 (potential applicants, actually 236, and from these recognized 14 and rejected 11)

Sources: Eurostat and www.asylumeurope.org (AIDA).

The Schengen Border Code determines the reasons why TCN cannot enter EU territory. It can be seen from Table 1 that the number of these TCN, as well as the number of applicants for asylum, is increasing. We can surmise that the corresponding increase in the number of people entering irregularly has not been stopped by physical barriers, and procedures based on the scrutiny of individuals will have to be carried out by migration/asylum authorities to determine this; it is unthinkable that people will make a risky journey of thousands of kilometers and then, failing to receive admission or have recognized their claims for protection, will simply accept that their entry has been denied. Furthermore, those who seek asylum should not be refused at borders, so their case has to be addressed, and the overwhelming majority of those arriving in recent years have a basis for protection under international law. The number of TCNs staying illegally has partly declined, too: in 2017, 618,780 non-EU citizens were found to be illegally present in the EU. This was down by 37 per cent compared with one year before (983,860) and by 71 per cent when compared with the unprecedented levels of 2015 when the total number of non-EU citizens found to be illegally present stood at 2,154,675.[3]

An influx of more than two million people has resulted in the erection of physical barriers on Hungarian-Serbian as well as on Hungarian-Croatian borders. The experience of 2015 and 2016 shifted the broad understanding of Schengen cooperation towards a more national-oriented approach in the context of a

[3] See more details on the Eurostat website: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation#Non-EU_citizens_found_to_be_illegally_present

significantly redrawn political landscape in the EU and individual Member States. Nonetheless, the increased influx of people in 2014 did not result in any significant political action either domestically or at the EU level. The political response in Hungary in 2015 was significantly different.

The function of the reforms of 2013 concerning external border protection should be questioned, since Member States - in this case, Hungary – have had full competence when it comes to evaluating impacts on internal security. According to the analytical materials provided by the Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), since 2015 Hungary has not actively notified the EC regarding the very high number of people entering the country. This led to a situation whereby migrants were transferred from Hungary to Austria and Germany in September 2015 using buses. This was neither communicated, nor agreed to by Austria and Germany (Alexander, 2016). Second, this is a very problematic development when it comes to the protection of fundamental and human rights and involved a significant decrease in the involvement of civil society when it comes to asylum-seekers and the systems of protecting the external border.

According to a study prepared by LIBE, the crisis of 2015 and 2016 contained two elements that hindered the functional modus operandi of Schengen cooperation. First, the understanding, definition and further use of the terms *threat to public policy* and *responsible for internal security.*[4] Second, the ineffective enforcement or control mechanisms of the EC regarding the evaluation of threats to the above-mentioned items.

4. The growing competence of the EU in AFSJ as a source of conflict

Following the substantial reform of Justice and Home Affairs that came into force with the Lisbon Treaty (2009), there were shared expectations about increased cooperation in this policy field. The Amsterdam Treaty rather transformed the intergovernmental policy of Justice and Home Affairs into the AFSJ, which thereby took on some elements of supranational decision-making. Among the most notable achievements of the Amsterdam Treaty was the inclusion of Schengen into the framework of the EU and the introduction of new legal instruments following the logic of decision making regarding the area of the common market.

Guiraudon (2003) argues that this was also a case of increasing the competences of the EU in asylum and migration policies; namely, a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) based on directives, SBC, a return and readmission system, the Dublin regime, and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). This argument follows the main logic behind the integration of Justice and Home Affairs over the past 50 years.[5] Security concerns are still very much a sign of state sovereignty,

[4] When it comes to migration, Art. 3 SBC says that migration and the border crossing of third country nationals in large numbers should not, per se, be a threat to public policy or internal security.

[5] Being outside the main aims of integration at the time of the creation of the European Economic Community, cooperation regarding security issues has been driven by MS and their ability to find the common denominators in terms of sharing experience, information and cooperation aims. Under this basis, the TREVI cooperation emerged during the 1970s and, on a similar basis, Schengen cooperation was created. The development of integration after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force was crucial from two perspectives. First, a changed international security environment shifted the focus from a single-

thus states are very reluctant to hand this proof of sovereignty over to a supranational institution. From a broader perspective, two drivers of integration can be identified. According to Kaunert (2011), there is some motivation from national bureaucracies that perceive the EU level as being more capable of defending their security interests, which is difficult to achieve at a national level. Second, there is mutual trust among Member States that has had a significant impact on the cooperation between EU institutions and Member States. The Lisbon Treaty has come up with new legal instruments in the AFSJ that were designed to be in conflict with the exclusive competences of Member States and aimed at developing a newly strengthened supranational platform for cooperation.[6]

EU policy implementation relies on the quality of information provided by Member States, which is again based on the political willingness of Member States to be cooperative about security issues. As mentioned above, starting with the Maastricht Treaty the EU has sought a role as a relevant security player in areas that primarily do not conflict with those in which Member States have unquestionable dominance, such as policing. Therefore, the EU has developed its capacity as well as legislation to tackle issues such as international organized crime, environmental threats, or illegal migration. It is questionable whether the migrant crises of 2015 and 2016 had an impact similar to the terrorist attacks of 2001, 2004, and 2005. Nevertheless, the chain of political implications and consequences for both the EU and Member States has been clearly visible.

The experience of the development of Schengen cooperation since 2006 has demonstrated the serious challenge of maintaining cooperation between Member States and EU institutions.[7] Despite logistical and technical demands for better coordinated and unified border protection, the main issue remains the legal framework of cooperation. In contrast to the period before the Amsterdam Treaty, cooperation within the AFSJ has shifted from solely intergovernmental towards strengthening the competences of supranational institutions. In the case of Schengen

state-orientation towards complex global threats. Second, with regard to changes in the shared understanding of member states and the EU about the security architecture in relation to the issue above. In this context, the Stockholm program is crucial in relation to how MS tackle global security challenges, such as migration (Kaunert 2011), hand in hand with the EU. In this context, it is worth adding that it is unclear how states are willing to tackle these challenges. Cooperation within AFSJ has been driven by different forms of motivation than in the case of the common market.

[6] Carrera (2012: 5) points out two challenges that, according to him, threaten cooperation within the framework of the AFSJ: 'First, how and to what extent will these new Treaty-based and policy elements be translated into practical and effective outputs? Second, how are the various interests and roles of the different actors going to be balanced under the new decision-making and institutional arrangements?'

[7] The current legal basis for external border control started to be shaped in 2006 and consists of the following elements: i) a common legislative framework (the Schengen border code and Regulation (EC) No. 1931/2006 on local border traffic); ii) a coordination structure for operational action (Frontex); iii) a burden-sharing arrangement among member states more or less affected by the border (a Schengen facility and EU external borders fund); iv) rules and procedures when it comes to Integrated Border management (IBM) (Hobbing 2012: 66). Since 2006, the system of external border protection has been further developed mainly in terms of human resources and technical capacity. This was the case for the following areas: upgrading technical capacity such as providing a system of risk analysis, a handbook relevant for IBM, the development of logistics for joint operations, and the creation of rapid border intervention teams (RABIT). As Hobbing (2012: 67) points out, this framework was a significant advance in terms of coordination, but provided individual MS with a significant share of competences as well as an understanding of the EU legal framework

cooperation, the Court of Justice gained competence in translating Schengen cooperation into reality. This relates to the case of the crucial findings of the Court of Justice judgments *Melki* and *Abdeli* as well as *Adi*, upon which further argumentation of Schengen cooperation has been developed (Peers, 2013). The crucial issue is the perception of *threat of internal security*[8] *or public policy* which has been a matter of different perspectives for both EU institutions and Member States. Going further, the problem lies in the level of analysis and responsibility – upon what conditions is internal security under threat, and who is threatened? As expressed in political action, the problem mainly touches on the issue of re-imposing border checks on internal Schengen borders. Naturally, this is a very complex issue when it comes to sharing responsibility for the future functioning of the Schengen system.[9]

The 2013 reform of the Schengen system led to an increase in demands on the EC in terms of coordination, but the biggest responsibilities remained in the hands of Member States. A very important element of the reform was the clarification of the border regime regarding control of citizens from third countries. This can be seen in the demand for strict unification of exit/entry regimes for third nationals, as well as for defining procedures upon which these individuals can be refused entry to the Schengen area. In addition, increased emphasis was given to protection of fundamental rights and providing refugees with international protection with regard to international law. This is also the case for the non-refoulement principle.[10]

Despite the fact that the reform emphasizes the standardization of training and logistical equipment, it mentions the need for respect and dignity in the treatment of vulnerable persons by border guards only vaguely. This call is developed further, stating that special emphasis should be paid to vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied minors and persons that have been victims of human trafficking. In this respect, the SBC regulates that people crossing the Schengen border should be apprehended and treated under the EU's Returns Directive. In this context, the Returns Directive rejects entry bans on persons subject to human trafficking or requiring special treatment. In this context, persons that have been subject to an entry ban have the right to review the decision according to national law and should be provided with legal assistance free of charge (Peers, 2013: 100).[11] At the same time, the 2013 regulation standardizes notifications regarding third nationals denied entry to the Schengen system, but the emphasis is still given to conformance with national law. Moreover, the regulation increased the competences of border guards regarding the

[8] According to the definition of art. 72 TEU.

[9] This blurred level of responsibility has been discussed, for example, by Pascaou (2012).

[10] The current external border regime stresses the use of the Visa Information System (VIS), the Schengen Information System II (SIS II) and the need for standardized reporting (containing justification) about entry refusals, as well as for appealing refusals according to national law (Peers, 2013: 50-51). In addition to this, the reform set standards for logistical equipment such as surveillance systems, appropriate language skills, and training in accordance with the SBC. The reform stated that border checks should be executed in conformity with national law when it comes appropriate training and equipment according to the standards of Frontex. Nevertheless, it is a crucial provision that the border guards of individual states are representatives of the only institution that enforces both national and EU law. This means that, despite increased pressure when it comes to increasing EC competences, border protection as such remains under the unquestionable control of Member States.

[11] This is regulated by the Asylum Procedure Directive.

provisions by which a person can be denied entry upon clear indication of an intention to a commit criminal offence, given previously stated clear evidence.

The most substantive part of the reform deals with the quality and accuracy of information provided to the Schengen Information System II (SIS II). However, while the EC emphasizes the need for standardization and better communication among the Member States when it comes to entry bans and asylum requests, the quality of information that is provided is still the responsibility of individual Member States. Using a similar logic, the Returns Directive provides individual Member States with significant room to maneuver with regard to the implementation of their own policies, which might be counter to the idea of the Directive (Peers, 2013: 99).[12]

5. The crisis as a pretext for unilateral action in Member States

The migrant crisis partly acted as a pretext for Member States in the CEE countries not to strengthen social control over police and borders guards and their subordination to human rights systems, public administration, and the rule of law. Although technical and IT modernization also occurred in law enforcement, police officers quickly became obedient security forces under populist governments that deployed soldiers to the border. Critical non-governmental organizations and the press were hindered as much as possible from engaging in support and social solidarity for refugees and migrants.

Using the defense of sovereignty that has been granted to them since 1989, many CEE Member States have developed any number of political and legal instruments to defend their policies. Among these are such instruments as referenda, modifications of the constitution, communication campaigns about the threat of refugees and migrants, the construction of fences at their borders, the transfer of applicants to the borders of another Member State, refusal to register and readmit applicants, and restrictions on the admission and integration of refugees and migrants. These measures are of course not just undertaken by CEE Member States. Nevertheless, in this region the politicization of the migrant crisis has reached a very high level in terms of the presence of the issue in political competition. One result of these adopted policies has been the decline in the enforcement of EU norms and implementation of international systems of refugees and migrant protection. This is the case, for example, when re-imposing internal Schengen borders or increasing the measures adopted on external borders. According to the SBC, Member States should send notifications to the EC when there are possible threats to public policy and internal security. The Member State should then act in coordination with the EC to adopt appropriate measures while respecting international migrant and refugee protection as well as EU fundamental rights.

This development has had a significant impact on law enforcement within the EU and in the national context. This can also be demonstrated by the fact that

[12] In this context, Frontex is given the competence to provide the analytical background and annual risk evaluation. It should serve as a central institution of information exchange and coordination of the national structures involved. The agency has been called on to coordinate its activities in line with fundamental rights and to provide training to border guards in this respect. As will be analyzed later, this task and its assessment is very problematic.

national bureaucrats and law enforcement professionals support the integration of the AFSJ which would result in a coordinated EU approach to the migration crisis. It is important to add that these experts often participated in the implementation of the SBC before the CEE countries joined the Schengen system in 2007.[13] This development is more apparent when it comes to the activities and role of civil organizations whose activity highlights the contradictions between the EU legal system and national policies. As a consequence, the debate is reduced to the issue of accepting refugees and migrants within individual EU countries, leaving aside the conflicting nature of the situation.

The most crucial element of the Schengen system is thus the relationship between the legal and technical coordination and implementation of the SBC as a key legal document. In this regard, it is expected that national law will brought into line with the SBC, despite the fact that Member States still have wide room for maneuver in terms of the execution of their policies in a national context. This is the case, for example, with providing assistance to victims of human trafficking or providing legal assistance and standardized procedures to people who have illegally entered the Schengen area. Another problem is the understanding of fundamental rights, which are supposed to be harmonized within the EU. The reality shows the resignation of EU authorities when it comes to the enforcement of fundamental rights, since this is still a matter of international law. As a result, the EU disposes of only a very limited capacity to enforce fundamental rights if MS do not respect these norms. The recent development of coordinated protection systems for the external Schengen border through cooperation with third countries will decrease the need for physical barriers such as those which exist on the Hungarian-Serbian border.[14] This will also require proper analysis conducted by the EC to determine if the erection of such physical barriers on external borders is in line with EU law.[15] In addition to this, it is still unclear how the conformity of modus operandi on external Schengen borders, such as on the Hungarian-Serbian border, will be brought back in line with the fundamental-rights-related stipulations of the EU (Carrera, 2018).[16]

According to the study developed for the LIBE (Guild, 2016: 68) Committee of the European Parliament, MS are obliged to communicate to the EC when disproportionate pressure exists on the EU's external border. In this particular case, attention should be drawn to the communication of Hungarian authorities with the EC and Frontex regarding whether the situation in 2015 was evaluated as directly threatening the public policy and internal security of the EU. Since the protection of external borders is still in its execution a matter of intergovernmental competence, MS

[13] From a personal perspective, these experts often experience disillusion with both the administration and political development and the situation results in, among other things, increased fluctuation within public administration.

[14] See more details in: Surk, 2015.

[15] Again, the political dimension of the migration crisis arises. According to the EC, the fence does not violate the EU legal system. However, the method of construction and communication with the EC runs counter to the meaning of the SBC system.

[16] Attention should also be paid to how MS frame the migration crisis. Since 2015 it has become evident that MS very often call people who are on the move 'migrants', which from their perspective allows them to treat their unauthorized entrance to the Schengen territory as an illegal act. According to the FRA, almost a third of the people who entered Hungary in 2015 were criminalized before making a request for asylum.

are to a significant extent freed from oversight by EU institutions. As stated above, this also opens up space for interpretation in intergovernmental decision making when MS make a cooperative approach to the EC regarding the implementation of urgent measures. Finally, it leaves the system of international protection and fundamental rights of the EU in a legal vacuum (Carrera, 2018).

6. Political conflict management in the EU versus Member States

The conflict between the EU and the Member States has been fought in several fields and using various means: relocation and emergency decisions, offering more money and expertise for borders, restoring control at internal borders, disputes before the Court of Justice, border control issues raised during electoral campaigns, and racist propaganda are but a few examples of the diversity of measures and means undertaken.

When focusing on the impact of the migrant crisis situation on the external borders of the EU, the impact of this politicization of the crisis manifests itself in an increase in physical infrastructural development instead of an advance in the use of technology. This is the case mainly on the Slovenian-Croatian, and Hungarian-Croatian-Serbian border. However, similar developments are also visible in different parts of the external Schengen border. From a political perspective, the easiest response to the migrant crisis is to raise physical barriers, increasing border protection. Also, this sends a very clear message to the domestic audience when it comes to introducing measures against illegal migration. Starting in 2015, these measures have been increasingly visible: a significant increase in police and military patrolling within the Schengen territory, the erection of light fences (for example, on the Slovenian-Croatian border)[17] or even multiple barriers like on the Hungarian-Serbian border and an increase in border zones placed under the control of limited law enforcement system.[18] This does not give an entirely clear picture of to what extent and under which framework the cooperation between law enforcement authorities within Schengen and the EU and outside the EU – such as with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Macedonia – operates.[19] At the same time, there is limited willingness to introduce advanced technological measures when it comes to the externalization of Schengen border protection. Following the logic of Schengen cooperation, the deepening of such cooperation relies on the willingness of Member States to act in coordination and under the management of EC/Frontex. Looking at the experience of the post-crisis period (2017-2018), there has not been significant progress when it comes to developing cooperation based on mutual trust among Member States.[20]

Going further, the preference for the politicization of the border protection issue at a domestic level does not lead to the fulfillment of the requirement of having well trained staff responsible for border control. This is the case on the Hungarian-Serbian border, for example. Between 2015 and 2018, this area experienced a

[17] More details regarding the developments in Croatia: N1, 2018.
[18] More detail regarding the development of Schengen cooperation in the context of bilateral disputes: Euractiv, 2017.
[19] More details about the development: Euobserver: 2018.
[20] According to an interview with representatives of MFA of the Czech Republic, held in August 2018.

substantive increase in border guards who often did not have appropriate knowledge of foreign languages.[21] Focusing on the impact of this increased politicization of the migrant crisis, one can observe a constant disrespect for international norms when it comes to migrant and refugee protection. In practical terms this has meant developing political and legal conditions under which there is a constant increase in the refusal to recognize asylum-seekers' rights to protection and the creation of conditions that implicitly lead to a refusal to provide legal assistance to vulnerable persons. This is also the case with unaccompanied minors, the most vulnerable group.[22] There are also other symptoms connected to increased politicization such as the limited respect for adult training and education, low salaries, limited monitoring capacity for the implementation of rules, and no impact assessment of strategic documents requiring standardization within the Schengen system. This naturally leads to very limited access to data and information for journalists, researchers, and civil society organizations.[23] As a result, within countries such as Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, and Austria, information regarding the migrant crisis is provided only through a very centralized system.[24] Such policies run counter to the nature of the EU legal system and the SBC specifically.

This struggle between competences in Schengen cooperation has had a significant impact on the EU response to the migrant crisis. As a result of this lack of leadership, the overall response of the EU institutions and Member States has been very blurred.[25] In contrast to a coordinated approach, the Member States have developed their own supplementary policies due to domestic political circumstances. Nevertheless, representatives of Member States have demanded that EU institutions tackle the migrant crisis more effectively, even if the EU only has only limited tools when it comes to law enforcement in terms of the protection of public security. Considering the fact that the management of the migrant crisis overlaps with foreign policy, a coordinated approach is even harder to achieve (Bossong, 2016: 5-7). This opens up a broad space for the politicization of *responsibility* for the crisis and prioritizes policies focused on a domestic audience. An evaluation of the impact of the migrant crisis on the functionality of Schengen system, as well as the consequent reform of the asylum-seeker system known as Dublin III under the above-mentioned conditions, leads to the identification of the following consequences.

In the abovementioned context, the biggest obstacle has been the implementation of compulsory solidarity in praxis, as well as the development of a standardized procedure for defining an emergency situation. Given the fact that Schengen cooperation is primarily based on the willingness of Member States to cooperate, it is very problematic to enforce solidarity using political arguments (European Commission, 2018). Since the EU cannot act based on exclusive competences as it can in the Single Market, Member States exercise their sovereignty over EU institutions. An increase in political pressure to approve the reform of the system for asylum-seekers in September 2015 also shifted the main scope of discussion from the level of experts and practitioners towards a broader public. This shift has had significant consequences on societies and on the actions of political

[21] According to an interview with a Frontex representative held in March 2018.
[22] According to information provided by Helsinki Committee, Budapest, July 2018.
[23] In-depth analysis provided by the Helsinki Committee in Budapest (Helsinki Budapest, 2018).
[24] According to information provided by representative of EEAS, August 2018.
[25] According to interview with representatives of DG HOME, held in December 2017.

representatives in EU countries.[26] The debate transformed into a discussion about the perceived sovereignty of Member States and about the matter of culture, as opposed to being focused on tackling illegal migration and organized crime (Council of Europe, 2018).[27] As a consequence, it showed the limits of the deeper integration of the AFSJ due to the very sensitive nature of cooperation when it comes to security in a national and European context. That said, responsibility for internal security cannot be transferred to the EU level in the foreseeable future due to the lack of a common understanding about its implementation.

In this sense, the EU only has relatively low-profile responses available to tackle the crisis. As the experience of migrant crisis showed, the most frequent response was to provide additional financial resources, such as funding for increased numbers of personnel to protect the external Schengen border, or direct financial assistance – for example, to Serbia, for running a facility for migrants who stay in the country. In this case, assistance is implemented through instruments of pre-accession cooperation under the control of DG NEAR.[28] The EU has also reacted to the crisis by extending competences to EU agencies and changed decision-making processes. This is the case, for example, with Frontex. According to negotiations with Western Balkan countries, Frontex has the right to execute joint land operations in non-Schengen areas such as Romania and Bulgaria[29] as well as in non-EU countries like Macedonia and Serbia.[30] In addition to this, the EU has provided resources for substantial infrastructure development and the extensive use of existing measures such as the deployment of RABIT teams. At the same time, the EU is trying to implement legal procedures with the aim of imposing effective law enforcement in the field of Schengen cooperation. However, the impact has been of questionable merit given the nature of the regulation. This is the case, for example, with the problematic issue of the compliance of physical barriers on borders with the Schengen Border Code and the EU legal system.

As a result, Integrated Border Management as a part of the Schengen regime has resulted in extended competences using legal measures to a greater extent than prior to the migrant crisis. This is the case with the quicker and more effective exchange of information about third country nationals on their entry/exit to the Schengen system, and closer cooperation with airline companies regarding the operation of flights from third countries.[31] Also, there has been an extended number of joint activities and deployments of RABIT as well as the more effective exchange of skills and expertise under the Frontex framework.[32] Nevertheless, this has no impact on the very limited competence of the EU to enforce EU law on the ground.[33] The most substantial change in external border protection and the Schengen system as

[26] For more details regarding the development of cooperation in terms of EU external border analyses, see: Lehne (2018).
[27] A different perspective is offered in a study developed by the Heinrich Böll Foundation (2017).
[28] Details about the substance of cooperation in regard of the migration crisis can be found at: Europa.rs (2018).
[29] A detailed overview of measures introduced on the Romanian border can be found at the website of the Romanian Border Police (2018).
[30] For more details about the involvement of Frontex in Serbia and Frontex, see: medium.com (2017).
[31] Key elements of Frontex activities outside the EU: analyses portal statewatch.eu (2017).
[32] More details about Frontex operations provided by Frontex (2018).
[33] According to the information provided by an EEAS representative in July 2018.

such is the expected gain in competences for Frontex as a law enforcement agency. Despite this expected substantial reform, it does not replace the key element which is missing with Schengen cooperation - trust-based cooperation and information-sharing among Member States and between Member States and the EC.[34]

7. Conclusions: lessons learnt from dual crisis-management

The migrant crisis significantly fostered the dynamic of cooperation regarding the protection of the external borders of the EU. The crisis of 2015 – 2016 can be compared with the events during the 1970s and 1980s that initiated cooperation in terms of initiatives for strengthening the protection of public policy. However, the context of cooperation has changed significantly. The migrant crisis posed a complex, multidimensional problem. Migration is not only a security issue, but also an inherent part of EU external relations, development policy, etc. which occurs in a highly globalized environment – Member States are unable to act on their own. Thus follows the motivation of Member States to strengthen the security competences of the EU, as was the case with reforms and primary law, beginning with the Maastricht Treaty and ending with the Lisbon Treaty. In order to accommodate these measures in an appropriate legal framework, the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice was developed within the EU legal system as a common basis for Member States who are responsible for law enforcement. However, this presumes that there is a common legal framework that Member States are ready to enforce under the umbrella of the AFSJ. This also presumes that the EU, when using the perspective of the AFSJ framework, understands itself as institution based on law enforcement and to a certain extent also on values. Naturally, this makes the system more complex and requires the determination of individual members of the system to act according to the given framework.[35]

The period after the migrant crisis resulted in more significant changes and agreements than political debate (i.e. political dialogue, rational explanations, arguments and opinion instead of blackmail, propaganda and ideological declarations) around relocation mechanisms for asylum applicants, known as Dublin IV. The most significant impact concerns the gradual decline of the rule of law in a situation where the EU portrays itself as a community based on values. In this sense, Member States such as Hungary and Slovenia are neglecting their commitments to international norms, as well as to the primary laws of the EU. This raises the question whether further integration of the AFSJ and further integration of the EU within the current legal framework is possible. The experience of the migrant crisis showed that there is a limited willingness to enact border protection under a trust-based framework of cooperation. Member States are not willing to share sensitive elements of border protection and even prefer to set aside the regulations of the SBC in order to prioritize national political preferences. In this respect, the case of Hungary shows

[34] According to the information provided by an EEAS representative in July 2018.

[35] For an example of case C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary vs. Council of the European Union regarding the reallocation mechanism of asylum applicants, see details at: asylumlawdatabase.eu (2018).

how the rule of law and dedication to EU standards can be swiftly changed if the national political narrative does not match the narrative of the EU. Since enforcement procedures, according to the SBC, are long and complex, the national agenda can be driven forward without significant limitations. As a result of this development there has been a shift towards intergovernmental cooperation that focuses on on-site collaboration and prioritizing national security rather than on adhering to any higher legal or political system. Nevertheless, this influences the current functioning of the Schengen system, resulting in a significant erosion of Schengen cooperation, as well as the current architecture of the AFSJ. This could open the space for cooperation in a broader geographical area without the need to consider the international system of human rights protection.

The migrant crisis also impacted relations with Western Balkan countries as candidate accession countries to the EU. Impacts are twofold. First, the externalization of border protection (and its consequences) to third countries, mainly to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (as a buffer zone, externalized migration zone, and migrant crisis zone). This involves the increased need for facilities to be provided to people in need on the borders of the EU and creates a precedent for EU integration, which has used money instead of the law as a permanent solution. Similarly to that mentioned above, this significantly decreases the narrative of the EU as a community based on the rule of law and certain values. In addition to this, it creates an unclear legal and political framework when it comes to first-hand experience of protecting the external border, that is now very often connected to the smuggling and trafficking of human beings. As a result, the externalization of the migrant issue has very little to do with the enlargement process and rule of law as such, and more to do with bargaining about security issues in exchange for financial transfers. Given the fact that there is very limited access to information and reliable data regarding the protection of the external border, the nature of the SBC seems to be dysfunctional, regardless of national regulations. Again, this creates a political environment in which the willingness to tackle smuggling and human trafficking is limited. Also, this contrasts with the meaning of the integration process for the Western Balkans, as these countries can see how easily the system can be made to malfunction.[36]

This leads to another significant impact of the migrant crisis which is connected to the politicization of the issue. Since the constant increase in measures focused on physical border protection as well as creating conditions that counter the provision of standardized protection to vulnerable persons, there has also been constant demand for smuggling and human trafficking into the EU.[37] These conditions contribute to the significant spread of organized crime due to the state 'pushing problems through the border policy.' This sharply contrasts with Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR (1950), which has served as the legal basis for European Court of Human Rights regarding the definition of human trafficking as an act that is against the spirit of the ECHR.[38] This might result in the activation of European Court of

[36] For an example of a large-scale case connected to smuggling at the Horgoš/Röszke border crossing: 444.hu (2017).

[37] An example of how migrants and smugglers seek new ways of getting into the EU/Schengen area is provided by Adrian Mogoš (2018).

[38] More details regarding the activities against smuggling and human trafficking can also be found within the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, signed in 2005.

Human Rights processes against countries such as Hungary in an inter-state dispute because of the latter's refusal to admit migrants, refugees and applicants, and a lack of assessment of their applications. Since Hungary hinders the entry of vulnerable persons, it increases secondary migration in the EU and people-smuggling. The politicization of the migration crisis across the EU, with an emphasis on countries like Hungary, thus raises questions about the application of basic norms such as the prohibition of torture, inhuman treatment, and the right to a fair trial.

References

444.hu (2017) Vesztegetés miatt őrizetbe vettek tíz röszkei határrendészt (English: Ten Röszke Border Guards Were Detained for Bribery). *444,* 17 May. Available at: https://444.hu/2017/05/17/vesztegetes-miatt-orizetbe-vettek-tiz-roszkei-hatarrendeszt . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

asylumlawdatabase.eu (2017) *CJEU - Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union*. Available at: http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/cjeu-joined-cases-c-64315-and-c-64715-slovak-republic-and-hungary-v-council-european-union-6 . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Bossong, R. (2016) The Multidimensional Nature and Dynamic Transformation of European Borders and Internal Security. In: Bossong, R. and Carrapico, H. (eds.) *EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security: Technology, Externalization and Accountability*. Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing. 1-21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17560-7_1

Carnegie.eu (2018) The EU Remains Unprepared for the Next Migration Crisis. *Carnegie Europe*, 3 April. Available at: https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/03/eu-remains-unprepared-for-next-migration-crisis-pub-75965 . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Carrera, S., Stefan, M., Chun Luk, N. and Vosyliute, L. (2018) *The Future of the Schengen Area: Latest Developments and Challenges in the Schengen Governance Framework since 2016*. Brussels: CEPS. Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/future-schengen-area-latest-developments-and-challenges-schengen-governance-framework . Accessed: 10-8-2018.

Council of Europe (2018) *GRETA Report on Hungary*. Brussels: Council of Europe. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/greta-2018-13-upro-hun-en/16807bf672 . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

EUobserver (2018) Frontex: Europe's New Law Enforcement Agency?. *EUobserer,* 22 February. Available at: https://euobserver.com/justice/141062 . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Euractiv (2017) EU and Hungary Spar Over Border Fence Ahead of Court Ruling. *Euractiv,* 4 September. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-and-hungary-spar-over-border-fence-ahead-of-court-ruling/ . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Europa.rs (2018) EU Provides €1.5 Million in Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Migrants in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Europa.rs*, 8 June. Available at: https://europa.rs/eu-provides-e1-5-million-in-humanitarian-assistance-to-refugees-and-migrants-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/?lang=en . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

European Commission (2018) *Managing Refugee Crisis*. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/balancing_responsibility_and_solidarity_on_migration_and_asylum_20160210_en.pdf . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

European Parliament (2013) *Asylum Protection Directive, 2013/32/EU*. Brussels: European Parliament. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/common-procedures_en . Accessed: 10-8-2018.

European Parliament and the European Council (2016) *Regulation (EU) 2016/399 Schengen Borders Code*. Brussels: EP and European Council. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0399 . Accessed: 10-8-2018.

Frontex (2018) *Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights: Fifth Annual Report*. Warsaw: Frontex. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-on-fundamental-rights-report-2017.pdf . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Frontex (2018) *Risk Analysis for 2018*. Warsaw: Frontex. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis_for_2018.pdf . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Guild, E., Carrera, S., Groenendijk, K., Bigo, D., Jeandesboz, J. and Martin-Mazé, M. (2016) *Internal Borders in the Schengen Area: Is Schengen Crisis-Proof? Study Commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizen's Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee*. Brussels: European Parliament Think Thank. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2016)571356 . Accessed: 10-8-2018.

Geddes, A. and Scholten, P. (2016) *'The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe': Second edition*. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi; Singapore; Washington DC; Melbourne: Sage. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473982703

Guiraudon, V. (2003) The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociology Approach. *Journal of European Public Policy,* 10(2): 263-282. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000059035

Helsinki Committee (2018) Lexngo 2018. *Helsinki.hu*, 21 January. Available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/en/lexngo-2018/ . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Hobbing, P. (2010) The Management of EU's External Border from Customs Union to FRONTEX and E-Borders. In: Carrera, S., Eggenschwiler, A. and Guild, E. (eds.) *The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years on: Success and Future Challenges under the Stockholm Programme.* Brussels: CEPS.

Kallius, A. (2016) Rupture and Continuity 'Positioning Hungarian Border Policy in the European Union'. *Intersections: EEJSP*, 2(4): 134-151. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v2i4.282

Kaunert, C. and Zwolski, K. (2013) *The EU as a Global Security Actor A Comprehensive Analysis beyond CFSP and JHA*. New York: Palgrave.

Mitsilegas, T., Berridge, G., Monar, J. and Rees, W. (2003) *The European Union and Internal Security: Guardian of the People?.* New York: Palgrave. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230504387

Mogoš A. (2018) Shut-Out Balkan Migrants Find Romanian Backdoor to EU. *Balkan Insight,* 10 May. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/shut-out-balkan-migrants-find-romanian-backdoor-to-eu-05-09-2018 . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Nagy, B. (2016) Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation. German Law Journal, 6: 1033-1081.

N1 (2018) Barbed Wire Fences to Stay on Slovenia-Croatian Border. *N1,* 6 July. Available at: http://ba.n1info.com/a265176/English/NEWS/Barbed-wire-fences-to-stay-on-Slovenia-Croatian-border.html . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Peers, S. (2013) *The Future of the Schengen System: A Report.* Stockholm: SIEPS. Available at: http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/2013/the-future-of-the-schengen-system-20136/ . Accessed: 10-8-2018.

Romanian Border Police (2018) FRONTEX Agency. *politiadefrontiera.ro*. Available at: https://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/en/main/pg-frontex-agency-121.html . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Šurk, B. (2015) Hungary Begins Building Serbia Border Fence to Curb Migrants. *Wall Street Journal*, 13 July. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungary-begins-building-serbia-border-fence-to-curb-migrants-1436799052 . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

Turudić, M. (2017) The Game of Hope - Asylum Seekers at the Serbian-Hungarian Border. *Heinrich Böll Foundation,* 11 December. Available at: https://www.boell.de/en/2017/12/11/game-hope-asylum-seekers-serbian-hungarian-border . Accessed: 20-10-2018.

JÚLIA SZALAI AND SARA SVENSSON *

On Civil Society and the Social Economy in Hungary

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 107-124.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.471
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [svenssons@ceu.edu] (Central European University);
[szalai.julia@chello.hu] (Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Central European University)

Abstract

While the development of civil society organisations in Hungary has been impressive in terms of number and diversity, its influence has remained limited on policy-making. Administrative attempts to draw civil society under tight regulation and control have produced a blurring of the boundaries between the civil and the public spheres that, in turn, has impaired the independent voice and criticism of civil society. Therefore, economic acts based on solidarity and originating from civil society do not automatically form or increase a 'social economy' but become as contested by and as intermingled with political developments as other acts of civil society. This development also has affected the profile of civil activities: against the earlier impressive weight of anti-poverty, anti-racist and human rights engagements, the 'non-risky' activities of sports and leisure services have come to domination. A turn toward declining participation is a warning sign of the decreasing contribution of civil society to everyday democracy.

Keywords: Civil Society, Social Economy, Solidarity, Social Entrepreneurship, Non-governmental Organization.

1. Introduction

Against the backdrop of the continuous European 'crises' that have accompanied the European project through much of the early 21st century, academic and policy-oriented attention to alternative modes of economic production have increased. For instance, in the summer of 2017 the European Economic and Social Committee, representing organised interests and civil society invited social economy representatives to Brussels and simultaneously called on the European Commission to include an action plan on how to support the social economy in its 2018 work programme (European Economic and Social Committee, 2017). Such a plan would contribute to government efforts in European countries to pull non-governmental actors into the 'provision and governance of publicly financed welfare services' (Defourny et al., 2014). Around the same time, a large global academic conference was organised to address the various implications of the social and solidarity economy and social entrepreneurship from a scholarly perspective (EMES, 2017). The *social* and *solidarity economy* in this context refers to a broad range of citizen- and/or third sector-based activities concerned with social and environmental sustainability that provide public goods in e.g. health care, social services or work integration (the definition draws on the work of Eschweiler and Hulgård, 2017).

Hungary is not unaffected by this international and European policy and practice discourse around, and the increasing public interest in the social economy. However, politics and policies around what constitutes acknowledgeable civil actions and also around the legitimate organisational forms of it have shown significant fluctuation with periods of alternating stringent and liberal regulations. Nevertheless, civil society has become a potent constituent of public life by providing interest-representation, self-fulfilling production and services for local communities, and also a domain of micro-level democratic participation. However, due to limited statistical data and a lack of systematic follow-up, there is little scholarly work available that depicts civil society and the social economy in Hungary within its policy landscape, and that sets it in a longer historical perspective. A literature review of all articles in leading scholarly journals published in Hungary in the fields of political science and sociology since 2010 did not result in any articles directly dealing with social economy, and surprisingly few focusing on civil society although of course non-state actions in various parts appear in many scholarly analyses. On the other hand, we find it probable that intense ongoing thinking around the issues of civil society and social economy means that more material exists as conference papers and workshop contributions that are less accessible to the scholarly community and the general public.

The purpose of this article is therefore primarily to provide a thick analysis of how the long-term development of civil society in Hungary impacts the scope for the creation of a social economy. Using Hungary as an illustrative case of mechanisms that are both unique to Hungary and present elsewhere, especially in other post-socialist countries, we hope to contribute to more informed international academic and policy debates about the opportunities and limitations of this ever more applied concept. Our analysis of the policy environment around civil society and the social economy is based on a synthesis of various data sources together with insights from long research careers in the field combined with case studies of civil society organisations carried out

within the framework of a recent large-scale study on solidarity[1] (SOLIDUS) in 2016-2017. Thus, while the purpose of the article is not to bring new empirical data to the fore, the analysis is informed by a large empirical body and occasionally uses this with illustrative examples in the text.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section discusses common definitions and usages in Hungary of the terms 'civil society' and 'social economy', and the inter-relation between these two. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the policy environment of civil society and social economy organisations, respectively. Finally, the concluding section addresses the main lessons of the preceding discussions by pointing to the political ambivalences of democratic development of the civil sphere and the strong limitations on its influence on policy-making. We argue that, in this context, economic acts based on solidarity and originating from civil society do not automatically form or increase the 'social economy' but become contested by and intermingled with political developments.

2. Divergent Conceptualisations and Perspectives: 'Civil Society' and the 'Social Economy'

Civil society, as it stands in front of us in its contemporary form, is the result of centuries of state-society relationship development. It grew out from the thick networks of mutual help and collective self-defence in peasant communities, and then adapted itself to urbanisation in the form of unions and associations to protect the working class and the new bureaucracies. It later absorbed new functions and became a significant agent of alternative economic activities for fighting unemployment, enhancing employment and providing services at affordable prices under non-marketised schemes of delivery. It follows that the scope of the concept has varied greatly by historical time and country.

It may embrace charity in one context and activities of the churches in another. Some include all informal relations and activities outside the home, others prefer a narrower definition that refers only to registered organisations (Kuti, 2008; Bocz, 2009). While a traditional definition specifies civil society as the space between the state, the market and the family (e.g. Gellner, 1994; Celichowski, 2004), recent research points out that while the sociological unit of the family is often seen as antithetical to civil society, it is sometimes seen as a cornerstone (Power et al., 2018).

In the case of Hungary, one can observe a colourful map of conceptualisations of civil society and its activities. In everyday parlance, people would emphasise the value of autonomy, the potency of interest-representation and the capacity of the civil sector to compensate the traditionally low quality of basic public social services and, with increasing involvement backed by the EU, human rights and environmental issues.

[1] The cross-country comparative project 'SOLIDUS - Solidarity in European Societies: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship' was a research project funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 Programme (Grant Agreement no. 649489), from June 2015 through May 2018. Information about the project is available at http://soliudush2020.eu.

A further important but rather neglected perspective is that of social science, which has yet another focus. At the international level, social scientists study civil participation in organised forms of actions, and explore the economic and social advantages provided by the civil actors in comparison to the state and the market. The tendencies in recent Hungarian scholarly work follow this general pattern.

The perspective of the several consecutive state administrations has been much narrower. By neglecting a vast array of informal associations and newly emerged organisations, a much reduced circle of civil society that may access the governments' financial and regulatory support has been defined. Only formal and registered actors are supported by legal, regulatory and financial frameworks, while all other forms are left to people's own initiatives and budget. Such a selective approach has a significant impact on the whole civil sphere, since socially it is oriented to better-off groups with ample resources, while declines participation of the poor.

Both the government and the social science perspectives see an (increasingly) economic importance of civil society as a complement or alternative to profit-driven production. Parallel to the expansion and diversification of civil activities and also in response to the growing criticism over the over-bureaucratised and sluggish functioning of the welfare state, a wide array of innovative activities providing a large scale of products and services has gained special attention which is nowadays drawn under the broad concept of the *social economy*.

Measured by the number of academic publications, topical conferences and policy documents, interest in the social economy as a terrain of new initiatives in producing and delivering services by self-governing rules and voluntary actions decades distinct from both the market and the state has been on the rise in the past decades. However, different strands and authors refer to the concept with varying contents and emphases, and there is no general agreement around an all-encompassing definition that all actors, scholars, practitioners and policy-makers of the field would accept without reservation. Nevertheless, there are some basic features of the social economy that the varying approaches include in agreement.

As a domain of production and distribution, the social economy is embedded into the third sector (some even use the two terms as synonyms), and for the most part, its units work on a non-profit basis. At the same time, its relations, principles and modes of operandi are driven by the norms and rules of civil society. Its primary characteristic is the way how people relate to it: participation is always voluntary and autonomy of the individual is observed in all internal and external relations. Moreover, autonomy and independence are important features on the organisational level as well: social economy organisations rely on self-regulated management that is independent from the public authorities and that also protects them against direct pressures of the market. A further distinctive feature is an inherent criticism of the traditional power relations: decision-making is always driven by democratic rules following a 'one man one vote' principle in most of the cases. Economic activities and the division of roles and labour are primarily driven by reciprocity. After decades of ruling neoliberalism that saw profit-making as the sole truly rational economic activity, the spreading of reciprocal relationships in the social economy inspired scholarly interest in Karl Polanyi's (2002) theory of reciprocity that underscores the importance of the corrective and compensatory functions of reciprocal relationships in a market economy. Reciprocity usually assumes non-monetary relations. In line with this,

participants' contributions are not exclusively seen in financial terms, but also as embodiments of important social values like social justice, equal opportunities, or the collective protection of the environment. The most frequent profiles of the social economy organisations follow from the centrality of these values: their activities are centred on expanding employment, providing training and mediation to the unemployed, inclusive services from housing to healthcare and to education with a focus on disadvantaged minorities, and community development with the centrality of citizens' equality. All these activities involve sensitive interpersonal relations; hence, trust in the organisation and also a trustful way of collaborating with public administration are fundamental preconditions of success.

The 2008 crisis gave a new impetus to the social economy now embracing a wide range of production and services that are not performed for profit. These dynamics informed conceptualisation and experimentation in the field. During the past 10 years, the social economy has become an important contributor to society through innovations in the organisation of economic activities: according to informed estimations, currently it provides 14.5 million jobs that makes up 6.5 per cent of the total employment in Europe with a contribution of five per cent to the GDP of the EU (Monzón and Chaves, 2015).

In 2012, the European Commission published an authoritative definition of the social economy that was meant to orient funding and decision-making of the ever more diversified sphere, hence, it focused on the financial and managerial aspects of the embraced activities: '[The social economy is a] set of private, formally-organised enterprises, with autonomy and freedom of membership, created to meet their members' needs through the market by providing services, insurance and finance, where decision-making and any distribution of profits or surpluses among the members are not directly linked to capital or fees contributed by each member' (European Commission, 2012). While this definition importantly influenced private-public cooperation and assisted legislation within the nation-states, increased diversity of the sphere and the need for better incorporating social innovation as a distinctive contribution of its services and production inspired new scholarly work to further develop and refine the concept of the social economy.

The SOLIDUS project evolved in response to these new needs. An extensive literature review of general and country-specific developments, together with the rich empirical material that the 13 participating countries brought to the table resulted in a new, finely calibrated conceptual approach to the social economy: 'There is no universally accepted conceptual definition of the social economy but most approaches highlight features like autonomous management, placing service to members or the community ahead of profit [...] democratic governance [...] principles of the primacy of the individual and the social objective over capital [...] voluntary and open membership[...] the combination of members/users and/or general interest [...] redistribution of profits to pursue the social mission of sustainable development, provision of services to members or of general interest' (Eschweiler and Hulgård, 2017).

This broad definition of the social economy comfortably accommodates recent Hungarian developments. In our attempt to give a general description of the field in post-socialist Hungary, we adhere to the definition of the SOLIDUS project with three additional remarks on peculiarities for Hungary. The first considers history. Given the

decisive weight and formative strength of the informal economy in pre-1990 Hungary, the emerging organisations of the post-1990 social economy where shaped to a large extent by the rules and traditions of the informal economy. This is reflected in a high volatility of membership and also in reluctance to adapt modern managerial routines and invest into modern technologies. These deficiencies slow down growth and keep social economy organisations small and stagnant. The second remark refers to some skewedness in the distribution of activities that social economy organisations engage in. Since the origins of the sphere point back to the dissolution of agricultural cooperatives after 1990 and the new needs that land privatisation has generated, the Hungarian social economy is still dominated by agricultural activities. Third: in addition to its productive role, the social economy is also a significant terrain of democratic relations and policy-making.

3. The policy environment of civil society organisations in Hungary

As is usually the case for the contemporary development of the post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to consider the last decades of state-socialism. It has been often pointed out as a strongly state-skeptic dissident perspective of what civil society was and what role it should have formed in these countries from the 1970s onwards (e.g. Celichowski, 2004: 62). In order to draw a meaningful picture about the broader political and policy environment of civil society and its organisations in today's Hungary, one has to go back in time to the late 1980s. However, for the analysis of Hungary, we argue that a closer look at civil society's actual functions gives a better explanation for its potential to contribute to a social economy today. The period preceding the systemic changes of the 1990s was a phase of vivid and widespread participation of Hungarian society in informal economic, cultural, and social activities. Participation was primarily driven by material needs that the socialist economy was unable to fulfil but was also fed by a widely shared, tacit opposition to the ruling state-socialist state. Even though, prior to path-breaking legislation in the late 1980s, independent associations and organisations could not be freely formed, thousands and thousands of spontaneously organised informal units existed. In a large part, these were called into being to countervail the deficiencies of the prevailing shortage economy. However, the widespread civil participation and self-organisation also contributed to the spreading of formerly practically non-existent knowledge and skills: through their experience, people learned the rules of fair and just cooperation, the basics of democratic decision-making, and the fundaments of economic management for the fulfilment of certain collective goals.

The accumulated experience richly paid off after the regime change. By acknowledging the constitutional right for free association and providing a new regulatory framework for the working of civil society organisations, the new regime created the socio-legal space for the earlier informal associations to become proper, formally acknowledged units. The newly recognised organisations enjoyed the rights to define their own goals and arrange for funding according to the participants' will and in a way that would fit into the larger-scale system of a regulated market economy.

By 1993, there were 35,000 registered non-profit organisations (associations, foundations, and the so-called companionship organisations). Their number grew to 48,000 units that were actively functioning by 1997, with further continuous growth

throughout the decade following the millennium, and reaching a stabilised number around 62,000 by the mid-2010s. At the same time it should be noted that most of the organisations are small in terms of financial activity with an average yearly income of 2.5 million HUF (approx. 7,700 euros). By profile, the organisations span broad areas of activities and policy sectors, with culture, sports and recreation taking a 44 per cent lead together. (HCSO, 1977; 2016; Bocz, 2009)

While widespread popular will to participate in the newly legalised civil sphere has certainly been *one* of the drivers behind the impressive figures, economic and political interests have also played a massive role. In an ever more habitual way, several subsequent governments and a great number of the municipalities have discovered the advantages of 'outsourcing' some public duties by contracting out the provision of services to nationwide, regional or local NGOs. Furthermore, the European Structural and Cohesion Funds that became accessible after the EU-accession in 2004 also gave impetus to the foundation of national and regional NGOs. While these larger organisations raised efficiency in the public domain, they have been working under tight control of the founding authorities.

These developments had ambiguous impacts. On the one hand, the flow of funding into the NGO-sector certainly has been on a steady rise for more than two decades (with the exception of a few years around the 2008 financial crisis, see: HCSO, 2015). On the other hand, by relying on external funds, the sector lost some of its independence and became more directly influenced by political interests and the prevailing power relations both at central and local governmental levels. Shifts in the composition of the sector from citizens-founded NGOs toward ones called into being and controlled by the authorities for assisting the fulfilment of certain public policy and/or business needs has led to the blurring of the boundaries between the civil and the administrative/economic spheres. Growing opacity opened the gate to corruption and significantly decreased transparency of financing and economising.

Given these circumstances, it does not seem incidental that both governments and parliaments have 'forgotten' to develop a coherent and all-embracing strategy to frame the clear and distinct roles of NGOs and to adjust the ways and forms of public control above them to their acknowledged independence. Instead, legislation has focused on refining categorisations and the rules of financing of the NGO-sphere (Török, 2005) that have affected the scope of manoeuvring of the different types and certain privileges. New laws and modifications in 2017 and 2018 have further impacted the sector. A law enacted in 2017 intends to draw under tight governmental supervision those NGOs that enjoy some significant financial support from abroad and that thus 'might pose high risk for national security'. In 2018, a legal package defined as criminal and suspended all civil activities supporting migrants and refugees. These new regulations openly go against the independence and freedom of the civil sphere and they imply a potential threat also for those organisations that are currently outside the targeted circle.

In contrast to tightening governmental regulations, municipalities proved more willing to see concrete forms of cooperation with the local NGOs as part of their mid-term plans. The two concurrent trends of drawing large parts of the civil sphere under government-controlled public policy and of seeing independent civil actions as an ingrained part of fulfilling local tasks at the municipal level have led to a high degree of fragmentation, and also to a sharp decrease in transparency and accountability. Amid

these conditions, it is not a surprise that trust in the civil society organisations has become shaken and especially the work of larger, nationwide foundations has become surrounded with suspicion and disbelief (Világgazdaság, 2017).

Nevertheless, the trends are not as bleak if one looks at a relatively new form of civil participation: the offering of a part of one's personal income tax for supporting a freely chosen NGO. Widespread engagement of the citizenry (see below) indicates that despite all criticism, people consider it important to support the civil society organisations as the representatives of public interest and as embodiments of independent decision-making in the conditions of ever tighter and centralised governance in contemporary Hungary.

3.1 Access of civil society to political decision-making

The new and older civil society actors perform a number of important tasks in Hungary. They contribute to service production and delivery and this way help in meeting often fundamental needs of vulnerable groups and people in remote parts of the country; civil society organisations can influence local development and modernisation; and they are also important in accumulating knowledge, skills and know-how and transferring such assets to the public domain. At the same time, the influence that civil society can exert on political decision-making and the shaping of public policy remains rather weak – and this is largely due to the one-sidedness of the relationship. While the civil society actors are deeply embedded into the national policy environment, their functioning is ruled by top-down mediation and regulations set by the government. Dependency on the goodwill of the government is all the more important, because civil society has few codified institutionalised access points to decision-makers. While proposed legislation should be subject to consultation (CXXX Law on the Participation of the Community in the Preparation of Laws 2010), either with the general public or stakeholder groups, a study of all consultations held between 2011 and 2014 shows that the average time period available for this generally was a mere 7 days in the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 that sank further to an average of 4 in 2014 (Arapovics et al., 2015).

This does not mean that representatives of civil society are never included in decision-making processes in Hungary. They are regularly taking part in such process surrounding the use and distribution of EU funds, although research shows that real influence is limited and that procedures are contested (Bátory and Cartwright, 2011; Demidov, 2014). One phenomenon which seems to have become very widespread at the municipal level is the organisation of 'civil society round-tables'. Despite their name, these 'round-tables' are often set up with the purpose of regular usage as consultative bodies to the local governments, and can be found across the country. The civil actors have more a 'courtesy role' than real influence though. However, even if just witnessing the decision-making process, their presence may create some platform for informal 'lobbying'.

3.2 On the finances

Reflecting the extensive involvement of the civil society organisations in providing a wide range of public and social services, the two main actors of financing them are the government and the municipalities. However, the revenues are typically modest. Most civil society organisations have yearly revenues of between 51,000 and 5,000,000 HUF, i.e. approximately 160-16,000 Euros, and a significant part of that is spent on outward donations (HCSO, 2016). Further, increasing in magnitude and extent are the public funds driven from the European Structural and Cohesion Funds and the yearly collected tax-revenue. Nonetheless, decision-making about the distribution of these resources has remained in the government's hands and this way dependence on central allocation has even strengthened. Frequent modifications of the rules of access and the fluctuation of the magnitude of funding cause a degree of permanent instability in the working of the NGOs, sometimes resulting in compelling temporary suspension of their working.

A particular form of funding is represented by the previously mentioned voluntary designation of one per cent of the taxpayers' yearly personal income tax to an NGO that that they can choose at will. Currently some 45 per cent of the taxpayers sign up for this opportunity. The transferred one per cent raises the revenue of the civil sphere: some three per cent or 83 billion HUF (280 million EUR) of their funding comes from this source. However, it is perhaps even more important that citizens can directly influence the potential development of the sector. The priorities that the individual offers highlight can be considered reliable information about country-wide developmental needs, and can be perceived as popular 'votes' that extend democratic participation in public affairs.

Another important step was the introduction of the concept of 'public benefit organisation' in 1997. An NGO can apply for acquiring this status if it has been engaged for at least two years in one or more activities that can be acknowledged by the court as 'publicly beneficial'. The long list of the activities is largely in concordance with the content that the notion of 'public and social services' covers. Public benefit organisations enjoy exemplary tax reductions, relaxed rules in engaging in profit-generating economic activities and extra support with regard to employment. At present, close to half of the civil society organisations are designated as such. The organisations are under strict control of the court: ceasing or suspension of their 'publicly beneficial' activities implies the withdrawal of the status.

In sum, finances of the civil society organisations show a duality. On the one hand, diversification of the sources of their income is much in accordance with the general Western patterns. On the other hand, increasing central control over the sphere has induced uncertainties and intensifying state-dependency that endanger democratic functioning and hinder self-regulated development.

4. The Policy Environment of the Social Economy

From the perspective of European policy-makers, member countries in the East seem to constitute something of a backwater when it comes to providing a sound and comprehensive policy environment for the social economy, due especially to the lack of schemes to support social entrepreneurs. Those that exist mainly come out of

European funding (European Commission, 2015: xvi). The legal situation is more varying, where Hungary stands out as complicated due to the high number of legal forms that organisations working directly for the social economy (social enterprises) can take. In an assessment by country experts for a report to the European Commission, Hungary listed the highest number of all countries under investigation, including a range of other member states.[2] (European Commission, 2015: 128). What this highlights is that the analysis of the Hungarian case can point to the likelihood of similar narratives unfolding in other member states with similar histories, but that there are at the same time significant differences due to local circumstances. In this section, we focus on how the growth of the sector has happened in response to a continuously changing and developing policy environment.

As the number of civil society organisations have grown, their share of and contribution to the Hungarian economy have grown, but as pointed out above and by Kákai and Sebestény (2012), the heavy and increasing reliance on public funds, as well as important regional variations in regulations and financing point to inherent structural problems of the sphere. This concludes into a relatively low growth rate of the sphere with a high occurrence of yearly closing down or several years of suspension. Such an instability works against the main dedication of the involved organisations such as job-creation primarily for the long-term unemployed and support for poor Roma communities (Futó et al., 2005). Moreover, as emphasised in the Hungarian contribution for the above cited overview report of social enterprises commissioned by the European Commission, Hungarian social enterprises not only come from the NGO-sector, but also from traditional cooperatives with some social functions, social cooperatives, and private companies with social aims (European Commission, 2014). While these organisations are commonly tailored according to traditional patterns, they demonstrate a high degree of solidarity among their members. At the same time, they are usually not very friendly toward innovations and often face financial problems due to their poor access to funds that claims proficiency in management and economising.

While the number of functioning and self-sustaining NGOs that have as a direct goal to stimulate employment has been low (Frey, 2006), a recent report on the social economy in the European Union estimated that as many as 5.3 per cent out of the total number of employees worked for the social economy in the years 2006-2010 (for which period the authors had data for Hungary) and this ratio places the country somewhat below the then EU-27 average of 6.53 per cent. The total number of workers were around 180,000 including also the employees of cooperatives, mutual societies and all associations and foundations (Monzón and Chaves, 2015).[3] In practice, this means that, for instance, an administrative employee working for a football club will be counted as belonging to the social economy. However, a narrower

[2] It should be noted, though, that this includes mainly forms that are not exclusive to social enterprises.

[3] The notion of mutual societies in this research refers to mutual insurance companies, whose claims to being social organisations may be dubious. However, the only Hungarian member of the International Cooperation and Mutual Insurance Federation, the Central European Insurance Society (Közép-európai Kölcsönös Biztosító Egyesület Magyarország – KÖBE), highlights its non-profit and Hungarian status as pitted against foreign profit-making insurance companies. See information in English about the Central European Insurance Society. Available at: https://www.kobe.hu/kobewww/aboutus/kobe Accessed: 01-06-2017.

definition of the social economy would concentrate on just a few of these, like the social services, community development and emergency relief. For instance, there are 5,600 organisations primarily active within social services, and 3,400 within community development. It also should be noted that the financial stakes are low. The combined income of all social service organisations is about 130,000 million HUF (approximately 400 million EUR) (HCSO, 2016). A thorough evaluation of the previously mentioned social cooperatives had tremendous difficulties to find access and solicit responses, and concluded that only about 60 social cooperatives were actually active (Petheő et al., 2010).

It should be mentioned that some NGOs are established as 'twin entities' of business organisations but are presented to the public as one social economy entity. This was for example the case of a case study of the Food Bag Organisation (in Hungarian: Szatyorbolt) carried out within the SOLIDUS project. The Food Bag Organisation was initiated by a group of like-minded friends in Budapest in 2008. The name of the group derives from its original key activity, namely, to supply a pre-ordered weekly bag of locally produced and/or organic food to subscribed members. The organisation has two parts, a general shop selling fruit, vegetables, dairy produce and some meat, and a non-governmental organisation seeking to raise awareness about the importance of organic and locally produced food, and to set examples on how to live by these principles. Interviews with its founder, staff, supporters, shoppers and suppliers showed high awareness of the social mission among core activists, many from other civil society organisations, but was less known among shoppers and suppliers.

At the same time, despite their modest economic size, the social economy organisations were important as models and for learning purposes. They represented a new form of non-hierarchical decision-making based on equal rights and equal power of the participants, which convincingly demonstrated a potentially efficient new way of tackling important social problems (poverty, ethnic discrimination, drug use, etc.) with full devotion and, at the same time, to the benefit of the larger community.

In recent years, the social cooperatives seem to have increased in popularity –, although publicly available statistics is contradictory. A 2016 study identified 587 social cooperatives in 2015 (Edmiston, 2016), whereas recent press coverage on the 'lavishness' of funds going to social cooperatives cites figures closer to 2,000.[4] Notably, the social cooperatives are typically small in size. Most would have between seven to 10 members, and usually very few or no employees (Edmiston et al., 2016). Despite all such limitations, these organisations play an important role in agriculture: by associating, private landowners with small lands can maintain cultivation and production by collective sales and the hiring of machines and technologies. Given the extremely high number of such properties due to skewed land privatisation in the 1990s, the cooperatives help them to avoid poverty and to remain in competition on the European market.

[4] Milliárdokat Szakítanak a Szociális Szövetkezetek, 2016. Augusztus 22. (English: Billions Earned by The Social Cooperatives, August 22, 2016). *Economic Online Portal*. Available at: http://www.piacesprofit.hu/kkv_cegblog/milliardokat-szakitanak-a-szocialis-szovetkezetek/ . Accessed: 17-05-2017. The cited source is a firm register which only release data against payment.

Nevertheless, the most likely explanation for the increase in number of social cooperatives is that they have become important vehicles for the distribution of EU funds. Edmiston et al. argue that 'social co-operatives are publicly supported through a range of regulatory provisions and funding instruments as a policy tool to create "employment opportunities" (Edmiston et al., 2016). This may sometimes be suitable but also makes the grantees vulnerable to criticism of being 'grant-hunters' or being submerged into EU discourses of job-creation rather than spreading democratic principles (Frey et al., 2006; Petheő et al., 2010; Edmiston et al., 2016). Moreover, there has been at least one instance of serious suspicion of corruption. In 2016, a police investigation was launched against one of the MPs of the ruling party (FIDESZ) upon accusations that he may have promised social cooperatives access to EU funding on the condition of receiving up to 90 per cent of the funding in return. Charges were pressed by the Chief Prosecutor's Office in April 2017 (Index, 2016; Newsportal 444, 2017).

There has also been significant turnover in terms of active actors. It is telling that among the five organisations listed as key umbrella and coordinating organisations for social cooperatives in the employment area (Petheő et al., 2010), only two seemed to be active in 2017 based on updates on websites and references by other organisations (The National Association of Social Cooperatives and The National Foundation of Employment). There have also been important developments in the legal framework which sets the rule for gaining membership in a social cooperative. First, changes in legislation in 2013 made it *possible* for local governments to be members, then additional modifications in 2016 made it *mandatory* to have them on board. As argued by Edmiston et al., this 'propagates asymmetrical power relations that distort the co-operative and democratic principles underpinning the effective operation of social co-operatives' (Edmiston et al., 2016). The National Association of Social Cooperatives has also voiced criticism regarding this, in addition to claiming the new law to be unclear on several points (2017).

To sum up, probably at least in part due to the willingness of Hungarian policy-makers to adhere to European discourses of the value of the social economy, an institutionalised legal form for this has been pushed as one of the preferred modes to disburse EU funds. This has led to the creation of a fairly large number of social cooperatives, many of which are shown as inactive when researchers have tried to approach them to assess their scope and activities. That is not to say that there are not many social cooperatives carrying out serious and substantial work in their areas. However, the sector, as the overall civil society sector, is vulnerable to competing narratives and interpretations of their practical value. The instrumental perspective of the social economy for the sake of job creation is one narrative, the social economy as a democratising force and promoter of labour done with other purposes than merely monetary gain is another. Therefore, social economy acts and actors do receive recognition expressed in policy strategies and enacted policies. However, the focus is on supporting organisational forms for social economy rather than acts of solidarity within the economy. This means that the importance of social economy actors is recognised in official discourse within a certain narrative before it has achieved much that can be actually measured, but also that the support does lead to some action that fits more or less well with established civil society practices. We therefore conclude

that a claim that there is an emerging social and solidarity movement in Hungary can be substantiated, but it would be with two caveats:

Firstly, 'emergence' must be situated in relation to layers of practices embedded in different historical times. In order to understand the current landscape, it is important to remember that practices of economic behaviour based on reciprocity and redistribution, i.e. the foundation for the social and solidarity economy, can be found in both planning and market economic systems. That said, more recent history also matters. The discourse around the 'social economy' and the role of social enterprises in 'revitalising the economy' in international fora, including the European Union, over the past two and a half decades, has given impetus to the creation of the specific legislation and policy frameworks described earlier in this article.

Secondly, the aim of the legislation and the policy frameworks has been to make social economy activities stemming from civil society visible, regulated and targets of specific support. We assess that overall the creation of the 'social cooperative' legal form has had positive effects in all the three respects characterising the social economy (visibility, oversight, funding) and has led to an increase in terms of size and scope of activity. There are, however, unintended effects: a) the focus on the form rather than on the content risks overlooking the systemic changes that would be required by a transition to a large-scale social and solidarity economy; b) the creation and support of a specific form has led to a focus on the instrumentality of the solidarity economy as a creator of jobs rather than as an enabler of other values, such as democratic principles; c) attention paid to the form sometimes creates sentiments of entitlement from the state (or the EU), and expectations on funding that is rarely fully fulfilled; d) as the rest of civil society, social cooperatives and other actors in the social economy are vulnerable to the effects of politicisation (Kövér, 2016) or perceived politicisation, of the relations to the state, the municipalities or even to the international stage.

A final caveat is that any discourse concerning the social economy in Hungarian public discussion is overshadowed by dominant narratives around the nation and the nation-state. The mentioning of social economy may even have declined in the period leading up and following the elections of 2018,[5] although that would need further substantiation.

5. Conclusions

This article provided an overview of the ambiguities that are surrounding civil society in Hungary with the aim to assess the potential of the civil society to spur the growth of a solidarity-based social economy through its own activities and policy influence. At European level, policy-makers have placed high hopes on the development of a social economy sphere based on activities stemming both from the business sector and the civil society sphere.

We started by showing how the civil society, as manifested through the creation and activities of non-governmental organisations, has become an important constituent of the Hungarian public domain. At the same time, we attempted to highlight certain

[5] For instance, the news items available on the official website Hungarian Government do not contain any news items related directly to the social economy in 2018.

vulnerabilities of the civil sphere that follow, on the one hand, from the blurring of the boundaries between the independent civil actions and the coexisting (sometimes cooperating) public services and provisions, and on the other hand, from the frequent undertakings of the state, the municipalities and other political actors to draw the civil organisations and their networks under tight political control.

Civil society organisations are, of course, just part of the broader landscape, nevertheless their status, recognition and embeddedness into the realm of the complexity of power, representation and influence seem to be good indicators of the prevalence of democratic conditions in society and they carry the potential of showing the strength and weaknesses of these relations (Warren, 2012).

Taken from this perspective, the controversies and constraints outlined above indicate a rather weak embeddedness, relatively high reputation and trust, and constant fluctuation in the status of the civil society organisations. At a closer look, the most problematic aspect of their operation is a low degree of incorporation into both the institutional environment and policy-making. But embeddedness would also require some stability in the conditions these organisations need to function, and in their daily operating. However, the prevailing state of affairs points toward weaknesses in these regards.

On the one hand, these deficiencies reflect the relatively short history of civil society with the even shorter history of its organisations in Hungary. After all, stabilisation of the sphere and its secured embeddedness into the democratic polity need years and decades of social experimentation, accumulation of knowledge and the expansion of functional networks and social capital. On the other hand, the 30-year-long history of the domain of civil society organisations shows that the majority of Hungarian NGOs have been institutionally and financially dependent on the public sector, and that such a state of affairs seriously hindered their engagement in the genuinely civil activities of advocacy and community organising. In this respect, Hungary does not differ from other post-socialist member states. As noted by Radu and Pop (2014: 96-97), civil society organisations increasingly depend on the public sector and therefore focus on a government-driven agenda. The dependence on the state may be stronger in Hungary than in some states with longer and more embedded development of democratic governance, such as the Czech Republic. However, more importantly, the Hungarian case is illustrative of how high expectations for the potential of the civil society to contribute to social economy growth may fall short. The 2010 reorientation of the country's political arrangement toward an 'illiberal democracy' has accentuated these tendencies: open turn-away from the involvement of the civil actors in politics and policy-making, or usurpation. This points to a sharp turn-around in Hungary's civil society developments. Despite the advantages a powerful civil sphere would have, current political trends undermine its potentials.

It would be an exaggeration to state that the government as of 2018 is entirely hostile towards the civil sphere. Rather, its intention is to keep the civil organisations under strict political, financial and administrative control: still propping them up but restricting their independence at every turn. Maybe such positioning is perceived by the ruling power as the launching of a 'new version of democracy'. However, our analysis shows that restrictions do not automatically stop at a pre-designed level. Instead, decline has a tendency to accelerate. Therefore, the current trends do not seem to signal the build-up of a new version of democratic entities, but point towards a

demise of the entire sphere. In concrete terms, this means, for instance, that civil society actors who actively work for general human rights will have difficulties to also engage in economic activities that include integration of disadvantaged groups into the work force. To do so with the help of public funds has become increasingly difficult under the conditions given by the successive Fidesz governments since 2010, unless the civil society actors adopt to dominant government-endorsed discourses around what a civil society should and should not be. Thus, although our analysis demonstrates there has been some development in the legislative and policy framework supporting organisations that situate themselves within the social economy sphere, we argue that the centralising and authocratic trend of the past eight years is a threat not only to the future of democracy in Hungary but also to the growth of a solidarity-based social economy that policy-makers at the European level as well as in many nation-states view as constituting a transformative power for enhanced well-being and all-embracing welfare.

References

Arapovics, M. (2011) *A Civil-Nonprofit Szektor és a Szervezetek Forrásteremtése (English: The Civil Non-Profit Sector and the Sector's Production of Resources)*. Budapest: BCE.

Batory, A. and Cartwright, A. (2011) Re-Visiting the Partnership Principle in Cohesion Policy: The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Structural Funds Monitoring. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 49(4): 697-717. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02159.x

Bocz, J. (2009) *A Nonprofit Szektor Strukturális Átalakulása Magyarországon. (English: Structural Transformation of the NGO Sector in Hungary)*. Doctoral Thesis. Budapest: Dept. of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus University.

Bocz, J. and Kmetty, Z. (2008) Egészségügyi Nonprofit Szervezetek (English: Nonprofit Organisations in Healthcare). *Civil Szemle*, 5(1-2): 39-60.

Celichowski, J. (2004) Civil Society in Eastern Europe: Growth Without Engagement. In: Glasius, M., Lewis, D. and Seckinelgin, H. (eds.) Exploring Civil Society: Political and Cultural Contexts. Oxon: Routledge. 62-69. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203358290

Defourny, J., Hulgård, L. and Pestoff, V. (eds.) (2014) *Social Enterprise and the Third Sector*. New York: Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203487747

Demidov, A. (2014) *Partnership Principle for Structural Funds in the New Member States: Understanding Contestation over the EU Requirements*. Budapest: Central European University.

Edmiston, D. (2015) *Social Innovation Policy in Hungary.* Oxford: Oxford University.

Edmiston, D. and Aro, J. (2016) *Public Policy, Social Innovation and Marginalisation in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Three Cases.* CRESSI Working Paper. Available at: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research-projects/CRESSI/docs/CRESSI-Working-Paper-33-2016-D6.5.pdf

EMES International Research Group on Social Entrepreneurship (2017) *News Item: Non-OECD Countries Participants on 6th EMES Conference*. Available at: http://emes.net/news/non-oecd-countries-participants-6th-emes-conference/

Eschweiler, J. and Hulgård, L. (2017) *SOLIDUS Concept Paper*. Barcelona: SOLIDUS Project.

European Commission (2012) *Report on the European Social Economy*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2014) *A Map of Social Enterprises and Their Eco-Systems in Europe - Country Report: Hungary*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2015) *A Map of Social Enterprises and Their Eco-Systems in Europe: Synthesis report.* Brussels: European Commission.

European Economic and Social Committee (2017) *The EESC calls for a long-term action plan for the Social Economy by 2018.* Press Release, 28 June. Brussels: EESC. Available at: http://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/news-media/press-releases/eesc-calls-long-term-action-plan-social-economy-2018

Frey, M. (2006) Nonprofit Szervezetek a Magyar Munkaerő-Piacon (English: Non-Profit Organisations in the Hungarian Job Market). In: Csoba, J. et al. (eds.) *Szociális Gazdaság Kézikönyv (English: Social Economic Handbook)*. Budapest: Országos Foglalkoztatási Közalapítvány. 50-56.

Futó, P. et al. (2005) *A Szociális Gazdaság Jelene és Jövője (English: The Present and Future of the Social Economy)*. Budapest: NFI.

Gellner, E. (1994) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals. Allen Lane: Penguin Press.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office (1999) *Nonprofit Szervezetek Magyarországon, 1997 (English: Non-Profit Organisations in Hungary, 1997).* Budapest: HCSO.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2015) *A Nonprofit Szektor Legfontosabb Jellemzői, 2015 (English: The Most Important Characteristics of the Non-Profit Sector).* Budapest: HCSO.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2016) *A Non-Profit Szervezetek (English: Non-Governmental Organisations)*. Table 3.2.13-3.2.17. Budapest: Sdatat Database. Available at: http://www.ksh.hu/stadat_eves_3_2

Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2018) *A Nonprofit Szektor Legfontosabb Jellemzői, 2016 (The Most Important Characteristics of the Non-Profit Sector, 2016)*. Budapest: HCSO.

Index (2016) Százmilliós Uniós Támogatás Lenyúlásában Emlegetnek Egy Fideszes Képviselőt (English: The Corrupt FIDESZ Politician Wanted to Get Hundreds of Millions of EU Support). *Index*, 4 August. Available at: http://index.hu/gazdasag/2016/08/04/szazmillios_unios_tamogatast_akart_lenyulni_a_korrupt_fideszes_kepviselo/

Kákai, L. and Sebestény, I. (2012) The Weight of the Non-Profit Sector and the Impact of the Economic Crisis in Hungary. *Civil Szemle*, 9(3): 115-136.

Kuti, É. (2008) *Civil Europe - Civil Hungary*. Budapest: European House.

Lundberg, E. (2013) Does the Government Selection Process Promote or Hinder Pluralism? Exploring the Characteristics of Voluntary Organisations Invited to Public Consultations. *Journal of Civil Society*, 9(1): 58-77. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2013.771086

Monzón, J. L. C. and Chaves Ávila, R. (2015) *The Social Economy in the European Union.* Brussels: CIRIEC.

National Association of Social Cooperatives (2016) *New Modification of the Civil Law*. Available at: http://www.szoszov.hu/megkuldte-a-nemzetgazdasagi-miniszterium-a-2016-evi-cxlv-torveny-34-ss-1-altal-modositott-2006-evi-x . Accessed: 22-05-2017.

Newsportal 444 (2017) Vádat Emeltek Mengyi Voldemort Roland Ellen (English: Charges Pressed against Mengyi Roland). *444.hu,* 25 April. Available at: https://444.hu/2017/04/25/vadat-emeltek-mengyi-voldemort-roland-ellen

Pethő, A. I., Győri, Z., Németh, B. Fekete, N. and Simon, F. (2010) *A Szociális Szövetkezetek Működési Modelljének Kidolgozása a Foglalkoztatás Elősegítése Érdekében (English: Developing a Model of Social Cooperatives for Improving Employment).* Available at: http://www.employmentpolicy.hu/resource.aspx?resourceID=252_szocialis_szovetkezet

Polanyi, K. (2002) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Power, S., Muddiman, E., Moles, K. and Taylor, C. (2018) Civil Society: Bringing the Family Back In. *Journal of Civil Society,* 14(3): 193-206. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2018.1498170

Radu, R. and Pop, D. (2014) New Forms of Dependency in Central and Eastern Europe? Reflections on State - Third Sector Relations in Public Service Provision in Post-Communist Countries. In: Brandsen T., Trommel, W. and Verschuere, B. (eds.) *Manufacturing Civil Society. IIAS Series: Governance and Public Management*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 96-115. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137351630_6

Török, M. (2005) Gaining Trust is a Must: Hungarian NGOs and Private Giving. In: Koncz, K. E. (ed.). *NGO Sustainability in Central Europe: Helping Civil Society Survive.* Budapest: OSI Local Government Initiative. 173-194.

Világgazdaság (World Economy) (2017) Bizalmi Válság Nehezíti a Civil Szféra Munkáját (English: Crisis of Trust Makes the Work of the Civil Sphere Difficult). *Világgazdaság Online*, 3 April.

Warren, M. E. (2012) Civil Society and Democracy. In: Edwards, M. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*. Oxford: OUP. 377-390. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195398571.013.0030

ONDŘEJ SLAČÁLEK*

The Leadership of the Czech Far Right 1990–2017: Changes in Practical Ideology?

Intersections.EEJSP
4(4): 125-136.
DOI: 10.17356/ieejsp.v4i4.482
http://intersections.tk.mta.hu

* [Ondrej.Slacalek@ff.cuni.cz] (Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University, Prague)

Abstract[1]

The research note attempts to contribute to the analysis of the ideology of the extreme right. Building on Barthes and Žižek, it proposes that we should not reduce this ideology to rational postulates or statements by the participants themselves, but that instead we should look for it in their praxis. It proposes that the figure of the leader should be perceived as an important part of this ideology in terms of both the significance of the leader in the extreme right's belief systems, and the role of leaders in various extra-parliamentary, extreme-right formations. The empirical part of the article is devoted to the figure of the leader in three periods of the existence of the Czech extreme right, and analyses the transformations in the characteristics that these leaders shared during the movement's beginnings (1989–2001), the period of its relative decline and repression (2001–2015), and finally, during the period of the rise of Islamophobia (2015–2017). The article concludes that for leaders it is important to have immediate contact with the movement, and to maintain closeness to fellow fighters. This characteristic may outweigh the importance of the cultural capital of musicians from well-known subculture bands and the symbolic capital that may be possessed by veterans from the distant past.

Keywords: Leaders, Extreme Right, Czech Neo-Nazism, Ideology.

[1] The research for this paper was supported by the European Regional Development "Fund Project" *Creativity and adaptability as conditions of the success of Europe in an interrelated world* (No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000734). For comments and criticism, I am deeply indebted to Jan Charvát, Vendula Prokůpková, Jovo Bakić, Hana Blažková, Matyáš Křížkovský and two anonymous reviewers.

1. Introduction

This article has a dual aim. Methodologically, it is a proposal for methodological innovation in researching the ideology of the extreme right.[2] Empirically, it is an attempt to apply this innovation to various environments of the Czech extreme right after 1989.

The theoretical approach that supports the article is a critical analysis of ideology. Instead of reconstructing what members of the extreme right say they *think*, this approach aims to focus on their *praxis* as a way of approaching their ideology. Ideology will interest us here as a *practical* category with an immediate relationship to action, not as a merely declared belief system. 'Practical ideology' in this sense is a mixture of approaches which are not fully recognised and articulated by actors but which are reproduced and transmitted by their practices, sometimes only with partial reflection. It is ideology which is not declared, but lived.

As one of the components of this practical ideology, we investigate the image and role of the leader. I argue that the real leaders of extreme right movements have to be perceived in terms of their role in the movements not just as real participants and concrete actors, but also as the bearers of ideological content, and indeed *as part* of this content. The article thus proposes to read them as part of the ideology of the movement and an object of semiological analysis.

In the empirical section, the article seeks to understand the role of the leader in the ideology of the various environments of the Czech far right. It traces the milieu over the three post-1989 decades using a working division of three distinctive epochs, differentiated on the basis of the relations between society and the extreme right: the first, the epoch of searching (1990s–2001), the second, the epoch of repression (2001-2015), and the third, the epoch of the new beginning (2015–present). After a brief summary of the development of the extreme right in the Czech Republic, there follows an analysis of the leaders.[3] Given the long period of time under analysis, we will concentrate most on the shared characteristics of the leaders in the various periods.

2. Ideology and the extreme right: from stylisation to 'practical ideology'?

It is difficult to reconstruct the ideology of the extreme right, however primitive that ideology may seem. One way of doing it is to gather the basic positions of the extreme right into a coherent form, and abstract from these often muddled factors those that

[2] I use the term extreme right conventionally to mean the far right which shares ultranationalist, authoritarian and racist views, and accepts violence as a political tool for overturning the existing constitutional order. I use the terms radical right or far right for the political forces which share ultranationalist views, authoritarianism and racism (or at least strong xenophobia), but where it is not clear that they are willing to use violence to overturn the existing constitutional order. I sometimes also use these terms as a broader category that covers the extreme right.

[3] The paper limits the right-wing movements in the Czech Republic in the first two generations above all to those that issued from the environment of the racist skinheads. It thus passes over the Republicans, a notable political party of the first generation. In the third generation, it covers both new forces that entered the neo-Nazi field, National Democracy and Islamophobes who try to represent a movement that distances itself from the classic extreme right and racism.

are of key importance for the rational reconstruction of extreme right-wing positions (cf. Mudde, 2000). Another possibility is to reproduce, faithfully, what *the actors themselves* consider their ideology to be (cf. Mareš, 2003).

The risk of the first approach is that it involves too much rationalism, while the risk of the second approach is abstruseness and scholasticism. If an ideology is reduced to rational arguments, it is possible to ask whether it will not then fail to capture the moments that are experienced by its participants just as much, if not more, than argumentation formulated using reason. In the case of the second approach – the descriptive reproduction of self-images – we may ask whether we take too seriously (and non-analytically) the adventurous and romantic backdrops that the neo-Nazis and other far-right ideologies imagine. The preceding caveats may be underlined with reference to Robert Paxton's words that 'Fascism was an affair of the gut more than of the brain' (2007: 42). I consider these words to be problematic because they indicate that other ideologies are affairs of the 'brain'. However, focusing on the 'gut' is important, and is a fruitful approach to the examination of an ideology that I believe has to be reconstructed as a mix of rational and non-rational elements that motivate behaviour. This examination of ideology focuses on things that are not articulated by the movement itself as its ideology, but are more its practice; the lived reality, that functions as the bearer of the significance and values of the movement in question (cf. Žižek, 1989; 1994).

I propose that one of the examples of this practical ideology is a focus on the person of the leader. While leaders are important to most political currents, if not all, on the extreme right an ideological emphasis on leadership and the *Führerprinzip* makes leadership an even more important part of 'practical ideology'. If the majority of extreme right-wing currents promote the strengthening of power in the hands of the leader, then the specific qualities of the leader who, they suggest, holds this power becomes an important part of their ideology.[4]

3. 'Führer' as 'symbol': an analysis of reception versus semiology

A basic problem in the analysis of extreme-right leadership is the tension between the role of the leader in most extreme-right ideologies and the reality of the extreme-right movement. In programmatic and historical terms, however, a large number of extreme right-wing movements accentuate the role of the leader and elevate them far above the rest of the movement's members. In sociological terms, most extreme-right movements are, in their initial phases, egalitarian movements with only small levels of difference. Especially in combative subcultures such as the racist skinheads, a 'warrior democracy' makes itself strongly felt, and there is often practical equality between individuals; indeed, a seemingly more egalitarian structure than in most other social subsystems. There is a weaker role for the leader than in most political parties (with their leaders), companies (with their managers) and universities (with their professors).

[4] This focus on the leader as a carrier and part of the ideology of the movement is the reason I do not deal with literature that focuses on the 'charisma' of far-right populist leaders, because despite some important insights this literature is focused on the leaders of political parties and based on a more technical approach to leaders' charisma, and does not include a discussion of it in the context of the ideology of movements (cf. Pappas, 2016; Eatwell, 2018).

Maybe this is the reason for the tendency of some extreme-right movements to adopt a 'leaderless resistance' formula.

How can we analyse leaders' charisma and the ideological meanings which it supports? Inspiration may be drawn here from the semiological approach that builds on Roland Barthes and his *Mythologies* (1957/1972). In a Barthesian vein, we can perceive extreme right-wing leaders as symbols that can be analysed at least in part independently, without considering what their reception has been.

The advantage of such an approach may be that it allows analysis to be carried out in cases when we do not have access to data regarding its reception. The disadvantage may be elitism and the risk of interpretational error and projecting. Essentially, this is a problem analogical to that which arises in debates regarding the analysis of youth musical subcultures, in which Hedbige's analysis (1979), inspired by Barthes (and Kristeva), was criticised by Muggleton for its projective nature (2002). When Muggleton read this analysis as a young punk, he did not understand it. When he read it years later, after graduating in sociology, he understood it, but it did not correspond to his experiences. With a certain amount of doubt, we may also inquire: How does Muggleton know that he was not also formed by something he did not realise; something that he rejected when confronted with Hedbige's analysis?

Given the experimental nature of this paper, I shall combine approaches: when sources are available regarding the perception of the movement, I shall make use of them with an awareness of their limits. This concerns, above all, the non-academic 'oral history' of the early years of the racist skinheads, *Těžký boty to vyřešej hned* ('Heavy Boots Solve It Immediately' – a quotation from a skinhead song), by the key neo-Nazi leader Filip Vávra (2017).[5] I shall also attempt to provide an interpretation. Before making such an analysis, I briefly review the history of the new Czech extreme right.

4. The Czech extreme right: a brief overview and periodisation

The roots of the contemporary Czech extreme right can be found at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The second half of the 1980s saw the slow rise of the skinhead subculture, with the first musical bands. The most important of these was Orlík. After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, skinheads experienced a boom. They separated themselves from punks and profiled themselves (mainly) as nationalist, racist and militant. Skinhead subculture soon became a hotbed not only of Czech nationalism, but also neo-Nazism (Mareš, 2003; Charvát, 2007; Charvát, 2018a; 2018b). After the Velvet Revolution a new far-right party was founded, called Republicans, which between 1992 and 1998 included members of parliament (cf. Roubal, 2012).

[5] The use of this source of course leads to methodological and ethical dilemmas. Even if we accept that the book is an honest attempt to record the writer's/narrators' own memories, they are understandably memories deformed not only by time, but also by the fact that they involve self-representation of the movement, albeit retrospective. Non-critical use of the book in question exposes us to the risk of participating in the spread of the neo-Nazi self-image. Nevertheless, we believe that it gives us an insight into factors and situations that occurred in the creation of the movement that would otherwise be hard to access. In our analysis we shall make use of those factors when the author does not seem to have any motivation to lie.

There are various approaches to the description and periodisation of the Czech far right in print (cf. Mareš, 2003; Charvát, 2007; Bastl et al., 2011; Daniel, 2016; Slačálek and Svobodová, 2017; 2018; Charvát; 2018a; 2018b; Slačálek and Charvát in print); in this section, I will argue for my own proposal and combine information from these scholarly sources, as well as long-term observations based on mass media and direct observation of related media and events. I propose a division into three time periods *based on the position of the extreme right in society*. The first one, 1990–2001, we may call the *epoch of searching;* the second, 2001–2014, we may call the *epoch of repression,* and the third one, from 2015 until the present, we may call the *epoch of the new beginning*.

The beginning of the time period 1990–2001 was marked by new opportunities brought about by the completely new and open conditions in society after the Velvet Revolution. For a couple of years, the skinhead musical band Orlík had a broad audience and could be found on mainstream TV hit parades. In some cases, racist skinhead violence was even covered by the police and applauded by some parts of society. Skinheads became, together with the Republicans (who obtained striking election results) and a few groups of nationalist or reactionary clerics, the most important basis for the Czech far right. They were also the basis for some nationalist organisations (the Patriotic Front, and Patriotic League), and even neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups and sections of international platforms (National Fascist Community, Bohemia Hammer Skinheads, Blood and Honour).

After a few years of expansion, marked by violence and even racist murders, the skinhead movement faced pressure from anti-fascists (recruited both from liberal and anarchist milieus), and state repression and media attention due to this pressure, as well as the consolidation of the new regime. After 1998, electoral support for the Republicans declined (they were no longer represented in parliament), probably because socioeconomic cleavages became most prominent in Czech politics, and also because of scandals related to the party.

Afterward, Czech neo-Nazis, based on the skinheads, tried to change strategy. From 1998 onwards the new militant organisations National Alliance and National Resistance started to organise large legal public demonstrations at which they intended to present their views as a political alternative (and to fulfil the political vacuum that arose after the failure of the Republicans). They attracted some attention, but their political party the National Social Bloc (founded in 2001, later renamed the Right-Wing alternative) had neither electoral nor organisational success.

The moral panic caused by neo-Nazi violence (sometimes connected with football hooliganism) meant the start of a new period, which we may call the *epoch of repression*. This does not mean that there was no repression in the development of the Czech extreme-right scene before or after this (as we have seen, there was), but it means that repression and exclusion became the dominant component of the relation between the far right and society. The Czech neo-Nazi scene had changed under various influences, with a prevalent role being played by the German neo-Nazi scene. Skinhead roots became less important, and new approaches such as those of the 'autonomous nationalists' came to the fore.

After the end of the Right Wing Alternative, the militant extreme right participated in the relatively marginal Workers' Party (composed of some former Republicans and neo-Nazis), which never had electoral success and was even officially

banned (and replaced by its carbon copy, the Workers' Party for Social Justice). The largest extreme-right mobilisation, the march through the Jewish quarter of Prague on the anniversary of *Kristallnacht* in 2007, ended with a mass anti-fascist mobilisation and police intervention. Many activists, organisers, and musicians were paralysed by the police intervention and criminal prosecution, and the situation also led to an atmosphere of fear and paranoia (with regard to collaboration between the police and neo-Nazis).

In spite of the repression, the extreme right was quite successful at organising some marches against Czech Roma, above all in Northern Bohemia (during the time period 2008–2012). Marches organised by the Workers Party and other extreme-right groups (there were also others, organised at a grassroots level or by local politicians) received a considerable level of grassroots support, and local people even supported neo-Nazis who participated in violent clashes with police. In some municipalities, the Workers' Party (and then Workers' Party of Social Justice) had considerable electoral successes.

Nevertheless, this did not help the party to any sort of success on a national or even a regional level in the new period which came after 2014 and the refugee crisis. This epoch, which we may call the *epoch of the new beginning*, may be characterised by its new opportunities, new topics and new actors. In the elections of 2014 the far-right populist party The Dawn of Direct Democracy, led by entrepreneur Tomio Okamura, had marked electoral success. After 16 years, a far-right party was back in the Czech parliament; moreover, the party was very open to collaborating with the extreme right. Since 2015, the Islamophobic movement has had a considerable presence, both on the streets and in public debate. Islamophobes scandalised liberals and anti-racists with some extreme statements and performances, but at the same time their hostility to refugee quotas was shared by the majority of society. A majority of mainstream politicians also expressed anti-refugee opinions, and the Czech president even spoke at an Islamophobic demonstration.

This atmosphere became a source of opportunities which traditional extreme-right forces tried to exploit. However, they were quite unable to do so – they were relatively weak in the aftermath of years of persecution, with little political capability and a very bad image in the public space. The main Islamophobic forces, which were able to organise a relatively strong Islamophobic platform and to organise fairly frequent public demonstrations, were single-issue anti-Islamic xenophobes formed around the grouping We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic, later known as the Bloc Against Islam. Even this platform, which tried to be the Czech Pegida and which was relatively visible in the public space, was unable to organise demonstrations larger than several thousand protesters, and was also unable to attract electoral success (indeed, because of internal conflicts they were unable to participate in the elections). Their leaders, Martin Konvička and Petr Hampl, were very militant in their rhetoric against Islam, the EU and human-rights liberals, but they did not work with traditional extreme-right symbols and references, thus their views were more similar to the 'new xenophobia' of Western Islamophobes in the Pim Fortuyn mould (cf. Barša, 2006; Brubaker, 2017; Slačálek and Svobodová, 2017; 2018).

A more radical political force connected with the traditional radical right and also with open antisemitism was National Democracy/No to EU!, but this political party was electorally irrelevant. Another part of the Islamophobic movement was the

Home Guard *votesDomobrana)*. It is still not clear if these guards really exist and how many real combatants they may potentially have.

Of the far-right populist forces, only Tomio Okamura was electorally successful, his new party Freedom and Direct Democracy receiving 10.64 per cent of the votes in the 2017 election. However, throughout almost the whole political spectrum the ideas of exclusionary nationalism and Islamophobia became acceptable, and even calling the far right 'extremists' became more problematic. In 2018, the office of the Czech President asked for statements about Okamura's party to be cut from the Interior Ministry's report on extremism, because, according to the president, this racist and nationalist party was not extremist. In the same year, the court canceled the criminal prosecution of one group of neo-Nazis and in its reasoning stated (among others),[6] that the ideas for which the neo-Nazis were being prosecuted had in recent years found their way into the media and political mainstream.

5. The first generation: musicians?

The individuals who on the given scene have some sort of 'natural' influence and charisma, as it were (given the significance of music in the skinhead subculture), are understandably musicians; above all, the lead singers of bands. In the first years of the movement, the latter have taken on the role of spokespeople, and have had the space to influence the formulation of values through a unique and key medium – song lyrics – but also using some other media elements (such as speeches during concerts).

The key musical group at the beginning of the establishment of the Czech racist skinheads was Orlík (1988–1991). Its frontman, Daniel Landa, may also serve as a case study of the limits of a musician's influence on a subculture. In its work, Landa's Orlík expressed in a classic and influential way a whole range of themes: anti-Communism, racism, nationalism, a collective belligerent identity, and a relationship towards alcohol (Charvát, 2018b). Orlík gained popularity and an audience, but when Landa tried to establish the identity of the skinheads around a rejection of German Nazism and the legacy of the Czech Hussites of the 15th century,[7] the attempt had only minority appeal.

Hypothetically (on the basis of testimonies in *Heavy Boots Take Care of It),* we may formulate three reasons for the former lack of success: 1) musicians were not credible, because words spoken with feeling at concerts and fiery appeals were followed by moderate statements in the media; 2) the charisma of the musicians was thus relatively distant from the everyday reality of street battles; 3) in opposition to the logic of the lyrics, there also existed a 'logic of style' (cf. Hedbige, 1979) and a will to identify with an idea of 'what it means to be a skinhead'. This problem was solved by the fact that a 'ready-made' skinhead style was already in existence in Western Europe, thus it did not make sense to create a local variant.

Vávra (2017) claims that, against the will of Orlík's frontman Dan Landa, Nazi salutes became commonplace, partly because of foreign influences and the sense of

[6] The main legal reason for stopping the prosecution was its duration.

[7] The Hussite movement, which provoked a religious and social revolution in 1418–1434, was one of the key reference points of the Czech nationalism of the 19th and 20th centuries, and also of the synthesis between nationalism and communism.

doing 'something forbidden', as well as the radical anti-Communist opposition, but also for another reason: a character called Ben.

> The opposition to these phenomena within the scene was surprisingly weak. The only person to say anything against it was Dan Landa. However, Dan, although the singer of a skinhead band, was not perceived as a chief of any kind. The guys liked him, and he was great at talking and winning people over, but they saw him as one of them. Not as an authority. The whole early skins scene in Prague, despite the impression of uniformity and order that it gave, was still based on punk, and it rejected leaders. Authorities did not exist, only people who had respect. Respect either because they were good fighters, or because they exuded it naturally. It was Dan's bad luck that this natural respect was held by the guy who was most into Nazism in Prague. Ben
>
> (Vávra, 2017: 67–68).

6. The first generation: fighters with a political project?

The people who came to prominence in the street fighting groups were people with charisma. This was not enough, however – political ideas were also needed. Considerable renown and a reputation for leadership were won by the brothers Michal and Ladislav Procházka, famous for both their brutal violence in skirmishes and for their project of renewing the interwar Czech organisation the National Fascist Community *(Národní obec fašistická)*. Their involvement ended in a prison sentence. The skinhead subculture gradually spilled over into various political projects, from fascisising nationalists to open neo-Nazis. It is interesting that the leaders of these projects, too, had the appearance of street fighters: the leader of the neo-Nazi National Resistance *(Národní odpor)* Filip Vávra and the Prague-based leader of the neo-fascist Patriotic Front David Macháček not only have distinctive, muscled and thick-set figures, but are of above-average size. Vladimir Skoupý, too, was a relatively strong man.

However, physical constitution alone is not enough. It was important during this period to combine 1) a robust physical constitution, 2) charisma, 3) a political project, and 4) the ability to present the latter credibly.

As far as political projects are concerned, the source is usually Western Europe, above all Germany, and to a lesser extent the USA, as well as historical fascism and Nazism. Vávra's National Resistance was a direct copy of a German group, while in Skoupý's case his National Alliance was a translation of a group from the USA, while his magazine *Vlajka* (Flag) was reminiscent of an interwar radically nationalist and then ultimately pro-Nazi collaborationist magazine.

As far as the ability to present this political project is concerned, the far-right leaders found themselves caught between two threats: the first was a loss of credibility among their supporters for *not being radical enough* during street demonstrations, while the second was the threat of criminal proceedings for the propagation of fascism and racism for being *too radical*.

7. The first generation: old survivor ideologues?

While most members of extreme right-wing groups (except the Republicans political party) were recruited from the youth skinhead subculture, and the same was true of most of the leaders, the less significant figures, leaders and speakers at demonstrations also included older people. Jan Skácel (born 1934) came from a significant family of interwar Czech anti-German nationalist National Democrats. Roman Skružný (1932–2004) came, in his own words, from a family of Nazi collaborators, and later in life allegedly joined some surviving Nazi anti-Communist resistance fighters.

Contact with the older generations also had symbolic significance: it created the impression of continuity and seriousness. At the same time, however, it is evident in the case of the neo-Nazis that Skružný could not (and maybe did not even want to) play the role of a real leader, nor was this even offered to him. His role was more decorative, an accessory. Skácel appears to have been more of a leader type but even he was at least balanced by more important young leaders with a subculture background.

8. The second generation: holding on

After 2001 it became more and more clear that the attempts of the racist skinheads to create a radical political formation were not going to be successful. Repression and police pressure to cooperate created a paranoid atmosphere in the skinhead subculture that led to some accusations, well-founded or not, of collaboration with the police and informing (even Filip Vávra was accused to be police informer).

In seeking to identify the key leaders of the extreme right connected with neo-Nazism and the (post-)skinhead subculture, we can name Erik Sedláček, Petr Kalinovský and Jiří Petřivalský (as leaders of neo-Nazi groups) and Jan Kopal and Tomáš Vandas, two defectors from the Republicans who became leaders of political projects with notable neo-Nazi participation (the National Social Bloc in the case of Kopal, in which he was probably only a fictitious leader and acted as a cover for other, more radical leaders, and the Workers' Party in the case of Vandas).

A basic and remarkable difference compared to the previous period is that none of these leaders was particularly outstanding in terms of physical or mental qualities. Only Petřivalský in his physical proportions corresponded to the idea of a physically dominant militant, and even he was less physically distinctive than Vávra, Skoupý, and Macháček. In the case of the others, there can be no talk of any kind of physical dominance over other neo-Nazis – their figures were normal or even on the weak side. Neither do the extreme right-wing leaders of this period dazzle with their personal charm. Some do not even pass muster by neo-Nazi standards: Jan Kopal is sometimes called a 'gypsy' by neo-Nazis (like Filip Vávra).

The extreme right-wing leaders of this period are ordinary. Their main virtue lies in not leaving the movement and their leading position in it and remaining publicly visible persons, even in situations of considerable pressure. They shared the movement's lack of success, but did not deflect it and were willing to share its fate.

9. Third generation: deserters from the establishment

With the gradual rise in Islamophobic sentiments that occurred during the third decade after the velvet revolution, the position of extreme right-wing movements changed, and so did their leaders. The new leaders are people who have come from the commercial, media, or academic establishment. In the eyes of their supporters, they represent a certain link with these establishments, but they want to distinguish themselves from them.

Even the highly extreme and anti-Semitic National Democracy gained a leader, who for many years was a journalist with the most widely read mainstream daily, *MF Dnes*. Adam B. Bartoš, who has become the country's most famous anti-Semite and conspiracy theorist, was originally a follower of the mainstream conservative right and even a supporter of Israel. The Islamophobic movement Bloc Against Islam, which distanced itself from connections with the extreme right and racism, had different leaders, including associate biology professor Martin Konvička and commercial sociologist Petr Hampl.

All three come from the establishment, but they are not subject to the taboos that the extreme-right leaders of the previous generations reacted to in their public declarations. Adam B. Bartoš openly articulates anti-Semitism, something that even the neo-Nazis of previous decades expressed in a more indirect way.

All three declare a clear fondness for physical violence. Adam B. Bartoš, at a demonstration against refugees, threatened the government and other 'traitors' with the noose, while Martin Konvička has made jokes about grinding Muslims' bones into flour and talked about concentration camps for Muslims. Petr Hampl repeatedly talks about armed revolt against the alienated elites and the shooting of boats carrying migrants, regardless of the fact that people on board would be drowned. These leaders who come from the establishment have an ambivalent role. They represent the partial acceptability and success of this establishment, but at the same time a revolt against it through the violation of its strictest taboos. To break these, they use a combination of the self-confidence that their previous membership of the establishment gives them, as well as their support in the radical movement.

10. Conclusion

The empirical research into social movements and the extreme right needs to engage in more dialogue with approaches that conceptualise ideologies. While in cultural studies and partly also in research into musical subcultures this dialogue is normal, it too often avoids the most common approaches to researching political actors. The result is the *reduction* of extreme-right ideology either to rationally-reconstructed postulates, or to the *reproduction* of the movement's romantic and historical self-image.

This article has provided a proposal for such a conceptualisation: taking the leaders of extreme-right groups not just as the bearers but also as part of the ideology of the extreme right, and perceiving these figures as a source for the analysis of the practical ideology of the extreme right. Certainly, there may be many options for analysing the leaders as standard bearers of ideologies. I have chosen a combination

of the interpretation of the self-perception of the movement (where it is available, in the case of the first phase of its existence in the Czech Republic) with an analysis of the potential effect of the features shared by the leaders in the given period. A further possibility is, of course, to undertake direct research into the way in which the characteristics of the leaders affect the movement's participants, or to engage in a more detailed semiological analysis of the various characteristics of the various individuals.

What has the analysis shown? The shared characteristics of leaders start with their rootedness in subculture, which most appreciates a marked and muscly masculinity. Subsequently, after the scene became ideologised, and following significant media and public pressure, leaders reflected the defensive state of the whole scene: the ability to withstand pressure and to hold on became a key and respected value. In the third generation, permeation with the mainstream led to ambivalence: the success of individuals in the central current appeared to bring a promise of success for the whole movement, but at the same time also made them somewhat suspect and forced them to define themselves clearly and all the more incisively.

The extreme right is frequently associated with the image of a leader standing high above a mass of supporters. Our research into the extreme right creates a different picture: what is decisive in a leader's position and ability to lead supporters is not only charisma, but above all proximity, the ability to bear the same burden, and to last the journey. These abilities are tested, become the object of controversy, and are the reason why leaders may lose their positions. Musicians may become significant carriers of the ideas of the movement and gain the status of 'stars', but this is not enough for political leadership.

References

Barthes, R. (1972) *Mythologies*. London: Paladin.

Barša, P. (2006) Nová xenofobie (English: New Xenophobia). *Dingir*, 9(1): 2-5.

Bastl, M., Smolík, J. and Vejvodová, P. (2011) *Krajní pravice a krajní levice v ČR* (English: The Far Right and the Extreme Left in the Czech Republic). Prague: Grada.

Brubaker, R. (2017) Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40(8): 1191-1226. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700

Daniel, O. (2016) *Násilím proti 'novému biedermeieru' (English: I Will Be Against the 'New Biedermeier').* Příbram: Pistorius & Olšanská.

Hedbige, D. (1979) *Subculture*. London: Routledge.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315016016

Charvát, J. (2007) *Současný politický extremismus a radikalismus (English: Current Political Extremism and Radicalism).* Prague: Portál.

Charvát, J. (2018a) Skinheads. In: Charvát, J. and Kuřík, B. (eds.) *Mikrofon je naše bomba (English: The Microphone is Our Bomb)*. Prague: Togga. 61-110.

Charvát, J. (2018b) Formation of a Racist Skinhead Identity. In: Charvát, J. and Oravcová, A. (eds.) *Politics and Subcultures in Post-Socialist Space* (in print).

Eatwell, E. (2018) Charisma and the Radical Right. In Rydgren, J. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 251-269. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.13

Mareš, M. (2003) *Pravicový extremismus a radikalismus v ČR (English: Right-Wing Extremism and Radicalism in the Czech Republic)*. Brno: Barrister & Principal.

Mudde, C. (2000) *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719057939.001.0001

Muggleton, D. (2000) *Inside Subculture*. Oxford & New York: Berg.

Pappas, T. S. (2016) Are Populist Leaders 'Charismatic'? *Constellations*, 23(3): 378-390. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12233

Paxton, R. O. (2004) *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Roubal, P. (2012) 'Smést to všechno do Vltavy' (English: 'Blow It All Into the Vltava'). In: Kopeček, M. (ed.) *Rozdělení minulostí (English: Divided by the Past)*. Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR (Institute for Contemporary History of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic). 311-342.

Slačálek, O. and Svobodová, E. (2017) Professionalised 'Civil Society' Vs. Grassroots 'Uncivil Society'?. *Socio.hu,* 7(5): 23-52.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18030/socio.hu.2017en.23

Slačálek, O. and Svobodová, E. (2018) The Czech Islamophobic Movement: Beyond 'Populism'?. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 52(2): 479-495.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2018.1495377

Slačálek, O. and Charvát, J. (in print) *Setkávání na okrajových scénách (English: Meetings on Marginal Scenes)*.

Vávra, F. (2017) *Těžký boty to vyřešej hned (English: Heavy Shoes to Solve It Now)*. Prague: Fiva.

Žižek, S. (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.

Žižek, S. (1994) How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?. In: Žižek, S. (ed.) *Mapping Ideology*. London: Verso. 296-331.

Book Review

Sik, Domonkos (2016) *Radicalism and Indifference: Memory Transmission, Political Formation and Modernization in Hungary and Europe*. Peter Lang Academic Research. 283 pages.

How does historical entanglement with modernity shape cultural memory? How does memory influence the landscape of national political culture? And how do anti-democratic sentiments emerge in formally democratic institutional settings in the very center of Europe? These questions form the structure of Domonkos Sik's comprehensive monograph on memory discourses and contemporary political-cultural formations in Hungary and beyond. The evidential basis of the book is a combination of focus group and in-depth interview data, discourse and ethnographic analysis of museum displays, and qualitative data from a survey panel of 14 European countries.

In the 'history—memory—political culture' construction, the book treats all three elements of the triangle with equal attention, examining their interrelationships. History—political culture tension is examined in the first chapter of the book, setting the frame for the discussion to follow. The key argument of this opening section is that the distinctive experience of modernity characteristic of Central Europe formed a particular type of political culture which, in turn, created impediments to the development of the communicative rationality necessary for a thriving democratic polity. The peculiar, 'semi-peripheral' character of the Central European experience of encounter with modernity meant that the project of modernity itself could be externalized as both optional and foreign, triggering fears of cultural colonization, worries of falling behind, and fantasies of opting out which prevented both serious engagement with and embrace of modernity's emancipatory promises, and ownership and an honest reckoning of its drawbacks. In addition, Sik points out that the ascendance of a 'dogmatic, authoritarian nationalism' in the interwar period was characterized by 'the emotionally overburdened, anti-democratic, intolerant deformation of political culture' (19 p.) which precluded criticism and debate as signs of potential disloyalty to the nation. The dogmatism marking the 'ontological nationalism' of the interwar period was followed, in Sik's analysis, by the alienations and privatizations of the socialist era, and the disillusionments of the post-socialist transition. Each in its own way, these 'local primordial impressions of modernity' provided the context for the 'long-drawn out identity crisis' of Central European countries in which the pathologies of modernity were either naturalized or blamed on others, while its universalist promises were misrecognized (49 p.).

The book's introductory discussion about the Central European entanglement with modernity defines the important conceptual context for the empirical chapters on memory and political culture. It makes it possible to frame the current constellations of political sentiments as necessarily situated in the fabric of historical and

sociopolitical experience of Hungary's national development and informed by its trajectory and positionality through the 20th century. At the same time, it raises the danger of not only oversimplification, but also implicit determinism, in that the multiple pathologies and distortions listed by the author (without paying equal attention to pockets of alternative developments) could be taken as decisively preempting the possibility of a genuinely inclusive and rational political debate either in the past or in the future.

But if the reader is tempted to make such an assumption, it is squarely countered in the rest of the monograph, starting from the subsequent two chapters which take on the third vertex of the book's conceptual triangle—cultural memory, insofar as its landscape is shaped by the historical processes of Central European modernization. As the author suggests, the historically rooted identity crisis resulted, in the case of Hungary, in a memory vacuum that, in turn, produced a bimodal, politicized culture of collective memory. Taking Hungary as its empirical case, the book examines two memorial institutions in Budapest, the House of Terror and the Holocaust Memorial Center, and concludes that in dramaturgy, intended effects and overall narrative these two sites serve as 'idealtypical expressions of the right wing and the liberal-left interpretations of the 20th century' (106 p.). The author is attentive not only to the logics of the exhibitions themselves, but to the way in which Hungarian students perceive and respond to these spaces, finding that the lack of a minimal consensus about the past in the public sphere turns some students towards family memories, but results for others either in a dogmatic embrace of the tendentious narratives that are available, or a withdrawal from past traumas altogether. This analysis is followed with in-depth case studies of three families that illustrate that, despite the largely overdetermined landscape of public memory, students find rather different pathways through the stories that are passed to them through public and private channels, resulting in distinct configurations of memorial and political culture, ranging from indifference to engaged commitment to either populist or emancipatory activist causes.

The fourth chapter momentarily takes a turn away from questions of historical memory to tackle the social and economic underpinnings of political culture. It undertakes a systematic comparison of two Hungarian cities, Ózd and Sopron, in which economic and social issues (rather than those of memory) come to the forefront as key drivers of young peoples' political outlooks. The comparison is rooted in the analysis of the two cities' different positions and historical experiences, which enables the author to take them as quintessential examples of two 'divergent constellations of Hungarian modernity' (167 p.); namely, one marked by 'the distorted perception of modernity and the consequent identity crisis' (212 p.) associated with socialist-era industrialization in the case of Ózd, and one marked by proximity to Austria and legacies of its bourgeois past in the case of Sopron. These divergent constellations are what gave rise to the divergent patterns of political attitudes revealed in the author's interviews with local youth, who possess what Sik describes as 'a basically "hopeless"' and 'a basically "indifferent"' political culture, respectively. Importantly, the difference in political culture is paralleled by a difference in the outlook on the past, in the sense that the young people in the two locations emphasize different historical turning points (injustices of the Treaty of Trianon and nostalgic memories of socialism in Ózd

versus the trauma of the Holocaust and the difficulties of state socialism in Sopron), suggesting an abundance, rather than a vacuum, of memory discourses available to them.

Persistent through the book is the author's interest in the transformations of political attitudes, particularly as it pertains to the tensions between activism and indifference, and between radicalism and democracy. These sets of oppositions provide the coordinates to the last, and most ambitious chapter, which undertakes the project of developing an analytical typology of European political cultures that integrates the books' earlier observations concerning the formation of political attitudes among youth. The chapter draws on comparisons within as well as between 14 European countries (or 15 locations, as East and West Germany are treated separately) to map out a range of idealtypical political formations derived through cluster analysis, ranging along the axes of radicalism and indifference. The six patterns (which the author labels 'anxious anomic', 'satisfied bystander', 'politically alienated', 'traditional antidemocratic', 'populist antidemocratic', and 'emancipatory activist') vary according to their makeup and causal origins in discernible ways, which allows the author to propose specific recommendations regarding their likely trajectories and further transformations. While I will leave it to my quantitatively inclined colleagues to comment on the statistical soundness of the cluster analysis, indexes and linear regression models used in the chapter, the discussion of the typology itself is crisp and detailed, successfully placing the Hungarian case in the context of political trends of its European peers, and offering a sophisticated, theoretically grounded set of categories with which to approach transformations in political cultures elsewhere. At the same time, the chapter implicitly throws into doubt the language of 'distortions' to modernity by showing that the same pathologies of political culture that plague Hungary occur in countries that are typically considered the cradle of modernity (such as the United Kingdom).

Perhaps inevitably for a book of such ambition, the monograph contains some themes that could be fruitfully developed more thoroughly. Given the analytical centrality of radicalism as a topic of exploration, a working definition of radicalism would significantly enhance the subsequent discussion, as would a more theoretically grounded development of radicalism's relationship to populism and democracy (as in 'radical democracy'), which currently seems antithetical to the author's working model. The role and significance of memory in political socialization, too, invites some further discussion. How necessary (or for that matter, democratic) is memory consensus for a healthy society? Or does the surest engagement with memory indeed, as James Young (1992) proposed, 'lie [...] in its perpetual irresolution'? Could such an engagement be a possible consequence, as opposed to a necessary cause, of civic activism? Despite (or perhaps, as evidenced by) these questions, *Radicalism and Indifference* is a rich, insightful and deeply committed work that will inspire and resonate with any readers interested in modernity, memory, and political and critical theory.

OLGA SHEVCHENKO (oshevche@williams.edu)

References

Young, J. E. (1992) The Counter-Monument: Memory Against Itself in Germany Today. In: Mitchell, W. (ed.) *Art and the Public Sphere*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Book Review

Cervinkova, Hana, Buchowski, Michal and Uherek, Zdenêk (eds.) (2015) *Rethinking Ethnography in Central Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 267 pages.

'Rethinking ethnography in Central Europe', co-edited by one Polish and two Czech anthropologists and published by Palgrave Macmillan, is one of the two selections of papers presented at an anthropological conference in Prague in 2014.[1] The two-day event, 'Rethinking Anthropologies in Central Europe for Global Imaginaries', was a regional reunion of the anthropological discipline in a collaboration of scholars from the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. The wider framework of regional cooperation that brought about the conference was provided by the International Visegrad Fund, a major force promoting and supporting regional networks in various segments of life in Central Europe. The 34 conference papers tackled the theme of anthropology in Central Europe; post-socialism; transnational migrations and mobilities in general, urban anthropologies, and capitalism in post-socialist states. The 11 papers in the book are preceded by an introduction and followed by a brief afterword, notes on the contributors, and an index. 'Rethinking ethnography' is invisibly complemented by six other of the conference papers published in an English language special issue of Cargo, the journal of the Czech Association for Social Anthropology (Cervinkova et al., 2014). The Cargo journal issue and the edited volume under examination are both end products of the same regional anthropological initiative. The main focus of the book is on field-based anthropological research related to Central Europe, whereas papers in Cargo interrogate anthropological practice in the region.

The editors of the volume, and Michal Buchowski in particular, had manifested a long time interest in and concern for the position, development, and international connectedness of anthropology in the former socialist states of Central Europe (Buchowski, 2004; Cervinkova, 2012). He has turned his attention to a sensitive issue claiming that Western academia has defined the dominant view on Central Europe (Buchowski, 2004) in English language works issued by prestigious Western publishing houses. There has been a long dialogue going on between representatives of anthropological centres in the East and the West over this issue (Buchowski, 2004; Hann, 2005), and consequently, one may consider this example of regional cooperation manifest in 'Rethinking Ethnography in Central Europe' an attempt of empowerment and decolonization through the creation and fortification of regional academic networks.

The introductory chapter by Cervinkova and Buchowski continues along the same line of ideas with an inquiry into the historical notion of Central Europe, and the

[1] The conference programme is available at: http://data.eu.avcr.cz/miranda2/export/sitesavcr/data.avcr.cz/humansci/eu/Social_and_Cultural_Change_in_Contemporary_Central_Europe/ConferenceProgramFinal.pdf . Accessed: 16-12-2018.

connections between national ethnologies, folklore studies, and Western social and cultural anthropology. This chapter introduces the 11 papers of the book, too. Cervinkova and Buchowski indicate straightaway that the individual studies do not aim at changing 'the course of thought in anthropology' (1. p.), but rather, they should be seen as 'the tip of an iceberg of a new wave of writings in Central European anthropological scholarship' (ibid.).

What topics do the authors tackle in the 11 ethnographic papers? The three thematic blocs, mobilities, activisms and expert knowledge, and post-socialist modernities, signal important and massive research directions that have kept up academic interest in Eastern Europe and elsewhere ever since 2014, the date of publication.

International migration is in the focus in the first, bulkiest part with five accounts on mobile lives of populations departing from or arriving in Central Europe. Marek Pawlak studied the process of social stratification, identity strategies, and internal power relations of Polish post-accession migrants in Norway. He found that when talking about Polish manual workers in Norway (commonly referred to in Polish as *robol*, i.e. prole), his high status professional interviewees emphasized 'strong distinctions and self-otherness' (31. p.). Pawlak offers an attractive analysis of the notion of cosmopolitanism in the Polish migrant context of Norway and of the interplay between ideological strategies of national identity construction, negotiation, and contestation, processes that also affect Polish migrants' integration strategies in the host country. Katarzyna Wolanik Boström and Magnus Öhlander focus on a phenomenon that involves everyday challenges for thousands of East European medical doctors launching a new career in the West. They explored Polish physicians' attempts to renegotiate their symbolic capital, status and expert knowledge in the Norwegian health care system. In the transnational medical field, as the authors have found, a wide array of skills other than strictly theoretical ones need to be displayed to gain professional recognition, such as proper body language and ways to talk, knowledge of administrative procedures, and adjustment to the expectations related to professional gender roles.

The third and fourth chapters target transnational migrant entrepreneurship in the Czech Republic. Gertrud Hüwelmeier introduces her readers to the transnational world of Vietnamese migrants in Prague's SAPA market. She draws a historical outline of Vietnamese presence in the region and centres her attention on post-socialist bazaars as places of economic exchange and interethnic encounters. Zdeněk Uherek and Veronika Beranská's paper, on the other hand, focuses on a particular case of what they refer to as compatriot migration of ethnic Czechs from the Chernobyl area of the Ukraine arriving in the Czech Republic in 1991, five years after the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe. The authors present the case of a migrant family's attempt to establish a transnational enterprise selling iodine-enriched mineral water in the Ukraine where it is widely considered a means to fight the negative health effects of nuclear radiation. Beranská and Uherek pay special attention to the family's efforts to adapt to a market economy with the help of information and networks from the pre-migratory socialist period.

An intimate aspect of the migration experience is explored in rich detail by Izabella Main in the fifth chapter. How do Polish migrant women experience childbirth in Berlin? How is these women's reproductive health affected by their mobility? The

author found that her interviewees had predominantly positive experiences of the German system of reproductive healthcare based on women's agency, involvement and co-responsibility offered during pregnancy and childbirth.

The second part of the book comprises three studies on the role of activism and expert knowledge in Slovakia, Poland, and Serbia. Chapter six by Alexandra Bitušíková makes an interesting point about changing patterns of civic participation in post-socialist societies in recent years. She argues that the intensification of locally oriented urban grassroots social activism in the town of Banská Bystrica in Central Slovakia is a sign that civil society is gaining strength. Bitušíková emphasizes the relevance and importance of qualitative methodology in measuring the strength of civil society.

Agnieszka Kościańska, on the other hand, has discovered an intriguing connection between a particular historical development of socialism-period medical sexology and the prospects of feminist and queer sex therapy in present-day Poland. Chapter seven explores this connection showing how the founder of Polish contemporary medical sexology allowed sociology, anthropology, and psychology to influence medicine.

Marek Mikus, the author of a theoretically profound analysis of the connection between Serbia's EU integration process and Serbian civil society unravels how NGO workers of the 1990s have been absorbed by the public sector preparing for accession. Mikus applied a historical anthropological approach to Serbian civil society and provided an ethnography of the nongovernmental sector to outline the country's post-socialist transformation.

Agata Stanisz and Waldemar Kuligowski's joint research venture on a recently completed motorway connecting Berlin and Poznan presented in chapter nine introduces the third part of the book dedicated to post-socialist modernities. The authors' multisite ethnographic research aims to explore the complex economic, social and cultural consequences of this modernization project. In chapter ten Hana Horáková gives a thorough analysis of social change induced by tourism in a locality in the Southwest of the Czech Republic and shows how the cooperation of local authorities with foreign investors has fractured existing local social networks. Horáková also demonstrates how memories from the socialist past affect social processes, practices, empowerment, and exclusion in the present.

Chapter 11 by Martin Hříbek focuses on the reception of the personality and the political case of the Dalai Lama in the Czech Republic and offers readers an engaging study on the orientalist construction of post-socialist consciousness, a phenomenon with parallels in several Central and Eastern European countries. In his historically informed paper Hříbek also presents a 2012 case of Czech political controversy about China. The author considers what he refers to as 'the Dalai-Lamaism debate a case of Orientalist discourse whereby Tibet serves as a surrogate self in the construction of Czech post-socialist consciousness' (231. p.).

The assembly of anthropological research displayed in 'Rethinking ethnographies' offers theoretically informed papers that focus on phenomena related to recent social and cultural processes in Central European societies but with a clear aim of connecting their analyses with mainstream anthropological scholarship in the West. The title of the edited volume promises qualitative methodologies; moreover it suggests works that are the outcome of fieldwork-based research. But how 'intimately

engaged', to cite Nancy Scheper-Hughes' phrasing (Klepal and Szénássy, 2016: 128), are the authors with their fields? To what degree does ethnographic depth, one of the distinctive traits of anthropology, characterize them? And to what extent have field data and experiences, often described in the form of voluminous passages, found their way in an edited volume on ethnography? Three papers in the first section on migration and mobility show actors in their anthropological fields from intimate closeness. The sharp dividing line of the Polish migrant world in Norway, just as well as Polish doctors' constant efforts to readjust to the often implicit expectations of their new professional environments come through very clearly. The analysis of pregnancy and birth experiences of Polish migrant women reflects the combination of online and traditional fieldwork expanding on illuminative personal details of these women's lives. Although clearly based on long-time engagement with the population they studied, the authors of the papers on migrant entrepreneurship decided to give more space to outlining the wider historical, social and economic context of the phenomena they presented. Works on activism and expert knowledge show the authors' personal familiarity with and dedication to the object of their study. The anthropological field in one of the articles on modernity is a well-defined locality, a Czech rural area, and the author produces a theoretically well-informed, thorough analysis elevated from the details of everyday community life. It is an intellectual and anthropological challenge to find focus in a field as extensive as an international motorway and produce the ethnography of it with an idea of modernization in mind as happens in the case study on the Berlin-Poznan motorway. The intriguing study of Dalai-Lamaism in the Czech Republic could be considered more a history of mentality than an ethnographic text; nevertheless its insights and interpretations throw a new light on a possible construction of Czech post-socialist consciousness.

'Rethinking ethnography' is a firm step taken on the road towards locating, defining and empowering social anthropology in Central Europe. It's an integral part of a several decades-long dialogue between scholars from the region or working on the region, such as Mihály Sárkány (2002), Chris Hann and his colleague Michal Buchowski whom he referred to as an 'innovative bridge builder' (Hann, 2005), Peter Skalník, or László Kürti, to mention just a few names. It shows clearly how strongly anthropological tradition took root in the region, particularly in Poland. The regional initiative of an anthropological dialogue and exchange has been carried on by other research centres such as the Visegrád Anthropologists' Network initiated by the Max Planck Institute in Halle,[2] or the Central European University. Besides being an anthropological milestone, 'Rethinking ethnography' offers some very good reading not only to anthropologists but also to a wider audience.

NÓRA KOVÁCS (kovacs.nora@tk.mta.hu)

[2] See: http://www.eth.mpg.de/4638411/Visegrad_Network . Accessed: 15-01-19.

References

Buchowski, M. (2004) Hierarchies of Knowledge in East-Central European Anthropology. *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 22(2): 5-14.

Cervinkova, H. (2012) Postcolonialism, Postsocialism and the Anthropology of East-Central Europe. *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, 48(2): 155-163. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.658246

Cervinkova, H., Robbins-Ruszkowski, J. C. and Uherek, Z. (eds.) (2014) 'Critical Anthropologies in / of Central Europe. *Special Issue of Cargo*, 12(1-2). http://cargojournal.org/index.php/cargo/issue/view/1/showToc . Accessed 15-12-2018.

Hann, C. (2005) Correspondence: Reply to Michal Buchowski. *Anthropology of Eastern Europe Review*, 23(1): 194-196.

Klepal, J. and Szénássy, E. (2016) From Barefoot Anthropologist to Global Watchdog: An Interview with Nancy Scheper-Hughes. *Cargo*, 14(1-2): 125-134.

Sárkány M. (2002) Cultural and Social Anthropology in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Kaase, M., Sparschuh, V. and Wenninger, A. (eds.) *Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe: Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociology (1989-2001)*. Berlin and Budapest: GESIS/Social Science Information Centre (IZ) and Collegium Budapest Institute for Advanced Study. 158-165.

Authors' Biographies

Alper Baysan is a political scientist specialised in the politics of European integration and enlargement. He is currently a PhD fellow with the European Politics Research Group at ETH Zurich in Switzerland. He has previously worked for the German Institute for Human Rights and the Berlin Institute for Population and Development in Germany.

Nóra Kovács is a sociocultural anthropologist working in Budapest on migration. She wrote her dissertation on the second generation identity building processes of the Hungarian diaspora in Argentina, a thematic area she keeps revisiting. Her recent project focused on Chinese Hungarian intermarriage and on the childcare forms of Chinese entrepreneurs in Hungary. Her upcoming project targets the identity political and social solidarity aspects of the adoption of Roma children in Hungary. She is one of the editors of Intersections.East European Journal of Society and Politics.

Radu Meza is associate professor of digital media and journalism at Babeş–Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. With a background in both journalism and computer science, he holds a PhD in sociology from Babeş-Bolyai University with a thesis on the structure and dynamics of popular social networking systems. His research focuses on digital media and online popular culture, media and information literacy, computational methods, digital social science.

Andreea Alina MOGOŞ is associate professor of journalism and digital media at Babeş–Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. She holds a PhD in sociology from Babeş-Bolyai University and a PhD in information and communication sciences from Université Paris 8 – Vincennes Saint-Denis. Her research focuses on media representations and frames, negative national and ethnic stereotypes and visual analysis methodologies.

Vendula Prokůpková is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of Political Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. In her research, she focuses on right-wing extremism, social movements, and political violence. She studied Political science and Gender studies at the Charles University and Ruhr-Universität Bochum. 2017-2018 she spent a 5-month fellowship at Moses Mendelsohn Zentrum in Potsdam and two months research stay at Heinrich-Heine University in Düsseldorf.

Ondřej Slačálek is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Arts at Charles University in Prague. He has published articles on national identities, social movements, the history of radicalism and musical subcultures in Patterns of Prejudice, Dějiny - teorie - kritika, Mezinárodní vztahy, Osteuroppa, Socio.hu and several other scholarly journals. For more than ten years he also worked as an editor and journalist on the street paper Nový Prostor and the cultural review A2.

Sara Svensson is a political scientist and public policy specialist, holding a PhD in political science from Central European University, Budapest (2013). She is a Research Fellow at the CEU Center for Policy Studies and Lecturer at Halmstad University,

Sweden. Her research focus is cross-border governance, but she also works on broader issues of collaborative governance and civil society inclusion in policy-making.

Judit Tóth is an associate professor, Head of the Constitutional Law Department and the Legal Clinic at the University of Szeged. Previously, she worked at the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the Ombudsman Responsible for Minority Rights.

Hanna Orsolya Vincze is associate professor of communications at Babeş–Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. She holds a PhD in history from Central European University, Budapest, and was a recipient of a Chevening scholarship at the University of Oxford. Her research interests focus on the uses of sociopolitical concepts and languages, and has pursued these interests on both historic and contemporary discourses, including mass media and social media.

Michal Vít is an assistant professor at the Metropolitan University Prague. His research focuses on the process of national identities forming of political parties in Central-East Europe and transformation power of the EU in Western Balkan.