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Different Types of Solidarity in Times of Crises: A Changing European Landscape

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to map and contrast recent developments in attitudes towards different types of solidarity in Austria and Hungary. The context of the paper is that the economic and the so-called 'refugee' crisis and its social and political consequences have fundamentally affected European attitudes towards solidarity. Such times of crisis are often seen as providing ample opportunities for the populist radical right to prosper. Nevertheless, the above developments do not necessarily mean a weakening of solidarity as its forms may change and its meanings become contested.

Based on a comparison of Austrian and Hungarian results of the ESS round 8 (2016) the article – with the help of k-means cluster and multinomial logistic regression analyses – examines what solidarity positions can be observed and contrasted and how they may be linked step-by-step to 1) objective socio-demographic variables, 2) subjective perceptions at the micro-level (like social trust, well-being, and feelings of insecurity), 3) subjective perceptions at the macro-level (like institutional and political trust, attachment to country and the EU), moreover 4) to different values and attitudes like xenophobia, homophobia, conformism or statism on the one hand, and, 5) to political orientations and voting intentions on the other.

Keywords: solidarity, ESS, crisis, Austria, Hungary, political attitudes.

1. Introduction

The countries of Europe in the past decade have been hit by a succession of crises that potentially altered the political and value landscapes of the affected societies. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and afterwards led to policy measures in the EU such as strict austerity measures that prompted commentators to propose that international solidarity was dead (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018; Habermas, 2017; Balibar, 2010). The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 and the contradictory reactions of the EU as a whole and its Member States have raised similar questions. Solidarity, defined as a situation in which the well-being of one person or group is positively related to that of others (Oorschot, 1991), therefore appears to be central to understanding both crises.

In the rich social scientific literature that discusses the consequences of the social, economic and political crises that have affected Europe over the past decade, there is often a taken-for-granted presumption regarding the relationship between socioeconomic changes of such scale and diminishing solidarity in the affected societies on the one hand and the rise of right-wing extremist political powers on the other. In the present paper, our aim is to provide a nuanced understanding of solidarity that encompasses both its inclusive and exclusive forms and its micro-, meso-, and macro dimensions. This distinction allows for an operationalized concept of solidarity that forms the basis of our cluster analysis. Furthermore, the creation of these clusters allows for the examination of a number of propositions regarding the relationship between solidarity and socio-demographic variables, personal values, attitudes and political behaviour. Such an analysis of the relationship between solidarity clusters in the two countries allows us to address the similarities and differences between the two countries and to investigate the explanations that may potentially underlie them. Our research questions are as follows:

RQ1. What type of clusters are identifiable in the two countries, taking into account different formations of solidarity?

RQ2. What is similar and what is country-specific about these clusters and their sizes?

RQ3. What are the similarities and differences in structural and cognitive explanations between these clusters and in the countries under investigation?

RQ4. How far is the distribution of the various clusters attributable to far-right political radicalism?

2. The concept of solidarity in the theoretical literature

The relationship between crisis and attitudes towards solidarity has gained renewed attention in the scholarly literature, partly as a consequence of the succession of crises that hit the Western world. Here, we only point to three such important works. De Beer and Koster (2009) examine the impact of developments such as globalization and individualization on social solidarity, relying on international comparative data, including EVS and WVS. They find that, contrary to popular claims, there is no general tendency towards declining solidarity. This work is followed up by their research (2017) on the relationship between ethnic diversity and solidarity,

again relying on international comparison, where the findings are inconclusive in terms of whether increasing ethnic diversity results in less solidarity.

The work of Lahusen and Grasso (2018) more specifically looks at solidarity in Europe, relying on survey data collected in 2016/2017 in eight countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK). On the level of interpersonal forms of solidarity, they find that practiced solidarity is lowest towards fellow Europeans, higher towards people outside the EU, and highest at the national level. Regarding support for redistribution policies they find considerable differences between countries, with Mediterranean countries finding the elimination of inequalities to be most important. Regarding solidarity with people from outside the EU, respondents show strong conditionality.

Regarding the relationship between solidarity and crisis, however, very little is known about the Central European countries that have been affected by –and reacted to –the developments of the past decade in a particular way. A comparison of Austria and Hungary provides useful ground for research for a number of reasons. Theoretically, it rests on considerations about most different conceptions of systems design (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe, 2009: 570), where the compared cases are different in relation to most variables but the variable of interest. Other than being geographically close and experiencing a similar succession of crises, the countries differ with regard to political, economic and social structure. This allows for the type of exploratory research design which is necessary for uncovering the dynamics that produce different attitudes towards solidarity. Practically, our focus on the two countries is founded on our research aim of validating the models and findings of independent research (SOCRIS, see later) that was carried out in the two countries.

Solidarity is defined in the paper as a 'situation in which the well-being of one person or group is positively related to that of others' (De Beer and Koster, 2009, 12; Oorschot, 1991). This includes individual willingness to contribute to the welfare of others and also attitudes to institutional contributions to others' welfare. We measure these attitudes at three levels: the micro-, meso-, and macro level. The micro-level refers to individualistic perceptions of deservingness of solidarity, the meso-level captures welfare chauvinist attitudes and welfare statism, while the macro-level refers to generally inclusive attitudes and attitudes towards migration.

Inherent to the issue of solidarity is its scope – defining who belongs to the circle of solidarity. Arendt therefore makes a distinction between *exclusive solidarity* based on a commonality of interest and the 'commonness' of situation within a group of people, and *inclusive solidarity* which exists between those who suffer and those who make common cause with them (Bernstein, 1985). Such distinctions appear at all three of the above-described levels. Thus, lower degrees of conditionality for solidarity at all three (micro-, meso-, and macro-) levels correspond to more inclusive-, while higher levels correspond to more exclusive forms of solidarity (see Figure 1).

CONDITIONALITY

High: Low:
Exclusive solidarity   Inclusive solidarity

Micro-level

Meso-level

Macro-level

Figure 1. Formations of solidarity according to level and scope

Before we move on to describe in detail the operationalization of solidarity formations on the one hand and the examined explanatory variables on the other, a few words about the research rationale of the present project are necessary.

3. Research rationale

The research rationale for the present paper originates in the ongoing SOCRIS project,[1] an Austrian–Hungarian research project that addresses the consequences of the crises with a focus on solidarity. In order to obtain a better understanding of this context, we provide a short description of the project below. The research carried out between 2016–2019 consisted of a quantitative phase in which a survey (N=2500) was conducted in both countries where the population was restricted to active-aged respondents.

Regarding solidarity, support for state help for disadvantaged social groups (pensioners, parents with many children and the unemployed) is significantly higher in Hungary. Support for state help for disadvantaged cultural minorities (refugees, the Roma) is stronger among respondents in Austria, but strongly correlates with higher social status in both countries. Analysing political attitudes, we found that in Austria right-wing extremism is closely connected to authoritarian, xenophobic, welfare chauvinistic and ethnocentric attitudes. Moreover, among FPÖ voters we found political alienation, mistrust of the state, rejection of state redistribution, and a lack of macro-solidarity. In the case of Hungary, we found a correlation between right-wing extremism and welfare chauvinism, authoritarianism and political disappointment; however, neither micro- nor macro-solidarity nor ethnocentrism played a role. To sum up, the social environment of right-wing extremist attitudes is much more defined in Austria and more diffuse in Hungary.

An important analytical tool for grasping the complexities of solidarity was the application of cluster analysis to our data to identify different patterns of solidarity in the two countries. The four clusters identifiable in both countries were: *full inclusive,*

inclusive inactive, *national exclusives*, and *non-solidarians*. The largest group in Austria is that of the fully exclusive (19 per cent), while in Hungary it is the national exclusive (24 per cent). Non-solidarians, the smallest group, are practically the winners of recent ruling regimes in both countries. Feelings of meritocracy, appreciation, and strong social ties are more widespread in Austria, while feelings of injustice and poorer social attachments are more widespread in Hungary and also appear in explanations both of inclusive and exclusive types of solidarity. In Austria, inclusivism was found to correlate with attitudes of tolerance, having strong social ties and the rejection of right-wing extremist political views. Exclusivism, on the other hand, is closely connected to authoritarianism and right-wing extremist attitudes. In Hungary, non-solidarians feel the most appreciated, can be described as xenophobic, have a social dominance orientation, and welfare chauvinistic attitudes. While full inclusives in Hungary have more social ties and are more tolerant than others, they also experience collective relative deprivation.

While both SOCRIS and ESS round 8 (2016) were carried out roughly at the same time, SOCRIS had a research-problem-focused population that included active-aged respondents, therefore the representative samples of ESS allow us to validate the models and findings of SOCRIS, and to obtain further analytical insight given the rich collection of variables of the ESS.

In order to address these questions, cluster analysis was carried out on the Austrian and Hungarian database of ESS round 8 (2016), supplemented by multinomial logistic regression analysis. This paper is accordingly structured as follows: In the first section of the paper we provide a theoretical introduction to the concept of solidarity and clarify a number of distinctions significant for our purposes. Our focus here is limited to issues central to the present paper and we by no means claim to cover the theoretical complexities in their entirety. Then we move on to a discussion of theories regarding the determinants of solidarity, with an emphasis on socio-demographic variables, the role of the personal micro-world, macro-level trust, personal values, receptiveness attitudes, and political orientation. Afterwards, we present the findings of our empirical analysis and discuss our answers to the above-listed research questions.

4. The operationalization of formations of solidarity

According to Zulehner, Denz, Pelinka and Tálos (1997: 54), solidarity is a central concept of social justice which can be distinguished at three main levels: micro, meso, and macro. We operationalized the different solidarity levels based on the literature and the opportunities offered by ESS Round 8,[2] as follows:

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[2] Since further on we seek to construct a comparative longitudinal analysis of the period before and after the financial and so-called refugee crises, we have only picked out those variables in this report which also can be analysed in ESS Round 4 (where the rotating module is more or less identical with the recent one). Unfortunately, in this paper—because of limits on the scope—this comparative analysis-in-time is impossible.

4.1 Micro-level

Understanding individualistic explanations of poverty has been at the forefront of research on perceptions of deservingness (Coughlin, 1980; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Oorschot, 2000). As we will see later on, at this individual level the criteria of blame and blamelessness is a crucial factor. It could be argued that the rise of individualistic explanations of poverty should also be understood in the broader social context – namely, as a consequence of the 'commodification of protection' (Hadis, 2015: 4).

Thus, micro-solidary attitudes are central to understanding broader societal shifts. The literature is consistent in finding that in their solidary attitudes most respondents in Western welfare states rank social groups by levels of deservingness, whereby old people deserve the most, the sick and the disabled less, needy families even less, and the unemployed the least (Oorschot, 2008: 269). Studies that add immigrants to this list find that the latter group is considered the least deserving. While numerous explanations exist to interpret these highly consistent findings, what is certain is that they do coincide with the chronological order in which state-funded social protection was introduced to support the respective groups.

Another strand of research does not focus on ranking but the foundations of micro-solidarity. This approach examines whether people utilize individualistic explanations as foundations for their attitudes towards social inequality. It has been shown repeatedly that respondents who rely on such explanations tend to be less solidary; that is, less supportive of welfare spending and the social protection of the poor (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Oorschot, 2000). This heuristic is a close relative of the 'culture of poverty' concept born in the 1970s that claims that the value system of the poor contributes to the reproduction of poverty (Lewis, 1969). It is clear that in this formulation research situates respondents on an individualistic-societal dimension in terms of their understanding of deservingness. It should be noted however, that Oorschot and Halman also claim that a further, crosscutting dimension – that of blame-fate – also exists (2000: 5).

Generally, regarding individual perceptions of recipients, deservingness is understood as a calculation of whether the target group has taken any steps to avoid their position or should be blamed for their neediness (Cavaillé, 2015). In Oorschot's (2000) approach, deservingness is based on five principles: need (Are you needy?), control (Is your neediness your own fault?), identity/solidarity (Are you one of us?), attitude (Are you docile and compliant?), and reciprocity (What have you done, or can you do for us?).

Micro-solidarity here measures whether people blame a 'too generous social system' and others who are in a disadvantaged position for exonerating themselves from responsibility (Oorschot, 2000). Values that correspond to lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity.

Table 1. Micro-solidarity (principal components in Austria and Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (61%*	Hungary (50%)*	Austria and Hungary together (56%)*
Social benefits/services make people less willing to care for one another	0.81	0.73	0.77
Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job	0.76	0.74	0.75
Many manage to obtain benefits/services they are not entitled to	0.68	0.52	0.63
Social benefits/services make people lazy	0.86	0.81	0.83

* total variance defined in brackets

4.2 Meso-level

The meso-level of solidarity is understood here as a societal but nevertheless locally bounded dimension. The meso-level is the level of welfare expenditure, the scene of social policy measures. The latter is based on the principle of collective interdependence, trust and assistance, on the grounds of the principle of resource allocation (Beecher, 1986; Stjernø, 2005).

On this meso-level, empirical research has found that one important European development is the strengthening of welfare chauvinism (Hentges and Flecker, 2006: 140). Scholars trace the origins of this to Scandinavia, where its representatives started out opposing high taxation and bureaucracy. Eventually, these issues were supplemented with conflicts about socio-cultural and immigration-related issues (Rydgren, 2006: 165). The narrative blames migrants, leftists, and civil society for social problems that the former frame as having an ethnic nature (Rydgren, 2006: 168–172), but blame can also be extended to the disabled, the unemployed and other inactives (Kaindl, 2006: 72).

We conceptualize the meso-level within the boundaries of the state but based on the above considerations we also distinguish between two problems that belong here and that often appear as distinguishing features of inclusive and exclusive solidarity attitudes. The first concerns state help for disadvantaged *social minorities;* that is, solidarity within the community. The second concerns state help for disadvantaged *cultural minorities* (e.g. immigrants or refugees), where the issue concerns state help offered outside the bounds of the (national-social-political) community.

Meso-solidarity can be measured by two different variable sets in ESS Round 8: the first one refers to welfare chauvinistic attitudes – that is, strong support for economic redistribution with opposition to welfare for immigrants (Hentges and Flecker, 2006: 140) – ,while the second one refers to welfare statism (Beecher, 1986; Stjernø, 2005); that is, support for strong state schemes that provide for 'needy' groups such as pensioners, the unemployed, and working parents. Values that correspond to

lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity.

Meso-solidarity 1 – welfare chauvinism (standardized index in Austria, only the first question was used in Hungary and on the merged file):

- When do you think immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?

    - Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring in their close family members.

Table 2. Meso-solidarity 2 – welfare statism (principal components in Austria and Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (72%)*	Hungary (58%)*	Austria and Hungary together (67%)*
Standard of living for the old is government's responsibility	0.87	0.82	0.85
Standard of living for the unemployed is government's responsibility	0.83	0.73	0.80
Child-care services for working parents is government's responsibility	0.85	0.73	0.80

* total variance defined in brackets

4.3 Macro-level

Macro-solidarity refers to support for the welfare state as a system as an institutionalized form of solidarity. In this case, society acts as a community that shares certain risks (Bayertz, 1998: 37). The question of how different goods and risks are shared and distributed amongst its members (through taxation, social services, etc.) is subject to political struggles. Societal solidarity or 'society-wide' solidarity (Laitinen and Pessi, 2015: 9) could therefore be considered a special form of group solidarity.

Macro-solidarity is also a form of solidarity that is based on the interests of others, such as social redistribution on an international level – for example, between countries in the EU, or supporting the struggles of minorities in other countries. Accordingly, *macro-solidarity* is solidarity with strangers and foreigners (Denz, 2003). Therefore, it covers burden-sharing between different regions and actions regarding migration and refugee issues. This is the level of collective interdependence, trust and assistance, and the redistribution of sources based on need (Stjernø, 2005: 28).

Macro-solidarity (or 'altruistic solidarity' by Voland, 1999: 158) is aimed at 'improving the situation of people who exist outside the horizon of personal interests' (Bierhoff, 2002: 295) and is motivated by values, norms and the creation of feelings of moral obligations to others. Altruistic solidarity is linked to values connected to self-transcendence, such as 'helpfulness, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, social justice, a world at peace, inner harmony, equality, and unity with nature' (Bierhoff, 2002: 285).

Macro-solidarity as an abstract dimension can be measured by two different variable sets: the first refers to general inclusive values concerning equality and altruism (Alexander, 2014; Voland 1999: 158), while the second one to migration-related issues (Stjernø, 2005: 28; Denz, 2003). Values that correspond to lower levels of conditionality and selectivity point to inclusive-, while those that correspond to higher levels of conditionality and selectivity point to exclusive forms of solidarity.

Table 3. Macro-solidarity 1 – equality and altruism (principal component in Austria and on the merged file, a standardized index in Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (52%)*	Hungary (standardized index)	Austria and Hungary together (49%)*
For a fair society, differences in standards of living should be small	0.54	–	0.55
Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities	0.80	–	0.81
Important to help people and care for others' well-being	0.79	–	0.79

* total variance defined in brackets

Table 4. Macro-solidarity 2 – tolerance (principal components in Austria and Hungary; component matrix scores)

	Austria (81%)*	Hungary (62%)*	Austria and Hungary together (75%)*
Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	0.87	0.69	0.78
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	0.93	0.87	0.92
Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.91	0.79	0.89

* total variance defined in brackets

5. Determinants of solidarity background variables

Beginning with *socio-demographic factors*, we investigate social status,[3] gender, age, settlement size[4] and migrant background.[5] Status, work and income are all important

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[3] Social status aggregated from education, occupational position, and income per capita.
[4] 1=big cities; 5=farms.
[5] A variable aggregated from items such as where the respondents and their parents were born, and whether they are citizens of the country.

values in modern Western societies (Ester et al., 1994). There is consensus in the literature that those at the lower end of the income and education ladder are less likely to show solidarity (Eurobarometer, 2011). Rydgren (2007) and Golder (2016) emphasize that those with lower status are mostly over-represented among voters of the new radical right and so also among supporters of exclusivist forms of solidarity.

Radicalization and affinity with right-wing extremism, however, takes place not only among 'losers' but among winners of socioeconomic change as well (De Weerdt et al., 2007; Flecker, 2007). These winners hold attitudes such as a social dominance orientation, expressed chauvinism, prejudice against immigrants and authoritarian attitudes, and ultimately favour right-wing parties and exclusive types of solidarity.

Moving on to our second group of factors – namely, the personal micro-world – we investigate the relationship between solidarity on the one hand and social trust,[6] social attachment,[7] (personal network), and subjective well-being[8] on the other.

Social trust is an important basis for social relations and cooperative action and for solidarity (Schweer, 1997: 10). According to Frings, co-operation – extorted not by rules but by social bonds based on interpersonal trust – greatly increases the effectiveness of actors' action (Frings, 2010: 15). Putnam supports the idea that solidarity and tolerance can only be effectively organized through well-functioning, mainly horizontal social networks; the norm of reciprocity can be established through these (Putnam, 2000: 134). Scholarly work on right-wing extremism stresses the importance of 'individualisation,' that is, the breaking up of traditional social institutions and norms that might lead to feelings of disorientation and insecurity, which are in turn capitalized on by right-wing extremist political actors (Heitmeyer, 1992; Endrikat et al., 2002). Nationalism – for example – as an imaginary bond is offered by right-wing extremism as a substitute for a traditional collective identity considered as threatened or destroyed by modernization and the market (Gundelach, 2001). According to Flodell, individual satisfaction and a lack of deprivation are important influential factors in the development of solidarity, too (Flodell, 1989: 108). Deprived persons, namely, are more likely to have unfavourable attitudes towards out-groups (Kriesi et al., 1998; Vester, 2001: 299).

Our third focus is the potential relationship between trust on a macro level (institutional trust,[9] satisfaction with functioning of the country,[10] EU/UN-related trust[11]) and solidarity. Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger (1994: 16) emphasize institutional trust

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[6] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'most people can be trusted' or you 'can't be too careful'; 'most people try to take advantage of you', or 'try to be fair'; 'most of the time people are helpful or mostly look out for themselves.'

[7] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how often do you socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues'; 'how many people are there with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters'; 'do you take part in social activities compared to others of same age.'

[8] An aggregated variable made up of items like subjective general health; 'how happy are you'; subjective income.

[9] An aggregated variable made up of items like trust in a country's parliament; trust in the legal system; trust in the police; trust in politicians; trust in political parties.

[10] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how satisfied are you with the present state of economy in [country]'; 'how satisfied with the national government'; 'how satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]'; state of education in [country] nowadays'; 'state of health services in [country] nowadays.'

[11] An aggregated variable made up of items like trust in the European Parliament and trust in the United Nations.

and institutionalized solidarity with various organizations and the protection of the commons against external threat (ecological, political, etc.) as a precondition for solidarity. Schweer believes that trust in politics and democratic institutions creates macro-solidarity by supporting the redistribution of wealth, whether at a regional, national, or even EU level (Schweer, 1997: 221).

Regarding the relationship between *personal values and solidarity*, we examine the values of individualism[12] and conformism.[13] Thome sees in solidarity action a subjectively accepted obligation and a varied value system. However, belonging to a given group may not only strengthen, but by strong group-binding that leads to conformity also weaken inclusive dynamics (Thome, cited by Kraxberger, 2010: 6). So, non-conformism and, according to Winkler (2010), individualism, may strengthen inclusive forms of solidarity.

A second group of personal values we investigate are norms related to equality,[14] statism[15] and meritocracy.[16] Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger also mention inclusive justice principles as prerequisites of solidarity (Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger, 1994). Ressler (2002) stresses the importance of a welfare state, the original aim of which was to protect the weak and create equal opportunities, as opposed to the competitive nature of neoliberalism. According to Ullrich (2005: 237), statism is a standpoint that opposes a liberal or corporatist position and sees the state as a player responsible for resolving social problems, which also supports an inclusive-emancipatory conception.

An important aspect of our research is an analysis of the relationship between *receptiveness attitudes* (xenophobic attitudes vs. tolerance,[17] homophobic attitudes, and male-chauvinism– see Footnote 13 – and political powerlessness[18]) and solidarity. According to Zulehner et al. (1997), solidarity is based on diversity, acceptance and tolerance. That is, solidarity is a binding link that exists despite (accepted and tolerated) differences and inequalities.

Intolerant behaviour is primarily manifested against people perceived as being non-equivalent or negatively assessed groups (Forst, 2000: 74). However, tolerance—as well as solidarity—always has a limit (Klein and Zick, 2013). Zick et al. (2011) ask the question which groups are accepted as part of society, and the extent to which social diversity and heterogeneity are desired (p. 18). They argue that intolerance poses a threat to democratically functioning societies because perceived differences can lead to the abolition of equalization, and discrimination (p. 11).

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[12] An aggregated variable made up of items like it is 'important to think new ideas and be creative'; 'important to show abilities and be admired'; 'important to make own decisions and be free.'

[13] An aggregated variable made up of items like it is 'important to do what is told and follow rules'; 'important to be humble and modest, not draw attention'; 'important that government is strong and ensures safety'; 'important to behave properly'; 'important to follow traditions and customs.'

[14] Such as gender equality: 'men should have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce,' or LMBTQ equality: 'gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish.'

[15] 'Government should reduce differences in income levels.'

[16] 'Large differences in income are acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.'

[17] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'immigration bad or good for [country]'s economy'; '[country]'s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants'; 'immigrants make [country] worse or better place to live.'

[18] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'political system allows people to have a say in what government does'; 'able to take active role in political group'; 'political system allows people to have influence on politics.'

The theory of political dissatisfaction and protest voting claims that those affected negatively by socioeconomic changes may become dissatisfied and feel they have no influence on political processes (Van den Burg et al., 2000). Exclusive attention to protest voting, however, is problematic, as large parts of the electorate demonstrate an affinity with right-wing extremism itself as well (Falter and Klein, 1994; Scheepers et al., 1995).

Finally, our paper investigates the relationship between *political orientation and solidarity.* Ressler emphasizes that supporters of leftist parties are more inclined to support inclusive-emancipatory-universalist ideas, while right-wingers prefer exclusive forms of solidarity based on certain criteria (Ressler, 2002: 211). This is in line with Lefkofridi and Michel's thesis (2014) which defines left-wing social democratic attitudes as addenda to the services of welfare states, and right-wing ideologies as incentives for supporting exclusive solidarity.

6. Empirical tests of different solidarity levels in Austria and Hungary

To answer our question what coherent patterns of solidarity can be identified in the two countries and whether these are rather analogous dynamics or country-specific; moreover, whether the proportions of the former patterns within the countries are similar, we stratified groups of respondents based on the above-mentioned micro-, meso-, and macro-solidary dimensions (see the structure of the aggregated variables in Section 4 above). First, we used k-means cluster analyses in both countries, separately.[19]
In both countries we were able to identify five more-or-less identical clusters with rather small differences: we named these 'self-lifting,' 'national exclusive,' 'anti-solidarian,' 'inclusive solidarian' and 'neoliberal-tolerant.'

Table 5. Austrian clusters (pairwise model, 47 iterations)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neo-liberal tolerant
micro-solidarity	-.89677	.37405	-.49598	.80919	.27068
welfare chauvinism – meso	.24683	1.07333	.80159	-.93217	-.59731
welfare statism – meso	.24108	.66359	-1.37703	.45777	-.82045
inequality – macro	-.41509	.12892	1.02557	-.69350	.83353
intolerance	.17990	1.05288	.88909	-.88571	-.58136

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[19] All the scores in the cells of the tables show differences from the means (zero) of a standardized scale (indices or principal components). The higher the (positive) values, the stronger the influence of the given attitude variable on the characterization of the cluster, and the lower (negative) values, the greater the absence of the given attitude.

– macro					
Total (N=2009)	28% (N=564)	17% (N=353)	11% (N=220)	25% (N=499)	19% (N=373)

Table 6. Hungarian clusters (pairwise model, 29 iterations)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neo-liberal (rather) tolerant
micro-solidarity	-.93184	.95738	-.11369	.53439	-.35853
welfare chauvinism – meso	-.02710	.74746	.98368	-.75330	-.58496
welfare statism – meso	.70049	.79521	-.97442	-.04330	-.62631
inequality – macro	-.54593	-.16198	-.16398	-.31001	1.26950
intolerance – macro	.11513	.62830	.78858	-1.14104	-.02882
Total (N=1610)	22% (N=350)	18% (N=291)	17% (N=274)	24% (N=381)	19% (N=312)

Individuals in the cluster we called *self-liftings* blame the social system and people in need in both countries, are welfare chauvinistic (but only at an average level in Hungary[20]) and are also welfare statist at the meso-level. They support equality but are intolerant towards immigrants on a macro-level. Seemingly, they are sectarian equalitarian, so they only support equality and state-subsidies for the (merited) in-group but dislike supporting out-groups. Their proportion is somewhat higher in Austria (28 per cent) than in Hungary (22 per cent).

National exclusives show solidarity on a micro-level; they also support welfare statism (meso-level), but at the same time they are also welfare chauvinists (meso-level) and non-solidarians on the macro-level. Seemingly, they only favour those who belong to the political or cultural nation and would support them through welfare measures. Here we find one notable difference between the countries: respondents in Hungary in this cluster are rather egalitarian, while Austrians rather support inequality. This small difference may be explained by the different value orientations of citizens in these countries: namely, that Austria is rather an achievement-centered society, while Hungary is rather a statist one. The proportions of these clusters are 17–18 per cent in both countries.

The members of the *anti-solidary* cluster are welfare chauvinistic and refuse all forms and levels of solidarity with one exception in Hungary: again, Hungarian respondents tend to support equality, but the difference from the average is rather

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[20] Here we had to measure welfare chauvinism using only one variable in Hungary.

small. This cluster is somewhat greater as a proportion of the total in Hungary (17 per cent) than in Austria (11 per cent).

Inclusive solidarians show solidarity attitudes at all levels in both countries; however, they only support welfare statism on an average level in Hungary. This is probably due to the merger of leftist and (neo)liberal values after the system change of 1989. The proportion of these clusters is around 24–25 per cent in both countries, thus this is one of the largest clusters among the solidary groups.

The last cluster includes the so-called *neo-liberal-tolerant*. Respondents who belong here strongly support inequality and reject welfare statism, but also welfare chauvinism in both countries. Hungarian respondents demonstrate no micro-solidarity, and their tolerance level is only average in this cluster. On the contrary, Austrian neo-liberals are clearly tolerant towards immigrants and do not blame the social system and people in need (micro-solidarity). So, those Austrians who belong to this cluster seem to understand that the functioning of the capitalist system and its dynamics unavoidably creates winners and losers within societies (and no one is to blame for this), while we find a rather social-Darwinistic version of neo-liberalism in Hungary. The proportion of these clusters is around 19 per cent in both countries.

In summarizing our most important results here, we can state that the cognitive and structural dynamics that produce different types of solidarity are rather similar in Austria and Hungary. However, some important questions arise, such as:

• first, whether the dynamics of cognitive structures and the relative weights/proportions of each cluster are also akin in international comparison; that is, can we declare that the two countries are not only similar related to their own average solidarity levels, but also that the absolute level of each type of solidarity is alike, or clearer and easier to identify: additionally, in which country do respondents demonstrate more inclusive or exclusive patterns of solidarity in statistical comparison?

• second, whether similar cognitive structures may be explained by similar variables; i.e., are the cognitive and structural reasons for the different types of solidarity in the two countries analogous?

• third, how much is the distribution of the various clusters attributable to far-right political radicalism?

6.1 Comparison of means of cluster-forming variables

First, we compared the cluster-forming variables and the averages of the aggregated variables (on different micro-, meso-, and macro levels) in a merged data file (i.e., the Austrian-Hungarian population was treated as one unit). According to all variables and aggregate dimensions, we found that respondents living in Austria demonstrated more inclusivity concerning solidarity (the only exception was the level of micro-solidarity, where we did not find significant differences between countries). The largest differences appeared between levels of tolerance and welfare chauvinism; that is, Hungarian respondents show more intolerance and welfare chauvinism.

6.2 Common clustering

The cluster structure we created using the merged file was practically identical with those created using the separate files, with small differences such as: the self-liftings cluster appeared more tolerant, and non-solidarians supported equality at an average level, just as was the case with neoliberal-tolerants' level of micro-solidarity (the appearances of these average values are due to the fact that these values had different – positive/negative – directions in the two countries in the separate files).

Table 7. Shared patterns (pairwise model, 45 iterations)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neo-liberal (rather) tolerant
micro-solidarity	-.82092	.75008	-.65344	.88737	.03157
welfare chauvinism – meso	-.15045	.65306	1.09143	-1.08181	-.38129
welfare statism – meso	.40098	.70576	-.66303	.32579	-.87428
inequality – macro	-.43176	-.11825	.02052	-.57498	1.15366
intolerance – macro	-.15417	.66146	.96473	-1.25327	-.11146
Total (N=3619)	25% (N=892)	19% (N=691)	18% (N=628)	18% (N=666)	20% (N=740)

We found important differences concerning proportions of inclusive-, national exclusive-, and non-solidarian patterns, however. Compared to Austrian respondents, there were twice as many Hungarian exclusivists (non-solidarians and national exclusivists), and four times as many Austrian inclusive solidarians as their Hungarian counterparts when the two countries were treated as one common European region (see Table 4.). It is worth noting that the cluster sizes hardly changed in Austria in the shared file compared to the country file, while radical changes were observed in the case of Hungary. This means that, compared to Austria, in Hungary the inclusive-solidarity cluster was not the biggest but the smallest one, while exclusivism clearly dominated the thinking of Hungarian respondents.

Table 8. Comparison of cluster sizes (proportions) created using different data files (as %)

	1: self-lifting	2: national exclusive	3: anti-solidary	4: inclusive solidary	5: neoliberal tolerant
HU merged data file	22%	24%	24%	7%	23%
HU separate data file	22%	18%	17%	24%	19%
AUT merged data file	27%	15%	12%	28%	18%
AUT separate data file	28%	17%	11%	25%	19%

7. Explaining solidarity according to background variables

To explain the memberships of respondents in different clusters we used step-by-step multinomial logistic regressions in both countries. Reference clusters were groups of non-solidarians both in Austria and Hungary. In the first models we only involved the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender, social status, settlement type, and migration background (the second variable only in Austria). In the second step, we complemented the models with variables that belonged to the micro-world of individuals, such as religiousness,[21] personal network, subjective well-being, feelings of personal security,[22] and social trust. Next, we complemented the models with variables related to individuals' macro-world such as institutional trust, satisfaction with the functioning of the state, trust in international organizations, feeling of attachment to the country and the EU,[23] political activity,[24] political powerlessness, and feelings of discrimination.[25] In the last models we complemented the independent variable set with values and attitudes such as conformism, individualism, homophobia, xenophobia (intolerance), male-chauvinism, statism, and meritocracy.

In the first model we found that, compared to the non-solidarian cluster, major demographic and social status indicators did not strongly explain the differences between the different solidarity clusters and the reference cluster. In Austria, members

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[21] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how religious are you'; 'how often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions'; 'how often do you pray apart from at religious services.'

[22] 'Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark.'

[23] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'how emotionally attached are you to [country]'; 'how emotionally attached to Europe.'

[24] An aggregated variable made up of items like 'contacted politician or government official in last 12 months'; 'worked in political party or action group last 12 months'; 'worked in another organisation or association last 12 month's; 'worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months'; 'signed petition last 12 months'; 'taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months'; 'boycotted certain products last 12 months'; 'posted or shared anything about politics online last 12 months.'

[25] 'Member of a group discriminated against in this country.'

of the neoliberal-tolerant cluster have relatively higher status and are more likely to have a migrant background. Similarly, inclusive solidarians are more likely to have higher status and a migrant background compared to the reference cluster. In Hungary, higher social status only correlates with membership in the inclusive cluster. In the case of the other solidarity clusters there is no status effect. Overall, in both countries the demographic characteristics of respondents and differences in status did not have a strong influence on the formation of solidarity clusters.

In the second model we tested the effects of people's subjective well-being and micro-world interpersonal cognitive attitudes. In this case, explanatory potential increased significantly in both countries, but there were also some differences between them. In Austria, members of the *inclusive cluster* were more likely to have a migrant background, higher levels of social trust, and personal feelings of security, with more women belonging to this group. In Hungary, members have more social trust, higher social status, and stronger social networks, but less religiousness and higher levels of feelings of deprivation (less subjective well-being). Members of the *neoliberal-tolerant* cluster are more likely to come from a migrant background, have higher levels of social trust and feelings of personal security, with more women belonging to this group in Austria, while in Hungary they have more social trust, are less religious and more deprived (less subjective well-being). Among *self-liftings* in Austria there are more women, members live in smaller settlements, have a higher level of subjective well-being and social trust, but are less religious, while in Hungary they are less religious and more deprived (less subjective well-being). Finally, in the case of national exclusives in Austria we find more women, less feelings of insecurity, and more people living in smaller settlements, while in Hungary there are more deprived individuals who live in bigger settlements.

However, the biggest differences between Austria and Hungary were found in the third and fourth[26] models among the different solidarity clusters compared to the non-solidarity cluster (for the most significant results, see appendix). In these models, we tested the effects of macro-level attitudinal variables and values. In the case of Austria, behind the different solidarity clusters we identified a wide variety of cognitive setups. Members of the neoliberal-tolerant cluster show less meritocratic affiliation (more egalitarianism), less homophobia and xenophobia (more tolerance), less trust in supranational organizations, and lower attachment both to the EU and Austria. Moreover, members live in smaller settlements than the reference group. Among the self-liftings cluster, we found stronger feelings of being discriminated against, less religiousness, stronger attachment both to the EU and Austria, less meritocratic affiliation, more statism, less xenophobia (more tolerance), more individualism (more affinity to the free market), but also more conformism (stronger feelings of inferiority compared to political power), and more political powerlessness. In the case of the inclusive cluster there is less meritocracy, more statism and egalitarianism (concerning LMBTQ and women), more individualism, less religiousness and less xenophobia (more tolerance). Members come more often from migrant families and feel attached either both to Austria and the EU or to neither of them. Finally, in the case of the national exclusive cluster we found less meritocracy, more conformism, more political

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[26] Explanatory powers of the fourth models – Hungary: McFadden R2 =.296; Cox and Snell R2 =.605 Austria: McFadden R^2 =.270; Cox and Snell R^2 =.558.

powerlessness, less EU/UN trust, more institutional trust, and less feelings of insecurity.

For Austrian respondents, it can be assumed that the macro-level attitudes and ideologies behind the individual solidarity clusters are not necessarily always coherent, but the value profiles of the groups are markedly different. From this we can conclude that solidarity cluster membership may be differentiated according to ideological and general macro-level – ideological and general – value choices.

In the case of Hungarian respondents, we could not find such coherence. Hungarian solidarity clusters rarely differ according to macro-level values. For example, self liftings and inclusives are more tolerant, while neoliberals and national exclusives show more trust towards the EU and UN compared to the anti-solidary group. But when thinking of social solidarity, people are rather driven by their individual problems, subjective positions, emotions and sentiments, rather than values, ideas or principles.

8. Party affinity

As a last step in our analysis, we looked at how much the various clusters were divided in relation to far-right political radicalism. In the past, in both in Hungary and Austria, we have witnessed the emergence of the political far right and populism, and we assumed that these political movements in terms of their social base would appear distinctly in the value profiles we revealed.

In Austria, the situation is very divided. For three value profiles (anti-solidarity cluster 40 per cent, national exclusive cluster 33 per cent, self-lifting cluster 24 per cent), the group of far-right FPÖ and earlier (though politically ideologically related) BZÖ party supporters is relatively large and clearly over-represented. By contrast, the popularity of extreme right-wing parties is barely detectable in inclusive (3 per cent) and neoliberal-tolerant (9 per cent) clusters. If we look at our 2016 research results from the point of view of the electoral base of the current extremist and populist right-wing coalition government, the polarization of respondents is observable, albeit to a lesser extent.

71 per cent of the members of the anti-solidarity cluster, 59 per cent of the members of the national exclusive cluster, and 54 per cent of the self-lifting cluster members supported the coalition, compared to 20 per cent of the inclusive and 37 per cent of the neoliberal-tolerant clusters. From these results we can conclude that in Austria different values and ideological preferences are behind the rise of the extreme right-wing populism that seriously divides Austrian society.

In the case of Hungarian society, the situation is different. Support for the extreme right party Jobbik is slightly different for each value cluster and ranges between 10 and 11 per cent. Only one group represents an exception, namely the anti-solidarity cluster, where the proportion of supporters is higher at 17 per cent. From this we can conclude that while Jobbik has basically based its political strategy on a strong process of ideological identity-building, voters do not support or reject Jobbik according to value profiles.

This becomes more noticeable if we look at not only Jobbik but also at Jobbik and Fidesz voter preferences together. In this case, the proportion of potential supporters is very high as the governing party is included here too. Moreover,

although there are significant differences between the proportions of the clusters, support for the Fidesz–Jobbik political group is very high in all clusters (anti-solidarity cluster 92 per cent, national exclusive cluster 80 per cent, self-lifting cluster 79 per cent, inclusive cluster 63 per cent, neoliberal-tolerant 73 per cent). Thus attraction to a far-right ideology, independent of value segments and profiles, is widespread in Hungarian society: there was no single value cluster where the majority did not support the right-wing populist Fidesz-Jobbik political camp in 2016.

9. Conclusions

In our paper we have shown that the cognitive and structural dynamics of solidarity patterns in both Austria and Hungary are very similar. Based on its scope and foundations, the most exclusive cluster is the non-solidarian one in both countries. People who belong here are intolerant, blame people in need, and also support inequality in Austria, while they are slightly egalitarian in Hungary. This group is followed in size – based on its level of exclusivity – by the self-lifting cluster, which group supports only the nationally-merited. The next exclusive cluster is a nationally-based one (national-exclusives) whose members favour supporting all nationals but not foreigners. Neoliberals are rather tolerant, but reject micro-solidarity in Hungary, while in Austria they seem to understand the need to support people in disadvantaged situations. Finally, inclusive solidarians show solidarity at each level we investigated.

Comparing the relative weights of these clusters in the two countries separately, we observe huge similarities between the proportions of the clusters. The picture becomes more sophisticated if we compare the sizes of clusters with the help of a merged data file, however. The relative weight of the inclusive cluster decreases, while the relative proportions of non-solidarian and national-exclusive groups increase drastically in Hungary, which result confirms our findings from the SOCRIS project (with the exception of the rising proportion of non-solidarians). This means that although the dynamics and structures of different solidarity patterns are similar in the two countries, Hungary generally shows a significant shift in the level of solidarity compared to Austria.

Explanations for the cluster memberships and party affinities are also different in the two countries but are similar to SOCRIS findings. While in Austria we find that mostly ideology- and value-based reasons circumscribe different choices related to different types of solidarity and party affinity, in Hungary, instead of coherent values and principles we find that individual problems and subjective perceptions explain solidarity patterns and a general tendency to right-wing radicalization, independent of the value profiles and solidarity cluster memberships.

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Appendix

Comparison of logit model results created using different data files

REFERENCE CATEGORY: ANTI-SOLIDARY GROUP	Independent variables (final model, only significant variables reported)	Austria Exp(B)	Austria significance ('–'=not significant)	Hungary Exp(B)	Hungary significance ('–'=not significant)
SELF-LIFTINGS	Religious	0,69	0,016	0,53	0,004
	Not powerless politically	0,67	0,017	‑‑2,02	–
	Not discriminatory	0,22	0,034	–	–
	Tolerant[27]	1,50	0,014	–	0,002
	Non-conformist	0,52	0,000	–	–
	Non-individualist	0,62	0,004	–	–
	Anti-statist[28]	0,63	0,001	–	–
	Non-meritocratic[29]	1,75	0,000	–	–
	Attachment to EU and the home country[30]	3,59	0,000	–	–
NATIONAL EXCLUSIVES	Gender	–	–	0,37	0,020
	Status	–	–	1,73	0,025
	Fear[31]	0,64	0,019	–	–
	Institutional trust	1,89	0,008	–	–
	Trust in EU and UN	0,55	0,007	2,00	0,008
	Not powerless politically	0,54	0,001	–	–
	Non-conformist	0,51	0,000	–	–
	Non-meritocratic[32]	2,24	0,000	–	–
INCLUSIVE SOLIDARY GROUP	Status	–	–	1,73	0,024
	Migration background	2,56	0,021	–	–
		–	–	2,65	0,000
	Trust in EU	6,94	0,000	4,67	0,000

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[27] Towards immigrants.

[28] Government should NOT reduce differences in income levels.

[29] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.

[30] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.

[31] Personal unsafeness: feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark

[32] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable to reward talents and efforts

	and UN	1,39	0,041	1,68	0,024
	Tolerant	0,66	0,013	–	–
	Gender-	0,69	0,048	–	–
	egalitarian[33]	0,44	0,000	–	–
	Religious	0,55	0,000	–	–
	Non-	2,74	0,000	–	–
	individualist	2,93	0,012	–	–
	Homophobic[34]				
	Anti-statist[35]	4,15	0,013	–	–
	Non-meritocratic[36]				
	Attachment to EU and the home country[37]				
	No attachment either to EU or to home country[38]				
NEOLIBERAL TOLERANT GROUP	Gender	–	–	0,42	0,037
	Age	–	–	1,03	0,035
	Settlement size	1,36	0,013	–	–
	Trust in EU	0,58	0,028	2,20	0,003
	and UN	4,13	0,000	–	–
	Tolerant	0,59	0,003	–	–
	Homophobic[39]	1,74	0,001	–	–
	Non-meritocratic[40]	–	–	0,46	0,025
	Institutional trust	3,05	0,045	–	–
	No attachment either to the home country[41]				

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[33] Men should NOT have more right to jobs than women when jobs are scarce.
[34] Gays and lesbians should NOT be free to live life as they wish.
[35] Government should NOT reduce differences in income levels.
[36] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talent and effort.
[37] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.
[38] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.
[39] Gays and lesbians should NOT be free to live life as they wish.
[40] Large differences in income are NOT acceptable for rewarding talents and efforts.
[41] Compared to the group that has only attachment to the home country.