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This issue of *Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics (IEEJSP)* covers three sections of articles, research notes, interviews and book reviews. In the first section our authors portray some major trends in the recent history of labour in Eastern Europe from a genuine semi-peripheral perspective. The articles of the second section discuss two salient issues of present-day East European politics: the mechanisms through which populism is shaping governance and the impacts of non-fulfilment of electoral pledges on representative democracies. The third section continues the debate about spatial exclusion and marginality that was the main topic of the previous issue of IEEJSP. The articles in this issue, however, focus on the political mechanisms beyond the Roma marginalisation in local communities: the invisibility of Roma political participation, the political economy impacts on ghettoization and the political strategy of moral panic in shaping Roma segregation.

Towards a new labour history: Eastern European perspectives

The 'working class' under state socialism

Labour history writing in Eastern Europe has been suffering from an ideological bias both before and after the change of regimes. During the era of state socialism, labour histories had to be in line with the legitimating discourse of the ruling Communist regimes across the region. According to this discourse, the Party ruled in the name of an allegedly homogeneous working class with a revolutionary consciousness, whose century-long struggle against capital was won with the leadership of the Party (the 'vanguard'). Scholars, whose work contradicted this legitimating discourse, risked their academic careers.

A famous example is the show trial against Miklós Haraszti, who wrote a sociography of factory work, in which he argued that workers are exploited to the same extent under socialism as under capitalism; moreover, they are conscious of their exploitation (Haraszti 1978). Since they do not consider the factory as theirs, they use all kinds of small tricks to cheat the proprietor, the State, and its local representatives (factory management, trade union leaders, foremen). They refuse to

follow labour protection regulations, they falsify work-sheets, they cheat with the calculation of norms (they are 'looting') they feel alienated and lonely in the brigades, they misappropriate materials and use machines for their own purposes (such workers are called 'homers', who are portrayed as thieves in the satirical journals) and they do not consider the misappropriation of state property as stealing. At the subsequent show trial sociologists, in fact, argued that they heard even sharper opinions of interviewed workers, so workers' discontent was by no means unknown to the regime. Workers' social and political opinions ('the conditions of the working class') were, in fact, carefully monitored, and strictly confidential reports were sent to the centre and the top functionaries about the political mood of working-class districts. Nevertheless, as the show trial shows, the open admission that 'real' workers behaved differently from the socialist ideal, tested even the relatively liberal Kádár regime's tolerance.

Thanks to this relative liberalism, however, in Hungarian sociology there were three major scholarly directions, which started the revision of the 'classical' legitimating discourse. The first grew out of ethnographic research on labour and the most famous representative is István Kemény. Kemény investigated various working-class groups in different industries and living places. During his ethnographic study he compared their origin, family circumstances, training, education, the nature of their work (how monotonous it is, what physical effort it requires and whether a special knowledge is needed to perform the given task), their financial and living conditions. Based on his fieldwork data he gave a more differentiated analysis of working-class consciousness than what was propagated by the official ideology. The fieldwork of Kemény showed that the industrial working class was not homogeneous either in its social composition nor in its culture, and stratification manifests itself even in the division of labour: immigrant workers, who are usually less qualified than their native urban counterparts, occupy lower ranks in the production hierarchy and specialists, who often come from old working-class dynasties, monopolize the posts of functionaries, foremen and other key positions in production (Kemény 1990).

The most famous member of the second school, which focused on social stratification, was Zsuzsa Ferge (Ferge 1976). Her research showed that school continues to reproduce social inequalities in socialist Hungary – in fact, with the dispossession of people cultural capital became the most important form of capital that parents could pass on to their children. Thus, the children of working-class parents received worse grades in school than those of employees and intellectuals. The stratification surveys of the 1960s refuted that social and material inequalities cease to exist under state socialism, and thus, it became clear that the theory of two-class-one stratum (working class, peasantry, intellectuals) was infeasible.

The third direction was that of industrial sociology and it mainly relied on surveys and participant observation. Lajos Héthy and Csaba Makó conducted research on the impact of technical development on working-class consciousness in the Rába factory (Héthy and Makó 1975). However, the survey also contained questions about the workers' trust in enterprise democracy, the trade union, and even in the Party itself. It is perhaps not surprising that workers were less satisfied with the trade union than with the Party, nor did they hold enterprise democracy to be a participatory one. They thought in fact that they did not have much say in enterprise

decisions. But the majority likewise argued that they could not even influence their immediate environment: only one third of the respondents thought that the management was interested in the proposals and innovations of the workers and less than one third agreed with the statement that the enterprise took an interest in the welfare of the employees. Makó and Héthy (1978) also demonstrated that workers, who occupied core positions, could successfully bargain with the management over the wages and the fulfilment of the plan.

Following the lead of these schools (mainly that of industrial sociology) Michael Burawoy conducted fieldwork in the Lenin Steel Works in Hungary. From his comparative studies in capitalist and postcolonialist countries he concluded that the despotism of early capitalism was replaced by hegemonic despotism, where workers gave concessions to capital to preserve their factories and workplace. His Hungarian fieldwork experience led him to the conclusion that the socialist factory regimes also developed into hegemonic despotism but at that time he was optimistic about the prospect of socialist workers' establishing self-governing, self-managing regimes after they got rid of the tutelage of the Party (Burawoy and Lukács 1992).

Rediscovery of the working class

While both Eastern and Western leftists shared Burawoy's opinion at the time, the collapse of state socialism did not verify left-wing hopes for a 'tertium datur' in the Lukácsian sense (neither Stalinism nor capitalism). There was only sporadic working-class resistance to the restoration of capitalism and full-scale privatisation. In spite of this, socialist workers were seen by many economists as 'lazy' or 'unfit to work' in a competitive environment, and their association with the fallen regime nourished a further bias against the re-discovery of labour histories – after they had been liberated from the tutelage of the Party.

The collapse of state socialism widely discredited legitimizing narratives of the old Communist parties, which were based on a simplistic equation of class, class consciousness and political action and organisation (Welskopp 1993). Anthropologists studying workers in Central and Eastern Europe, indeed, argued that the workers became the new subaltern class (Kideckel 2002; 2008; Buchowski 2001; Kalb 2009; Kalb and Halmai 2011). While sub-alternity was used by Rudolph Bahro (1977) to explain workers' location at the bottom of a knowledge-based division of labour in socialism,[1] the transformation of socialist political economies to a market economy have deepened the subalternalization of labour according to this stream of authors. Kideckel, for instance, argues: 'The dominant trends, however, have been to sanctify individualized ownership at the expense of social equity, to pursue inappropriate loan policies, and to facilitate a corrupt bargain between owning and political classes at the expense of labor. Industrial workers have fallen to near the bottom of the economic and social scale, there is still no effective middle class, and class boundaries are further solidified' (Kideckel, 2002, 115).

[1] See also Konrád and Szelényi (1979).

This new political bias hindered the recognition that labour histories can be written from various angles and that in the Western literature there was a call for writing a new labour history, which has also been referred to as global labour history (Van der Linden 2007). The call for a new labour history seeks to re-orient traditional labour history-writing, which focused on large-scale social movements, strikes and party histories, and also in the West towards a widening use of social historical and anthropological methods to study different working-class milieus, cultural contexts, gender relations and everyday working-class life. There is also a re-orientation towards the global South and the inclusion of non-free workers (in contrast with the focus of the old labour histories on the white, male wage-earners, who are seen as members of the 'traditional' working classes).

In Eastern Europe, there have been recent attempts to re-discover the working classes in the postsocialist era (see Ost 2005; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Kideckel 2008; Trappmann 2013), and there is an increasing interest in the new labour history among young researchers. The investigation of the social milieus of working classes and the recognition that there have been various working-class groups has been an important part of new labour history, which has strong connections to social history (from the German literature see, for instance Vester et al. eds. 2001). In Hungary, Tibor Valuch is the most prominent representative of this new approach.

Another, 'Eastern European' specific field is the recollection of state socialism in working-class memory. While workers were often uncritically associated with the state socialist past, the memories of state socialism are far more controversial (see e.g. Bartha 2014; Bittner 1998; Rudd 2000). The memory of state socialism, however, remains to be a contested field of contemporary politics and ideology.[2] Dominic Boyer (2006) argues that in East Germany several journalists told him that speaking critically of unified German society was something they were loath to do because such criticism was immediately taken by their Western colleagues as a lack of commitment to democracy and as a yearning for a return of the GDR. To illustrate the point of the essentially different *rights* of talking of the future and the totality of a society, he cites a journalist, who complained that while it was natural for West Germans to ask their 'Ossi' counterparts, how they could have lived under such a totalitarian regime, they would not understand the reverse question: how could one live in a society, where so many people are unemployed or threatened with unemployment (Boyer 2006, 374) or where – as in the case of Hungary – sociologists showed the existence of a large underclass?[3]

[2] See, e.g. the insightful introduction of Maria Todorova (2010).

[3] Ladányi (2012) argues that one-fifth of the population of the country lives in segregation and he concludes with the argument that since the collapse of state socialism, *deprivations have been multiplied*: 'Geographical segregation, the segregation of the poor, and primarily that of the Roma population sharply increased after the change of regimes. If one looks at the maps of where the unemployed, the uneducated and the Romas are concentrated, these maps are easily interchangeable. The relationship is so strong among the processes of segregation that they show the same tendencies. In the North-eastern, Eastern and Southern, South-western regions of the country there is a concentration of small poor, and multiply disadvantaged settlements (*törpefalu* or *aprófalu*), where there is a very high concentration of the excluded and multiply disadvantaged Roma population' (Ladányi 2012, 175).

Of course, workers *en bloc* cannot be seen as part of the precariat even though many of them undoubtedly belong to the losers of the change of regimes. Ferge (2010) argues that the working class constitutes a separate category within the social structure – but mention must be made of the fact that the 'working class' is highly segmented with a fragmented group consciousness (if it exists at all) so it is more appropriate to speak of working classes. Szalai (2004) argues that a dual model is needed to describe contemporary Hungarian society in which she distinguishes between the workers of the multinational companies and the workers of the domestic sector. The latter are described as poorly paid, badly exploited '*bricoleur*s', who are often informally employed and they live from one day to the next while the former are better paid, have better working conditions and enjoy a higher degree of job security than the bricoleurs. At the same time, Szalai stresses the differentiated character of the Hungarian working class and the weakness of the local trade unions, which account for the weak (or non-existent) class consciousness. The specification of the model is rendered difficult by the lack of empirical research which Erzsébet Szalai strongly advocated. Other Hungarian sociologists also recognised that the specific working-class perspective was missing from the literature, for instance Ágnes Losonczi (2005) urged for new oral history projects, which would analyse the impact of the change of regimes on workers without the old and new political distortions, separating collective memory from ideology and counter-ideology.

We should also take into consideration that in Eastern Europe de-industrialisation (the decline of heavy industries, mining, textile industry) was paralleled with processes of re-industrialisation in certain regions, mainly driven by global capital. Therefore it is fully justified to speak of the highly fragmented structure of the ex-socialist working class, and we should also stress that workers in different industries and companies have access to labour interest representation to a very varying degree. That said, it is not to deny that a significant part of the ex-socialist 'working class' became self-employed or unemployed: Ferge (2010) estimates that one million jobs were lost in Hungary as a result of economic re-structuring while according to the calculation of Mark Pittaway, there were 23% fewer jobs in Hungary in 2008 than in 1989 (Pittaway 2011).

The present issue seeks to explore new research and theory on Eastern European labour, which attempt to answer the call for the re-orientation of old labour history and at the same time remain open to a critical engagement with the social and material inequalities developed by global capitalism. Burawoy observed that the new capitalist labour organisation increases the exploitation and dependence of labour already in the mid-1980s: what kind of wage dispute can be successful in the advanced Western countries when the management threatens to transfer production to cheaper countries (where there is no strong working-class movement and resistance)? In Eastern Europe the picture is mixed because of the parallel processes of the decline of the old socialist industries and re-industrialisation as observed above; nevertheless, labour interest representation remains weak and concentrated on multinational companies, which adopt the German model of enterprise councils and trade unions.

Critical perspectives on Eastern European labour: this issue of IEEJSP

For this special issue, we interviewed Marcel van der Linden, who is one of the chief representatives of global labour history. In the interview he shows how this history developed out of traditional working-class history and how the category of worker (which mainly meant white, male wage-earner) was extended to include other major groups of labourers in the non-European parts of the world. He also gives interesting examples for how this Euro-centrism of old labour history was challenged and how important it is to include non-free workers and women workers in the analysis. It is worth stressing that reproductive work also counts as an integral part of the analysis since 'caring' (housework, raising of children, etc.) is central to the maintenance of the life of the wage-earner. The well-known labour historian also speaks of the global processes, which render (most) labour relations inflexible, incalculable and often informal – both in the global North and in the global South. This is paralleled with the weakening of trade unions in the global North and the difficulties of the establishment of labour representation in the global South. As a result, people turn for defence to religious fundamentalist and right-wing populist movements. He also shares with us his thoughts on the Western left-wing criticism of state socialism and contemporary Russia. Marcel van der Linden also discusses the (possible) relationship between political activism and labour history writing. The interview provides a nice framework to this special section, which attempts to bring together papers that address the Eastern European 'specificity' (between the global North and global South as Marcel van der Linden also formulated), while they aspire to contribute to the new labour history.

Sonja Dragović sets out to analyse new Eastern European labour initiatives through the example of the case study of a Croatian textile factory, Kamensko, which was closed down and left workers unpaid for seven months. The author carefully documents the process through which the workers of the factory trained themselves to be activists and set up *Kamensko Opened*, the first non-governmental organisation in Croatia founded and led by industrial workers. Other NGOs and civic organisations also supported the workers' struggle. Sonja Dragović's article shows how 'global capital moves around in search of the cheap, skilled labour that is closer to home than the sweatshops of Asia, keeping the largely exploitative textile industry in Eastern Europe alive'. It also demonstrates the overall weakness of labour interest representation in the region as well as the essential deficiency or lack of labour legislation, which would effectively defend workers' rights against capital. Sonja Dragović' research explores the mechanisms through which workers gain empowerment under the difficult conditions of neoliberal capitalism (and she also focuses on the gender dimension since many interviewed workers are women!) and succeed to obtain – with the help of the NGOs – the support of a wider community. Given the sporadic working-class resistance to the neoliberal project in Eastern Europe, it is very important to document existing initiatives for a scholarly audience. The argument that the factory was set up for bankruptcy in order to be torn down and its land used for the new real-estate development brought the support of the local community for the workers. The case sadly depicts, how defenceless workers are in the new regime, who rather choose to

work even without pay than to be unemployed. Sonja Dragović cites Bohle and Greskovits, who relate 'Croatia's weak state capacity' to the 'combined effect of an unbalanced nationalism, war and its aftermath, and the semiauthoritarian nature of the Tudjman regime that undermined an originally capable state' (2012, 194). From a comparative perspective, however, it can be said that workers had no say in the outcome of privatisation in countries such as Poland (Ost 2005; Trappmann 2013) or Hungary (Nagy 2012). It is a very far-reaching topic how the original self-managing ideas were replaced by the neoliberal recipes across the region[4]; nevertheless, the outcome is the strengthening of the support of far-right-wing, populist parties with an overtly nationalistic, anti-globalist programme (Ost 2005; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Feischmidt and Hervik 2015). It is all the more important to analyse cases when working-class resistance manifests itself in new labour initiatives; further, it is capable of attracting wider social support.

Ádám Mayer's paper continues a tradition, which has been started in the second thematic issue of *Intersections. East European Society and Politics*: it is critically engaged with the Eastern European specificity of knowledge production and self-understanding. He starts from the assumption that Eastern European social sciences have been developing self-defeating and self-orientalising tendencies since at least the change of regimes (see also Tlostanova 2015; Petrovici 2015). Therefore, he suggests a theoretical parallel with African social thought, arguing that it can offer illuminating insights into the history of global marginalisation. Mayer shows with the example of Nigerian Marxism, how rich critical thinking can develop as a response to the experience of peripherization and he gives some theoretical examples how to fight against Euro-centrism and neo-colonialism, which 'stratify' modern social thought. In the global hierarchy of knowledge production Eastern Europe does indeed occupy a lower rank – it is enough to think of the list of leading universities or academically ranked journals. Further, the regional academies also suffer from self-orientalism; and here we can also cite – alongside Marcel van der Linden – Dipesh Chakrabarty, who argues that the reference point for many Indian historians continues to be the West. The outcome is often a list of what 'have not' yet happened events in India (in comparison with Western Europe and North America). Eastern European scholars often encounter the same problem. By recognising the creative *potential* of African social thought to revitalise Eastern European social sciences, we already made a step forward to fight Western cultural hegemony.

The research note by Attila Gulyás reviews the literature on how to measure subjective well-being (SWB), an important part of which is work satisfaction. Attila Gulyás reflects on the fact that the nature of work has changed dramatically as a result of technological development as more and more people are doing routine white-collar work. Their satisfaction with the job may be influenced by several factors – but it seems safe to argue that money alone cannot explain work satisfaction. It was observed that SWB did not increase in proportion with economic wealth – this later became known as the Easterlin Paradox. SWB was developed as a concept to indicate that happiness was not a mere 'sum' of economic indicators but it also includes the

[4] In Hungary, the journal *Eszmélet* (Consciousness) seeks to preserve the most consistently the intellectual heritage of self-management and the concept of *tertium datur*.

everyday positive and negative effects people experience in various domains of their lives (this adds the 'subjective' element). Gulyás then goes on to introduce some current international surveys that may be used for SWB related research and describes the applied methodology. He critically notes, however, that the methodology was developed for Western European countries, and it may be important to investigate the impact of the between-country differences on the validity of the measures. There are numerous points where asking about satisfaction and happiness in different countries may lead to significantly different opinions when controlling for other factors. Two important factors are the wording of the survey questions and the approach to happiness in the given culture. As for Hungary, the data show a steady, very slowly descending SWB value, which didn't change significantly until the 2008 crisis and the 2010 elections (after which it reached its negative peak). When taking into account data on happiness, the author concludes that in Hungary the collapse of state socialism had the strongest effect on SWB among the recent major events in the country's history.

The last few decades brought a change in the work itself as the 'traditional' working classes are increasingly replaced by routine white-collar wage-earners – at least in the advanced capitalist countries. In these circumstances it is obvious that the attitude to work, the expectations of work and how work influences people's well-being is also changing, which renders SWB a relevant and fruitful subject of research.

The coming of the neoliberal era brought about fundamental changes in the social composition and bargaining power of wage-earners. Eastern Europe experienced these changes somewhat belatedly as Communist regimes artificially maintained 'traditional' working classes and universal employment to avoid social protests. The collapse of state socialism removed former barriers to neoliberal transformation: old industries were severely reduced; however, de-industrialisation was paralleled with processes of re-industrialisation, mainly driven by global capital. Eastern Europe thus occupies an 'in-between' position in relation to the global North and the global South. The papers of our thematic bloc aspire to bring some examples of new labour initiatives and critical social thought in the region, which facilitate a productive dialogue with global labour history.

Discursive governance, populism and pledge fulfilment

In the field of Eastern European politics, a major issue often associated with the persistent disappointment with well-being prospects of the people is the rise of populism. Concerning Western Europe, Cas Mudde wrote about the emergence of a populist *Zeitgeist* in a seminal article already more than a decade ago (Mudde 2004). In this context, Peter Mair pointed to a division of labour between the mainstream West-European parties that typically govern 'but are no longer seen to represent' (Mair 2011, 14) and the parties of protest populism that seem to better fulfil the representation, but tend to adopt a populist political attitude and are typically in opposition. The thesis of inadequate fulfilment of the representation function of national party systems is, however, even more valid in the case of Eastern Europe

where the weaker institutionalisation of the party systems makes the new democracies of the region more susceptible to the rise of populist challenges (Kriesi 2014). This process has been paving the way for the rise of a new 'centrist populism' (Učeň 2007) and in several countries of Eastern Europe populist parties came into power thus they are governing, dominating the policy agenda as well as the style of political communication.

Populism in Hungary and making sense of pledge fulfilment: this issue of IEEJSP

Hungary represents a typical case of populist democracies (Pappas 2014). The article by Zoltán Ádám and András Bozóki in this section of IEEJSP explores the *faces of Hungarian populism in government position*. The authors argue that the populist idea of governance intends to reconcile the anti-elitist and anti-institutional perspective of popular participation with limiting the public contest for power. According to Ádám and Bozóki a peculiar feature of this Hungarian populism is the politicized understanding of Christianity that also provides legitimacy for charismatic leadership.

The specific features of Eastern European new democracies have probably fertilized the research agenda presented by Miklós Sebők. The conceptual framework of Sebők's article interprets *mandate fulfilment in the context of normative theory of representation*. The study has a particular focus on pledge fulfilment and the author argues that non-fulfilment of electoral pledges is not necessarily bad for democratic representation. An empirical novelty of this article is the operationalisation of good and bad forms of mandate slippage and Sebők provides ample evidence about the *conditional compatibility of non-fulfilment of pledges with representation*.

From a broader theoretical perspective the logic of discursive governance is shaping the instruments of populist politics and often the effectiveness of discursive governance decides the viability of mandate slippage. Interpreting the varieties of discursive governance is embedded into the social constructivist tradition in the chapters of the *Discursive Governance in Politics, Policy and the Public Sphere* volume edited by Umut Korkut, Kesi Mahendran, Gregg Buckan-Knapp, and Robert Henry Cox; this volume is reviewed by Gábor Illés. The articles explore the discursive mechanisms through which political parties and major policy actors are successful or fail to achieve particular policy goals and the readers are also informed about the patterns of perception of the targeted recipients of these discourses, the wider public. The empirical analyses cover a large variety of policy fields and European regions (including Eastern and Southern European Union member states as well).

Political mechanisms beyond the Roma marginalisation in local communities

Spatial exclusion and marginality was the main topic of the previous issue of *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*. Our authors discussed the different faces of spatial and social peripheral inclusion of the marginalised Roma through labour market, housing and urban policies as well as local development policies. The articles of this issue, however, explore the implicit political mechanisms beyond the Roma marginalisation in local communities.

Júlia Szalai investigates the apparent *Roma policy puzzle*. While in the past decade the issue has become largely thematised and national as well as European inter-governmental Roma policy strategies were developed, marginalisation of the Roma has nevertheless rather increased in education, work and the daily conditions of living, and the tendencies of exclusion of the Roma have become stronger in a wide range of local communities. Szalai argues that the *invisibility of Roma political participation* may be a major factor in the reproduction of deprivation and exclusion of the Roma.

Enikő Vincze and Florina Pop portray the process of ghettoization of the Roma in two settlements (Bufa and Poligon) in Aiud, a small town in Romania. The authors argue that recurring *discretionary use of power has deprived individuals of their human rights and often pushed them into instances of bare life*. Local housing policies include forced evictions, the reluctance to legally recognise informal housing and to provide local resources for the improvement of housing conditions. In addition, Vincze and Pop pinpoint that the development of welfare dependency discourse and subsequent exclusionary local policies against the Roma has been legitimised by the neoliberal shift in social policies.

Ioana Vrabiescu explores *citizenship rights limitation of the Roma under metropolitan governance in Barcelona and Bucharest*. The article interprets the process of denial of the right to the city in the context of a moral panic political strategy. Vrabiescu presents how urban governance enacts moral panic against the Roma and implies practices of evictions and voluntary returns as forms of spatial cleansing. Scapegoating of the Roma preserves the social conflict, and at the same time alleviates the political responsibility to secure social provisions for vulnerable groups. The author demonstrates that local authorities of Barcelona and Bucharest not only force the mobility of the Roma, but also blames this vulnerable ethnic group for their alleged failed integration.

Failing Europe?

The three sections are followed by a review of a thought-provoking volume edited by Jody Jensen and Ferenc Miszlivetz about the interdisciplinary perspectives on the state of European integration and the challenges that face the common European project (*Reframing Europe's Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction*) by Gábor Kardos. The book offers a critical discussion about the impacts of the financial crisis, the economic strategies of the possible way-out, as well as of what

constitutes 'Europe'. The main thesis of the book is that Europe remains a widely contested terrain, both intellectually and practically. Indeed, the articles of this issue of *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* seek to contribute to global thinking from the perspective of being European without being Euro-centric.

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New Perspectives on Labour History – An Interview with Marcel van der Linden

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Marcel van der Linden was research director of the International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam) until 2014, and is now Senior Researcher at the Institute as well as Professor of Social Movement History at the University of Amsterdam. He is also President of the International Social History Association and chair of the Editorial Committee of *International Review of Social History*. He has published widely on various aspects of left-wing intellectual history (e.g. *Western Marxism and the Soviet Union: A Survey of Critical Theories and Debates since 1917*), social movements and labour history. He is a chief advocate of global labour history, a new paradigm in the writing of labour history, which has been taken over by several labour historians. This paradigm is less well-known in Eastern Europe where labour history became a stepchild after the change of regimes and it is only recently that there has been a growing interest in this field among social historians. In the interview I asked Marcel to introduce this paradigm and tell us something more about the social and political implications of a global labour history.

E. B.: ***The International Institute of Social History is mainly known to experts in Eastern Europe. Can you introduce us briefly to the history of the Institute?***

M. L.: The Institute is a very old institution. It was founded in 1935 as a rescue operation for archives from Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. It was a privately financed initiative, financed by a life insurance company that had connections with the Dutch Labour Party.

Originally, it collected archives like the archive of the German Social Democratic Party, the SPD (also comprising the original Marx-Engels papers), which was travelling through Europe after Hitler came to power, and then later archives of the defeated anarcho-syndicalists in Spain and Menshevik archives.

It has grown significantly since then, so now the total collection of the Institute amounts to about 55km of shelf space and it is now part of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences. It goes on collecting materials especially in the global South, Africa, Latin-America and Asia but with the policy that we try to keep the materials where they come from. If we find interesting material, let's say in India, then we first try to bring that to an archive in India itself. If that is not possible, then we bring it to Amsterdam. Most of the time we succeeded in finding places at the location itself, where you can deposit these materials.

Since 1986 the Institute has also been pursuing research projects. That's a much later development. Since that period we have been building a research department, officially established in 1993, and that department focuses mainly on international matters and since the late 1990s, on global labour history, which means that we try to reconstruct the history of work and workers movements and working-class politics across the globe from about 1500 up to the present.

E. B.: ***For those of us, who are less familiar with your work, the concept of global labour history might require some more explanation. What is this new paradigm, and how does new labour history-writing differ from the old working-class histories?***

M. L.: Our approach to global labour history has been developing gradually out of traditional labour history. Traditional labour history very much focused on certain groups of workers, industrial workers, dock workers, miners, sometimes agricultural workers, especially wage earners and it had a very institutional approach, it focused mainly on strikes, parties, unions, resolutions. The new approach is that we broaden the notion of the working class, so that we include also slaves, share-croppers, and the labour of people, who make this whole working class possible, and this includes housewives and all those who do unpaid work for the maintenance of families and the households. So this is a much broader approach. And we not only study many more forms of organisational initiatives (all kinds of self-help, cooperatives, mutual aid societies, attempts like self-employed women's organisations in India and South Africa) but we also try to expand the notion of the working class so much that we include non-European parts of the world as well, where we can only recently speak of a huge expansion of the traditional working classes, which had been the focus of old labour history.

E. B.: ***You recently held a very inspiring lecture at the Central European University.[1] Why do you think that it took so long for labour history to discover the global South?***

M. L.: Because we were very Euro-centric. For instance – let me tell you this from my personal development. Already in the late 1980s I started to think about labour movements in a more global way. The project that I want to tell you about was on the history of revolutionary syndicalism, and a book came out of it, which I edited together with a colleague from Canada.[2] We wanted to have an international perspective but at that time we only focused on Europe in the wider sense – European or European settler colonies. We included the United States, Argentina, Australia, and so on, but we did not think of the possibility that there would have been any revolutionary syndicalist movements in East Asia. Only in recent years has it become clear that movements like this and also anarchist movements have been much more global than we had thought. Gradually you have to step out of this framework of Europe and its settler colonies and see that you have all kinds of developments elsewhere that were neglected. And I think that the classical problem of Euro-centrism is that we are always looking for things that are like what we already know from Europe, which includes North America in this case. Thus, Europe is showing the way, it has done and achieved great things, and other countries and movements have to catch up and do the same things and in the same way as we did them in the past. And this is a problem for historians especially so in the global South because then they are confronted with the problem, which the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has called the problem of the 'not yet'. All the time Indian historians, for instance, will have to say that this happened in India but not yet this because – and then they compare India implicitly with Britain or another European country. The attempt is now to leave all these separate cases in their own right and try *not to have* this unilateral perspective on history.

E. B.: ***The typical working-class image then, is that of a white (European), male wage-earner. Can you tell us some examples, where this image has been challenged?***

M. L.: One example could be the history of labour management, where we usually assume that the great innovations like Taylorism or Fordism originated in the US or in Western Europe, while now through the study of the history of slave labour we know that many of these forms of labour disciplining and creating labour incentives started earlier in slave plantations, for instance, in the Caribbean where you already had synchronised labour but without an assembly line, you had time measurement to see what was the most efficient way of doing a certain job. So many of the inventions and labour management, that we consider to be of the North, were first tried out on unfree workers in the South. The same goes for job description. It is attributed to Mr and Mrs Gilbreth around 1910. But originally we know now – it was an invention of

[1] Caribbean Radicals, a new Italian Saint and a Feminist Challenge. 1 February 2016.

[2] *Revolutionary Syndicalism: An International Perspective*. Edited with Wayne Thorpe (Aldershot: Gower/Scolar Press, 1990).

Governor Lachlan Macquarie of Botany Bay (now Sydney) in Australia where he used job descriptions to discipline the policemen in the colony. These policemen were all convicts paradoxically, who half time worked as policemen and half time as labourers. For the half time they worked as policemen, they needed a job description – the governor thought. And later he expanded this to other occupational groups in the convict colony as well. So many management methods have been tried out on unfree workers first, and I think that there is a logic to it, because it is easier to try out new methods on unfree workers, who cannot object so much as free workers, and when it works – you found out how it can be done – you apply it to free workers.

E. B.: ***I already mentioned your lecture, where you spoke of the feminist challenge. What can you tell us about the gender bias of old labour history and how was it challenged?***

M. L.: There was absolutely a gender bias, and it was a very long-term bias because labour history in the modern sense – traditional labour history – started in the 1880s, and certainly until the 1960s, and maybe the 1970s, the history of labour and labour movement was mostly written from the perspective of the male bread-winner, and only thanks to the second wave of feminism of the 1960s and 70s did we begin to see how important the work of women was – not just women workers, which is in itself a very important category – workers in factories, for instance, in the textiles were often women – but also the women who ran the households and families and facilitated the male worker in his earning the money wage for the household. So in many respects the second wave of feminism has contributed significantly to this changing outlook of modern labour history.

Let me tell you some examples! Women even in the advanced capitalist countries were for a very long time unfree. For instance, in the Netherlands until 1956 women could only have a paid job until they married. That means that as soon as they married, they had to leave the job and become a housewife. Or they had to choose not to marry. The Netherlands is not an exception. In many cases the women were tied to their husband in several ways, certainly also economically. They could not run a shop, and so on. There has been a whole wave of emancipation since the mid 20 century, which contributed to the partial emancipation of women.

But I can mention another example from old labour history. Chattel slaves were predominantly male, which created a gender imbalance in the colonies. This meant, so to speak that women were in a demand – but of course, very often, they were subject to sexual violence. While in the old labour history, this story was not written, the oppression of women should also be part of a global labour history.

E. B.: ***You mentioned that the work of housewives, that enables the male worker to work full-time, should also be part of labour history. Without getting into the long debate about the nature of reproductive work, can you clarify your position?***

M. L.: Reproductive work is also productive work, in the sense that it also produces goods and services, services like the so called productive work does. In that sense there is no difference between the work in the household and work for wages and I

note here that reproductive work is a basic condition without which it is impossible to have the so called productive work. A wage-earner cannot earn a wage unless he lives in a house, which is cleaned a bit every day and where he has food, which is prepared for him, so even if we assume a male bread winner, so a man, who earns the money for the whole family, there is still a lot of subsistence labour – household labour – necessary to maintain this unit for which he earns the money.

E. B.: ***To a large extent, old labour history focused on the achievements of workers' struggles – be that in the form of strikes, social movements or revolutions. How do you see these achievements from a historical perspective?***

M. L.: We have to differentiate between different parts of the world. In Europe – including the socialist bloc – there were significant achievements for the working classes after the Second World War. They managed to get very good social security arrangements, there was a reduction of unemployment until the 1970s. In the East, unemployment was unimportant for a long time.

Standard employment relationship was part of this development from the 1940s till the '80s, when the working-class position improved in parts of the world. There you have this situation that workers can have a full-time job where they earn enough money to support a small family, with some social security attached to the job and some influence on the shop floor, co-determination or other forms of interest representation. In this period, the working class had a strong position, relatively speaking.

The neoliberal counter-offensive started in the late 1970s, which in several waves in Western Europe reduced these achievements of the working class by introducing large-scale unemployment, reducing social security arrangements, making them more rudimentary, for instance, Hartz IV in Germany. The standard employment relationship is gradually being broken down everywhere in the world, I would say, although there still remain islands of standard employment.

And then we have the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, which led to the deterioration of working-class conditions, at least for significant parts of the working class. So I would speak of the rise and fall of working-class power – from a historical perspective.

In other parts of the world it is very different. Take the example of Brazil! The labour movement of the working class gained a lot of strength in the 1970s and '80s, and it could even build a new workers party, which came into government, and then became a victim – well, supporter – of a kind of neoliberalism, so now we see a deterioration of working-class conditions in Brazil as well. So you have different rhythms in different parts of the world regarding the achievements of the working classes.

I might add here that I am also involved in the International Panel on Social Progress – a new initiative, chaired by Amartya Sen. Our task is to write a report on the social developments in the world in three years' time. This might answer your question.

E. B.: *Thanks, I am very much interested! But speaking of Eastern Europe, I have a question. Some authors think that neoliberalism was, in fact, tested in Eastern Europe after the change of regimes. What do you think?*

M. L.: Neoliberalism is in fact a current, which has developed since the 1940s. Hayek was one of the founders of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947, which then met every year, where they prepared a plan for a neoliberal revolution. When Thatcher and Reagan came into power, they could serve them the recipes for introducing more market forces on a plate. This also contributed to the undermining of state socialism in Eastern Europe. But the beginnings were in the West.

E. B.: *The neoliberal turn in the West was paralleled with a massive reduction of the traditional working classes. How do you see this development on a global scale?*

M. L.: Well, you should not forget that much of the industry, which has disappeared from Europe, went to other parts of the world, especially to East Asia. In the 1950s Britain was the largest ship-builder in the world. By the end of the 1950s, early '60s Japan had taken over.

Now more than 90% of all ships are built in East Asia – China, Korea, Japan. There has been a massive shift of work – employment – from Europe and United States to East Asia. So there is a massive process of proletarianisation going on in the global South, for instance in China – at a grand scale – but also in India, South America, parts of Africa. So I would rather speak of a shift, which is also reflected in the trade union movement, which became relatively stronger in the South – sometimes unions are growing significantly, while in the North they are weakening. And perhaps it is interesting: within this working class, female labour is increasing. 40 per cent of the world workforce (wage earning class) is female. So back to the report on social progress: in general the position of women in the world seems to be slightly improving. More and more women learn to read and write, they have more access independently to labor market, they can work for wage if they want or become self-employed. Although this is a limited development, a slight positive trend can be observed.

E. B.: *Where do you see the place of Eastern Europe in this global division of labour?*

M. L.: I really don't know the answer. I don't know enough about it. You have a very contradictory evolution. Wages are lower, so there is a relocation of Western industries to Eastern Europe, but these countries also witnessed a massive de-industrialisation after the collapse of state socialism – and I don't know enough about this region to draw a balance.

E. B.: *The world-system school has strong ideas about the inequalities within the structure of the capitalist world-economy – I am mainly thinking of the unequal exchange between the centre and the periphery. How do you see the relationship between the global North and the global South?*

M. L.: I think that on a global scale we see that income differentials are flattened, the global Gini coefficient is becoming smaller but within countries – and this is partly of course through the rise of China and India, which means that there is more wealth and more income in parts of the global South – at the same time, within the countries you see an enormous increase of social inequality. I have somewhere in my computer a Gini index graph of the United States, where you see that from the early twentieth century till the present it got really huge – it was low in the 1950s and '60s and now it is really going up and it is the same as it was in the early twentieth century. Within the countries inequality is increasing – so you have a double movement. On a global scale you see a reduction of inequality between countries – there is still a large amount of inequality but less than it was – but within countries you see an increase of inequality. This is not to deny that there are still important differences: in Vietnam GDP per capita is now eleven hundred dollars a year, and in Germany forty thousand. So you have an enormous gap between these two countries, although we should also recognise that there is also precarianisation in the North now, which means that some aspects of the labour relations become a bit more similar. I spoke of the breakdown of standard employment relations – well, this is a huge challenge which workers of the North have to face. And of course, there is a lot of terrible inequality in the world, and this contributes to the problem of mass labour migration, migrants searching for a better future somewhere else.

E. B.: *You spoke of the rise and fall of working-class power – at least in Europe. How do you see the political and interest representation of labour from a global perspective?*

M. L.: On a global scale trade unions are weakened, together with the traditional working-class parties. Social democracy is globally in a crisis – Communist parties have to a large extent disappeared or merged or they went bankrupt like in Finland, and unions are declining, too. Although there are new initiatives to have a different type of unions – new social movement unionism in parts of Brazil, India and Korea – but global union density now, according to the International Trade Union Confederation, the ITUC, is 7 per cent. Of the 2.9 billion strong workforce in the world 2 hundred million are organised in unions. We exclude from this calculation the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is larger than the ITUC, but which we do not consider to be a trade union. 7 per cent of the workers is organised in unions and this percentage is declining. In Europe union density is relatively high – in Norway 70 per cent or so. In the global South this is even lower than 7 per cent. In India it is, for instance, 3.2 per cent.

The traditional labour movement is extremely weak now, but there is a paradox because there is a lot of working-class protest. Examples: there was a very large strike

in India two years ago when more than a hundred million workers were on strike for two days, you had a general strike in the area of Jakarta, Indonesia, when the whole region was paralysed, you have enormous amount of strikes in South Africa, an upsurge of struggles in South America, but all these are not translated into organisational forms yet. We have a transitional period when the traditional labour movement seems to be disappearing and we have not yet found an alternative. And in this situation we see that all kinds of – let me call them – pseudo-alternatives come. In Latin-America and South Africa you see a dramatic rise of pentecostal churches. In Brazil one quarter of all people is in the pentecostal church. Hamas in Palestine would be a similar thing. Or the Shiv Sena movement in India – that is a Hindu fundamentalist movement. They also provide social support for the people – they create social networks, people help each other in cases of emergency, and so on. They partly do what trade unions should and could do. This is combined with a strong belief, which also gives people a sense of usefulness, and of direction, so they know, I am part of this movement, I am a real Hindu, I am doing the right thing, I can be proud of what I do and at the same time I have some support. This is what my Indian colleague Sabyasachi Bhattacharya called the vernicularisation of labour politics. Non-traditional organisations take over part of the things labour movements did in the past. That is what we see now due to this crisis of the labour movement.

E. B.: ***How does global labour history translate into political activism?***

M. L.: Well, in labour history we try to study five centuries but when we talk about the present, I would say, we are now studying working classes and labour movements that are in a deep crisis. You know, if I want to be optimistic, then maybe we can help to give some orientation for the future. You also see it in a more general sense that separate states have less influence on economics because of globalisation. We are also here in a transitional period that social movements, for instance, Occupy – they generally emphasise the things that they do not want – they do not want the bankers to cheat and so on – but they do not say what the positive solution would be. And that is because if separate states can no longer be the solution, and there is no supranational state, which can be the solution, then you have nowhere to address many of your demands. In the past labour movements and other social movements addressed their demands to the state but now it is much more difficult to do this. Here there is a significant change happening in politics.

E. B.: ***If I may paraphrase what you said, you mean that the old left has suffered a defeat in organisational terms, and this has led to the rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism worldwide.***

M. L. I agree.

E. B.: ***While there is a crisis of the labour movement, can we also speak of a crisis of capitalism?***

M. L.: There is no crisis of capitalism. There is a crisis of capital. Capitalism would only be in crisis if there were an alternative. There is no alternative. In fact, there has never been so little alternative as there is now. And capitalism has shown in the last 150 years that it can overcome every crisis, and it will also overcome this crisis if we just give it a few more years,

10 or 20 years, it will overcome this crisis as well because it is not threatened from the inside. Or another option would be – and this is of course what people like Wolfgang Streeck would say – he wrote this article 'How will capitalism end?' in the *New Left Review*.[3] In 2016 it will also appear as a book. He says that even if there are no enemies of capitalism any more, and he also includes state socialism here, capitalism will collapse because it reaches the limits of what it can do in its expansion – commodification of labour, land and money, all the Polányian things – it exhausts its possibilities, and then it is not very clear what will happen. And my guess is that we would only see the end of a certain kind of capitalism, but not of capitalism as such. That's why there is no alternative. But that's speculation, of course.

E. B.: ***You wrote a very illuminating and thorough book about left-wing criticism of state socialism. How do you see the place of state socialism in global labour history?***

M. L.: A divergent past? A bifurcation? I am just joking. My book is on what Western Marxists thought about the Soviet Union, especially the Western Marxists who thought that the Soviet Union was not socialist. And what was it then, if it was not socialist? And in the first 70 years, no, in the first 50 years of the existence of the Soviet Union there were mainly three approaches. One approach said, well, it's just a form of capitalism, state capitalism. Another theory said it's a new form of class society, with a new kind of ruling class, which has never been seen before. And thirdly, Trotsky's position was that it was a degenerated worker state. So it's still a workers' state, but it is corrupt and bureaucratised ... and so on, so it needs a political revolution.

And because the three theories all have their theoretical problems, which I cannot go into now, in the 1960s and '70s you get a fourth current which says, well, classical Marxist categories are not enough to understand what's happening in the Soviet Union, we need a new kind of approach. And the most interesting approach that was then developed, I think, was the one by Hillel Ticktin, a South-African British economist, who had studied in Kiev, and so studied the Soviet Union from the inside. He argued that in the Soviet Union you saw at that time, in the 1970s already, a dramatic increase of waste. So that in his time two-thirds of all the industrial output was useless. And this situation was deteriorating further so that he predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union within a few decades in 1973.

[3] The book, *Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), has already been published.

Of course, that prediction has come true. I think that was a good analysis. The Soviet Union was at first, in the first decades, showing a staggering growth of the economy, but this growth itself paralysed the possibilities of further growth, because through this growth planning became more and more complicated and since there was no reliable information coming from bottom up from the factories, of what they really could produce, and wanted to produce, planning became more and more kind of 'quasi' planning. And waste increased, and growth then went down, from the 1950s on already you see the decline of the growth rate, then around 1978 or 1980 growth reached zero, and then went below zero. Then it was only a matter of a few years and the whole thing collapsed. So it was an industrialisation dictatorship I would say, which then in the end reached its limits and therefore also partly failed. It has never been, I think, a real alternative to capitalism. As Ticktin would say, it was a society in limbo, a dead-end street.

E. B.: ***Many Western Marxists expected that a kind of democratic socialism would develop in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the rule of the Communist Parties. What did you think would happen, at that time?***

M. L.: I didn't expect that, no. I was not so optimistic because I thought, well, it will depend on the workers what will happen, and the workers would have to really change society. But society was not changed by the workers. Society was in crisis and it was changed from the top down. And of course you had some worker struggles in the Soviet Union, Russia, after 1990, especially the miners were very crucial, but they were kind of labour aristocracy. For the rest, I think, workers didn't protest so much, so that the oligarchs could become kind of capitalists without much resistance from below. And what we now see, I think, also because of this lack of working class resistance, is that we have a kind of further bureaucratic degeneration, where the social forms are very similar to those of the late Soviet Union. Some people, for instance Ticktin, even say that this society is still not a capitalist society and it's also not a worker society, it's still a society in limbo, but it can survive because of natural resources.

E. B.: ***Do you speak of Russia, or the whole of Eastern Europe?***

M. L.: Russia, not about the rest of Eastern Europe. Russia, as I said earlier, is a special case of course. It's different from EU countries and Eastern Europe.

E. B.: ***So you wouldn't call Russia capitalist?***

M. L.: If it is a kind of capitalism, it's a very strange kind of capitalism, a completely new form of capitalism. I'm not sure how to characterise Russia. But it's not a 'normal' capitalist society.

E. B.: *What would you call a 'normal' capitalist society?*

M. L. The Netherlands! Even though we have still lots of subsistence labour going on, and we still exploit free nature, which we do not buy, but just destroy...

E. B.: *What do you think of the Eastern European societies? Without Russia?*

M. L.: You are on your way... you have now been transformed into capitalist societies, I would say... but I would not consider Eastern European capitalism as the most advanced form of capitalism; that I would say more for north-west Europe, or parts of the United States and Canada, but yes, Eastern Europe is developing along the lines of capitalist logic.

E. B.: *How would you explain the fact that there was such weak working-class resistance to capitalism in Eastern Europe?*

M. L. I think that partly Stalinism is to blame for this. Because if you only show, constantly, for many-many years, you show in the mass media, stories about the misery of capitalism, and then people get to know about all the shopping possibilities, the wealth, and so that is also in the West, then people start to mistrust the information that they get, and they think that capitalism is a good thing, it gives you freedom and money and so on, so people had a lot of false hopes of capitalism I think. That's part of the explanation.

E. B.: *Do you think that the same explanation exists in the global South? Is there a belief that capitalism is somehow good, or should be good...?*

M. L.: Well, most people, of course, envy Japan or the United States and so on, because they think that life is better there. And also, Norway, since the refugees now coming to Europe – Slavoj Žižek wrote a nice essay on this – most of them want to go to Norway, because they think that is the wealthiest country in the world, and social inequality is the lowest and – of course, Norway is perhaps the most pleasant variant of capitalism that exists in the world, although it's a bit cold there.[4] So – yes, people have these dreams about a better life in advanced countries.

E. B.: *Why should one fight against capitalism if it is held to be good also in places, where you don't have the most advanced forms of capitalism?*

M. L.: But people do not fight against capitalism; they fight for better wages, better working conditions, and so on. People do not fight against capitalism. I don't think that ever in history workers have fought against capitalism as such. There's a very nice analysis of this in *The phenomenology of perception*: do you know that book? It has a chapter where, at the end somewhere, Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that in the Russian revolution for instance, you have the peasants who were dissatisfied with the

[4] Slavoj Žižek, 'The Non-Existence of Norway', *London Review of Books*, 9 September 2015.

situation and then started to demonstrate and walk to the city, and so, and workers were doing the same, and then suddenly they realised: my God, we have made a revolution! But they didn't know that they were toppling down the government and then were transforming society, that was not their intention, they just wanted their small things! Suddenly, this unintended consequence was a huge transformation of society, and that's, more or less, what happens all the time. People do not have these grandiose ideas, 'We will overthrow capitalism', or whatever. They have more modest wishes.

E. B.: ***Yes, but you can argue: you had leaders who had clear ideas...***

M. L.: Yes, but then, of course, another question here would be, what do you think of the October revolution. I would say it was not really a revolution. I think that it was a coup d'etat, with mass support.

It was not a social revolution in the sense that the masses themselves did something, they supported something that others, the vanguard did. So in that sense I would call it a hybrid of coup d'etat and a revolution. And the real revolution was the February revolution. That was a real revolution. But I know that here I have a very dissident opinion.

E. B.: ***One can also argue that dictatorship was an outcome of the economic backwardness of Russia...***

M. L.: You have situations in history where there is no easy way out. That's what I would think. That in many situations there is no real solution in the short term. And this also means that progress of politics has also to build on long term pedagogy. I think to have a really democratic society, you need decades or maybe hundreds of years of education where people learn to rule themselves. For instance, I think that the reason why in Scandinavia democracy is so strong – relatively speaking – is also because already in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries they had lots of free peasants, who were not in any feudal relationship, and they decided their local affairs among themselves, at the village level, more or less democratically, of course with a male bias. And so the later achievements and the whole social democratic movement and the building of parliamentary democracy and welfare state: they could build on this foundation. So it was those hundreds of years of training, acting in (limited) free ways, that anticipated, pre-dated democracy. While if you introduce democratic structures in situations where this kind of pre-history does not exist, then it's much more difficult to do this. Well, I would guess. That's also why I think that the left should think more in these terms, also of how do we raise the self-awareness, self-consciousness, and the democratic level of populations, and this means that we have to do a lot of experiments with cooperatives, and small-scale initiatives in the kindergarten and whatever, as part of this longer term project.

E. B.: *How do you see the relationship between labour history writing and political activism?*

M. L.: Well, most colleagues will deny that there is a relationship. Most labour historians at least in Europe will not consider themselves, working as scholars, as part of an activist thing. At the same time, I think that many-many labour historians are also politically engaged on the progressive side of the political spectrum, whatever that may mean... As individuals, people will often not see the immediate connection. But I think if we develop global labour history in the way I just described, then we will automatically be, I hope, of help in finding a political orientation. And therefore to direct activists in the right direction.

E. B.: *You said that you don't really see an alternative to capitalism.*

M. L.: True, yes.

E. B.: *So how do you see the future of the left? The global left? Can we speak at all of a global left?*

M. L.: Well, there are left people everywhere in the world, so that's yes – but I think that we will have to start anew. We have to reform the trade unions, if that is possible, you see trade unions now have an orientation towards collective bargaining, that's the main task that many unions have: to negotiate with employers and make a contract for three or five years or whatever... That doesn't work for the largest part of the working class in the informal sector, these are people who have two or three jobs at the same time, or for a short time, (for a short period, two weeks maybe, or a day), so collective bargaining is not something they are interested in. What we need is new forms of organising, for instance also through the creation of mutual benefit societies, aid societies for sickness, unemployment, and so on. You can see that many self-employed people in Europe are now organising. So trade unions have to change, they have to become much less autocratic, so that they could become part of this project of democratic education, they have to become more open to coloured people and they definitely need more women in the leadership, so – trade unions will have to change fundamentally. For the rest I think, we should try to do as much grass-roots organising as possible. To build new forms of organisations.

And then we have all these people in the informal sector, self-employed people who are in fact informal wage-labourers... if you are self-employed and you have only one or two customers, then you're kind of wage-labourer for these people, although officially you are an employer of yourself. So I think we should move away a bit from this orientation towards the traditional working class, the miners, the factory workers. We should widen the modern wage-earning class to a large extent, to the largest extent to include all people, who live from their work. In services and so on.

And then of course you have another point, that for instance in our kinds of societies, the large majority of the work force is in wage labour. Maybe 80% or so of the people does wage labour. Most of these people we would not consider traditionally as working class. And the huge difference is that the CEO of a

multinational organisation also receives a wage. But we would no longer consider him to be a worker, of course. So we have a differentiation of the working class, which has become in this sense the wage-earning class, which is enormous, and the very varieties within it are large, so what we also need to do is to better understand the different milieus within this wage-earning class. Some sociologists have been working on this, for instance, Michael Vester, do you know him?[5] So we need to understand that better. And then see what the possibilities are for organising.

E. B.: *Do you think that we can still speak of a working class?*

M. L.: I would, yes. I would speak of a working class and – my definition of the working class is the same as that of Karl Marx and that of Max Weber: all those people who have to sell, have to hire out their labour power in order to survive. In that sense I would say, yes, we still have. The large majority of the working population is working class, in that broad sense. Yes.

E. B.: *Class consciousness has been a favourite term of the old left. Is there any of it left after the fall of this discourse?*

M. L.: No, no, true, there's not so much class consciousness, certainly not of this group as a whole. Small group-consciousness is what one can encounter... But we shall also see that in the past in the traditional working class, the blue-collar working class, there was also not often that really broad class consciousness. Also, what we could observe was mostly group consciousness. That has been exaggerated under the influence of Marxist ideology. The presence of a real social and class identity among workers was often not class consciousness in that sense.

E. B.: *So you would rather speak of group consciousness also today?*

M. L. Yes. And the point is of course to extend the group as much as possible.

[5] Michael Vester et al, *Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2001).

SONJA DRAGOVIĆ [·]

Tailors Turned Activists: Surviving the Demise of the Croatian Textile Industry

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Abstract

This article examines the case of closed Croatian textile factory Kamensko and the non-profit organization Kamensko Opened, formed by the factory workers when they lost their jobs in 2010, after working without pay for seven months. It seeks to show the ways in which textile workers brought novelties into the Croatian labor struggle and provided means of subsistence while facing an array of challenges—bogus privatization and real-estate speculations, weak law protection, lack of political representation and gender-based discrimination. These ways can become rather creative and turn the group of factory workers into exemplary, although unlikely activists, who voice the concerns of an aging population of Croatian industrial workers while developing a small business to support themselves. The results were obtained through qualitative analysis semi-structured interviews with nine former Kamensko workers and an extensive review of newspaper coverage of the events related to factory closure. The findings show that political struggle and work within the framework of a non-profit organization have empowered the workers and brought them the support of the wider community. Their method could be used by unions to a certain extent, for the sake of creating connections and allies within the rest of the civil society.

Keywords: Textile workers, Privatization, Unions, Protests.

Introduction

The East-Central European region entered the post-1989 era with a considerable industrial strength, skilled unionized labor and an established social contract upon which the power of different communist regimes used to rest. As political structures eroded to pave the way for new, democratic developments, economic change took place as well, promising a bright future with the free market. For industry, this largely meant a switch to private ownership—instead of being centrally regulated by bureaucratic governments, or self-managed by the collectives of workers, factories were now to attract private capital that was supposed to ensure the quality of production and success in the competitive, increasingly globalized market. Globalization and liberalization of markets and capital flows threatened that if labor was not obedient and cheap enough, it could always be found elsewhere. The workers started losing the rights previously guaranteed by the state in the neoliberal reform process that has (as yet) been neither completed nor reversed.

Burawoy (2002) admits that the workers reacted to such development much more calmly than expected. He explains such a state of affairs as a result of ideological disappointment in socialism, the idea now forever tainted by the experiences from the period under communism. Capitalism promised a better future, and when it failed to deliver labor found itself in an ideological dead-end, with no alternative to turn to. Another important factor comes from labor's insufficient capacities to act: the potential for joint action of the industrial workers only weakened as numerous factories, former central places of economic and social production, got dismantled. With the state and capital standing firmly on the same side—against labor, as that is the way leading to higher profit margins and pleasing capital, which the new political leadership of the region rushed to satisfy, and with pressing political changes often driving public attention away from the rights of workers toward the questions of national and religious sentiments, it is no wonder that labor has lost its local power and its transnational awareness. The future, according to Burawoy (2008; 2010), might see either the Polanyian-type counter-movement to marketization, encompassing all parts of society hurt by capitalist commodification and concentrated on solving local problems caused by global capitalism, or the Marxian-type struggle of exploited workers united across the national borders.

The following study of the textile factory Kamensko in Zagreb, Croatia, showcases the locally organized counter-movement started by dissatisfied workers and joined by students, non-governmental organizations, researchers, consumers, artists and activists concerned with labor rights, social justice and privatization of public space. The analysis shows how the workers gradually lost the rights of factory ownership and management, how they kept clinging onto the ones they still had—to work and to have at least some monthly income and social insurance—and how in the end they were left without any of it, due to the liberalized labor laws, the connections between city planning and private speculative developers, and flawed Croatian judiciary practice that has not protected the workers' rights even five years after the event. Furthermore, it shows how global capital moves around in search of the cheap, skilled labor that is closer to home than the sweatshops of Asia, keeping the largely

exploitative textile industry in the Eastern Europe alive (see Baševska, 2015). Finally, it shows the condition of the rights of the female workforce in Croatia and the inception of cooperation between diverse social actors, the aim of which was to publicize the problems workers of Kamensko faced, to improve the condition of labor, and to point to the issues of speculative real-estate developments and submission of public space in the interests of capital. A rather obvious connection between the rising value of the plot of land the factory occupied and the increasing troubles workers had with getting their monthly salaries was investigated, bringing workers and the organizations of civic society together for the first time in the short history of Croatian neoliberal capitalism (see Ivandić et al., 2015). These new alliances and the ripple effect they have already produced are important for the future of Croatian labor movement, whatever else that might hold.

Other labor initiatives in the region are sporadic, but exist nevertheless. One of the experiments now underway is a detergent factory Dita in Tuzla, Bosnia and Hercegovina, taken over by the workers who succeeded in restarting production and are currently struggling to keep the company afloat. Even though the workers of Kamensko and Dita are going through similar processes and acting in similar environments, there is no cooperation or exchange between the two collectives, other than possible sympathy for one another's struggle. The reason most probably lies in a lack of capacities to sustain regional activities (the labor ties built in the time of former Yugoslavia no longer exist), but also in a greater interest of workers to focus on the local issues, as that is where their problems are most likely to be resolved. If the potential benefits of cross-border cooperation in this disintegrated region were greater, the actions of labor would probably move in that direction as well.

It is uncertain that the attempts of Kamensko workers and their allies to improve the condition of industrial labor in Croatia will come to fruition. However, the persistence they showed thus far in advocating for their rights, building the network and pointing to problems that should no longer be ignored deserves recognition. Other groups of workers in Croatia and the rest of the region of former Yugoslavia—those employed in services, as well as unemployed, underemployed and precariously employed people—might soon see the benefit in supporting causes such as this, against the damaging reforms of labor laws and further cuts in social services.

Finally, even if the actions of Kamensko do not result in an improvement of workers' rights and better law protection for them in the future, it is still important to investigate such initiatives and the problems they struggle to articulate. While we recognize that traditional labor history has lost much of its appeal both for methodological and ideological reasons, there is a new global labor history,[1] which continues to search for new perspectives while documenting labor struggles throughout the world as a continuing critique against the inequalities brought about by global capitalism.

[1] See e.g., Linden (2008).

Declining unions and new labor struggles: The case of Croatia

'I live off 2000HRK salary, which I never receive. You can imagine how I live.' A poster with this slogan took a prominent spot in one of the protests of DTR workers in Zagreb, where they demanded their salaries to be paid and their textile factory to be saved from collapse. It says a lot about the post-socialist condition of the textile industry and its workers in Croatia. Official data show a constant decline in number of workers: according to Milat (2012), 110.000 textile workers in Croatia have lost their jobs since 1990; the number of employees dropped from 130.000 in 1990 to 21.400 at the end of 2011. At the same time, the pay stays low: average salary in textile industry is 50 per cent lower than the national average in Croatia, while salaries of women in this sector are 30 per cent lower than the salaries of their male colleagues (Milat, 2012).

The textile industry is only one drastic example of the setback Croatian economy suffered in the post-1989 era. In the pre-transition period, Croatia (as one of the Yugoslav republics) was among the top ten newly industrialized countries in the world, according to the method and criteria of the UN (Kokanović, 1999). Back in the 1960s Yugoslavia aspired to become one of the core industrial economies of Europe; however, the crisis of the 1980s followed by the 1990s breakup destined the states that succeeded it to re-peripheralization (Schierup, 1992). In the case of Croatia, according to Kokanović, it was a consequence of many mistakes made in the process of privatization, which encouraged bad business practices and the creation of monopolies and oligopolies, contributing to an environment with 'numerous deviations (...) ranging from corruption and small crime to organized crime at all levels and in all sectors of the economy and of society' (1999: 205). Bohle and Greskovits explain Croatia's 'weak state capacity' as a 'combined effect of an unbalanced nationalism, war and its aftermath, and the semiauthoritarian nature of the Tudjman regime that undermined an originally capable state' (2012: 194).

Inadequate privatization decisions, political clientelism and weak state capacity have characterized the climate in which Croatian industrial workers have been trying to preserve their economic and social rights inherited from the Yugoslav period. For decades they have been not just workers, but self-managers of socially owned property; the whole socio-political system of Yugoslavia rested upon their shoulders (see Musić, 2011). The values and rules of self-management did not survive the transition to the neoliberal system; as Grdešić (2015) points out, workers are now seen merely as somewhat annoying relics of the past with no power or importance, their lingering rights standing in the way of business development. As de-industrialization progressed and new economic environment shaped without workers as important constituents, the unions started losing significance too; became smaller and disintegrated. Membership rates have been in constant decline, particularly in the private sector, with sporadic joint actions of limited success (Grdešić, 2008; 2015). The necessity for the unions in Croatia to get a grip, strengthen their capacities, bridge the differences and put up a fight for retention and expansion of the rights of workers has been voiced over and over again (Grdešić, 2008; 2015; Kokanović, 1999; Kubicek, 2004).

Although the work of unions might not be sufficiently organized and effective, workers keep fighting their battles. Ivančić and Livada (2015) have given a rather detailed overview of the forms the labor struggle in Croatia took since the beginning of 1990s. These include occupation of companies, wildcat strikes, prolonged actions aimed at preventing bogus privatizations (known as Stožeri—Headquarters), cooperation between craft unions, efforts to empower, educate and involve rank-and file-workers, and joint actions with civil society organizations. The last one is a rather novel idea, with Croatian non-governmental organizations (NGOs)2 starting to show deepened interest in labor struggle only in 2010. The motif was the strike of Kamensko Textile Industry workers who protested in hope of retrieving their salaries and preventing closure of the factory, which was likely set up for bankruptcy in order to be torn down and its land used for the new real-estate development. As NGOs Pravo na grad (Right to the City) and Zelena akcija (Green Action) aim to prevent the takeover of the public space by private capital, their interest aligned with those of workers and they joined the protest, extending substantial technical support to workers in the process. Since then, non-governmental sector became rather active in advocating the workers' rights (Ivančić and Livada, 2015). However, that is not the only novelty the Kamensko strike helped bring to labor struggle in Croatia. The other one is Kamensko Opened, the first non-governmental organization in Croatia founded and led by industrial workers. Organization funds its activities by doing tailoring and sewing work and advocates for Kamensko workers, whose rights have not been honored even five years after the factory was closed. What exactly is the difference between workers' NGO and workers' union will be discussed in a moment. For the start it will suffice to notice that forming an NGO opened a space for action previously inaccessible to these workers. Can new models of civil organizing such as this help further the interests3 of industrial labor in Croatia? If yes, to what extent? I will explore these questions by analyzing the case of Kamensko.

Prior to taking a closer look at the case study, it is important to determine the motivations behind civil and union organizing, and how both of them are, or can be, perceived in the post-socialist context. Kubicek (2004) provides an analysis of the position of unions within the civil society of post-communist states. He notes the prominent role assigned to the civil society in the process of democratization, which it should be using to promote and guard common interests. Unions are by all means part of civil society, but with a purpose of taking care of their particular concerns, which do not necessarily have to be aligned with those defined as common—those that are, again, composed of various and not necessarily corresponding interests of various civil organizations. Unions are also political organizations, taking an active part in political negotiations and decision-making. Belonging to both civil and political camp makes unions imposters in both of them. To complicate matters further, unions are

[2] Throughout the paper I will use "Civil society organization" and "Non-governmental organization" as synonyms.

[3] These interests include enforcing the labor law, increasing visibility of industrial workers and the problems they face, lobbying with the state institutions and political parties for the extension of labor rights, helping in servicing workers' economic needs.

loaded with the baggage of socialist past which new democracies, as Grdešić (2015) notes, would rather not be reminded of. Kubicek concludes (2004: 12): 'Civil society as a whole, with all its normative assumptions included, is lauded. Unions are, to put it mildly, another matter—groups that need to be beaten or subdued if democratic consolidation and marketization are to have a chance.' This difference in how interests and activities of unions are perceived compared to the rest of civil society is basis for the differentiation between the unions and the NGOs that I make in this paper.

The evidence of declining membership and relevance of the unions is overwhelming. As a way of overcoming these problems in post-communist Eastern Europe economies, Ost (2002) suggests that unions turn towards economic unionism model, where servicing the needs of their membership would be the priority. He emphasizes the importance of history of contemporary unions, tied to communist past and broader social movements which often clouded the importance of particular workers' interests in the workplace. These particular interests, Ost argues, need to be revived and prioritized in order for unions to attract new members and regain influence: 'What successful unions are beginning to do differently today is make clear that they seek to represent labor's particular interests in capitalistic society, not lead a social movement fighting a former kind of society' (Ost, 2002: 48). He does not neglect the importance political and social movement unionism can have, but argues for economic unionism to be at the core of all unionized activity. With this in mind, I want to try to examine if workers' can organize around their shared interests outside the union—that is, circumvent its bureaucracy and burdened history—and successfully provide services for their peers, while also reaching out to the wider community.

Methodology

To answer the questions posed, I will analyze the case of Kamensko workers as a specific example of labor action in Croatia, bringing the non-governmental organizations' activism and the labor movement together. The press material that covered the case was used for the first level of analysis, as a primary source which provided me with the information necessary to understand the case and position it within the Croatian context. In order to learn about workers' experiences and their own perceptions of the action they took up, and to answer the questions on how this action might influence the Croatian labor movement, I interviewed nine former workers of Kamensko factory. Eight of them were women, as the textile industry employs predominantly female workforce. I met Djurdja, Štefica and Biserka at the office of their new organization and got the contacts of the other six interviewees - Bega, Mara, Marija, Suada, Božica and Damir—by snowball sampling. Interviews took place in January and February 2015. All of the interviewees were in their 50s or 60s, long-time employees of Kamensko, who spent 10 to 34 years working for the company and were or were not involved in the work of NGO formed after the factory was closed. Once the interviews were done, I spent three afternoons in Kamensko Opened workshop, using this opportunity to observe them doing their job and see how the community that uses their services interacts with them.

The interviews were semi-structured, with questions designed to examine how the changes in their factory and their reaction to these changes influenced their lives, their community and their understanding of the issues industrial workers face in Croatia today. All interviewees were asked about (1) the way in which factory work was organized (2) the relationship they had with the collective and the management, (3) the process of decision making in the factory, (4) the methods used to advocate for their rights while they still had a job, (5) the process of NGO formation and (6) the activist work. By creating this long overviews of interviewees' careers I was able to identify the issues at the workplace and within the society that influenced workers the most and led them to first disobey the managers, disregard the union and try and save the factory from closing, and then to create an NGO in order to continue the fight for their rights.

What follows is the detailed account of the process in which Kamensko workers lost their factory jobs, fought for their legal rights, gained allies, and established non-governmental organization as a continuation of their factory collective.

3. Losing the Factory

3.1 History

Kamensko was founded in 1949, by the Yugoslav government, with the aim of producing clothes for the army. During the 1950s it started exporting, first to the Middle East and later to several European countries. During the 1960s two new factories were opened in other parts of Croatia, in Grižani and Gračac. At the beginning of the 1970s the expansion of the main factory in Zagreb (Picture 1) was finished, giving the building the form it has today. In the period from the 1952 to the 1973, the space that factory occupied increased eight times.[4]

(Picture 1 here)

The company was licensed by Piere Carden in 1990 to produce garments for men and women and continued production for export as well as for the Croatian army during the civil war in Yugoslavia. In 1993 it was turned into a shareholders' company. Workers were given an option to buy shares first and become owners of the company themselves, which was accepted by the majority. This was not the prevalent model of privatization in Croatia, as the government's general inclination was towards privatizing through public auctions and direct deals and retaining control over who could the future owners be (Grdešić, 2008), which resulted in numerous failed processes and corruption affaires, and contributed to economic downturn. By buying the shares Kamensko workers managed to keep the ownership of the company, but not for long. Low earnings and the crisis that spanned through 1990s pushed them to trade shares within the company, leading to smaller number of workers and managers owning most

[4] Kamensko Company (2004) A Simplified Prospectus for Listing the Shares of the Issuer Kamensko in the Stock-Exchange

of company's shares and transferring them to a third party after the stocks became listed for public trading in 2004. By this time all the production facilities outside of Zagreb were closed, due to the lack of business and physical damage suffered during the war, which additionally lowered the value of Kamensko. External buyers gradually became majority owners and installed their own managers. Several interviewees refer to the moment when 'the people from the outside' became managers as the moment when the factory started declining. Božica, who used to work as a supervisor, claims the new management had no real concern for the workers, or the factory: 'They would yell and insult us. They had no understanding for the process of production.' The number of people at the managerial positions started increasing—controllers, supervisors, administrators—while the workforce involved in the actual production declined in numbers and worked under a lot of pressure, trying to achieve demanding norms. Štefica and Biserka, now active members in the NGO, pointed out the importance of stability, and how in the previous decades of their work at Kamensko directors and managers would change only when the time came for them to retire. These sudden and frequent shifts during the period from 2005 until the closure in 2010 contributed to the feeling of disorientation among workers and hostility towards the new management, but it might have strengthened the ties within the workers' community as it became obvious they no longer share history, values nor interests with those in the managerial positions. This relationship was very important during the era of self-management; as Musić notes, workers' alliance with company managers rather than the Party representatives was one of the distinct features of the Yugoslavian model of socialism: 'Solidarity with the technical and managerial cadres, who were close to the producers inside the enterprise and contributed to the total income of the work collective, seemed to make more sense than political alliances with the distant and unaccountable government bureaucracy' (Comisso, 1979: 47). Hence, the disruption of this inner-company cooperation was even more troubling for workers than in would be without the self-management heritage.

As opposed to the new and ever-changing leadership, workers of Kamensko knew each other very well. Apart from working together for years—often even decades, what connected them were similar socio-economic and educational backgrounds. The company data from 2004 show that 533 of the total of 1703 employees had secondary school education—probably related to the work with textile, while 1083 had lower qualifications. Most of the workers interviewed for this research came to work in Zagreb when they were young, from one of the surrounding towns or villages. Their experience illustrates the trends of urbanization, with young people pulled towards industrial centers in pursuit of opportunities to master a skill and get a job (Bonfiglioli, 2012). Women's emancipation through access to labor market was an important part of Yugoslav project. In order for women to keep the position of the main caretaker while at the same time participating in labor force the 'working mother' gender contract was established: 'Working women gained access to free healthcare, free abortions, free education, extended paid maternity leave of up to a year, canteens and childcare facilities in the workplace, and could benefit from shorter working hours to take care of small children (although all women did not benefit from these possibilities in the same way due to the uneven development of welfare services

throughout the country)' (Bonfiglioli, 2013: 6). Workers of Kamensko benefited from such provision, which made their living situations all more difficult when this system fell apart (Baševska, 2015). Being working women in self-management system did not protect them from gender discrimination at work either; as Biserka remembers: 'Most of managerial positions were occupied by men. They climbed the company ladder faster than us, they were promoted much sooner than we'. Men were also doing the work in the warehouses and in machinery maintenance, but the women were the ones who had to do difficult and stressful labor of sewing on the norm. These shared experiences made a strong basis for the development of compassion and solidarity among predominantly female workforce of the factory. An experience workers shared regardless of gender was union membership, which was treated as obligatory and paid for on monthly basis. One of the benefits union provided during socialist times was an affordable summer vacation at the company's summer resort in Crikvenica, at the Croatian coast, where workers and their families would often spend their summer vacation together.[5]

Before privatization, workers participated in managing the factory through workers' councils—another institution characterizing the era of self-management which, according to Grdešič (2015) gave the workers a sense of empowerment and entitlement. Members of these bodies were chosen by their working units; they held meetings regularly and the management was obliged to inform them on how the company was doing, while they could take part in suggesting solutions and making decisions. Some form of this body was kept after privatization for a while, as now workers were the shareholders and preserved the right to have a say in how their company is doing business. However, this did not last for long—multiple interviewees suggested the councils were shut down because they often opposed managerial decisions.

At the end of 2010, Kamensko was left with 426 workers. Talking about the closure, Bega says: 'Younger people sought other jobs and left if they found any. We had to stay, as we had nowhere to go: if you are 50 years old, you're too young to retire, but too old for anyone else to want to hire you.' This is another symptom of how women have been gradually losing the rights gained during state socialism era. 'Due to traditional and renewed forms of gender discrimination in the productive and reproductive sphere, women have been more vulnerable to unemployment and poverty, and have often been pushed to the margins of the labor market as well as into the informal economy' (Bonfiglioli, 2013: 25). As witnessed by several interviewees, many Kamensko workers suffered chronic illnesses, lacked good healthcare and remained unemployed for extended periods of time once they stopped working in the factory.

[5] Benačić (2014) Intervju o nekim drugim vremenima: znate li da su nekoć naše radnike tjerali da se odmaraju na Jadranu?

3.2 Protests

The closure of Kamensko was preceded by seven months long period during which the workers were not paid at all. Working days and shifts were organized as usual, but the salaries kept being postponed 'until tomorrow.' Bega admits that it is difficult to understand why someone would keep working under these conditions: 'I used to say that people should not work if they are not paid—if they don't get the salary for one month, they shouldn't just keep working. But it's different when it happens to you, you keep hoping. Besides, you don't have anywhere else to go and work, there are no other options.' The situation went so far that the controllers for the public transportation started remembering the 'Kamensko gals' and let them ride without a ticket, expressing in this way their solidarity and hope that the workers would soon get their money and be able to pay for the ride. Working for months without pay while hoping the conditions will improve is not unusual in Croatian factories, nor in other post-Yugoslav countries.6

After the seventh month without the pay had passed, in September 2010, group of 20 workers started the ten days long hunger strike in the park in front of the factory. Many coworkers supported them, but could not join due to legal restrictions concerning public gatherings. They slept in the park, worked their shifts and demanded to be paid, but also aimed to draw the public attention to their problems and struggles of Croatian textile workers in general. One of the Croatian online magazines wrote a supportive story about the strike, but ended it with a note on how ordinary it is to see workers of some fallen factory protest in Zagreb and how sad that the protest of Kamensko will only have the usual five minutes in the spotlight and then disappear from the public eye.7 That is the sense of hopelessness that even the participants of the protests had, aware that their stories are far from unique and that the wider community seldom has the time or interest to invest in supporting their cause.8 The support, however, arrived spontaneously: first the neighbors living in the buildings close to the factory joined, then came university students (who at the time were fighting their own battles against privatizing the education) and Red Cross. Citizens signed the book of support, while media covered the strike extensively. Although this experience was physically and emotionally exhausting, the worst memory of the strike for Bega was a visit paid to the workers by the director of the factory, few days after the protest started. He offered to buy them some 'ćevapi'—traditional, sausage–like grilled meat, popular fast food in the Balkans. This was an insult to the workers who opted for hunger strike because they could not sustain themselves after working without pay for months. However, no one was surprised: such behavior was another indicator of the degree to which new management was unable to empathize with workers. The union did not support the strike and advised

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[6] In her study of a case in Leskovac, Serbia, Bonfiglioli (2013) notes how the local textile workers worked without salary for two years, from July 2001 until July 2003.

[7] Bačić and Opačić (2010) Glad i bijeda radnica Kamenskog

[8] Grdešić, (2015: 7): 'Although strike and protest levels appear to be moderately high, it should be mentioned that they occur in a public climate and political environment that shows little interest in worker struggles.'

workers to enter negotiations with the company; according to Djurdja, one of the leaders of the strike, this was not accepted as workers no longer believed the management would honor any potentially reached agreement. Public statements later released by both the workers and the Textile Workers Union (TOKG)9 have shown mutual distrust, personal disagreements and, overall, inability of workers and the union to work together.

Ten days after the protest began, no solution was found. 'We had to make a decision: we could either die of hunger and exhaustion in the park, or we could continue this in some other form,' says Djurdja, Workers moved inside the factory and started organizing daily protests by walking from the factory to the city center and back (Picture 2), accompanied by sympathetic citizens, students and the media.

(Picture 2 here)

Workers felt that the especially important support to their cause came from the two representatives of an Italian company which was one of Kamensko's main foreign customers. They walked with the protestors and encouraged the management to find a solution, offering assistance in restructuring the factory. Božica claims this company offered to rent the factory space for two years and continue production by keeping at least half of the workers employed. This suggested alliance between the foreign customer and the workers of Kamensko reveals two particular interests: the willingness of foreign company to invest in keeping the low-paid workers to whom they have been outsourcing the sewing and finishing phases of work with textile, and workers' interest in any sort of arrangement that would help them keep their jobs. Workers main preoccupation is to keep working and get paid: they are not necessarily interested in improving and changing the system in which they have been exploited and underpaid. This comes as no surprise; as Grdešić writes, this is typical of labor struggle in Croatia: 'Workers have either demanded that their back wages be paid, that corrupt privatization be stopped or that their rights in collective agreements not be cut further. Very rarely have workers gone on the offensive and attempted to expand their rights and influence' (2015: 8). The proposal by the Italian company was never publicized or acted upon, even if it might have been a real possibility. Instead, the factory soon closed for good. Mara remembers: 'One Saturday, the supervisor came and gave us our documents, informing us that we will no longer work as the factory is closing. He told us that we should go to the Unemployment Bureau. It was awful when on the following Monday more than 400 of us gathered in front of that office, it was sad. I have never been to that place before in my life. The job at Kamensko was my first and only job.' Workers were forbidden to return to the factory premises. The protest walks stopped, as it became clear they will not help in trying to reopen the factory or get the money.

The newspaper have written about Kamensko filing for bankruptcy at the beginning of October 2010, following the request for the debt payment filed by one of

[9] TOKG (2011) Istina je samo jedna

the foreign creditors.10 Less than two months later, on November 26th, the factory was closed. Some of the economic analysts explained the end of Kamensko by suggesting that the closure was an inevitable result of the company's low productivity and inability to compete with low-cost garments of international clothing chains, arriving to Croatia together with the market liberalization.11 This, however, is not a satisfactory explanation: according to workers' testimonies, much of Kamensko production was done for the export, which makes it less exposed to the competition in the domestic market. The low productivity was an indicator of poor management decisions, also recognized by the workers as increased pressure and borderline harassment they started experiencing at work in the period leading up to closure. Further evidence of the managerial abuse of power can be found in the fact that multiple members of the board of directors were prosecuted by the state because of the misconduct of the bankruptcy procedure and misuse of the company's funds. In 2011 the Commercial Court found that Antun Crlenjak, the former director of Kamensko, was guilty; he was sentenced with approximately 3.000€ in fines. In a separate processes, members of the managerial and supervision boards were sued by the workers, with the NGOs Right to the City and Green Action supporting them and providing the necessary technical guidance.12 Since then several managers and supervisors of Kamensko have been indicted for different crimes related to financial fraud and speculation and have spent time in prison13, but none of these processes has been brought to an end yet—another showcase for the inefficiency of the judiciary, if not even its bias. For now, there seems to be strong evidence that people leading the factory through its final years have had ties with companies and individuals involved in real-estate speculation in Zagreb, and would benefit from shutting down the factory in order to build in its attractive location.

Concerns about the possible takeover of the land belonging to Kamensko by the real-estate speculators has been a trigger that started the cooperation between the protesting workers and the NGOs invested in protecting the public space. Factory building is located in the wider city center area, across the street from a beautiful public park (Picture 3), and hence suitable for new luxury developments. The idea to relocate the industrial activity from this area has been around for more than a decade14, and plans were made to buy a new piece of land and move Kamensko to the suburbs. The workers were familiar with this idea, but did not believe it would come through—Božica explained they were aware of the factory's bad business performance and the lack of money to buy the land and build the necessary facilities. The production was never moved; after it got closed, the factory was locked and put under guard of a private security company. Part of the complex has been torn down

[10] Kuskunović and Milovan (2010) Hrvatska će biti gladna
[11] Bošković (2012) Nisu htjeli promjene. Zaduženi i bez pomoći bili su lake žrtve krize
[12] Gaura (2011) Bivši čelnik Kamenskog kažnjen sa 22 tisuće kn
[13] Hina (2014) Slučaj Kamensko: počinje suđenje za aferu Kobilje mlijeko
[14] Renić (2010) Lenucijeva potkova 21. stoljeća

in July 2015 (Picture 4), presumably to make space for a new mixed-use building that is supposed to be built in place of an old Kamensko shop.[15]

(Picture 4 here)

The implementation of a new redevelopment project for the whole area, named Integrated City and heavily promoted by the city government, is supposed to start soon[16]. It entails relocating the railway and tearing down whole blocks, then building from the scratch. The plan has been criticized by the experts in the field[17], activists and citizens as exclusive, secretive, dismissive of the city's history and Kamensko workers while benefiting real-estate speculators. As Mucko (2012) writes: 'The planned translocation of the factory, the recommencement of production, and the payment of delayed salaries seemed marginal in terms of the market, unimportant and burdening compared to signifying the factory space as reduced to its essentials—as real-estate. (...) Endorsement of the interests of gross capital and the systematic destruction of Kamensko are parts of the same process.' The stance local government took by ignoring the legitimate concerns citizens voiced and excluding the social groups such developments might affect is illustrative of the neoliberal policies of urban development Croatia adopted. Harvey (2007: 9) describes such stance thusly: 'The municipal government was no longer about benefiting the population, the municipal government had to address creating a good business climate. That was the goal, create a good business climate. And if there is a conflict between creating a good business climate and the wellbeing of this or that segment of the population, then to hell with this or that segment of the population'. By not ensuring that transparency of planning process and supporting the project that would ultimately hurt the workers of Kamensko, the local government became a common enemy that brought the workers and NGOs Right to the City and Green Action together. A lot of support that came from citizens, activists and artists seems to be inspired by their disproval of how the governing structures encourage dubious business projects. The relationship between shady privatizations and real estate developments has usually been disastrous for workers of the privatized factories, leaving them jobless more often than not. This has recently been pointed out even by a popular Croatian punk rock band Hladno Pivo. In the video for their song Firma (Company), which is a tribute to the industrial workers, several Kamensko workers appear and share bits of their stories.

4. Kamensko Opened: A new Approach

4.1 Let's stay together

After the factory was closed and the protests stopped, workers appealed to the court in hope of getting the money they earned. The group was advised by a lawyer who, as

[15] Pandžić (2015) Ruše Kamensko: na mjestu uništene tvornice ničU stanovi
[16] Simić (2015) Projekat uređenja Trga Franje Tuđmana
[17] Milas (2010) Zaustavite Fabijanića: Protest protiv gradnje na Trgu Francuske Republike

Mara remembers, suggested forming an NGO that could represent all the workers in the process. Some of the students who joined them during the protests had the same idea in mind; although they did not know how to lead such an organization, workers accepted and a group of them registered an NGO in 2011 under the name Kamensko Opened (KO) and with a goal to help the group cope with the new circumstances of joblessness and uncertainty. This was an attempt to provide some space and continuity for the community created at the factory, to keep the mutual, internal systems of support as the external ones - the union, the company and the state institutions—were proving to be unreliable. Djurdja, appointed president of KO, estimates the organization has somewhat more than 100 members.[18] New challenge was to find a place where the organization could gather regularly, which could be turned turn into an office, a sort of Headquarters from where future actions could be planned. While acknowledging that some organizations offered them their offices for limited use, Djurdja admits they wanted to have their own space. By utilizing media attention and contacts obtained during the protests, KO managed to exercise some pressure upon the local government and the mayor himself and got to use an office space owned by the municipality, with affordable costs of rent and utilities (Picture 5).

(Picture 5 here)

As they were out of work, members of the organization started a campaign to obtain tools and materials necessary for a workshop that could function within the NGO, and maybe make some income by fixing old and making new clothes for private customers. They used the media spotlight, which their story still attracted[19], to inform the public about their plans and to ask people to donate the old sewing machines, or cloth and other materials such as cotton and buttons.[20] 'Donations came from all over Croatia. People's support made our work possible,' says Djurdja. The relevance of Kamensko story was also kept from fading away by their public performances, such as the one Croatian theater director Lenka Udovički organized with several workers and professional actresses (Picture 6), titled The Unbreakable Threads, on the topic of hardships the women of Kamensko suffered after losing their jobs.[21]

(Picture 6 here)

Gradually, the NGO expanded: in an improvised sewing workshop, using old machines and donated materials, former Kamensko workers started making their own designs, which they presented to a broader audience in a runway show (Picture 7)

[18] Although it advocates for the right of all former workers of Kamensko, not all of them were eager to become members of the NGO. Of the workers interviewed for this research, Mara and Božica were not affiliated with the organization. They chose not to be because the closure of factory was so traumatic that they want to leave everything related to it in the past.
[19] Majdandžić (2011) Sutra obilježavanje godišnjice gladovanja radnica Kamenskog
[20] Tportal (2013) I vi možete pomoći radnicama Kamenskog
[21] Tportal (2011) Performans o socijalnoj propasti Kamenskog

organized in September 2013, with the support from the local government.[22] This was a way to mark the date when the factory filed for bankruptcy, and to have a conversation about the problems of employment for women. The organization started getting orders from other NGOs, small Croatian boutique businesses and even political parties—the last presidential campaign of the former Croatian president Ivo Josipović had the jackets for the campaign made by Kamensko Opened.[23] They managed to rent another, bigger space beside the one they already used, where they permanently set up the sewing machines (Picture 8). The old space in now an office equipped with a computer, a printer and a scanner—all second-hand devices donated by the mayor's office, Djurdja explains. The public support Kamensko Opened amassed in the meantime, with theater performances, fashion shows and the story of 'losers of transition taking matters into their own hands' helped a lot in negotiating with the local government, as it gave workers the media platform to use and express their grievances. It is important to note the change in workers' position: from a collective of more than 400 unsatisfied workers demanding their earned salaries and their factory to be spared from real-estate speculators, they became a small NGO (pacified part of civil society, one that does not 'break any windows'—Kubicek, 2004) that still demanded their earned salaries and sued the speculators, only this time they could make the local government look good for providing a couple of used computers. The same group of workers was treated differently when they wanted to claim their rights as industrial workers and when they asked for support as an NGO with entrepreneurial aspirations.

(Picture 7 here)

To generate more income, KO started organizing courses where they teach sewing, tailoring and knitting, driving a lot of interest from mostly women, young and old, wanting to learn these skills and support troubled workers. At the time of interviews, organization employed eight women and engaged several volunteers, including the president and the accountant, who were both retired—hence, receiving a pension and not in urgent need of an additional monthly income. The accountant is not a former worker of Kamensko, but a woman who found out about workers' struggles and activities from the media and who offered her services for free in order to support the organization.

(Picture 8 here)

4.2 Building Community

So far, the noted effects workers of Kamensko achieved by turning to NGO activism have been as follows: increased media presence, widened network of public supporters and business partners, better cooperation with local government, and jobs

[22] Gradske vijesti (2013) Zagreb za Kamensko
[23] Špoljar (2014) Josipović posjetio udrugu Kamensko

for eight women (out of 426 people who lost work when the factory got closed). It is difficult to speculate what would have been the outcome were the other methods of struggle employed—if cooperation with the union was better, or if workers occupied the factory. Having in mind the state of Croatian economy, government and unionism, and the fact that factory closures and workers' protests are mostly treated as 'business as usual' by the public, it's safe to say that Kamensko workers managed to grab the attention and make some difference. Apart from becoming a framework in which eight workers can provide the means of subsistence, Kamensko Opened also became an important informal community center. Benefits of KO as such center manifest in three ways.

First, it informs the former workers of Kamensko who are not involved in organization's daily activities about the court proceedings and news related to workers' claim of their salaries and severance pays. The organization also uses its visibility to help in solving economic problems of the former colleagues. Damir, who used to be a warehouse worker and is only male employee of Kamensko participating in this research, is thankful for the organization's help in providing wood for heating his home over the winter, which he could not afford as he does not have a regular job and receives unemployment benefits of only 700 HRK (around 90€) a month.

Second, the organization presents the case of the Kamensko workers to the general public through the media channels, keeping the story compact and focused, hence easier to understand and empathize with. If there was no such organization, individual stories of Kamensko workers would likely dissolve and disappear among the multitude of similar records of former industrial workers of Zagreb. This benefits all the former workers who are waiting for their money, as there is a sense that not only the former employees, but the general public as well are waiting for the epilogue of this case and expect it to be fair to the workers. It might, however, result in the story becoming somewhat simplified, deprived of details about particular cases and individual struggles, as well as oriented more towards the short–term relief that belated severance pay would bring to the workers than to the need to evaluate, criticize and change the system which left workers in this position in the first place. Kamensko Opened makes no secret of the fact that their primary goal is to retrieve the money the factory owes them. Still, organization participates in public events and conferences[24] where their representative, most often their president Djurdja, speaks about the need to support workers, protect them from possible manipulations by employers and help them get timely law protection. While KO is visible and active in supporting the workers' and women's rights, they do not support any political party in Croatia. 'We cannot support anyone who contributed towards creating the system in which we now cannot get justice, even though we have been actively fighting for it for almost five years,' Djurdja says. Social Democratic Party supported their cause and

[24] European Commission Office in Croatia (2014) Žene, ekonomsko nasilje i stakleni strop u Hrvatskoj (Women, Economic Violence and the Glass Ceiling in Croatia). March 14, Zagreb.; FemCities Conference (2015) Uticaji ekonomske krize na zapošljavanje žena u europskeim gradovima: Sličnosti i razlike. Smjernice za gradove (The Influence of Economic Crisis on Employment of Women in European Cities: Similarities and Differences. Guidelines for Cities). June 1-2, Zagreb.

Kamensko Opened made some promotional material for their presidential candidate, but did not endorse them: 'We did business with them. Supporting us is nice, but it doesn't solve the problem. We need systemic failures to be fixed, and there seems to be no political party in Croatia who is committed to doing that now.'

Third, Kamensko Opened does not limit their activities to helping only to the other former workers of Kamensko. Djurdja admits this is something they decided after discussing it at length, as involving other people in their work would mean devotion to goals not tied specifically to their shared history and their main objective. At the end of 2014, organization hired a woman who is a trained tailor and a domestic abuse survivor, in need of a job so she can provide for herself and her kids. 'Others rejected her over and over again. She was a woman in trouble and we had to find a way to help. Now she works with us and everyone is very content with her contributions to our workshop' says Djurdja of the only KO employee who is not a former Kamensko worker.

While I observed organization at work, they had two visits, both of them illustrative of how the local community perceives Kamensko Opened. One was by an older man whose wife recently passed, leaving behind many hand-made pieces of clothing and a lot of textile materials. He brought these as a donation, to support the women's work in honor to his wife's memory. The other visit was by a young woman with a master's degree in textile design, who was searching for an opportunity to work. 'All the ads for jobs that I see through the Unemployment Bureau are fixed for someone in advance, and there is not many of them anyway. I was hoping I would find something here,' she explains. Djurdja instructs her to apply for a paid internship, funded by the state, available for young professionals of all profiles and done in one of many companies or organizations around the country who decided to participate in this government-sponsored training. Kamensko Opened has already had several such interns—young people with broad theoretical knowledge would come to acquire some practical skills in working with textile. 'It is nice to be a teacher,' says Štefica. Participation in programs such as this shows how Kamensko opened, as an NGO, got its members plugged in the system in a completely new way. They were now providing the training for youngsters similar to the one they received at the factory decades ago, only in a much different, uncertain and precarious environment which these young people are now entering.

By engaging in community life and providing services for former, current and future workers, Kamensko Opened found a way to engage in activities that support their peers, while at the same time investing in community building. What they are doing might be both servicing the workers and going beyond the factory gates, in Ost's terms (2002)—finding the balance between economic and political engagement, although on a very small scale.

5. Conclusion: The Unlikely Activists

The case of Kamensko and its successor, Kamensko Opened, is an interesting example of industrial workers' collective searching for its place in a new, uncertain

capitalist environment. I used it to examine if the new models of civic organizing in post-socialist Croatia—such as non-governmental organizations—can be used in furthering the interests of industrial labor, abandoned and almost unnecessary in the new, largely de-industrialized economy. After studying how the workers' NGO attracted and sustained public attention over the time of almost five years, advocated for the rights of all former Kamensko employees, connected with the community, created alliances with other civil society actors and started its own economic activity, it is tempting to say that yes, it is possible to improve the condition of industrial workers by encouraging them to get involved with the public in a new, organized and possibly non-unionized way.

Why is it important that Kamensko Opened is an NGO and not a union? As explained earlier, unions have fallen from grace in the post-socialist period, largely unable to gather strength and assert their importance to either their members or the employers. According to Hymen (2003), unions in Europe became increasingly dependent for their survival on institutionalized internal routines and formalized external relationships, which puts them in danger of losing contact with those they aim to represent. This is largely true for Croatian unions as well. Rigid and out of touch, could these institutions find inspiration in a smaller, yet formalized and organized workers' actions such as Kamensko Opened? It depends.

It is important to consider the limitations. Workers who run Kamensko Opened have lost their factory jobs, so they had the strongest motivation to find a new way to provide means of subsistence, while protesting over their breached labor rights. Although they are advocating for the rights of more than 100 former co-workers, they are a small organization, which simplifies managing and decision making processes. They have been active in the community, but they have never aspired to become activists—merely to survive and publicly state their problems while waiting for the money that factory owners still need to pay them. They have learned a lot in their new endeavor, but this emancipating potential has been mostly limited to a small number of workers involved in the organizations' day-to-day activities. Many of their friends and colleagues are either unable to work due to health issues, like Marija, or trying to make ends meet by doing low-paid jobs in the black market, like Bega and Suada. They are aware that they have not made any big difference, and still consider their position to be in a sort of waiting space until their belated money arrives, or they get old enough to retire.

Kamensko Opened, however, is surely not insignificant. It operates on a small scale and manages to give little but important contributions to the community, while developing its own capacities in the process. The biggest lesson the rest of the Croatian labor movement could learn from its experience is the importance of this small, human scale. By choosing to encourage grassroots action, build connections and concentrate on small problems, unions and their allies might eventually get strong and relevant enough to make more of a difference within the socio-economic system.

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Picture 1: Factory building of Kamensko in Zagreb. Photo: Author

Picture 2: Protest of Kamensko workers; Photo: G. Mehkek

Picture 3: Park and a parking lot across the street from Kamensko factory. Photo: Author

Picture 4: Tearing down parts of the Kamensko complex, photo: T. Kristo

Picture 5: Office of the Kamensko Opened. Photo: Author

Picture 6: Workers of Kamensko in the "The Unbreakable Threads", photo: D. Lovrović

Picture 7: The first runway show of the Kamensko Opened organization, Photo: S. Jandjel

Picture 8: The workshop of Kamensko Opened. Photo: Author

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Afrikanizacija: Eastern European Epistemologies and African Labour

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Abstract

The paper offers a critical reading of Eurocentrism and Western hegemony of social thought by highlighting the essential similarities between the African and post-1989 Eastern European experience. It argues that Eastern European local knowledge and *difference* should be addressed in new ways, which take into account our neo-colonial negation and subjugation. The reorientation of what I call an essentially orientalist discourse in Eastern Europe can come from renewed engagement, after a nearly thirty-year gap, with African political theory, labour activism, and resistance movements. The article offers a discussion in what ways the African experience can be paralleled with the Eastern European peripheral integration into the global capitalist economy and it argues that African social thought, which has been hitherto largely neglected in post-socialist Eastern Europe, can, indeed, have illuminating insights into a history of global marginalisation. Further, I argue, that in that sense, African social thought can be an inspiring source in order to reorient current Eastern European histories, which have been developing self-defeating, self-deprecating and self-orientalising tendencies since at least 1989. *Afrikanizacija*, a grand metaphor for our region's descent into a world of neo-colonialism, should also mean that we recognise the liberating and emancipating contents of African social thought especially in the fields of labour and feminism when we look for ways to fight Western hegemony.

Keywords: African Labour, *Afrikanizacija*, Nigeria, Academic Identity Politics, Eastern European Epistemologies.

In this essay, we first address the riddle of how, under conditions on de-industrialisation, organised working class struggle is more and more relevant in the early 21st century in Africa. In Eastern Europe, de-industrialisation has not reached African levels (in most places) but organised labour and Marxian theory has arguably become even weaker in our region than in Africa. We then go on to offer a metaphor for Eastern Europe's neoliberal descent into its current conditions. The term *Afrikanizacija* is drawn from the Yugoslav experience of the mid-1990s but in this essay we argue that its application goes far beyond Eastern Europe's war zones and pockets of third world underdevelopment: the retreat from social services by the state has made *Afrikanizacija*, the convergence with Africa's peripheral economies, a region-wide reality. In the African context, flag independence from the 1960s usually coexisted with neo-colonial systems. Those systems allowed for some limited development in the 1960s and 1970s, but deteriorated in the 1980s and the 1990s, creating in Africa numerous military dictatorships and unliveable hell-holes, while maintaining extraction economies for the benefit of the global capitalist order in tandem with local compradors. Today, wars in the former Soviet peripheries, autocratic systems in different parts of Eastern Europe, and also anti-immigrant hysteria all point to a replay of 1990s Africa in the Eastern European theatre of global capitalism.

Naturally, Eastern European academics are not in the position to single-handedly re-build the moribund trade unions, or to revitalise the workers' struggle in the region. What we may do, and should do, is that we should build theory on which eventually, activisms might be built in the future. It is with this in mind that in this article, we offer uses for the re-engagement, after a 30 year gap, of African Marxist social and political theory. Eastern Europe before 1989 did furnish Africa with genuine transfers of technology, credit, and know-how (including the know-how of building Bolshevik type vanguard parties). Today advice must flow the opposite way. It is my conviction that African social scientists' experience with Western domination, extraction of resources, super-exploitation of the work force, the necessity of emigration for professionals, the emergence of right wing radical rule and de-industrialisation, will make it worthwhile for Eastern European social scientists to study the works of Africa's theorists exactly to gain ideas on how to analyse and address those negative phenomena.

This essay then goes on and argues for academic identity politics in the Eastern European region. Instead of offering morality tales for the West on why their political, economic and social systems are always best; and instead of offering caricatures of our own historical failings, we should learn pride from Africa's radical minds from Fanon to Madunagu, when we want to face up to Western condescension. This is done here with the help of Ramon Grosfoguel's refutation of universalistic notions of Western philosophy of knowledge, and the recognition that Eastern Europe has had indigenous achievements that merit historical pride.

It is difficult to build historical pride in a region that sees itself in light of its current colossal failure and through the eyes of its incumbent neo-colonial masters before it can realistically weigh itself on the scales of history. Pride in fields of the human imagination is not very easy in Eastern Europe to develop as the region has not been the cradle of world religions or philosophies. However, beyond practical

historical achievements, Eastern Europe has built systems of thought that we may be proud of (from Leftist thinkers to the pockets of paleo-conservatism that *hassidism* represents). In the Central-Eastern European sub-region, a British historian and commentator notices extremely pertinent ways in which the region's history hinders its healthy development and self-image. This is contrasted with theoretical approaches by thinkers such as Hobsbawm and Gellner to present how Central-Eastern Europe, despite its tragic history, has also having been something of a laboratory of thought, ideas, nationalisms, and their discontents. My essay ends with a warning that if we fail to uncover objectively, our own condition and let Eastern Europe's political elites subjugate the region to the ever-growing demands of international capital then further economic and epistemic decline is inevitable, and Eastern Europe's trajectory will eventually converge with that of the super-exploited economies of West Africa.

New vistas in the field of African Labour

The unique role that the African workers' movement plays on that continent has recently been noticed once more and completely re-evaluated after decades of academic neglect especially in the Atlantic countries. Pnina Werbner's *The Making of an African Working Class*, Immanuel Ness's *Southern Insurgency: The Coming of the Global Working Class*, Zachariah Mampilly's *Africa Uprising* and *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*, are all in print and they all point to a massive and sustained, renewed interest in African rebel movements that form and operate on the basis of class and not on the basis of *ethnic politics*, that vicious darling of mainstream narratives.

It has now been widely recognised that ethnic and ethnicist explanations often serve to explicate the neo-colonial master and to implicate the victim. After scores of proxy wars fought out for international corporations from the Congo to the Central African Republic that in aggregate have killed millions in the last two decades, and after fundamentalist fanatics have launched Salafist insurgencies and triggered US televangelist style Protestant 'awakenings,' with literal witch hunts, and inter-religious warfare all over the African continent, it is time that academia recognised how embedded its mainstream liberal explanations and ideas are in the 'mainstream' web of global corporate interests. It is indeed high time that academia move beyond an unwitting service to those interests through its own indirect ways. It is now important to assess possibilities of an entire plethora of genuine emancipatory theory from (post) industrial working class activism to radical feminist takes, as well as addressing questions of how progressive kinds of 'identity construction' (in this case mainly class and gender) may actually serve emancipation.

Within the Central-Eastern European context, author Zachariah Mampilly was recently invited to deliver a lecture at Budapest's Central European University – a sign that our region has picked up on this major global academic trend. Mampilly's activist links allow him access to a number of rebel leaders, civil society organisers and labour personalities (sometimes by clandestine means). His analysis is a radical departure from the Security Studies dominated North American/West European discourse on African rebel leaderships: Mampilly constitutes some of them as part of a potential

long term solution and not as security threats. With the US Africa Command now getting more and more entangled in local conflicts on the African continent, it is vital that voices independent of the US security architecture are also gaining recognition within global Africanist circles, and that their authentic voices are recognised even in Central-Eastern Europe.

Another important representative of labour oriented Africanist scholarship is London's Leo Zeilig: labour organiser, academic, writer, socialist, and prolific author. With especially Zeilig's fantastic recent works such as *Lumumba: Africa's Lost Leader*, *The Congo: Plunder and Liberation*, and his very own new take on Frantz Fanon, the Africanist community has again reconnected with 1960s and 1970s radical icons. Leo Zeilig's *oeuvre* has gone beyond such reconnection though. It has also been pivotal in explaining how under de-industrialisation, labour movements can still mount massive coordinated strikes that influence major political developments in Africa. In his *Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, and in *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa*, major explanations are offered as to how strikes are gaining in organisation and strength despite the systematic dismemberment of manufacturing industries under structural adjustment programmes (ongoing since the early 1980s along with privatisation and the elimination of parastatal companies in African states). It is crucial to understand that African labour thrives under conditions of de-industrialisation, while urbanisation itself marches on. This has created serious difficulties even for Marxist analysts of African societies: Mike Davis' *Planet of Slums* is testament to that. Leo Zeilig, in disagreement with Davis, explains how a lumpenised urban mass in the context of de-industrialisation still does *not* mark the end of labour resistance in Africa:

> (...) to see ... instances of protest as simply spontaneous explosions of a slum dwelling multitude is nonsense. More often they are organized or semi-organized expressions of political dissidence... (...) Writers doubted whether bonds of solidarity and consciousness were strong enough for a 'real' working class to bring about social transformation, and suggested that the so-called working class was in any case excluded from other groups in society as 'an aristocracy of labour.' It is undoubtedly true that the formation of the working class has been characterised by a complex and often heterogeneous process of 'proletarianisation' in most parts of Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth century – from migrant labour in the mines in Southern Africa from the 1900s to labour in oil extraction and processing in the Niger delta from the 1970s. (Zeilig, 2002: 15)

Following this general discussion, Zeilig brings into the discussion the concrete example of Soweto in South Africa:

> (...) the effects of mass unemployment – typical of the de-industrialised urban life in the South – have created a new class of the wage-less poor, excluded from the world of work. The working class seems now, by implication, a tiny and privileged group, many of whom live outside the township slum and have interests separate from the majority of the urban poor. However, a closer look

> at the statistics reveals something quite different. If we examine the household, we can see extraordinary mixing of the different and seemingly divided groups of the poor. (...) There is no 'wall of China' between work and unemployment. (...) the potential for a similar crossover exists as regards popular protest and social dissidence. (Zeilig, 2002: 15-16)

What is important to realise in connection with Zeilig's argument is that a single man or woman in formal employment may be directly responsible for the physical survival of up to ten people who live in the same compound as the employee, or who receive from him or her remittances, and that the latter's own revolutionary potential will reflect very closely, the influence of their luckier brethren.

We should extrapolate on Zeilig's important point by bringing to the table the revolutionary potentialities of Europe's young *precariate.* Arguably, our own Eastern Europe's semi-peripheral *precariate* already lives on the very edges of physical survival if it does not emigrate. (Dale, 2011) Pointing out structural parallels between the fate of Africa under de-industrialisation, and Central-Eastern Europe under simultaneous dynamics of de-industrialisation and subaltern (neo-colonial) re-industrialisation will allow us to draw attention to understudied aspects of Eastern Europe's condition itself.

Afrikanizacija

In works that focus on de-industrialisation, or the critique of NGO paradigms of meaningless 'empowerment' and specifically also the failings of micro-credit systems in the former Yugoslavia, the term 'afrikanizacija' was introduced early on in the 1990s. 'Afrikanizacija' (a Serbo-Croat word that is frequently misspelled 'africanizacija' in Western literature) is a technical term for how a 'society in transition' (most especially one that had been based on a socialist economy before) is transformed relying on the informal sector of kiosks, street stalls, rehashed subsistence farms, (Lal, 2013: 156) and we may add, on widespread prostitution and criminalisation of its socio-economic and political life. Kiosk economies, informal economies, outright criminality and ubiquitous sex work characterised the 1990s all over Central-Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and the Balkans. They remain embedded in countries such as Ukraine, Bosnia, Macedonia or Moldova. (An interesting case study of Moldova is supplied by Keough, 2016). Relatively luckier new EU member states such as Hungary, with their growing geographical regions and pockets of Afrikanizacija, are also transmogrifying into neo-colonial style remittance economies (because of massive flows of intra-EU emigration). The wholesale supplying of low skilled physical labour by men and also physical and emotional labour by women (as nurses, caretakers, sex workers etc.) to the economies of the global centre brings to mind parallels with the Philippines and its similar role vis-a-vis the US, but also, parallels with economies such as that of Ethiopia (another well known source of nurses in the global market for emotional labour, in this case for the Persian Gulf). At the same time, while subsidiary re-industrialisation is considered a panacea by ruling elites, Afrikanizacija grows in relevance in sub-regions that are left out of that process.

In some ways however, Afrikanizacija stamps more than just Eastern Europe's under-researched, desperately poor hellholes. It may be said to characterise aspects of our entire developmental model. The near complete lack of unemployment benefits in Eastern Europe, the way in which tertiary education and secondary education expenses are cut back, the state of healthcare, and the wholesale destruction of entire segments of the middle class in our region (Atal, 1999; Dale, 2013) underline that Afrikanizacija has not been just a transitional phase: indeed that it should appear among the defining grand metaphors for our socio-economic system today. It is also here to stay. Understood this way, Afrikanizacija would not mean a return to some idyllic folk capitalism of the African jungle (a much touted but nonexistent historical phenomenon anyway) but the specifics of economic life in Africa after the brutal neo-liberal restructuring of the 1980s and the 1990s (and in some cases still ongoing) that artificially rid the African continent of much of its potential for growth and cemented its international economic role as a supplier of raw materials and super-exploited labour power.

Naturally, this is not to suggest that current skills levels in West Africa approximate skills levels in Eastern Europe or specifically in Hungary (skills levels in de-skilled and de-educated West Africa are startlingly low); but it is to suggest that these two distinct groups of economies are similar in that they cannot accommodate their very own highly skilled professionals any more – and neither can they accommodate their skilled workers. There are more Nigerian medical doctors practicing in the United States than there are within Nigeria (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 255). Trends in Hungary are similar: our medical doctors and nurses are leaving, along with our welders. Africa's structural adjustment programs and Eastern Europe's disastrous post-1989 transition have both resulted in the establishment of distinctly neo-colonial systems; and they both resulted in the destruction of entire embedded life-worlds, including much of the life-world of the urbanised Central-Eastern European intellectual that we ourselves as a sub-class so much cherish.

It has perhaps been easiest to notice the nature of (neo-) colonial rule in regions where legal sovereignty was also taken away, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (an EU *protectorate* in name and substance). The highest political authority in that country is the foreign 'High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina,' the chief executive officer for the 'international civilian presence' (i.e. the Western colonial authority) in the country. Since 1995, the High Representative has been able to bypass the elected parliamentary assembly, and since 1997 has been able to remove elected officials. The methods selected by the High Representative have been criticised even in mainstream media as blatantly undemocratic. International supervision is planned to end when the country is deemed politically and democratically stable and self-sustaining – i.e. this is a typical colonial mandate (Hayden, 1998).

The BiH protectorate is also a textbook case of how the North-Western European core treats its South-Eastern European periphery: through de-industrialisation, privatisation, austerity; another well known example is Greece. It is not in the least surprising then that it was exactly in Bosnia that the most visible and most crucial multi-ethnic social revolt of the former Eastern European region has happened so far. The 2014 revolt started in Tuzla and spread to Sarajevo and Bihac, and was characterised by inter-ethnic inclusion and a complete lack of the supposedly

paramount 'ancient hatreds' that are thought to characterise the peoples of the region in the minds of the (neo-) colonial ruling authority. The demonstrators' anger focussed on the (indigenous) political class. Although home grown, that class clearly represents no one, it maintains an apartheid (ethnically constructed) system, it is complicit in the destruction of industry, and it functions in complete disconnect from ordinary people's lives as much as any similar colonial authority (such as warrant chiefs in the British colonial system a century ago) (Robertson, 2014).

Elsewhere, as in Hungary or Poland, legal sovereignty made the recognition of a neo-colonial political economy extremely difficult, although of course, there exist some (mostly marginalised) critical thinkers. While on the other end of the spectrum, delusional conspiracy theorists (distinguished also by their university positions and academic titles too in Eastern Europe) envision dark schemata of unspeakable ferocity and drama to great popular acclaim, the obvious reality of Hungary's economy as characterised by neo-colonial assembly plants that produce profit for German firms, is blurred by the ongoing 'high politics' entertainment show that is played out with the European Union.

The idea that there is a necessary analytical link between conditions that prevail in Africa and Eastern Europe does not rest on superficial parallels but on real commonalities between the lives and conditions of Central European migrant workers, its *precariate* and its fourth estate on the one hand, and with the Fourth World of Africa's destitute (including their migrants) on the other. The destruction of life-worlds, as an important element in understanding social change, is emphasised by Karl Polanyi when he discusses how colonialism uprooted traditional communities in Africa thus:

> (...) institutions are disrupted by the very fact that a market economy is forced upon an entirely differently organized community; labour and land are made into commodities, which, again, is only a short formula for the liquidation of every and any cultural institution in an organic society. (...) Who for instance would care to deny that a formerly free people dragged into slavery was exploited, though their standard of life, in some artificial sense, may have been improved in the country to which they were sold as compared with that it was in their native bush? And yet nothing would be altered if we assumed that the conquered natives had been left free and not even been made to overpay the cheap cotton goods thrust upon them, and that their starvation was 'merely' caused by disruption of their social institutions. (Polanyi, 2001: 167)

In this centrally important passage, Karl Polanyi battles the idea that exploitation is merely a fact of numbers, prices, and nominal incomes. Similarly, Eastern European societies before 1989, in their ways of preserving pre-modern solidarities and in maintaining enforced (state run) ones, social and economic factors sometimes allowed for a more humane existence than (semi-)peripheral capitalism does in the same regions today: an obvious statement of fact but one that still carries shock value in Eastern European periodicals. It would of course be foolish to suggest that Eastern Europe's state socialist societies were organic societies a la Polanyi in any sense – but then again, neither were *acephalous* African Igbo village communities really 'organic'

in any other sense than not being subjected to the *diktats* of capital. It is also obviously the case that people in gainful employment earn much more today in dollar terms than in 1986 in Hungary (although they do not necessarily do so in Bosnia). However, numbers alone tell nothing of the system at work. 'It is the absence of the threat of individual starvation which makes primitive society, in a sense, more humane than the market economy, and at the same time less economic,' continues Polanyi, describing pre-colonial economic systems that relied on solidarity and shared food resources as a way of life (Polanyi, 2001: 172). Indeed we must realise that it is completely impossible to make sense of the Nigerian economy even in 2016 and even in its most urbanised realms such as Lagos, without the knowledge that identity communities support their members, neighbours support neighbours, blood relations and co-workers support relatives and comrades in ways that are absent from the West, but somewhat still familiar from the 'vertical villages' of socialist housing blocks of 1980s Bulgaria or 1960s Hungary where the wider sharing of food was still a socially relevant phenomenon. With the arrival of Eastern Europe's peculiarly vicious version of unregulated capitalism after 1989, such solidarities were eroded by economic rationales and global hegemonic morals reinforcing each other: making Hungarian immigrants in the West one of the saddest, most individualised groups that do not rely on comforting (pre-modern) group solidarities much.

In the 1970s, epistemic communities established important links between Eastern Europe and Africa, where the latter largely, was the recipient of technological transfers and also of ideas such as Marxism-Leninism, Trotskyite analysis, and state socialism. Lake Balaton's chief architect Polonyi went and designed Nigeria's Calabar's entire urban layout. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana employed two Hungarian economists (Nicholas Kaldor, Jozsef Bognar). Corvinus' own Tamas Szentes, who worked in Dar-es-Salaam was an inspiration for an icon of African Marxian political economy, Walter Rodney himself. Bulgaria built the National Theatre in Lagos. More importantly still, the USSR financed and underwrote labour movements for decades in African countries (I narrate a case of this phenomenon in my upcoming book on *Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria*) (Mayer, 2016). In this article, I claim that it is time for Eastern Europe's social scientists to acknowledge and engage with African social science: especially Walter Rodney (*How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*), but also with Bade Onimode, Edwin Madunagu, and others who have important insights into how neo-colonial economies function, along with the kinds of humiliations that people who live under neo-colonial systems have to endure when it comes to their welfare, culture and identity. Bade Onimode, an economist, wrote classical economic histories and studies on political economy in the orthodox Marxist-Leninist, East-European fashion, when he analysed Nigeria's development. His voluminous oeuvre is testament to the fact that such an approach, despite its obvious shortcomings, was not at all without value in the African context. The more heterodox Eskor Toyo, although a Polish educated economist himself, showed more sympathy towards Maoist solutions, the peasantry as the bearer of revolution, and alternative Marxian cultural criticism, based on an understanding for the need to decolonise thought, before decolonising economies. Edwin Madunagu went even further and explored Trotskyite options, set up a New Left style rural commune with his comrades in the jungle, and wrote extensively on the effects of the neo-colonial

condition on a Fanonian basis, with corresponding rage. Although rage itself might be a double edged sword for an analyst, it might create an entirely new vantage point. I claim that in Eastern Europe, treating our own regional identity and our own academic history as an exercise in failure and a morality tale for the West on how the Other is always wrong, is slavish, self-negating, and ultimately, degrading. It is only through a critical re-engagement with our own tragedies and successes that Eastern Europe might hope to overcome its apathy.

The necessity of academic identity politics

Ramon Grosfoguel of UC Berkeley (who seems to be acquiring some of his co-author Immanuel Wallerstein's towering global credibility within World Systems Analysis circles today) has drawn academia's attention to the importance of decolonising Southern epistemologies and also to the impossibility of the detached, universal, Western *God's eye view*: the recognition that mainstream social science is gendered and that it has geographical and racial underpinnings. The triumphant Westerner in Grosfoguel's narrative *exterminates* not only people and peoples (as in South and North America, Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania) but also entire indigenous knowledge structures, right after it subjugates a geographical region (Grosfoguel, 2011). The full subjugation of our own region to transnational capital happened only after 1989: the regression in our region in the field of Humanities and social sciences is palpable ever since then.

This statement must be tempered with the knowledge that before 1989, Eastern Europe was obviously not free either: most of the region lived under the thumb of Soviet state socialism. I consciously avoid discussing the ideological question whether the USSR was socialist or state capitalist: I do tend towards a version of the former opinion and thus employ the formula of state socialism. Slovak social scientists Dobrota Pucherova and Robert Gafrik presented an engaging collection of essays that focus on Eastern Europe's flight from under Moscow's iron fist in *Post-colonial Europe? Essays on Post-Communist Literatures and Cultures*, a very interesting compilation that merits discussion (Pucherova, 2015). The basic problem with the editors' thesis however, seems to me their lack of discussion on the political economy of Soviet empire. It is well known that the USSR controlled tightly, the kinds of domestic political economies that were tolerated or encouraged within its orbit. However, it is also well known that resource extractive classical colonialist/neo-colonialist methodologies were lacking to such an extent that the cost of maintaining Soviet Central Asia, or Central-Eastern Europe under COMECON, was a major reason behind the dissolution of the empire and the state itself; in other words, not only did the USSR not exploit most of its colonies economically but it usually lost resources on them. This is not to say that the colonial or post-colonial paradigm cannot be used in relation to our relationship with the Soviet Union; there may be reasons and parallels that warrant such treatment. However, what is entirely lacking from such a discussion is the realisation that in the economic sense, 1989 actually opened up Eastern Europe's economies, through shock therapies and brutal privatisation schemes, to Western capital, this time as a really integrated semi-

periphery/periphery, and that 1989, despite its calls for emancipation even for workers, was hijacked by neo-liberal elites and ended up transforming Eastern Europe into a neo-colony in the economic sense.[1] The region's case is special as the realisation of how legal sovereignty appeared exactly at the time when economic sovereignty was withdrawn, and that this fact made widespread realisation of what was happening very hard. It prevents still, a cultural awareness among elites and intellectual strata, of the region's neo-colonial condition, startlingly even when signs that point to neo-colonial realities are closest to researchers. Madina Tlostanova's exceptionally brilliant thesis in 'Can the Post-Soviet Think?' shows exactly this kind of realisation, where she not only talks of the subaltern position of post-Soviet researchers but the effects of double coloniality (Tlostanova, 2015).

Gabor Eross has focused on how sociology assumed a mere data provider function in Eastern Europe upon 1989 in an important article in *Intersections* – and I find this should be saluted (Eross and Bartha, 2015). In the field of History, raw data collection does not operate as a field independent of the conceptualisation of results; hence, entire self-orientalising narratives arrived after 1989 with intellectual mimicry, as modalities of individual survival for researchers. Eastern European social thought has to recognise that there can, and there should be, epistemologies specific to the region, which are markedly different from Western perspectives. We in Eastern Europe, and especially Central-Eastern Europe, including social science researchers, physically *look* like members of the dominant groups in Western academia, hence *academic identity politics* has been slow to emerge. It is possible for Hungarian historians to assume a quasi Western, American academic persona and identity. In such cases however, the authenticity of the voice might be questioned (Szalai, 2015). There have been cases where former celebrity historians of the region became unabashed apologists for the most triumphal US centred narratives. A disturbing example is Ivan T. Berend's trajectory: his last publication stressed the positive role that US companies had played in the rebuilding of Western Europe in openly celebratory ways – a real disappointment after his former well earned fame as an independent Marxist voice regionally (Berend, 2013).

The Eastern European Humanities scholar/Historian as academic migrant in the Atlantic world might, if he/she so chooses, build an entirely new intellectual persona and engage in what Rene Girard, the philosopher, calls 'acquisitive mimesis/appropriative mimicry:' not only in the sense of appropriating a better salary (an enticing prospect no doubt), but also of appropriating a vantage point, a tradition, a manner of weighing issues originally alien to the migrant academic. Girard warns us that mimicry is a violent process; in this case, most of the violence is done on the scholar's very own self.

Academic identity politics is not something that Eastern European Humanities and social sciences had to focus on formerly: regional output satisfied regional demand, and most of it remained within the region, or even within national discourses that happened in national vernaculars. However, academic globalisation that brought enhanced bonuses for publication in English versus national tongues, is forcing Eastern European analysts to face entirely new pressures of asserting group identities

[1] See. e. g. Gowan (1995)

within global linguistic mediums and discourses. The dynamic that in the 1970s started to characterise US academia (the increasing importance of academic identity politics from New Left to feminism, from Black approaches to Latino self assertion, from working class credentials to in-the-face religious statements) is today a global phenomenon. An academic persona today exists in a contested space where local and regional discourses interact with, but ultimately are also judged by, global hegemonic discourses in the Gramscian sense. No one will have the luxury of revelling in locally or regionally constituted discourses without being scaled by the watchful eye of a brutally competitive international discourse where unasserted regional standings do not carry currency except if they manage to make their mark on the global whole. Eastern European identities are as much historically constituted as most other ones: however, our physiognomy's similarity with Western academics' makes it difficult to revert to fashionable biopolitical explanations and racialist/ethnicist foci, when introducing our own *difference*. In our case, our identities as Eastern European researchers have to be based on what it is that we *say*, especially about our own history, and how we can move away from the slavish criminalisation of our own past that characterises Western scholarship about our region, and deal instead with our *significant unsaid*, our state socialist legacy in a critical and meaningful way as it offers insights into understanding universal questions. Following Grosfoguel, I claim that we must understand this: Our viewpoint may not be *a God's eye view* of universal rationalism – but neither are Western dominated universalisms really God's eye views – as epistemological universalism is today a blatant impossibility (Grosfoguel, 2011). If we assert the relevance of our regional historical experience instead of simply copying Western externalisations and orientalisations of it, we may do global discourse great service. From the Yugoslav experience on workers' self government to 1956's similar experiments, from state sponsored socialist feminisms to the way how pre-modern peasant identities enriched Eastern European cultures under state socialism and beyond, from the region's historical presence in Africa to the organised experiment at building a workers' state in the early USSR; all are achievements that Eastern European researchers and academics can be proud of and use when considering today's pressing social problems within and without, the Eastern European region. Our current status as providers of morality tales on how the West is always right, and how we ourselves are inferior, is an obvious *cul-de-sac* of thought.

What the dominant, hegemonic discourse does when it orientalises and ultimately dehumanises us Eastern Europeans played out for all eyes to see from around August 2015 in the region's refugee crisis, when instead of explaining how local political classes used the crisis to their own benefit (and as Gaspar Miklos Tamas points out [2015], as a misguided attempt to safeguard the sub-region's potential to export our labour to the West), academic heavyweights and light hearted media actors alike, portrayed Eastern European peoples and cultures as vicious, bigoted, ungrateful and evil: exactly the late 19th century image of 'the ungrateful savage of the Congo.' Participants in academic sub-rational discourses such as the 'Why We Study Eastern Europe' closed group on Facebook saw such opinions being promoted and played out, as when a British participant there 'joked' that 'Hungarian intelligence' was 'a contradiction in terms': a type of joke that after the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s in the United States, academics would never crack about African countries, and

naturally so. The regional governments' buffoonish reactions to these insults as they reached the region through mainstream media, were equally vindictive but missed entirely, the point of origin of this blame game; which is the bloated general superiority complex of Western (non-radical, capitalist) mainstreams vis-a-vis us 'Ossies,' and our recurring constitution in their eyes as (neo-) colonial sub-humans. The *ungrateful colonial subject* is particularly interesting here as it echoes exactly, established Western opinions on their own victims before about the Second World War in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Although it is obvious that Western corporations make much more money in Central-Eastern Europe than what the sub-region receives through structural funds from the EU; and thus that it is *us that aid Western development and not vice versa*, the (neo-) colonial Western (academic) mind seems to require the notion that its inferior should exude gratefulness for his/her fate.

It is important to note that although Western condescension, dismissal and discrimination against Eastern Europeans has been a major culture shock for most of our new immigrants in the UK (including workers and academics), those phenomena are not new at all: so much so that when Agatha Christie herself wanted to describe shoddy architecture, she made mention of a Hungarian hunting lodge. Bulgarians in a profoundly self-deprecating manner speak of 'bulgarskata prostotiya,' 'Bulgarian simplicity' – as if anyone could offer proof that the 'average' Dane or Briton is more 'complex' than the average Bulgarian (if such concepts have any meaning at all in the first place).

However, what is important here is not to advocate cultural neurosis, or a regional spin on anti-Western resentment and nationalism. A truly authentic answer to Western disdain or our own self-orientalising tendencies would be the celebration of our own *difference* from what constitutes the North-Western European mainstream, by way of embracing a multifaceted critical attitude to our own historical heritage. This should allow for solidarity with every single actor of good will in the West and would also allow us to present ourselves with a pride that has been lacking to a large extent in the last thirty years. Pride in suffering and oppression is naturally something that Black thinkers know much about: hence my insistence that the African experience is very relevant for us.

Radical History as an identity builder in Eastern Europe

Eastern European epistemologies with wider and especially global influence have been few and far between. Successful meta-theories or popular commentaries on the human condition that emanate from our region have been truly rare. Eastern Europe has *not* been the ground source for major world religions, and has not generally excelled in philosophy (our record is better when it comes to the hard sciences, and also literature, music, and art in general).

An obvious exception to our relatively inconspicuous existence in the global history of ideas has happened at the intersection of Marxist theory and practice: Lenin, Trotskiy, Dunevskaya, Lukacs, Djilas have not only managed to alter the course of history within Eastern Europe but also provided the impetus for global

applications of the vanguard (Bolshevik) party (from the PRC through North Korea and non-Communist South Korea to Taiwan at least as an organisational principle for parties such as the KMT), and Eurocommunism and Western Marxisms (in the case of Lukacs). Original liberal, libertarian and conservative thinkers have been less numerous in the region, and even 'perennialist philosohies' of the ultra right that are so fashionable in today's Eastern Europe, originated in France, Switzerland and Italy (Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, and Julius Evola are to blame for Putin's court philosopher Alexander Dugin and the Jobbik-enamoured 'perennialist thinkers' that hail from Debrecen in Southern Hungary today). In a curious way, no major new religion ever sprang up from our wider region: Hussites or Transylvanian Unitarians have not become important players in spiritual fields of human imagination, and Eastern Orthodoxy had also been largely a Byzantine invention.

A notable recent exception to that general rule has been the world of the Satmar rabbinical dynasty that grew out of a minute community under Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum and has managed to attract a significant following in the US with its message of celebrating both age old Judaic tradition *and* the world and customs of 19th century pre-industrial Satmar. This is an example of an ossified knowledge structure that consciously disengages from its immediate environment but one, which has provided solace for victims of specifically US kinds of social and psychological alienation for its followers. I claim this as most of Joel Teitelbaum's *hassidim* in the United States were not survivors of his own original *kahal* in Satmar but *baal tshuva*, new converts, from various secularised and semi-secularised strata of US Jewry (most with some links to the Eastern European region though).

Eastern Europe's sometimes insular epistemologies and exclusivist public ethos has come to light recently with the refugee crisis and the Hungarian, Slovak, Slovene, and Polish reaction to it – also highlighting the dangers implicit in historically focussed world views. History and historical world views are thus capable of exerting both benign psychological influence amid the terror of global capitalist accumulation and its onslaught on human integrity (as in the case of Satmar in the US that provides comfort and identity amid a hyper-competitive and thus dehumanised environment – as a matter of fact Satmar is also well known for its kindly gestures towards Palestinians everywhere) or, as harbingers of extreme inhumanity politically (as in the case of the use of history in the region's refugee crisis by the region's governments in 2015).

Simon Winder's *Danubia* is probably the most accessible popular work on Central and Central-Eastern European (Habsburg) history that appeared in print in this decade. Winder sums up the dangers of History in CEE thus:

> The extraordinarily toxic legacy of the Empire's obsession with linguistics, archaeology, ethnography, sigillography, numismatics, cartography and so on, makes me feel in my darker moods, that the spread of these subjects and the use to which they were put was nothing but a disaster for Central Europe and that academics more than anyone else are (with help from priests) one of the greatest villains. Indeed, in comparison with academics, the politicians and military men were mere puppets, with even Hitler simply a disgusting by-product of various Viennese nationalist and scientific teachings. / The stakes

> have been so high because each linguistic group has obsessively picked over its past not merely out of a wish to entertain itself with fancy-that facts about ancestors, but to use it as the key weapon in establishing its ascendancy over other groups (Winder, 2013: 5-6).

Winder seems somewhat naive, or averse to theory, when he ascribes such powers to the ancillary subjects of History or to History itself. After all, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner spent significant parts of their respective oeuvres on explaining the structural causes for why fervent nationalisms had to appear exactly in CEE (and why History and historians often had to be conjurers of myths) (Hobsbawm, 2012; Gellner, 2008).

However, although it is hard to neatly tell apart and separate narratives from myths (if not on the basis of forensic factual truths), and although our former convictions have waned in the sense that the 'scientific method' may be demarcated easily from myth-making due to classical Marxist understandings about the nature and laws of History; and although our general positivist outlook has been shattered and questioned by numerous post-modernist takes, it is still important to recognise that all narratives are *not* equal in their causal strengths, in their intellectual outlook, and in their capacity to act as tools, especially in relation to any praxis that takes as its reference point, the disenfranchised. Few historians in Eastern Europe have retained any interest in the fate of working class people, agricultural labourers, (especially lower class) women, the unemployed and the precariate in our region after 1989. Pride in striving, effort, and suffering is more difficult to achieve than pride in the glitzy past of regional capitalism but ultimately, it will be more rewarding and decidedly more realistic.

Corporate tyrannies and the global imperative to avoid them

I claim that in order for Eastern European epistemologies to revitalise and regain strength, it is central to reconnect with conceptions of class as well as any other conceptual framework that may be of use to agendas of emancipation, as opposed to 'weapons establishing ascendancy.' In a new kind of humility, it may be important to reconnect with African labour movements and with the social science that explains them, but in this case in the new and unfamiliar role of recipient. African social thought has largely been triggered by the colonial and neo-colonial condition with its economic, social, political and cultural implications. Their insight into how colonialism works may enrich not only social science but also social action and activism.

The historical focus that characterises our own Eastern European epistemologies and world views, may furnish us not only with narrative strengths in the sense of art, as in the case of high literature, but also with analytical tools to address problems of social change. The first source, as always, should be closest to home: it should pour from our own historical experience. Africa's neo-colonial past and present may offer us a parable on how corporate capitalism destroys societies: indeed as Africa's extraction economies and low skilled industries thrive under systems of

corporate tyranny, governments there act as literal agents of the representatives of transnational capital. This landscape may act as potent warning to the historically conscious: corporate tyranny is one possible scenario for the future of Eastern Europe.

Examples that draw exactly such a startling picture of the future abound already. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which has been in the news for months in early 2016, is thought to include the possibility of corporations' suing national governments when the latter's regulations harm the former by incurring 'lost profit.' Such a right, when given to corporations, would undermine the ability of national governments, intergovernmental organisations and also the EU's supranational agencies to resist the *diktats* of capital, as is the general rule in Africa. Thus, I claim that it is not in some distant or remote future where a structural convergence of Central-Eastern Europe's largely semi-peripheral economies and the peripheral economies of Africa may occur. Given the accelerated rate of change associated with the 21st century, this may happen much sooner than we are wont to think. Studying African social thought of the 1980s or Gramscian African thinkers of the early 2000s (such as Usman Tar) should not be viewed as a weird antiquarian occupation or an exotic indulgence: it should have direct implications for our very own social theory.

Endre Sik[2] (Shiik)'s scholarship on Africa has been much ridiculed recently in Eastern Europe and beyond, for serving an obvious ideological purpose as it had set the tone for Soviet African Studies for generations – as if the *Cambridge History of Africa* served no ideological purpose beyond the love of knowledge for knowledge's sake... However, expository, exotic and antiquarian interests that manifest in superbly meticulous studies are also there for us to celebrate and build on, as immediate forerunners of a possible new Eastern European Africa scholarship: in Hungary Gabor Bur, Istvan Kende, Gyozo Lugosi, and Mihaly Sarkany's works on History, Security, and Social Anthropology in Africa have provided ample exposure to movements of emancipation already, on the African continent. On that basis, it would be a befitting and rather grand task for today's generation to show how in the brave new neo-colonial world of global capitalism, 'the bell tolls also for us' – while providing us with tools that in the Marxian sense, might help us shape our own identity, and form our own consciousness.

A note on our current state of knowledge

Naturally, all this has yet to amount to quantifiable, neat, positivist descriptive analysis within the framework of the author's long term research agenda. At this stage, we are armed with a recognition, a number of metaphors, and the notion that our sensibilities in Eastern Europe and within the Central-Eastern European sub-region, should

[2] Not to be mistaken with the contemporary Hungarian sociologist, Endre Sik. Shiik comes from the Russian transciption of his name since he worked until the mid 1940s in the Soviet Union. He is the author of the 4-volume *History of Black Africa*. He was the founder of the Soviet scholarship on Africa. See: Matusevich, (2003).

realign with important work that has been done and is being done, in the global South, notably including Africa. Quantitative analyses of the convergence between Eastern Europe and Africa and the comparative uncovering of their respective political economies may come at a later stage in this process. By way of presenting parallels, this article hopes to increase appreciation of an understudied and almost forgotten branch of human inquiry (African radicalism) and points out how engagement with that branch may reinvigorate our own receptivity, sensitivity and difference. The material for this article has largely been based on the author's research for his forthcoming monograph *Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria* (Mayer, 2016) where a reassessment of 20th century Marxist theory in that country is supplied. The lessons of that research included how Marxism in Africa did not represent a rootless foreign ideology, but from the 1960s onwards, presented adequate analyses, and supplied answers and alternatives, to the ever more startling realities that African intellectuals had to confront. The claim of my present article is similar: While it is natural that radical analysis has to spring out of the analysis of local conditions in any given region, it is also necessary to engage with theory produced elsewhere, to make use of comparative opportunities and a plethora of analytical ideas that originate in another region of the world. Specifically, this article also identifies a problem of attitudes in Eastern Europe where self-negation in the intellectual sense has been internalised to such a degree that it makes sense for us to re-engage with the very notions of pride and dignity. Especially under conditions of suffering and dislocation, this is very difficult. In this sense especially, it has tremendous value for us to learn to engage with what Africa has to offer in the vein of African radical movements for emancipation. Today, the emancipation of the Eastern European social scientist and humanities scholar happens mostly by way of individual mimicry and adjustment when subtle shades of accommodation to Western demands are self-engineered by participants. This is exactly the way of the colonial subject, uncovered by Frantz Fanon at the onset of Algerian independence half a century ago. Today, the realisation that Eastern Europe is under neo-colonial exploitation triggers ultra-right reactions exactly because of the lack of awareness for global parallels and the marked lack of global solidarity that characterises our region to a unique degree. It is the recognition of this article that we may discover ourselves in the image of today's and yesterday's radical African, and that such a recognition will help us regain not only our own solidarity and humanity but also our self-respect and pride.

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ATTILA GULYÁS *

Subjective Well-being and work – a Brief Review on International Surveys and Results

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Abstract

The research and policy impacts of subjective well-being (SWB) have gained more emphasis in the last decade as international agencies became aware of its importance. Governments have realised that besides the improvements of the economy, the overall life satisfaction of citizens are influenced by multiple other factors. An important part of SWB is work related well-being – often referred to simply as work satisfaction. The nature of work has changed a lot in the recent decades due to immense technological development, more people are behind desks than ever and in general the structure and policies of huge companies have evolved as well. Simply put: life has changed substantially, especially for white-collar workers. The way how people perceive work has also changed, hence the structure of work satisfaction is also different. This paper aims to give an overview on results in this domain and to highlight some possible directions in future research. First the paper gives an overview on SWB and the related research methodologies. Then some current international surveys are briefly described that may be used for SWB related research and finally recent results on work related well-being are shown and some research questions are presented.

Keywords: subjective well-being, work-related well-being, work satisfaction.

A brief overview of subjective well-being[1]

Happiness is more than money – Easterlin's paradox

How well a country performs could be measured by many indicators in many ways. The simplest, thus most often used indicators are pure economic indicators like overall GDP, GDP per capita, annual GDP growth or budget balance measures. These are measures demonstrating the output of the economy, the wealth of a nation giving an overall indicator about the country. In their simplicity they only indicate how well the country does in the economic sense as a whole, yet it does not really say much about how well-off the country's residents are. This weakness of purely economic measures was already recognised recognized in the late 1960s[2], yet even today, the leading comparison of countries is still based on these robust, yet not necessarily 'social' indicators[3].

The most important results emphasising this lack of correlation was that of Richard A. Easterlin analysing data in of the USA and other countries spanning several decades (Easterlin, 1974). While some results did support the intuitively positive relationship between wealth and happiness, some have shed light on interesting phenomena. Within the country the basic positive relationship was clearly presented by results, but cross-country comparisons didn't allow such straight forward conclusions. The difference in happiness between richer and poorer countries was not by far as emphasised as in case of people within the country. A similar phenomenon was observed in longitudinal data: despite the massive GDP (and thus income) growth, happiness did not increase proportionally in the US between the 1940s and the 1970s. The main conclusion derived from this – namely that the happiness of residents does not increase systematically with economic growth – later became known as the Easterlin Paradox. In his work Easterlin raised numerous important arguments trying to point at other directions in explaining this phenomenon. Some of his concerns were related to the concept and methodology of happiness measurements, but he also raised numerous points related to the behaviour and perception model of humans used by economists. He underlines that considering the differences in social experiences, underlying social norms and other non-economic features for richer and poorer classes and for different countries in general it is vital to understand the differences in happiness.

Later research however has led to interpret Easterlin's results differently – basically further agreeing with the points Easterlin raised about the need for further considering social factors, but mainly falsifying Easterlin's conclusion (Ruut

[1] I would like to thank the MTA TK "Lendület" RECENS research group at the Hungarian Academy of Science for the support of this work.
[2] One may refer to Robert Kennedy's historic speech of 18 March 1968
[3] In 2007 this was the prime topic of a conference entitled 'Beyond GDP' focusing on '... clarify which indices are most appropriate to measure progress, and how these can be best integrated into the decision-making process and taken up by public debate' (see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/background_en .html). The initiative has fulfilled its goals through its report in 2013 (European Commission, 2013) which served as a basis for improving various key indicators in the European statistical system.

Veenhoven & Vergunst, 2014). The argument of Veenhoven et.al. has been about the existence of positive correlation between happiness and GDP[4], yet the most important conclusion that can be drawn from their work was that indeed, there is much more to well-being than simple GDP, or income per head. In their work Veenhoven et al. have basically tried to control for the other factors influencing happiness to be able to clean the effect of GDP. For example one of their findings was regarding Easterlin's explanation of that happiness didn't increase over time in the US despite the massive GDP growth. Easterlin used this data to question the correlation between happiness and nation wealth, yet in this attempt – as pointed out by Veenhoven et al. – he basically supressed all other variables possibly explaining this phenomenon. One contributing factor in this case was the effect of the deterioration of family life clearly observable in this period.

Similar findings were reported by by other studies as well. In a more technical approach it was highlighted that absolute (log) household income is indeed correlated with well-being (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008). It is interesting to note though that if the correlation gets weaker in higher GDP regions, taking the log of the income could partially mask this decrease of correlation. Supporting this, Diener and Suh also find that this correlation disappears at richer countries (Diener & Suh, 2000). To put it another way, there is a clear, but diminishing marginal effect of GDP on happiness – above a certain limit of household income.



Figure 1: Life satisfaction (Cantril ladder 2010 – see later) and GDP/capita (source: Fig 12.3 (OECD, 2011))

[4] In his works Veenhoven presents numerous convincing results to support his claim. However it cannot be overemphasised that the measurement methodology and the data available to Easterlin was by far not as advanced as newly developed happiness measures. He used a 3 level scale to measure happiness and in other questions, plus the other items were measured by asking about best and worst life possibilities and not happiness explicitly. In his study he also reflected on these drawbacks of the happiness measurements used.

The concept of subjective well being

So while main economic indicators were still the prime measures used, social scientists have designed various measures to monitor people's well-being or satisfaction (Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1985). Well-being as a whole however is a far more complex phenomenon than simple satisfaction. The term used to capture its complexity is 'subjective well-being' (SWB) and it is widely used since its proposal by Diener (Diener, 1984). As Diener – following numerous earlier studies spanning decades of related work – suggests, subjective well-being is defined through multiple dimensions. It is not only about satisfaction with life in general, but also includes the everyday positive and negative effects people experience in various domains of their lives (this adds the 'subjective' element). A brief definition given in a later work summarises the notion perfectly: 'a person's cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life' (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003). While the formalisation and operationalisation can take various directions this brief definition describes the notion of SWB the most accurately[5].

Life evaluation consists of people's perceptions on various domains of their lives and some general questions about life. Starting with general satisfaction about life, life choices and perspectives the questions may narrow down to several areas. This may include evaluations of income, housing, job satisfaction, environment and other factors.

Positive and negative affect include the emotions people experience during everyday life. Usually such questions focus on recent events, as these have an immediate effect on emotional well-being It is important to note that positive and negative affect are not complimentary – the absence of positive affect does not necessarily mean negative affect and vice versa. Moreover people are more sensitive to negative affect in the short run than to positive affect. However, people can make an judgement to describe the overall 'balance' of these affects (Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999), so it is indeed possible to use a single 'affect balance' measure.

To distinguish life evaluation and affect, well-being can also be classified temporarily. 'Hedonic' well-being refers to short term well-being, mainly associated to affect and 'eudaimonic'[6] well-being is used in the sense of long term well-being, associated with life evaluation. Here the terms of life evaluation and affect are used.

Besides these subjective measures the objectively measurable items – related to the domains of life evaluation – are also prime topics in SWB research. Often these are referred to as 'quality of life' (QoL) measures. These include – among others – income, housing properties, social status, employment status and conditions, environmental conditions and health. These factors are important when deriving policy implications from SWB data and when country level comparison is done – also these are the domains that can be improved with various policies.

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[5] Of course it is important to note that the logic of well-being is based on the human needs. The easiest way to approach this is referring to Maslow's pyramid of needs (Maslow, 1943). Although numerous works on the field of psychology discuss well-being (for a good review see Diener's various works referred here), the main focus of this paper is rather on measurement aspects and results.

[6] This may also found as 'eudamonic' or 'eudemonic' well-being in the literature.

Often the literature refers to 'happiness' as 'well-being' which is a misconception in some sense. Happiness – being a much 'older' notion in both practical and psychological sense – may mean multiple things. It can be used to describe a temporal emotional state as a result of recent affections and also a general emotional state resulting from more stable factors. On the contrary well-being tends to be referred to being more 'stable' over time as it is influenced by the individual's affect, environment and future expectations as well. To avoid confusion in this paper the notion of happiness is avoided – unless used explicitly in a referred work.

Similarly the literature also uses 'quality of life' in relation to subjective well-being. As mentioned above quality of life is usually meant the exogenous factors – income, environment, housing, job etc. – of well-being rather than the perception of well-being. Quality of life data and its importance will be discussed later and for clarity reasons, it is always specified if QoL questions are discussed.

Measurement methods and scales of subjective well-being

Defining a proper measure for well-being has been a prime topic already in the 1960s, even though the proper theoretical foundations were not present at the time. Mostly the scientific community attributed people's well-being directly to their happiness. One of the first widely known works on this field (in sociology) was done by Wilson, discussing the relationship between social factors – age, gender, family status, income etc. – and happiness (Wilson, 1967). At this point time happiness was considered not too different from the notion defined in Greek philosophy, hence the conclusions drawn from data were vague from the vantage point of today's approach. Wilson has given a clear description on an 'average happy person' by his social traits: young, healthy, well-educated, extroverted, well-paid, religious, married, having high self-esteem and work morale. His second main conclusion concerned the notion of happiness itself – namely that it didn't develop too much.

Along Wilson's measurement there were numerous scales used in the 1960s and 1970s using both single item and multi-item measures. The single item scales mostly aimed at asking about happiness in general ('how happy do you feel' or similar) and multi item scales were measuring several aspects of satisfaction and emotional affect (for a brief review, see (Diener, 1984). The drawbacks of some of these was that they were developed not in a generic way, but to investigate the relationship of satisfaction and a specific area.

A relevant measure from this era is Cantril's Self-anchoring Striving Scale, or as simply known – due to the 'ladder' in the question – as Cantril's ladder (Cantril, 1965)[7]. This scale basically asks for a general life evaluation (abstracted to steps on a ladder, which allows personal interpretations of course) for the present and the close future on a 10 level scale. Although it is simple and tempting to be used, it does not uncover the underlying factors, yet when this is used the goal is in general not the discussion of these, just an overall indication of life satisfaction. Hence it has limited use, but due to its robustness it is still in practice today – used as a measure for life satisfaction.

[7] See the appendix on the questions in Cantril's ladder.

The first really widely used measure – also used nowadays as remarked later – is the 'Satisfaction With Life Scale' (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991). It is a very simple measure directly asking respondents about life satisfaction on different aspects per se[8]. This multi-item measure consists of 5 questions each of which can be evaluated on a 7 level scale, resulting in 35 points in total. The responses are equally weighted (points are summed up practically) to produce the SWLS index of a person that is classified to seven categories. Diener et al. claim that the factor loadings in the SWLS scale components are relatively even (0.61-0.84) and the overall SWLS correlations with other previous measures are also significant.

These measures have been used to survey well-being in various countries with different economies and social structures. The results obviously being different, it may be important to investigate the impact of the inter-country differences on the validity of the measures. There are numerous points where asking about satisfaction and happiness in different countries may lead to significantly different opinions when controlling for other factors. Two important factors are the wording of the survey questions[9] and the approach to happiness in the given culture.

Diener has reported on studies exploring samples of Asian students reporting on happiness (Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995). He has found that indeed in the Asian sample, different SWB was reported compared to USA samples. Ouwenheel and Veenhoven on the other hand have analysed several studies and concluded that the differences in SWB are indeed due to the well-being provided by the states to their citizens (Ouweneel & Veenhoven, 1991). Two decades later Veenhoven revisited this question with more recent data and he reached similar conclusions (Ruut Veenhoven, 2012). Hence here we may thus assume that the SWB results are not significantly distorted by the differences in the cultural background of Western countries and post-socialist countries.

General findings on subjective well-being and social factors

In one of their works Diener et al. have numerous findings about SWB (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). They concluded based on results from the preceding decades that a substantial part of an individual's SWB is attributable to the personality and it is also heritable. Naturally both social and cultural environment are contributing factors, but they also conclude that those pursuing materialistic goals attain lower SWB levels due to the interference of these goals with other prosocial and self-actualisation goals. The latter conclusion also supports Easterlin's paradox on the micro scale.

Further evidence on the questionable direct effect of income was presented as well (Diener & Suh, 1997). In general the time series of the US, Japan and France have shown very small deviations between 1946 and 1990 (slightly decreasing for the US in this period). The data obtained did not cover the entire period, so the post-world war effects were not observable for France and Japan, but a few data points

[8] See the appendix on the questions in the SWLS scale
[9] There are many connotations of 'happiness' in different languages. It may mean hedonistic happiness, or it may be closer to satisfaction.

show a recovery from a lower level of SWB (as the war waged on in the country as well as opposed to the US).

Diener and Suh also investigate other findings of Wilson finding that religion explains only a very small ratio of SWB and is probably correlated to the cognitive affect and marriage is – as expected – positively correlated to SWB. An important conclusion corresponds to the age effect, which was again put into question. First of all, the differences in the emotional sensitivity of the elderly was not considered at all in the SWB measurements, hence the positive (and negative) affect scores were not properly calculated. As with age the affect's influence on satisfaction decreases, the measured SWB will also decrease unless the data is controlled for this effect. Moreover, a generic satisfaction measure (overall satisfaction) did not support Wilson's conclusion that a happy person is young.

Gender didn't have a remarkable effect on SWB either (although it is important to note that affects are more intense in the case of women than men), neither does intelligence. In terms of job satisfaction an opposite relation was suggested by Diener and Suh, namely that people more satisfied with their lives tend to have higher satisfaction in their work as well. Education was also correlated to SWB, but in this case probably the direct effects of being educated (higher income and social status) have to do more with the increased SWB.

Another interesting phenomenon about income was noted by Kahneman and Deaton, who concluded based on their results, that there is a given limit of income for emotional affect and hence for SWB. Under a certain income negative emotional well-being is experienced, but above that limit positive affect is not observable either, only the negative affect diminishes. This subjective limit is individual and relates to the minimal needs of emotional well-being (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). This is similar to the figure of GDP and overall satisfaction, in the lower regions of income a clear correlation can be observed, but as it reaches a certain level, it largely decreases, or disappears even. All this evidence shows that although the Easterlin's paradox is not unfounded, the question of happiness or well-being is indeed much more complex than how much is in one's wallet.

The relationship between the components of SWB is also interesting. Ideal measures would be completely independent, but of course as was already noted this is not the case, as affect does have an effect on life satisfaction and vice versa. According to OECD data (collected between 2006 and 2010) life satisfaction, positive and negative affect are also correlated (OECD, 2013a)[10]. As it is expected, negative and positive affect are negatively correlated, which is in line with the results of Kahneman and Deaton. More importantly though, life satisfaction is also correlated to positive and negative affect, but the correlation is weak[11]. Hence although they are not ideal measures, they are not correlated to the extent to significantly distort results.

Besides the life satisfaction, affect and social variables, the objective and perceived quality of life measures are also very important. Quality of life measures

[10] Data used in this analysis derived from using Gallup World Poll results. The positive and negative affect was obtained by creating indices from questions related to affect and life satisfaction was measured using the Cantril ladder.

[11] The correlation is ~0.23 between life satisfaction and affect (both positive and negative)

include numerous items (some of which may also be classified as social factors): direct financial status, housing, living environment, health conditions, work conditions etc. Some of these items can be measured objectively providing a good basis for comparison, but their perception is also often recorded in the surveys. Using the perceived QoL data enables a more accurate mapping of factors influencing overall life satisfaction as well.

In terms of international surveys the importance of quality of life measures is that it provides basis for the cross-country comparison and also it provides context for interpreting the SWB results in general. When considering a cross-country or cross-regional comparison also generic QoL data can be used – for example information on the average income at a region, regional specifics about the environment and housing conditions. As shown later, numerous relationships were investigated using such data that allowed to establish some general trends and conclusions.

When the QoL data is recorded in the surveys it is often used to create indices – both objective and perceived data. As SWB has a high dimensionality, such indices ease the analysis – of course the structure of the various indices strongly influences the results. It is particularly important in case of cross-country comparisons to make sure that indices with similar meaning are used.

Also temporal and contextual effects are to be taken into account. The best example of this is the effect of major life events (both personal, and ones affecting a huge portion of the population). Such a recent event is the 2008 crisis, which had a clearly measurable effect on SWB (Deaton, 2012; Welsch & Kühling, 2011)[12]. It had a direct effect on income and other social factors (housing, job loss, etc.) that affected the perception of safety and then satisfaction in general.

Contextual effects also include the cultural differences as well. Similarly to the influence of personality the cultural traits also determinants of the structure of SWB. It was found in numerous studies that SWB results differ significantly between different nations (or minorities). While these results can partially be explained by the different economic status of nations and minorities, a key determinant was their culture (Diener et al., 2003).

[12] Deaton has investigated the issue also analysing the stock market and has found that it moves very much together with the SWB results. A reason for this – besides the direct relationship to other economic factors – is that the stock market also 'calculates' future expectations in prices similarly to how such event influences one's life satisfaction and expectations.

Measuring SWB – international surveys

Along with the scientific progress on the issue of well-being, more and more questions about well-being were included in international surveys. Most importantly these surveys aimed at gathering information for comparative analysis of the participating countries. Some major international surveys to mention are the World Value Survey (WVS), the surveys run by OECD, EU sponsored surveys (Eurostat, Eurobarometer and Eurofound surveys), the Gallup World Poll aimed at well-being[13] and the European Social Survey (ESS)[14].

The purpose of these surveys is different, hence the quality-of-life related questions targeted different domains as well. The WVS was indeed focusing on values, so well-being was only lightly emphasised. Surveys by the OECD and Eurostat on the other hand were strongly focusing on SWB, as their purpose was policy oriented. The Gallup World Poll also has a wide scope both in terms of well-being and background variables and the ESS has good coverage on many SWB domains as well. In the following these will be briefly analysed, while their results are briefly discussed. The results will focus on Hungarian data where available.

EU funded surveys

a. Eurobarometer

The Eurobarometer is the earliest survey run including life satisfaction related questions having a long timespan (it has entered into its fifth decade) and was mainly run in EU countries along with the expansion of the EU. Its big advantage is that it is run twice a year, hence very dense longitudinal data are available. The drawback of the survey is that it focuses on opinions and attitudes towards EU related or in general politics related variables, but does not include the variables required for detailed analysis – questions on perceptions and QoL related questions, except for a few basic ones. The survey includes however an explicit question on life satisfaction measured on a 4 level scale (Not satisfied at all, to Very satisfied) that enables a brief longitudinal analysis.

b. Eurostat surveys

Among the other surveys run by the EC, Eurostat focuses on Quality of life indicators in their survey – similarly to OECD, they based their indicators on the recommendations of the Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussi Comission. The first (and so far only)

[13] The Gallup poll is also worth mentioning. It is also referred to in OECD publications and the well-being related research is only a small part of Gallup's activities. Although some results will be referred too, the Gallup World Poll will not be analysed in this paper in detail.

[14] There are of course other initiatives as well about measuring well-being, for example the New Economic Foundation (http://www.nationalaccountsofwellbeing.org/), whose goal is proposing international measures for well-being. However as no longitudinal data is available and there are no details on the samples used (responses collected on-line) it is not considered here.

implementation of these indicators was done in the 2013 EU-SILC[15] survey. The survey itself is being used since 2004 and the last available dataset is dated 2013, the results are gathered by the statistical agencies of the EU member countries.

The SWB module of the survey includes numerous questions about the psychological side of SWB (emotional affect) alongside questions aimed at satisfaction. The psychological questions include questions ranging from anxiety and calmness to more abstract topics – like the meaning of life. Many questions focus on satisfaction with different domains (accommodation, job etc.), but there are only general questions about overall satisfaction on the domain. Hence this survey will not be used further.

c. European Quality of Life Surveys

The EQLS survey is run by Eurofound and is a European cross-national household survey having been run in 3 waves so far. Run every 4 years, it was started in 2003 and it is at its next run in 2016. It contains complex question blocks on all aspects of subjective well-being putting emphasis on perceived and actual quality of life. The blocks include questions about housing conditions, health conditions, family conditions (and family life), time usage and work-life balance.

Obviously the main focus of the EQLS surveys is a European comparison rather than producing country specific analysis. The results concerning Hungary are in line with the Eurobarometer data for life satisfaction.

The model of subjective well-being in the EQLS consists of 5 areas adding 'psychological functioning' and 'social well-being' to the three commonly mentioned components life satisfaction, positive and negative affect.

World Value Survey (1982-)

One of the earliest international surveys including SWB questions is the World Value Survey (WVS). Already in its first wave of 1982, questions on happiness and satisfaction on various aspects (World Values Survey, 2014) were found. There were in total 6 waves so far with expanding scope as more and more countries joined in. Hungary was present in the first wave (1982), wave 3 (1995-1998) and wave 5 (2005-2009), but did not take part in the other three waves.

The questions concerning satisfaction in the WVS did not follow the structure of the SWB questions as mentioned explicitly. The questions resembled Cantril's ladder – although the formulation of the question didn't mention 'ladder' – asking for satisfaction on a 10 level scale. In the first wave numerous similar questions were raised. They related to past comparisons, future expectations, job satisfaction, household income satisfaction and 'home life' satisfaction (this notion allowed some free interpretations, but it resembled satisfaction with family life). In the following waves however, fewer and fewer questions concerned these matters, leaving only life satisfaction and household income satisfaction in the latest survey of 2014.

[15] SILC refers to 'Statistics on Income and Living Conditions'

On the other hand another important aspect, emotional affect is included in many questions. Happiness is surveyed explicitly, measured on a 4 level scale and on many domains (including job and family). There were always questions regarding the current emotional state of respondents and the affect experienced in the recent past.

So while the questions in the WVS are not completely in line with the structure outlined in the literature, the multi-item scales proposed by Diener et al. can be derived from the survey. Moreover the surveys contain questions mapping the contributing factors – namely surveying the importance of the various fields – hence more complex relations can be directly investigated.

The biggest drawback of the WVS is that it does not survey quality of life measures. So while happiness and satisfaction can indeed be investigated, there is no good way to really see connections to exogenous or some social variables (social status).

Currently the WVS is preparing its seventh wave, which is scheduled to be surveyed in the period of 2017-2018. Although the questionnaire has not been finalised yet, it is already clear, that SWB and happiness will be among the topics of the survey.

European Social Survey (2002-)

The European Social Survey (ESS) is cross national survey run biennially since 2002 in European (not necessary EU) countries (plus Israel). The surveys focus on many areas that are mainly related to attitudes (various domains including politics, media, human values etc.), behaviour (media consumption) and well-being. These topics were common in each round, but besides them there was always a specific topic recorded in a 'rotating' block of questions – these include attitudes towards immigration, welfare state, personal and social well-being etc.

The SWB block is in the 'core' block of the survey, which means that it was included in each round of the survey – currently included in 7 waves already. Both life satisfaction and happiness is recorded explicitly in the survey using an 11 level scale (0 to 10). Besides these perceptions there are also a number of QoL related questions and attitudes towards other domains relevant for SWB. The 'human values' block of this questionnaire provides better insight on the structure of well-being as well, as it is composed of queries on the importance of various life domains.

Considering the questions present in the ESS, its frequency and the range of responders (covering a relatively stable set of European countries), the ESS provides a solid dataset for investigating SWB from various aspects.

OECD Surveys (2011-)

Well-being and life satisfaction has been measured specifically by the OECD only since the past decade[16] – as scientific and mainstream interest started focusing more

[16] The research of well-being is conducted by the Better Life Initiative within OECD. The framework used in well-being research was established based on results produced in 2009 together with the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (including Joseph E.

and more on these issues. The research conducted by the OECD focuses entirely on well-being, hence questions spanning all domains may be found in the OECD survey. A considerable part of the survey focuses on environmental and natural issues – this is due to the interest of OECD in sustainable development in general and is indeed gaining importance based on latest results.

The OECD framework is show in Figure 2 (from an earlier OECD publication), this already outlines the complexity of the OECD surveys. Different domains of well-being are described along 11 indicators in total, each consisting of multiple items. These include both objective and subjective measures, included in both self-reported and exogenous (country specific) variables.

There were three reports published by the OECD (OECD, 2011, 2013b, 2015) spanning the OECD countries with their data. In this aspect the OECD data is much broader than the VWS, yet since this initiative is relatively new, no long-term analysis may be done using that data[17]. Being an OECD country, Hungary has participated in each wave.



Figure 2: the OECD framework for measuring well-being (OECD, 2011)

Stiglitz – a strong critic of Easterlin's paradox – and Amartya Sen), also known as the Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussy Commission.

[17] Note however that another study of the OECD gives a broad longitudinal analysis on well-being (van Zanden et al., 2014) – obviously summarising only the evolution of living conditions (material and environmental)

This framework (and the structure of the survey) resembles that of the EQLS surveys in the aspect of individual well-being. The different types of capital mentioned in this framework are an improvement compared to the EQLS model, as they are treated as exogenous variables. Hence comparisons can be made not only based on perceived QoL variables.

The results of the SWB measurements are quantified in the 'Better Life Index', which basically implements this framework. The index consists of indices covering the areas identified by the framework: housing, income, jobs, community, education, environment, civic engagement, health, life satisfaction, safety and work-life balance. This covers the data that is required to investigate most SWB questions. The weakness of this framework lies in the complete absence of emotional affect (neither positive nor negative affect are surveyed) – this omits investigating hedonic SWB completely, but gives a wide range of QoL data to use.

Results on subjective well-being – trends in the past few decades

In the aforementioned surveys subjective well-being is measured in several ways in different surveys along multiple dimensions. Measurements have been using various scales (4, 7, 10 or 11 level) and the dimensions surveyed covered different areas with different weights depending on the purpose of the survey. Most notably, the quality of life variables have been treated differently. Here a short analysis is given on SWB trends in the past few decades with specific emphasis on results in Hungary in comparison to the other Visegrád countries – Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. All of them being post-socialist countries they serve as a solid base of comparison.

First of all it is important to define important periods in Hungary. The first period before 1990 signifies the last decade of the communist regime; then the years 1990-1995 correspond to the recession after the regime change. The years following 1995 were characterised by a boost in the economy and this period ended in 2004 upon joining the EU. The next period are the first 4 years in the EU until the crisis in 2008. The crisis years were 2008-2010, which are followed by the cycles of the current government (2010-).

So, to cover these periods it is interesting to look at the trends obtained from various databases (mainly ESS, WVS, and databases of SRI[18]) showing results in Hungary. These numbers show an almost constant decline in SWB data since the regime change (the data in 1999 probably being an outlier – this unlikely change can probably be explained by sampling issues).

[18] SRI refers to TÁRKI



Figure 3: Mean life satisfaction in Hungary and the other Visegrád countries measured on a 11 level scale from various databases[19] – ESS, WVS (R. Veenhoven, 2016) and OECD data (Better Life Index[20])

These data show a steady, very slowly descending SWB value, which didn't change significantly until the 2008 crisis and the 2010 elections (after which it reached its negative peak). More interesting results can be seen if happiness data are also taken into account. The data in the following figure are from the WVS (on-line accessible) and we can draw somewhat different conclusions from these results – a reason for the difference could be the sampling methodology.

The other Visegrad countries did much better in the 2000s and are rapidly approaching the SWB level of the US. As the data shows, all these countries did benefit from joining the EU, in each country the SWB increased steeply after 2004. As expected the world crisis had its effect on them as well, with Poland being the only exception where the constant rise did not halt even temporarily.

[19] The data used here were obtained from the World Happiness Database using 11 level Life Satisfaction questions. See http://www1.eur.nl/fsw/happiness/hap_nat/nat_fp.php?cntry=53&name=Poland&mode=3&subjects=70&publics=4

[20] See http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/hungary/ for this data



Figure 4: Happiness and life satisfaction in Hungary in the WVS data (1981-2009)[21]

The data on happiness show clear differences between the different eras in Hungary before, spanning the second economy decade, the regime change, and the pre/post European Union membership. Unfortunately no data is available from the post-crisis period in the WVS.

Starting from the last decade of the communist regime, Hungary was indeed the 'merriest barrack' among the post-socialist countries, with around 70% of people reporting being very happy or quite happy, and the same ratio reporting a life satisfaction of at least 6. After the change of the regime the immediate recession is clearly observable in the data, people reporting decreased happiness and much lower life satisfaction. Then life satisfaction moved together with happiness with the only exception of the 1994-1998 period, when despite the continuous decrease in life satisfaction, the happiness levels rose. In general the medium-term effects of the transformation from a socialist (with higher social and job security) to a capitalist-liberal (weakening of the welfare state) regime can be observed in life satisfaction data.

[21] The data presented here were obtained from the on-line data analysis of the WVS accessible at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp

The post EU period brought an improvement in the economy increasing both financial and social security and increasing life satisfaction as well to the post-regime change level.

To provide a short summary, we can conclude that in Hungary the collapse of the communist regime had the strongest effect on SWB among the recent major events in the country's history. Comparing Hungary to the other Visegrád countries based on this data we may see that EU membership did not have the expected positive impact on Hungary in this group. It is also notable that the GDP per person has increased the least in Hungary since 2004[22]

International results on work related well-being

Importance of work related well-being

Usually when referring to work related well-being, the objective outcomes of high job satisfaction are considered: the work output. While it has been proven before, high job satisfaction does indeed have a positive effect on productivity (Bryson, Forth, & Stokes, 2014; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001), such management oriented issues are not in the focus of this paper.

As was discussed in the previous sections, subjective well-being is composed of many factors, work satisfaction being one of them. Obviously since people spend at least a third of their day at work, the well-being during this period is a key contributing factor to overall well-being. In fact as Heliwell et. al found, the social aspects of work have a comparatively strong influence on overall life satisfaction (Heliwell & Huang, 2005).

Hence here not only 'job satisfaction' is addressed, but also its components as for example the social aspects of a job (responsibility perceived during work, creativity required for work) are also related to higher needs and influence life satisfaction directly.

The last few decades brought various changes on the field of labour. Not only did the employment rate increase in most OECD countries even despite the 2008 crisis (OECD, 2011), but there were huge changes in the contents and nature of work due to the boost in technology. The ratio of blue collar workers and jobs has decreased while the demand for skilled white collar workers has increased[23]. Besides this change another common phenomenon is related to globalisation – that is outsourcing and off-shoring white collar work. It has numerous impacts on the way of working, on people interacting each other and also on the role of work perceived by the worker.

The most important technical change that made this available was of course the introduction of computers into various fields of work. This completely changed the work done by the white collar workers and indirectly impacted on blue collar workers

[22] Based on World Bank data.
[23] In the case of the US the ratio of skilled white collar workers has doubled between 1920-1980 and then increased by another 50% until 2010 (Katz & Margo, 2013).

as well (Marteen Goos, 2013). It is probable that these changes will further speed up in the close future. There were numerous changes in the work and working conditions of white collar workers specifically; the work is less and less routine work, the office may or may not exist due to remote working and also with the sharing economy becoming an ever wider spreading trend (requiring highly developed technological infrastructure) and work contracts have also changed. All these affect how work is perceived by the workers and how it affects everyday life and general well-being, hence the work related well-being structure of white collar workers is an exciting topic.

The importance of work satisfaction and well-being perceived during work can be also demonstrated through its weight in everyday life. As also the WVS data shows, work is the second important domain in life behind family – in the last two decades in Hungary always at least half of the respondents has valued it 'very important' in life (on a 4 level scale) in the WVS surveys.



Figure 5: The importance of various life domains in Hungary using WVS data

Over the past decades work has not lost its second place in this ranking, being significantly more important than friends, leisure time or even religion. Hence it is highly relevant to further investigate the structure of job satisfaction and work related well-being.

Results on work related well-being

Although the main topic of this section is work related satisfaction, the purpose is to raise questions and inspire research about investigating work related well-being of white collar workers. The international surveys described earlier provide a wide range of data regarding work related well-being. Besides a short analysis, a recent study is highlighted here giving a good example on how these issues may be investigated and providing some interesting results.

A recent work by Hajdu and Hajdu presents a concise study on work satisfaction and its components on a European sample using the fifth wave (run in 2010) of the ESS (Hajdu & Hajdu, 2014). The sample size in Hungary in this wave was 521 and the country is ranked in the mid-range for work related satisfaction with the average of 7.21 on a 10 level scale. The authors have used the complete ESS dataset, where all relevant information (active-working responders, who also provided their income) was available (with a total of 15,875 responses used).

In their study Hajdu and Hajdu focused on eudaimonic well-being and consider the emotional affect also in the long term through properties indirectly (e.g. like help received from colleagues). They investigated the effect of objective and perceived (subjective) work properties on work related well-being. The ESS includes numerous questions on both objective and subjective work properties, and surveys the quality of life as well. In the paper the focus is on all these aspects besides numerous work properties – company size, contract type (fixed-term or indefinite), employment category (ISCO code[24]).

The main methodology of the study was OLS regression, but looking at the bivariate correlations between the different aspects of work and work satisfaction is already interesting. The ESS data shows that the variety of work done has the strongest correlation to work satisfaction followed by job security and learning new things during work[25]. These were followed by the help gotten from colleagues, possibility of advancement and influence on the work[26]. Although these correlations are not strong (0.33 being the strongest), it is interesting that health risks, leisure time and the ease of finding a new job were not correlated to work satisfaction (income was not included).

There were three models tested by Hajdu and Hajdu: one containing purely subjective measures, another containing only objective measures and a third one containing all subjective and objective variables. Clearly the subjective work properties have more effect on work satisfaction, with the coefficients being stronger for the properties mentioned before (variety of work, job security and learning new things). Higher income in general brings higher work satisfaction and the negative effect of overtime is due to worse evaluation of subjective work properties. Interestingly the employees at private enterprises are at a disadvantage in work satisfaction compared with governmental employees (despite the higher average income).

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[24] International Standard Classification of Occupations, it was encoded in 10 categories in the survey.
[25] Variety had a coefficient of 0.33 while the others were both around 0.27.
[26] Each three almost head to head with a correlation of 0.23.

Investigating the differential effects[27] shows somewhat different results, here the work-life balance has a strong effect together with work variety and advancement. Work security also has a stronger effect, but surprisingly the effect of flexible working hours is not relevant. Note, that 'flexible working hours' was not analysed in details[28]. Hajdu and Hajdu also compare the Western and Eastern European countries underlining several key differences[29]. Earnings are a much stronger factor in work satisfaction for Eastern European employees followed by the lack of advancement and work-life balance problems.

The data also highlight differences between graduate employees and employees not holding a degree. For degree holders the variety of work and learning new things has more impact on work satisfaction, while income had a higher impact for those without a degree. For our topic the former group is much more interesting as we can assume that degree holders are the group from which white collar workers are recruited. In the following conclusions the studies and surveys reviewed in this paper will be discussed from the vantage point of the impact on white collar workers.

Conclusion

In this paper a brief review was given on subjective well-being and the international surveys that could be used to investigate SWB. A particular focus was work-related well-being, more specifically the role of subjective and objective measures of well-being. The surveys reviewed here contained items focusing on hedonic and eudaimonic subjective well-being as well, hence the most important properties of SWB are well covered. Also they included various countries (mostly European) in the sample, hence cross-country comparisons are also feasible using the databases.

The variety of these surveys can provide insight into various aspects of well-being. The World Value Survey focuses mostly on attitudes towards certain properties of living, describing perception of attitudes, but it is short on quality of life related information.

The EU funded surveys (Eurobarometer, Eurostat, EQLS and ESS) cover wide areas and present a large scale of relevant information: explicit questions on both hedonic and eudaimonic properties SWB, broad QoL overview and often good details on specific SWB fields. Among these surveys the ESS is the easiest to access and already provides a good range of information enabling various topics for analysis. The EQLS gives more detailed QoL information than the other surveys, yet due to

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[27] Assuming that an independent variable jumps from the lowest to the highest category.
[28] In case of when flexibility means that the daily 8 hours of work may be shifted with an hour (from 9-17h to 8-16h), this may not be perceived as something significant as opposed to a flexibility which allows e.g. that some working hours are spread on different workdays to allow other types of activities (family, medical or governmental administration related) to be conducted during working hours.
[29] In Europe in general there is a significant difference in the work satisfaction between Western and Eastern European countries (basically post-socialist countries). It was previously found that although the 'iron curtain' was physically been destroyed, it still exists in terms of work satisfaction (and other properties) (Lelkes, 2003).

the lack of wider SWB blocks (it has blocks on different aspects of SWB) only a general SWB-QoL relationship can be investigated.

The OECD also provides a good framework for SWB research and the current waves already produced interesting results. It is already possible to do comparisons between the different waves, but with further waves it will be a good source for longitudinal studies. Since it includes non-European countries as well, even wider comparisons can be done.

In each of the aforementioned surveys at least some questions related to work-related satisfaction are included. Starting from the simplest explicit question various objective and subjective work properties are surveyed along which the different types of workers can be investigated.

The last few decades brought a change in the work itself as higher and higher proportions of managerial and technical professional work is done in the offices as white collar work. The tools of this work have also changed with technology and the geographic and language barriers are nowadays also disappearing. In these circumstances it is obvious that the attitude to work, the expectations of work and how work influences people's well-being is also changing, hence it is a relevant subject for research.

The data available now in these databases through these surveys can give insight to numerous features of this change. How is work itself valued in life? When deriving satisfaction from work, how important do we consider work-life balance, the advancement we can make in work, the variety of the jobs we do? Do we 'mix' our social life with work more frequently nowadays? How does the relationship between a company and an employee influence the employee's overall SWB?

While these questions have always been relevant, nowadays it will become more and more important to answer them both from managerial viewpoints and from the policy-maker's perspective. It serves so that both the employees' interests in enjoyable work and the companies' interests in a productive working environment can be considered when national governments or the management of companies are formulating work related policies.

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Appendix

The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS)

The following text is authored by Ed Diener and may be downloaded freely (Diener, 2016).

"Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale below, indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding.

7 - Strongly agree
6 - Agree
5 - Slightly agree
4 - Neither agree nor disagree
3 - Slightly disagree
2 - Disagree
1 - Strongly disagree
____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
____ The conditions of my life are excellent.
____ I am satisfied with my life.
____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
____ If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

- 31 - 35 Extremely satisfied
- 26 - 30 Satisfied
- 21 - 25 Slightly satisfied
- 20 Neutral
- 15 - 19 Slightly dissatisfied
- 10 - 14 Dissatisfied
- 5 - 9 Extremely dissatisfied"

Cantril's ladder

The following text describes how Cantril's ladder is implemented in the Gallup World Survey. It may be accessed freely (Gallup Inc, 2016).

"The Cantril Self-Anchoring Scale, developed by pioneering social researcher Dr. Hadley Cantril, consists of the following:

- Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to 10 at the top.
- The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.
- On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time? (ladder-present)

On which step do you think you will stand about five years from now? (ladder-future)"

ZOLTÁN ÁDÁM AND ANDRÁS BOZÓKI *
State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary

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Abstract

Our paper explores how populist radical right-wing forces re-interpret religion, and re-frame Christianity in a non-universalistic, nationalist way to legitimize their rule in Hungary. Populism is considered as an anti-elitist, anti-institutional political behavior that identifies with 'the people', and enhances their 'direct' participation in the political process as opposed to representative government. Populism has an ideological character but in itself does not have a particular ideological content. As a form of government it is based on popular participation with limited public contest for power. Although neither Fidesz nor Jobbik appeared before the electorate as a deeply religious political party, both of them have portrayed themselves as socially conservative, 'Christian' nationalists. This implied a form of institutionalized cooperation between them and the large historical Christian churches. The Orbán regime demonstrates that radical right-wing populism employs a quasi-religious ideological construction through which it attempts to mobilize a wider social spectrum: ethno-nationalism. This surrogate religion offers a nationalist and paganized understanding of Christianity and elevates the concept of ethnically defined nation to a sacred status.

Keywords: populism, radical right, religion, Christianity, nationalism, Hungary.

The relation between right-wing politics and religious world views in Central and Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular has been subject of recent academic research (Enyedi, 2000 and 2003; Máthé-Tóth and Rughinis, 2011; Pirro, 2015; Minkenberg, 2015). This inquiry fits into the long-standing research interest in religious interventions into politics and the role of the church in shaping policy decisions (Koesel, 2014; Grzymala-Busse, 2015). In this paper we argue that although in Hungary the relationship between right-wing populism and religion is of secondary importance only in setting the right-wing political agenda, historical Christian churches take part in providing legitimacy for right-wing populism.[1] We agree with those who argue that Fidesz is not a moderate center-right conservative party any more due to its political radicalization driven by party president and prime minister Orbán (Mudde, 2015). The governing Fidesz party[2], and its far-right (semi-)opposition Jobbik[3], that are both considered to be radical right-wing populist parties, in turn, make religious references to signal their traditional social values and identification with the societal mainstream. While Jobbik tends to mainstream extremism, Fidesz radicalizes the mainstream.

As Hungary has been fairly secularized, right-wing populist parties cannot afford to appear in front of the electorate as political representatives of churches or religious values. Yet, both Fidesz and Jobbik tend to refer to religious values and to seek church support as we will show. As a result, a link between right-wing populism and religion has been created in Hungarian politics in the previous 25 years, following long-standing historical patterns originating from the inter-war period. Meanwhile, liberal and left-wing parties have rather promoted secular ideologies. The divide between leftist/liberal-centrist versus anti-communist parties thus has appeared following the classic secular vs. confessional cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

In the following, first we will present our understanding of political populism. Secondly, we will discuss the rise of right-wing populism in Hungary and its dominance since the end of the 2000s. Thirdly, we will look at the role of religion in right-wing politics and the relation between churches and right-wing parties. Fourthly, before the conclusions, we will discuss the phenomenon of right-wing nationalism as a surrogate religion.

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[1] 'Right-wing' in East Central Europe is defined in cultural rather than economic terms. It usually contains (ethnic) nationalism, social conservatism, elements of religious traditions and historical references to patriotism (Kitschelt, 1992).

[2] Since 2003, the full name of the party: Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance). From 1989 to 1995 the party used the name Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Young Democrats) which was changed to Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Párt (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party) in 1995. As of 1995 the name Fidesz is no longer an abbreviation but a noun.

[3] The full name of the party*: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom* (Movement for a Better Hungary).

1. Populism as politics of under-institutionalization

We consider populism as an anti-elitist political ideology, sentiment, and movement which contrasts the interests of the 'pure people', often presented as oppressed and innocent, with the oppressive, corrupt elite and its foreign allies. Populists favor 'the people' over any other options (Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2007; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). As Edward Shils famously observed, 'according to populism the will of the people enjoys top priority in the face of any other principle, right, and institutional standard. Populists identify the people with justice and morality' (Shils, 1956: 97). As Shils' definition implies, for populists, people's justice, independently from its actual content, is regarded more important than the procedures of the rule of law.

When electorally successful, populist parties come to power and form government. As they initially represent an anti-elitist and anti-institutional stance, their administrative performance may well run into difficulties, and they often under-deliver on promises. Yet, the Fidesz administration in Hungary since 2010 has demonstrated that populist parties can be successful in power, and their administrative performance might well be sufficient to get re-elected. Fidesz managed to combine anti-elitism, nationalism and an anti-EU stance with a pragmatist approach in most policy areas, presenting a charismatic leadership, allegedly defending the national interest and those of ordinary people.

Populism does not have a particular and permanent ideological content but rather an anti-elitist approach to politics that has sought political mass-mobilization and mass-participation in the political process (Laclau, 2005). In this sense populism is truly 'democratic' even if it fails to live up to (or openly rejects) the constitutional norms of liberal democracy. While engaging in mass-mobilization, populist parties tend to manipulate the public discourse by using mass media outlets and advocating their own (often ideologically defined) world views. These ideological contents might be nationalistic, xenophobic, anti-gay, anti-liberal, anti-western or, anti-Semite, anti-Arab, anti-Muslim or, for that matter, even neoliberal: the only criteria is that along the particular ideological content populist political entrepreneurs must be able to perform top-down mass-mobilization. Once this requirement is attained, populism can serve various ideological purposes: it can be nationalist, socialist, semi-fascist or even neoliberal (Bozóki, 2015a). Populism might extend any of these ideas as the unifying and homogenizing idea of the nation. Therefore, populism can be described 'as the militant use of political partisanship for the sake of overcoming pluralism in partisan views and creating a unified opinion, that is to say, by making one partisan view representative of the whole people' (Urbinati, 2014: 109).

Populism in power can be also understood as a way of governance in which power is personalized and its execution organized along personal relations. This has to do with permanent mass-mobilization as a means of popular legitimation: as formal political and administrative institutions need to be sufficiently fluid to allow for mass participation in politics, the organizing principle of power resorts to personal authority. Populism promises broad inclusion of the society but usually end up in producing a new vertical political setting. 'Simplification and polarization produce verticalization of political consent, which inaugurates a deeper unification of the masses under an organic narrative and a charismatic or *Caesarist* leader personating it'

(Urbinati, 2014: 131). Populism represents a certain regression towards pre-democratic politics in an era of mass-democracy when political legitimation is conditioned on the open expression of mass political will. Yet, such a popular legitimation process typically takes place under illiberal or semi-authoritarian conditions that insure the continued power of the ruling populist party of government, while curtailing the opposition's chances to raise an effective electoral challenge.

This illiberal or semi-authoritarian rule is, however, not always easy to maintain.[4] The open expression of political will requires a degree of formal institutionalization of the political process — a condition populist governments have difficulties to cope with once they start losing popularity. In fact, the loss of popularity in case of populist governments easily turns into loss of legitimacy: i.e., the loss of the popular belief that those in government justifiably exercise power even if their policies are harmful for some part of the electorate and hence do not enjoy unanimous approval. In consequence, populist governments typically try to maintain their popularity even at very high long term economic costs. Because of the type of legitimacy populist governments enjoy, such economic policies can still make sense politically on the short run (Sachs, 1989; Dornbusch and Edwards, 1989). This was mainly a characteristic of left wing populism in Latin America that sought popular legitimation through the inclusion of under-privileged social classes. Neoliberal populism, in turn, pursued market reforms and maintained economically sustainable but politically increasingly oppressive policies (Gibson, 1997). None of these regimes led toward liberal democracy.

However, all types of populism tends to rely on charismatic, personalized rule, in contrast to the impersonalized, rational bureaucratic legitimacy characteristic of industrialized Western societies (Weber, 1978 [1922]). Traditional and charismatic legitimacy in a Weberian sense do not require any formal act of mass-approval of power. Populism, on the other hand, is based on formal approval of governance by people, and populist political regimes in this sense belong to the tradition of modernized, secular power. However, as a result of weak political institutions, bureaucratic legitimacy is typically not sufficient to preserve political stability in relatively less developed societies. Therefore, charismatic legitimacy continues to play a dominant role, along with formal mass-approval of power.[5] Hence, populism in a Weberian context can be labeled as an attempt to rationalize, and thus justify, charismatic rule, in which political leaders themselves become institutions and power tends to be personalized.

In other words, populism is a shortcut for establishing the missing element of impersonal institutions. In the absence of sufficiently strong civil societies and political institutions, populism makes up for the missing element of bureaucratic legitimacy.[6]

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[4] For the consequences of under-institutionalization in authoritarian regimes see (Gandhi, 2008).

[5] To be sure, charismatic and traditional legitimacy play a crucial role in mature liberal democracies as well. Identification with particular politicians, their personal characteristics and capability to represent a set of 'sacred values' in a particular society remain to be decisive elements of democratic political life (Williams, 2015; Berrett-Koehler and Hofstede, 1997).

[6] In line with this observation, the critique of technocratic, impersonalized power in modern societies emphasizes the positive role of populism in making society once again the dominant political actor instead of professionalized technocratic elites (Laclau, 2005).

However, a political regime based on a personalized way of governance, lacking rationally organized bureaucratic institutions remains predictably unstable (Horowitz, 1992). This fits our conceptual framework: as personal authority in populism tends to substitute for institutional authority, the loss of popularity of leaders tends to create systemic crises, while the transfer of power from one leader to another is typically a great challenge for a populist government.

Populism uses a direct style of expression to address its followers. It is a politics that opposes intellectual sophistication, it displays a lack of any ambiguity, relies on passion, emotions, and religious worship. In short, populism is the 'politics of faith' (Canovan). Populist leaders are often tempted to rely on the infrastructure of the Church in order to substitute the missing links in the 'infrastructural power'[7] of the state, particularly at times of crises. By 'outsourcing' this infrastructural power to the Church populist leaders can maintain their power over the remnants of state institutions that perform the vital function of coercive power

Modern democratic populism in the post-WWII era can be interpreted as the substitute of totalitarian politics in a period of mass democracies (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969). Modern populism originally appeared in South America where illiberal politics was less discredited than in Western Europe. Modern populists, such as Argentina's Juan D. Perón, managed to combine popular participation with the oppression of the political opposition (Laclau, 1987). As an observer put it, 'populism emerged as a form of authoritarian democracy for the postwar world; one that could adapt the totalitarian version of politics to the post-war hegemony of democratic representation. While it curtailed political rights, populism expanded social rights; and at the same it put limits to the more radical emancipatory combinations of both' (Finchelstein, 2014: 467).

Hence, populist governments are typically 'democratic' in the sense of seeking mass-approval of power, but they build 'illiberal democracies' in which governments are not constrained by the rule of law, and impose a majoritarian approach of governance, systematically exploiting political minorities, and ensuring their reelection by using public resources. They approximate Robert Dahl's 'inclusive hegemony' that allows for limited participation but curtails contest for political power (Dahl, 1971). Some populists tend to use plebiscitarian mass support in order to transform established institutions into more 'flexible' ones. They concentrate power in the hands of the president, limit debates, strike at opponents, and tend to use state resources and state apparatus for campaigning. They seek to deconstruct democratic accountability by eliminating safeguards against arbitrary rule. Other populists favor market economy, they also push for undemocratic constitutional changes and embrace an increasingly personalist leadership style and the practice of rule by 'emergency' decrees. Leaders in both camps tend to dismantle checks and balances, intimidate the opposition, attacking the privately owned media, co-opting civil society organizations and trying to build new 'civic' organizations from the top down (Cf. Mazzuca, 2013; Weyland, 2013). Contemporary populist phenomena include

[7] For distinction between infrastructural and coercive power and a detailed analysis of dimensions of state power see Mann (1984, 1986).

'videocratic forms of popular identification, simplified polarization of public opinion into niches of self-referential creeds, dogmatic radicalization of political ideologies, and the search for a winning leader in the age of the public' (Urbinati, 2014: 133). Populist leaders tend to selectively disregard the norms and procedures of liberal democracy. In Europe, Viktor Orbán's regime is a prime example of similar politics.[8]

2. The populist takeover of Hungary

Strengthening of right-wing populist and extreme nationalist movements across Europe has puzzled democratic theorists and worldwide observers alike as a trend that would seem to be incompatible in the purportedly liberal democracies in which they are taking root. In the nearly three decades since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet bloc, countries in East-Central Europe have struggled to create a democratic legacy and propel their societies towards democratic futures. In Hungary — although the Round-table Talks of 1989 led to a democratic arrangement and nonviolent transition from communism to a market economy and democracy (Bozóki, 2002) — many Hungarians have become disillusioned by their post-transition situation. A sense that democracy was 'stolen' from Hungarians has arisen and that a new transformation must be undertaken if Hungary is to be truly vindicated after centuries of indignity under various imperial powers and then under communism.

A 2009 Pew Research report measured public opinion of democracy and the current state of affairs in post-communist states. Tellingly, 77 per cent of Hungarian respondents indicated their frustration with the way Hungarian democracy had worked within the time period of 1991-2009, and 91 per cent of Hungarians thought that Hungary was not on the right track.[9] Approval of democracy in Hungary immediately following the fall of communism was at 74 per cent, whereas by 2009 this figure had fallen eighteen percentage points to 56 per cent.[10]

In 2010, shortly after these survey results were published, Orbán's nationalist Fidesz party won the elections with an absolute majority, which was translated, due to the disproportionate electoral rules, into a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority. Not insignificantly, Jobbik took 17 per cent of the vote in addition to Fidesz's 53 per cent, representing a noteworthy increase in radical right wing representation in Hungarian elections.

Using its two-thirds parliamentary majority, Fidesz altered the constitutional system. Not only did they introduce a new constitution, but they also changed electoral rules and fundamental laws, governing the relationships among government bodies and between the government and the citizenry (Bozóki, 2011; Korkut, 2014).

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[8] For analyses of the Orbán regime see Bozóki (2011, 2015b, 2015c, 2016), Csillag and Szelényi (2015), Kornai (2011, 2015), Körösényi (2015), Magyar (2015, 2016), Pataki (2013), and Ungváry (2014).

[9] For more details see 'Two Decades after the Wall's Fall: End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations.' (2009), *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Pew Research Center, November 2, http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/267.pdf Accessed: 11-03-2016.

[10] Ibid.

The authoritarian turn was carried out using the two-thirds parliamentary majority only, lacking any meaningful concession to the opposition and without a referendum or other institutionalized way of popular approval of the new Fundamental Law that replaced the Constitution of 1989. The Fundamental Law suffers a critical lack of legitimacy, and hence will be relatively easy to modify by a future liberal democratic majority (Kis, 2012). However, perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Fidesz takeover from a liberal democratic viewpoint has been the fact that even this restricted legitimacy seems to represent a larger, more extensive popular political appeal than the pre-2010 liberal democratic regime did. In this sense, the right wing populism of Fidesz that is in many ways based on exclusionary policies appear to be more successful — and for some key electoral groups more inclusive — than the left-wing populism of previous center-left coalitions had been. Whereas Fidesz exercises authoritarian rule and exerts strict state control over society and economy, center-left governments maintained liberal democratic institutions and pursued inclusive policies through providing economically unsustainability social provisions.[11] Whereas Fidesz built an economic clientèle, the center-left let multinational companies run the economy. By introducing a flat personal income tax, Fidesz increased the taxation of lower incomes and reduced that of higher ones. It also provided large tax allowances for high earning middle class families — and in real terms much smaller ones for low earners. Hence, it redistributed money from the relatively poor to the relatively rich, relying on the political support of the latter, but also gaining popularity among the former as a nationalist government providing law and order after the 'two chaotic decades of transition'.

Increasing economic problems after 2006 were widely associated with the failure of liberalism and the political Left. The fact that left-wing governments privatized national assets both in the 1990s and the 2000s — according to right-wing parties, allegedly benefiting former communist oligarchs — pushed the right-wing electorate to adopt simultaneously anti-communists and anti-capitalist attitudes. The visible rise in foreign direct investment reinforced their perception of liberal elitism and crony-ism between a 'comprador bourgeoisie', made up by former communists and multi-national capital. In short, the economic crisis of the 2000s alongside the insustainability of populist economic policies played a major role in the de-legitimization of liberal democracy (Korkut, 2012: 60).

At the June 2009 European parliamentary elections, center-right Fidesz gained 56 per cent of popular votes whereas far-right Jobbik received 15 per cent. Next, in the spring 2010 national elections, Fidesz received 53 per cent and Jobbik got 17. Due to the disproportional electoral system, Fidesz' victory was transformed into a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Left-wing and centrist parties together gained less than 20 per cent of parliamentary seats. The takeover by the populist Right was completed politically and ideologically[12] and a new, anti-liberal regime was established. Liberal democracy has been replaced by an illiberal one, and later on, since the unfair

[11] For a discussion on economic policies prior to 2010 see Ádám (2015).
[12] On Hungarian populism see Bozóki (2015a) and Enyedi (2015).

elections of 2014, by a hybrid regime, a mix of democratic and autocratic practices.[13] In a hybrid regime, formal democratic institutions exist and are viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state brings them a significant advantage against their opponents. Even if such a regime is competitive, it is not democratic due to the uneven playing field favoring them, created by the incumbents.[14]

3. Radical right populism and politicized christianity

Historical Christian churches had been traditionally strongly affiliated to right-wing politics in inter-war Hungary, providing popular legitimacy for the Horthy regime[15] that relied on the so called 'Christian national middle class,' and considered itself anti-liberal, anti-Semitic and strongly nationalist. 'Christian' in this context first of all meant non-Jewish: reducing the economic, social and cultural influence of the generally highly assimilated Hungarian Jewish community was a primary ambition of the regime. Hence, Hungary introduced a cap on the number of Jewish university students as early as 1920, which is considered the first anti-Jewish Act of 20th century Europe (Kovács, 2012). As a historian of the inter-war period explained:

> *In the Horthy era, Hungary can be described as being under an authoritarian political system, operated under a multi-party parliament and government. At the same time, the rule concerning the right to vote were far from democratic, with state institutions serving the governing conservative party. (...) [It] had an overwhelming majority in the parliament, something that made it practically impossible to transform the existing political system. (...) The regime also had its own official ideology, known as 'Christian nationalism'. The latter blamed liberal legislation during the period prior to 1918 for weakening the 'spiritual unity' of the Hungarian nation, something it claimed could only be guaranteed by Christianity. Therefore, after 1920, Church and State were indissolubly linked to the whole of the regime and took on a 'Christian character', implying a complete sharing of interests between the historical Christian Churches and the Hungarian State (Fazekas, 2015).*

Fidesz and Jobbik are in many ways successors of inter-war political parties. Fidesz is the current dominant right-wing social conservative party that, in line with Dahl and Finchelstein, allows for participation but severely limits contest for power. As a governing party, it has staged 'National Consultations' along with mass advertisement campaigns, a ritual of masquerading its (often repressive) policies as the result of direct participation. Through its government-sponsored 'civil society organization', called the 'Forum of Civil Alliance', it has staged mass rallies called 'Peace Walks' as

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[13] For the empirical analyses of transformation of liberal democracy into a hybrid regime in Hungary, see Bozóki (2015b, 2016), Magyar (2016), Ungváry (2014).

[14] For more detailed analyses of hybrid or mixed regimes see Levitsky and Way (2010) and Bunce and Wolchik (2011).

[15] Miklós Horthy was Regent of Hungary in 1920-1944. For an historical assessment of the Horthy regime, see Ungváry (2012).

a means of mass mobilization to protect the national interest against 'external enemies' such as the IMF and the EU, and to express solidarity with the government. In a classic authoritarian fashion, Fidesz has hijacked the entire state and made it its own political and economic asset, refusing the principles of limited government and the system of constitutional checks and balances, curtailing the prerogatives of the (otherwise already diluted) Constitutional Court and undermining the institutional autonomy of the judiciary system. Finally, the new voting system has given Fidesz an even larger electoral advantage than a dominant party had enjoyed in the 1990-2010 electoral system, resembling the structural political conditions of the inter-war period at an increased level of participation.

Jobbik, in turn, represents the far-right opposition of the ruling party, following the tradition of the Arrow Cross movement that ruled Hungary in 1944-1945 during the Nazi occupation. It rejects the social and political principles of the European Union, campaigns for a strategic alliance with Russia and other eastern powers, and mobilizes against the Jewish and Roma minorities. Fidesz and Jobbik have both attempted building a mass movement around themselves: whereas Fidesz created the network of 'civic circles', Jobbik built a paramilitary group in uniform, the Hungarian Guard. Since the transformation of Jobbik from movement to party is widely documented (Mikecz, 2015; Tóth and Grajczjár, 2015), in the following we focus on their position within the camp of populist radical right and their political relationship to religion.

Fidesz and Jobbik both operate outside the realm of liberal democracy. They both campaign for the extreme right vote, resulting in a strongly nationalist populism in both of their cases (Cueva, 2015; Dobszay, 2015; Krekó and Mayer, 2015; Mudde, 2015). This required Fidesz to adopt increasingly illiberal policies so that maintaining its political dominance and a parliamentary supermajority since 2010. (Fidesz kept its two-third parliamentary majority at the 2014 general elections, labeled as free and unfair, but lost it a year later as a result of a local by-election.) Consequently, the political center shifted further to the right, polarizing left and right and making it more difficult for political moderates to appeal to a mass electorate.[16]

One of the most intriguing questions from our point of view is whether the politicization of religion has played a significant role in this further right shift. Our answer is no: Hungarian right-wing populism, performed by Fidesz and Jobbik in an increasingly similar ideological fashion, has used limited religious references in the post-1989 era. The most important reason for this, we argue, is the limited role of churches and religion in the Hungarian society.

[16] This is by no means a new phenomenon in Hungarian politics, though. Polarization had been a characteristic of Hungarian politics since about the mid-1990s (Karácsony, 2006; Körösényi, 2013).

Table 1. Ratio of believers/non-believers in international comparison. Source: Smith (2008)

Percent of respondents who claim that 'I don't believe in God'		Percent of respondents who claim that 'I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it'	
Germany (East)	52.1	Japan	4,3
Czech Republic	39.9	Germany (East)	7.8
France	23.3	Sweden	10.2
The Netherlands	19.7	Czech Republic	11.1
Sweden	19.3	Denmark	13.0
Latvia	18.3	Norway	14.8
Great Britain	18.0	France	15.5
Denmark	17.9	Great Britain	16.8
Norway	17.4	The Netherlands	21.2
Australia	15.9	Austria	21.4
HUNGARY	**15.2**	Latvia	21.7
Slovenia	13.2	**HUNGARY**	**23.5**
New Zealand	12.6	Slovenia	23.6
Slovakia	11.7	Australia	24.9
Germany (West)	10.3	Switzerland	25.0
Spain	9.7	New Zealand	26.4
Switzerland	9.3	Germany (West)	26.7
Austria	9.2	Russia	30.5
Japan	8.7	Spain	38.4
Russia	6.8	Slovakia	39.2
Northern Ireland	6.6	Italy	41.0
Israel	6.0	Ireland	43.2
Italy	5.9	Northern Ireland	45.6
Portugal	5.1	Portugal	50.9
Ireland	5.0	Cyprus	59.0
Poland	3.3	United States	60.6
United States	3.0	Poland	62.0
Chile	1.9	Israel	65.5
Cyprus	1.9	Chile	79.4
The Philippines	0.7	The Philippines	83.6

Although Hungary is certainly not particularly an atheist society, a clear majority refuses to follow churches and to participate in institutionalized religious activities. Whereas a revival of churchgoing had taken place after 1989, a large part of society still distance themselves from churches and religious references. Hence, appearing to be overly devoted towards religion and churches may alienate a substantial part of the electorate from any particular party.

Although József Torgyán's Independent Smallholder's Party (FKgP)[17] in the 1990s renewed the historic party slogan of 'God, Fatherland, Family', Christianity itself played a limited role even in their relatively old fashioned right-wing populism.[18] As representatives of current right-wing populism, neither Fidesz nor Jobbik defines itself through a religious identity, although in party manifestos both of them claim to be 'Christian'. Yet, Christianity in this context rather signifies a degree of social conservatism and traditional nationalism than expressing any substantive religious reference.

As for Fidesz, party leader Orbán regularly participates in the festive Catholic processions, known as *Szent Jobb Körmenet* (Sacred Right March) held on the anniversary of the foundation of the Hungarian state, August 20, every year. In the meantime, he openly identifies his own political camp with 'the Nation' and takes his opponents as the ones who serve 'foreign interests'. The turn from their original anti-clericalism in the late 1980s and the early 1990s to their openly positive stance towards religion never played a highly important role in the history of Fidesz. A recent book on the history of the party — published by a semi-official publishing house of Fidesz — does not even discuss the role of religion in the formation of party ideology (Oltay, 2012).

The new Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 was the result of a unilateral governmental process, which did not reflect at all a national consensus. This Law, voted by Fidesz MPs only, refers to Hungary as a country based on Christian values (Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele, 2015). The text increases the role of religion, traditions and 'national values'. In contrast to the Constitution of 1989, the Fundamental Law of 2011 serves as expression of a secularized national religious belief system: a sort of paganized, particularistic understanding of the universalistic spirit of Christianity. The signing of the Fundamental Law by the President of the Republic took place on the first anniversary of the electoral victory of Fidesz that happened on Easter Monday, April 25, 2011, blasphemously claiming a bizarre parallel between the resurrection of Jesus and the adoption of the new Fidesz constitution (Bozóki, 2015b).

Fidesz uses religious symbols in an eclectic way in which references to Christianity are often mentioned together with the pre-Christian pagan traditions. By politicizing Christianity in this contradictory manner Orbán aims to reconcile conflicting cultural frames in the minds of Hungarians. This approach refers to the idea of 'two Hungaries': the Western Christian, and the Eastern pagan, tribal one.

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[17] The full name of the party: *Független Kisgazdapárt* (Independent Smallholder's Party)

[18] József Torgyán, an old-school populist politician, served as Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development and the Development of Countryside at the first Orbán-cabinet between 1998-2001. Five years after his resignation he published a book on Christianity (Torgyán, 2006).

When Orbán talks about the reunification of the Hungarian nation, he intends to re-balance power relations between the two camps. He aims to 'Christianize' the pagan traditions — or rather, to paganize Christianity to accommodate it to the needs of the Hungarian nationalist right — when he brings together seemingly incompatible religious symbols. In his vocabulary, the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen, the first Hungarian king, who introduced Christianity in Hungary, can easily go together with the Turul bird, a symbol of pre-Christian, ancient Hungarians. The concept of political nation gave way to the ethnic idea of national consciousness. On inaugurating the monument of 'National Togetherness', Viktor Orbán voiced his conviction that the Turul bird is the ancient image into which the Hungarians are born:

> *From the moment of our births, our seven tribes enter into an alliance, our Saint King Stephen establishes a state, our armies suffer a defeat at the Battle of Mohács, and the Turul bird is the symbol of national identity of the living, the deceased, and the yet-to-be-born Hungarians (Orbán, 2012).*

He conjectures that, like a family, the nation also has a natural home — in this case, the Carpathian Basin — where the state-organized world of work produces order and security, and one's status in the hierarchy defines authority. The legitimacy of the government and the Fundamental Law is not only based on democratic approval, but it is approved by God, and features the spirit of Hungarians represented by the Turul. All these concepts have replaced an earlier public discourse whose central categories were liberal democracy, market economy, pluralism, inalienable human rights, republic, elected political community, and cultural diversity.

As for Jobbik, research proves that its pro-Christian stance simply indicates that the party should be interpreted as 'non-Jewish'.[19] By using this discourse, Jobbik creates an easily identifiable reference to its antiSemitism. Founded in 2002 from a conservative university movement, Jobbik's official ideological standpoint in their own terms is that of a

> *principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party. Its fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests. It stands up against the ever more blatant efforts to eradicate the nation as the foundation of human community. Its strategic program takes into consideration the possibility of the crumbling of globalization as we know it in a chain reaction due to its internal weaknesses and its disconnect from the real processes of the economy. The party considers the protection, replenishment and expansion of the national resources crucial. These include the physical and mental condition of the nation, patriotic togetherness and solidarity (Jobbik, 2006).*

This ideology is that of a radical right-wing party 'whose core element is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of

[19] Political Capital Institute: Research on religion and right-wing politics. Budapest, 2011.

individualism and universalism' (Jobbik, 2006). In addition to this nationalist rhetoric there is an underlying economic appeal that blames globalization for Hungary's troubles.

Pirro identifies Jobbik by its clericalism, irredentism, social-nationalist economic program, and by its anti-Roma, anti-corruption, and anti-EU stance. The party believes that 'national morality can only be based on the strengthening of the teachings of Christ', and Jobbik promotes the spiritual recovery of Hungarians which has to be achieved by returning to the traditional communities, i.e., the family, the churches, and the nation (Pirro, 2015: 71). True, Jobbik was particularly militant against the Roma and against the EU (burning an EU flag and throwing out another one from the window of the Hungarian parliament). It was also vehemently pro-Christian in installing large wooden crosses at several squares of Budapest. Nonetheless, as others explain:

> *Scapegoating against the Jews and Roma is not what makes Jobbik exceptional in Europe today. (...) The solutions that Jobbik proposes to solve Hungary's problems not only signal an anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, anti-capitalist, anti-European, and anti-globalist stance (positions that may be shared by other European right-wing parties), but also appear to be historically and culturally hostile to the West (Akcali and Korkut, 2012: 602).*

Although Jobbik enjoys the support of certain members of both the Catholic and the Calvinist Churches neither church in general approves of Jobbik and most church leaders tend to distance themselves from it. Despite its manifestly Christian self-identification, Jobbik is seen by many of them as representing an essentially pagan, anti-Christian cultural tradition. This might not be accidental. In fact, despite Jobbik's self-definition as Christian party, Jobbik voters are the *least* religious in Hungary.



Graph 1. Source: Political Capital Institute (2011)

Whereas the followers of churches seem to represent the highest share among Fidesz voters, their ratio is a mere 22 per cent, followed by 15 per cent among Socialist voters. Again, followers of churches represent a conspicuously low 6 per cent among Jobbik voters. At the same time, explicitly non-religious people have the highest share among Jobbik voters (41 per cent), and their share, interestingly enough, is lower among Socialist voters (21per cent) than among the Fidesz electorate (22 per cent).

Table 2. Answers to the question 'How much religious are you?' among voters of parliamentary parties (in per cent of the particular party's total electorate). Source: Political Capital Institute (2011)

	I am religious, and I am following the guidance of the church	I am religious on my own way	I am not religious	I cannot tell whether I am religious or not	Refuse to answer	Total
Fidesz-KDNP	22	51	22	5	1	100
Jobbik	6	43	41	9	1	100
MSZP	15	57	21	7	1	100
LMP	4	51	35	9	1	100

While Fidesz has probably been the most preferred political party by Christian churches since at least the beginning of the 2000s, and Prime Minister Orbán has on numerous occasions identified himself as a Christian believer, Fidesz has established a strategic alliance with the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), a dominantly Catholic historic party, since 2002. As part of their agreement, KDNP has been provided a sufficient number of parliamentary seats to form its own parliamentary faction and is also allocated a generous number of government positions when they are in power. In exchange, KDNP has effectively given up its separate political identity and become a Fidesz-satellite, endorsing its 'Christianity' by its sheer name.

Although certainly not disliked by the Catholic Church, Fidesz probably has closer ties to the Calvinist Church, Hungary's second largest congregation. Orbán himself is Calvinist and one of its closest political confidants, Minister of Human Resources, Zoltán Balog was a Calvinist pastor before joining professional politics. Orbán likes to attend religious ceremonies and to deliver semi-public speeches in churches. Correspondingly, Fidesz's relation to Churches is friendly but not strongly institutionalized. Yet, Christianity in general serves as a broad ideological reference, and at some politically prominent instances this reference becomes more concrete. For instance, in the new 'Memorial of the German Occupation of 1944-45' on Szabadság tér, a central square in Budapest, Hungary is represented by Archangel Gabriel, being attacked by the German imperial eagle. This is a highly controversial

new memorial that seeks to modify the public discourse on Hungary's role in WWII, depicting the country as a victim rather than a perpetrator. In this context, Hungary is represented by the Archangel, providing an obviously religious reference for national identity politics. Nevertheless, Fidesz typically refrains from directly advocating hardcore religious ideas that may alienate people. We explain this by the fact that Fidesz is a large umbrella organization, 'the party of power', and its voters typically do not nurture strong religious identities. Therefore, while using religion to justify its populist policies, Fidesz have to keep a delicate balance.



Graph 2. Share of religious congregations in Hungary (in per cent of the total population). Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, census data

Somewhat similarly, Jobbik does not appear to be a representative of religious interests either. In contrast to other right-wing populist parties of the region, for instance Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, it does not appear to be the protagonist of religious values. In contrast, it sometimes seems to nurture pagan affiliations, cultivating a longstanding relation of far-right or Nazi political culture to pre-Christian paganism. However, just like Fidesz, Jobbik also has its own direct links to the Calvinist Church with one of the most prominent Budapest pastors being an explicit supporter while his wife, another Calvinist pastor by profession, being an elected Jobbik MP.

The particular congregation run by this couple happens to be located on Szabadság tér in Budapest, in about 50 meters from the German Occupation Memorial. On the staircase of the church, already on private property but facing the entire square, is a bust of Admiral Horthy, a present day extreme right political icon, who in fact fought the extreme right parties of the 1930s and 40s, and incarcerated the leader of the Arrow Cross movement, Ferenc Szálasi, who subsequently replaced him as head of state in October 1944 with the assistance of the Nazis. This is the way religious ideas and (semi-) public religious spaces meet radical right politics in present day Hungary: typically they do not themselves create political identities, but both Fidesz and Jobbik use them as references to secure their positions and enhance their legitimacy as protagonists of the right-wing political cause.

4. Sacralization of the nation

Whereas neither Fidesz nor Jobbik can be considered to be the political representatives of specific churches or particular religious values, radical right-wing populism itself can be understood as a kind of surrogate religion, as for many socially conservatives and/or nationalists it provides a sacred subject to worship. Hungarian right-wing populism uses Christianity as a reference, but its political content often appears to be in contrast to Christian values. Instead, it advocates an ethno-nationalistic surrogate religion in which the nation itself becomes a sacred entity and national identification carries religious attributes. Although from a Christian perspective this represents a kind of worldly paganism, and as such should be dismissed on actual religious grounds, this kind of surrogate religion is able to draw a sizable crowd as followers in Hungary as well as in other countries. Such a surrogate, paganized Christianity has little to do with actual religious beliefs, though, even if it uses religion in general and Christianity in particular as a source of political endorsement. As Tamás Szilágyi argued:

> *Though radical right-wing ideology places itself in the political field, it uses a syncretistic religious narrative to legitimate its program, the central elements of which are the sacralization of the Hungarian nation, the idea of chosen people, the designation of the national territory as a sacral space, and the inclusion of religious moral elements into political rhetoric. The Hungarian radical right-wing does not only designate religious doctrines as the source of ideals and values that underpin its political actions, but the orientation towards the transcendental also appears specifically in its ideological direction. The elements of Christianity and the ancient Hungarian pagan faith are mixed in the religious narratives of the radical right-wing ideology. (...) In the Hungarian radical right-wing, the groups using Christian rhetoric seem to enjoy the most popularity, but the currently marginal paganism-oriented group plays a more and more increasing role (Szilágyi, 2011: 252).*

The nation as a sacred collective entity is a crucial element of both Jobbik's and Fidesz's political ideology, and large historic Christian churches typically subscribe to this. The dominant attitude of the Roman Catholic and the Calvinist Churches — the two largest Christian congregations — approves it, and only smaller Christian churches, notably the traditionally more liberal Lutherans and some evangelical communities, tend to distance themselves from it. Christianity and the two largest Christian Churches, thus play a legitimizing role of populist right-wing politics, in line with the long-standing historical pattern in inter-war Hungary.

The role of churches is important precisely because of the lack of rationally operating social and political institutions that integrate the nation as a political community. Instead, churches provide ideological resources to support right-wing populism, essentially playing a propaganda role for the regime. In exchange for this, a growing share of publicly financed services in education and health care are being administered by the historical Christian churches. This makes institutional relations

between churches and secular authorities increasingly vital for both the churches and the state: church-run schools, hospitals and even universities are quite generously financed by the government but in exchange they need to fulfill certain administrative criteria in operation. Another way of the institutionalized participation of churches in everyday life is the incorporation of religious studies into the national curriculum of elementary schools that the Fidesz government introduced from 2013.[20]

Religious conflicts, such as the opposition to Islam or other religions have not played a major role in political identity creation so far. Unlike their radical West European counterparts, the Hungarian populist Right has not displayed any strong anti-Islam stance, which was probably due to its traditional antiSemitism. This attitude changed recently due to the increasing number of migrants to Hungary from the Middle East. In the summer of 2015, the Hungarian government built a wire netting fence on the border between Serbia and Hungary to prevent *any* form of migration regardless to the political or economic motifs. It also took the opportunity to raise its popularity by conducting a populist hate campaign against immigrants, which was, however, rather based on ethnicity than religion.

To demonstrate the state of mind of the Hungarian radical Right on the migration issue, it is worth referring to Péter Boross, a former prime minister of Hungary and former advisor to Viktor Orbán, who has equally been close to Fidesz and Jobbik. In an interview, Boross blames the United States for the rise of the number of refugees in Europe and the crisis in the Middle East. In his comment he criticizes the Americans for maintaining universalistic principles, like democracy and God, instead of accepting local democracies and local Gods.[21] As influential father figure in shaping the ideas of the Hungarian right, Boross claims that each nation has a right to create its own state, its own political regime (whether it is democracy or autocracy is less relevant), and also to choose its own God. While aiming to defend Europe, he displays strong anti-EU sentiments. For him any supranational entity which bases itself on general principles beyond the nation-state (a universalistic approach to democracy, human rights, and Christianity) is wrong, because God belongs to nations not to individuals.

Recent mass migration from the Middle East to Europe is interpreted by Boross as not a cultural but a biological and a genetic problem, which cannot be solved by the classic nationalist ways of assimilation. These views, received positively by the populist radical right, embrace ethnic nationalism in its crude form: for Boross, cultural integration has not yielded anything good, neither 'in the case of the gypsies' nor with the 'hordes of Muslims crossing the green border'. Therefore, 'the European Union should not be thinking in terms of its own refugee quota system, but in forming its own armed forces' (Boross, 2015).

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[20] Non-religious students can choose ethics instead.

[21] As Péter Boross said: 'The thing is that the Americans enforce a ruthless approach by favoring the strong over the weak in everything. With them the strong are free to trample the week. They named this system "absolute democracy". After putting their hands on the world, they think that from an "Arab Spring" a functioning democracy will form. (...) Rome was wise back then. They left the conquered provinces in peace and officially adopted some of their gods in Rome. Washington does the opposite. It wants to impose its own God, Democracy, on the conquered countries' (Boross, 2015).

In this militaristic approach, a provincialized 'national Christianity' is contrasted to the mainstream, universal form of Christianity as a religion of love. In the meantime, it is also contrasted to the Gods of the refugees which are deemed unacceptable in Europe. Hence, ethno-nationalism, embraced by the populist Right, provides a sufficient basis of political identification as a type of surrogate-religion. While Fidesz interprets Christianity within the framework of nationalism, Jobbik frames it as part of its nationalism *and* anti-Semitism. God is not presented as a symbol of universal religious identity, as it is understood in the New Testament or explained in several speeches of Pope Francis, but as 'the God of Hungarians' (*'a magyarok istene'*), in its particularistic, tribal, paganized, political understanding. In this sense, Hungarian right-wing populism does not have to rely on religious affiliations and neither places a particular emphasis on mobilizing them: they are simply parts of their fundamentally nationalist world views without any substantive religious references. Although religious identities are mobilized by the Right, they are merged with nationalistic worldviews and ideologies.

Finally, one should note that Fidesz in government has insisted to approve church statuses on political grounds. In a high-profile case, the Fidesz government in 2012 introduced a restrictive regime of registering churches, making it the prerogative of parliament to recognize a religious community as a church. Yet, both the Constitutional Court (in 2013) and the European Court of Human Rights (in 2014) judged the new provisions unacceptable, forcing the parliament to repeatedly revise it.[22] The new provisions obviously sought to extend government control and to differentiate between 'accepted' and 'non-accepted' churches. This way, the Fidesz government attempted to alter the relations between the state and churches and to strengthen its strategic alliance with the politically preferred large historical Christian churches.

Conclusions

Hungarian right-wing populism, represented by governing Fidesz and its (semi-) opposition Jobbik, has been dominating the Hungarian political scene since the end of the 2000s. The Hungarian populist Right has in many ways followed the historical patterns laid down in the inter-war period by the then governing conservatives and their extreme right opposition.

We considered populism as an anti-elitist, anti-institutional political behavior that identifies with 'the people', and enhances their 'direct' participation in the political process as opposed to representative government. Populism has an ideological character but in itself does not have a particular ideological content. Rather, it is a pattern of discourse and behavior that can be filled by both left- and right-wing ideologies. We also argued that in a post-totalitarian historical era, populism

[22] The Constitutional Court in 2013 and the European Court of Human Rights in 2014 considered the deprivation from the status as a church and recognition by the Parliament as a violation of rights, while the existence of two kinds of statuses for religious groups was considered discriminatory. (Eötvös Károly Policy Institute, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, and Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, 2014).

should be seen as the political manifestation of illiberalism, especially in (semi-) peripheries such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. Such an understanding of populism can be easily reconciled with the Dahlian concept of inclusive hegemony: a form of government based on popular participation without public contest for power.

Both Fidesz and Jobbik have strong tendencies towards such a restrictive notion of democracy and they both manifestly dismiss the principles of liberal democracy. Although neither of them appeared before the electorate as a deeply religious political party, both of them portrayed themselves as socially conservative, 'Christian' nationalists. This implied a form of institutionalized cooperation between them and large historical Christian churches. Whereas the political Right gain political support and legitimacy from churches, the latter are commissioned to run educational, health and social care institutions on government-provided budgets. In addition, politically well-received churches have been given official church status with all its benefits, whereas their politically less obedient counterparts have been stripped off it.

However, in a substantially secularized country, such as Hungary, actual religious values play a limited role in policy-making. No rational political party would risk to represent a primarily religious agenda if it was to win elections. Christianity is an important political asset, but it is not enough to carry elections and gain majority political support. To maximize electoral votes and to avoid the breakdown of the state, Viktor Orbán used the infrastructural power of the Church to outsource certain functions and responsibilities of the state to the Church while maintaining his own exclusive control over the coercive power of the state. Within the realm of politics, the 'vision of "the people"' as united body implies impatience with party strife, and can encourage support for strong leadership where a charismatic individual is available to personify the interests of the nation (Canovan, 1999: 5). As a charismatic leader Orbán claimed full sovereignty over the political process and used populism as a shortcut to reach his political aims.

The Orbán regime also demonstrates that radical right-wing populism employs a quasi-religious ideological construction through which it attempts at mobilizing a wider social spectrum: ethno-nationalism. This surrogate religion offers a politicized (nationalist and paganized) understanding of Christianity and elevates the concept of ethnically defined nation to a sacred status. Thus, religion is 'nationalized', and the universalism of Christianity is transformed to a particularistic, pagan vision in which faith appears to be not an individual but a tribal issue. 'Nationalized Christianity' also provides legitimacy for the 'rationalized charismatic rule' of authoritarian leaders, who represent exceptional characteristics but are nevertheless popularly elected. This rule is illiberal and anti-democratic even though it relies on (often manipulated) elections and other forms of politically conditioned popular participation. Within the European Union, Viktor Orbán's Hungary is probably the closest approximation of this type of governance.

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MIKLÓS SEBŐK*

Mandate Slippage, Good and Bad: Making (Normative) Sense of Pledge Fulfillment

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Abstract

Despite the substantive findings of existing research, the electoral mandate is still an elusive category in representation theory and empirical political science. The article offers a conceptual framework that promises to properly evaluate mandate fulfillment in general, and pledge fulfillment in particular from the standpoint of the normative theory of representation. In this framework the non-fulfillment of pledges is not necessarily bad for representation since *mandate slippage*, or the gradual process of abandoning the mandate in the post-election phase, may come in both *bad* and *good* forms. The proposed framework also develops an empirical research agenda for measuring the causes of bad mandates and mandate slippage by relying and expanding on the toolkit of empirical pledge research. Outcome oriented pledges serve as a prime example of bad mandates, whereas agency shirking is a major cause of bad mandate slippage.

Keywords: mandate; electoral pledges; pledge fulfillment; normative theory; representative government.

I. Introduction

Despite the substantive findings of existing research, the electoral mandate is still an elusive category in representation theory and empirical political science.[1] It was not so long ago that Andreas Schedler (1998: 191-192) contended that the 'mandate theory of elections (...) has not commanded too much attention from political science'. Eventually, the concept received the serious treatment it deserved in the form of an edited volume by Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999). A serious but less than uncontroversial treatment.

In describing the 'mandate conception of representation' the authors claimed that 'mandate-representation' occurs if 'parties truthfully inform voters about their intentions and the implementation of these intentions is best for voters under the given circumstances' (Manin et al., 1999: 30). While the first part of the definition is in line with most accounts of elections as a means to 'confer the median mandate' (McDonald and Budge, 2005), the second part introduces a somewhat alien element, and a fair amount of tension, into the equation.

On the one hand, informing the citizens of proposed policies and incentives conducive to the implementation of these policies is well mapped in the principal-agent literature of delegation and representation (see e.g., Besley, 2006). On the other hand, the injection of a benchmark of citizens' interests in the theoretical framework *other than* their revealed preferences at the polling station creates conflicting directives for normative evaluation as well as a model that is less suitable for operationalization. Indeed, two decidedly empirical research agendas make only use of the first part of the 'mandate-representation' definition: pledge and saliency research. One way to operationalize the complexities of electoral mandates for empirical research is to look at explicit promises made during the campaigns. Studies following this approach create their databases by extracting relevant information from party manifestos and other electoral communications.

They mainly come in two flavors, which are distinguished based on their respective understanding of mandates. On the one hand, 'saliency'-based approaches (such as the classic study by Budge and Hofferbert, 1990) map general trends in policy-making (often relying on budgetary data) in order to gauge the relevance of party manifestos in setting the direction of government. 'Pledge' research, by contrast, singles out individual commitments and the fulfillment thereof, regardless of overarching tendencies in governance (see e.g., Royed, 1996; Thomson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2014). As the latter approach has generated a more extensive literature, in the following pledge research serves as our main focus.

While these studies make use of an increasingly standardized set of variables, they rarely venture into uncharted theoretical territory. They mostly rely on an *implicit mandate theory* derived from the concept of responsible party government. This 'strictly empirics' line of research, however, is not without its own shortcomings. Perhaps the most important of these, from the perspective of representation theory, is their dependence on the unpacked concept of pledge fulfillment. In this line of research pledge fulfillment is treated as an inherently positive result for the functioning

[1] I am thankful for the comments by two anonymous reviewers. All remaining errors are mine.

of representative democracy. The problem here is that, as it was highlighted by the dual definition of Manin and his co-authors, the redemption of electoral promises may in fact lead to catastrophic consequences for citizens under changing circumstances.

The present article offers a conceptual framework that promises to properly evaluate mandate fulfillment in general, and pledge fulfillment in particular from the standpoint of the normative theory of representation. In this framework the non-fulfillment of pledges is not necessarily bad for representation since *mandate slippage*, or the gradual process of abandoning the mandate in the post-election phase, may come in both *bad* and *good* forms. The proposed framework also develops an empirical research agenda for measuring the causes of bad mandates and mandate slippage by relying and expanding on the toolkit of empirical pledge research.

The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the baseline principal-agent theory of representation is presented along with a new metaphor of the process of representation: the delegation tree. Second, the concepts of bad mandate and mandate slippage are introduced. Third, the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapters is translated for the purposes of empirical research in order to be able to measure the factors leading to mandate slippage. The final section concludes.

II. The Baseline Principal-Agent Model and its Discontents

II.1. A delegation tree with branches in the air

It is a common feature of contemporary works on democracy to assume that modern government must derive its 'authority directly or indirectly from the people' (Ferejohn, 1999: 131). It is also clear that variations persist in terms of the exact forms and channels of what we refer to as the program-to-policy linkage (Thomson, 2001). As the fictional government *by* the people was suppressed by an indirect government *of* the people, the concept of representation became inherently linked to the role of elections in a democracy.

Elections are pivotal elements of representative democracy as they establish the core political relationship of the system by linking principals and agents via accountability (Shepsle, 2008: 30). They produce a bundle of *winners*—by way of sanctioning poor performance or forward-looking selection—and *at the same time* they also produce *mandates*. Though it manifests itself in various guises, the latter component is always present in campaigns—even as some authors downplay its relevance in effective electoral control (Fearon, 1999). In fact, classic public choice texts on political accountability share the view that 'if voters vote on the basis of platforms or "issues," politicians have little incentive to do what they promise. Thus, voters might be well-advised to pay attention to the incumbent's performance in office

rather than to the hypothetical promises of competing candidates' (Ferejohn, 1986: 7).[2]

This negative general attitude toward a concept of political accountability linked to and based on ex ante authorization[3] spawned a sprawling literature linking popular preferences directly to societal outcomes, without any institutional or policy-related intermediary (see studies on 'opinion/policy consistency/dynamics', such as Monroe, 1998). This results in cutting out the 'middle man', the institutions mediating the content of mandates; in the process the institutional environment that filters this content is removed. Thus, it sheds little light on the *mechanism* of preference transmission. And in this it presents both empirical and theoretical conundrums: it underestimates the importance—in fact: persistence—of electoral pledges and manifestos in actual campaigns. Perhaps more importantly, it also reduces voters into rational principals similar to corporate shareholders for whom the only relevant metrics is located under the red line of earnings reports. Yet politics resists such simplifications: elections may be won and lost over pledges that turned out to be untrue, or policy switches that contradicted existing party ideology.

There are also persuasive reasons for giving elections (as opposed to, say, public opinion polls) a central role in revealing voter preferences. Election day establishes a political contract between principals and agents that is anything but a fiction or metaphor: it institutes obligations buttressed by constitutional law as opposed to the more informal mechanism of *responsiveness*. As it happens, this is the root that gives rise to the tree of representative government, and its crown consists of a complex structure of branches and leaves (see Figure 1). Party mandates, then, are best understood as the trunk of this tree of delegation: all future decisions emanate from this original authorization for the party/parties of government.[4]

[2] Even researchers adhering to the mandate tradition acknowledged that mainstream studies had considered parties too weak to 'function effectively as programmatic, policy effecting agents', at least in a system based on the separation of powers (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990: 11).

[3] The terms authorization and accountability are used in the sense of the principal-agent model of politics (see e.g. Ferejohn, 1999: 133). Authorization is the 'means by which a representative obtains his or her standing, status, position or office' (Dovi, 2011). Ex ante authorization demands that the authorization takes place before the execution of the task or mission at hand. Accountability is 'the ability of constituents to *punish* their representative for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g., voting an elected official out of office) or the *responsiveness* of the representative to the constituents' (ibid.).

[4] For applying the tree metaphor to public policy decision-making, see Lindblom (1959) and the literature centered around this classic book.



Figure1. The flow of legitimacy through a branch of the mandate process

True, some decisions are not rooted in policy mandates in the substantive sense. The government's relations with social partners and exogenous shocks all shape the general direction of government decisions. Nevertheless, the answers to virtually all of the challenges of governance are embedded in party ideology and the values espoused by a political community of like-minded people (consider, for instance, the motives behind the presidential nominations of Supreme Court judges in the U.S.). These are all part of a *broader concept* of mandate that is far from devoid of policy content.

The totality of government decisions that involve a modicum of policy content are, therefore, relevant for mandate theory. This is true despite the fact that in many cases no clear path can be discerned connecting the actual policy decision to the original authorization. In other words, government resembles a tree with some branches suspended in the air. These branches may or may not have capillaries emanating from the trunk. Furthermore, some decisions may be in direct contradiction with pledges made in the same policy domain. In this respect, they may disrupt the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004) even as they perform some basic government function. The tree of delegation is hence supplemented by branches unrelated to ex ante authorization, and together they form government policy.

All in all, mandate models are integral parts of the more general field of political accountability. And in light of these considerations, when it comes to theories of political authorization, they appear simply unavoidable. Following this line of reasoning, in the remainder of this paper it is assumed that *party mandates* are vital elements of well-functioning representative democracies.[5] Nevertheless, we are still faced with the problem of defining what exactly constitutes a mandate. [6]

II.2. The trunk of the tree: The direct flow of the mandate

The concept of the electoral mandate has been the subject of interpretations and redefinitions by politicians and political scientists alike. Based on an analysis of the 1984 presidential campaign in the United States, Hershey (1994) discerns three recurring thematic elements in mandate claims by politicians: the party mandate, the personal mandate and the policy mandate. This provides a useful starting point as it highlights the diverse conceptual sources of electoral mandates. The common denominator is the presence of a *partially binding* content which is associated with ex ante authorization. This partially binding mandate is the essence of representation; and is understood as a counterpoint to the appointment of delegates (with a fully binding mandate) and trustees (with a fully non-binding mandate).

With mandate-based representation thus described, the next challenge is to make sense of the *content* of the partially binding mandate. Figure 2 breaks down this loaded concept.

[5] The question of personal vs. party mandates (as in studies on the personification/presidentialisation of party government) is less important for our current purposes as long as personal mandates involve a modicum of policy content (which is present even in 'good type'-style approaches in which the candidate's policy preferences are similar to that of his voters (Fearon, 1999: 68).

[6] One sitting prime minister in Central Eastern Europe famously stated during his campaign: 'our program consists of just one word: [we'll] continue.'



Figure 2 The content of the mandate: from parties to pledges. Source: Sebők – Soós, 2013: 48.

In its most general form, the mandate is associated with a beneficiary: a party or person. Insofar as most leaders are members and representatives of their own parties, it is not necessary to distinguish between these two levels. Furthermore, there is an implicit linkage between leader and party: their shared history, decisions and ideology. In this sense there is arguably no such thing as a mandate without policy content, even if some leaders make no effort to present a manifesto to the public.[7]

Having said that, parties and politicians in developed countries do have a propensity to publish electoral programs (as witnessed by the main database of the Comparative Manifesto Project). This helps to make the case for the relevance of ex ante authorization in democratic theory and practice. Yet in trying to find the meaning of electoral mandates, manifestos are a part of the problem at least to the same degree as they are part of the solution. What authorization entails still depends on the researchers' point of view, and the prime exhibit which illustrates this phenomenon is the division of the research community along pledge and saliency lines.

Once again, both strands of research rely on a policy-based definition of mandate, only this time they consider explicit pledges and issue emphases as opposed to more implicit party ideology. Explicitness, on the other hand, is not a privilege of manifesto pledges: campaigns are ripe with reactive policy statements, which are

[7] One sitting prime minister in Central Eastern Europe famously stated during his campaign: 'our program consists of just one word: [we'll] continue.'

sometimes expressed only verbally, as opposed to the more proactive, written form of communication that is the hallmark of manifestos. Perhaps the best way to understand the overall policy content of campaigns—and, thus, that of the mandate—is to think of it as a word cloud. In this *mandate cloud* some pledges will appear more often, and in more varied forms and terms, while others retain a small, standalone place in the cloud.

This diffuse policy mandate is difficult to interpret and evaluate for social scientists, let alone for the average citizen. That is one of the reasons why research strategies have gravitated towards the piecemeal approach of analyzing manifesto pledges or issue saliency. Studies regarding 'cloud fulfillment' estimates seem like science fiction in light of entrenched research agendas, but they are the next logical step all the same. From the electorate's perspective, such a cloud may come closest to laying out the contents of a contract between themselves (the principals) and the parties (the agents). Insofar as campaigns are informative, and the cloud is filled with pledges and issues that send voters signals about future government policies, it is not an exaggeration to speak of a direct, undisturbed and uncompromised flow of the mandate.

This direct flow represents the trunk of the delegation tree. Although its relation to the root of the tree—voter preferences—is ambiguous[8], the moment of authorization creates a firm link between the two. In formulating the provisions of the mandate contract, it is also unnecessary to take a stand regarding bottom-up or top-down dominance (where the bottom-up approach refers to the dominance of focus groups and opinion polls in constructing party platforms and top-down is a metaphor for elite leadership and, possibly, herethetics). As long as parties offer a selection of campaign contents, a mutually endorsed content for the principal-agent contract is within reach.

III. Concepts for Disrupted Principal-Agent Relations

III.1. Bad mandates: The missing or ill-defined source

While the conceptual development of the delegation tree offers a better metaphor for real-life representative processes, the basic terminology of principal-agent model is still deficient when it comes to explaining disruptions of text-book principal-agent relations. A new dictionary explaining these phenomena could make use of the notions of *bad mandates* and *mandate slippage*.

Elections play a pivotal role in setting the content of the mandate, yet the contours of this content are shaped before and after polling day. The pre-election period defines the comprehensiveness of the contract, while the post-election phase determines the rate of contract fulfillment. Taken together, these steps constitute what might be called—by taking a page from Thomson's work—the *preferences*-program-

[8] The preferences-program part of the general preferences-program-policy linkage is not without its problems. Indeed, Pennings (2005) contends that 'the low degree of responsiveness of parties indicates that the linkage between voters and parties is the weakest one in the chain of delegation.'

policy linkage. As in this model elections are the mechanisms whereby the contents of contracts are endorsed and formally authorized, the preceding and subsequent phases decide if the provisions of approved contracts are actually delivered on.

It follows directly from this framework that the linkage may break down either prior to or following the election. In the former case, *bad mandates* are the result of *bad campaigns* or *weak authorizations*. In the latter instance, disrupted principal-agent relations are the outcome of interactions between self-interested strategic players. The former render proper contract-fulfillment impossible as the *preconditions* for a principal-agent relationship are not met. The latter entail breakdowns in the *execution* of ex ante authorizations. Table 1 presents these sources of the breakdown of the preferences-program-policy linkage in a stylized chronological order.

Table 1. Sources of the breakdown of the preferences-program-policy linkage

Period	Mandate anomaly	Theoretical categories	Empirical examples	Normative status
Pre-election	Bad mandate	Low information campaign	Manifestos are not published	Bad
Pre-election	Bad mandate	Low participation	Significantly below average	Bad
Pre-election	Bad mandate	Weak authorization	Heavily contested elections w/ close results	Bad
ELECTIONS				
Post-election	Indirect flow	Trustee contracts	Supreme courts, independent central banks	Trade-off between input and output legitimacy
Post-election	Multiple flows	Coalition formation	Minority preferences prevail in policy areas	Trade-off between governability and pledge fulfillment
Post-election	Multiple flows	Government structure	Mismatch between pledges and the allocation of ministries	Trade-off between governability and pledge fulfillment
Post-election	Shirking	Implementation	Bureaucratic preferences prevail	Bad

Bad mandates become incomplete or void contracts on account of either deficiencies in the pre-election period (the campaign) or weak authorizations provided by the electorate. Among the necessary preconditions for a meaningful contract between principals and agents, the content of the campaign is paramount. The quality of the imparted knowledge (scope, depth, concreteness) determines whether a partly binding mandate is created. Citizens' perceptions of the contents of the contract (or the mandate cloud) are also shaped by party decisions regarding the issues that are emphasized or the relative ratio of rhetorical, ideological and policy statements in the campaign. Bad mandates result from low-information electioneering or from massive overlaps in the platforms of major parties concerning all key issues even as other parties are crowded out.

The second source of bad mandates are low-participation elections, for these sever the link between the preferences of the majority of voters (who decided to abstain) and the parties responsible for governing. The third source of bad mandates is the weakness of ex ante authorization. Here the term weakness refers to both the scope of victory (whether it is a plurality, a majority, a supermajority etc.) and the relationship between the share of the popular vote received by the winner vis-à-vis the actual seat allocation in the legislature (even as the form of this relationship may differ between polities).

Bad mandates invariably put a dent in the normative basis of representative democracy. Such deficiencies imply that the potential for meaningful mandate-fulfillment is limited. This is also why bad mandates are relevant for normative theory, for they constitute a key area of *representative deficit*. Coupled with the bad sort of mandate slippage (see below), bad mandates dismantle the preferences-program-policy linkage which is one of the key elements in the process of providing legitimacy in representative democracies. In sum, input legitimacy may be 'contaminated' right at the source. Nevertheless, anomalies in mandate-based representation are just as common in the later stages of the process.

III.2. Mandate slippage: When the direct flow stops

Modern representative government is built on institutional complexity. This complexity disrupts basic principal-agent relations: multiple principals and various agents crop up throughout the delegation chain and—in some cases—the chain itself is broken. Non-majoritarian institutions draw their legitimacy precisely from the fact that they are disjointed from elected office holders. In light of this complexity, the very usefulness of the 'chain model' is called into question: delegation flows through diverse channels as opposed to just one; and these may further dissociate, to the point of resembling a river delta or the crown of a tree.

The branches can be connected by differing logics of representation. A relationship may be based on delegation in the strictest sense: a transfer of authority with no room for maneuver (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). An intermediate form of delegation is based on a partly binding mandate, which allows for some wiggle room in terms of interpreting the contents of the contract. The third form is trusteeship, which is a non-binding transfer of authority when it comes to policy content.

The delegation tree consists of the aforementioned forms of relationships which are created between principals and agents, such as parties, political leaders, ministers and government agencies. They jointly populate the space between the original authorization provided by the people and the policy outcomes that partly serve as the basis for future decisions on authorization. The theoretical consequence of this space between the people who provide ex ante authorization and the people who provide ex post authorization of government performance is that policymakers may become released from direct electoral accountability. This is especially true in the case of long-term trusteeship contracts (as is the case with supreme court or constitutional court appointees in some countries—once again, see Table 1).

This phenomenon may also occur in parts of the tree where initially there is a clear and uncontested direct flow of delegation from the root/trunk. Three such phases merit a more detailed discussion: coalition formation; decisions related to the government structure; and their implementation.

Election results are often ambiguous. In fact, in parliamentary democracies a single-party majority in (both houses of) the legislature is the exception rather than the norm. This sets the stage for a duplication (triplication etc.) of principal-agent relations at the top of the trunk. Various parties run on a wide assortment of pledges and issue emphases, and the coalition formation process blends these policy contents into an unpredictable shape: coalition agreements. In some cases there may be more than one majority constellation (including grand coalitions and the like), and even on its own this fact blurs electoral mandates. Overall, the problem of incomplete contracts manifests itself already at this first stage.

This coalition effect is further compounded by an unbalanced relationship in party coalitions. The hierarchical ordering of parties assigns different weights to party-specific mandates (as each party proposed a different manifesto with varying issue emphases): the formateur party may have more clout over the coalition agreement, just as a minority party with a great potential for hostage taking (especially when the formateur party only won a plurality) can end up being overrepresented. Either way, the *chain of legitimacy* (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff, 2010) remains intact while *delegation relationships* are muddled.

The second step concerns government structure. It is shaped by the (formal or informal) coalition agreement in the form of allocations of control over ministries/departments or by appointments to non-majoritarian bodies and issue emphases in the government program. It is also a manifestation of the underlying constitutional structure, i.e., the specifics of the system of separation of powers. Multiple principals may have jurisdiction over the same policy domain, which may result in obscuring responsibility for the fulfillment of specific pledges. Finally, some pieces of legislation may require a supermajority, which brings in the opposition as a new set of stakeholders.

The third major layer of complex delegation relationships is located at the level of implementation. Bureaucratic/agency behavior may be one of the important reasons behind the failure to fulfill a mandate. Classic causes underlying this include agency shirking and problems related to agency (or more general policy) design. The former refers to cases in which the ideal policy position of the agency is different from that of its principal (the legislature or the executive—Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999). Although the principals have various measures of ex ante or ex post control at their disposal, some level of shirking or laxity may nevertheless persist.

Agency design may make matters worse: multiple missions or fuzzy missions confuse agents as to who their real targets are. Multiple and heterogeneous agents functioning in the same policy domain can replicate this jurisdictional overlap from the policy-maker level (where two departments are responsible for the same or largely overlapping policy area) to the 'street level' of bureaucrats (where e.g., two separate police units are responsible for the same or overlapping geographical area or crime type). And coordination between majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions (such as those between a finance ministry and an independent central bank) can further

complicate mandate-fulfillment. Again, there is a limit to the extent to which careful policy design can be used to solve the 'problem of many hands' (Thompson, 1980) or the 'difficulty of assigning responsibility in organizations in which many different individuals contribute to decisions and policies'.

The three phases of coalition formation, government structure design and implementation depicted in Table 1—along with many other potential layers along the same lines—represent interruptions in the direct flow of delegation. They break or dissolve parts of the chain of delegation. Thus, they contribute to mandate non-fulfillment, which—in the existing research—is considered a negative outcome from a normative theory perspective. The next subsection makes the case that this perception is somewhat misguided, as mandate slippage may come in two flavors: good and bad.

III.3. Problems of controlling agents through mandates

Breakdowns in the direct flow of legitimacy through the tree of delegation cast a shadow on theories of ex ante authorization. From the perspective of normative democratic theory, this is not all bad news, however. Mandate non-fulfillment or mandate slippage may manifest itself in many different forms during the long process spanning the time when campaign pledges are made to when policy outcomes are first realized. Each phase has its own normative character, which also means that no generalization can be made with respect to unfulfilled promises without the analysis of the normative character of each segment. Together they are a testament to the problems and virtues of controlling agents through mandates.

This 'neglected side' of mandate theory was seldom subjected to a more detailed discussion. In one of these attempts Schedler (1998) contends that electoral accountability is a complex and contested exercise. According to him, the public controversies associated with the very idea of mandate-fulfillment can be settled only by the voter, whom he considers the 'supreme judge.' While this is probably true, there is a possibility to dig deeper and analyze the causes that shape this normative judgment. And these causes may be connected to the position of the individual 'transgression' in the mandate slippage process.

The concept of mandate slippage is best understood as *a progressive divergence*—realized in the course of governance—*from the policy content of ex ante political authorization*. It may be the product of strategic agency or an inadvertent consequence of decisions unrelated to mandate-fulfillment. The result is a delegation tree with some branches firmly connected to the root and trunk; and others seemingly up in the air without such attachments.

Not all such breaks in the delegation chain are normatively unattractive. Modern representative government draws its legitimacy from a number of sources, and policy content-related input legitimacy is just one such element. Trustee-type institutions of 'government for the people' take no formal orders from elected leaders (who serve relatively short terms) as they fulfill their long-term mission. And voters have a tendency to acknowledge decisions made in a complex political and institutional environment that includes coalition governments, multi-level government and elaborate structures of government agencies. In this complex environment, the

merits of mandate-fulfillment are relative. It is advisable, therefore, to undertake a piece by piece, phase by phase analysis of the process of 'slippage.'

Mandate slippages may be assigned to either of three categories based on their normative status. On the one hand, 'good slippages' allow for the contradiction-laden process of converting heterogeneous voter preferences into actual policy outputs. 'Bad slippages' on the other hand are unrelated to plurality and mostly consist of institutional frictions (principal-agent anomalies) stemming from the process of governing. A third category refers to slippages that highlight a trade-off between following voter preferences and other normatively worthy requirements (such as governability or stability). Table 2 provides a summary of these phases of the mandate slippage process.

Table 2. Examples of mandate slippage (post-election phase)

Theoretical background	Cause of slippage	Empirical example	Normative status
Heterogeneous voter preferences	Multi-party government	Conflicting pledges of coalition partners	Trade-off between governability and mandate-fulfillment
Institutional complexity of cabinet government	Incomplete contracts	Electoral manifestos vs. government programs	Depends on the degree to which issue emphases and major pledges are observed
	Lack of jurisdiction	Portfolio allocations prevents pledge fulfillment	Trade-off between governability and mandate-fulfillment
Institutional complexity of executive power and bureaucracy	Agency shirking	The implementation of an initiative is obstructed by administrative units	Loss resulting from institutional frictional loss: Bad
	Outcome-related pledges	Pledges of economic growth before a global financial crisis	A consequence of bad mandates. Trade-off between serving the 'public interest' and pledge fulfillment

In parliamentary systems the first breakdown in the delegation process usually occurs no later than election night. On the one hand, the policy content of the mandate may be straightforward when single-party majorities emerge (but even in these cases 'skeletons in the closet' may divert the content or emphasis of policy-making). At the same time, multi-party majorities may upset clear expectations with coalition agreements which create a government that pursues only a subset of the pledges featured in each participant's manifesto. Moreover, these pledges may be contradictory, which creates the need to reach a compromise, along with the necessity to insert new or modified policy initiatives into the government program.

The literature on the relative merits of single-party and coalition governments underscores the importance of a trade-off between governability and compromise. Ideological distance between coalition parties may be a force for good, but at the same time it may also act as a source of constant tension. Issues related to polarization—which are widespread in contemporary two-party systems—may be mitigated by the art of compromise as practiced in multi-party governments and grand coalitions. In light

of the conclusions found in this line of research, the least that can be said is that coalition governments may be both natural and appealing outcomes of the electoral systems typically used in parliamentary democracies.

The next phase of mandate slippage concerns policy-related problems stemming from the structure of government. Non-fulfillment in this stage may be due to either incomplete contracts or lack of jurisdiction. First, government programs are not identical with coalition agreements. They address issues that were not emphasized in manifestos simply because campaigns and governments prioritize different issues. In most policy areas there is no mandate content to begin governance with: these contracts are incomplete and may contain no information even for some salient issues.

A solution may lie in the combination of pledge and saliency approaches. The more transparently a party's stance is on a policy domain, the better. But in a situation when campaign strategists made no specific attempts to highlight an issue, the saliency approach may fill in the blanks. Then, non-compliance with this more general policy mandate at this stage is detrimental to mandate-based accountability.

With respect to the structure of government, the second problem of non-fulfillment stems from lack of jurisdiction. Let us assume that parties make pledges in good faith and they are willing to execute them if the opportunity arises. Nevertheless, there is a considerable difference between being *willing* and being *able* to execute policies. Portfolio allocation is key in this respect: controlling the relevant chunk of government bureaucracy is almost a prerequisite for solving complex policy problems. While issue-oriented parties (such as Green parties) have a tendency to ask for cabinet positions related to their main area of concern, they may fail to secure them. The fulfillment of pledges concerning policy areas that fall outside the direct policy control of a coalition party should therefore be evaluated against norms that are less strict than the ones one would apply in the case of full portfolio control.

After these party-related issues, the third phase of mandate slippage pertains to government and execution. Formal veto points are less of an issue at this stage, the focus is on more informal factors in the way of mandate redemption. In some cases policy *outputs* require a mere act of parliament. In other cases fulfillment depends on a complex web of agencies and their cooperation.

Part of the art of governance is policy design and bureaucratic control. In single party settings non-fulfillment resulting from these two factors should be frowned upon from a normative perspective. This also applies to 'agency slippage,' regardless of its source (shirking, opportunism or sheer incapacity). In coalition governments it is more difficult to assign the blame to a specific actor. Having said that, ministerial control should serve as a useful rule of thumb for determining where responsibility lies.

Pledges related to policy *outcomes* are trickier still. Exogenous shocks may force cabinets to change course and go back on pledges. Such policy switches may nevertheless be tolerated by the electorate in the case of actual disasters that justify the change. In other situations 'partnership non-compliance' might occur: as in the case of a pledge to end a war with a neighboring country. It follows directly from this discussion that pledges targeting outcomes are less enforceable and parties should therefore mostly refrain from them. And for those outcome pledges that are

'unavoidable,' the evaluation of non-fulfillment will have to factor in outside circumstances.

The conclusion that can derived from this cursory analysis leads us back to Schedler's contention regarding the final judges of government performance. Experience also shows that voters make complex decisions regarding incumbents: their evaluation involves the ex post analysis of performance (including 'economic voting', pledge fulfillment, etc.) and also ex ante assessments of future performance. In this larger shape of things, mandate-fulfillment is but one metric that informs the electoral control of agents. Mandate slippages need not involve democratic deficits, let alone representation deficits. From the average citizen's perspective, therefore, mandate slippage may either be a normatively good thing or a normatively negative thing.

This section provided an introduction into the theoretical problems of mandate slippage. The final task is to relate the concept of good and bad mandate slippages to the existing literature on pledge fulfillment so that we can make empirical sense of these theoretical propositions.

IV. Explaining Mandate Slippage with Empirical Variables

Studies in the pledge fulfillment have used various sources of data and produced impressive results regarding the empirical strength of ex ante authorization theories. However, there is no overarching theme in the literature concerning mandate-fulfillment *besides implicit mandate theory*. As the delegation chain is dissected into pieces based on the focus of individual researchers, the literature remains devoid of hypotheses regarding the preferences-program-policy linkage as a whole (with the usual caveat of government/opposition).

Despite its purely empiricist inclination, the literature on pledge fulfillment still serves as the best choice available for making empirical sense of, or indeed measure, mandate slippage. Two aspects of empirical pledge research deserve special attention from the perspective of mandate slippage theory. First, its theoretical sources and normative statements regarding representation. The task here is to relate its explicit conceptual underpinnings or implicit tendencies to the framework presented in the previous chapter. Second, the groups of its empirical variables as related to the phases of linkage breakdown in general, and to bad mandate slippage in particular (see Table 2). By highlighting pivotal variables influencing mandate slippage the measurement of this very concept comes within reach.

IV.1. The theoretical sources of pledge research

The theoretical sources of empirical research on the program-to-policy linkage are drawn of a distinctly canonic set of literature. Recent pledge research (Kostadinova, 2013; Toros, 2015; Praprotnik, 2015; Thomson et al., 2014; Naurin, 2013; Dobos and Gyulai, 2015) mostly takes inspiration from a small selection of classic pieces in pledge research (Royed, 1996; Artés, 2013; Artés and Bustos, 2008; Naurin, 2011; Moury, 2011; Mansergh and Thomson, 2007; Costello and Thomson, 2008; and the APSA papers by a group of first generational pledge scholars: Thomson et al., 2010; 2012; 2014) and the theoretical literature these classic pieces make reference to.

The two main theoretical sources of these classic studies are the literature on responsible party government (following, inter alia, APSA, 1950 and Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994; for an overview see: Körösényi and Sebők, 2013) and the theory of parties and coalitions as adapted to European context (such as Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Strøm et al., 2008). Nevertheless, formal models of principal-agent relations are not prominently featured in any of the landmark studies of pledge research.

The discussion of the normative value of the results is even less pronounced. The staple quotation here is by Mansbridge (2003: 515) regarding 'promissory representation'. The works of Manin (1997) and his co-authors (Manin et al., 1999) is also often summoned. In neither cases, however, are empirical hypotheses directly related to these theoretical underpinnings. This is true even as the tension regarding the normative aspects of the results is palpable in some work in the saliency or pledge traditions.

Pennings (2005: 14) acknowledges that 'the Dutch case shows that there are several structural barriers for the mandatory role of parties in consensus democracies where mandates are always shared with other parties.' But the next step in the normative analysis of these 'structural barriers' is missing. Similarly, Royed and Borrelli (1999: 115) conclude that 'institutional control is fairly predictive of the relative success of the parties, although other factors are also influential.' Once again, the analysis does not go further into an examination of the relative importance of 'party success' and 'institutional control' for the proper functioning of the delegation chain.

It is important to emphasize that these features of the literature are not to be considered to be shortcomings per se. Pledge researchers follow their specific research agenda, which is empirical in its nature. Furthermore, they do indeed make some progress toward generalizing the content of their preferred variables. With some refinements these can indeed be related to various stages of the linkage process and, therefore, can be factored into normative evaluations of the process of representation as well.

IV.2. Variable groups in empirical pledge research

The preeminent characteristic of empirical pledge research is the heterogeneity of its hypotheses and explanatory variables (see Table 3 in the Appendix)[9]. Perhaps the single quasi-permanent hypothesis in over 25 years of research refers to government/opposition party position, with government parties expected to achieve a higher rate of pledge fulfillment. Other recurring variables include status quo (in pledge content), consensus over a pledge in multiple party manifestos as well as ministerial control related to the pledge in question.

While a degree of standardization has been attained regarding a core set of variables, actual hypotheses are still tailored to the research question of individual papers. Factors related to the institutional setting of government (majority/minority; single party/coalition; affiliation of the chief executive; portfolio control etc.) are well-explored, the initial and latter stages of the preferences-program-policy linkage make no appearance in most pledge research. From voter preferences regarding various issues[10] to agency and partner slippage the list of important components of mandate slippage are mostly absent from empirical studies of pledge fulfillment.

Only a few studies venture beyond stand-alone variables in order to make sense of variable groups and their role in the linkage process. Royed (1996: 48) conceptualizes the 'factors influencing pledge fulfilment' in terms of 'leadership', 'constraints' and 'decision-making environment'. The first of these is usually not captured by variables in pledge research (such as a presence of a 'programmatic leader'). The second is most often represented in the control variables section of models. The third, however, foreshadows the proliferation of institutional variables in comparative studies, introduced from the early 2000s.

Thomson, Royed and Naurin (2010) group some of their variables into the 'government-type' and 'prime ministerial and ministerial control' categories. Thomson et al. (2014: 11) list 'institutional context', 'resources' and 'pledge characteristics' as major groupings. Naurin (2013: 1057) registers 'type of change' and 'issue area' as composite categories.

Table 3 in the Appendix presents these overlapping ideas in a unified structure along with the pertinent variables in empirical research. Besides exogenous factors (which partly incorporates the 'resources' category) and dummies (mostly used for election years/periods), three major variable clusters emerge: *pledge-related, party-related* and *government-related* factors. Pledge-related variables are associated with the

[9] For saliency studies, the most widely used pairing of variables consisted of the issue emphases in federal expenditure categories (dependent variable) and those of election platforms (which was used as the explanatory variable; in this the authors followed the lead of Budge and Hofferbert, 1990). This research direction is strongly tied to the work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG)/Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and the policy topic coding system used by the latter (see https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/coding_schemes/1). Recent developments added breadth to the approach, which now focuses on voter preferences as they are manifest in survey data (Pennings, 2005), inter alia. On the dependent variable side, a three-fold description of pledge fulfillment (fully, partially or not fulfilled) has emerged as the standard, even as the causal models in these pieces of research are almost exclusively binary: fulfilled/not fulfilled. (I thank the anonymous reviewer for making this point—for exceptions see e.g., Toros, 2015: 246.)

[10] For an exception see the survey method used by Naurin, 2011.

pre-election phase of the linkage process. Most often they refer to the content of manifestos and pledges (issue area; left/right understood in terms of e.g., tax cuts; status quo or change). Some others touch on the entire corpus of pledges (saliency measures) or the action or outcome oriented nature.

Two further groups are relevant for the post-election phase of the linkage process. Party-related variables describe the political clout of parties (legislative control), its history (incumbency) or its future oriented pledges vis-á-vis other parties' pledges (consensus). The third group, government-related factors, resembles previous categorizations most ('government type'; 'decision-making environment'). This three-fold classification scheme provides a means to relate the underlying empirical variable groups to mandate slippage theory.

V. Measuring Mandate Slippage with Pledge Research Variables

Situating variables in the linkage process is a crucial step toward measuring mandate slippage. First of all, some variables are unrelated to the concept of mandate slippage as they refer to the pre-electoral phase of the process. These variables describe pledges as components of manifestos: the content or saliency of specific promises. Anomalies, such as an overwhelming reliance on outcome pledges (as opposed to output/action pledges), in these cases are only relevant for a discussion on *bad mandates*, as opposed to the mandate slippage.

As for the post-election phase of the linkage process pledge research offers insights into mandate slippage, at least in some cases. A simple re-ordering of the elements along the tree structure of Figure 1 will immediately shed light on the potential of adapting these empirical variables for the purposes of normative evaluation (see Table 4 in the Appendix).

The linkage process unfolds through five major phases: the formulation of policy preferences; the formulation of pledges; the assignment of party seats in the legislature; government formation; and execution. A brief evaluation of the variables, as situated in this process, from a normative standpoint is as follows.

Forward-looking *voter preferences* lie at the root of all ex ante theories of representation. However, these may or may not be reflected in party manifestos since bottom-up preference representation is limited by incomplete, transient and manipulated preferences. The actual mandate formation process is less reminiscent of a nationwide poll of opinions on all policy issue than an amalgamation of party stances, ideologies and polls of preferences regarding specific issues. The resulting electoral programs provide a transparent interface for voters' interaction with parties, and for both interested parties the content of the contract is unveiled during the campaign. Information is readily available, at no or negligible cost, and voters make their choice by either using it or opting for rational ignorance about it.

The key normative concept of these first two phases (preferences formulation; pledge formulation) is the *bad mandate*. A bad mandate is by and large unrelated to mandate *content*: electoral authorization is *always* ripe with content as a mandate may include policy, personal and party elements with only blurred lines separating these segments (Hershey, 1994). Manifestos also provide a wide selection of information for

voters, including the party's position in the policy space (such as the left-right spectrum), what issues it emphasizes, and the general weight of policy issues as opposed to political statements with no policy relevance. The wide variety of variables in empirical pledge research describing content (*context area; status quo; favored groups; expand/cut taxes; policy instruments*) reflects the diversity of types of content.

Nevertheless, the most widely used variables in this category only derive their normative importance from describing the information level of campaigns not actual policy positions. In this context better information (in terms of its scope, depth, concreteness: see the *output/outcome* variable) equals better mandates. Similarly, the lack of manifestos may be indicative of bad mandates (even as a counterweight to the lack of explicit manifestos the policy history of parties and candidates should also be factored in). More salient pledges, on the contrary, have a higher visibility in the mandate 'cloud' and, therefore, they are expected to be fulfilled at a higher rate. Finally, economic indicators are factored in both to electoral decisions and policy outcome, yet—as they lag behind political decisions; and an element of luck is ever present—they have no clear normative relevance.[11]

Election day provides a linkage between the electorate and parties, which forms the basis of a legitimate government (see ex ante authorization, as the first step in the delegation chain). Elections (via turnout, voting and the electoral system) convert policy preferences to party size in the legislature.

The crucial element here is the proportionality of pledge fulfillment to party size. This sets the normative evaluation of a number of overlapping variables (including *coalition/grand coalition; chief executive*). Of these, *government/opposition* clearly enjoys a unique position, both in theory and empirical research: it selects the subjects of pledge fulfillment (governing parties) as well as the actual set of pledges to be fulfilled. *Consensus* pledges, which a number of parties explicitly support, are to be fulfilled at a higher ratio than, say, 'purely' opposition pledges because of their wider support. This reasoning also applies to pledges featured in the *coalition agreement*.

Perhaps the most developed set of explanatory variables in current mandate research concern government formation. Yet most of these variables are related to the trade-off between governability (having a stable government as opposed to a constant flow of early elections) and pledge fulfillment. This phase gives rise to the idea of unified and divided mandates, with the latter prevalent in the cases of coalition governments. The number of participants (*coalition/single party government*) and their ideological background (*coalition/grand coalition*) in itself signifies no normative value. They may be the result of a dominantly proportional electoral system or heterogeneous voter preferences. Furthermore, *ministerial control* may be misaligned with pledges made, but may be the price to be paid for a stable government.

While variables related to government formation may serve as the key focus of some pledge research, the ultimate phase of implementation is more important from the perspective of normative analysis. In this stage the mandate is already set for each policy area: either by virtue of the initial authorization or the reshuffle of saliency and

[11] In fact, the study of 'mandate cloud fulfillment' instead of 'pledge fulfillment' or 'saliency research' could lead to a new, more realistic research direction. Needless to say, this would involve a more detailed analysis of campaigns contrary to the current focus on government fulfillment.

control due to government formation. Nevertheless, divided government still plays a role with regards to the problem of input vs. output legitimacy.

The wider bureaucratic structure, including the institutions of the system of separation of powers is a 'melting pot', where sources of legitimacy are intermixed. From an institutional perspective, constitutional courts and independent central banks are designed in a way that is expressly meant to give them the ability to withstand public pressure. Thus, input legitimacy (the theoretical basis on which ex ante authorization processes are built) competes with output legitimacy: in the eyes of the electorate, the value of pledge fulfillment competes with 'good' policy outcomes. The trunk of the delegation tree is disconnected from certain policy decisions in the given policy domain: some branches grow out of this trunk, others are hanging in the air.

This presents a complicated scenario for normative analysis. On the one hand, non-fulfillment or the lack of co-operation by *non-majoritarian institutions* (such as the role a central bank plays in pledges concerning economic growth) represents a trade-off between input and output legitimacy. On the other hand, *agency slippage*, in the form of shirking by street level bureaucrats or others, is considered detrimental for the proper functioning of the mandate model. The status of what could be referred to as *partner noncompliance* is less straightforward: this is typical of outcome-related pledges, as they require the cooperation of extra-governmental actors. In these cases coercing non-obliging actors into joint action may have adverse consequences for representative government as a whole.

Taken together, the above-mentioned factors have a bearing on the rate of pledge fulfillment. In general, pledge fulfillment may be favorable from a normative perspective, but non-fulfillment is not necessarily bad. As a result pledge fulfillment can only be normatively evaluated in the wider context of the process of representation, and by a detailed analysis of each step and variable related to this process.

Mandate slippage can only be measured when provided a good mandate: missing and ill-defined sources are difficult to track through the process of delegation. Variables widely used in pledge research may prove key components in any empirical analysis of mandate slippage. They may fall into good, neutral or bad categories depending on the presence of logics competing with the inherent value of pledge fulfillment (such as governability or output legitimacy).

As for our normative analysis, only a few variables stand out for their normative relevance both when it comes to bad mandates and bad mandate slippage. The composition of the mandate cloud lead to relatively good or bad mandates, as in the case of output and outcome pledges. Bad mandate slippage may result from agency shirking in the implementation phase. In contrast, the positive evaluation of government party fulfillment could lead to a wider category encompassing various forms of popular support and party size (pledges enjoying a wider consensus; put forth by the formateur party/chief executive).

VI. Conclusion

This article introduced the concept of mandate slippage, and the related terminology of bad mandates, as well as good and bad mandate slippage. It relates these concepts to empirical pledge research as the research agenda of the latter presents a unique opportunity to apply these concepts to the reality of contemporary representative government.

The argument unfolded in three steps. First, the baseline principal-agent theory of representation was presented. Its various discontents include its reliance on the delegation chain metaphor and its inability to incorporate parallel processes of governance. For these reasons the alternative metaphor of the delegation tree was introduced. This captures more accurately the multiplicity of policy subsystems and the individual paths of various pledges from formulation to implementation.

Second, the concepts of bad mandates, and those of good and bad mandate slippages were introduced in order to account for disrupted principal-agent relations. Third, the conceptual framework presented in the previous chapters is translated for the purposes of empirical research in order to be able to measure mandate slippage. It was argued that the theory of mandate slippage offers a hitherto missing general framework for situating and understanding empirical variables in the preferences-program-policy linkage.

Throughout our analysis the point was made that empirical pledge research will only make sense from a normative perspective if it can answer two simple questions:

1. Is non-fulfillment bad for representation?
2. If and when it is bad, which factors are responsible for this negative outcome?

In contrast to extant research based on implicit mandate theory, the answer put forth to the first questions is: 'not necessarily'. Indeed, one of the aims of this paper was to show that non-fulfillment may be related to neutral or even beneficial factors in the linkage process leading to 'good' representation. In the most simple rendering, 'good' representation consists of 'good' substance and 'good' process. On the one hand, a properly functioning delegation chain (or tree) provides the latter. On the other hand, it is quite impossible to forecast in a pre-defined manifesto all decisions of a parliamentary cycle of, say, four years. This is why *both* pledges and issue saliency matter—and also the missing element of underlying party ideology as well as the general trends in the (policy) contents of past decisions.

'Good substance,' therefore, partly results from this more general link between campaign content (best understood as a 'pledge cloud') and government deeds. The other source of good substance is leadership or finding adequate answers in response to a changing environment (see exogenous shocks and the associated policy switches, Stokes, 1999).[12]

The second research question concerns factors underlying pledge non-fulfillment in a negative normative status. In the analysis two main culprits are picked

[12] This source is unrelated to ex ante authorization and, therefore, is of less importance for our current purposes.

out: bad mandates and bad mandate slippage. Bad mandates make pledge fulfillment irrelevant as in these cases there are no pledges to start with, or because they are vague, disorienting even. Bad mandate slippage causes the non-fulfillment of pledges in a way that is unrelated to normatively valuable trade-offs between fulfillment and governability or outcome legitimacy.

In conclusion, a normatively relevant pledge (and saliency) research agenda should focus more on variables that have some bearing on bad mandates or bad mandate slippage. This entails more emphasis on the initial and ultimate phases of the delegation process: pledge formulation and implementation. A reoriented research agenda will make great strides toward fulfilling the promise of pledge research as the empirical study of representative government.

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Appendix

Table 3. Hypotheses (H) and variables (V) in recent pledge research[13]

Unit of observation/ Focus	Variable	Toros 2015	Pétry Duval 2015	Dobos 2015	Dobos Gyulai 2015	Praprotnik 2015	Thomson et al. 2014	Naurin 2013	Kostad inova 2013	Sebők et al. 2013	Ferguson 2012	Artes 2011	Thomson et al. 2010	Costello Thomson 2008	Artes Bustos 2008	Thomson 2001	Royed 1996	SUM
EXOG.	GDP growth	H3					V						V					3
DUMMY	Election year	V		V				V								V		4
PLEDGE	Context area	V						V		V	V			V	V		V	7
PLEDGE	Status quo		V			H5	V	V	H2		V		V	V	V	H4	V	11
PLEDGE	Favoured grops														V			1
PLEDGE	Expand/cut taxes		V				V	V	H4			V			V		V	7
PLEDGE	Policy instruments							V							V		V	3
PLEDGE	EU				H1-2			V	V									3
PLEDGE	Pledge saliency					H8							V	V		H5		4
PLEDGE	Output/outcome						V	V		V							V	4
PARTY	Gov party vs. Opp.	H1		H1		H1			H1		H1	H1		V	V	H1		9
PARTY	Incumbency	V																1
PARTY	Legislative majority						V						V					2
PARTY	Party size / seat share			H2						V								2
PARTY	Consensus / Agree		V			H6-7			H3		V			V		H6	V	7
GOVERN'T	Coalition/single party gov	H2					V						V		V	H2		5
GOVERN'T	Coalition/grand coalition										H2							1
GOVERN'T	Minority government		V									H2-3	V		V			4
GOVERN'T	Short governments						V						V					2
GOVERN'T	Coalition agreement					H4	V			V			V	V		H7		6
GOVERN'T	Ministerial control			H3		H3	V			V	V		V	V		H3		8
GOVERN'T	Chief executive					H2	V						V					3
	TOTAL	**6**	**4**	**4**	**1**	**7**	**10**	**7**	**5**	**5**	**6**	**3**	**10**	**7**	**8**	**8**	**6**	**97**

[13] Abbreviations: exog. for exogenous; govern't for government. Variable groups are presented by headline variable followed by related variables in the literature in brackets. GDP growth (Economic index); Election year (Election period); Context area (Issue area; Subject category; Policy area; Pledge field; Domestic; Socio-economic; Planned economy; Economic field); Status quo (Change); Expand/cut taxes (Expand/cut spending; More/less public sector); Policy instruments (Legislation; Review); Party platform topic saliency ('prominenter'; Media coverage); Output (Action); Legislative majority (U.S. congressional control); Coalition agreement (Inter-party agreement; Government agreement); Ministerial control (Relevant portfolio); Consensus (Agree; Pledge agreement); Chief executive (prime minister).

Table 4. The normative status of pledge research variables

Phase of linkage process	Empirical variable	Normative status regarding linkage process	Comment
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES			
Exogenous preferences	Voter preferences	No straightforward normative relevance	Bottom-up preference representation is limited by incomplete, transient and manipulated preferences
Pledges	Context area (incl. EU)	No straightforward normative relevance	No clear hierarchy between policy areas is discernible when it comes to mandate fulfillment
	Status quo	No straightforward normative relevance	As long as they convey a clear message, status quo and change-type pledges can be equally important
	Favoured groups	No straightforward normative relevance	Preferences for favoured groups are rooted in ideology
	Expand/cut taxes	No straightforward normative relevance	As long as they convey a clear message, government expansion/cuts-type pledges can be equally important
	Policy instruments	No straightforward normative relevance	Alternative policy instruments may lead to similar results
	Pledge saliency	The fulfillment of more salient pledges is preferred	More salient pledges have a higher visibility in the mandate 'cloud'
	Output/outcome	Output pledges are preferred	Outcome pledges exploit the bounded rationality of the electorate; May only be fulfilled with luck. Outcome pledges can be considered to be an important element of bad mandates.
Exogeonus factors	GDP growth	No straightforward empirical relevance	Economic indicators lag behind political decisions; an element of luck is present
ELECTIONS			
Parties	Government vs. opposition party	A higher ratio of government party pledge fulfillment is preferred	Government party pledge fulfillment is in line with responsible party government theory: Opposition pledge fulfillment may also be beneficial if it is related to

Phase of linkage process	Empirical variable	Normative status regarding linkage process	Comment
			consensus
	Incumbency	No straightforward normative relevance	-
	Legislative majority / party size	Bigger parties should have more clout over pledge fulfillment (even in opposition)	Electoral institutions may place the party with the largest vote share in opposition.
	Consensus / agree	The redemption of consensus pledges is preferred	Consensus pledges enjoy higher support in the electorate
GOVERNMENT FORMATION			
Government: structure and program	Coalition / single party government	No straightforward normative relevance	Coalition or single party government may be the result of the vote of a heterogenous electorate
	Coalition / grand coalition	A higher ratio of formateur party pledge fulfillment is preferred	This is an application of the reasoning with regards to party size
	Majority / minority government	No straightforward normative relevance	There is a trade-off between governability and mandate fulfillment. Furthermore, a minority government may still be supported by a majority of the electorate (due to the effects of the electoral system)
	Coalition agreement	The redemption of consensus pledges is preferred	Manifesto pledges also featured in the coalition agreement are a form of consensus pledges.
	Ministerial control	No straightforward normative relevance	There is a trade-off between governability and mandate fulfillment: a stable government may require the formateur party to relinquish portfolios pertinent to its most salient pledges
	Chief executive	Insofar as the party affiliation of the chief executive is indicative of party size a higher fulfillment ratio is preferred	As a general empirical tendency the party with the highest vote share/seats nominates the chief executive
IMPLEMENTATION			

Phase of linkage process	Empirical variable	Normative status regarding linkage process	Comment
Governance and execution	Pledges related to non-majoritarian institutions	No straightforward normative relevance	There is a trade-off between input and output legitimacy in representative systems: Non-fulfillment of pledges related to the policy authority of non-majoritarian institutions is not inherently bad
	Short governments	No straightforward normative relevance	Cabinets may resign over many reasons
	Agency slippage	Agency slippage is a unique type of bad slippage	As opposed to institutional frictional loss in the case of government formation this form is unrelated to heterogenous voter preferences
	Partner non-compliance	A consequence of bad mandates: no straightforward normative relevance	Outcome pledges may differ from output pledges in their reliance on luck or players outside government. Non-fulfillment may be related to the latter
DEPENDENT VARIABLE			
End of the government cycle	Pledge fulfilled/emphasis matched	Pledge fulfillment may be favourable; Non-fulfillment is not necessarily bad	Pledge fulfillment can only be normatively evaluated in the wider context of the process of representation

Book Review

Varieties on Discursive Governance

Umut Korkut, Kesi Mahendran, Gregg Bucken-Knapp, and Robert Henry Cox (eds) (2015): Discursive Governance in Politics, Policy and the Public Sphere. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

The view that ideas play an important role in the policy process can be labelled as commonplace today. More than two decades ago, Peter Hall argued (Hall 1993) that beyond expertise and technical knowledge, we also have to consider policy paradigms to understand public policy-making. His article has 'provide[d] a foothold for a new wave of ideational scholarship in policy science' (Béland – Cox 2013, 195). However, recent pieces of that ideational scholarship seem to problematize the structuralism of the Hallian approach, and lay a greater emphasis on agency (see e.g. Bevir – Rhodes 2006; Béland – Cox 2011; Hay 2011). This focus on agency is often coupled by a focus on the broader categories of discourse and ideas (see e.g. Schmidt 2002; 2010; 2014). These factors enable ideational approaches to acknowledge the normative role of intersubjective ideas in regulating political conduct, and at the same time pay attention to the active role of political agency in shaping those ideas.

The volume edited by Umut Korkut, Kesi Mahendran, Gregg Buckan-Knapp, and Robert Henry Cox fits into this research tradition. Cox, a prominent figure in today's ideational scholarship, highlights in his Preface that '[t]he main intellectual message in this volume is that most of the social world is socially constructed' (xiii.). The meaning of 'discursive governance' is to be understood in the light of that social constructivist assumption. As the editors in the Introduction put it: 'discursive governance refers to implicit mechanisms of governance resting on narratives, leitmotifs, and strategic metaphors in political language, and the subsequent framing of policies using such language to interpose ideas in order to affect political and social representations within the public sphere in accordance with the wishes of political authorities.' (p. 2) In this volume, as in several constructivist/ideational works, discourse is seen as strategic (in the sense of being a tool of legitimizing policy measures or achieving political goals), as well as constitutive (in the sense of shaping the perceptions of those who participate in the discourse).

The editors argue that identities, communities, as well as institutions are shaped by our ideas that we communicate through discourse. To use Schmidt's distinction (Schmidt 2002), the discourse has both an ideational and an interactive dimension. The editors see the most important contribution of the volume in reconstructing the latter, interactive dimension, or, as they put it in 'tracing the discursive relationship among actors, namely governments and political parties, policy participants and societal actors, and the public' (p. 2).

Each chapter of the volume analyses an empirical case (or compares more cases), and tries to draw some theoretical conclusions, ask potentially important questions for further research. Although the cases show a great variety, there are some

topics on which several chapters touch, such as European integration, migration, or gender equality. The methods used by the authors are also manifold, ranging from qualitative content analysis through critical discourse and critical frame analysis to quota-sampled interviews. In the following, I will try to touch briefly upon the main findings of every article, while dwelling longer on some of them to illustrate a couple of the main problems addressed by the volume.

The volume is organized into three parts. As the variety of topics and methods suggest, chapters are often connected rather loosely. In the first part, the focus is mainly on political parties, more precisely on how they use and generate discourses. In the second, other political and social actors come to the fore; and the third is mainly about the role of the public sphere in discursive governance. The first and second parts contain four chapters each, while the third consists of three.

In the opening chapter, Lena Karamanidou uses a Critical Discourse Analysis approach to identify and analyse different frames and narratives that Greek government parties used about violence against migrants. The frame of illegalization denied migrants their true asylum-seekers status by emphasizing the illegality of the way they entered the country; while the frame of securitization identified migration as a threat to employment, national and cultural identity and to public order. The narratives construing anti-migrant violence as isolated events (in an expressive metaphor of a government spokesperson: '[i]n every basket of apples there is a rotten one that needs to be removed' – p. 23) and recurrently emphasizing a lack of evidence served similar goals. In Karamanidou's view, these goals were, on the one hand, to cover certain institutional (structural) shortcomings of the Greek polity (the unaccountability of security agencies, and connected to it the flawed nature of investigations about cases of violence committed by them). On the other hand, they helped the state to maintain one of its highly symbolic functions (the exercise of sovereignty understood as protecting citizens), and at the same time to cover the failure of the Greek state to exercise this function within the normative requirements of liberal democracy. The paradox of the case lies in the fact that while the government condemned violence against migrants as a violation of democratic norms, the discursive practices mentioned above contributed to the legitimization of that violence.

The chapter written by Umut Korkut and Aron Buzogány problematizes the interaction between institutional (structural) and ideational factors. They compare the health care policy reforms in Slovakia and Hungary. What makes this comparison particularly interesting is that despite the similarity of certain conditions and of the ideational background of the reforms (neo-liberal economic ideas) one of the attempts ended with success, the other with complete failure. They argue that the different outcomes were due to the different relationship between institutional and discursive factors. In Slovakia, the institutional arrangements (the position of reform teams within government; the role of prime minister Dzurinda as a publicly acknowledged, authentic leader, head of a Europeanizing right-wing elite and as middleman in the coalition; the opportunity of coalition partners to carry out their own portfolio) played a vital role in the success by boosting ideational factors. By contrast, in Hungary the synergy between ideational and institutional factors was missing. Coalition tensions

between the liberals and the socialists, the weakening authority of Hungarian PM Ferenc Gyurcsány after his leaked Őszöd-speech (in which he admitted lying to the voters before the elections), and the dissipation of the government's reform capacity with the dismissal of the liberal minister for healthcare Lajos Molnár led to the failure of the reform plans. Besides these factors, the successful negative framing of the planned reform by then-opposition party Fidesz also contributed to the failure. According to the authors, 'the Hungarian case illustrates [that] discursive factors cannot bring forward policy reforms unless they enjoy institutional factors that enforce their resonance in the public sphere and impact of policy making' (p. 59). The conclusion of the chapter in fact seems to point toward the limits of discursive governance: ideational factors and discourse on their own are not enough for a successful reform.

The remaining two chapters of this part show how parties use certain ideas strategically. In the article of Mikael Nygård et al., the idea of social investment, human capital and equality of opportunity (concepts usually having a positive connotation) are used to legitimate policy shifts undertaken by parties. Mari K. Niemi shows how the selection of women as party leaders serves strategic purposes, although in different ways. In the Swedish case, through the selection of Mona Sahlin, her party tried to appeal to the Swedish public that is very sensitive about equality issues; while in the Finnish case the cause of selecting Jutta Urpilainen was rather her immaculate image. This difference draws our attention to the importance of the public/discursive context: as Niemi emphasizes, contrary to the common sense notion, the several kinds of Nordic public are not homogeneous when it comes to progressiveness.

While parties are the primary initiators of policy discourses, other agents can play active roles as well. The rest of the book is about such actors – the second part about societal actors and policy participants, the third about the role of the public.

The chapter by Marcin Dąbrowski illustrates how a new public policy instrument (the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas – JESSICA) 'can result in the discursive frames becoming reality through incentives to change behavior and the perceived interest of the actors' (p. 93). The new frame mentioned is the 'results-oriented' recalibration of the EU cohesion policy by the European Commission, following the economic crises and the emergence of the idea of austerity.

A common point between the chapter by Dąbrowski and that by Alexandra Bousiou and Antonios Kontis is the importance of how policy actors interpret certain discursive packages presented to them. While in the former case, the new Commission Discourse and the policy instrument fostered new (although not at all unproblematic) cooperation and synergies between policy actors, in the latter case a narrative competition has begun. That competition takes place between the asylum policy of the EU and the bilateral agreements of southern member states with the countries of North-Africa concerning migration control. While the measures of the EU asylum policy are both control- and prevention oriented (both short- and long-term), the inability of this union-level policy to handle cases of emergency led southern member states to focus only on the short-term, control-oriented measures. This resulted in disregarding the long-term dimension and several normative aspects

of the EU-level policy (e.g. that of refugee protection, and democratic reforms in North-African countries). Therefore, while the presence of a potentially transformative policy-instrument (that of JESSICA) can help in turning discursive commitments into reality, the lack of such instruments (in the case of EU asylum-policy) can lead to rivalling interpretations and narrative competition.

The other two chapters in this part show the potential power of discourse and the role of other, non-party actors in the discursive process. In the chapter written by Angela O'Hagan, these actors are femocrats and policy entrepreneurs who are able to present a particular policy goal (the introduction of gender budgeting) as essential to achieving the policy priorities of governments. Gregg Bucken-Knapp et al. emphasized the role of the media in framing labour migration in Sweden.

A key question of any discursive theory is how we look upon the 'recipients' of the discourse, that is, upon the wider public. The third part of the volume tries to cope with this problem. The last chapter written by Hande Eslen-Ziya et al. is about the potential tension between constitutional norms and public attitudes. The case that it analyses is the paradox of the South African equality legislation: while equality as a norm resonates with the views of South-African society, LGBTI rights form an exception. This fact renders the constitutional protection of these rights ineffective. In this case, ideas challenge formal institutions – more precisely: the 'conservative' ideas of the public are at odds with the 'progressive' ideas institutionalized in the constitution. Ideas in this case are understood as 'beliefs held by people in general' (p. 179). It is remarkable that the authors of the chapter seem to attribute a rather passive role of the citizenry, relying on former researches that conclude that 'citizens lack factual information on political matters [and] [s]uch deficiency in political knowledge [...] affects their political behavior' (p. 186). This view leads them to emphasize the role of the political and social elite (state representatives, churches, media) in forming public beliefs.

Contrary to the analysis of Eslen-Ziya et al., the chapter by Kesi Mahendran et al. offers a micro-level perspective and attributes a more active role to citizens in the discursive processes. Relying on quota-sampled interviews of non-migrants, intra-European migrants and non-European migrants, they investigate citizens' ideas about European citizenship. They draw on Bakhtin's concept of 'authoring', a process where people create a dialogical self, bringing in the voices of others when speaking about a topic – in this case, about their relationship to European citizenship. This points towards an understanding of social representations as dynamically created during interactions, and 'exist[ing] between people, rather than in the heads of people' (p. 148); and towards the European public sphere understood as 'a relational site [...] a more symbolic space, where stories circulate and shared stories create borders' (pp. 153–154). These theoretical considerations lead them to introduce the concept of the 'dialogical citizen', that 'enables a public citizen to emerge engaged with stories, metaphors and narrative ideas as a way of both enacting and making sense of Europe' (p. 152), thereby actively engaging with 'social knowledge circulating in a globalized and relational public space' (p. 161). The image of the 'dialogical citizen' is founded on the interviews conducted by the authors. They identify various identification and disidentification patterns among the interviewed. The results lead to a conclusion

contrary to Raymond Aron's statement that '[t]he European idea is empty', and to the claim that 'it seems to have gained some narrative plausibility [because] ordinary people are able to project their ideals into the European project' (p. 161). More concretely, they identify the 'freedom through mobility' narrative as a potential basis of identification with the EU-project.

The last chapter of the volume by Arno van der Zwet tries to reconstruct the dynamics of how party discourses resonate with the public; it focuses on the parties' innovative use of a certain idea. The problem he analyses is how endorsing the idea of European integration can contribute to the mainstreaming of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties. He identifies three main areas: legitimizing core goals, moderating core message, and offering a platform for learning (through participating in the European Free Alliance). The main finding is that the protean nature of the European integration narrative and the malleability of the European idea is a crucial factor that enables these parties to frame it to their strategic goals – showing it as either a process towards post-sovereignty (as in the case of the Flemish FNP), or as an intergovernmental cooperation of sovereign nation-states (as in the case of the Scottish SNP).

In summary, the volume offers a wide range of contributions to several highly actual problems (such as the migration problem or the future perspectives of the welfare state), and sophisticated analyses about their impacts on concrete policy fields. Researchers interested in the topics of European integration or gender equality, and in critical or feminist perspectives could also read it with interest. The structure of the volume is mainly logical – a considerable merit at this thematic and methodological variety – although one might have questions at some points (for example it seems to me that the chapter by van der Zwet might fit better into the first part than the one by Korkut and Buzogány).

Finally, a short remark about the notion of 'discursive governance'. Discursive approaches often face the fact that there is substantial distance between their theoretical background and their empirical analyses. The reader might feel something similar in the case of this volume, too. While the theoretical parts (the Preface and the Introduction) articulate a clear-cut social constructivist view, some chapters deal with problems that would not necessarily (or only partly) need this theoretical background to be addressed (e.g. the 'classical' institutional problems in the case of Korkut and Buzogány; an EU-level policy failure and national responses to it in the case of Bousiou and Kontis; or the impacts and shortcomings of a new policy instrument in Dąbrowski's chapter). At the same time, some chapters (most notably that by Mahendran et al.) build on social constructivist views more substantively. So, if I had to name the lowest common denominator of all chapters, it would be – to borrow a phrase from Thomas A. Schwandt – some kind of 'garden-variety constructivism' (Schwandt 2010, 46.), meaning here that all authors attribute some importance to discursive factors, although in some cases this role is rather supplementary, in others more substantial. However, this is certainly not a grave problem, and it is perhaps even unavoidable in the case of a volume that tries to connect many authors with different topics and approaches.

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Informality and the Invisibility of Roma Political Participation

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Abstract

The past decades have been characterised by a puzzling dilemma of the politics of the 'Roma issue' in European societies and also on the international level. On the one hand, due to the intense work of a range of influential international organisations of Roma representation and the enduring efforts of a group of dedicated politicians acting on the European level, the case of Roma has become thematised in political terms and as such, it has been drawn into the arena of governmental and inter-governmental politics and policy-making. As a peak of such efforts, the formulation of a national strategy on Roma inclusion has been made a task for all member states of the European Union and this way it has been successfully elevated to the existing mechanisms of monitoring and reviewing as parts of the Europe-wide applied open method of coordination in outlining developmental plans and policies. On the other hand, domestic statistics and research signal the lack of any improvement in the situation of Roma: occurrences of discrimination and segregation have not diminished, poverty and the extreme inequalities hitting Roma in education, work and the daily conditions of living have not been decreased, and the tendencies of exclusion have become stronger in a wide range of local communities all across. In an indirect way, these latter developments indicate the weakness and marginal state of Roma politics in attaining any breakthrough in the structures of power. A closer look at the conditions in a broader scope of political participation reveals how informality in articulating needs and claims weakens the potency of the minority in influencing decision-making about their cause, while the very same relations properly fit into their experiences of daily living. An overview of the conditions and prevailing relations in education and work in marginalised Roma communities will serve to demonstrate the congruence of informalisation between the daily realities and their political representation.

Keywords: political participation; informality; minority rights.

Introduction

The past decades have been characterised by a puzzling dilemma of the politics of the 'Roma issue' in European societies and also on the international level. On the one hand, due to the intense work of a range of influential international organisations of Roma representation and the enduring efforts of a group of dedicated politicians acting on the European level, the case of Roma has become thematised in political terms and as such, it has been drawn into the arena of governmental and inter-governmental politics and policy-making (Vermeersch, 2007; van Baar, 2011). On the other hand, national statistics and research signal the lack of any improvement in the situation of Roma: occurrences of discrimination and segregation have not diminished, poverty and the extreme inequalities hitting Roma in education, work and the daily conditions of living have not been decreased, and the tendencies of exclusion have become stronger in a wide range of local communities all across Europe (FRA, 2014; Kullmann et al., 2014). In an indirect way, these latter developments indicate the weakness and marginal state of Roma politics in attaining any breakthrough in the prevailing distribution of power and thus signal the perpetuation of the social and political contexts that bring about an undisturbed reproduction of deprivation and exclusion.

Such a duality suggests that the politics of the 'Roma issue' is caught by unbridgeable departures. On the one hand, new institutions and new mechanisms of negotiations are in place in international and macro-level domestic currents, but these function largely without Roma participation; on the other hand, politically meaningful representation is seriously lacking in the settings where Roma live and where their lives are framed by the largely unchanged conditions of the communities that they are part of (Kóczé, 2013; Pajic, 2013).

However, this duality and the sharp discrepancies between the macro- and micro-level politics around the 'Roma issue' call for explanation. Most frequently it is pointed out that, as part of the Europeanisation process driven by shared interests of unity of Europe's nation-states, powerful alliances could be created around the 'Roma issue' as framed in terms of discrimination (human rights violation) and the rights of national minorities (Vermeersch, 2007; Sigona and Trehan, 2009; van Baar, 2011). At the same time, issues of segregation, poverty and deprivation as daily experiences in local communities rarely invoke political responses. Such failures of local-level politics and policy-making are, however, generally attributed to the widespread 'indifference' of Roma. 'Indifference' is usually reasoned to be due to their low education and their preoccupation with struggles for securing daily subsistence; it follows that the great majority of Roma neither have the potentials in time and energy nor have the knowledge to play politics (Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005). Therefore, exclusion from participating in politics has to be seen as a 'natural' consequence and as a deeply ingrained cultural feature that is daily reproduced by the very conditions at the heart of the problem. This way the duality is represented as an unchangeable given and the responsibility for such a state of affairs is left with the Roma minority and its 'uninterested' orientation.

This article aims to show that 'indifference' as an attitudinal trait of Roma does not provide a proper conceptualisation of the reality of Roma participation in local

affairs. Instead, I propose to approach the phenomenon by extending the notion of political participation through embracing both its formal and informal manifestations[1]. As I will attempt to show, a closer look at the conditions that shape Roma participation in local public life reveals the dominance of personified informal relations between the local majority and the minority. It will be pointed out that these relations largely hinder the evolution of organised political representation and actions while they maintain informality and the adjacent invisibility of Roma political involvement.

The theoretical foundations of such an extended approach to the phenomenon are provided by the classic work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward on *Poor People's Movement* (1979) who propose to conceptualise the often non-traditional movements and actions of the poor American working class by framing their cases in the structural positions of those involved, on the one hand, and the potentials – and the limitations – of accessing various organisational settings in attaining their specific goals, on the other hand. Such a framing of the political processes allows for seeing the emerging claims in the context of changing needs that are generated, in turn, by the dynamics of structural forces and it also helps to see how the often informal associations behind these claims find their way to political expressions by reinventing and reinterpreting the existing organisational arrangements of collective action.

A similar approach seems fruitful in the case of local Roma communities. Instead of 'throwing out of the boat' all the non-traditional incidences of participation and activity, the extension of our analysis to the embedding of such occurrences into the local social structures and their reflective analysis against the locally given organisational frameworks promises to bring in new aspects of involvement and expression. As I will argue below, such an extension of the scope implies the recognition of the formal and informal aspects of Roma daily living whereby a largely unrecognised duality of formality/informality can be brought into the understanding of everyday Roma political participation.

The empirical foundation of the discussion that follows is provided by a recent cross-country comparative study on 'Faces and causes of Roma marginalization and

[1] The distinction between the formal and informal forms of political participation considers the difference in the ways how participation is organised. Formal participation takes place either in registered organisations that follow legally defined rules of functioning and accountability, and/or it involves engagement in political activities that are organised according to set general regulations (e.g. elections). In addition to political organisations, participation in formal politics also embraces involvement in politically meaningful actions of non-political organisations (e.g. political demonstrations of trade unions). At the same time, the informal forms of political participation rely on spontaneously evolving loose associations of people and/or on one-time actions that do not claim lasting membership. Such loose associations and actions often emerge in response to certain non-political claims (e.g. educational needs, access to public work, etc.) and it is the public character of them that makes them 'political'. It is often the case that spontaneous informal collectives make steps towards formalisation through setting up a new registered entity (mainly a new NGO). However, such a development requires a modicum of human and material resources that are often not available to those involved in informal actions. It has to be noted that the border between the formal and the informal forms of politics is sometimes quite obscure: due to internal conflicts or the lack of resources, attempts at providing organisational framing to local politics might fail or the experiment might prove transient, while a group of the most dedicated members of the community go 'underground' and try to maintain the political content of their work and network in the form of initiated informal actions.

exclusion in local communities' that was run between 2012-14 in selected urban and rural communities in Hungary, Romania, and Serbia. This study looked at the structures and processes of marginalisation and exclusion in multi-ethnic communities with substantial Roma population and important groups of the non-Roma living in close proximity to the concentrated Roma communities. By combining quantitative data-collections and qualitative techniques of personal interviews and focus group discussions, the study looked in details at the locally existing provisions and developmental attempts in education, work and employment, and housing and infrastructure and contrasted these conditions with the daily experiences of their users, the young and adult generations of Roma and the poor. Experiences and opinions of the inhabitants of the marginalised Roma/poor segments were seen also in a relational way by facing them with the views of the representatives of the local non-Roma community whose explanations for the prevailing ethnic and ethnicised inequalities gave important points of reference in understanding the local power relations. This mirroring exercise helped us in detecting the major points of controversies and constraints between how Roma in dependency and non-Roma in power receive, explain and handle the same set of phenomena and the same set of relations in their background. Furthermore, the study put substantial weight on exploring the forms and the contents of participation in various domains of education, work and daily living in the broad sense of the term. It was our explicit aim to test how existing organisational settings are used and mobilised in meeting the needs of marginalised communities and how certain inadequacies of these settings are challenged by varied forms of informal participation. Given such extensions of the classical notion of engagement in politics, the collected material provides fertile soil for scrutinising the conditions and the logic of various forms of political participation ranging from informal involvement to the take-up of roles of representation and leadership. The discussion that follows builds on the extensive analyses of these conditions and manifestations as presented by the three in-depth country-studies of the research (Váradi and Virág, 2014a; Vincze, E. et al., 2014a; Cevjić, 2014a).

The institutional frameworks

The claim for creating appropriate frameworks for minority representation as parts of the legal, regulatory and administrative structures was one of the fundamental requirements that the three countries faced in joining the European Union. The case of Roma enjoyed particular importance in these preparatory negotiations. The responses to the claims of the EU required a thorough exploration of what 'minority status' and 'minority rights' mean in their respective social contexts. For sure, the concept of minority rights was new in their socio-political contexts. Given the 'one nation – one state' approach of the ruling Communist ideology and politics during the decades of state-socialism, even sizeable national minorities were denied special rights and institutions. With the profound turn now towards a liberal understanding of nationhood and towards the celebration of multinational/multicultural social relations, the concepts of nationhood and minority status gained new interpretations and these became the cornerstones of conceptualising identities and membership in the polity.

At the same time, these new interpretations had to be positioned against the prevailing traditions of representation and administration. The former problem meant to interpret the minority status of an ethnic group and meaningfully relate it to those of national minorities. The latter task bore on the institutional design: the frameworks of representation and rights protection had to be adjusted into the existing structures of national, regional and local governance. The three countries responded in three different ways to these challenges. However, their responses had an important common element: the case of Roma was kept apart from that of the traditional national minorities, and frameworks were created to guarantee the long-term maintenance of structural separation.

Hungary[2] experimented with the inauguration of a brand-new institution: in 1993 it established the system of local minority self-governments that were perceived as elected representative bodies to safeguard the cultural rights of the country's 13 national and ethnic minorities. This decentralised system of minority representation fits well into the highly decentralised structures of public administration. However, the restriction of representation to culture and the cultural contents (but not the framings) of education has implied that, from their inception, the local Roma self-governments were emptied of providing true representation.[3] After all, the preservation and revitalisation of Roma culture meant that the most pressing issues of discrimination, poverty and exclusion remained outside of the assigned competence of the new bodies. What is more, expectations in this regard implied the outright maintenance of those structures of deprivation that largely conditioned Roma culture in the past. Despite all these controversies and despite also the often constrained functioning of the new institutions due to tense local majority-minority relations, the system of minority self-governments provided for the first time electoral opportunities. Mainly this is the qualifying aspect of the new system that made it rather popular in Roma communities which is tellingly shown by the steadily growing number of local Roma self-governments by each election. Such a growing popularity reflects strong expectations of the Roma communities. Given the only available framework of representation and interest protection, they hope for some effective mediation and 'lobbying', although they are aware that such functions are not formally assigned to the institution. The discrepancy between the formal entitlements and the informal expectations surrounds the local Roma self-governments with a good deal of informality: the local leaders of the institution are faced with a permanent duality and use their formal power to strengthen their informal position in the community while they simultaneously maintain similarly informal relations with the municipalities and the non-Roma leaders of the community-at-large.

Romania[4] gave a different response to the EU requirements concerning Roma minority rights. On the one hand, a set of new legal regulations on anti-discrimination, acknowledged minority status as part of citizenship, the banning of segregation and the

[2] The presentation of the Hungarian case of local Roma representation relies on Váradi and Virág (2014b).

[3] Due to the relatively high educational level and above-average material conditions, further, due also to their small size and the support arriving from their mother-countries, the new system with new entitlements offers appropriate institutional framing for the other 12 minorities.

[4] The presentation of the Romanian case of minority representation relies on Vincze (2014b).

extension of multicultural education were seen to circumscribe minority rights. On the other hand, due representation of Roma was understood as a matter of communication between the majority and the minority. Such an approach implied the administration of the Roma cause without changes in the prevailing administrative structure. Institutional innovations were driven by this latter consideration: within a short while the system of educational and health mediators was set up with the clear goal of providing better bridging. However, the new mediators were not armed with proper power. Their positioning between the Roma communities and the authorities in charge of public administration introduced a good deal of insecurity in their status and left them without clear means as much for proper minority representation as for enacting regulations and municipal interventions. Such a floating position gave birth to all-round suspicions. Roma saw the extended arm of authoritarian control in the work of the mediators, while the authorities found disturbing their 'inappropriate' claims and interventions as hindering their functioning instead of helping it. This way the system of mediators quickly became de-legitimised from both ends and it suffered personal losses by the mass-scale departure of the personnel. However, the dramatic weakening of a system that was weak from its inception left the Roma communities without channels for formal representation. Apart from the handful of Roma participating in national politics, Roma remained enclosed in the informality of their communities where interest representation and protection remained the direct derivatives of personal relations – on rare occasions for the fortune, but mainly for the misfortune of the affected communities.

The Serbian case[5] is different yet again. It is important to note that Serbia is still not a member state of the European Union. Although the ongoing negotiations accompanying the preparation of accession put important weight on the acknowledgement of Roma minority rights, a fully-fledged functioning of the respective institutional arrangements has not been expected yet. In this sense, the current administration of the Roma cause can be seen as transient and incomplete. Nevertheless, the outlines seem to be clear and nothing points towards any intentions for their alteration. As it appears, Serbia does not conceive of the 'Roma issue' in the framework of minority rights. Instead, the case is conceptualised in the refinement and better targeting of administrative arrangements. This is reflected in the fact that the EU challenges were responded to by creating a wide range of administrative positions: 'Roma referees' and 'Roma departments' with clearly defined tasks and responsibilities have been inserted into the ministerial hierarchies and also into the functioning of the regional offices of public administration. This rigidly top-down construction does not reach the municipalities and the local offices which suggests that it is mainly coordination and control that they are assumed to provide. More to the point of rights and representation are the recent legislative acts that, in concordance with the EU requirements, tackle discrimination in the first place but that do not entrust any Roma minority bodies or institutions with representation and political negotiations. The latter are left to the rather weak structures of Roma parties and a rather immature build-up of a system of Roma health and educational mediators. However, neither the competing Roma parties, nor the loose network of mediators

[5] The presentation of the Serbian case of minority representation relies on Cvejić (2014b).

have been strong enough so far to provide needs articulation and interest protection for Roma on the field. Given the overweight of administrative arrangements and regulations, the traditional relationships between Roma and the majority in local communities have remained unaffected. The frames and contents of the prevailing patron/client relations largely continue to rule the scene with their ingrained informality. Any challenging of these relations falls outside of the competences of the Roma-specific administration. It is perhaps better and more accurate to say that a new administrative professionalism is actually built on the unchanged functioning of majority-minority relations that set the boundaries of rights and representation according to the well-established patterns of domination and subordination. New initiatives founded by a new understanding of the Roma cause find themselves outside of the political arena and the civil organisations called into being are confined to act on the margins of society.

The above brief overview of the responses that the three countries gave to the challenges of the 'Roma issue' as an important constituent of their EU accession carries a few lessons. First, it shows that despite the remarkable differences in conceptualisation and practice, none of the applied solutions provides proper framing for Roma representation and none of them can be considered satisfactory in expressing and exercising minority rights. Instead, secondly, a common line can be identified in tackling the issue as a matter of expertise in administration and management. Given the common pursuit of administrative responses that maintain the prevailing power of the majority in governing the relationships with the Roma minority, it is not surprising that the new arrangements quickly lost the interest and support of the Roma community. In a way we can say that, by driving Roma interests away from the institutions and stages of meaningful politics, these attempts and arrangements help to reinforce the distancing of Roma from the scenes of true politicisation while they extend the control of the majority above all needs, issues and claims with potential implications for distinguished Roma articulation.

The third implication follows from these trends. Since the new arrangements either never aspired to providing representation to the Roma minority or quickly lost any such potential, they actually contribute to new waves of informalisation. As we saw, the deliberate reduction of competencies in the case of the Roma minority self-governments in Hungary, the discrediting of representation through mediation in the case of Romania and the drawing of the Roma cause under administrative settings in Serbia all failed to create the scope for articulating and protecting Roma interests in changing or at least improving the structural conditions of daily living. However, the squeezing of issues of segregation, poverty, discrimination and exclusion into the sideline does not erase the needs of and the claims for betterment. Instead, these needs and claims find new ways to informality where the lack of proper institutions and organisations has induced permanent insecurity, instability and an unceasing working of the haphazard patterns of personification. Amid these conditions, all what appears to the outsider as 'indifference in politics' is part of a fundamental feature: the all-round ruling of informality in driving the lives of the Roma community.

The causes of such a state of affairs are manifold. Beside the above discussed discrepancies between the official framing and the everyday realities of Roma political representation and participation, a closer look at the conditions in a broader scope of

participation may help us to see how informality in articulating needs and claims fits into the experiences of living up to the ruling of informal relations in the various domains of everyday life. An overview of the conditions and prevailing relations in education and work in marginalised Roma communities will serve to demonstrate the congruence of informalisation between the daily realities and their political representation.

The selection of these two domains is reasoned by a number of specificities. First, both provide experience concluding in common concerns and claims of the majority of the Roma communities. Second, both areas have been affected by important formal changes as parts of the broad reforms of post-socialist transformation and thus clearly show how marginalisation is reproduced in profoundly changed conditions. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Roma gave clear responses to the experienced institutional changes, still these responses and the claims that followed did not cross the boundaries of informality: the prevailing majority-minority relations and the implied inequalities of power have kept them caught in the established patron/client contacts of personal dependency.

Informalities in education

When considering recent trends in Roma education, two contrasting developments deserve particular attention. The first is an important change in the parental attitudes towards education. By experiencing the strengthened association between educational attainment and one's employment opportunities, Roma parents have started to emphatically pay attention to their children's schooling. Throughout the fieldwork – much in accordance with earlier findings[6] – parents gave voice to their conviction that the completion of schooling was the most important guarantee of employability, hence they are ready to make all efforts for extending schooling to a level affordable by the resources and conditions of the family. This way accomplishment of the primary school became a norm and most parents make serious efforts to facilitate their children's continuation also at the secondary level.

At the same time, the ongoing reforms in education have deepened the segmentation of the school systems in all our three countries by tightening the association of the various school-types with the expectable labour market and social positions. The adaptation of the designated social groups has been assisted by the various new forms of private education (including the extended interest of the churches in schooling) and the concurrent enactment of new rules of admission in public institutions. While these new trends affect mainly the schools and training forms at the secondary level, primary schools adapt to the new challenges by intensified streaming according to different clusters of knowledge and skills.

These manifold changes importantly affect Roma children's opportunities. As a rule they find themselves in the least valued streams in primary schools and face

[6] See the results of the qualitative inquiries with parents of school-age children in the four post-socialist countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia) that participated in the cross-country comparative study on 'Ethnic Differences in Education and Diverging Prospects for Urban Youth in an Enlarged Europe' (EDUMIGROM) (Szalai, 2011).

severe segregation into the units of poor vocational training at the secondary level (Messing, 2014). All these processes have been accompanied by pronounced informality that drew the claims of Roma parents and children under the uncontrollable and uncontrolled relationships between the schools and educational authorities on one side and Roma families on the other. A few examples may highlight the point.

The first is the case of the one-time special schools that used to host substantial proportions of Roma children away from the 'ordinary' arrangements of schooling. At the strong claims of human rights groups and the pressure of the European Union that considered such schools the embodiment of unlawful harsh segregation, the number of special schools has been significantly reduced in Romania and Serbia, and enrolment to these institutions was banned in Hungary. The new 'invention' in substitution was the introduction of a new educational category of students with 'special educational needs' whose education is expected to be organised in integrated arrangements in ordinary primary schools. However, being classified as a 'SEN child' carries a strong stigma resembling the old institutional labelling. As a rule, these children are considered inapt by intellectual and behavioural qualities to progress according to the ordinary pace and structuring of schooling. Hence, they usually find themselves at the bottom of the educational segments of the primary schools that usually implies outright deprivation of certain forms and contents of instruction.

Parents do not fail to see this form of segregation and try to give voice to claims for putting up their children into the 'normal' conditions. However, they are without means for making their claims complied with. These claims are seen by the school as 'unauthorised' intervention: after all, the new system of identifying who is and who is not a SEN student is built on the exclusive competence of the teachers and it implies their expertise in finding out 'the best' way for the child. Parents' claims are thus seen as unjustified and as inducing a disturbing 'noise' into the regular functioning of the system. And the schools' liberty to deny them is further underscored by the vastly shared views about the low competence of Roma parents in child-rearing and their unreliability relating to the requirements of education. It follows that Roma parents are left to acknowledge their multi-sided 'incompetence' and they remain without even the loose control that the old system provided by binding special school enrolment to parental consent. In brief, the acceptance of the low positioning of their children with gloomy prospects on continuation remains a rule that is seldom challenged by the rare occasions of fortunate personal relationships with one or another member of the school staff who acts on behalf of the child and the family by strongly emphasising the special favour implied in the exceptional case. Exceptionalness of such interventions underscores two important aspects at once: it demonstrates the significance of informality in transgressing the prevailing limitations while it also points to the severe restrictions on any such attempts.

The second powerful example of informality in education comes from vocational training.

Vocational training has been the target of important reforms in all the three countries. These reforms served two, partially conflicting, goals. On the one hand, vocational training schools as parts of the system of secondary education gained increased power in shaping their admittance policies by founding those on the

acknowledgement of students' earlier performance and by launching streams with clear hierarchical arrangements according to the measured indices of knowledge and skills. On the other hand, vocational schools have been considered in their relation to local labour market needs. More than before, these schools exercise a good deal of freedom in tightening their relationships with selected entrepreneurs and firms while declining interest in other fields and actors. The dual bondage of the reformed system is reflected in its administration: while the educational authorities maintain control over the educational tasks of the schools, their actual management and financing is bound to the local industrial boards having direct influence on their professional shaping.

The needs of Roma youth have to be seen against these frameworks. Given the state of sharp selection among the various forms of secondary education, apart from the tiny minority of some 15 per cent of the Roma students attending one or another form of secondary schools providing graduation in all the three countries, it is the vocational domain that has to accommodate the majority. However, the dominant part of the schools seems reluctant to open its doors to Roma. Their elevated prestige as educational units inspires them instead to apply the methods of 'good old' streaming. By building on their new freedoms of defining the profiles and the rules of admittance, the vocational schools devote themselves to the principles of competition and declare unbiased justice by applying these principles in admittance.

Roma students populate with very high over-representation the lowest-ranking streams and classes. They and their parents see the risks of how such separation implies segregation that does not lead anywhere on the formal labour market. However, there are only limited means at their disposal to respond, and all the available means fall outside of the frames of any formal protection. The first response – seemingly the one applied with the highest frequency – is to leave behind the school as soon as the age of compulsory education (16 years) is reached. Although this way the fleeing students risk later employment, and they also create hardship for the school in maintaining the 'emptied' tracks, the ceasing of outright humiliation together with the work on offer in the informal economy provide strong enough pulling factors. The second response also leads to informality: in cases when the parents succeed in keeping alive the old working contacts with their one-time non-Roma colleagues, these old friends are asked for mediation in order to attain a better and more meaningful placement for the child.

However, admittance is not the only point under informal rule in the system. Obscurity is perhaps even greater concerning the heart of acquiring a vocation: apprenticeship. The reforms in secondary education introduced decentralisation in this regard by shifting the responsibility for practical training from the regional or municipal educational boards to the schools. In the new arrangement, vocational schools are compelled to find placements for their students, and this implies tightening their relations with the local economic actors. However, this way the quality and later usability of the training has become directly dependent on the interests and willingness of these actors who, in turn, consider apprenticeship solely in terms of their recruitment policy. This way openness or refusal of their role in providing apprenticeship is conditioned by their position and success in the local competition. It is no surprise that such a direct competition creates its own hierarchy by offering

differentially attractive placements with highly differing contents and prospects for later employability. As a rule, Roma students are at the bottom of this hierarchy. Given their attendance in classes and streams with highly restricted opportunities for later employment, they are either refused any placement or are accepted by firms which themselves struggle for survival and which thus prove unable to offer usable practical training.

In addition, the family interviews revealed a great number of cases of harsh stigmatisation and direct discrimination. As parents disclosed their frustrating and annoying experiences, it turned out that, by referring to the prevailing prejudices of the non-Roma majority as a 'given' to set the stage, local entrepreneurs tend to refuse acceptance of Roma as a potential risk for the success of their business. Due to such refusals, Roma find themselves excluded from working in a non-Roma dominated shop floor or they are denied training in vocations that involve bodily contacts like butchers, waiters, hairdressers, etc. This way exclusion and sharp humiliation become parts of the experience of Roma in vocational training, and thus escaping this arena of education seems the only rational response.

Again, students and parents at best have informal ways of seeking personal favours and support. The availability of such contacts is conditioned by the old socialist acquaintances and/or by the offering of extra services within the prevailing system of patronage. It is easy to see that the younger generations of families can hardly mobilise such contacts and favours and this way remain without help and protection. The outcome is clear. Despite strong efforts for modernising the system, vocational training is still a domain of traditional relations of pre-modern patriarchy and it 'uses' its Roma clients to assure the unbroken maintenance of such relations. Part of the characteristic features of the domain is the low level of institutionalisation that provides a free flow to the ruling of informality. Given the weak positions of Roma in the system, informality implies deepened dependency that, in turn, concludes in segregation and ultimate exclusion.

The case of vocational training demonstrates perhaps even better than the segregating trends in primary education that these disturbing outcomes do not follow from the alleged 'indifference' of Roma in education but reflect the strength of the prevailing structures and the weaknesses of informal intervention for attaining any change of them.

However, informality hides the political momentum. Given the lack of collective political representation of needs and claims and the consequent lack of organisational frames, the actions and steps of Roma parents and students appear as purely personal intentions that do not add up to any collective claims. Their personified perception allows for reducing their handling to matters of individual behaviour that justifies the lack of any systematic responses and that also allows for maintaining personified patron/client relations as their base. At the same time, personification and a case-by-case management of the claims help to preserve the structurally conditioned distance between the individual attempts and the existing organisational settings. The differential conceptualisation in itself safeguards the departing workings by emphasising personal 'deservingness' on the one hand and the fulfilment of macro-level political and policy aims on the other. Given their departing conceptualisations and the implied divergences in daily working, the two levels do not

get into interaction and this fact alone helps in maintaining the unchanged relations of the prevailing structures.

Informality helps this process in additional ways. The personified perception of Roma claims for reducing discrimination and segregation reinforces the personified views of the majority on the entirety of the Roma community. The widespread views about Roma parents' 'indifference in education' and their inaptness in nurturing child development remain in place in justifying 'white flight' as a proper response of non-Roma parents for protecting their children's undisturbed progressing in education. By elevating personification and the implied behavioural characterisation at the level of the community, Roma families' actions and claims for change are not simply denied but become declared as unjustified attempts. Furthermore, personification at the level of the community pulls out discrimination and segregation from their institutional framing whereby it helps to hide the structural features of these processes and renders ill-placed (if not illegitimate) any claims for change. In brief, informality and the involved currents of personification are important constituents of preserving the prevailing relations of dominance and power by serving the needs of the non-Roma majority. At the same time, these processes keep breaking down Roma attempts at politicisation and suggest that any such strivings are in vain.

The ruling of informality in work

As the above examples suggest, despite the growing importance and depoliticising impact of informality in education, a modicum of public visibility and responses is maintained by the sheer fact that certain formal ties and involvements in the educational and training institutions have been maintained in the meantime. Even if deprived of providing proper representation and protection, these ties and engagements preserve some potential for the success of efforts of the Roma families and communities to remain involved in the mainstream relations and thus frame their claims in ways that allow for publicly controllable negotiations and actions for changing the structures and contents of schooling. This is an important difference when comparing the potentials of Roma representation to the currents of the past twenty years in employment and work. For given the processes of vast privatisation and marketisation, employment has been driven out of public control and it has become a private matter framed by the exclusive relationship of the employer and the employee. It follows that the recent developments have led to a severe weakening (sometimes utter disappearance) of all formal ties and involvements and have produced a concurrent overall ruling of informality in regulating access and omission.

As I will attempt to show below, such a development has devastating consequences on Roma employment and work. For informality helps to purposefully frame an important segment of competition in marketisation: the race for employment in the least qualified segments of work where informal re-framing of the relationships by ethnicity serves for maintaining non-Roma primacy while keeping it under hierarchical control. At the same time, all-round informality assists in drawing Roma attempts at employment under the personified relations of behavioural adaptation and acceptance whereby – similarly to what we have seen in education –

employability becomes a matter of individualised arrangements and it remains confined in the traditional patron-client relations of the prevailing local social structures.

As I will show in details, the drawing of Roma work under informality directly follows from the single most important development in their socio-economic position: the massive erasing of their ties to formal employment and the enforced accommodation of the community to permanent unemployment and inactivity. The high prevalence of unemployment is not simply a matter of economic change. Despite marked differences in the economic development of our three countries and also despite the variations in their economic structures, the high rates of Roma unemployment show little variation. A high degree of invariability also is reproduced at the level of settlements: whether in industrial or agrarian settings, whether in urban or rural areas, Roma face unemployment as their typical state, and their lead remains in place also in comparison to similarly educated and qualified non-Roma groups (Hyde, 2006; O'Higgins, 2012). All these indicate that deep ethnicisation of access to work is an outstanding feature of post-socialist employment, and as we will see below, it proves an important constituent of the informalisation of the involved economic and social relations.

It is easy to see that in the conditions of massive economic exclusion Roma would be highly interested in forms and ways of collective interest representation for claiming the extension of employment and for providing meaningful training that renders access to new opportunities. However, such bodies of attaining collective political goals have not come into being in the course of post-socialist transformation. Out of the complexity of the causes in the background, let me point here to the falling apart of the old trade unions and the limited strength and outreach of the new ones that have proven ineffective to represent labour interests and to inform the prevailing neo-liberal economic policies by elevating these interests to partnership in privatisation and marketisation (Dimitrova and Vilrokx, 2005). Further, the evolving tripartite bodies of macro-level negotiations do not even strive for universal representation and steadily remain under the pressures of the best organised parts of the labour force. Moreover, the development of the collective forms of representation has been severely hindered by the sharpening competition among the different groups of employees and by their often contrasting claims considering training and the rules of admission (Kubicek, 2004). At the same time, the emerging few civil initiatives dedicate their activity to developing new forms of employment for their membership which is enough to show alternatives but which is inadequate in attaining deeper-going structural change.

Given this landscape, it follows nearly by definition that, for the most part, employment remains a highly individualised domain in the post-socialist economies that is put under the ruling of informality. It is this broader context that frames Roma attempts at employment. However, while informality remains a rather subordinated aspect of the employment of the well-established groups of society, it gains exclusivity in the case of Roma. Due to its domination, it is worth seeing its varied functioning in the everyday ways and techniques of seeking jobs in Roma communities.

As our research has brought it up, three major facets of informality could be recorded behind such variations in mobilising the available resources outside of the

framework of formal institutions: adaptation of earlier occupational experiences and the traditional trades of the different Roma communities; reinvented application of the patterns of cooperation between Roma and non-Roma in former employment under state-socialism; and exploitation of the potentials provided by the division of roles and tasks within the Roma community.

The collection of interviews focusing on the history of work and employment of younger and older male and female members of the investigated communities revealed important differences. It turned out that the chances for re-entering the labour market or for preserving one's relatively stable positioning were deeply affected by the former work experiences as embodied in different occupations and different routines of exchange during socialist times. Some occupations and types of work practically disappeared from the scene, while others could be fruitfully converted to new forms of engagement. Mining and the involved auxiliary activities are a good example of the first, while the adaptation of jobs in the food processing industry makes the case for the second outcome. By considering such differences, the potentials for reconstructing ties with organised labour greatly varied across our investigated communities. Of course, it was not the occupation per se but the involved skills, practical knowledge and the inventive adaptation of the earlier routines that mattered.

Earlier participation in the informal economy added to these differences. In this regard, traditional occupations of the different Roma groups entail diverging paths. While experience with trading renders knowledge about the play of the market and good skills in contracting and accounting that can be profitably preserved and adapted to the new conditions, the old trades of wood-carving or metallurgical processing have been swept away by the respective modern forms of mass-production. As the interviews revealed, it is not only the content of the previous occupation that matters, but being engaged in a multi-pillar arrangement in different jobs also deeply influences participation in the informal economy: the different degrees of involvement opened up opportunities or set limits for changing the prevailing constellations also after the regime change. In this sense we could observe that certain Roma groups stood firmly in socialist production without attempts to gain completion and/or compensation in the informal economy, while others established a living based on simultaneous involvement and a purposeful constant moving between the two domains. The former groups faced high risks with marketisation and privatisation, while the latter usually reserve some scope of manoeuvring.

The picture is even more colourful when the gendered differences are considered. As the interviews demonstrated, the familial strategies of involvement take into account what the formal labour market offers for men and women. As a rule, while the opportunities to stay in employment or to become re-employed are markedly less for women than for men, their 'profiles' relate to each other. Hence, in communities deeply ingrained into the functioning of the socialist firms with relatively well-paid jobs for men, rigidly shaped constellations driven by the rules and routines of the planned economy were on offer also for women, though usually in different fields and with less favourable material conditions. As a rule, if there were some opportunities for re-employment for men in the course of marketisation and economic modernisation, similar opportunities hardly ever came up for women.

Therefore, women have been forced by the conditions to turn to the informal economy. However, they experience significantly lower chances and high instability in this domain where they face a lack of skills for proper adaptivity and a range of disadvantages in comparison to those for whom working and trading in the informal domain was conditioned by decade-long experience.

While the interviews demonstrated the importance of knowledge and skills and the capacities for adaptation, it turned out that what primarily mattered was their embedding into the inter-ethnic relations of work. In other words, good vocational knowledge and a long history of experience remain 'dead material' unless these are ingrained into meaningful cooperation and divisions of roles in cross-ethnic relations that deprive them of their ethnic content. As it turns out, the frequency and the content of inter-ethnic encounters greatly differ according to the branch of production and the requirements of the specific occupations. In certain terrains, the physical conditions of the work and a high degree of mutuality and cooperation follow from either the risk or the complexity of the tasks that should be performed – a typical case is provided by mining. In other terrains the work requires individualised routines and those performing the given tasks simply work side by side but without cooperation – most activities of animal husbandry or land cultivation provide cases in point. In a third type, although cooperation is needed but takes place among purposefully set groups of people who, while they rely on each other's work, might not even see each other – this is the case in all those types of factory work where the employees are organised into distinct shifts and their work and the division of tasks among them are framed exclusively by these units.

While these differences in cooperation seem to be merely technical, it turns out that involvement in one or another form has significant implications amid the post-socialist conditions. The accounts of the occupational histories testify that personal qualities, earlier experience and knowledge of the vocation did not carry enough weight in attempts for re-employment: without having somebody among the established workers who offers some personal guarantee, Roma have practically no chance. In other words, the mediation of a non-Roma actor proved essential. At the same time, such contacts are rare assets that, by their nature, require a long history of acquaintance and unconditional trust. It follows that it is at best the first type of close cooperation that nurtures assistance on the part of the non-Roma workmates; experience in earlier work based on loose togetherness or, even more, on the hierarchical order of often ethnically composed shifts is simply not enough for mediation. It is worth adding that earlier experiences originating from the informal economy also matter. By framing them in neighbourhood relations, memories of cooperation in the informal domain also colour non-Roma willingness in providing testimonies in favour of the Roma applicant for employment.

At the same time, the official institutions for the purpose of providing placement do not work. It turned out in all our countries that the work exchange offices or centres provide at best bureaucratic justifications but we did not come across a single case in which such institutions would have succeeded in bridging the Roma applicants and their future firms.

Altogether, these experiences show that Roma employment takes place under the rule of private relationships and hence, it is governed by the patriarchal contents of

such relations. One has to note in addition that such an embeddedness of the work and employment opportunities into the private relations deprives Roma of organised protection while it hides their efforts from the public eyes and this way contributes to maintaining the general views and convictions about their 'idleness'.

The third important factor with immediate impact on the chances for Roma re-employment is the state of cooperative relations within the community. Of course, the foundation of such cooperation lays in the families and relates to the division of roles in them. The roots of these divisions are usually in experiences of participation in the informal economy. Decades have shaped these practices: as we saw above, intensification of work in the informal economy has been a widespread response to the fading away of employment in the formal economy. At the same time, the content of work greatly determines the extent and the form of dividing the roles within the family and, on familial bases, within the community. The most important dividing line is formed by gender. As a rule, the young and middle-aged male members make efforts for gaining employment at any distance on an individual basis, while the female members and often the older children set up a chain of mutual help to compensate for the losses. In other cases, women offer auxiliary help to men: this is the frequent case with traders in informal exchanges for whom women usually render storage, packing and often even driving. Yet in other cases, the contemporary practices mean a continuation of earlier patterns: whole 'shifts' of men and women are formed to accomplish different tasks in agriculture.

These diverse forms of engagement in the informal economy matter in two aspects with regard to re-employment. First, well-organised communities can accumulate quite important resources to finance the employment search of their male members while providing compensation for their absence through supporting their families. Second, the practised divisions of roles in the informal domain provide an important relational backing: as we saw above, the inter-ethnic encounters in the informal economy fill with impressions and meanings the patronage that non-Roma offer to their Roma acquaintances. This secondary source of working relations proves exceptionally important when remembrance of cooperation in the first economy cannot be relied on any more with the passing of time.

It is worth noting that the informal relations of intra-community work and support have the greatest importance for migrants. For the most part, migration is a personal path forced by necessity. It is again men who leave first and they do so full of uncertainties regarding the possibilities of being followed by their family (Cahn and Guild, 2010). In addition to the support that these families need for sustenance, usually it is a must for them to find female employment or at least work in the informal economy. However, such work does not grow out of the blue: it is the working relations and practices within the community that condition it. The deeper distinct female roles ingrained in the division of tasks within the community are, the better are the chances of migrant families for coping with the hardships of the transient phase and also for joining the male members in migration.

All put together, it seems that there are important variations in the state and level of deprivations that Roma suffer due to being cut off from the regular, safe and well-paying segments of the economy. At the same time, these variations are not strong enough to induce different patterns and paths of work formation: the general

trend remains that of deprivation and exclusion and in an ultimate reading, the trends are uniform by genre. The differentiating factors and processes have an important feature in common: these impact Roma unemployment, re-employment and participation in the informal economy in very small circles, at best within the local communities that Roma are part of. The impacts always remain individual and they never reach whole collectives. Beyond the favourable consequences manifesting in better earnings and improved safety of the sources of living and some assistance for maintaining the ties to the mainstream, the success always appears rewarding individual qualities and efforts, and the sporadic occurrences even underscore such impressions. In brief, the positive exceptions are too weak to change the general trend.

On top of all this, the rare instances of re-entrance into the world of formal labour are not potent enough to change the public view that considers Roma in work as exceptions to the rule of inactivity, which is understood, in turn, as the own fault of the ethnic minority. According to the customary reasoning, idleness and reluctance in accepting the rules and the rigour of formal employment are parts of the Roma world-view, and the high rates of unemployment accompanied by reduced re-employability are rooted primarily in the bad habits and damaging routines of Roma living. It follows that the efficiency of efforts to lead Roma out of this situation depends on attaining profound changes in Roma lifestyle, in other words, the key to significant modifications lays in the success of *educating programmes towards behavioural change* that take the notion in its broadest sense. This reasoning does not observe borders: it follows the same structure and the same arguments in our three countries and does not demonstrate differences according to the positioning of the communities on the exclusionary/inclusionary scale. The widespread prevalence of the involved notions inspires us to call this mainstream argumentation the iron rule of majority approaches to Roma that finds access to work and employment a 'civilisational' issue with sole responsibility of the minority.

The introduced differences imply the breaking up of common interests: the more potent and better negotiating groups are interested in the maintenance of the attained informality that favours their attempts and aspirations. Given that usually these are the best qualified groups with the best chances for re-employment, the Roma majority loses its potential leadership and it remains left to the risky experimentations in the informal economy.

This state of affairs is exploited by the recently 'invented' form of Roma employment in the framing of public work. Although public work schemes look from a distance as if offering collective solutions for the first time, a closer scrutiny reveals their deep embedding into informality and into the reproductive cycles of traditional patriarchy. First, the schemes are run and controlled by the local majority (the municipalities in the first place), and admission amid the usual shortage of placement is regulated by the applicants' behavioural 'aptness'. Second, public work is not seen as a form of employment but more as a corrective measure: by re-establishing the link between inputs and rewards it is meant to suspend the ill-famed dependency of the poor (and Roma poor in the first place) on accessing welfare funds without returns to society. Although the strength of the association between participation in public work and entitlement for welfare assistance varies among our three countries (rendering the

strongest ties in Hungary where conditionality has been expanded to practically all types of public provisions), public work programmes rapidly gained a unifying profile: a new arena has emerged with deeply ethnicised contents to establish a separate segment of the labour market more or less exclusively for Roma and the 'Gypsy-ised' groups of the non-Roma poor. Under the ruling of these contents and the lack of generally controllable rules, it is a natural development that participation becomes a matter of personal services and favours on offer that is pulled out of any monitoring and public accountability.

While this way public work fulfils a number of 'useful' functions by meeting important majority interests, it has devastating implications for Roma. First, by understanding public work as a 'Roma segment' of the world of labour, it powerfully annihilates attempts of Roma to avoid the segregated and ethnicised paths and try accessing employment according to mainstream rules and steps. Second, the strong stigmatising contents of participation block seeking employment in more valued segments of the economy: Roma carry the stamp of 'worthlessness' as associated with public work far beyond the time of actual involvement and this sole factor limits their capacities in finding more rewarding alternatives. Third, recent expansion of public work towards the vocational schools by offering work to youth who start their career as being unemployed points towards tendencies of creating a larger arena of education, training and work that governs the working lives of Roma apart from the majority. It is clear: these spontaneous developments make segmentation and segregation the very foundations of deep ethnic divisions in the local society and this way overwrite (actually: debilitate) all attempts towards integration and inclusion. The ruling of informality serves the undisturbed reproduction of these relations and keeps away Roma needs and claims from proper representation and political articulation.

In sum, when looking at the different aspects and segments of the work and employment of Roma, one sees the unbroken ruling of informal relations. Such relations navigate entrance to the rarely accessible different forms of employment and also to the distribution of all kinds of work. Informality implies personification of the working relations that are set less by knowledge and skills but more by behavioural traits: the major expectation towards Roma work is to provide flexible reserves for meeting majority needs and to keep apart an important segment of the population from the constrained employment-opportunities that characterise the post-socialist transition. The non-Roma majority has important interests in maintaining the current state of affairs. Besides limiting and controlling competition on the labour market, informality helps to regulate the at-risk groups of the lower middle class and the working class, whereby disciplining is put under spontaneous forces and slips institutional control. Furthermore, informality creates an ample arena for personified selection whereby the potentials of mass organisation and the politicisation of the claims of non-employed Roma are efficiently reduced and kept under strict control of the non-Roma community. Finally, informality helps to maintain the personified ideology and the adjoining public discourse that visualises Roma non-employment in terms of 'idleness' and 'indifference'. This way all recognised employees gain: even if earnings are low and the working hours are long, they may see themselves as acknowledged and useful members of society whose positive qualities are perceived in opposition to the negative ones of Roma. Such an ideological contrasting carries the

additional advantage of creating insurmountable difficulties for associations and collective actions across social and ethnic boundaries and this way directly helps the smooth reproduction of the prevailing relations and structures of uncontrollable informality.

However, all these advantages come from the majority's perspective. Against this, informalisation largely deprives Roma of the potentials of articulating labour needs in collective forms. What is more, informality keeps in place their personal dependence and helps to frame it in behavioural relations and actions. The revival of the old patterns of patron/client relations deprives them of applying an alternative framework of processes and structures whereby they become deprived from the language of politicisation. By losing the language and the opportunities, Roma themselves become active players of the reproduction of the prevailing, highly unequal and highly humiliating, relations. Yet again, it is not their 'indifference' that hinders politicisation, but it is the pressure of the institutions and processes in place that turn even the slightest attempts at expressing claims with some political momentum into personified categories and behavioural failures.

Conclusions

The above excursion to some important segments of education and work as experienced by Roma in their daily lives revealed the domination of informality in the ways of expressing and fulfilling needs and articulating claims for a change. Of course, education and work are not the only areas where Roma experience collective exclusion from the forms and scopes of functioning that are put into institutionalised frameworks in case of the majority and that are distinguished to a large extent by limiting access according to enthnicised principles of participation of the minority. For sure, one could find similar constellations if looking at the structuring of the housing conditions, access to healthcare or the organisation of fulfilling daily needs. Nevertheless, a single paper does not allow for extensive explorations all across these areas. At the same time, the lessons drawn from education and work seem powerful enough for providing a few generalisable conclusions.

The first among these relates to the sources of informality in representing Roma needs and claims. Here one meets a high degree of congruence: whether claiming desegregation, proper training or local job-creation, the hindrance or the outright breaking down of collective representation is conditioned by the in-built structures of informality. As we saw above, informality characterises the conditions of daily experience. Attempts at seeking proper education and training or finding gainful work take place to a large extent away from the ordinary institutional frameworks and channels and build mostly on invisible personified relations. As the examples repeatedly showed, these personified attempts are deeply embedded into the varying individual relationships of Roma with the non-Roma majority and convert the fulfilment of needs into the contents of the prevailing patriarchal patterns that these relations contain.

Reliance on such patterns has several further implications. Most importantly, these personified arrangements powerfully break up collectivity and allow for singular

histories with singular outcomes. This way the potential political claims are successfully converted into spontaneous and individualised attempts and rule out any collective interpretations and actions. As a consequence, informality with its implications of being deprived of institutionalisation and thus being freed from external control becomes a self-sustaining feature. Those profiting from it become interested in its maintenance, while those who are losing out face deprivation not only of similar opportunities but even of the concepts and the language of collective representation that others' success in private encounters makes obsolete and inappropriate. As a consequence, deep informalisation of the political potentials is fully congruent with the informal working of the system that maintains personification as a basic rule of functioning. It could not be otherwise. Amid the informal relations and patterns that keep away from the visible and controllable institutions of society it is structurally conditioned that needs and claims of the Roma community appear in the web of personal favours and services and remain enclosed into myriads of personified individual relations all with unique and ungenerisable characteristics and contents.

While the ruling of informality establishes congruence between the conditions and the attempts at changing them, it is not in the intentions of Roma to maintain it. Instead, such a state of affairs serves the interests of the non-Roma majority and does so by providing multiple advantages for its members. First, as already mentioned, informality means the squeezing out of Roma from the institutional domains and allows for the application of 'irregular' solutions for their case. Informalisation of access to certain streams in training or to the restricted opportunities of entering employment in certain occupations reduces competition and helps maintaining domination over those segments in education or work where external insecurities or the prevailing limitations or simply the shortage put at risk direct access even for the powerful groups. Second, informality allows for depriving the claims of Roma of their collective nature. By breaking up the always partial and haphazard fulfilment of these claims to personified relations and negotiations, these claims appear as if rooted in purely individual needs whereby the majority finds it justified to relegate them into the private domain and refrain from providing collective responses through collectivised institutions and services. Third, informality provides important advantages in politics as well. The experience of personification justifies personified argumentations that help to paint the Roma cause in a behavioural conceptualisation. Such an approach makes the fulfilment of Roma needs a matter of 'deservingness' and frames it in terms of loyalty and proper adaptation. This way Roma lose the language of politicisation before even attempting to translate their personal experiences of discrimination, segregation and injustice into criticism and claims of the collective. At the same time, the behavioural framing of the approach of the non-Roma majority calls for education in the broad sense of the term, whereby political issues and claims are pulled out of the play of power relations and are deposited into the professional settings of disciplining and 'educating'.

When looking at the ruling of informality from the angle of the internal relations of the Roma community, the disruptive implications of this state come to the fore. First, the breaking down of the claims and strivings of the community to more or less successful individual attempts undermines solidarity. This is an unavoidable

outcome of depriving the claims and actions of their collective nature. But this is not the sole consequence of the process. Since good personal relations with members of the majority depend on the richness of the content on offer, more qualified and well embedded members of the Roma community have better chances when opting for individual solutions. However, this way the more vulnerable parts of the community lose the protection that the better qualified and better-off groups could provide. Being left to their poor resources, these groups have no means to reduce dependency and this way their conditions and potentials remain at the mercy of the majority without any mediation. Second, the stratified nature of personification induces contrasting interests within the Roma community: those with good chances for gaining personal favours join the majority in their attempts at maintaining informality, while the more vulnerable parts of the collective increasingly experience the devastating aspects of their state. Third, through the lens of personal successes it seems that dependency can be reduced and the smartest members of the community gain some scope for manoeuvring. However, the always one-time character of the favours that they enjoy often fall back to the general conditions of dependency that hit the Roma community in its entirety. The frustrations over the betrayal of those following individualistic paths and the arising mutual blaming within the community hide the conditioned nature and deep structural embedding of the given state of affairs and thus importantly block the potentials for collective action through politicisation. This way the illusions of betterment through individual strivings and actions contribute to the unbroken maintenance of informality and assist the fulfilment of the interests of the majority in keeping its relations with the Roma minority outside of the formal domains of making politics.

Finally, informality helps to shift responsibility for the plight of Roma to the community itself: Roma appear as 'uninterested' in utilising the new institutional frameworks that have been created for advancing their rights as a minority whereby they miss the opportunity for enriching the contents also of their citizens' rights. To a large extent, such an argumentation gains its empirical evidence from observing the speedy emptying of the new legal frameworks, institutions and officially rendered services. As we saw above, despite their variability, the respective institutions were all called into being by providing administrative arrangements for managing the 'Roma issue' largely without Roma participation, while no fora and mechanisms have been developed to provide institutional framing to the actual local Roma needs or at least to offer formal representation of Roma in policy-making. Due to these developments (that prove uniform across countries, regions and settlements), the formal arrangements themselves have contributed to the informalisation of the Roma cause. By forcing the genuine collective needs of Roma onto the sideline, they actively invigorate informality as a substitution. However, due to the prevalence of personified relations and the lack of collective articulations that are the very characteristics of informality, Roma pressures 'dissolve' in the arrangements and processes that deprive their claims of visibility. The issue of minority rights as a typical collective claim is pushed into the background as an 'empty notion' and it becomes invisible among the manifold needs and claims of immediate daily living. What is more, the emptying of the institutions from their respective contents appears as an unavoidable outcome – clearly at the responsibility of the minority.

In sum, our overview provides two main conclusions – both with far-reaching implications. First, the ruling of informality in Roma politics is not at will or at a choice by preference. Instead, it reflects the dominance of informality in the lives of Roma that does not allow for collective organising and that does not accommodate collective representation. Although collective representation and the institutional framing of Roma needs and claims would be the sole most important guarantee for elevating the Roma cause to societal level and for making it part of the political processes in society-at-large, such an advancement hardly can be hoped for amid the continual maintenance of large-scale poverty and exclusion. In this sense strengthened claims for efficient economic and welfare policies targeting poverty and exclusion across ethnic lines might be argued for as prerequisites for increased Roma political participation and a fair positioning of the Roma minority in the socio-political structures of representation.

The second important lesson of our overview regards the structure of interests. As we saw, the maintenance and unbroken reproduction of informality serves primarily the interests of the non-Roma majority. It helps limiting competition for the scarce material resources and labour; it helps to break up unities and collective solidarities as potent resources of representation; it helps maintaining informalised and personified structures of rewards and sanctions with all their disciplining implications; and it helps to deprive the Roma minority of entering into associations behind scattered and ill-balanced private formations. In the light of such multi-sided advantages, it seems difficult to claim more self-reflection, clearer identification and better organisation in Roma politics with extended Roma participation as their backing. Nevertheless, the still existing initiatives and the attempts all across the region for developing Roma political parties as recognisable institutions in political partnership are promising seeds of a gradual change. While such parties and the emerging civil organisations with similar aims often face insurmountable difficulties, one has to welcome them as the potential actors to turn the wheel around. Their future success is not guaranteed. However, their potential in challenging the fate of informality and their attempts at developing representation along the claims and aims that are articulated by the Roma communities promise to break down the web of personal dependencies and help Roma towards elevating their lot out of the rule of informality by making visible the vested interest of the non-Roma majority in it.

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Roma Settlement Formation in a Small Romanian Town – Instances of Ghettoization and Reduction to Bare Life

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Abstract

Based on findings from a comparative qualitative contextual inquiry carried out between 2012 and 2014, the article analyses the formation of two Roma settlements in the larger context of a small sized town in Romania. The article aims at understanding the constitution of these areas as reflected through people's narratives, while also accounting for the influence of economic and political developments on where and how they were and are placed on the social and geographic map of the city. Altogether, the article illustrates the similarities and differences between how the two settlements were founded under different political regimes and how are they nowadays subjected to ghettoization and reduction to bare life, understood as processes characteristic for contemporary global capitalism. At the same time, the analysis highlights the limits of the approaches informed by these conceptual frames and ends up by pinpointing the need to complete them with a perspective that links the politics of spatial marginalization to the understanding of how the latter is part of a political economy that exploits the spatially marginalized.

Keywords: Roma settlements, ghettoization, bare life.

1. Introduction – the empirical and theoretical grounds of our analysis

The empirical material used in this article was generated by the means of field-research conducted between 2012-2014 in 25 localities in Romania within the umbrella of the qualitative contextual inquiry Faces and Causes of Marginalization of the Roma in Local Settings: Hungary – Romania – Serbia.[1] In this paper we are relying on the last phase of this investigation (Causes and Faces of Exclusion of the Roma in Local Communities), conducted in Romania between October 2013 and July 2014 in three localities (two towns, and one village) selected from the 25 settlements addressed during the prior research phase (Vincze et al., 2013; Vincze and Hossu, 2014; Vincze, 2014). Given the geographical and historical heterogeneity of Romania, during the selection process of localities in this country we also had to make our choices regarding the historical region the chosen settlements belong to: Transylvania, Moldova, and Muntenia/Oltenia. The Romanian Kingdoms (Wallachia and Moldova) were subject to a history of Roma slavery for about 500 years (being abolished at the middle of the 19th century), while Transylvanian administrations subjected Roma to ethno-cultural assimilation policies ever since the Habsburg domination. Consequently, socialist industrialization and the assimilation that accompanied it had different outcomes for various local Roma groups, historically embedded from different socio-economic statuses into diverse power regimes.

According to the methodology we have agreed upon for selection of fieldwork sites in the last phase of the research, in Romania – similarly to what our partners have done in other countries (Szalai, 2016, this journal issue) – we opted for three types of settlements: (1) a town with mainly exclusionary tendencies, within which there is at least one extremely disadvantaged area and another less poor residential zone; (2) a town with mainly inclusionary tendencies having a deeply deprived area inhabited by Roma and another housing territory where Roma have a better material condition; (3) a commune near an urban centre, which is generally isolated and poor, and comprises areas inhabited mainly by Roma groups, one of them very deprived while the is other better-off. The selected towns of Aiud and Calafat, respectively commune Lungani (from the Centre, South-Vest and North-East development regions of Romania) embodied the local stages where several Roma groups (some of them deeply impoverished and others better-off) were taken part in different ways in the life of the larger local society. Aiud was pointed out at a particular time of our research as an 'exclusionary town' mostly due to the eviction practices of the municipality and the 'Gypsy school' functioning on its territory. Commune Lungani (and in particular its composing villages with a majority Roma population) was chosen to exemplify the case of a rural locality characterized by generalized poverty and exclusion. Calafat was selected at its turn to illustrate the case of an 'inclusionary town' since there, during the

[1] Faces and Causes of Marginalization of the Roma in Local Settings: Hungary - Romania - Serbia. Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011. A joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Open Society Foundation's Roma Initiatives Office (RIO) and the Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma Inclusion program, and the Central European University/Center for Policy Studies (CEU CPS). October 2012 – June 2014. http://cps.ceu.hu/research/roma-marginalization

prior phase of our research, we could notice that one of the local Roma groups was settled in a district close to the town centre and in time managed to override the boundary between its 'own' spoitori area and the larger Dunării neighbourhood hosting Romanian dwellers. Nevertheless, at the end of the research on the faces and causes of marginalization of the Roma in local contexts we concluded that the combinations of inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies identified at the level of each locality displayed a much more complicated and nuanced picture of adverse incorporation (as also analysed in Vincze, 2015).

While focusing on one particular aspect addressed by our complex investigation about faces and causes of Roma marginalization, i.e. the social and historical formation of predominantly Roma-inhabited housing areas, in this article we are restricting our attention to the town of Aiud. Aiud is a small sized town with 22,876 inhabitants, out of which, according to the 2011 Census, 4.06 percent declared themselves as Roma. The empirical material displayed in this article, which describes the historical constitution and recent developments of two residential spaces from this town (locally named Bufa and Poligon), illustrates how are ghettoization (Wacquant, 2011) and reduction to bare life (Agamben, 1998) shaping the condition of the inhabitants of these housing areas founded under different political regimes. Bufa exemplifies a trend of the formation of a Roma-only settlement as a result of economic in-country migration of an extended Roma family and the growth of the settlement that they established on the periphery of Aiud during socialist industrialization and urbanization, as well as the tendencies of impoverishment and stigmatization that they are running through during current de-industrialization, privatization and retrenchment of state from its social roles. On the other side, Poligon illustrates the creation of a precarious informal housing area under the very circumstances of the collapsing socialist political economy, including among others its particular employment and housing policies. Poligon resulted from the relocation of Roma families forcibly evicted from the gentrifying town centre beyond the town's boundaries, but not accidentally very nearby to Bufa, which during these times started to gain more and more predominantly the meaning of a space associated with poor Gypsies. Our analysis demonstrates that although one settlement appears to be 'voluntarily' formed during socialist times, it was created under the constrains of those times and nowadays it becomes more and more isolated due to a severe process of a social and ethnic/racial stigmatization, while the other was constituted due to the involuntary removal/relocation of a group of poor ethnic Roma from one area to another, they both carry elements that illustrate how are the current local practices of economic and political power pushing the inhabitants of these areas into urban marginality through ghettoization and reduction to bare life.

The discussion in this paper is mainly based on the analysis of 15 family interviews conducted in Aiud, with members of the Roma ethnic minority living in *Bufa* and *Poligon*.[2] Interviews were conducted in the other two Roma inhabited areas of Aiud as well (*Feleud* and *Bethlen Gábor*), but in this article we will refer only to

[2] Fieldwork in Aiud, including these family interviews was conducted by Florina Pop and Rafaela Muraru during both the phases of the investigation.

Bufa and *Poligon* in our attempt to describe and compare the two settlements in the light of our theoretical background. The interviewees were identified based on specific criteria (e.g. families having children under the age of 14, families having at least one child aged 14-18, families in which none of the adults is employed, families in which at least one adult is employed either permanent or seasonal, families in which at least one adult is involved in public employment) so as to achieve a diverse qualitative 'sample' from the point of view of people's employment status and demographic characteristics. We identified our interviewees by the snowball method, while making use of the contacts we established in the settlements in the previous phase of the contextual inquiry. We conducted the interviews in the respondents' homes, after they were informed about the purpose of the investigation, the means for dissemination and the ethical aspects of the research. With regard to the history and formation of the settlements, the interviewees were asked to share what they know about these aspects, either from their own experience or from the memories learnt from their parents, grandparents or other inhabitants. We then analysed these interviews together with other information collected from interviews or informal discussions with local authorities' representatives and with data collected from local monographs.

Drawing on Wacquant's (2011) approach towards urban marginality, we suggest addressing the analytical potential of the term ghettoization for describing the processes that our settlements are subjected to. He defines the ghetto as 'a bounded urban ward, a web of group-specific institutions and a cultural and cognitive constellation (values, mind-set, or mentality) entailing the socio-moral isolation of a stigmatized category as well as the systematic truncation of the life space and life chances of its members' (p. 1). According to the same author, a ghetto includes four specific elements, following economic and social domination functions: stigma, constraint, spatial confinement and institutional parallelism. Wacquant subsequently argues that the ghetto is an instrument of power and control for the dominant group, but at the same time it can have an integrative role for those inhabiting the ghetto. More precisely, in the face of external hostility, the ghetto becomes a place for social and cultural exchange for the confined population, thus providing protection for its members and to some extent replacing the dominant norms and structures from which they are excluded. The restrictive physical and social boundaries among the two groups deepen the divisions and eventually create even more prejudices about the confined population, which may be perceived as exotic or inferior.

On the same lines, Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000) conceptualize ghettoes as realms of social exclusion, described by involuntary separation enforced by a dominant group which views the excluded population as inferior and ascribes negative social, political and economic characteristics to this group. Considering a 'new spatial order of cities', the authors discuss the ghetto as a form of urban poverty, promoting spatial divisions and boundaries, as well as social hierarchies. In their view, specific forms of socio-spatial formation based on ethnicity or developed through exclusionary processes are the ethnic enclaves and the excluded ghettos, hosting the urban poor, a group which is long-term excluded. An important aspect in this conceptualization of ghettos is that the market is accounted as responsible for the production and reproduction of these divisions, under the overarching umbrella of the state, which can as well create and perpetuate inequalities through its social structures.

Stigmatization of excluded groups is also explained by Wacquant (2009) aș penalization or criminalization of poverty. Wacquant (2001) argues that criminalization of poverty has become a specific approach through which the neoliberal state addresses social insecurity via economic policies which foster state and particularly social-welfare retrenchment. In terms of 'punishing the poor' (Wacquant, 2009: 166), we argue that there are new forms of penalization, such as informal labour kept under surveillance and sanctioned by the police or blaming informal housing as a form of crime, while restraining the excluded group's access to local employment and housing opportunities.

From this perspective, it becomes essential to search for a complex understanding of how the state and its structures can create spaces where power becomes discretionary enforced, as discussed in Agamben's (1998) biopolitics, drawing on the work of Foucault (1978-1979). The author employs the concept of camp to describe a hybrid 'space of exception' (Agamben, 1998: 99), grounded on security reasons and often having a racial or ethnic character. The exception comes from the fact that the laws become suspended, since they are used to exclude a certain population, but also to put them under the strict control of the state, creating a gap between citizenship and human rights. De-nationalized, but under the control of the state, the inhabitants of the camp are refused any protection such as that offered by a political status. The author further highlights that in this case the state of exception becomes 'a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that can no longer be inscribed in that order' (Agamben, 1998: 113). The concept of bare life is used together with that of sovereign or unmediated state power to explain how in present day democracies the individual can be deprived of his/her basic human rights and be reduced to bare life, having no political relevance, in the absence of any juridical protection.

Based on these theoretical assumptions, in our paper we argue that the development of the investigated settlements in Aiud (*Poligon* and *Bufa*) illustrate specific patterns of social exclusion encompassing elements of ghettoization or discretionary use of power depriving individuals from their human rights or pushing them into the instances of bare life. In these urban marginal spaces, the impoverished Roma are held responsible for their poverty status and are stigmatized and ascribed negative characteristics of inferiority in order to explain their exclusion from the city. Some of the exclusionary practices that they are subjected to are the forced evictions, the reluctance to legally recognize informal housing and to provide local resources for the improvement of housing conditions, and the discretionary use of local policies in the field of housing, employment and political participation.

2. Processes of Roma settlement formation in the larger context of Aiud

Aiud is located in Alba county, in the Southern part of Transylvania, in the Central Development Region of Romania. This locality has been heavily affected by the collapse of one of the biggest industrial platforms in the country, the Aiud Metalurgical Company (*Întreprinderea Metalurgică Aiud*), which provided employment for approximately 9000 people in 1990. Other medium-sized and small-

sized companies in the field of garment manufacture or construction have also collapsed or have significantly reduced their activity. At present, according to interviews conducted with local employers in the previous phase of our research, there are scarce employment opportunities, particularly for people with a low educational background. Besides Aiud Penitentiary, which is an important local employer but not accessible for the low educated, there are some small employers in the field of garment manufacture, construction and footwear, the majority having between 50 and 200 employees. Other important economic activities in the larger geographical area of the town (*Fabrica de Sodă Ocna Mureș, Salina Ocna Mureș, Mechel Câmpia Turzii*) have also collapsed or have significantly reduced their activity in the last decades.

According to statistics provided by the National Agency for Employment, the unemployment rate in Aiud in 2013 was 5%, compared to 5.7% at the national level. The percentage of registered unemployed out of the 18-62 age group was 7.9%, thus opening the discussion about hidden unemployment in the form of agricultural unemployment, seasonal migration or informal labour. As will be discussed in the next sections, the Roma illustrate to a large extent the phenomenon of hidden unemployment, but in the absence of formal data about the ethnic structure of unemployment, we cannot provide statistics about the percentage of unemployed Roma and about their participation in support programmes for the unemployed, as stipulated by the national legal framework.

The monograph of Aiud published in 2010 refers to the local Roma population only in terms of the census statistics produced over the years. Roma (named Gypsies in this monograph) are first mentioned in the 1920 census, when Aiud recorded 8108 inhabitants, of whom 1954 were Romanians, 5604 Hungarians, 103 Germans and 447 of other nationalities ('the majority of them Gypsies'). At the 1992 census, the total population of Aiud was 31,894, of whom 1170 self-declared as Roma. According to the last census (2011) only 930 persons declared themselves as Roma and the total population has decreased to 22,876 persons.

With regard to Roma political participation in Aiud one should notice that until 2013 the Roma minority was not represented at all within the Town Hall. Since 2013, the Local Council has an elected Roma councillor (nominated by the National Liberal Party). Although positively appreciated by the Town Hall representatives and the majority of the local Roma population, his activity regarding the representation of the needs of his ethnic fellows in the City Council is limited by the unequal distribution of local funds between areas that are considered worthy of development and items which are cut out of development funds. The support that the local Roma councillor provides mainly in one of the Roma settlements (*Feleud*) is based on external funds received by the NGO he administers rather than on local public funds. At the same time, the local Roma Party which according to the national legislation is the main central and local representative structure is hardly recognized by the Roma in Aiud. On the contrary, this structure is highly contested by the local Roma population. Throughout the interviews, many people mentioned that they felt that they have been used in the political struggles because of the votes they brought, but overall they had no influence on the local decision making processes. This appeared to be relevant particularly with regard to local housing policy and infrastructural development. There

were only few developmental projects which targeted the areas inhabited mostly by the Roma population of Aiud, which promised to be participatory and sustainable, but had restricted and little effect on the systemic causes of social and territorial marginalization, while most importantly they were conceived under the new, neoliberal paradigm of entrepreneurial development and competition for external funds (Vincze, 2015). As will be discussed in the next section of our article, the areas inhabited by Roma generally lack developmental investments, which perpetuate their territorial and social exclusion. Therefore, we argue that because of the past and recent local policies, as well as due to how they were historically formed, *Bufa* and *Poligon* became marginalized areas that nowadays are both subjected to ghettoization and reduction to bare life.

Besides *Bufa* and *Poligon*, already mentioned in the introductory chapter of our article and discussed in more details in the paragraphs below, the town of Aiud presents the other two cases of 'Roma neighbourhood' formation. However, briefly presented below for the sake of signalling their existence and the patterns they illustrate, we are not going to discuss them in details, since our aim is to demonstrate the similarities and differences between two housing areas that nowadays are both subjected to ghettoization and reduction to bare life, but were founded during different political and economic regimes.

Feleud (the informal name of *Aiudul de Sus*) is a former village, approximately 2-3 kilometres away from the centre of Aiud, which was lately annexed by the Aiud municipality. This area is inhabited by Romanians, but also by several Roma groups, some of them self-identifying as *caştalăi*, others as *căldărari* or *corturari*. Most of them recall living in *Feleud* ever since they were born, however some state that their families migrated here because of the employment opportunities at the factories in Aiud during socialist times. At present, there are Roma families living in *Feleud* that constantly migrate to Switzerland, Spain or France, where they are usually engaged in informal labour. There is public transportation from *Feleud* to different locations in Aiud including the hospital and the Town Hall. However, in *Feleud* one can find a 'Gypsy school', a segregated school, as well as poor Roma families for whom migration could not function as successful means to overcome poverty.

Bethlen Gábor is an area located in the vicinity of the Town Hall. The housing security of Roma living in this building has worsened during the last years, since the building they lived in formerly as renters of social homes was redeemed by its former owner (the Transylvanian Reformed Church District). People were informed that they would have to move out eventually, but the old/new owner of the building extended the renting contract with the former tenants for a few years. However, according to the post 1990 Romanian legislation the state would have had the obligation to provide alternative housing for the tenants of the retroceded buildings, until now only a couple of families were offered an apartment in the social houses newly built right in the vicinity of Bufa. Even if many old tenants from *Bethlen Gábor* street, Roma, Romanian and Hungarian, can hardly imagine themselves being moved from the city centre to the proximity of the marginal 'Gypsy neighbourhood', the City Hall continues the plan to develop this territory as a social housing area even if this plan evolves very slowly.

3. The formation of the century-old Roma settlement of Bufa

The history of the area is described differently by different Roma inhabitants. One of the interviewees, a Roma female, reports that *Bufa* was named after her grandfather, who supposedly was a very wealthy man. This part of her family came from *Târgu-Mureş*, where some of her relatives still live. From what she could remember, he was an employee at Aiud City Hall. She also stated that her grandfather owned a large part of the land and had a horse herd established on the land where *Bufa* is located today. From what her mother has told her, her grandfather lost all his belongings and all the title deeds in the 1970 flood. In Aiud's monograph we find evidence stating that in 1970 a flood produced damages of ten milliards, Bufa and the industrial area of Aiud being the most affected areas.

> *They were very wealthy indeed, they were very wealthy in those times and my grandfather... he graduated college, he was educated, he wanted to become a priest (...) and he employed people like these ones from our neighbourhood.* (Roma inhabitant, Bufa).

With regard to employment, she reported that her grandfather had some sort of relation with the town's cleaning company and public toilets and also with people's transportation to the town by wagon. It is possible, she stated, that her grandfather employed inhabitants from *Bufa* for those jobs. She considered that the majority of the Roma living in *Bufa* were related to each other because they were descendants of the old family named *Bufa*. Another interview described what kind of jobs did the early Bufa inhabitants carry out:

> *Early on, where you cross the barrier (...) on the railways from the depot, there came woods and there was some kind of fuel from woods and coals (...) and people came there (...) and people from all over Aiud bought woods (...). They were waggoneers, my father had a horse and a wagon... and he had the best horse out of all. He went to the depot and my father had a lot of orders from people to deliver the wood, he knew that money can be made out of transportation.* (Roma inhabitant, Bufa).

Another interviewed Roma considered that his grandparents built their houses there because they were not allowed to enter the town. From what his grandmother told him, approximately a hundred years ago, near the place where nowadays the *Bufa* houses are built, there was a forest in which wild animals were often times spotted, especially wolves.

> *There used to be a forest here, all this hill used to be a forest before. And there were some houses here of my grandparents, and they stayed here... They stayed here because in the past, as it is now with us here, they were not allowed to enter into other parts of the town, as we are not allowed today to enter as well... They believe we are savages. It is not different now from what it was back then. Because if they would have had a place to build a house in the town, we would*

> *be in the town now, but they stayed here and so did we.* (Roma inhabitant, Bufa).

From another interview we find out that *Bufa's* history is related to the town's cleaning industry. An ancestor named *Bufa* is mentioned again, who lived here and was responsible for the town's cleaning, with some employees. It is important to mention that during family interviews, the information that the grandparents or parents were employed at the town's public toilets and at the Aiud Metallurgical Company came up several times. Finding a place for building a house or for agricultural activities was another common aspect described in the interviews, reflecting the inequalities people of Roma ethnicity had to deal with through the years. Even at present, the inhabitants of *Bufa* do not possess property or housing documents,[3] however they do pay taxes for land and house and have done so since three years ago, when the address where they now live was recognized in their identity cards.

> *There was a community here, there was someone from here, an old man, Bufa. (...) He was in charge of the town's cleaning (...). They enclosed us here, the place where the crops were, we called it Berek, a sort of wood, in Hungarian. We are Hungarian gypsies, but nowadays the majority of us doesn't speak the language. Only a few of us know what this means and what it is, the ancient ones.* (Roma inhabitant, Bufa).

Today an approximate number of 100 persons live in Bufa, all of them Roma. When asked about the history of the settlement, they answered that they were born there, and as well as their parents and grandparents did. According to the stories the settlement is supposedly one hundred years old. About their lineage, they state that among them there are *caştalăi*, *băieşi*, *căldărari* and *geambaşi*,[4] but nowadays they do not consider this as an important identification. A part of them speak Romani language, usually the elderly.

From the local authority's point of view, there is a strong, allegedly cultural difference between Roma from *Bufa*, and Roma moved recently in its vicinity (the *Poligon* area, whose formation is discussed in the next paragraph). They note:

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[3] However, there is no published information yet on this recent development, we were told by Simona Ciotlăuş, national expert at the Local Engagement for Roma Inclusion (LERI) programme of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, which runs in 22 localities across Europe and among them in Aiud, that as a result of the local activities, the group created in Aiud under the LERI programme managed to establish a relationship of cooperation with the Town Hall and this endeavour ended up very recently with the legalization of several units of informal housing in the Bufa area.

[4] These Roma 'nations' (neamuri), sub-groups, people, were delimited on the one hand according to their traditional occupations. *Geambaşi* Roma were known for their horse trade, while *căldărari* (Kalderash) Roma were metal workers manufacturing buckets or pots, and the *băieşi* (Boyash) Roma, also named as rudari 'originally' were dealing with gold processing. Some denominations refer to the extent to which Roma kept up their traditions. Relative to the groups from above, the *caştalăi* are distinguished as those who do not speak Romani any more. The term *băieşi* might also refer to sub-groups who supposedly are of an arhaic Romanian origin and do not speak the Romani language.

> *Even the Roma can be divided into two categories, the ones you can reason with, who respect the law, such as the community from Hotar, meaning Bufa, where there is discipline and order and there are people with common sense, clean and they seem to be more emancipated and there are those you can't reason with, they just want, and they have only rights and no obligations.* (Local authority representative, Aiud).

4. The constitution of a new Roma settlement in Poligon

The official name of this area is Hotar 101 street. The Roma from this area do not identify with a certain lineage, nevertheless they recall their parents identifying as *caştalăi, băieşi* and *romunguri*. Only a few of them speak the Romani language. This settlement was established in 2010, when local authorities evicted approximately 25 Roma families from a building in the town's centre. The authorities partially explained their decision by the fact that this building, used in the past for social housing, was restored to the owners; but often they justify this action by associating the Roma with a form of threat or deviance:

> *They lived in the centre, in nationalized housing, which was in good condition. All they had to do is pay rent, a modest amount. They destroyed the houses, turned them into pest holes. They were demolished and they had to relocate the ones who lived there. This happened two and a half years ago. Some of them are mentally retarded. The majority of them have a mental or a physical handicap, although not all of them have a handicap certificate. We now have a project through which 31 social houses are being built in the Hotar area for those who were relocated.*[5] (Local authority representative, Aiud)

The evicted persons state that when they were told about their relocation, they were also informed that the municipality had built (or was about to build) social housing for them in another part of the town. People remember that they were forced to move their belongings with the trucks from the town's cleaning company. They were also told to take all the materials they could use to build a house on other land. The location where they were taken was an empty field, except for some remaining wall of a former construction project and was located on Mureş' river bank, a place used in the past as a military unit, shooting ground and auto park for the army. Nowadays, the Roma inhabitants of this area live in improvised wood, textile materials, cardboard or clay barracks. As in the case of *Bufa*, they do not possess any property documents relating to their houses, however, they are also paying taxes for the use of the land where they have built their houses informally, on the basis of a verbal agreement with the Town Hall.

[5] Out of this project in 2014 only three such social houses were built near *Bufa*, but none of its apartments was distributed to the new inhabitants of *Poligon*.

> *I didn't know anything. My mother-in-law came and told us we have to move but they didn't give us another place to live, what are we going to do, where will we go? They just said that we would have to move tomorrow. So we arrived here and we saw we had no house, nothing (...). And then we started collecting the bricks after the demolition. We collected iron, we made some money and started building... It was very difficult, and it still is...* (Roma inhabitant, Poligon).
> *There used to be a military unit here. They banished all the Gypsies here, so that they don't live in the centre of the town any more.* (Roma inhabitant, Poligon area).

Bufa inhabitants recount that in the past this area was well attended, with luxurious cars, parks and cabins. Then a vehicle park belonging to the military unit was established here, but afterwards this was also dissolved.

> *Why did it [the car park] remain a desert? Because the bosses from Bucharest intervened, they came here to Aiud, others came (...) and got everything out of it. And after what they did, everything was empty, they took these people [the Roma now living in Poligon], they had places in the market, in the bus station, in the back, in the vicinity of an attorney (...) they saw they were filthy, and they struggled until they got them out.* (Roma inhabitant, Bufa).

According to the interviews with *Poligon* inhabitants, it seems that some of them, but also the parents of the now middle aged adults living in *Poligon*, migrated to Aiud during socialism because of the employment opportunities at the local cleaning company or the Metallurgic Company. Both *Bufa* and *Poligon* inhabitants stated that on the field where today the houses of those from *Poligon* are built there was a lot of scrap-iron and they dug after it and sold it. Nowadays, the Roma from *Poligon* still search for iron on this field, but it is very hard to find any because the field has already been dug over many times before.

5. Conclusions

The stories of the families whom we interviewed revealed that they were very much related to the broader social and economic histories of the localities, closely linked at their turn to the changes of the larger political regime, including its policies towards ethnic Roma. These structural circumstances determined when and how they settled down and what kind of conditions could provide for themselves on these territories including the areas of the locality where they were allowed or moved or forced to inhabit. Family narratives show that their individual or collective options regarding spatial mobility were on the one hand resulting from their need to provide sources of income compatible with their traditional occupations and other skills acquired in time, and on the other hand were moulded by the potential and limits of the changing economic and political orders.

In the case of the *Bufa* settlement in Aiud, the interviews informed us that most probably the Roma ethnics migrated here because of local employment opportunities, and were allocated (or tolerated on) marginal land, with restricted access to the town. In the socialist times, being formally employed made the Roma feel 'more included', as this provided various opportunities for inter-ethnic interactions, as well as a more valued social status. But when narrating about the times when they were employed, the interviewees still mention that frequently the Roma were accepted in the inferior and lowest paid jobs, or even having the same status as today, meaning being involved in informal labour. During socialism, the Roma in Romania were provided opportunities for school participation and employment, but in many cases this went together with their forced assimilation and destruction of traditional communities, as well as the embargo against practising traditional occupations. In terms of education, gaps persisted between the Roma and non-Roma population and discrimination further deepened the difference in attainment levels between Roma and the non-Roma. This in turn, along with other factors such as discriminatory practices on the part of employers led to Roma unemployment or to enrolment in low-skilled and underpaid jobs in heavy industry and agricultural state holdings. However, the redistributive social policies implemented by the socialist state had a positive effect on the poor Roma to some extent, although it often meant low paid jobs and marginal and substandard housing. The collapse of public employment caused a severe increase in the unemployment rate of Roma. The low-skill levels of Roma and low educational attainment made re-entering the labour market difficult for them and determined a high rate of long-term unemployment. Furthermore, the deceleration in implementing social protection measures for the unemployed contributed to the reproduction of a state of poverty especially among Roma, followed by prejudices and discrimination that were often initiated at a political or mass media level (Raţ, 2011).

More recently, the neoliberal trend in social policies has encouraged the development of 'welfare dependency' discourse that was soon legitimated by local authorities, who became managers of local funds as an effect of decentralization. This opened the way to discretional use (and abuse) of power on the part of the local authorities who were more or less prepared to approach local problems using professionals such as social workers. In the case of Aiud, this shift to a neoliberal logic was easily depicted in local authorities' discourse, who explained that poverty is created by the poor people themselves and with few exceptions the poor themselves are the only ones to be held responsible for their situation.

> *In my opinion, poverty is made by the person himself. They [those of Roma ethnicity] expect only to receive, they don't even try to find employment, they don't want to work, not even as seasonal or daily labourers. There's no way to reach any agreement with them. All they do is wait for the social aid [the Minimum Income Guarantee].* (Local authority representative from Aiud)

The collapse of public employment, the discourse and actions promoted by central and local authorities to limit and discourage state subsidies, social benefits and services are some of the reasons for the social exclusion of impoverished Roma. Moreover,

the local housing policies have not yet clarified the housing situation of the Roma living in Bufa and Poligon.

Whether the Roma have voluntarily decided to settle in *Bufa* is difficult to assess, given that no other alternative was available for them at the time when they initially moved there. We argue that this form of constraint corresponds to Wacquant's (2011) understanding of the involuntary nature of an urban space characterized by marginality. The isolation of this area from the town is a strong element of constraint and confinement, which eventually restricts access to opportunities: there is no public transportation to *Bufa* and the inhabitants here have difficult access to public utilities. There is neither access to running water nor a heating system. For their water supply, people use a common pump installed in their area and they share the costs. Because of arrears in paying electricity bills, it often happens that a great part of them are disconnected and have improvised common access with their neighbours and they share those costs as well.

Social boundaries within the city are created and recreated through local policy decisions, such as offering the land in the vicinity of the houses in *Bufa* to the non-Roma, who have chosen to use this land to raise animals or to cultivate vegetables. In contrast, the houses of the Roma are limited to very small pieces of land. These local decisions empower social hierarchies, promoting the inferiority of the Roma, who are physically and socially restricted in this area. As a mechanism to address stigmatization and poverty, the Roma ethnics living in *Bufa* have developed their own internal surviving strategies including helping each other to build or renovate the houses in the absence of any state support, a loan system, or finding informal labour networks that would accept people of Roma ethnicity as a cheap labour force. Less impoverished compared to the Roma from *Poligon*, some of those of Roma minority ethnicity from *Bufa* are positively appreciated by local authorities' representatives. The reason for this is precisely the institutional parallelism, as described by Wacquant (2011), meaning that the Roma from *Bufa* have somehow substituted state support services with their own informal support networks, thus expecting and asking less support from the local authorities, who have failed to answer their needs. Another important element revealed in the narratives was the penalization of informal labour, while offering no other formal employment opportunities or, moreover, while restricting access to formal employment. Interviewees described how collecting scrap-iron is sometimes arbitrary sanctioned by the local police, while at the same time there is no employment support provided by state institutions, although as Minimum Income Guarantee beneficiaries they would be entitled to receive such support. In addition, in some interviews carried out with local authorities' representatives, living in informal settlements was considered to be illegal, and thus perceived as a local form of law-breaking on the part of the Roma, yet ethnic tolerance towards the poor Roma on the part of the local authorities.

Furthermore, drawing on our theoretical approach and particularly on Agamben's (1998) work, we can observe how such a settlement becomes a 'space of exception', controlled by the state. The inhabitants are excluded as local housing policies are enforced and kept at the margins using the same local development policies which are discretionary applied. For example, the municipality states there is no public transportation because the roads are in very bad condition, but the local

development plans in the last years have not included any infrastructure work in the area. The Roma population in *Bufa* remains under the control of the state, which goes beyond the law and keeps them in an informal status of housing and employment. The 'bare life' concept is relevant to notice how the excluded Roma are deprived of their rights, an action which is explained by local authorities' representatives as them not deserving state support since as citizens they contribute very little to the local well-being.

Another aspect revealed in our research was the eviction-based pattern of Roma settlement formation. That is justified in the frame of a discourse regarding 'the undeserving Roma', who are to a higher extent perceived as 'outsiders' and pushed even further away than the better-off Roma. *Poligon* area is the settlement in Aiud which encompasses most visibly the ghetto and camp characteristics as described by both Wacquant (2011) and Agamben (1998). The forced eviction of the Roma from the centrally placed social houses to an empty river bank illustrates discretionary power enforced to exclude a group of people, in the context of arbitrary use of the national and local legal framework. Local authorities explain they had no control over the relocations because the building was restored to its former owner, but at the same time they stated that the Roma were evicted because of their poor hygiene. Moreover, as stipulated by the law in force, it is state's responsibility to allocate other social housing to social tenants evicted from buildings after restitution. Similar to *Bufa*, no legal documents were provided for the improvised houses in *Poligon*, but the inhabitants here were asked to pay taxes for the use of the land and the houses on the basis of a verbal agreement with the Town Hall. The withdrawal of state responsibility in the field of housing leads to even more impoverishment for the Roma, who are refused their housing rights, yet asked to pay taxes in order to be accepted as local citizens. Other similar elements between *Bufa* and *Poligon* are the absence of public transportation and difficult access because of the unpaved roads. The conditions in *Poligon* are even more precarious than in *Bufa*. There is no access to electricity (apart from an improvised connection), nor to water and neither is there a heating system. There used to be an improvised pump but during the winter it froze and it could not be used any longer. At other times it was disconnected because the inhabitants in *Poligon* could not pay the costs.

The perception of local authorities is that the Roma in *Poligon* are themselves responsible for their poverty status and their housing insecurity. In their view, they do not deserve state support because they do not make enough efforts to improve their situation. In one of the narratives, one local public stakeholder explained that all social benefits should be cut off in order to end the social welfare dependency of the Roma. In addition, the same interviewee stressed that the difficult situation of the Roma in *Poligon* and their inability to overcome their poverty status might be explained through the state of mental or physical disability of the people living there. In line with Wacquant's (2009) approach on stigmatising the poor, in this case we notice how poverty together with ethnicity are convened as a pathology, an inferiority status for which local authorities do not want to carry any responsibility. The *Poligon* area functions as a ghetto, involuntarily formed in order to address the demand of a dominant group, while excluding a minority group. A series of negative characteristics are attributed to the excluded group, in order to explain their exclusion from the

town: mental illness, poor hygiene, unwillingness to work and to participate in the educational system. The relocation of the poor to the margins of the town constructs a new spatial order of the town, as Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000) notice, ascribing an inferior spatial and social position for the Roma.

Our analysis showed that the economic prospects in the form of employment or trade market opportunities determined the Roma groups before socialism and during socialist times to internally migrate to and settle in a certain urban area (from) where they could play economic (and other) roles accepted and required by the mainstream society. Such trends may have resulted in the 'voluntary' formation of the *Bufa* Roma settlement in Aiud, whose inhabitants were to some extent economically embedded in the local society. However, we could observe that their placement in this very area depended on where they were allowed to settle. Likewise, we could also notice that after 1990 this residential space also displayed the characteristics of ghettoization and reduction to bare life. Besides this trend of formation of residential areas inhabited by impoverished ethnic Roma, in Aiud one could also identify instances when impoverished Roma groups were forcibly evicted from one vicinity of the town to another neighbourhood. The case of *Poligon* reflects that after the collapse of socialism new residential territories characterized by severe physical and symbolic isolation and precarious housing conditions were created for impoverished people by local public policies. The latter case is most visibly embodying the signs of ghettoization that takes place at the intersection of ethnic enclosure and socio-economic exclusion as a manifestation of advanced marginality (Wacquant, 2008), i.e. of the new form of social exclusion in neoliberal regimes, characterized by accumulation of economic penury, social deprivation, ethno-racial divisions, and public violence in the same distressed urban area.

Nevertheless, the approach of ghettoization and reduction to bare life as understood by the authors used as reference points in our analysis proved to have an analytical potential, the cases of Roma settlements in Aiud discussed in this article demonstrated that their formation should not only be addressed through them. There is a need for further analysis from a perspective that might enlighten how these ghettoized areas are reduced to a bare life adversely incorporated into the city's life both as lands and housing areas that generate taxes for the Town Hall while still maintaining people's housing insecurity, and as territories providing homes to people whose informal labour is highly exploited by both public institutions and private companies.

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Evictions and Voluntary Returns in Barcelona and Bucharest: Practices of Metropolitan Governance

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Abstract

This article is about techniques of exclusion by local governments against Romani people. Tackling the case of people of Romani ethnicity in Barcelona and Bucharest, I explore evictions and voluntary return as practices of segregation within and exclusion from the city. I reflect on the condition of *being* or *becoming Roma* in the process of spatial cleansing by interrogating the construction of Roma as an ethnicized mobile minority, a category that is submitted to social and territorial exclusion. Under the pretext of defending the social security and the urban development of cities, the local authorities produce moral panic around the presence of Roma. Portraying them first as vulnerable, then as having a mobile life-style, the authorities justify a range of interventions that eventually push out the Roma habitants and subsequently deny them the right to the city.

Keywords: spatial cleansing, eviction, voluntary return, moral panic, right to the city, Roma.

> *'...only after I was evicted, thrown out into the street with my baby, did I realize that I am Roma'.* (Nastasia, 2015)

Introduction

This paper discusses a particular form of metropolitan governance and questions in which way citizens, mostly of Romani ethnicity, are labelled 'vulnerable', dispossessed of their rights and rendered mobile on account of cultural prejudices. Pointing to local regulations in the city, I tackle the political practices of evictions of poor and/or ethnicized Roma and the 'voluntary return'[1] of Romani migrants. Revealing the mechanisms of exclusion in two urban spaces, Barcelona in Spain and Bucharest in Romania, my aim is to open up the debate on the condition of *being* or *becoming Roma*. Specifically, I explore how groups of ethnicized people are forcibly rendered mobile having their residential rights contested, and their socio-economic conditions ignored.

Analysing the context of Barcelona and Bucharest as highly urbanized spaces, I point to the multidimensional concept of the right to the city (Harvey, 2012; Wacquant, 2014), and to the social and political dynamics negotiated in the city (Appadurai, 2000; Asquith and Poynting, 2011; Pullan, 2013). Undertaking the right to the city, scholars consistently discuss the social and spatial dimension of governance (Harvey, 2003, 2012; Bernardot, 2008; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2011; Marcuse, 2012; Brenner et al., 2012). The literature on administrative and political development of the globalized cities opens up enough questions for debate: patterns of systemic discrimination, the emergence of neoliberal ideology in the city, state re-articulation, urban governance through social policies and redistribution, and the right to the city (Leontidou, 2010; Attoch, 2011; Merrifield, 2011; Aalbers and Gibb, 2014; Bhan, 2014; Rolnik, 2014).

Unravelling the right to the city, Marcuse notes 'it is not the right to the city that is demanded, but the right to a future city, indeed not necessary a city in the conventional sense at all, but a place in urban society in which hierarchical distinction between the city and the country has disappeared' (2012: 35). When political power limits citizenship rights, the debate is overtaken through the right to the city. That is to say, abridged by Czepczynski, that the language of power becomes 'urbanized' (2008: 1).

This study explores the processes of citizenship rights limitation under metropolitan governance to explain how the people of Romani ethnicity are denied the right to the city. Taking into account critical urban theory (Short, 2014; Parker, 2015), I exploit the meaning of moral panic as a political intervention (Critcher, 2008, 2009; David et al., 2011; Dandoy, 2014). Moral panic represents a short-term moralizing strategy against less civilized others, marginalizes and expels a culturally scapegoated group of people. Particularly, I describe the strategy of moral panic

[1] I use here 'voluntary return' with quotation marks to challenge the mainstream understanding of the term, and the allegedly 'voluntary' character of these returns. Below, I will drop the quotation marks for ease of readability.

aiming to spatial cleanse Roma from the city, at the same time denying them the right to the city.

In doing so, I recall the notion of spatial cleansing, explained by Hertzfeld (2006) and Czepczynski (2008), which refers to the attitudes and actions taken by authorities at national or local level that transform the urban space in order to ensure appropriate political control. Spatial cleansing defines a sort of violence that entails 'the disruption of fundamental security for entire groups of people' (Herzfeld, 2006: 142). Drawing detail from my case studies, I discuss the recent urban modalities of spatial exclusion: displacement, evictions and voluntary return, and how these types of racial-spatial segregation are directed towards people of Romani ethnicity (Vincze, 2013; Picker et al., 2015). Specifically, the term 'voluntary return' (*retorno voluntario*) is used as such by social services in Catalonia, and in Spain in general, while only recently scholars have questioned the 'voluntary' character of return policies (see Webber, 2011; SAIER, 2015; Kalir, 2016).

Within this conceptual architecture, I decipher the political techniques of exclusion used by the local governance in two cities, Barcelona and Bucharest. Introducing the term *ethnicized mobile minority* I discuss a certain Roma label that is generated in urban contexts. The Roma denominator is used to categorically encompass different marginalized and vulnerable people, mobile minorities and ethnically classified Romani groups.

The primary data I am using is based on my own field research conducted sequentially during the years 2013-2015 with civil servants, NGO workers, as well as with Romanian migrants (people of Roma or non-Roma ethnicity) in Spain and with evicted people in Romania. The data were collected from thirty in-depth semi-structured interviews and six sessions of participant observation. Adding to this, I draw upon secondary sources, analysing the historicity of social and urban exclusion/inclusion processes decided at the local level where citizenship transforms its meaning according to people's territorial belonging. In both cities, these processes take place through urban development, constitutional change, political regime and administrative reorganization. Although the research was conducted in the frame of two distinguished individual research projects, both were using similar research methods: interviews with public servants, planned group discussions, direct observation, and secondary source analysis.

The first section explains the moral panic enacted against the Roma. This political strategy manipulates groups of people to render them vulnerable. The second section develops on the historicity of inclusion-exclusion processes of Romani shaped along different political regimes in Barcelona and Bucharest. Illustrating through empirical research and secondary data, I analyse the regulatory effect of moral panic while reinforcing the dormant racism and politics of exclusion.

The conclusion summarizes the analytical architecture built on illustrative elements of first and secondary sources about the governance in the cities of Barcelona and Bucharest. While tackling the Romani urban situations, the end point demonstrates how moral panic acts against migrants and ethnicized vulnerable people, forcing their mobility.

1. *Moral panic: Roma become an ethnicized mobile minority*

This section develops on the concept of moral panic when directed to people of Romani ethnicity and correlates the stages of the short-term strategy with the political practices of ethno-spatial cleansing.

Moral panic is enacted against those considered threatening the community, the norms established by society. Sometimes, moral panic is directed towards the group of people defined as Roma. Reflecting on the way in which people of Romani ethnicity become the scapegoats for metropolitan governance, I argue that local authorities manage differently groups of people. First, I investigate the criteria applied for the group/s selection. Second, I explore the concept of vulnerability, previously related to Roma issues and explicitly evoking the Roma victimhood. Third, admitting the city may select different targets for scapegoating, I describe the manner in which Roma become part of the social conflict negotiated to redesign the urban space.

To begin with, the governing authority selects the target group/s employing the category of vulnerability. On the one hand, labelling vulnerable a group of people, the authority prepares the ground for either benevolent inclusion or punitive exclusion. As I show further, vulnerability enacts both processes of securitization and social provisions. On the other hand, moral panic endorses the politics of emergency which are characteristic of the repressive power (Agamben, 2002). Without being self-evident, when directed towards a group of vulnerable people, moral panic becomes an instrument of the repressive power, excluding rather than including the target group.

1.1. Group selection

Anderson et al. (2014) explain how hierarchy of deservingness (and belonging) intersects with the system of (il-)legalizing people, allowing 'foreigners' to enter or not, reside and have access to social benefits on a given territory. Her analysis focused on nation-states tactics and different approaches to exclude non-citizens becomes useful as I emphasize similar strategies employed by local authorities.

The metropolitan governance selects the group/s of people to be included or excluded from the city by applying local administrative rules. Exploiting the absence of state's leverage and avoiding political accountability, the local authority endorses norms for recording (or not) the presence of people on their administrative territory. By means of technical regulations the local governance decides who belongs and who does not belong to a community, who amy inhabit its territory. In order to do that, the authority activates services for social provisions able to identify people in precarious situations. Subsequently, the authority approves the repressive actions of the public services.

Initially, the group selection is done by the social services. Analysing their practices of attending people in precarious situations, some particularities are revealed.

In Barcelona, people living in social housing (*piso de inclusión*) are periodically surveyed by civil servants as part of their job. The regulations applied during the evaluation process are obligatory for allocating social benefits to poor families. For the civil servants, people and families have to live according to the standards of extreme marginality to solicit social support. By selecting the target group for social benefit, these centres for temporary housing can be considered places where the state of exception is applied: those submitted to such a mechanism of surveillance being initially suspected of non-integration behaviour. Romani migrants who have no means to ensure their legal status as residents may sometimes qualify for social housing (*piso de inclusión*). When this applies, Romani migrants should both prove their willingness to integrate into the community but also to maintain their vulnerable condition in order to access further state provisions.

In Romania, the state collects data about people according to their ethnicity, without guaranteeing straight-forward social justice. For example, in order to apply for social benefits, one should fill-in a form specifying the Roma identity, but without an open option for ethnic self-identification. Roma are rather considered itself a category of vulnerable groups. The classification is important, but makes a small difference within the competition between several vulnerable groups. Once a person decides that they belong to the category of a vulnerable group, they have to choose: either they self-identify as of Romani ethnicity, or submit their classification into another disadvantaged group (living on or below the poverty line, being a single-parent family, large size family etc.). One person cannot fall under more than one category. One of the results of such a classification within the social services registration leads, in Bucharest, to 'ethnic differences in housing conditions... the Roma [being] worse off in terms of both space and quality compared to the Romanian majority population' (Gentile and Marcinczak, 2014: 462).

1.2. Addressing vulnerable group/s: unsustainable politics

In the international political context vulnerability has been widely associated with migration and especially with Roma (Helms, 2014; Heaslip, 2015). Scholars who analyse vulnerability in relation to Roma rarely provide a consistent concept (Jovanović, 2015), one of the persistent confusion being between vulnerability and vulnerable group/s. Roma have been listed among vulnerable groups, and over-represented as such in EU policy documents. Portraying Roma as vulnerable group/s reinforces their political liability and, not surprisingly, increases the association of Roma with human trafficking and exploitation. Contrary to this, the framed politics for Roma do not address a 'group at high risk' that will impose an intersectional approach (Crenshaw, 1993; Platt, 2011). Jovanović explains that Romani have been put into vulnerable situations by institutional discrimination, but neither 'their ethnicity' nor racism have been addressed as factors influencing Roma vulnerability (2015: 4-13). She further marks the difference saying that while the category of vulnerable group points to institutionalized discrimination, vulnerability reveals a moralizing structure.

Vulnerability enacts moral panic producing on the one hand subjects that should be saved, and on the other hand the dehumanization and criminalization of those of Romani ethnicity.

The suitable 'vulnerable Roma' becomes the suspect that fails the inclusion strategy, although the politics addressing Roma integration are supposedly implemented. Roma portray a threat to society against the apparently rightful and benevolent local administration. Roma as a vulnerable group proves to be a concept built on unsustainable politics for those of Romani ethnicity. The more politics are drafted for vulnerable group/s the more people of Romani ethnicity have to fit the group/s description of 'vulnerable Roma'. This categorization of 'Roma' as a vulnerable group precedes and makes it possible to expel and evict people of Romani ethnicity by previously assigning them cultural prejudices.

Further, by using 'making someone vulnerable' I explain the way in which a group of people is labelled rather than *ab ovo* belonging to a certain socio-political category. Vulnerability is not an intrinsic characteristic of people, instead the public structure enables the category in order to respond to existing internal logic and bureaucratic regulations. The aim is excluding the group from the community/territory through practices of evictions and voluntary returns.

1.3. Maintaining social conflict for urban development

The next step in the tactic of the local authority is the intervention of repressive structures against the selected group. After the identification and containment of the 'vulnerable group of Roma' by the social services, the authority proceeds to scapegoating in order to expel the undesirables.

Both in the country of origin and in the host countries, Roma cultural scapegoating articulates primarily on prejudices of nomadism, being considered a community with a highly mobile life style (Puşcă, 2010; Roccheggiani, 2011; Coquio and Poueyto, 2014). By collectively labelling them 'nomads', the state creates a doubt over the Roma's right to belong. Indirectly normalizing homelessness, the prejudice of nomadism against those of Romani ethnicity explains the 'inclusive exclusion of the Romanies' (Armillei, 2015), the way Romani are accepted by the urban community as a temporary exception. These cultural characteristics attributed to Roma on behalf of their vulnerability affects people beyond their poverty status or migration opportunities. In fact, Romani migrants have been pushed to circulatory migration by grey job market opportunities and the context determined by their living possibilities such as squatting buildings or settling in slum housing (Nacu, 2011; Voiculescu, 2014).

Urban development relies on social conflict (Kramer, 2010). This social conflict is produced and maintained by territorial population registration and through repressive measures of evictions and expulsions. Contrary to moral panic that is a short-term strategy, urban development is a long-term process determined by the commitment and continuity of political governance. However, both political strategies require a tensioned social dynamic. Thus, while the urban planners prefer a conceptual debate, researchers concentrate their attention on the technical aspects of

urban politics – housing policies and residential or infrastructure development. Left outside of direct political debate, urban planning intertwined with social services provisions legitimize the spatial cleansing in a straightforward meaning of racism and dispossession. In fact, the urban planners' and social workers' most valuable task is to control poverty and keep a cheap labour force available.

To summarize, the moral panic strengthens a common identity and resettles the borders of the community in order to ensure the state's governance over the territory and its population. Similarly, the city undertakes similar privileges deciding upon belonging criteria, especially under the guise of urban development which pretends to be a politically neutral action.

1. Evictions and voluntary returns: the urban solutions

The spatial marginalization or ghettoization of Roma settlements in Europe was the topic of several research studies and reports (Clough Marinaro and Daniele, 2011; ISPMN, 2013; Piemontese et al., 2013; Piasere et al., 2014; Berlin, 2015; Studia Sociologia thematic issue, 2013). Besides, the spatial marginalization is connected to the identity and (mis)recognition of Roma within an 'oppressive social and cultural construction of the space' (Chiesa and Rossi, 2013: 2) or within institutional racism, an expression of long preserved ethnic inequalities. In particular, the housing policies for Roma have been criticized throughout countries like Italy (Beluschi-Fabeni, 2015), France (Nacu, 2013; Legros, 2011; Legros and Olivera, 2014; Fassin, 2014), Romania (Rughiniș, 2004; Berescu, 2011; Racles, 2013) and scholars have paid attention to evictions and forced mobility detected despite the right to decent housing or freedom of movement (Cames, 2013; Parker and López Catalan, 2014; Romanos, 2014; Armillei, 2015).

Being migrants or nationals, those of Romani ethnicity are challenged for their right to the city in the most conspicuous way: they are evicted, expelled and exposed to the sheer violence of power. The informal settlements (squats, slum housing, *barraque*, *platz*, *părăseală*) trigger local police intervention. Thus, the mobility of Romani migrants is enforced by local authorities that prefer evictions instead of legalizing their settlements.

Cousin and Legros (2014) explain the political leverage of evicting Roma migrants in France. In their study, the authors point to evictions as being the actions conducted by civil and administrative power and directed towards 'illicit settlements'. By contrast, Picker et al. (2015) argue that the emergence of a 'Gypsy-camp' is both a spatio-racial colonial type of governance and a form of governance through control directed to a certain category of people. In Spain and Romania, the eviction and voluntary return procedures represent a shift of power from the state to local and civic authorities, depicting even less accountable local authorities.

Further, I focus on the way the governance through eviction relies on the unexpressed ethnicization of migration. I illustrate through the examples of Bucharest and Barcelona in which way the people of Romani ethnicity are chosen to be the scapegoats.

Mentioned above, the metropolitan governance uses two methods, urban development and social services, to contain and exclude the marginal population. The social services have the role of supporting the integration of the marginal population, whereas the repressive structures punish those failing to integrate. To redesign the urban landscape local governance uses techniques of segregation, eviction, or gentrification. The engine for maintaining urban development is the social conflict necessary for the political interest to manipulate the social dynamic. One of the tools of social conflict is scapegoating Roma, calling them nomads or migrants, un-integrated and un-settled, becomes the handy tool of metropolitan governance.

The scholarship considers Bucharest throughout its history and in the recent past a violent and violated urban space, although this is rarely backed by analyses on class or ethnic social structure. Meanwhile, Barcelona has been successively subject to dire spatial and social changes, producing rich debates on urban identity, but also accepting blind spots of neoliberal ideology.

2.1 Barcelona: the urban ideology

Being the second largest city in Spain, Barcelona is the capital of Autonomous Region of Catalonia. Having some political autonomy, Barcelona yields its own political and administrative regulations. Hosting in the metropolitan area two thirds of region's population, the city became one of the most visited places. Barcelona's urban politics and architecture challenge and change the life of its inhabitants at a high speed, often being called a space invaded or endangered by mass tourism. Scholars and politicians debate the notions of residential area, right to housing, property rights, public urban space, both proudly considering as political acts the associations of neighbours or squatted places (i Ventayol, 2010; Vallhonrat et al., 2011; García-Vaquero, 2012; Romanos, 2014). Following the urban anthropology and historical literature of Barcelona, I evoke here some moments of political urbanization.

Highly industrialized Barcelona almost tripled its population during the 1960s, receiving people affected by civil war, Franco's forced evictions or internal migration. Shanty towns grew outside the scope of urban planning. They were never recognized as part of the city, neither were the working class people living there. The work related migration of Spaniards pushed urban development and challenged the housing situation of the population. In the late 1970s, under the fresh authority of Catalonia (*Comunidad Autónoma*), urban planners remodelled the city. The facelift was called the fight against *barraquismo* (a twisted word rooted in *barraque,* meaning shack, but sounding like *barroquismo,* a classical, recognizable, architectural style). The policies to eradicate shanty towns or informal housing systematically spread around the old city. The removed working class population went to inhabit newly built houses in the neighbourhoods of La Mina, Carmel or Sants-Montjuc. Furthermore, other shanty towns were demolished, moving people according to social housing plans. As Vallhonrat et al. (2011) put it, each time the *Gitanos* were the last occupants of the shanties (e.g. San Roc de Badalona, La Perona). Moreover, just before the *Plan to Eradicate Slums* would end, in late 1980s, the last inhabitants were given the

alternative: to receive money if they chose to return to their cities of origin (Vallhonrat et al., 2011).

Supported by a consistent financial input and decentralized administration (Olympic Games in 1992, autonomous status, administrative reform), the political and urban intervention against shanty towns in the history of Barcelona translated into an amnesty for migrants without legal housing. A logic that gave the opportunity to the city to develop its own political strategies of inclusion-exclusion.

The 1990s witnessed two major political changes in the migration management and in the wealth redistribution system. Firstly, the migrants' status started being regulated by an administrative norm[2] and the local interpretation of the state's Foreign Law[3]. The Spanish Foreign Law establishes different conditions for the 'normalization' of the migrants, but each autonomous region has the freedom to choose the way in which the policy is implemented. For example, Grigolo (2010) explains the debate around the migrant evaluation of 'settling' (*arraigo*) through labour or social inclusion. Managing migrants turns out to be profitable for political reasons: 'local authorities are responsible for the registration (*empadronamiento*) of all city residents independently of their migration status' (Grigolo, 2010: 899). Hence, the right over the territory claimed by the local authorities guarantees the governance of the people residing there.

Secondly, while the redistribution of wealth is narrowed to the state's decision, the city should find ways to produce wealth for its own budget. The Catalan region, one of the most decentralized neoliberal administrations, uses social services equally as a surveillance system. The foreseeable results are: the lack of political accountability towards citizens or non-country nationals; no political adherence to human rights conventions and regulations; highlighting the role of the social services in surveillance of the daily life of vulnerable people. The local administration actively produces and maintains people in vulnerable situations through evictions (*desahucios*), discretionary usage of power over the people living in Barcelona, and poor redistribution of welfare or random allocation of social benefits.

This policy affects mainly people with a high degree of vulnerability, championed by the Romani migrants and *Gitanos* (Macías 2008; López-Catalan, 2012). Further on, I rely on my fieldwork notes taken while researching the policies and institutional practices towards *Gitanos* and Romani migrants in Barcelona. I detail here two situations illustrating the entanglement of ethnic and social policy of the local authority in the city of Barcelona.

For example, the Galician *Gitanos* in Barcelona were considered a decade ago to be a 'nomadic' or 'semi-nomadic' community. The social services created SASPI, an externalized dedicated programme that functioned for the integration of some tens of people. These few Galician *Gitano* families have been demanding their right to social housing since their arrival in Barcelona when they registered at social services.

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[2] *Ordenanza de medidas para fomentar y garantizar la convivencia ciudadana en el espacio público de Barcelona* is a highly debated norm after the present mayor, announced structural changes in June 2015. The text of the normative can be consulted here: http://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ca/informacio-administrativa/normativa Accessed: 24-03-2016.

[3] Foreign Law (*Ley de Extranjería*) 1985, modified in 2000, 2005, 2008.

For more than 10 years they have been settled and were living in caravans on the same public space. Despite this, in 2015 they had to face eviction without receiving any social housing. The families allegedly did not qualify for social housing due to an extensive list of people left without housing during the crisis-years. This was the explanation given by the head of Immigration Department of Barcelona city council. Moreover, the *Gitanos* were also unable to access the social housing policies framed for local Catalan *Gitanos,* policies crafted in the *Plan Integral del Pueblo Gitano*[4]. According to the judge's verdict, the Galician *Gitanos* living in c/Alaba have been illegally occupying the public space, therefore they have been legally evicted.

Another situation shows how the Romani migrants are excluded from both the *Plan Integral del Pueblo Gitano*, and from social housing programmes. While public and private places are squatted by activists, homeless people, migrants, locals, or the Romani migrants (predominantly coming from Romania),[5] it is the Roma that played the scapegoat role in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. During my interviews, the social workers and mediators explained what made Romani migrants so visible:

> [They] had an impact on the citizenship because there were a lot of them that came; and their clothes and their way of living with the children in the streets... this created social alarm. (*interview Jordi* 2015)

And another one details:

> (...) there is not a big percentage, the quantitative level is not too... but the people got alarmed. Nowadays, the Romanian is the scapegoat. Always when there is a problem – I am talking about the Romanian Gypsy – any problem, a Romanian Gypsy will show up. So, fantastic! The problem is already... only the Romanian Gypsy. In Badalona [part of metropolitan area of Barcelona], you know, the mayor won the elections doing a campaign against... focused on the issue of Romanian Gypsies and house squatting. (*interview Clara* 2014)

In the decentralized administrative system of Catalonia, private companies or NGOs working under contract manage the public services for city councils. For example, in the metropolitan area of Barcelona, the projects are developed together by the city council and several companies specialized in providing social services. The social intervention usually follows the denouncement of misbehaviour, meaning when people occupy a public or private space. The team of mediators provided by these externalized social services can be accompanied by the police or not depending on the intervention. The practical results of the mediators' intervention translate into evictions:

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[4] Within the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies states take the responsibility to implement the strategies according to their own constitutions. In Spain, the management of Roma Integration policies is left to the autonomous regions. In Catalonia the document has been developed and financed by the Social Services Department - *Departamento de Bienestar i Familia, Generalitat de Catalunya*.

[5] Romani migrants called *Gitanos del este* are also from other countries such as Bosnia-Hertzegovina, Hungary, Bulgaria, but according to public servants working in social services more than 90% are from Romania.

> Do you know what we were basically doing? Evictions. Meaning, there was an empty place here in this neighbourhood, I remember... c/Agricultura. 300 persons. This cannot be like that... This cannot stay. In a city like Barcelona which tries to have an international opening, which tries to have a specific image of high level in the Mediterranean area... I cannot allow it. So, what do we do? We have looked and then evicted. [...We asked for] and the police came saying: 'Pack your bags and you are leaving.' (*interview Claude* 2014)

Not only do the social workers maintain the bias of cultural identification, but they also exaggerate the stigmatization of Romani migrants. The local administration swiftly moves from mediation programmes to evictions, finally offering Romani migrants the 'voluntary return' solution. Besides being targets for the evictions, Romani migrants are submitted to practices of voluntary return under the benevolent gloss of social services. The distinction relies on a subtle tactic of local governance: while for an eviction a judge's order is necessary, the voluntary return is provided as 'help' for evicted Romani migrants.

> Look, I do not like the word *cultural*, the adjective *cultural* I dislike, but I see it as a condition of generations and of history, of ...how to say it, of cultural inheritance, family legacy. Meaning, if my grandfather lived, and my father lived like his father, and I live like my father, my sons will live like me. We cannot stop this. We cannot dismantle this legacy. So, starting from here it has been decided that one of the policies was to make a reality plan. We talked with the families [of Romanian Roma] and offered them to return to Romania... this a very common practice. Many will deny it but it is like that. They send them away: 'Do you want to go to Romania? Here [have some money] and goodbye!' So, we cannot help them. (*interview Claude* 2014)

The housing rights for Galician *Gitanos* and the social services approach to Romani migrants leads to structural exclusion of entire groups of people. In Barcelona, the moral panic acts to deny the right to the city to an ethnicized group. The local authority controls who belongs to the urban community by a continuous surveillance of the territory. At the same time, the diversity of decision units in the decentralized system encourages a dispersed control that accumulates political power without claiming but administrative entitlements.

2.2 Bucharest: a violent city?

Bucharest's urban development has been documented and framed as a place constantly subjected to natural and inflicted disasters. From the earthquakes, plagues and fires that destroyed the urban settlement several times, to wars and civil disobedience ending in bloodshed, what is called the violent transformation of a city qualifies the place as a metropolis, as a desired, claimed urban space. Bucharest

establishes itself as a metropolis according to different standards of urban evaluation. The biography of the city, covering urban planning, human geography or public space development typically evidences the ideological positions of the changing regimes and ruling elites.

Recent studies are keen to explain the broader mechanism of post-socialism affecting the living conditions in Central and Eastern European countries (Tsenkova and Nedović-Budić, 2006; Light and Young, 2014; Stanilov, 2015). Outlining historical arguments and emphasizing the brutality of the politics – like the socialist regime in Romania, scholars rarely engage with spatial governance or critical urban theories (Nae et al., 2014; Patroescu et al., 2015; Suditu et al., 2015; Ghyka, 2015). Exceptionally, the housing sector has been tackled (Stan, 2006; Chelcea, 2006), with a particular attention to Bucharest for its recent socio-economic segregation (Ioan, 2007). Indeed, some studies have focused on the context of urban and housing development during the socialist regime, its further transformations and social consequences (Marcinczak et al., 2014; Gentile and Marcinczak, 2014). Summarizing, the literature on the city of Bucharest gathers different disciplines, keeping the spotlight on the political urban changes, but failing to tackle the ethnic and class dimension of urban policies.

The ideology, limited post-war housing stock, and the need to shelter the workers to build the city determined the nationalization process (1948-1951/2). The socialist centralized system erected and allocated houses according to the scheduled need of the work force solicited by the state companies. By the 1960s, building locative spaces intensified the urbanization process, at the same time using the recent nationalized housing stock to accommodate the state's institutions. The political ideology, while simulating the implementation of de-segregation criteria and equal rights to housing, kept a blind spot on ethnic identity. During the socialist regime, the quality and legal status of housing stock, as well as the interests of stakeholders created different forms of spatial segregation. The resulting pool of housing stock was the chance for working migrants to settle in the city, then moving from nationalized houses to new ones.

When nationalized building ceased to be a priority for the state (late 1970s-1980s), the houses were left to degrade and then allocated to poor families, mainly people of Roma ethnicity. The Romani living in destitute houses near Bucharest or in the city were assigned homes according to their work place. In this way, the socialist centralized urban planning produced its own undesirable, the '*unhousable* underclass, both segregated and highly deprived' (Marcinczak et al., 2014: 1402). By allocating the poorest houses to the Roma, the state excluded them from the urban community.

As Cîrnu (2013) points out, after 1989 Bucharest followed urban planning less, but rather the residential areas extended with scarcely any infrastructure rehabilitation. Moreover, the city underwent two major legal interventions: the selling of the state housing stock to the population and the restitution laws (Stan, 2006). The high percentage of private house ownership and gradual but constant shrinkage of the job market are among the factors that influenced the stagnation of social housing investments. The regulation and deregulation of the real estate market reached the

tipping point with the so-called global economic crisis. The locative space remains the lowest in Europe, and the social housing policies are under-financed.

In fact, nowadays the social housing policies address two categories of beneficiaries: the people fulfilling the criteria for state benefits, and the people evicted from ex-nationalized houses. However, the housing law[6] permits the local authorities to decide the priorities, as well as the criteria used for housing allocation. The housing regulations change constantly, as is confirmed by the manager of the housing department in one of the city council committee meetings: 'the law has changed and thus the criteria [for housing allocation] have changed' (*Ionel, Local Council Bucharest*, 2009).

People applying for social housing, who are entitled to make such a demand at the time of application, often discover that are not able to fulfil the necessary criteria. The civil servants acknowledge the anomaly of a constantly changing law and complain about their situation and the impossibility to take decisions:

> (...) look, anything that will be done in housing national strategy will get down to these criteria. They are established by each city council every year. For example, one criterion now is that a family with 7 children and without income gains up to 20 points, whereas somebody who has a PhD will accumulate 40 points. (*conversations Andrei, Ministry of European Funds 2015*)

The second category is represented by the people evicted from ex-nationalized houses. Initially, the state protected the tenants living in nationalized houses against the owners, but its 'involvement in the post-socialist era in building houses for the disadvantaged categories of the population is punctual and with no significant effects with regard to the housing stock or the socio-spatial architecture' (Suditu, 2014: 77). After the restitution process, the evicted tenants should have been given social houses. Instead, the state only permitted an increased number of evictions in Bucharest.

The recent evictions in Bucharest reveal a structural violence inflicted on families and ethnicized individuals. For example, a Romani woman evicted and left homeless lived for four years with her family in a shack (*baracă*) on the same street where the Bucharest mayor's building is located. Although she was clearly in a need of social housing, having a file submitted to the local authority, she never received an official answer regarding her situation. One day, apparently a delegation of 'foreigners' were passing by and asked about the situation of that shack and why the family is living in the middle of the street. Within 24 hours the woman and her family received an offer of social housing in an apartment complex somewhere in the city. Still, since then, a few years have passed but she did not receive a contract, nor can she pay the electricity bill in her own name, nor can she have the place as her legal dwelling. For another woman the experience of being thrown out into the streets represented the moment when she understood the role her ethnicity plays. Initially she was shocked by the blunt racism of some civil servants that in her case would have decided her fate:

[6] Housing law no. 114/1996.

> He [the manager of housing department] said to me 'I cannot... it hurts my heart if I have to give houses to the Gypsies' (*conversations Nastasia* 2014)

Then, the media representation of the eviction, the reaction from civil-society and activists and finally from several implications of disapproval from a Roma representative gave her the sense of ethnic identity in a way that, she said, she had never experienced before:

> They [the Roma representative at the municipality level] said about us that we stayed there illegally, that 'the Gypsies occupied those houses illegally', but it is not true. And also... look, my husband is a Romanian, I am a Gypsy, a Roma, but I never had this [type of] conversation before. Before, nobody said to us... I never felt like now, that I am a Gypsy. Both of us have jobs, you know, I am employed at the municipality. After all that scandal... only after I was evicted, thrown out into the street with my baby, did I realize that I am Roma. (*conversations Nastasia* 2015).

The consequences of evictions on social structure translate into a wide political and economic input for racial marginalization of those of Roma ethnicity (Vincze and Raț, 2013), with harsh consequences to their citizenship (Vrăbiescu, 2015). In Bucharest, the racist discourse doubled by a constant marginalization within housing policies, accelerates the social and spatial exclusion of people of Romani ethnicity. The political responsibility towards the citizens is overtaken by the social securitization claims and urban development necessities. The social benefit is contested for that group of people forcibly rendered mobile. This group of people becomes an ethnicized mobile minority, to whom the local authority is denying the right to the city.

The low-income and minority group tenants are the first to be affected by evictions, while neither the dimension of the phenomena is recorded, nor are the racialized systemic policies critically addressed. Thus, no systematic data are collected at a local level and no specific policies are developed. There are no social housing policies for the Roma minority at local or national level, and no Roma integration policies address the housing problem of the migrants. The social housing is an eluded option for the politics of evictions, both in Bucharest and in Barcelona. The two cities display significant differences in the implementation and politico-economic context, but a meaningful parallel can be detected in the ideology and governance of the excluded.

During my research in Barcelona and in Bucharest among the people evicted from their houses on different grounds, transformed into 'nomads', the Roma safeguard a tolerated and welcomed exceptionality. Nevertheless, others might be moulded in the urban matrix: the migrants, the undocumented, the illegalized. Even

the local citizens, as Romano (2014) suspects, are equally exposed to the same treatment, despite the present vibrant political movement in Spain.[7]

Conclusion

Within the broader context of metropolitan governance this article illustrated, through the examples of Barcelona and Bucharest, the way in which local authorities enact administrative regulations to exclude people considered undesirable. The argument builds upon moral panic theory and defines political practices of evictions and voluntary returns as forms of spatial cleansing, actions having a clear ethnicized and racialized dimension. Claiming urban development and social security, the local authorities instrument cultural scapegoating for spatial cleansing and social restructuring. Inflicting sheer violence, practising spatial cleansing and denying the right to the city, the local governance develops an urbanized language of power.

Social conflict is necessary for social security and urban development, and to maintain social conflict the authority routinely enacts moral panic. Within this strategy, a target group is selected and qualified as vulnerable in order to legitimate forms of exclusion against it. Vulnerability exposes the target group to benevolent or punishing practices of the local authority, enabled by the social services and the repressive structures. Acting against the selected peoples, the local authority attributes a cultural stigma to them. In an urban space the cultural stigma applies to groups of people first rendered vulnerable, then forcibly mobile. To expel the undesirable people, the political intervention of moral panic aims at spatial cleansing.

The paper discussed how urban governance enacts moral panic against the Roma. Roma scapegoating preserves the social conflict, at the same time alleviating the political responsibility to secure social provisions for vulnerable groups. The local authority not only forces their mobility, but also blames Roma for their alleged failed integration. Being migrants or not, Roma can be labelled an ethnicized mobile minority, representing the racialized consequence of the metropolitan actions against dispossessed citizens.

The paper argued that governing through evictions instead of being the exception, has become the norm at city level. On the one hand, ruling according to administrative regulations permits the local authority to gain power over citizens. Acting like the state, the metropolitan discourse uses the paradigm of the undeserving poor living on its (sovereign) territory. On the other hand, the undesirable labelled by the metropolitan governance is an ethnicized mobile minority, the group of people identified as unable to integrate or adapt to the city norms. Their status is civilly and morally judged, and not debated in the political arena of citizenship rights.

The dispossession and displacement substitute the political act with an administrative rule, actuating the discretionary power of street level bureaucrats. The emergency measures, evictions and voluntary returns, as well as cultural scapegoating indicate the

[7] One of the most prominent figures is Ada Colau, president of the platform of those affected by mortgages (PAH, *Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca*) and the recently elected mayor of Barcelona.

new leverage of local governance. Barcelona and Bucharest have incorporated into their governance the practice of spatial cleansing, displaying a pattern of violence adequate only to the sovereign state. The leading ideology allows the local authorities to explicitly deny the territorial belonging of people of Romani ethnicity, thus contesting their right to the city.

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Book Review

Jody Jensen and Ferenc Miszlivetz (eds) (2015) Reframing Europe's Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction. London and New York: Routledge.

This thought-provoking book addressing the challenges and failures of the European integration processes from an interdisciplinary perspective has been published in the series of Routledge Advances in European Politics. The main aim of the book is to contribute to the deeper understanding of the structural problems standing behind the European crisis and to the identification of ways out. The editors emphasize in the introduction that in previous crises there always was a pro-integration bias to proposed solutions on which consensus was based. These days that is far from clear as more and varied voices articulate increasing frustration, dissatisfaction, distrust, and cynicism with the current state of affairs in Europe. Furthermore, the increasing number of asylum seekers means great external challenge to the integrated Europe. We might say that the ship of European integration is cruising on troubled waters under gloomy sky.

Historical perspective might help to preserve some optimism. To illustrate this I would like to recall the observation that European integration is rather similar to the construction of a Gothic cathedral in the Middle Ages. The construction of a gothic cathedral lasted for centuries; those who started never saw the end product; it happened that the original plans were altered, new architects had different ideas, and there were periods when the construction came to a standstill because the financial burden was too high. New rulers had different priorities; there were personal antipathies between the leading figures in the construction, there were quite understandable and hardly understandable delays, the faith in the construction was lost, but anyway, somehow they passed the point of no return, and if you look at Europe today, we have many marvelous gothic cathedrals (sometimes only finished in the nineteen century though.) But the longue durée optimism is not exempt from the painstaking process of search to find solutions to the deep problems of histoire événementielle of today. The authors of this book promote the idea that the project of European construction has always accelerated because of periods of crises. What the authors have in common is a drive to change the current state of affairs, "while endorsing a more balanced multi-stakeholder (states, markets, and society) approach to problem-solving."

The authors raise a very important question that came into a challenging new perspective in 2014: What is Europe as a politico geographical concept? Is Ukraine a part of Europe from the point of view EU enlargement in a time when young Ukrainians are sacrificing their lives because they are convinced that they belong to Europe?, is this problem addressed by Ferenc Miszlivetz. József Böröcz scathes geopolitical scenarios to preserve Europe's competitiveness and economic weight on the global stage, a scenario called North-Atlantica which would include the EU and the NAFTA, or another one called Northern Eurasia: the EU and the CIS together.

Well, although the economic rationality behind these scenarios can be seen, the political logic contradicts such constructions, because size matters. Even in the case of the Turkish membership size might be the real problem and not cultural and religious background. A stronger inclusion of the NAFTA states or the CIS would completely change decision making by diminishing the role of the current leading member states of the European Union. Stefano Bianchini recalls the Bavarian premier Stoiber's concept of the absorption capacity of the EU, an idea that can be considered the real limit of the integration for policy makers. This could be translated like this: no enlargement can endanger the decision making weight of the leading member states.

Another delicate issue is the impact of integration on polities. As György Schöpflin underlines, the EU faces considerable difficulties to accommodate collective identities in the integration processes; although there is an additional half sentence in the Lisbon Treaty, actually the rights of historic and linguistic minorities are not protected by the law of the EU and as Steve Austen points out, the protagonist of cultural citizenship should consider that collective rights must be recognized. But there are problems not only with ethnos, but also with demos on EU level. The pro-active demos is missing in European governance, as it is pointed out by Jody Jensen, mainly because European political elites systematically keep EU policies out of electoral politics, even in the case of the election of the members of the European Parliament.

The financial crisis and its wider implications is a major topic in the book. The Euro, the symbol of the post-Cold War phase of the European integration led to dissatisfaction and in certain cases to despair. I think Tibor Palánkai is right in emphasizing that the original sin was committed when Germany and France violated the Maastricht rules without negative consequences. When Angela Merkel said no to the transfer union, it clearly proved what Doris Wydra and Sonia Puntscher quoted: the European system of democratic states is one where some tend to dominate others. It is called diffused reciprocity. As Federico Rampini points out, the outcome of the German behaviour is almost paradoxical, Angela Merkel, inaugurating her third mandate as a chancellor, seemed almost eager to embrace the social policy requests of her junior partner, whereas Germany continues to preach austerity abroad. Discussing problems of the Euro-zone, Annamária Artner concludes that data reveals that the euro zone has been harmful for the less developed members while it helped the stronger ones become even stronger. Stuart Holland emphasizes that the policies imposed by the Troika as a treatment for the Euro crises in many respects resemble to the policy of the Brüning government of Germany of the early 1930's. Holland emphasizes the importance of learning from the New Deal. A great expectation of the population of new members has also failed in many respects and as it has been demonstrated by Dóra Győrffy, the dissatisfaction with democracy is an important root of the crisis.

But what are the roots of the crises? And what kind of crises is it? On a high level of abstraction Elemér Hankiss correctly emphasizes that the continuity or the belatedness of modernism in the period of postmodernism might be a powerful reason. György Schöpflin basically sees an epistemological crisis. Anyway, on the level of the basic political premises the main reason might be the contradictions among

three major tendencies: deep economic integration, powerful nation states, and democratic politics. Or, on even a lower level of abstraction the contradictions among the ideas of fiscal consolidation, the preservation of welfare state and green investments.

To find solutions first we should understand the achievements correctly. Europe achieved a lot in past decades. It is important to remember that Europe created a new phase in the history of international relations. As Steve Austin points out, the EU can be seen to have added a new chapter to the Von Clausewitz doctrine suggesting that "the EU is the continuation of peace by other means". Analyzing the effects of the Lisbon Treaty, Jaap Hoeksma concludes that the EU can no longer be described in terms of the traditional categories of states or as a union of states but rather constitutes a new phenomenon of international law. I would say that it has been the case even before the Lisbon Treaty. The member states are not simply nation states any more, membership in the EU creates a new quality of statehood, which cannot be described by specific terms of international law. Moreover, the EU itself is a sui generis phenomenon, neither a federation nor a confederation of states. The EU is a regulatory union, but it is not an international legal phrase.

Social scientists were not able to foresee the crisis. As Ferenc Miszlivetz states, as far as the future for post-crisis Europe is concerned two things are clear: the fear from German Europe, from the Bundesrepublik of Europe, and the chance for a new social contract. It is also sure that neither member states nor markets are able to provide automatic solutions, and the EU does not exist, evolve in social vacuum but in the shadow of global tendencies.

In this review I selected only a very small fraction of the great reservoir of thoughts which can be found in the book. The title is Reframing Europe's Future. In a way all of us is a part of that project. There should be some possibilities to overcome Unordnung und frühes leid.

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