This article attends to the instrumentalization of gender and sexuality in recent Polish political campaigns. Locating current political debates in a cultural-historical context of long-established hierarchical divides, it conceives of gender and sexuality as ‘empty signifiers’ deployed in political struggles (for hegemony) over notions of civic responsibility, good citizenship and articulations of Europeanness. Similarly, it takes ‘Europeanness’ as an empty signifier, without any essential meaning, arguing that these signifiers are key to understanding recent mobilizations around moral frontiers in Polish politics. Illustrative examples serve to elaborate how LGBT rights and sex education are instrumentalized among self-proclaimed liberals as well as rightwing nationalists, seeking to guarantee the moral integrity of the nation according to an antagonistic logic. On both sides of the political divide, we witness a self-orientalizing positioning towards the European ‘core’, whether phrased in terms of sexual modernity or Christian civilization.¹

Keywords: Europeanness, gender and sexuality, notions of nobility, political divisions and struggles.

¹ We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments, as well as the participants at the workshop ‘Struggles over Europe: Post-colonial East/West dynamics of race, gender and sexuality’, organized by Paweł Lewicki at European University Viadrina in Frankfurt Oder/Slubice, November 2019. Rafał Smoczynski wishes to acknowledge the Hungarian Bilateral State Scholarship he held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2020.
1. Introduction

This article draws on critical political theory in the tradition of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) to highlight the instrumentalization of gender and sexuality in recent Polish political campaigns. Our starting point is that political discourses do not merely transmit meaning, but produce the meaningful, social world in the first place. Moreover, we take as our point of departure that post-1989 Poland is characterized by, on the one hand, the disruption or dislocation of old interpretive frameworks of civic responsibility, which, after 1989, lost their efficiency in interpellating political subjectivities, and, on the other, discursive strategies of assessing its actual or imaginary state of maturity according to self-reported European values or ideas (Kuus, 2004; 2007; Böröcz, 2006; Melegh, 2006).

We shall make the case that ‘Europeanness’ represents ideals of civilization corresponding to a cultural-historical notion of nobility deeply rooted in Polish society. More specifically, we will highlight the impact of an entrenched ‘feudal’ lord/boor binary on contemporary struggles for hegemony in the Polish public sphere. This framing suggests that it is helpful to consider both local, historical-cultural specificities and global factors when interrogating how antagonistic frontiers originate in dislocated structures (see Nabers, 2017: 421). Illustrative examples will serve to highlight how LGBT rights and sex education are instrumentalized in political struggles across the political spectrum – among self-proclaimed liberals and rightwing nationalists alike.

2. Current struggles over civic responsibility

As in other situations of dislocation of sedimented discourses, when old normative codes are waning (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990), the post-communist Polish situation called for new civic responsibility frameworks suitable for the new circumstances. Amid post-1989 weakened legitimacy of institutionalized social control agents, rivalling factions of the Polish intelligentsia struggled for hegemony over citizenship models, notably moral disputes about good and bad citizen ideals. Two discursive currents dominated the struggle: a conservative faction advocating regional protectionism over its resources (political, economic and cultural), and a liberal faction advocating ‘European values’.2

Lacking a stable, positive content that remains unchanged in relational contexts, the category ‘European values’, like ‘Europeanness’, is an empty signifier in Laclau’s (2005) terms. Political rivals seek to transform the particularistic

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2 Arguably, the Polish political landscape is more complicated than the simple binary ‘conservative’ vs. ‘liberal’ suggests. While one liberal formation advocates ‘European values’ in economical and cultural terms, another left-wing formation is economically social-democratic and liberal in cultural terms. Conversely, while one ‘conservative’ formation is ‘instrumentally pro-European’ (PiS), another, emerging one, is anti-European (Konfederacja). We see similar divides within Polish feminism to which we shall turn in due course. However, these differentiations do not change our assumption that Polish political formations are driven by a culturalist, interpretive framework of social reality.
signifiers into a dimension of universal meaning that resonates with the wider experiences and sensitivities of the public. As indicated above, a set of (empty) signifiers related to gender and sexuality have gradually rose to prominence as a moral indicator of good and bad citizenship in Poland (and elsewhere). LGBT rights and freedoms have fueled political campaigns with various valence, strategically deployed in political struggles over notions of civic responsibility, citizenship and articulations of Europeanness (Graff, 2006; Hall, 2015).

Some conservative elites, including the Catholic intelligentsia, have been adamantly anti-liberal in matters concerning gender and sexuality, although not necessarily stridently anti-gay. As Dorota Hall (2015) observes, ‘Catholic intelligentsia’ members have on several occasions expressed their friendliness to LGBT people, and the Christian ‘Faith and Rainbow’ group has pledged allegiance – or entered a chain of equivalence – with the ‘Catholic intelligentsia’, especially associated with the prominent Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny. Nevertheless, an antagonistic relationship between religion and homosexuality has evolved over time, engaging various discursive components. We shall return to these antagonistic articulations in due course, but first we will attend to some key cultural-political, historical factors that help explain the evolvement of more recent forms of instrumentalization of sexuality in both ‘pro-gay’ and ‘anti-gay’ articulations.

**3. Polish intelligentsia and divisions between good and bad citizens**

In Central and Eastern European (CEE) societies, where the bourgeoisie has been weakly established and where a high degree of foreign ownership of financial assets has dominated (Jedlicki, 1999; Szenleyi, 2006; Hardy, 2007; Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009), a post-gentry intelligentsia stratum – the elite of cultural capital – has historically set the parameters of civic responsibility (Gella, 1976; Jedlicki, 1999a; Jasiewicz, 2009). Political struggles have thus had less to do with class conflict over the distribution of material capital and more to do with tensions between different factions of the cultural capital-oriented intelligentsia (Smoczynski and Zarycki, 2016; Zarycki, Smoczynski and Warczok, 2017).

It is beyond the scope of this article to explain the prominent status of Polish elites from the late 19th century onwards. Suffice it to say here that the intelligentsia’s dominant position is down to a combination of disposessions brought about by the 20th century world wars, the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, and the 1944 imposition of the communist regime which gradually wiped out economic elites (mainly bourgeois and aristocratic milieus) from the centre of public life. These composite factors left the intelligentsia as the major actor in the national field of power (Zarycki, Smoczynski and Warczok, 2017; cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1993), accompanied by the communist ‘nomenclatura’ – the elite of political capital – which was particularly influential in the early communist period (up to the late 1950s) (Eyal et al., 1998). In short, the capitalist elite has not been in the position to significantly challenge the dominant role of the intelligentsia for...
the better part of the 20th century in matters concerning civic responsibility (Zarycki, 2015), and its impact in the 21st century remains limited (Drahokoupil, 2009).

Moreover, and most importantly for our purposes, the Polish intelligentsia stratum evolved historically out of the waning landed gentry and their gendered notions of civic responsibility. Even though the intelligentsia’s ideological imaginary was mostly shaped by late 19th-century ideas of democratic politics (mainly socialist and nationalist) (Walicki, 2005), their civic frameworks were substantially influenced by the gendered, ‘feudal’ division between good (noble) and bad citizens: ‘lord’ versus ‘boor’ (Tazbir, 2013). During the 20th century, the masculine ‘lord’ figure gradually lost its association with this pastoral imagery and became increasingly informed by modern meritocratic ideals associated with the figure of the educated intelligentsia member, although the public remained a distinctly masculine coded sphere. The notion of the good citizen was in this process re-defined to signify the paternalistic figure who takes responsibility for the civic sphere and thereby serves the nation, while ‘boor’ denotes the non-responsible citizen or non-citizen, historically identified with the landless male peasant who did not participate in public life and hence did not take responsibility for the Rzeczpospolita (Republic) (Zarycki, 2014). This persistent binary has made the Polish citizenship model strongly hierarchical and exclusive (Chalasiński, 1946), with gender and sexuality distinctions cutting across class divides (see e.g. Fidelis, 2010; Grabowska, 2012).

To grasp the impact of this historical division on post-1989 political discourses, it might prove fruitful to draw a structural parallel with the Netherlands, where political elites at the turn of the 21st century, in a period of rapid social change, sought to recreate a moral civic sphere by discerning between good and bad citizens (Schinkel, 2008). In the Dutch case, the informal moral differentiation was triggered by a declared crisis of the welfare state and the articulation of risks posed by non-Western migrants to social cohesion, national security and cultural norms, especially liberal gender and sexuality norms. It was argued that some non-Western migrants, Muslims in particular, did not actively participate in public life and did not comply with the ideals of secular Dutch society, epitomized by gay tolerance (see e.g. Butler, 2008; Graff, 2010; El-Tayeb, 2011).

Polish citizenship politics, either in the interwar (1918–1939) period, or during the post-communist era, saw similar moralization mechanisms evolve, encouraging the public to participate in the civic sphere and comply with the ideals of the Republic, embodied by the figure of the intelligentsia member: the white, heterosexual male, educated, politically responsible individual (see Zarycki, Smoczynski and Warczok, 2017). Although opposite in substance as well as style, both the Polish and the Dutch culturalist approach serves to establish a hegemonic code of legitimate moral citizenship, and in both cases, the excluded are subjects who supposedly fail to comply with the normative ideals – those who do not fulfil the culturally defined (inherently gendered and sexualized) boundaries of the nation.
We have thus far argued that in the post-communist era, boundary-settings between ‘lordish’ and ‘boorish’ citizens (and non-citizens) have largely been characterized by antagonistic tensions between liberal and conservative factions of the intelligentsia. This is not to deny, however, that the ‘entrepreneurial secular individual’ who – according to this ideal – is capable of managing various types of risks (such as employment risks), achieved a high level of prominence in the 1990s. Self-proclaimed ‘real Europeans’ among the post-1989 liberal intelligentsia expressed a moral superiority attitude (typical of this stratum) towards ‘not real Europeans’ on the basis of possessing entrepreneurial qualities required for a successful European integration. Informed by the lord/boor binary, liberal intelligentsia members sought to combat cultural forces said to impede European integration (Sztompka, 1993), casting various categories of citizens as out of joint with the modern world (Horolets, 2006; Koczanowicz, 2011). This was particularly the case in political campaigns against the ‘homo sovieticus’ figure coined in the early 1990s public discourse (Zarycki, 2004). The ‘homo sovieticus’ figure, commonly juxtaposed with the entrepreneurial urban-based individual, was allegedly failing to adapt because of its lacking self-management skills. A corresponding opposition is the one between educated and the poorly educated, the latter presumably incapable of taking advantage of socio-economic transformations. Related polar oppositions include open-minded versus closed-minded, secular versus religious, and rational versus superstitious (Buchowski, 2006: 466).

Techniques of moral regulation, which are vivid in the above-depicted dichotomies, are crucial to the formation of prudent citizenship (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985; Hunt, 1997; 1999; Valverde, 1994; 1995), and as feminist and queer scholars have demonstrated, formations of nation – notions of proper citizens – are inextricably linked to formations of gender and sexuality (see e.g. Mosse, 1985; Parker et al., 1992; McClintock, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Pryke, 1998; Nagel, 2003; Kulpa, 2011). For instance, Sam Pryke (1998: 541) points to two principal ways in which sexuality has figured within nation building: through attempts to delimit what is normatively acceptable sexual behaviour on the part of a national citizen, and through controlling fertility. Both mechanisms are central to nationalist politics in Poland, but even liberals have advocated regulations of gender and sexuality, albeit in more indirect ways (through governmental regulations rather than disciplinary control) and with slightly different aims. It should be noted that Polish liberal elites have until recently wielded a relatively conservative gender and sexuality agenda compared with their ‘Western’ counterparts. In line with liberal formations elsewhere, however, their strategy has predominantly been to address ‘prudent individuals’ capable of managing risks and avoiding harm through governmental techniques of responsibilization. As Hunt (2003) and others (see e.g. O’Malley, 1996) point out, the strategy of identifying prudent citizens has achieved a dominant regulatory position in everyday life.
4. Moralization of citizenship and self-orientalization

Once implemented in the post-communist CEE region, the regulatory discursive machinery generated its own interpelling efficiency, usually within the self-orientalizing register of ‘nesting orientalism’, that is, the extension of the symbolic topography of the original Orient to other places and people, implying a gradation of Orient: Asia is cast as more East or Other than Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans and Russia are designated as the most Eastern within Eastern Europe (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 918; Zarycki, 2015). In Poland, the prudent citizenry has in various historical contexts been perceived as torn between the empires of the rational, civilized West and the barbarian, alien East (most commonly linked to Russia in its different political forms), the latter being variably associated with nationalism, authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and suppression of women and sexual minorities. Although this East/West antagonism could be traced back to exponents of the Polish Enlightenment, we shall concentrate on the post-1989 discursive dynamics between the European ‘core’ and the eastern ‘peripheries’.

It bears noting in this context that over the last three decades, there has been a strong asymmetry between pro-European elite discourses (associated with the liberal intelligentsia) and Euro-sceptical ones (associated with nationalism) in their capacity to shape formal and informal hierarchies of citizenship. Political hegemony has unequivocally belonged to the elite factions, which have presented their ideological stand in line with the self-reported dominant neoliberal compromise reigning in ‘core’ European countries. Put differently, the political elites have enjoyed the hegemonic position of being able to articulate an undisputable universal model of good citizenship that ought to be implemented in the ‘semi-peripheral’ CEE countries. This asymmetry did not change significantly until the 2008 ‘economic crisis’, when the neoliberal compromise started to unravel globally, followed by the so-called European migration crisis of 2015. The two moments of articulated ‘crisis’ paved the way for the rightwing Law and Justice (PiS) party, whose victory in the parliamentary elections in 2015 meant that the cultural hierarchy between Euro-enthusiastic and nationalist or protectionist discourses gradually crumbled. This displacement surely weakened the neoliberal ideological agency in its capacity to address Polish political subjectivities, but it also gave rise to a more moralized and polarized debate revolving around gender and sexuality.

Before illuminating some of these moral-political tensions, it should also be noted that Euro-scepticism does not amount to a full-blown anti-EU ideology. Given Poland’s fragile geopolitical location, EU membership is widely regarded (either instrumentally or idealistically) as a national security assurance in the face of Russian revisionist policies. Hence, the major Polish nationalist formations, most notably the PiS party, do not want Poland to leave the EU. They target instead what they consider as undesirable foreign influence. As we shall see in the following, PiS strategically portrays homosexuality as a ‘foreign invasion’ and do not shy away from invoking anti-Semitic tropes, such as ‘the homosexual lobby’
seeking to undermine ‘the family’ according to a carefully prepared plan (Graff, 2010: 594). Apparently, ‘the corrupt European body’ is embodied in the Europeanized gay person (Graff, 2006: 448; cf. Lewicki, 2016; Keinz and Lewicki, 2019).

From a critical political theory point of view, we could argue that the articulation of corruption of the social is made possible by reference to some mythical purity that is lost (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990). In a comparable manner, Dirk Naber (2017: 425) shows how the ‘nation’ functions as an empty signifier in the US ‘war on terror’ in a sedimented discourse of American exceptionalism: ‘a deliberate attempt to suture a dislocated identity by drawing on previously established sedimented practices’. Antagonism is crucial in this process: opposed elements are articulated as conflicting and are excluded from the alleged fullness of the mythical national community, the national imaginary. The subsequent institutionalization of this imaginary – which excludes alternative frames of intelligibility – is experienced as a solution to the crisis threatening the national identity, that is, a recovery of something that has been there all along: a lost origin, identity or ‘core’ (Naber, 2017: 422).

5. The politicization of homophobia and ‘gender ideology’

Agnieszka Graff (2010: 585) notes that after Poland’s EU accession, rightwing nationalist forces increasingly portrayed Europe as morally corrupt, juxtaposing ‘European perversion’ with ‘healthy Polish traditionalism’ capable of resisting the pressure to conform to EU-imposed standards (see also Graff, 2006). Because EU resolutions are meant as responses to state-sanctioned discrimination against sexual minorities, Graff continues, so-called homophobes can score political points by non-compliance, and homophobia can function as a sign or discourse of patriotism and national sovereignty (Graff, 2010: 590–591, 600–601; cf. O’Dwyer and Schwartz, 2010). This is of course the reverse of the Dutch case, where ‘homo tolerance’ – in accordance with official EU policy – serves as an index of democracy and civilizational development. In both cases, though, sexual boundaries are assumed to coincide with national ones, underpinned by the same gendered, culturalist binaries (Graff, 2010: 584, 601; cf. Kulpa, 2011; 2014; Bilić, 2016).

The privileged position of the Catholic Church in Polish public life has arguably played an important role in the post-communist politicization of homophobia. Church leaders’ ‘family first’ rhetoric resonates with nationalist sentiments and gives legitimacy to the rising tide of homophobic hatred and hostile environments for sexual minorities. The ‘family first’ refrain became particularly prevalent in March 2019, after Warsaw’s newly elected liberal mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski, proposed a series of commitments towards LGBT people, including anti-discrimination measures and sex education in schools. In response, the leader of Poland’s ruling PiS party, Jarosław Kaczyński, warned against same-sex marriage and ‘sexualization’ of young people at a gathering in the city of Włocławek. By way of moral protection, he took aim at so-called risk-related sex
education, LGBT rights and gender theory, claiming that these ‘ideologies’ pose a threat to the traditional Polish way of life: “These ideologies, philosophies, all of this is imported, these are not internal Polish mechanisms [...]. They are a threat to Polish identity, to our nation, to its existence and thus to the Polish state”.3

Homosexuality is not only alien to Polish traditions, according to this script, but poses a threat to the Western civilization itself. To combat the alleged menace posed by foreign-hearted enemies, it is imperative – so the dominant claim goes – to reassert ‘authentic’ national and European traditions of which political and religious leaders claim exclusive ownership. According to a study by Justyna Kajta (2017) on nationalist discursive strategies, there is a growing tendency to depict homosexuals as enemies according to a slippery-slope logic: it is believed that gay marriage would eventually lead to pedophiles’ beginning to organize, which ultimately would result in a national and civilizational crisis.

Given the messianic tendencies embedded in Polish society, it does not come as a surprise that Catholic/rightwing articulations elevate Poland as ‘the last bastion of Christian civilization’ (Kajta, 2017: 100) which should be protected or saved by dint of cultural self-defense and, in turn, could help protect or save Europe from itself (cf. Mizielińska, 2011: 87–88; Korolczuk and Graff, 2018: 806, 812; Jarkovská, 2020). As Srdjan Sremac and Roard Ganzvoort (2015: 8) point out in their discussion of religion and homosexuality in the CEE region, the sacred social order is fundamentally antagonistic towards the constructed enemies, and the authority of their ethno-national and religious powers thrives on the principle of exclusion and their exhibited will to ‘moral defense’ (by mobilizing moral panic). We may infer from this that the postulation of Polish exceptionalism concurs with exclusions of sexual minorities through phantasmatic articulations of evil forces, thus consolidating ‘noble’ Polish sexuality as a norm underpinning the sacred moral order of nationhood, which in turn epitomizes (lost) ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ European values.

6. Rightwing, anti-LGBT election campaigns

In the political campaign leading up to the European parliamentary elections in May 2019, we saw an unprecedented coordinated effort to create sexualized antagonisms and a sense of social and civilizational crisis in Poland. Leading ruling party members and the media associated with PiS strategically interlinked homosexuals and pedophile rings menacing children’s well-being, all the while referencing Catholic doctrine on marriage and the family. In a sermon to mark the 75th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the archbishop of Kraków, Marek Jędraszewski, warned about a ‘rainbow plague’, comparing gay rights to Nazism and Soviet communism.4 This message dovetails with how senior member of the ruling party likened ‘LGBT ideology’ to Soviet-imposed communism.

Ahead of the national elections in October 2019, PiS intensified its homophobic rhetoric, claiming that ‘LGBT ideology’ or ‘gender ideology’ is an ‘invasion’ and that gay people are ‘foreign agents’ or ‘traitors’ against which the national community – symbolized by innocent children and the traditional family – must be protected. The run-up to the parliamentary elections also inspired physical homophobic violence, such as the brutal attacks by far-right groups on participants of the so-called Equality March in the city of Białystok in northeastern Poland in July 2019.5

Following this line of events, regional PiS officials pushed to declare cities and entire provinces in Poland’s conservative southeast ‘LGBT ideology free zones’. For instance, the council of Lublin designated the city as an LGBT-free zone to signal that LGBT and other gender non-conforming citizens do not fit into Polish society, thereby marking them as alien. Another example of LGBT ostracism is the declaration by mayor of Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, Augustyn Ormanty, of the town as a LGBT-free zone and his attempt to adopt a resolution stating that gay ideology is annihilating Christian values. (The resolution was rejected by the council in favor of a milder one pledging to protect the ‘traditional family’).6 Such designations and resolutions, though legally dubious, are instances of symbolic violence serving to aggravate anti-LGBT moral panics nation-wide.7

Against this background, we see that by incorporating religious elements into the ethnonational ideological matrix, LGBT rights and freedoms can readily be made to appear as detrimental to the integrity of family, tradition, nation and Western civilization alike (Sremac and Ganzevoort, 2015: 2). When the proscribed term ‘LGBT ideology’ is paired with the juggernaut ‘gender ideology’,8 politicized homophobia becomes part of the wider incursive strategy of ‘anti-genderism’, with the potential to galvanize a large number of conservatives around destabilization of ‘natural’ gender roles and patriarchal structures. These crisis narratives are often informed by anxieties about depopulation (playing into ‘the great replacement’ conspiracy theory) and the ultimate destruction of culture and humanity (Korolczuk and Graff, 2018: 803). Elżbieta Korolczuk and Agnieszka Graff (2018: 805) comment: ‘today the interests of the Vatican, US Christian fundamentalists, and European nationalists appear eerily convergent with those of Putin’s Russia, which is perceived as a moral rejuvenator of the West.’ The different actors are symbolically united by a yearning for universalism, which necessitates the defense of ‘original’ universal Western values represented by a (white) Christian civilization (ibid., 806, 807). The road to universal European values is, in other words, paved with nationalist, anti-elitist struggles for gender and sexuality conservatism.

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7 By the end of 2020, over 100 cities and regions had declared themselves ‘LGBT-free zones’.
8 ‘Gender ideology’ is an abbreviated shorthand for a variety of practices and freedoms associated with LGBT, queer and feminism. In some religious objections, Judith Butler (2019: 10) notes, “gender” simply is the same as, or a cover for, homosexuality.”
At the same time, anti-LGBT articulations have triggered counter-discourses and mobilized people against homophobia, such as the ‘LGBT welcome’ actions by Lublin-based restaurants and other institutions. What interests us most in this context, however, is the antagonistic ways in which PiS opponents and pundits, home and abroad, have condemned what they see as an increasingly anti-liberalization of Poland, accusing the government for exaggerating the dark sides of European liberalism and discrediting liberal principles and institutions – to which we shall turn next.

7. Liberal anti-populist rhetoric

Under PiS, it is often argued, Poland has emerged as an opponent of the EU’s liberal-democratic values, culminating in the declarations of LGBT-free zones and the homophobic violence in Białystok.\(^9\) Describing the attacks on the Equality March from a first-hand perspective for the British newspaper, the Guardian, author and columnist Jacek Dehnel vividly writes:

> Now and then, a lorry drives along the march with a megaphone, spitting out Catholic propaganda about how gays and lesbians rape children by the dozen. [...] We march doggedly, through a series of blockades, and it seems as if we are marching through the darkest valley, a lions’ den, though these are definitely less noble animals.\(^10\)

Although the described acts of violence are disgraceful, the column is not without its own symbolic violence in its invocation of the Polish nobility imaginary. This is not to say that the two political sides are equally violent, because that would be to construct a false moral equivalence between them and tap into rightwing ‘what-about-ism’.\(^11\) But given the long-established lord/boor divide, the designation ‘less noble animals’ (in the quote) is firmly rooted in the intelligentsia-informed symbolic framework underpinning and animating Polish public debate, and the transmission of meaning through such discursive framing speaks to political

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\(^9\) In September 2020, the head of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said that Poland’s ‘LGBT-free zones’ are ‘humanity-free zones’ that have no place in the EU. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/ursula-von-der-leyen-says-polands-lgbt-free-zones-have-no-place-in-eu A few months earlier, the Dutch town Nieuwegein ended its longstanding ties with Pulawy in eastern Poland after the latter municipality had declared itself a LGBT-free zone. Following the decision to ‘unfriend’ the Polish municipality and terminate all contact, stickers with a rainbow flag were – in a symbolically laden gesture – placed on one of the town’s entrance signs to cover up its Polish counterpart’s name. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/16/dutch-city-ends-ties-with-polish-town-declared-gay-free-zone-nieuwegein-pulawy


\(^11\) An exemplary example of ‘what-about-ism’ or ‘two-side-ism’ is Donald Trump’s infamous comment ‘there were very fine people on both sides’, uttered after the clash between fascists and antifascist at a rally in the Virginian city Charlottesville in 2017, where a white nationalist (suprematist) drove his car into the crowd and injured a civil rights activist who died shortly after the attack.
subjectivities in ways that risk exacerbating existing political divides and the sense of crisis of democracy and (sexual) freedom. As Jason Glynos and Aurelien Mondon (2016) argue, the tendency to present an overly simplistic picture of one’s opponents is not confined to populist discourses but can also be found in liberal responses to rightwing populism. One dimension of the ‘hyped’, anti-populist response is the use of disaster rhetoric to convey a sense of existential threat to ‘European values’ and ‘democratic ideals’ posed by ‘irrational and irresponsible (populist) voters’ (ibid, 7–10).

In Poland, many in the liberal camp viewed the 2015 PiS parliamentary victory as a triumph of the political pariah, purportedly opening up for an inflow of plebeian aspirations in public space and giving rise to unacceptable political articulations in terms of ‘nationalism’, ‘homophobia’, ‘anti-democracy’ etc. Instructive here is liberal reactions to the PiS party’s leading welfare policies, the so-called 500+ program, which provides parents with a monthly welfare subsidy per child. One of the most striking results of the program is a growing domestic tourism: families visiting Poland’s seaside resorts, a phenomenon frequently ridiculed by the liberal intelligentsia. For instance, Anna Szulc expressed her aversion for the ‘boor’ tourists in a 2016 Newsweek Weekly article in which she describes the invasion of 500+ Barbarians (Inwazja Hunów) on the Polish coast. Much like anti-Brexiters in Britain, social media users and newspaper columnists in the Polish liberal camp have resorted to classism and ageism when fingering majority constituencies as rural, uneducated, elderly peasants from underdeveloped regions. Symptomatic of this deriding form of social commentary is a 2017 Facebook post by Krzysztof Łoziński, who at the time served as leader of the civic movement KOD (Committee for the Defense of Democracy):

Everything that is taking place now should be understood as an ennoblement of the boor, these are boors in the courtyard. Once the time comes and PiS loses its power, the biggest problem will be removing the halo from the boor’s head. The boor is being elevated on monuments. The boor yields power.

In this quote, ‘ennoblement of the boor’ is clearly a derogative term used to delegitimize PiS voters and simultaneously raise warnings about their affront to liberal rights and freedoms. The storyline figure of the irrational voter, Glynos and Mondon (2016: 10) note, energizes narratives about threats to European liberal democracies. Another top-ranked KOD activist, Walter Chelstowski, went even

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12 The fact that the story is published in the British newspaper, the Guardian, suggests that its readers are mainly liberal-minded (in moral quisitons), well-educated European cultural ‘elites’.
13 At its start, the program did not cover the first child, but was later extended to cover every child, including the first one. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/05/family- faith-flag-catholic-religious-right-battle-polands-soul
15 See https://studioopinii.pl/archiwa/184061
further, expressing his disillusion with the equal right to vote (suffrage) when commentating on the elections results on his Facebook page:

This is a result of equality policies towards the foolish and independent thinkers that are being practiced in the free democratic elections in many countries. The vote of the boor, simple-minded, the foolish and poorly educated, counts exactly as much as the vote of all others among us.16

Incoherent as they may seem as far as the enshrinement of liberal rights and freedoms is concerned, these anti-populist statements express and provoke feelings that clearly tap into symbolic registers rooted in the lord/boor distinction: ‘we’ are civilized and morally responsible citizens, whereas ‘they’ are unruly and irresponsible. As with nationalist-populist discourse, liberal anti-populist articulations of threatened identities draw on sedimented practices, predicated on mythical ideas of the pure but lost origin – the moral (dis)integrity of society (cf. Nabers, 2012: 422–424). Moreover, these attempts to articulate a cultural and moral crisis within a civilizational frame are enmeshed in the East/West dynamic of (self)colonialization. It could be argued that efforts – home and abroad – to shame Poland (or the CEE region more broadly) as backward and parochial, while construing the West as essentially progressive, do not merely belie the more complex realities, but inevitably reinsert the colonial-imperial moral and cultural superiority of ‘core’ Europe (Sremac and Ganzevoort, 2015: 2; cf. Kulpa, 2014). We have seen that LGBT rights-related signifiers, customarily used in shaming practices to exert political leverage, are readily available in anti-populist liberal politics insofar as they symbolize civilizational Europeanness (cf. Gressgård, 2015). We shall now turn to the equally divisive struggles over sex education.

8. Modernization and struggles over sex education

If we look at how sex education in schools was politicized in the 2019 European parliamentary election debates in Poland, a similar antagonistic pattern appears. A chain of equivalence was articulated, on both sides of the political divide, between various sexuality-related practices to establish a national imaginary. By drawing on sedimented practices, both liberals and nationalists sought to guarantee the moral integrity of the nation according to the crisis logic described by Naber (2016: 427): ‘The articulation of binaries, the depiction of an ‘evil’ Other, and antagonism are [...] significant for the establishment of hegemonic relations in times of crisis’.

A case in point is the February 2019 decision of the President of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, to sign a LGBT+ declaration identifying areas in need of policy intervention (following World Health Organization (WHO) standards), including anti-discrimination and anti-violence education in schools, the establishment of a hostel for LGBT+ people and the introduction of comprehensive sex education.

16 See https://www.tvp.info/35384763/bydlo-na-salonach-nobilitacja-chamstwa-o-kim-mowia-tuzy-kod

INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(3): 13–32.
The declaration was indubitably a deliberate move in the ongoing European Parliament election campaign, calculated to polarize public opinion, and as one would expect, rightwing activists swiftly mobilized against it. For instance, PiS president, Jarosław Kaczyński, stated: ‘Polish parents have the right to raise their own children, we will defend the Polish family. It’s hard to call it education; this is not education; it is social engineering aiming to change a person. What’s in the centre of it? It is the very early sexualization of children.’

When the debate took off, liberals seized the opportunity to portray conservatives as enemies of modernization, morally backward and sexually repressed, orbiting towards non-rational arrangements owing to their religious, superstitious inclinations. The inclusion of sex education in the national curriculum and the implementation of sexual minority rights into the legal framework are, as they see it, necessary steps towards deeper integration with the secular, liberal-democratic West. Accordingly, they promote a rational and non-sectarian approach to sexuality which allegedly invests minors with the competence required to avoid risk-based sexual conduct. In the liberal intelligentsia optic, inhibiting minors from receiving sex education amounts to blocking their opportunities for gender and sexuality empowerment, hence putting them at risk. Once again, we see how gender and sexuality issues serve as political instruments for building a new, more liberal citizenship model (cf. Dzenovska, 2018; see also Gressgård, 2015). For the conservative/nationalist faction, on the other hand, universalization of their ideological stand entails strategies of social control in the name of ‘child protection’. Mirroring the widespread Euro-Atlantic anxieties over children’s safety, they symbolically link LGBT rights and freedoms to abuse of minors, while conflating sex education in schools with premature exposure to sex and linking it to risky sexual behavior. In both cases, an equivalent relationship is established between risk-oriented signifiers, and on both sides of the political divide, the hegemonic discourses purport to overcome a politically articulated crisis.

At this juncture, we may ask where – in this polarized debate – Polish feminist movements are positioned. Around the turn of the century, Graff (2019: 474) explains, contemporary Polish feminism was divided along two main strands, one radical left-wing and another mainstream liberal. Both were distinctly anti-populist-cum-nationalist, but while the former resolutely rejected national symbols, the latter had a more affirmative (patriotic) relationship to the national heritage (ibid., 475; cf. Grabowska, 2012). This symbolic logic changed, however, with the Black Protest in 2016, which brought hundreds of thousands of people into the streets and involved symbolic activity on an unprecedented scale. Graff highlights how the protest complicates the neat divide between anti-nationalists and patriots, making it impossible to stabilize the meaning of symbols along established lines. She concludes that ‘the Black Protest mobilization was a breakthrough for Polish feminism, bringing joy, hope, and enthusiasm, but also chaos and unpredictability’ (Graff, 1019: 492–493).

9. Concluding remarks

In our discussion of current struggles over moral gender and sexuality issues in Polish political debates, we have demonstrated that it is helpful to take into consideration the historical emergence of Polish cultural elites and its relationship to the empty signifier ‘Europeanness’ or ‘European values’. Given the prevalent role of cultural capital in Polish public life, it does not come as a surprise that rightwing nationalists-cum-populists take criticism of their policies as attacks on ‘sacred’ resources, whereas the Euro-enthusiastic camp takes EU integration as a modernization process (including sexual modernization): a movement away from ‘Eastern superstition’ towards ‘Western rationality’ (Zarycki, 2014). For self-proclaimed nationalists, moral panics pertaining to gender and sexuality serve to justify moral responsibilization techniques in the name of ‘defense’, while also giving a mythic explanation for why desired family values are deprived of their social fullness. Nationalist campaigners seek to expose European corruptness that must be blocked by ‘good citizens’ representing – and yearning for – the genuine, non-corrupted European universal civilization. Their liberal counterparts, on the other hand, make claims to ‘European values’ through a civilizational discourse of modernization. On both sides of the political divide, whether phrased in terms of sexual modernity or Christian civilization, we see a self-orientalizing positioning towards (the empty signifier) ‘European values’.

Considering the largely unchallenged position of the intelligentsia in Polish society and the prominence of gender and sexuality signifiers in political conflicts over normative citizenship models, it is likely that polarized struggles over ‘the European body’ will continue to dominate political debates in the medium-run perspective. But in keeping with Graff’s cautiously optimistic view, which suggests that entrenched cultural imaginaries might be less stable when looking at the more complex realities beyond the vantage point of key enunciators (politicians, political commentators, etc., with voluminous media exposure) (Glynos and Mondon, 2016: 3, 6), we want to end on a theoretical note that reminds us of the contingency – and instability – of these polarized factions: while efforts to re-suture a dislocated structure is necessary for the constitution of society, it is also its condition of impossibility (Laclau, 1996).

If we recognize that indeterminacy is the constitutive feature of society, antagonism is not reducible to concrete political conflicts, but is better understood as constitutive of political conflicts and, more generally, of the social world’s pluralistic nature (Mouffe, 2005: 17). So, while every social order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities through antagonism, any moment of antagonization is also a moment of undecidability, pointing to the contingency of every order. Put in slightly different terms, if antagonistic politics serves as a (symbolic) reminder of the ungroundable nature of society (Marchart, 2007; Gressgård, 2011; Glynos and Mondon, 2016), it also tells us that polarized debates are moments of political volatility and great social stress. And, as Gayle Rubin (1984: 267) highlights, conflicts over sexual values and erotic conduct acquire immense symbolic weight and should be treated with special respect in such times.
References


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