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Struggles for Recognition and Redistributive Policies: A Polanyian Analysis of Post-crisis Housing Policies in Europe’s Periphery

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**Abstract**

The policy area of housing is associated with a set of contradictory claims over its subject and scope. This includes tension between a market-based understanding of housing, a social-rights-based approach, and a traditionalist approach (as patrimony). Debates about housing intensified after the financial crisis of 2008, especially on Europe’s periphery. The present research focuses on Hungary and Spain, two countries with diverging housing paths after the crisis, in which crisis management and housing debates resulted in a number of housing policy changes. The paper is based on a critical frame analysis of interview data and policy documents about these two sets of policies. It combines Karl Polanyi’s double movement theory with Nancy Fraser’s perspectival dualism to trace recognition and redistribution frames in housing policy discourses in an investigation of the dynamics that led to policy changes. It argues that market expansion and social protection, the two movements in Polanyi’s theory, should not be understood as forces that always clash with each other, but as a set of recognition and redistribution claims that mutually enable or limit each other as they are mediated through policy-making.

**Keywords:** housing policy, double movement, recognition, redistribution.
Housing is a site of social struggle, and policy changes reflect the dynamics of this struggle. This includes ideational struggles over housing as property, asset, patrimony, or social right, and material struggles related to housing deprivation, homelessness, and indebtedness. The financial crisis of 2008 became a problematizing moment (Bacchi, 2009); a moment when the reframing of housing and housing struggles occurred. The crisis was a result of housing financialization processes that opened up political space for different understandings of housing and the crisis itself.

Crisis management and the contestation of existing housing policies together led to a number of policy changes in Hungary and Spain (Bohle, 2014; 2017; Colau and Alemany, 2014; Csizmady and Hegedüs, 2016; De Weerdt and Garcia, 2015; Habitat for Humanity, 2017; 2018) – two countries on Europe’s periphery that were severely affected by the crisis, and ones in which pre-crisis policies were contested by various political actors.

Most studies about housing policy change (Aalbers, 2008; 2017; Kemeny, 1992; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011; Bohle, 2014; 2018; Bohle and Seabrooke, 2019) understand housing struggle as a form of redistributive struggle, and concentrate either on the financialization of housing (housing increasingly understood as an asset and collateral in financial transactions), or the institutional responses of redistribution to financialization. However, studies about Spanish housing policy changes after the financial crisis of 2008 (Colau and Alemany, 2014; De Weerdt and Garcia, 2015) often focus on the role of recognition struggles in these changes. Namely, how the housing movement and the Platform for Mortgage Victims (PAH) empowered mortgage debtors to participate in activism and mobilize for the right to housing by reframing mortgage debt as systemic injustice rather than individual failure. This framing involved a struggle for recognition, as it removed the social stigma of indebtedness and offered recognition to the indebted.

The aim of this paper is to propose an analytical framework that explains how both struggles of recognition and redistribution contributed to housing policy change. For this, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of the former struggles. Therefore, the paper analyzes them through a Polanyian (1962) lens: understanding housing policies as mediators of the tension between market expansion (movement) and social protection (countermovement), and, as such, as reflections of the dynamics between movement and countermovement. It argues that housing struggle can be understood by focusing on both the processes of market expansion and its political contestation at the same time.

The paper’s analytical framework combines Polanyi’s theory of double movement (1962) with Fraser’s (2003) perspectival dualist analysis of recognition and redistribution, which is then used to investigate the dynamics between market expansion and social protection.

Thus, the aim of the paper is threefold. First, it proposes an analytical framework that combines Polanyi’s (1962) double movement theory with Fraser’s analysis (2003) to analyze how claims of recognition and redistribution influence the dynamics of market expansion and social protection in housing, and thus the
dynamics of housing struggle. While the paper does not specifically engage with debates about recognition/redistribution and identity politics, both its theoretical and empirical sections support Fraser’s (2003) argument that recognition and redistribution are co-constitutive, and it is at the specific dynamics between the two where the analytical focus should be directed.

Second, the paper aims to explain how the various claims of recognition and redistribution in the double movement led to housing policy changes on Europe’s periphery. The literature on housing and housing financialization primarily focuses on housing as a site of redistributive struggle (Aalbers, 2008; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Aalbers, 2017; Pósfai and Nagy, 2017). While the variety of residential capitalism (VORC) frameworks (Kemeny, 1992; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011) include some ideational/cultural factors in their analysis of housing policies, these studies do not systematically analyze them, and do not understand them as claims of recognition. Due to the lack of focus, these perspectives do not explain why Hungary and Spain, two countries on Europe’s periphery that are defined as familialist housing regimes due to the significant role of family and private property in housing access, diverged so much from their pre-crisis understanding of housing. The empirical findings of this paper show that both claims of recognition and redistribution played a decisive role in these changes.

Third, the paper offers empirical insights into housing policies from on Europe’s periphery that were influenced by forces of social protection that sought to depart from the paradigm of housing financialization through a variety of frames of recognition and social protection. Hungary followed a path of reframing housing based on familialism and nationalism, while Spain reframed it as housing rights. The analysis of these two paths through a Polanyian lens offers insight into the complex dynamics that exist between market expansion and various forms of social protection.

The contribution of the paper is, first, an introduction to the concept of recognition in both Polanyi’s (1962) theory and the housing literature, and second, the use of an analytical framework based on these concepts that helps investigate the dynamics of housing struggles in Hungary and Spain without solely focusing on the redistributive or recognition perspective. By concentrating on both dynamics, it is possible to explain how double movement dynamics contributed to policy changes.

1. The double movement and Fraser’s perspectival dualism

As I argued above, housing is a site of social struggle. This struggle is reflected in the different conceptualizations of housing. Housing is, on the one hand, a form of private property, and, due to processes of financialization, increasingly considered an asset (Aalbers, 2008; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011; Fernandez and Aalbers; 2016). However, housing is also the basis of participation in social and political life and patrimonial systems, as it is passed on from generation to
generation (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009; Lowe, 2011). Housing policies in capitalist societies are both the result and the reflection of these different notions.

Redistributive practices and principles in the case of housing therefore reflect Polanyi’s (1962) concept of a double movement: the tension between the forces of market expansion (housing privatization, then financialization) and the forces of social protection (social policies aimed at the decommodification of housing, or the protection of specific social groups affected by the negative consequences of market expansion).

In *The Great Transformation* Polanyi (1962) argues that capitalist societies operate through this double movement. Market expansion is a force of commodification based on ‘veritable faith in man’s secular salvation through a self-regulating market’ (Polanyi, 1962: 135), while social protection is a defense mechanism that occurs because ‘leaving the fate of soil and people to the market would be tantamount to annihilating them’ (Polanyi, 1962: 131).

Both of these forces have material and ideational elements. Market expansion involves not only a process of commodification, but also the dissemination of a particular theory (economic liberalism). Social protection is not merely the contestation of these ideas, because social problems themselves are not merely economic: ‘a social calamity is primarily a cultural not an economic phenomenon that can be measured by income figures or population statistics’ (Polanyi, 1962: 157). To put it simply, the struggle described by Polanyi is social: it is not purely economic or political, but a struggle that encompasses the entirety of society.

Polanyi argued for a holistic perspective in the social sciences that captures the complexity of the double movement and takes into consideration specific local and historical contexts. The dislocation caused by market expansion varies based on the context, as do responses to it. The changes that market expansion consists of challenge society as a whole, but the “response” comes through groups, sections, and classes’ (Polanyi, 1962: 152). According to Polanyi, social protection, no matter its form, is always a response to a real need for protection from market expansion. However, some forms of social protection set into motion harmful forces. In Polanyi’s (1962) case study about the Nazi regime, he calls the specific regime that emerged from the need for protection a degenerative force. Thus, social protection is not a normative term: it does not necessarily mean a progressive force, but rather a set of responses that emerge from needs as a result of change.

In Polanyi’s view, however fragmented the force of social protection may be, claims to social protection always enter into conflict with the forces of market expansion, and the site where this tension is relieved is the political sphere – namely, political institutions. This is why this paper focuses on policy change. Although Polanyi does not specify public policies as a phenomenon through which the double movement can be traced, he draws attention to the importance of political institutions as mediating forces of the tension between market expansion and social protection.
Apart from the idea of holism and the importance of the political sphere, Polanyi nevertheless offers little guidance about how to carry out holistic analysis that could trace the double movement. Yet conceptual guidance is important, especially in cases when the forces of social protection co-constitute a degenerative, anti-democratic force. I argue that this conceptual gap can be bridged by incorporating Fraser’s (2003) perspectival dualism and her notions of recognition and redistribution into Polanyi’s theory. In one of her feminist analyses of capitalism in the neoliberal era, Fraser (2013a) argued for a modified version of the Polanyian framework. She suggested adding another ‘force’ of social struggle to the theory and rephrasing it as triple movement. The struggle that – according to Fraser (2013b: 230) – mediates between the forces of market expansion and social protection is emancipation, which ‘aims to overcome forms of subjection rooted in “society”’. Fraser argues for including emancipation in the framework on the basis that Polanyi, in her view, tended to romanticize the societal forces in which the market was embedded and the forces of social protection without taking into consideration the fact that the market is not the only locus of domination in society. While it is true that Polanyi did not systematically engage with all structures of domination, neither did he romanticize either social protection or society in general, and nor did he conceptualize social protection on a normative basis (see the case of Nazi Germany above).

The problem of systemic engagement rather lies in the fact that Polanyi did not offer a conceptual framework with which to analyze the societal elements of market expansion and social protection, and the processes that are set into motion once these elements clash. Fraser assumes that it is emancipation that mediates between the two, but, as argued above, not all processes of social protection have an emancipatory goal or the potential to overcome preexisting forms of injustice. Some may well be forces that represent sectoral, societal interests rather than groups suffering from any form of injustice.

I rather rely on Fraser’s theory (2003) to conceptually refine the movement and the countermovement: to enable us to consider its elements and the tensions and clashes between the latter elements. Fraser’s perspectival dualism is rooted in similar dissatisfaction to that which drove Polanyi’s holistic approach; namely, dissatisfaction with theoretical approaches that focus solely on the material/economic or the cultural/ideational angle of the social struggle. Fraser argues that social struggle cannot be solely derived from claims for redistribution or recognition. Redistribution is not an epiphenomenon of recognition, and neither is recognition a derivative of redistribution. Fraser considers recognition and redistribution to be normative paradigms (philosophically) and families of claims (politically) of two different kinds that are co-constitutional. The redistribution paradigm ‘focuses on injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes to be rooted in the economic structure of society’ (Fraser, 2003: 13). The recognition paradigm ‘targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication’ (ibid.). Consequently, the former paradigms offer different remedies for injustices.
According to Fraser, social struggles cannot be reduced to either recognition or redistribution.

If the same logic is applied to Polanyi's theory, and the market is understood as a force embedded in society, the clash between movement and counter-movement can be defined as a clash between claims of recognition and redistribution of various kinds. Market expansion does not solely involve a wave of redistributive claims that result in redistributive policies, but is rather a force with elements of redistribution and recognition claims that results in policies that are the products of these claims, and which may clash with the claims for recognition and redistribution of the countermovement.

While redistributive claims in market expansion and social protection have been widely analyzed in housing studies, it is more difficult to integrate claims of recognition into housing analysis. The empirical findings of this paper suggest that the recognition claims Fraser and Honneth (2003) focus on in their theoretical debate about recognition and redistribution are distinct from the ones that appear in housing discourses. Fraser (2003) conceptualizes recognition as a process through which Weberian status groups subjected to cultural injustices interpret their own situation, or whose cultural injustices are thematized by other actors. Such recognition claims have not been at the center of the housing frames under analysis. Recognition has become detached from status groups, and has often been linked to solidified principles or structures such as private property, market autonomy, or individualism – which thus became recognized instead of the status groups Fraser’s theory focuses on. These principles and market (as a structure) appeared as social ideals to be recognized. They became not simply actors or principles that guaranteed the equal distribution of resources, but separate entities to be respected. Such claims could not be subsumed as redistributive, but nor do they fit perfectly with Fraser’s definition of status groups. In this framework, however, I understand them as social ideals that are systematically referred to in the same manner as status groups in such political contexts.

To explain the dynamics of market expansion and social protection as redistributive and recognition struggles, it is crucial to focus on policy making as a force of mediation and representation. According to Polanyi, political institutions mediate the double movement. Polanyi understands political institutions as having a controversial role: they introduce measures of intervention (policies) in order to establish the free market, and others to defend society from the deleterious impact of the free marketeer. Fraser (2013a) also highlights the importance of the political, but she does not simply refer to this as a mediating force, but a source of injustice on its own. There are two kinds of injustices attached to the political: a formal way of denying certain groups access to the political (electoral laws, for example), and framing, through which specific social groups are misrepresented or silenced. In this paper, I understand policies both as mediating forces and sites of injustice, even though one definition focuses on its dynamic element and the other on its more static one. I bridge this difference by making a distinction between the processes of market expansion and social protection, and the struggles of various
redistributive and recognition claims within these processes, and understand them as different units in my analysis. Since the paper is more concerned with the dynamics of justice claims within the double movement and policy change, its primary focus is the dynamics of change, but in order to understand such dynamics, one has to decipher them and focus on the recognition and redistributive claims present in these processes.

2. Methods

2.1 Claims as frames: Critical frame analysis

As mentioned above, Fraser (2013a) refers to framing as a form of (in)justice within the political sphere. For her, framing is of great importance in (mis)constructing status groups. Her definition of framing is in line with how critical policy analysis focuses on frames when analyzing representations of policy problems and the power dynamics these influence, as it understands the policy frame as ‘an organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly enclosed’ (Verloo, 2005: 20).

Since the scope of this paper is policy change, I define claims of recognition and redistribution as policy frames and conduct critical frame analysis (Verloo, 2005; Krizsan et al., 2012). However, unlike Fraser (2013a) I do not refer to framing as a separate form of injustice, but, similarly to Verloo, as an organizing principle that includes redistributive and recognition frames as well. Thus, while I consider frames as being of crucial importance in understanding policy change, I do not depart from Fraser’s (2003) perspectival dualism, meaning her focus on recognition and redistributive struggles, as critical frame analysis is (per se) aimed at unmasking misrepresentation and silence within policy struggles. Thus, framing struggles do not remain hidden in relation to recognition and redistributive claims.

While ‘policy frame’ as a concept encompasses all types of frames in policymaking, I concentrate on policy frames of redistribution and recognition. In this manner, I am able to trace the power dynamics between market expansion and social protection by explaining the dynamics between frames of recognition and redistribution within both processes. These concepts, and critical frame analysis as a method, encompass enough specificity regarding market expansion and social protection, as well as redistribution and recognition, to permit the application of the analytical framework I have outlined above. In addition, they leave space for frames of recognition and redistribution that are not necessarily progressive or emancipatory by avoiding treating them as normative categories.

I used critical frame analysis as a two-step process. First, I investigated what types of policy frames of recognition and redistribution appear in the data, and linked these to either the process of market expansion or social protection. Second, I analyzed the dynamics between market expansion and social protection claims: the interactions (or, sometimes, the lack thereof) between the following four categories: (1) market expansion recognition frames; (2) market expansion
redistribution frames; (3) social protection recognition frames; (4) social protection redistribution frames.

It is important to emphasize that the study does not aim to compare two country contexts, but rather to identify and analyze the shared mechanisms leading to housing policy changes on Europe’s periphery.

2.2 Data

This study is based on critical frame analysis of 40 semi-structured interviews conducted with MPs and city council member advocates in relation to housing problems, as well as housing activists and housing research policy experts in Barcelona, Budapest, and Madrid between November, 2016 and October, 2019. The larger proportion of interviews (n=28) were conducted in Barcelona and Madrid, since it was more difficult to reach out to the policy actors in Hungary (government officials) who had designed the housing policy changes in Hungary. Thus, I complemented the Hungarian interview data with a selection of policy-focused documents and political speeches related to housing policy changes in the period between 2010 and 2016.

3. Context: Housing policies on Europe’s periphery

The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the context and policy changes as well as theories about peripheral housing regimes and the specific country context of the housing policy changes.

3.1 Why Europe’s periphery?

One of the most influential theoretical strands of housing literature, the Variety of Residential Capitalism framework (Kemeny, 1992; Schwartz and Seabrook, 2009; Lowe, 2011), classifies the Southern and Eastern European housing regimes as familialist states: i.e. regimes in which housing is primarily a patrimony, and where the dominance of home ownership is maintained through the inheritance of housing property. While the VORC framework focuses on shared patterns in these countries, it uses familialism as a common element. However, it is questionable whether familialism is a concept that can explain housing policies, and whether the approach can be applied in the same way in all peripheral contexts. For example, Hungary’s familialist housing policies, which involve offering a discount – the Family Home-Making Discount (FHMD; CSOK in Hungarian) – to families if they have, or agree to have, a certain number of children (Habitat for Humanity, 2016; 2018), would not be possible in other contexts.

It is thus more fruitful to concentrate on these countries’ shared geopolitical position, since these states depend on the economies and investment, including financial investment, of core Western European countries (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011; Fernandez and Aalbers, 2016; Aalbers, 2017; Bohle, 2014; 2017; Pósfai and Nagy, 2017). This dependence has multiple layers: economically and financially,
these countries depend on such investment and are prone to external shocks. However, this dependence also translates into political constraints in the form of sensitivity to political decisions made in core countries, particularly in crisis situations in which policy measures aimed at tackling recession are decided by creditor countries or international organizations. The dependence also has a cultural component: such core countries are perceived as examples to which peripheral ones should and could converge and achieve the same level of development (Melegh, 2005; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011). Thus, it is a cultural belief that following the advice and the path of core countries is key to creating a prosperous society.

3.2 Why Spain and Hungary?

While all peripheral countries share certain characteristics, for the purpose of my research I was interested in cases in which there was a variety of post-crisis housing policy changes. Among these countries, two extreme cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) emerged that represent two ends of a spectrum in terms of the direction of policy changes. Both countries have similar housing structures and characteristics to other countries in dependent positions, thus, in this regard, there is nothing unusual about them. What makes them more unique is that the housing sector of both countries was severely hit by the financial crisis (García, 2010; Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011; Bohle, 2014). In addition, several new housing policies were implemented after the crisis. Both countries introduced social protection measures that curtailed existing forms of market expansion, and forms of social protection that resulted in the transformation of their housing and housing finance policies.

Hungary and Spain are also extreme cases in relation to each other. Social protection has taken extremely divergent forms in these two housing regimes. On the one hand, Hungary introduced new governmental policies constructed on nationalist and familist grounds (Bohle, 2014; Habitat for Humanity, 2016; 2018). These policies include the prohibition of mortgage lending in foreign currencies, nationalization of the bank sector, moratoria and other measures to help mortgage debtors, the establishment of a state-level housing agency, the introduction of a variety of home-ownership subsidies for families with children, along with curtailing funding for the system of shelters and criminalizing homelessness as a form of ‘social help.’

On the other hand, social protection in Spain was introduced as a form of self-defense against the financialization of housing, the anti-democratic entanglement of politics with financial interests, the violation of consumer rights, and the right to housing (García, 2010; Colau and Alemany, 2014; De Weerdt and García, 2015). The changes included a moratorium on evictions in the case of mortgage debtors, the introduction of dación en pago (fully discharging all mortgage-related debt in exchange for mortgaged real estate), stricter consumer protection laws against financial institutions, rental protection for tenants, policies enabling the nationalization of financial institutions’ real estate in the case of long periods of vacancy in Catalonia and mediation services between financial
institutions and mortgage debtors in many regions and local authorities. The majority of these changes were accepted by regional parliaments and local authorities, and some by congress. All the policies resulted from the pressure social movements put on national and regional governments, or were due to actors from social movement becoming members of local councils. Thus, the two extreme cases provide an opportunity to analyze a wider variety of frames and processes.

Since there were a large number of new housing policies after 2008, I have narrowed down the scope of analysis to two types of policy changes: policies that directly responded to the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008, and policies targeted at housing support following 2013. See Table 1 for an overview of the policies that were analyzed in the paper. (These policies were identified as the most relevant ones by my interviewees.)

Table 1: Relevant housing policy changes in Hungary and Spain after 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing policies related to the management of the mortgage crisis</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of FROB (a government agency for overseeing financial institutions) in 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bajnai package (one-year action plan by the crisis-management government) in 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of Sareb (a semi-private ‘bad bank’ for cleaning up toxic assets from the financial market) in 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Code of good bank practices in 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measures for mitigating the impact of the financial crisis (Laws 6/2012, 27/2012, 1/2013, 1/2015) and mortgage market regulation (Royal Decree 716/2009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Prohibition of mortgage lending in foreign currency in 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Code of good bank practices in 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>• New laws on protection of foreign-currency mortgage debtors in 2011–2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Law 1/2013 on protection of mortgage owners</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishment of the National Asset Management Agency in 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Modification of the Law on Civil Procedures (Law 5/2018) (eviction procedures)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishment of the Ócsa housing project for mortgage debtors in 2011</td>
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As the table shows, two sets of policies can be identified: the first are policies that followed the outbreak of the crisis that were aimed at both stabilizing the economy and providing relief to mortgage debtors. Another set of policies was accepted after 2014, but these were no longer addressed at mitigating the impact of the crisis, but offered alternative forms of housing support in addition to the pre-crisis housing policies. In Spain, these policies were implemented due to the pressure of social movements, while in Hungary they involved government action. The next section is a more detailed analysis of these changes and the claims that were made in relation to these policies.

### 4. Recognition and redistributive frames in housing discussions at the periphery

In this section, I concentrate on recognition and redistributive frames; more precisely, on how these are linked to market expansion and social protection. Throughout the analysis I identified six types of frames that mediated discussions about housing. Frame types included issues of recognition or redistribution that were both central in the construction of market expansion and social protection frames, even though these issues arose in different ways. The following section thus explains which main issues (types of frames) the market expansion and social protection frames were centered on, and how these issues were framed depending on their aim (market expansion or social protection).
4.1 Frames of recognition: Responsibility, authority, status groups

As I mentioned earlier, recognition frames in the case of housing were not only centered on status groups, but also on social ideals, reflecting the autonomy of the latter. These were organized using three types of frames: responsibility, autonomy, and protected groups (groups deemed in need of support). Table 2 provides an overview of the frames.

Table 2: Recognition frames in housing discussions in Hungary and Spain, 2008–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of recognition frames</th>
<th>Market expansion</th>
<th>Social protection</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Voluntarism and private property</td>
<td>Exploitation, inequality, and housing as public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Nationalism, regionalism, and municipalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected groups</td>
<td>Prudent households</td>
<td>Familialism and social justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main tension between the recognition frames of market expansion and social protection is found in where they assign responsibility. Market expansion frames emphasize individual responsibility. This appears as the idea that mortgage debtors are those actors who should bear the financial burden of the debt they took out because they had voluntarily entered into contracts in order to acquire private property, no matter how difficult it was to foresee the risk of this. Even though the interviewees who underlined the importance of individual responsibility did not deny that one who is indebted is in a more vulnerable position than one who provides a loan, they did not see this imbalance as exploitative or unequal, per se. The actors who framed mortgages in this way were mainly (the former) employees of government agencies or ministries responsible for economic policies. The latter presented individual responsibility in these frames as a principle that must be respected, but also as a type of moral imperative: this was based on the idea that people should suffer the consequences of their own individual decisions to some extent.

This recognition frame directly conflicted with the frames of market and state responsibility, particularly in the discussions of mortgage relief in Hungary and Spain. Social protection frames of exploitation were most dominant in terms of placing the emphasis on the fact that the banking sector had profited from the lack of information about risk, and built exploitative relationships with their clients and/or with the peripheral states that were more dependent on foreign banks. While the concept of the periphery and its disadvantaged geopolitical position also arose in the Spanish crisis discourses (Lopez and Rodriguez, 2011), it was more relevant in the Hungarian case. In Spain, the concept of territorial exploitation was presented in the context of gentrification: international development companies who take over the city were frequently referred to as ‘vultures’ in the interviews. First, exploitation by banks and the support of this by governments is one of the reasons why social protection was justified for those who had suffered its
consequences. Second, in the Platform of Mortgage Victims’ campaign for datio in solutum in Spain, rejections of individual responsibility were more strategically employed: the latter not only entailed the shaming of banks for their exploitative practices, but also the rejection of the stigmatization of mortgage debtors, and their presentation as victims of exploitation rather than individuals responsible for their own debt (Colau and Alemany, 2014; De Weerdt and García, 2015).

Thus, the claim to individual responsibility in relation to market expansion clashed with the promotion of social protection as represented in two frames: the idea that the crisis was the financial sector and the supporting governments’ responsibility, and the rejection of debtor stigma associated with the claim that the related debt was solely the responsibility of the individual. In some social protection frames, respect for individual responsibility as a principle was questioned by claims for frames of market and state responsibility, partly on the basis that mortgage debtors are a culturally disadvantaged status group that bears the shame for their debt, and partly on the basis of autonomy, which will be discussed below.

In Polanyi’s theory (1962), market expansion is rooted in the freedom of the market. In market expansion frames, the autonomy of the market, like individual responsibility, was taken for granted as a guiding principle that had to be respected. In the social protection discourses, counterclaims of autonomy played a central role in tackling both these frames. Autonomy-based frames were not concerned with the equity of housing governance from a redistributive perspective, but the right of nation-states, regions, and municipalities to make their own decisions about housing.

In Hungary, these types of frames were linked to ideas about the autonomy of the nation in relation to dealing with the consequences of the crisis, as well as to the introduction of regulatory measures related to housing finance, among other areas (this was considered a form of opposition to international frameworks that imposed conditions on the country). In Spain, regionalist and municipalist claims operated from a different perspective. Catalan policies aimed at the introduction of measures involving enforcing the right to housing (which was already part of the constitution) were embedded in discourse about the region’s autonomy in relation to implementing social protection measures during a housing crisis, as opposed to the government’s policies that promoted market expansion. In addition to this, in an interview with a member of a Catalan independence party the promotion of housing rights was framed as an issue of Catalan regional identity, which was associated with openness and an emphasis on equality and social justice. However, the interviewee also emphasized that he did not consider this a nationalist argument, because such sensitivity to social justice was rather rooted in the history of the region, and was also true for people who were not originally Catalans, but live in Catalunya. About the link between housing policies and independence, the former said that ‘independence will not simply be a change in the identity card, or a change in the passport, but an instrument for creating public policies so that citizens can live with dignity.’ Thus, these autonomy frames were embedded in self-identification (i.e. the interviewee as a member of a progressive region), but
also emerged in the claim that regions should have the right to introduce protective measures, even if this ran counter to the policies of the central government.

The same discourse can be traced in the case of municipal autonomy. Many of the interviewees who were members of the housing rights movement in Spain and Hungary expressed disenchantment with the possibility of influencing housing policies on the national scale. The former framed autonomy as turning to local politics, local identities, and local housing policies; the level at which politics can truly address people’s needs in the form of political strategies for promoting universal access to housing, not achieving regional independence.

Both market expansion and social protection frames referred to protected groups in the discussions. In the market expansion frames, again promoted by people engaging in economic policymaking, the social groups whose access to mortgages and even to mortgage relief was seen as desirable were claimed to be households with a stable income. This idea was partly framed in terms of redistribution, but was also linked to the individual responsibility frame because it assumes that mortgage lending itself should be protected from households taking out loans in an irresponsible way. In Hungary, one of the post-crisis goals of post-crisis economic policy was to boost mortgage lending by prudent households (Hungarian National Bank, 2019; Government of Hungary, 2019) – the moral antithesis of ‘irresponsible mortgage debtors’ – thereby avoiding the risk of another subprime crisis.

Social protection recognition frames nonetheless diverged or were even conflicted in relation to protected groups. In Spain, social protection discourses were center on the recognition of the housing needs of people without secure housing and recognition of the right to housing. Housing was explicitly made a social justice issue by social movements and the parties that originated in the movement. In Hungary, there were two sets of claims for social protection. First, the government framed housing or ‘home-making’ as a means of starting a family or supporting families with children. Familialism is the normative basis of their housing policies, and this familialism is often linked to nationalism, involving the growth of the nation, because such policies are designed to increase birth rates. In a speech at the Third Demographic Forum, Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian Prime Minister, referred to childbirth as a way ‘to biologically reproduce the national community’ (Miniszterelnok.hu, 2019). Second, the housing movement focused on people living in housing poverty and advocated for social protection based on the housing needs of those who were discriminated against by lawmakers (Udvarhelyi, 2014). Thus, it was not the family as an ideal that was recognized and supported in these discourses, but, similarly to the Spanish social protection discourse, the idea that housing status is the basis of the subject position of specific social groups.
4.2 Frames of redistribution: Stability, intervention and housing governance

Redistributive discourses concerning housing policies were centered on three types of frames: stability, intervention, and housing governance. Market expansion frames focused on financial stability as a means of enabling economic growth through helping the market to free itself from toxic assets (in Spain) and the expansion of mortgages and other types of loans for households with a stable income and providing subsidies for the construction industry (in Hungary) – no matter whether related to crisis management or after-crisis policies. Table 3 gives an overview of the frames.

Table 3: Types of redistribution frames in housing discussions in Hungary and Spain, 2008–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of redistribution frames</th>
<th>Market expansion</th>
<th>Social protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Financial: economic growth</td>
<td>Social: demographic goals, housing needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Voluntary forms of cooperation between the market and the state</td>
<td>Restrictive measures against market actors; subsidies; social housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing governance</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Redistributive social protection frames focused on social stability, although recognition frames about protected groups had an impact on how this social stability was framed. On the one hand, housing-rights groups in Spain and Hungary, as well as the political actors who had been members of these social movements, employed a very universalistic notion of access to housing, which according to them, should be understood as a right. The scope involved putting an end to the housing crisis, which was framed as a social crisis in all the interviews with social movement members. On the other hand, the Hungarian government framed housing as a tool for resolving a different type of social crisis and promoting social stability: the demographic crisis (see the quote from Viktor Orbán above). Discussions about demographic decline emphasized its negative consequences on society, and the fact that people who needed housing subsidies to start a family should be provided with the opportunity to access them.

The other two types of redistributive frames were more focused on intervention and governance; namely, on how intervention in housing and housing finance should occur, and whose role it was to introduce those policies. Since these frames are more interconnected than others, I do not discuss them separately, but in relation to each other. Market-expansion claims of intervention and governance by the same economic policy experts mentioned above focused on voluntary forms of cooperation between the market and the state regarding crisis management and the provision of housing subsidies in a decentralized manner. As one of the Hungarian interviewees who had worked for a government agency responsible for the supervision of financial institutions put it, there is a need for social housing, and there are viable models for social housing constructions, but ‘it
cannot be expected that banks will make donations.’ He then suggested that local authorities should create social housing programs with subsidies through which banks could be incentivized to invest in social housing. Decentralization, thus, also means that the internal logic of housing capitalism remains intact.

Interestingly, all social-protection-related redistributive claims in Hungary and Spain about intervention and housing governance emphasized the role of the central state in intervening in market processes and taking action in relation to housing policies to some extent. Even the actors who argued for limited housing support on a local scale agreed with the regulations concerning mortgage lending (regulation that enables the state to seize empty housing units owned by market actors to create social housing) and the regulation of rental contracts and rental prices. These initiatives clearly run counter to the social ideal of granting autonomy to market expansion as they refer to imposing or suggesting interventions related to the market.

Second, the social-protection-related redistributive frames promoted by political actors (MPs, local council members, and public administration employees and civil actors in Spain, and policy experts, civil and political actors in Hungary) argued for centralized housing policies, but there was significant divergence within the frames about which kinds of policies should be created by the central government. Social-protection-focused frames of housing governance and intervention slightly contradicted autonomy frames in Spain: all social-protection actors who argued for housing subsidies and social housing also argued for state-level policies, and, more importantly, an increase in the budget for housing. However, due to their disenchantment with state politics, they also promoted decentralized, local, and regional housing policies. A leftwing MP whom I interviewed compared being a member of the parliament to entering a casino, ‘a dark place where light never enters,’ referring to the fact that parliament is an elite club entangled with the financial lobby, and a political space in which change is practically impossible. In spite of this, a local council member from the same political party emphasized that ‘housing must be given central space at all levels of administration; local, regional, and central, with a considerable budget.’ Many interviewees who worked in housing policy or housing research pointed out that the most important expectation from the central state, on which all regional and local housing policies depended, was the provision of an adequate state budget. Thus, centralization in the Spanish context meant that the state should have a leading role in financing housing. The disenchantment with state politics nonetheless resulted in relevant housing policy changes occurring almost exclusively at the local and regional scale, a fact that also illustrates the tension between the housing-governance-related redistributive frame of centralization and the autonomy-related recognition frames of municipalism and regionalism.

In Hungary, housing policy experts and civil actors argued for an increase in, and the centralization of, state subsidies. All interviewees, regardless of their position, also expressed disenchantment with state-level politics, including the extremely centralized manner in which all types of policies were created. However, those who argued for housing policy change (housing activists,
researchers, and homeless care-providers) thought that the government should create housing policies for poor and low-income people, but with the meaningful participation of experts and civil actors. Thus, it was not the issues of centralization and decentralization that caused tension for the actors who advocated for social protection in the area of housing, but the issue of protected groups: the government had introduced housing subsidies aimed at tackling the demographic crisis instead of providing support for low-income groups, which the policy experts and civil actors in the interviews would have expected. All housing experts and civil actors criticized the government for its housing policies based on two redistributive claims. First, that the latter excluded low-income people from housing subsidy schemes, and, second, that they defined no upper limits in terms of income or the size of the housing units, thus, as one of the housing experts said, the government had not ‘prevented luxury use.’ Thus, while the government framed social stability as a means of stopping the demographic decline and pronatalism, housing experts, and activists as well as care employees for the homeless, framed the former in relation to housing access and housing-related inequalities.

Overall, redistributive frames tended to be directed at action and concrete forms of intervention, while recognition frames were typically directed at social ideals. Interestingly, both the redistributive claims of market expansion and social protection conflicted with some of the recognition frames presented by the same actors. There were two main contradictions. While in terms of recognition, market expansion frames were concerned with responsibility, redistributive frames emphasized voluntary cooperation and the use of market tools in a decentralized manner in housing. Social-protection-type claims of intervention and housing governance conflicted with autonomy frames in Spain, and frames of protected groups in Hungary. In the next section, I provide a more thorough analysis of such dynamics between recognition and redistributive frames, and then between market expansion and social protection.

5. The dynamics of market expansion, social protection, and housing policy change

In the previous section, I outlined what types of recognition and redistributive frames involving market expansion and social protection were constructed in relation to housing. In addition, I mapped out where certain frames of market expansion conflicted with those of social protection, and I also identified tensions within frames of social protection. In this section, my aim is to increase understanding of how these tensions turn into mechanisms of change. Namely, how the dynamics of the double movement contribute to housing policy change. Based on the analysis, I mapped out three main mechanisms: clashes, mutual enablement, and limitations. In this section, I explain how these mechanisms operate, and illustrate each one of them with a policy case to show how they were reflected in housing policy changes.
5.1 Clash

Clashes may be the most obvious dynamic between frames of market expansion and social protection. By clashes, I understand a form of political dynamics involving frames that openly and directly clash with each other, leading to policy consequences. Clashes do not necessarily occur between market expansion and social protection, but may exist in relation to the dynamics related to social protection. However, clashes within social protection did not contribute to housing policy change in the policy cases outlined in Section 2.

Catalonia’s laws (24/2015 and 4/2016) in defense of the right to housing illustrate how clashes between market expansion and social protection frames can result in policy change. These laws resulted from a clash between frames of responsibility. The related regional laws were preceded by state laws that introduced the opportunity of dación en pago, or datio in solutum, as mentioned above, and the legal expectation that financial institutions should offer social housing to clients. While this was a significant achievement of the Platform of Mortgage Victims and its allies and a political result of the popular legislative initiative (ILP) to change mortgage laws (De Weerdt and García, 2015), the legal changes did not regulate who and what percentage of mortgage debtors could benefit from these opportunities. Most housing activists whom I interviewed expressed disappointment about these legal changes. I will expand on these arguments in the next section, but to understand the clashes that led to Catalunya’s housing rights laws, it is important to focus on the fact that, after these legal changes, housing activists directed their efforts at making legal changes that would involve legally enforcing the right to housing, instead of offering individual help on a voluntary basis. According to the interviews, these housing rights laws were accepted so as to create social housing stock by enabling the use of empty housing units owned by developers and financial institutions, and thus increasing access to social housing. Government actors responsible for financial policies rather saw these laws as breaching the right to private property. Thus, the Catalan laws were a result not just of disappointment with previous changes, but a direct clash between market expansion and social protection frames of responsibility, whereby the recognition of private property and voluntary help clashed with the recognition of housing as a social right and public good.

As I explained in Section 4, clashes also occurred within the frames of social protection. For example, in terms of social protection in Hungary, the familialist and the egalitarian frames of recognition clashed. However, these clashes were not reflected in government housing policies, which were influenced more by the mutual enablement of market expansion and social protection frames. In Section 4, I also highlighted the tension between the redistributive frame of centralization – the push for state-level housing policies – with the autonomy frame because of political disenchantment with state-level politics. However, this tension was not represented as a clash between social protection frames by interviewees, but rather as a limitation caused by the market expansion frame of decentralization: a distinct mechanism I will expand on at the end of this section.
5.2 Limitation

I mentioned above that Catalan housing policies were accepted after the disappointing results of the ILP for housing rights activists, who had expected more radical policy changes. The Spanish mortgage-relief policies hence illustrate how market expansion frames can limit frames of social protection by introducing a voluntary element in terms of a change towards understanding housing as an issue of social justice. These policy changes stemmed from the recognition of failed mortgage debts as the responsibility of financial institutions instead of that of individuals, and offered protective measures for debtors based on those recognition claims and the redistributive frames of social protection.

For example, mediation services between financial institutions and debtors were also part of these changes, and were usually offered by organizations through contracts with local and regional authorities. One of the interviewees who worked at such an NGO explained that obtaining access to mortgage relief was completely voluntary, and depended on individual agreements with banks. She explained that banks that participated in such schemes usually signed a contract with the NGO that prohibited the disclosure of the financial institution’s name. In her view, such banks did not want to make it publicly known that they had participated in negotiation with debtors to avoid future claims, which illustrates how the voluntary frame limited the social protection frames of recognition and redistribution and resulted in ‘limited’ mortgage policy change.

The market expansion frame of decentralization created limits to the redistributive claims made by actors demanding social protection in Spain. Even though housing experts and activists expressed that their goal was to achieve changes on the state level too, the decentralized frame about housing (namely, that housing was primarily the responsibility of regional and local authorities, as emphasized by financial agency actors) prevented such changes. This was mentioned as an important limitation by all interviewees, because without an adequate state budget it was not possible to create social housing. However, there were recognition-related responses to this limitation that resulted in policy change through mutual enablement.

5.3 Mutual enablement

Market expansion and social protection frames did not necessarily clash, but could also enable each other and, through this, affect the acceptance of housing policies. The modification of the General Metropolitan Plan in Barcelona in 2018 illustrates such a dynamic. As mentioned above, decentralization created significant limitations on local- and regional-level policies. However, these limitations were responded to by a municipalist strategy that was rooted in recognition of the democratic potential of local-level politics, as well as a desire to expand the boundaries of the latter. Policy efforts were concentrated on the local scale to create social housing. The modification mentioned above was a result of exactly this: it forced developers to offer 30 per cent of newly built housing units as social
housing, which was mentioned as one of the most important post-crisis policy achievements by local housing experts.

In Hungary, the most important policy changes resulted from mutual enablement. An example of such a case is the Family Home-Making Discount (CSOK in Hungarian) which was primarily framed as a familialist policy tool and linked to the recognition frame of familialism and the redistributive frame of social stability as demographic stability (Kopp Mária Institute for Demographic Growth and the Family, 2018; Habitat, 2018; Elek and Szikra, 2018).

However, the approach is also very much in line with the recognition frame of the prudent household as a protected group, and as stability framed as financial stability. The context of this mutual enablement or reinforcement is that the crisis highlighted the risk of subprime lending and Forex mortgages, and therefore mortgage expansion frames changed: instead of undermining these risks, they aimed at promoting financial stability by offering mortgages to households with a stable income (Hungarian National Bank, 2019; Government of Hungary, 2019). Thus, the view of market expansion after 2015 consisted of a mix of recognition claims (‘prudent’ households as a target for mortgage lending) and redistributive claims (on financial stability).

As one of the housing experts from Hungary pointed out, the conditions of access to the Family Home-Making Discount have become softer in terms of ‘upper’ limits, meaning that the incentive has become increasingly accessible to financially stable households. Thus, even though its framing by the government is primarily based on recognition claims, these are mutually enabled by frames of market expansion. Very similar arguments were made by housing researchers and activists about the Hungarian mortgage relief policies that preceded the Family Home-Making Discount.

Table 4 gives an overview of these mechanisms of change, as well as their results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Double movement</th>
<th>Frames mobilized</th>
<th>Policy change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clash</td>
<td>Market expansion – social protection</td>
<td>Responsibility, intervention</td>
<td>Right to housing laws in Catalonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social protection – social protection</td>
<td>Responsibility and protected groups</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation</td>
<td>Market expansion – social protection</td>
<td>Responsibility, intervention</td>
<td>Mortgage relief policies in Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mechanism | Double movement | Frames mobilized | Policy change |
--- | --- | --- | --- |
Social protection – social protection | Housing governance, intervention, responsibility | – |
Mutual enablement | Market expansion – social protection | Decentralization and autonomy | Mortgage relief policies and Family-Home Making Discount in Hungary |
Social protection – social protection | Protected groups and autonomy | Modification of the General Metropolitan Plan in Barcelona in 2018 |

6. Conclusions

This paper, which complements Polanyi’s (1962) double movement theory with Fraser’s (2003) concept of recognition and redistribution, has offered empirical insight into the claims that shape housing policies in two countries on Europe’s periphery, Hungary and Spain. Instead of solely focusing on financialization, or on other forms of market expansion, it analyzed policies that reflect the dynamics between market expansion and social protection. The aim of the paper was not to compare the two country contexts, but to offer insights into the shared mechanisms and double-movement dynamics on Europe’s periphery, as well as their contribution to housing policy change.

The paper first argued that both processes include recognition and redistributive frames. Instead of the recognition of status groups, these processes entailed recognition claims that were centered on social ideals or principles such as individual responsibility and market autonomy, as opposed to the recognition claims of status groups or other principles. It was not only the recognition and redistribution frames of market expansion and social protection that were found to conflict with each other, but I also identified tension within social protection frames. In the second part of the paper, I identified three mechanisms that contributed to the housing policy changes in these countries: clash, limitation, and mutual enablement. The analysis shows that recognition claims had an impact in all cases of policy change, and that this impact could be very diverse. The double movement dynamics were much more complex than simple clashes between actors or the frames of market expansion and social protection, and policy changes were often derailed or enabled in unexpected ways.
This analytical framework thus offers insights about double movement dynamics by offering a conceptual tool, which combined with Critical Frame Analysis enables the tracing of these dynamics, as well as the policy changes they result in. It also shows that describing housing regimes in Europe’s periphery as familial ignores the fact that familialism might not be a relevant factor in housing policy change in these countries, and it is more fruitful to focus on mechanisms of change to understand the transformation of these housing regimes.

References


