Production of Marginality
Spatial Exclusion and Development
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Introduction

The idea of the symposium on ‘Production of Marginality: Spatial Exclusion and Development’ that called most of the articles in this issue of *Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics (IEEJSP)* came from two international conferences that were enriching the academic stage of Babeș-Bolyai University (BBU) at Cluj-Napoca, Romania in November 2014. A panel called ‘Spatial exclusion and social inequalities’ was held at the annual conference of the Hungarian Sociological Association and the panel conveners proposed addressing the models of territorial exclusion and the social and political relations that (re)produced them on the ethno-socio-economic maps of local societies. Participants were also encouraged to focus on how local and trans-local factors and processes are shaping the spatial position and social status of the poor and rich, the ethnic Roma versus the non-Roma majorities in local settings. One week earlier the Romanian Society for Social and Cultural
Development and Policy Interventions’ and another on ‘Post-socialist Neoliberalism and the Dispossession of Personhood’.

These panels fertilised several articles published in this issue of Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics as the authors could meet and exchange ideas about ways how political economy regimes are shaping the processes of spatial, including housing arrangements, and exploring mechanisms by which impoverished people are pushed into informality, illegality and stigmatised status, and are denied of social citizenship and personhood. The remarkable interest of Eastern European scholars in these topics implied an obvious intention of publishing themed articles by the editorial team of IEEJSP; and the call for papers on the ‘Production of marginality: spatial exclusion and development programmes’ was launched by guest editors Tünde Virág from Hungary and Enikő Vincze from Romania. The editors of Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics originally planned one special issue; the particularly strong interest of regional scholars, however, meant that two special sections are dedicated to this topic. Accordingly, some of the themed articles will be published in the next issue of IEEJSP.

Assuming that the formation of Roma ghettos across Europe as impoverished territories associated with ‘Gypsyness’ is a manifestation of spatialisation and racialisation of social exclusion, our approach acknowledges that advanced marginality is created by the overlapping mechanisms of capitalism and racism (Wacquant, 2008; Wacquant, 2012). This means that the spatial positioning of people belonging to different social classes or with diverse social status and ethnic backgrounds on the mental and geographic maps of localities is the territorial expression of social inequalities created by the larger political regime. Thus spatial exclusion is both a cause and a consequence of social inequalities, and marginalisation advances through both social and spatial processes. However, neither spatial exclusion nor social inequalities are created by space or poverty, but they are the effects of the economic and cultural order of capitalism, among others of its development paradigms (re)creating socio-spatial inequalities and injustices.

Spatial segregation (and of how material deprivation overlaps with ethnic separation) is a dynamic process: the territorial divisions of the settlements, and the concepts used to identify them are subject to continuous economic, social and political changes during which the local actors re-construct and divide the space according to their social, economic, and political interests (Harvey, 2008; Mitchell,2003). Moreover, local development projects or different community based programs applied to segregated neighbourhoods are typically structured in a way that facilitates the access to the financial resources of the European Union, and they reflect the interests of various local actors positioned unequally in the local power structure.

In empirical terms this approach implies the analysis of different patterns and mechanisms of spatial exclusion affecting marginalised Roma. It addresses the historical dynamics of their spatial position in a given settlement and connects these phenomena with development programmes that create or eliminate Roma colonies and slums, or aim at (Roma) community development. This approach, beyond the localised empirical materials, also endorsed the theoretical potential of addressing the production of marginality at the intersection of theories on spatial exclusion and
theories of development. In addition, the editors of *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* expected that the articles also explore to what extent the production of marginality is an endemic feature of capitalism and what particular features it displays a quarter century after the demise of state socialism and under the conditions of the prevalence of neoliberal governance.

**Conceptualising the production of marginality**

*Re-politicising spatial exclusion*

While approaching production of marginality through the lenses of spatial exclusion, one may start looking for adequate methodologies by which to understand the functions of space in the process of exclusion or the role exclusion plays in the creation of spatial arrangements of human life, using the theoretical benefits that the spatial turn brought into social sciences. In this approach space is acknowledged as an important dimension of inquiry, as ‘position and context are centrally and inescapably implicated in all constructions of knowledge’ (Cosgrove, 1999:7). Recent studies in various fields asserted that ‘space is a social construction relevant to the understanding of the different histories of human subjects and to the production of cultural phenomena’, and that spatiality matters ‘not for the simplistic and overly used reason that everything happens in space, but because where things happen is critical to knowing how and why they happen’ (Warf and Arias, 2009:1). Moreover, besides inquiring the space as a social product (Lefebvre, 1974), or the multiple aspects of the relationship between the social and the spatial (Tonkiss, 2005), or the way in which social inequalities are inscribed into space through spatial production processes and in which societal and spatial dynamics are creating segregation (Cassiers and Kesteloot, 2012), interpretations of the phenomenon of marginalisation might also be based on the examination of space in relation with social justice (Harvey, 2010[1973]; Purcell, 2002; Mitchell, 2003; Soja, 2010).

In order to provide a contextual analysis of the broader structural factors that contribute to the creation or conditions of the ghetto (Whitehead, 2000) as a particular space of marginality we must not forget that ‘much of what should concern us about ghetto life has its ultimate determinants in much larger structures, beyond the reach of the ghetto dwellers’ (Hannerz, 1969:13). With the aim of taking one step further in the identification of such determinants, many scholars are following the theory of advanced marginality according to which this is a new form of social exclusion in neoliberal regimes, having characteristics such as accumulation of economic penury, social deprivation, ethno-racial divisions, and public violence in the same distressed urban area. This type of expulsion does not stem from economic crises or underdevelopment; it is rather the result of economic restructuring and its unequal economic effects on the lowest faction of workers and subordinated ethnic categories as Wacquant (2008) cogently describes. To facilitate the inclusion of systemic perspective into the analysis of spatial exclusion, the analyst cannot avoid recalling the inquires generated by critical urban theory (as discussed in Smith, 2002;
Critical urban theory addresses the role of the urban question and more broadly the politics of space in the history and geography of capitalist development, or in creating, solving and recreating the contradictions and crises of capitalism. This approach allows one to address the production of space (and spatial exclusion) as foundational for the growth and survival of capitalism (Lefebvre 1968), or to interrogate the spatial specificity of the reproduction of labour (Castells 1977) and even more to cross-examine the spatialisation of political economy (Brenner 2000; Brenner, 2009; Peck et al., 2013).

Marginalisation by (uneven) development

Critical urban theory proves to be a prolific frame for the conceptual effort to link theories of spatial exclusion to theories of development when addressing the production of marginality as a systemic process. Most importantly, the concept of uneven development has the potential to connect production of marginality via the political economy of space to capitalism. This approach offers us creative insights into how and why production of marginality is another face of uneven development: while capital travels across different spaces at different scales it has the effect of elevating some spaces while simultaneously marginalising others. According to Smith (1984), uneven development is the geographical expression of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism between use value and exchange value as a result of which there is development in one pole and underdevelopment in another pole. One of his main questions was about the contribution of the geographical configuration of the landscape to the survival of capitalism. In this context, he also suggested analysing how capital is producing the space in its own image via investing into built-up environments or moving to another area because of the promises of higher profitability elsewhere. Harvey also observed that the spatially and temporally uneven processes and outcomes are functional to capitalism (Harvey, 2006), and that capitalist expansion always happens through accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2008), i.e. accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a few by dispossessing the public of their wealth, goods, or lands. However, what exactly is brought within the capitalist logic of accumulation differs from time to time. Even more, one has to note that ways how, for example, the spatial organisation of the city acts as a source for the development of capitalism in diverse periods (in the 19th, 20th or 21st century’s capitalism) are displaying distinctive modes of capital accumulation (Harvey 1985; Harvey, 2008).

Recent East-European studies suggest that polarization of impoverishment ‘partly resulted from marketization: backed by neo-liberal incentives and measures, the flows of capital and investment targeted the best developed areas while abandoning more underdeveloped regions’ (Szalai, 2014:140). Under these conditions, the formation of ‘Gypsy ghettos’, as instances of Roma marginalisation, happens at the crossroads of multi-level processes that create territorial disparities and uneven developments between and within regions, counties and localities (Vincze, 2015b). The result is the emergence of rural areas where people are surviving on
subsistence agriculture, small towns that lack economic activities providing decent jobs for the inhabitants, or ‘poverty pockets’ in larger cities where multiple economic deprivations become territorially concentrated. The formation of spaces of economic deprivation is overlapping with ethno-territorial segregation of marginalised Roma, and the poor segregated areas are culturally stigmatised ‘Gypsyhoods’, though they are not necessarily inhabited predominantly by persons self-identified as Roma. Faced with such phenomena, public authorities, non-governmental organisations and funding bodies are looking for development programmes to tackle them. Within this system, the capacity to attract funds becomes a key condition, and those actors who are not competitive on this specific market, are classified as subjects unworthy of development. Furthermore, the development programmes dedicated to poverty reduction transfer the accountability of this objective onto the shoulders of the impoverished categories themselves, stating that they should be empowered to solve ‘their own problems’. These trends are also manifested and (re)produced in ways how marginalised ‘Roma communities’ are transformed into an object of development. This process becomes part of their racialisation, since in a colonial spirit, it transforms Roma into a subject that needs to be developed, while the projects for Roma are conceived as a potential route for attracting external funds, and are mostly based on merits and not on needs and rights. Altogether, one has to note the existence of a ‘sharply unequal distribution of developmental and urban renewal funds to upgrade local infrastructure in middle-class-dominated segments while allowing for prolonged spontaneous degeneration in quarters inhabited by Roma and the truly poor’ (Szalai 2014:141).

Going beyond the post-socialism paradigm

It is not the aim of this current journal edition to contribute to the debates opened up by former issues of Intersections, East European Journal of Society and Politics around post-socialism (Petrovici 2015) or about what Central and Eastern Europe is (Piotrowski 2015). However, we have to underline the differences between one stream of the theoretical approaches towards poverty, exclusion or marginalisation that emphasise the post-socialist nature of these trends in our societies, and between those that relate them to the very features of capitalism. Moreover, it is necessary to note that in current Eastern European contexts post-socialism typically means anti-socialism, and it is used as a discursive device; not only in order to justify neoliberal policies while pretending to empower the individual faced with an oppressive state, but also to sustain that globalisation of capitalism as it happens today is not a political option, but a natural extension of the market as embodiment of freedom and guarantee of economic well-being (Vincze 2015a).

These ideas were also developed in the Short report on Romania – Uneven development and Roma marginalization: from economic deprivation to ethno-spatial exclusion (October 2013), resulted from Faces and Causes of the Roma Marginalization in Local Settings. Contextual inquiry to the UNDP/World Bank/EC Regional Roma Survey 2011, focusing on Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and as well as in a 2014 special issue of the journal Studia UBB Sociologia on the spatialisation and racialisation of social exclusion.
Following Bodnár (2001), who addresses the socialist economy as a strategy of a developmentalist state in the periphery of the capitalist world system, one may affirm that after the dismissal of the socialist economy or of the developmentalist state, the former socialist countries continue to be shaped by how they are connected to current global capitalism, i.e. to a global post-industrial, post-developmentalist and post-welfare regime. Therefore, our subject, the production of marginality, might be approached as a phenomenon endemic to capitalism and as a process that displays the commonalities of this political economy across countries and larger geopolitical spaces, and not as something specific to post-socialism. Such a perspective could assure that, even if they are studied in Central and Eastern European countries, issues such as the marginalisation of the Roma, or the processes of impoverishment and spatial exclusion are not linked to the region’s allegedly primitive and backward nature, but to the very ways how the region itself and its precariatised and racialised working class (Vincze 2015b) is adversely incorporated into the capitalist world system.

**Marginality at the crossroads of spatial exclusion and development: this issue of IEEJSP**

The first article in this issue follows critical urban theory’s understanding of the political economy of space and development, and their role in the formation of capitalism. Enikő Vincze argues that the spatial and social peripheral inclusion of marginalised working class (Roma) into the society is a manifestation of the adverse incorporation of a precariatised and racialised working class into the capitalist system. Exploring the mechanisms of this adverse incorporation in the context of a critique of capitalism she analyses the politics of socio-spatial marginalisation and the politics of entrepreneurial development conceived via neoliberal governance in the present capitalism in Romania.

The drastically increased displacement of Roma people in Sofia are studied by Mariya Ivancheva who discusses the legacy of state socialist housing policies and the changing housing regime during Bulgaria’s transition from state socialism to post-socialism. She combines archival and secondary sources with ethnographic observation and qualitative interviews and investigates legal regulations and policies that made Roma settlements in Sofia vulnerable to demolition and their inhabitants to displacement. The main argument of this article combines historical explanation of state-socialist legacies with a dominant feature of present East-European capitalist development: the typical self-built houses of the Roma that were informally tolerated but formally not legalised under state socialism paved the way of the eviction of the Roma by neoliberal urban authorities seeking space for new private investments. Thus former inhabitants of the destroyed illegal houses were pushed out to zones without economic and education opportunities, reinforcing the marginalised status of them.

Urban governance policies and mechanisms of uneven spatial development are equally central issues in the article of Márton Czirfusz, Vera Horváth, Csaba Jelinek, Zsuzsanna Pósfai and Linda Szabó who present three case studies of local urban regeneration in the most stigmatised area of Budapest, the Eighth District
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(Józsefváros). The authors discuss the cases of the Corvin Promenade, the Magdolna Quarter Programme, and the ongoing Orczy Quarter project, including the underlying revanchist policies and discourses to explore gentrification and rescaling urban governance concerning the area. This study understands structural factors contributing to exclusion, criminalisation, displacement, and othering through a scale-sensitive political economic approach, and explores three major dynamics of rescaling urban governance in Hungary as the main arguments: first, in the 1990s, the decentralisation without the redistribution of resources, then the EU accession and Europeanisation of public policies from the 2000s and finally the recentralisation after 2010.

Developmental programs on social integration in two small towns are studied by Judit Keller, Katalin Fehér, Zsuzsanna Vidra and Tünde Virág. Their comparative case study argues that institutional models of developmental change play a dominant role in shaping the capacity of marginalised individuals on the long run. In one of the cases the local government mayor acted as a socially skilled entrepreneur and managed to build a powerful local developmental agency. This mitigated the exclusionary mechanisms of the external institutional system and supported the emancipation of poor Roma families for a number of years in one of the small towns investigated. However, exclusionary mechanisms dominated the local institutional configuration in the other small town where uneven distribution of developmental mandates implied an increasing polarisation between the individuals of marginalised status (in particular the Roma) and the relatively better-off within the community. The authors demonstrate that the latter institutional model implies the absence of an integrated local community as in this case public goods are more likely to be appropriated by the incumbents. Accordingly, exclusionary institutional mechanisms hinder the evolution of innovative solutions to socio-economic problems and weaken the developmental capacities of local communities.

In addition to the themed articles, two interviews prepared by Szilvia Rézműves, a social politician and national project officer of the ROMACT programme give an insight into the use of development funds targeted at Roma integration. The interviewees are two professionals, Deyan Kolev and Ádám Kullmann who have had a longer experience in managing and evaluating the use of these types of development funds. Though their assessment about specific policies differ somewhat, both of them underline the need of ensuring the stronger participation of the Roma in deciding about developmental source use.

At the first glance, a different perspective, a post-socialist approach is suggested by Francesca Stella whose book about Lesbian Lives in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia is reviewed by Judit Takács. Stella, however, understands post-socialism in a critical context, opposing her micro-level ethnographic approach with that of mainstream transitology. Takács argues that this critical post-socialist perspective indeed makes the integration of queer theory into empirical social scientific research possible, thus paving the way for post-queer social scientists.

The other book review of this issue of IEEJSP is prepared by Ilgvars Jansons about Chasing Warsaw (edited by Monika Grubbauer and Joanna Kusiak). The articles of this edited volume address the particularly intense dynamics of urban change in Warsaw since 1990. The approach of the authors of this book is similar to
the original articles of *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*: they investigate patterns of change and continuity in post-socialist Warsaw in the context of global urban changes, but going beyond post-socialist area studies perspective.

Finally, the individual article of Ervin Csizmadia explores some specific features of the *Hungarian democratic opposition movements in the late Kádár-era*. The author overviews the role of international environment as well as the programme and strategy of the Hungarian opposition. The study argues that in addition to these well-documented effects, the *informal concept of organisation and network-building* may also play an important role in the flexible political adaptation and the subsequent success of the democratic opposition in Hungary.

**References**


Abstract

Empirically rooted in the findings of a research conducted between 2012-2014 in localities of Romania under the umbrella of a larger contextual inquiry concerning faces and causes of marginalisation of the Roma, the approach of this article is informed by critical urban theory’s understanding of the political economy of space and development, and their role in the formation of capitalism. My study argues: the way how marginalised Roma are included into the mainstream society while pushed into and kept in its dispossessed spatial and social peripheries, is a manifestation of the adverse incorporation of a precaritised and racialised working class into the capitalist system. In Chapters 2 and 3 the article describes how, on the one hand, the politics of socio-spatial marginalisation and, on the other hand, the politics of entrepreneurial development creates the Roma as adversely incorporated (dispossessed and racialised) subject. Furthermore, Chapters 4 and 5 of the analysis conclude that nowadays capitalism (in Romania) is (also) formed through the politics of socio-spatial exclusion and racialisation of the working class (Roma), and as well as through the politics of entrepreneurial development conceived via neoliberal governance that exclude them from development resources. Therefore the article proposes to use the analysis of the adverse incorporation of the Roma as a critique of capitalism.

Keywords: Adverse incorporation, socio-spatial marginalisation, entrepreneurial development, racialisation, formation of capitalism.
1. Empirical foundation and theoretical background

My article is based on the findings of field-research conducted between 2012-2014 in localities of Romania within the umbrella of the qualitative contextual inquiry. Faces and Causes of Marginalization of the Roma in Local Settings: Hungary - Romania - Serbia. By and large, the aim of that investigation was to map the differing conditions in the domains of education, employment and work, housing and infrastructure, and representation and participation in local policy-making and politics and to reveal differences in access and provisions in the aforementioned areas that the aggregate (average) indicators for the communities-at-large may hide (Szalai and Zentai, 2014). The fieldwork-based contextual inquiry unfolded through two major phases. Between October 2012 and June 2013 we identified and described several economic, social and policy-related factors that reproduced social and territorial marginalisation of the Roma in local contexts - in Romania we have ‘scanned’ 25 localities (five small cities and 20 nearby villages) with this aim. The next step of research (Causes and Faces of Exclusion of the Roma in Local Communities) was conducted in Romania between October 2013 and July 2014 in three localities (two small cities, and one commune comprising three villages) selected out of the 25 settlements addressed during the prior phase: the general frame of this part of the investigation was designed for all the three countries to identify and describe the dimensions and mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion as processes affected by ethnic relations.

The present analysis makes appeal to the empirical material resulted from the contextual inquiry conducted in Romania, but addresses it from a more radical critical angle than the approach initially inspiring the investigation as a whole.

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3 I am grateful to my colleagues who conducted fieldwork in these settlements: Rafaela Maria Muraru and Florina Pop in Aiud, Adrian-Nicolae Furțună and Mihaela Preda in Calafat, and Cătălin Dîrțu and Bogdan Herțanu in Lungani.

4 This article is among the first publications that make use of the empirical material collected during the last phase of the mentioned contextual inquiry, respectively of the information generated by the investigation as a whole. Since at this stage I feel the need to elaborate a new approach towards the addressed issue, it makes sense to test it now only in relation with the empirical knowledge gained in the
Nevertheless, continuing to tackle inclusion and exclusion, the article highlights: the way how marginalised Roma are included into the mainstream society while pushed into and kept in its dispossessed peripheries (spaces and class positions), is a manifestation of adverse incorporation of a precariatised and racialised working class faced with insecurity in several or all domains of life. The latter is portrayed as redundant for nowadays capitalism, but in fact it is needed by the system as a reserve army and/or as a cheap, easily exploitable labour force both in the formal and informal economy. At its turn the process of precariatisation and racialisation of the working class (Roma) and their adverse incorporation are sustained by a political economy of space and development that are among the productive forces of the formation of capitalism in Romania after the demise of the actually existing socialism. Therefore, the case of adverse incorporation of the Roma is a question through which one may critically address the large issue of the formation of capitalism. The successive chapters of the article will demonstrate this via the empirical material generated by the contextual inquiry on faces and causes of marginalisation of the Roma, in particular by stressing that precariatisation and racialisation as forms of dispossession are leading to the creation of deprived housing areas and to the exclusion of the most marginalised from development as far as they are politics that serve directly or indirectly the interests of capital accumulation.

The concept of adverse incorporation highlights instances when ‘inclusion’ is disempowering or inequitable, and it is used to make an explicit focus on power relations, history, social dynamics, and political economy (Hickey and du Toit 2007). My analysis proposes to use it in order to make a step further from the inclusion/exclusion perspective towards a political economy approach, which highlights that the precariatisation of the working class (Roma) is a result of how they are adversely incorporated into the system as an easily exploitable labour force or a reserve army of capitalist economy and of how they are pushed into or kept in deprived residential territories. By introducing the concept of precariatisation into the analysis, I am not stating that the precariat is a distinct social class separate from other (more privileged) workers (as Standing thought about it in 2011, criticised by Bailey 2012, and Breman 2013), but I am describing some of the transformations that the working class (Roma) went through under the formation of capitalism marked by de-industrialisation and shaped by neoliberal governance.

Romanian localities and perhaps later use it for a comparative endeavour referring to all the countries cached through this ambitious contextual inquiry.

5 These authors argue for the adverse incorporation approach on the base of the criticism of importing the term of social exclusion from European countries (where it describes the exclusion of minority groups from the mainstream of civic life) to the contexts where poverty is the mainstream, and where it ensures the denial of the social rights of citizenship to the majority of people.

6 Discussions with Norbert Petrovici, Cristina Raț and Anca Simionca linked to the research Spatialization and racialization of Roma exclusion. The social and cultural formation of ‘Gypsy ghettos’ in Romania in a European context (SPAREX) that paralleled the writing of the present article, informed my new insight towards the old empirical material collected under the contextual inquiry on faces and causes of marginalization of the Roma in local settings. SPAREX is supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS –UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0334.
The general theoretical frame, which enlightens this article is rooted in critical urban theory (as discussed in Smith 2002; Brenner and Theodor 2002; Brenner 2009; Marcuse et al. 2010; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2012; etc.), which addresses the role of ‘urban question’ and more broadly of the politics of space in the history and geography of capitalist development, or in creating, solving and recreating the contradictions and crises of capitalism. My understanding of the relationship between the spatial and the social (and in particular of the process of socio-spatial marginalisation of the Roma discussed in Chapter 2) is shaped by inquiries about the production of space as foundational for the growth and survival of capitalism (Lefebvre 1968, 1974); about the spatial specificity of the reproduction of labour (Castells 1972); about the urbanisation of capital and of consciousness (Harvey 1985) or about the process of accumulation by dispossession through urban redevelopment (Harvey 2008); and last, but not least, about the spatialisation of political economy (Brenner 2000, 2009). This approach also informs my analysis in Chapter 4 on how is the formation of capitalism sustained by the politics of socio-spatial exclusion and racialisation of the working class (Roma).

Furthermore, addressing in Chapter 3 how is the entrepreneurial model of development functioning as an exclusionary politics towards the precariatised working class (Roma) at local levels while playing a role in the formation of the larger political and economic system, I need to make reference to neoliberal governance (already analysed in relation to the Roma by van Baar 2011), respectively to rely on the critical analysis of neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jessop 2002; Brenner 2004; Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, 2013; Harvey 2006; Morange and Fol 2014). Last, but not least, my study highlights in Chapter 5 how a global model of neoliberal governance is localised by state actors who, while reconfiguring the role of the state, are making efforts to justify privatisation, marketisation and to support foreign investment in order to contribute to the formation of capitalism that at its turn produces uneven development and leads to the precariatisation of the dispossessed working class (Roma).

Chapter 6 (the conclusion) of the article briefly summarises its core idea that the politics of socio-spatial marginalisation and the politics of entrepreneurial development, both justified by racialisation do not only create Roma as dispossessed and racialised subjects adversely incorporated into the system, but they are also constituting forces of capitalism.

2. The creation of the adversely incorporated Roma through the politics of socio-spatial marginalisation

The adoption of theoretical approaches as discussed above, enables me to talk about the usual topic of Roma inclusion and exclusion in a more unusual, i.e. political manner. Consequently, I am addressing how marginalised Roma are included into the mainstream society while being pushed into and/or kept in underdeveloped housing areas (discussed in paragraph 2.1) and in a precariatised working class position from where their labour force is easily exploited (tackled in paragraph 2.2). By adverse incorporation the working class Roma are integrated into the local
capitalist economy in a way that serves the interests of capital: they are pushed to the social and spatial margins of the local societies, i.e. into position of unemployed on the formal labour market, and/or towards housing areas that do not benefit of developmental investments. From these positions their labour force is easily exploited, since people are kept (both materially, territorially and discursively) under insecurity, dependence and control by powerful actors (public administration, private investors, non-governmental organisations etc.) who are in command of the distribution of resources at the local level. As I will demonstrate in paragraph 2.3, such processes are justified by the racialisation of the Roma, and they are more effective if the perception of their supposed ‘inferiority’ and subordination is interiorised and accepted as normal by the Roma themselves. It is to be observed that racialisation associates precarious life with ‘Gypsyness’ and it extends the negative stereotypes associated with precariousness towards all the Roma regardless of their class position, while considering that someone who transcends his/her precarious position actually leaves his/her Gypsy identity behind (Vincze 2015b).

2.1. The placement of marginalised Roma into underdeveloped housing areas

Adverse incorporation functions as an outcome of both inclusionary and exclusionary trends that mingle in different arrangements affecting unevenly the various local Roma groups who self-identify themselves by the crafts practised by their ancestors. Addressing socio-spatial marginalisation as adverse incorporation, one may emphasise how the working of society, economy, or how development and growth produce marginality, or how the latter is caused by social relations of production and reproduction, of property and power, which characterise certain forms of development (Hickey and du Toit 2007: 5). The selected cities of Aiud and Calafat as well as the commune Lungani (found in three different development regions of Romania), to which I am referring below, embody local stages where several Roma groups are incorporated into the life of the larger local society, while being exploited, kept on the peripheries, or transformed into objects of technical or de-politicised ‘inclusion policies’, and racialised as inferior subjects.

These localities differ from each other in population size and ratio of self-identified ethnic Roma in the total population. They are also different according to the proportion of self-identified Roma who state that they speak the Romani language. Table 1 synthesises these differences. Moreover, these three localities are found in different development regions where the risk of poverty displays regional inequalities, as Table 2 shows. They exhibit different institutional arrangements, which translate the legal measures provided by the Romanian policies for Roma into local practices. The local councils of Aiud and Lungani included Roma councillors (elected from the list of the majority political parties), the City Hall of Calafat and Lungani hired a Roma health mediator, the local school system employed a Roma school mediator in Aiud and in Calafat, and a Romani language teacher and another

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7 Data for 2011, offered by the Romanian National Institute of Statistics using a EUROSTAT composite indicator that reflects the share of people who are in one of the following situations: under the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, in severe material deprivation, or living in households with very low work intensity.
school teacher of Roma origin in Lungani, while in each locality the mayor used to consult more or less officially with the informal Roma community leaders.

Despite of their differences signalled above, all of these localities display cases of social and territorial marginalisation of the Roma. In all of these cases, the local historical divisions within the localities intersect with current unequal territorial development, which increase the disadvantages of Roma living in isolated neighbourhoods of a city or in the poorest village of the larger commune. Besides suffering the effects of economic scarcity, the impoverished are also restricted to the underdeveloped margins of a city or to a less developed village of a commune because of housing and school policies. However, in all of these localities the local Roma population is divided internally, too, both on socio-economic lines and according to the intra-ethnic distinctions sustained among different Roma ‘nations’ (neamuri).

(1) In the city of Aiud (Map 1), a town in Alba County (Transylvania) the areas called Bufa and Poligon are inhabited mainly by impoverished Roma. People from Poligon know the most severe degree of precariatisation, as in the last six years they experienced an enforced eviction and relocation to a deprived periphery characterised by ethno-residential segregation. The Feleud area has grown from a former village, nowadays a neighbourhood included within the administrative boundaries of the city. Otherwise ethnically mixed, it still has a few streets where Roma live compactly and which did not benefit from infrastructural development, however, they are connected to the city with public transport. Feleud people try improving their living conditions by seasonal labour migration to Switzerland, France and Spain.

(2) In the city of Calafat (Map 2) in Dolj County (Muntenia/Oltenia) the so-called Dunării area benefits from its proximity to the urban centre. Better-off Spoitori or Cositorari Roma inhabit a part of this district, which as a larger neighbourhood also hosts Romanians. They practice seasonal migration to Spain, France and Italy. However, not all the Spoitori Roma are better-off. Rudărie area is situated at the margins of Calafat and is populated exclusively by Rudari Roma. They suffer the most because of material deprivations connected to their residential segregation in a disadvantaged urban area. Regardless of the historical crafts of their ancestors or of their participation on the city’s socialist industry before 1990, nowadays people from both groups are taking part in the local economy via its informal sector. However, even before 1990, despite being employed workers, some of them practised in-country migration for seasonal agricultural work and augmented their salaries with income from informal labour.

(3) Lungani commune (Map 3) in Iași County (Moldova) displays how the spatial division of its composing villages is overlapping with the economic disparities

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8 At a very early stage of our research, with the occasion of our socio-tours by which we identified the core institutional actors from public administration, schooling, healthcare, local economy, politics etc., we asked representatives of these institutions to mark on the city map the vicinities where, according to their knowledge, ethnic Roma persons/groups, respectively the impoverished people of the locality lived. Out of this exercise several ‘social maps’ of the localities resulted - we use some of them here to illustrate the spatial divisions within the localities on ethnic and economic lines.
of the locality. Zmeu village is a better-off composing village populated by Ursari Roma, who from the beginning of the 1990s have started to migrate for seasonal work to Italy and Spain. On the other side, Crucea village is inhabited by Lăiești Roma, whose great majority lives in extreme poverty. All of them are lacking property documents for their houses or the land on which they are placed. Before 1990 the agricultural work was strongly feminised in the village since the men migrated to cities offering employment opportunities in industries.

2.2. The exploitation of labour force of the Roma

The local histories of Roma presence in the settlement (reconstructed from the conducted family interviews) suggest that regardless of the political regimes, the living conditions and the socio-geographic placement of Roma groups on the localities’ map were firmly connected both to their economic activities through which they could integrate into the larger local communities, and to their social and cultural status associated with their ethnicity (Vincze 2015b). Due to all these they were placed in marginal residential areas and subordinated class positions of the local hierarchies and power structures, even if they may have known different degrees of participation in the economic life of the larger settlements during different periods. As a result of the conjunctures of these factors, Roma in Feleud (Aiud), Spoitori Roma in Calafat, and Ursari Roma in Zmeu/Lungani usually had social, economic, and cultural resources that provided them with better living conditions and more access to social goods compared to Roma in Bufa and mostly to Roma in Poligon (Aiud), to Rudari Roma in Calafat, or to the Lăiești Roma in the Crucea village of Lungani. We could observe that the better-off Roma might inhabit residential spaces that are differentiated from the rest of the locality as so-called ‘compact Roma communities’, but their tendencies to move out and mingle with the majority are not necessarily refused or made impossible by the latter and it mostly happens on the base of informal economic exchanges, but within unequal power relations. In the case of Roma belonging to the most precarious working class, the ethnic enclave overlaps with a condition of territorial segregation that is hardly permeable, and usually they are the categories who are subjected to forced evictions and relocations to areas that are harshly separated from the rest of the local society.

The labour force market has dramatically changed in all of the three localities after 1990, since all their industries were basically dismantled. Nowadays they do not provide sufficient jobs in industry or agriculture, so Roma who practice transnational labour migration are those who can secure a relatively better-off living condition (Roma in Feleud/Aiud, Spoitori Roma in Calafat, and Ursari Roma in Lungani). Material resources gained through working abroad allow them to buy houses near Romanians and thus they enjoy a better residential integration, however, seasonal labour migration offers only insecure resources and exposes the migrants to several risks. The most precarious Roma of these settlements remain segregated in disadvantaged areas; they do not benefit from resources and networks assuring mobility; and local entrepreneurs and mayors exploit their poverty and dependence on social welfare or on underpaid day labouring.
2.3. Socio-spatial marginalisation and racialisation of the Roma

The most direct and severe form of Roma exclusion was practised by the municipality of Aiud. This took the shape of forced evictions of impoverished families from the city centre and their transformation into homeless (‘allowing’ them to settle on the urban peripheries in homes improvised by themselves). Yet, we should also notice that other, more indirect forms of housing exclusion were also practised in Calafat towards the Rudari Roma, or in Lungani toward Roma from Crucea, who were entrapped into sub-standard housing conditions, hardly having access to water or electricity or paved roads, and were under-served or totally neglected by local investments in terms of housing infrastructure.

In each of the above-mentioned cases, material deprivation (class-based inequality) and cultural stigmatisation (ethnic-identity based mis-recognition) are juxtaposed to different degrees, and racialisation (dehumanisation and denial of personhood) ‘justifies’ the differential and unfair treatment of the Roma. Together these factors produce and maintain different forms of socio-spatial divisions. Moreover, such forms are also created and/or reinforced by unequal territorial development. The latter are linked to the general deregulation policies practised at national level as a result of which some territories are totally neglected by authorities, while they are not of interest either to any of the local political actors looking for their direct economic profit. At the local level, the attention of policy-makers towards the territories that should be developed and those that should not benefit from infrastructural or human resource-related investments are also shaped by racist conceptions. These ‘justify’ the neglect of the residential areas inhabited by ‘undeserving Roma’ who supposedly ‘like living in poverty’ (without water, electricity etc.) or in ‘dangerous areas’ (such as landfills, polluted environments, water treatment plants).

Despite its internal differentiations, the inferiorisation of Roma as a racialised ethnic group has a great role to play in their collective exclusion and marginalisation both in social and spatial terms. In this process ‘The Roma’ are associated with the ‘cultural behaviour’ or ‘physiological essence’ of the ‘socially assisted’ or of the individual who is incapable of living otherwise but only in a precarious way. That is how they are transformed into an ‘inferior’ kind of people, or even a ‘sub-human species’ who are purportedly unable – due to their ‘non-modern culture’ or ‘blood’ – to fit into the new social order and to qualify not only as worthy citizens, but also as persons. The practice of coupling ‘The Roma’ perceived as the ‘racial other’ with ‘The poor’, is even stronger in cases when a distinction is made among the poor themselves, between the poor who ‘deserve’ and the poor who ‘do not deserve’ social protection (respectively the ethnic majority on the one hand and Roma on the other). Or put differently, between the poor who deserve to live in poverty (like Roma who supposedly ‘do not like to work’) and the poor who became poor through no fault of their own (the non-Roma who ‘are victims of economic restructuring or of the financial crisis’). On the other hand, the racialization/inferiorisation of Roma means the displacement of poor Roma from the inner cities and of entrapping them into segregated and dehumanising marginal/deprived spaces. The latter usually lack proper infrastructure, are polluted and isolated and of course stigmatised, so that the
disgrace attached to the space becomes the dishonour projected on people and interiorised by them, and eventually leads to further dehumanisation.

3. The creation of the adversely incorporated Roma through the politics of entrepreneurial development

The analysis we made about the development programmes in Aiud and Calafat shows that these are also ways of adversely incorporating the precariatised working class Roma into the system. This is so because these programmes (as described in sub-chapter 3.1), while defining the Roma as beneficiaries of inclusion measures, reproduce their social exclusion by promoting the enterprise-based development agenda, on which they cannot be ‘competitive’ due to the structural inequalities that they are subjected to. We could observe that the discursive frames of local development plans are strongly shaped by the ideologies of the European Commission and the World Bank, which underlie the interests related to the post-socialist economic reconstruction of a country such as Romania. In addition, we could note (as expressed in sub-chapter 3.2) that the directions of local development are defined according to the logic of the Structural Funds schemes, and projects for Roma are also conceived as a potential route for attracting external funds to the localities. Paragraph 3.3 at the end of this chapter interprets all these trends as ways how precariatised working class Roma are created as subjects who are excluded from development due to the fact that the latter is shaped by an entrepreneurial approach and development is transformed into business.

3.1. Projects for Roma in Aiud (2009-2013): poverty reduction through community development

The municipality of Aiud implemented two projects on behalf of the local Roma communities, both of them instrumented by the Romanian Fund for Social Development (RFSD). On the base of a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development given to the Romanian Government in 2006, the RFSD was designated as implementing agency of the Social Inclusion Project (SIP) across the country. Its effective implementation started in 2009. The Social Inclusion Project was conceived ‘to help the Government of Romania implement the Joint Inclusion Memorandum through assistance given to the existing, or emerging programmes that address the needs of the vulnerable/disadvantaged groups of Roma, persons with disabilities, youth at risk, and victims of domestic violence.’

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9 The RFSD was established by the Law 129/1998 as a Bucharest-based organisation through which the Romanian Government aimed at implementing projects for poverty reduction. Since its establishment the RFSD has acted as implementation agent for several Ministries of the Romanian Government (administration and interior, finances, economy and commerce, regional development), but it also implemented projects with the support of the European Social Fund, the Making the Most of EU funding for Roma inclusion/ OSI (Project Generation Initiative), and others.

10 More information available:
One of the four components of the Social Inclusion Project was the Priority Interventions Programme (PIP), which between 2011 and 2013 ran 133 integrated projects on behalf of poor Roma communities across Romania using a total budget of circa 18 million euros. In each and every locality where it was implemented, the Priority Interventions Programme included a component to improve small infrastructure (roads, water and sanitation, and basic housing), and a component addressing community-based social services (education, health, advocacy and social support), while targeting the increased participation of Roma communities in local decision making processes. The RFSD required a precise procedure regarding the legal establishment and functioning of the Local Initiative Groups consisting of Roma community members, which were supposed to implement the Priority Intervention Programme at local levels in a partnership with the City Halls (that had to provide modest co-funding). According to the philosophy of PIP, the Roma beneficiaries of such projects were expected to participate on a voluntary base in the mutually agreed activities, for example by labouring on the small infrastructure works. Through the PIP the RFSD implemented a particular view about poverty reduction ‘through the mobilization and accountability of Roma communities.’ Its operational Manual stated that ‘through the PIP the RFSD offers the opportunity to poor communities constituted mainly by ethnic Roma, to improve their capability to solve their problems through learning by doing, through their involvement into the identification of their needs and hierarchising their priorities, and through participation on decision-making regarding the elaboration, implementation and monitoring the projects.’ Defining such projects as community development, the expectation of the funding bodies was to also prepare the local communities for accessing the foreseen European Funds: through PIP the RFSD aimed both to ‘assure funds for improving the life condition of the Roma population, and to offer technical assistance and training of local actors with the aim to increase the capacity of communities with Roma population to self-organise and to manage to solve their problems by their own efforts.’ The selection of the beneficiaries was facilitated by the National Agency for Roma (NAR) that transmitted to RFSD a list of Roma communities proposed to benefit from PIP, and also a description of their situation. On the base of the NAR proposals, the RFSD experts visited the targeted locations, informed the population about the opportunity to participate on this programme, verified if the communities would be eligible and offered assistance for the elaboration of the integrated projects. Eventually the applications were submitted to RFSD by the City Halls with the condition of partnering with the local initiative groups of the Roma communities or with non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, the City Halls were administering the funds and were responsible for the efficient implementation of the projects, including contracting the works, goods and services.

No wonder that the two projects for Roma communities in Aiud funded by the RFSD were strictly following the model from above, which actually generated them, motivated the City Hall to get involved, and facilitated the creation of a local initiative group composed of Roma community members. The beneficiaries of both projects were people living in one particular area of Aiud, Feleud (targeting two of its
component zones, Pășunii street and Budu), while the other disadvantaged areas of the city were not included. Regarding the project and its objectives, the project manager stated:

‘We wanted the project to contribute to reduce poverty and social exclusion through mobilisation and responsibility of the Roma community, offering the population from this community the opportunity to improve their problem solving skills.’

The group interview made with the Roma people living on Pășunii street revealed that despite the implementation of this project, the most serious problem they still face today is the lack of drinking water. They said that before the project through which the City Hall installed water pipes in their street, there was already a water pump on Pășunii street, brought by a non-governmental organisation through foreign sponsors. The community members stated that the City Hall came to the spot and found that the water system had to be restored as it had not been done properly. Then they made lists and came and laid the water pipes. The interviewees brought into the discussion the fact that even after finishing the installation work the water pipes, only six families out of 30 had running water in their house: those who could afford it. Regarding participation in the project implementation in the other part of Feleud (Budu), the informal Roma representative mentioned the participation of Roma in ecological campaigns and a waste collection action, but less so at meetings. He thinks this is one of the reasons why the initiative group no longer functioned after the lifetime of the project, nevertheless during the project it was important because it gave him access to the City Hall for representing the community. With regards to the results of this project, the two interviewees stated that the objectives were achieved, namely, paving the streets and strengthening the river banks. But they affirmed that there is more work to be done on the social component. The Roma representative believed that the local initiative group should continue its work after the project is finished and the City Hall representative considered that Roma should be more involved in these actions to ensure the continuation of the works or for monitoring the project.

3.2. Projects for Roma in Calafat (2010-2012): pursuing of funds without strategy

Between 2010-2012 the public authorities conceived project proposals on behalf of Roma communities, or they wanted to be partners in such initiatives, but they did not get any financing. One of these failed projects was intended to develop a social enterprise generating income for the Roma.

At the City Hall there was a consensus about the positive message of having ethnic Roma persons on the boards of projects, but we could also learn that the formation of Roma initiative groups were very superficial and were only related to some particular project proposals without a sustainable impact on Roma participation on decision-making. On the other hand we could note that the Roma representative bodies had no qualified personnel who would be able to write project proposals and/or to conceive programmes. Another aspect worth mentioning is that even if the local government has made a number of important steps to have an income
generating project for Roma, such an action on the behalf of the Roma community was not mentioned anywhere in the Sustainable Development Strategy of the city. The Roma were not mentioned in any section as a distinct target group of this strategy. This made us supposing that the local government acted as a ‘funding hunter,’ and it did not conceive projects on the base of a well defined intervention strategy. Under these conditions, even if the City Hall could have received financial support for projects dedicated for Roma, its interventions could be only sporadic, unstructured and without lasting results.

Referring to the general difficulties of elaborating projects for the Roma, the City Hall expert on European programmes emphasised that the biggest obstacle of such endeavours is the lack of data on the situation of the local Roma communities. Moreover, he admitted that the development strategy of the city was elaborated by a private firm from Craiova (the administrative centre of Dolj county) to whom they sub-contracted this work on the base of their offers:

‘They developed the strategy from the bottom up, they held meetings with the business people, with NGOs and the citizens of the city. There were three meetings, I think. Each of them proposed various projects, so this strategy includes projects in various areas, on various topics, which we have included in project files that are attached to this strategy. no Roma or any representative of theirs attended these meetings, nobody came to tell us “we want this or that”. The informal community leader was on holiday, he was not active, he was in a difficult period of his life.... Now, honestly, whom should we have addressed? Which representative? I can say that Roma representatives should be more active.’

3.3. From enterprise-based development to development as business

In the case of Aiud, our analysis identified the links between the two projects dedicated for the social inclusion of the local Roma communities and the development model promoted by the World Bank in Romania (through governmental actions often mediated by some big NGOs, such as the Romanian Fund for Social Development, RFSD). Moreover, we could also note how the ideology of projects for Roma is related to the general local development strategy of the city, in its turn informed by the regulations of the European Commission regarding the use of EU funds in Romania for infrastructural and human resources development. On the base of this we may conclude that the view on how community development à-la World Bank (and the RFSD as its national intermediary) is supposed to solve the problems of the disadvantaged (promising to empower them to tackle their issues) is related to the view of the EU (and of Romania as Member State) regarding the role of local authorities in directly supporting private investors on the one hand, and in promoting the active inclusion of vulnerable groups viewed as potential labour force or as a source of development on the other hand. Furthermore, in the case of Aiud we could arrive at the conclusion that the presence of the RFSD in the locality, later followed by the ROMACT and ROMED programmes of the Council of Europe was crucial in the appearance of a moment when the elected Roma local councillor could promote a brief plan for the improvement of the condition of Roma successfully, which was adopted by the Local
Council as an official statement of the municipality. Procedurally speaking, this was an important development at the local level, however one may continue to be critical about how far the defined provisions could serve the assurance of social justice for the Roma subjected to intersectional forms of exclusion (including housing, labour, educational marginalisation). As far as these are produced by structural factors, they can hardly be overcome by vocational courses or by small steps towards procedural justice.

In the case of Calafat, the lack of local policies and projects targeting impoverished Roma is also linked to how the municipality planned to adapt its development strategies to the provisions of the European Union regarding its rural policies and development models. On another occasion (Vincze 2015a) I described how, as a result of this, the city of Calafat was introduced into a larger rural territory chosen by the government, besides other several similar areas in Romania, as a beneficiary of the LEADER programme. The LEADER development approach addressing disadvantaged micro-regions did not pay attention to internal inequalities or to the particular situation of impoverished ethnic Roma, and there was no other major impetus either coming from outside that could have motivated the local authorities to implement projects for Roma. Under these conditions, the City Hall did not make any effort either to elaborate a local policy for Roma inclusion or to implement individual projects. Generally speaking, the direct link between envisioning local development and between the funding opportunities was explicitly stated by one of our interviewees, the representative of the Calafat City Hall. The formation of the Local Action Group (GAL) ‘Calafat’ and its underlying conceptions reveal how the predominant development models are, at best, replacing the ideal of social justice with the ideal of procedural justice. Most importantly, due to this case one may comprehend how a limited understanding of participation is at risk of recreating local power structures and re-assuring the control of the local powerful on development priorities and financial resources, without assuring larger citizen participation.

In due course, the idea of the need to cultivate the entrepreneurial spirit not only guides the discursive construction of development visions, but the elaboration of development plans itself also becomes an enterprise or a business. The City Halls are outsourcing this activity to private companies, while the national non-governmental organisations enjoying governmental or presidential support are ensuring their existence by administering EU or WB or other foreign funds, and local non-governmental organisations are created in order to attract these funds usually with the help of consultancy firms specialised on project applications and project management. Within this system, the capacity to attract these funds becomes a feature of a desirable, i.e. entrepreneurial self (both in the cases of persons and institutions), and those who cannot fulfil this requirement might be stigmatised as subjects unworthy for development. Under these conditions, the local development strategies, otherwise very ambitious in terms of projected programmes, are in danger of not being translated into effective interventions as far as the local actors (not to speak about disadvantaged groups) are not capable, due to several structural reasons, to elaborate projects that could be competitive on the market of funding.
4. The formation of capitalism through the politics of socio-spatial exclusion and racialisation

In Romania today, the politics of socio-spatial exclusion and the transformation of Roma into a racialised subject is a foundational element of capitalism. This politics, in the broadest sense of the term, is an outcome of several factors and processes that are not necessarily coordinated and targeted against Roma by one or another actor. However, the implemented economic and social policies are developed to serve the interests of profit over people (Chomsky 1999; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2011) and altogether these factors and processes systemically correlate producing effects as a whole that consist of growing social divisions and inequalities. Moreover, the functioning of such a politics is sustained by ideologies actively developed and promoted to carry on the visions of the ‘good society’ that serve the economic and political interests of those who have access to define these visions and explain the created inequalities not by exclusionary mechanisms but by the characteristics of the excluded. As a result, the politics of socio-spatial marginalisation dispossesses the persons and families subjected to such processes of the resources and capabilities to overcome the effects of marketisation, while it also deprives them of means of participation on decision-making. Consequently, this politics concludes in the precariatisation of the working class whose livelihood today cumulates all the effects of past and present structural disadvantages.

In the case of Roma from our selected localities this precarious class position overlaps with an ethnic status ranked as inferior by the power arrangements of all political regimes (including pre- and post-socialist, and socialist as well). Enslaved till the middle of the 19th century in the Romanian Kingdoms (Wallachia and Moldova), subjected to assimilation in Transylvania, adversely incorporated into the Romanian socialist economic, civic and ethnic order, and severely pushed to the margins as redundant by the emergent capitalism, different groups organised in extended families converged by kinship and economic lineages and envisaged as ‘Gypsies’ or ‘Roma’ could only find niches of fitting into the larger society that were prescribed by the majority. Besides, they always lacked genuine instruments of participation on an equal base on the political negotiations regarding distribution and recognition.

Our research demonstrated that Roma of the scrutinised communities underwent during their histories a process of downwards mobility or, at the best, known the reproduction of prior standards both regarding school participation and labour opportunities. This is underscored or aggravated by the effects of current structural processes of housing/residential exclusion and segregation, while the latter is also enforced by this educational and occupational downwards mobility and at its turn induces severe deprivations in all domains of life. The formation of segregated, materially deprived and culturally stigmatised territories is not a contingency, but stays at the very core of post-socialist capitalism. These areas are populated mostly by ethnic Roma deprived of other livelihood opportunities and/or cast out by authorities in the name of ‘law, order and civilisation’, and are very often stigmatised as ‘Gypsy neighbourhoods’ (țigănie). The Romanian Explicative Dictionary defines țigănie as a slum populated by țiganii (Gypsies) or as a reprehensible and scandalous misbehaviour characterised by excessive bargaining.
In the light of the rich empirical material collected in the three selected localities, our analysis has the potential to contribute to the understanding of how capitalism and racism are functioning today in Romania through one another while creating and justifying a racialising capitalist political economy. This deprives the socially and spatially excluded not only of economic (and housing) means needed for living a decent human life, but also of personhood. Moreover, neoliberal governance extends the principles of the ‘free market’ to all domains of life and politics (including housing), and it disseminates an enterprise model over the entire social body (van Baar 2011), as a result of which ‘competitiveness’ is celebrated as the core quality of personhood. By this it creates a regime of economic domination where the privatising classes accumulate wealth and the dispossessed are experiencing advanced marginality and not due to their inborn differences regarding ‘competitiveness’ (or individual ability to qualify on the ‘free market’), but due to how the state enforces this two-directional process and makes the fiction of markets real (Wacquant 2012). Moreover - through (housing) policies as technologies of governmentality (Foucault 1982, 1991; van Baar 2011; Shore and Write 1997, 2011) - this regime also fabricates the subjects that act and speak and perceive themselves as ‘naturally’ belonging to positions into which they are placed by the system.

The formation of capitalism shaped by privatisation and marketisation is enacted among others by racism. In this process racism functions not only as a cultural system justifying the created socio-economic inequalities, but most importantly it also works as an institutionalised arrangement producing material effects in the form of accumulation on the one side, and of disposessions on the other side (Harvey 2006). The interplay of capitalism and racism materially produces the dispossessed by pushing some people into structurally disadvantaged conditions, and it also racialises them discursively by asserting that they are ‘sub-human’ or ‘non-person’ since they cannot fit into the ideal-type subject position prescribed by the neoliberal order.

While the politics of socio-spatial exclusion creates ‘The Roma’ as racialised (sub-human) subjects by placing disadvantaged ethnic Roma into dehumanising structural positions, racism justifies their dehumanisation by making an appeal to the marketising ideologies of capitalism. Paradoxically, the impoverished Roma ending up in the particular neighbourhoods of the selected localities on the one hand proved to be redundant or useless on the formal labour markets of the larger settlements (this being the reason of their dislocation from ‘civilised territories’), but on the other hand they, as people kept in total economic dependence and under control could be always abused as a cheap labour force ensuring that they would never resist their exploitation. This re-demonstrates how the interplay of capitalism and racism privileges the winners of marketisation and it is inclusive of people, places, and societal areas that might be better included into the profit-oriented political economy of capitalism (as a labour force, as geographical zones worthy of investment, as domains which deserve development). But it is exclusive towards those who became redundant and were rendered ‘surplus’ and ‘needless’ from the point of view of capital, and most importantly towards the racialised, dehumanised subjects whose labour might be exploited due to its socio-spatial location placed at the edge of legality and human dignity (Vincze 2014).
5. The formation of capitalism through the politics of entrepreneurial development

A core idea of the new development visions promoted in and for Romania that, as a general trend, are also manifested and (re)produced locally in Aiud and Calafat, is the reconfiguration of the role of the state in its relation, on the one hand, with the market, and on the other hand with the citizens or with the society. The way local authorities are defining themselves at the same time as powerful agents that fully support the private economic investors, and as weak actors that cannot (and should not) tackle the social consequences of economic restructuring, is a symptom of the broader tendency that shapes the post-socialist reconstruction of Romania in a neoliberal tone. On a more general level we may conclude that this development model is sustaining the neoliberalisation process in Romania, too, as it does globally. It is promoting and reproducing the idea according to which ‘human wellbeing can be best achieved by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (Harvey 2005: 2).

Under the conditions of the dismiss of actually existing socialism, arguments for this model of organising and developing the economy and society are strongly relying on the criticism of the socialist past, including its development paradigm. This criticism also informs the endeavour to reconfigure the role of the state so that the latter is expected to create and preserve an institutional framework that spreads the competitive and market principles to all spheres of life, including development strategies. The cost of this change is dismantling public agencies for the provision of social services, a phenomenon that is conceived not as something that (re)produces social injustice, but as a new (desirable) mode of governance. Such processes are also going on at the local level, as the cases of our cities showed, and are resulting in the fact that cities cease to be a space of social reproduction to become a space of competition (Jessop 2002).

One should note that in Romania the neoliberal practices of governance became predominant and more visible with the austerity measures of the government imposed on the population starting in 2010 (as part of the structural adjustment programme enforced in the country by the International Monetary Fund), which were sold to the public opinion as the one and only possible way to handle the economic crises. Moreover, we also need to observe that this paradigm was explicitly recalled in the ‘competitive cities’ development model recommended to Romania by the World Bank at the end of 2013, which defines competitive cities as engines of development.11 Parallel with this report, in its capacity of advisor to the Government of Romania, in April 2014 the World Bank released another report including the

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11 The Report Competitive Cities. Reshaping the Economic Geography of Romania is available here: <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/02/20/000456286_20140220151016/Rendered/PDF/843240v10Full00s0Box382123B000UO070.pdf>. The proposals of this World Bank Report were also fundamental in the elaboration of the EU-Romania Partnership Agreement for 2014-2020.
results of its investigations conducted on urban marginalised communities\textsuperscript{12} and a related practical handbook on the ‘Elaboration of Integration Strategies for Urban Marginalized Communities in Romania.’\textsuperscript{13} The latter discusses the development approach suggested to Romania by the European Commission called Community-Led Local Development (CLLD). Briefly put, this model promises social change by increasing community participation in local governance.

One may explain the parallel existence of the two views with reference to Romania (the competition-based development and the inclusive development model) by using the interpretation of Morange and Fol (2014) about how, in several parts of the world, neoliberalisation functions on the continuum of the roll-out and roll-back sequences of redistributive and procedural justice. According to the authors, after the roll-back phase of neoliberalism, consisting of structural adjustment policies severely affecting social and redistributive justice, this capitalist system attempts to correct the social consequences of the previous period by roll-out measures, which usually consist of the introduction of greater participation and procedural justice. That is why, the authors observe, ‘it is true that neoliberalization is often accompanied by the reformulation of discourses on justice, because in even the most aggressive projects the objectives of social and spatial justice are rarely entirely disregarded’ (Morange and Fol 2014:16). Under these conditions the main question to ask is whether procedural justice (participation) can or cannot produce corrective social outcomes. This is a phenomenon that might be studied in time in Romania, too, by addressing how the CLLD development model solves the problem of social marginalisation (of Roma) that it promises to handle successfully. According to the experiences learned in other cases, greater participation may lead to forms of power sharing while still remaining compatible with a neoliberal system of management (Bacque and Biewener 2013), i.e. with the delegation of traditional public service roles to the ‘community’. Or, differently put, the great expectations towards this development model might mask how ‘the rhetoric of social inclusion can be twisted in favour of material exclusion’, or how ‘the underpaid labour force can be exploited in the name of equity’ (Morange and Fol 2014: 17).

Through the analysis of the development visions of the two cities under our scrutiny, one may depict some signs of such evolutions hidden in their logic. The judgement according to which, on the one hand, development rests on the attraction of private investors into the city, and on the other hand the competitive advantage of the locality rests on the reduced cost of labour, transforms the latter into a factor that increases and serves capital. As a result, the enterprise-based development model, without safeguarding measures regarding the socio-economic rights of the workers and generally speaking of citizens, cannot really provide a development assuring social equity, but only one that incorporates the working class in an adverse manner and therefore leads to its precariatisation.


\textsuperscript{13} The handbook is available at: <http://backend.elard.eu/uploads/wb-project-in-ro/integration_strategies_a4_en_print.pdf>
6. Conclusions

According to the assumed critical urban theory’s understanding of the political economy of space and development, and their role in the formation of capitalism, my study demonstrated that the politics of socio-spatial marginalisation justified by racialisation and the politics of entrepreneurial development not only create Roma as dispossessed and racialised subjects adversely incorporated into the system, but are also constituents of capitalism.

We could see that the Roma pushed into the conditions of a precariatised working class are classified like redundant social categories, but actually they are marginalised at the edge of society from where their labour force is easily exploited without a consistent investment into its reproduction. The formation of capitalism informed by neoliberal governance is held up by a state that withdraws from its role sustaining collective consumption; for example, instead of financing adequate public housing for its citizens, the state supports a type of urban development that serves the interests of real estate investors and developers. But, as described in chapters 2 and 4, it is also sustained by racism, therefore racialisation functions as a further constitutive element of capitalism. The uneven development of the localities, within which the precariatised working class Roma are forced to live in the most deprived and isolated housing areas, whose underdevelopment is also a result of local investment and redistribution policies, is used discursively not only to deny the accountability of the state towards its citizens, but also to associate the negative connotations of underdeveloped territories with the (allegedly biological or cultural) features of people inhabiting them.

Furthermore, as described in chapters 3 and 5, the politics of entrepreneurial development practised in relation to impoverished Roma communities, also contributes to the justification of the withdrawal of the state from its role as a developer and of conceiving development as merit. This merit, supposedly, should be won through a competition for projects. The vision behind such projects (promoted at different scales by several organisations, from transnational, through national and to the local ones) places the responsibility of ‘poverty eradication’ on the shoulders of the impoverished community itself while supporting already powerful local actors in their capacity to practice development as a profitable business.
References


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Tables and Figures

Table 1. The population of the selected localities and % of ethnic Roma, Census 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Ethnic Roma</th>
<th>Percentage of ethnic Roma</th>
<th>Romani speakers</th>
<th>Percentage of Romani speakers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aiud</td>
<td>22493</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calafat</td>
<td>16247</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lungani</td>
<td>5574</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>33.85</td>
<td>1734</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Selected localities in the context of regional rate of risk of poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Development Region</th>
<th>Rate of risk of poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aiud</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calafat</td>
<td>South-Vest Oltenia</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lungani</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 1. Aiud socio-map (green areas populated by ‘poor Roma communities’)

Map 2. Calafat socio-map (red areas marked as zones inhabited by ‘compact Roma communities’)
Map 3. Lungani socio-map (territories marked by red line: 'Roma area'; marked by blue line: 'poor areas')
Abstract

This paper discusses the changing housing regime during Bulgaria’s transition from socialism to post-socialism. Focusing on the Roma minority in Sofia I trace the present-day legacy of socialist housing policies. After 1989 the displacement of Roma people drastically increased. As their self-built houses and annexes were informally legitimised but not formally legalised under socialism, they were evicted by neoliberal urban authorities to clear the way for new private developments. Many small Roma neighbourhoods were pronounced ‘illegal’ and destroyed and their inhabitants were pushed out to zones without economic and education opportunities. Triangulating archival and secondary sources with ethnographic observation and qualitative interviews, I ask what past and present legal regulations, policies, and practices made Roma settlements in Sofia vulnerable to demolition and their inhabitants to displacement. I claim that, as in other periods of the development of the Bulgarian capital, quick-fix solutions were characteristic of the socialist period. In the case of Roma, in order to provide a temporary solution to the overall housing shortage the state turned a blind eye to the increasing amount of semi-legal housing. Furthermore, as Roma mostly remained low-skilled workers, they did not benefit from the redistribution that championed certain occupations privileged by the one-party state.

Keywords: Roma, housing, (post)socialism, neoliberalism, displacement, Bulgaria.
This study explores a number of contingent decisions, quick-fix solutions, and well-intended but badly implemented policies that compromised the colossal endeavor of the Bulgaria socialist government to provide decent housing for the poor. State socialism – unlike its adversary, decentralized laissez-faire capitalism – aimed at a centrally planned economy under which housing was provided to all workers. The socialist city was to become ‘an optimum living environment where enhanced productivity, social justice and maximum satisfaction of the inhabitants can be attained’ (French and Hamilton, 1979:5). Yet socialist urban planners had to start from certain inherent structural conditions: the post-war devastations, the spatial and social differentiation of the remaining housing stock, and the difficult balance between industrial growth and social expenditure (French and Hamilton, 1979; Szelenyi, 1996). After 1989 as many former socialist cities the Bulgarian capital Sofia quickly became a case of rapid neoliberal restructuring. In the process, the houses of many Roma people were pronounced ‘illegal’ and their inhabitants were evicted from parcels of land palatable for real estate developers (Ivancheva and Krastev, 2012).

The study is in dialogue with scholarly work on advanced urban marginality (Wacquant, 2008). In advanced capitalist societies neoliberal reforms push communities to the margins of the state (Das and Poole, 2004). In terms of housing policies, neoliberalism means the reorientation from redistribution to competition, institutional rescaling (especially decentralisation to sub-national i.e. regional or municipal), and an attempted revitalisation of the urban economy through privatisation, liberalisation, decentralisation, de-regulation and increased fiscal discipline (Brenner et al, 2009). With the growth of certain cities the value of land in their central areas is artificially increased (Harvey, 2008:34). Unable to compete, the old inhabitants and lower class newcomers are pushed beyond the urban frontier out of emergent global cities where they function as an easily exploitable surplus population (Sassen, 2001; Smith, 1996). This process also influences the very concept of citizenship, which is granted to global capital holders, whilst marginalised formal residents are ever more disenfranchised (Appadurai and Holsten, 1996).

Roma displacement in both socialist and post-socialist Eastern Europe has had similar effects (Ladanyi, n.d.). Socialist governments and urban authorities have followed a double standard. While they had a policy of ethnic desegregation, at times they also followed the logic of advanced capitalist societies. Roma people were removed from the city centres to places where they remained invisible and away from infrastructure. The authorities often closed their eyes to the precarious housing conditions, the informal property relations, and the ongoing encroachments on public property in these neighbourhoods (Kolev, 2003). After 1989, these informal arrangements became an easy target: the members of the biggest national minority were pushed out of settlements they had inhabited for decades (Ivancheva and Krastev, 2012).

The paper explicates some of the mechanisms through which Roma people remained a particularly vulnerable group despite the intervention policies of the Bulgarian socialist governments. Firstly, urban authorities in Sofia at the beginning of the socialist period inherited the mass destruction of housing and infrastructure and a refugee crisis, which exacerbated the inter-war housing shortage. The government tried to deal with the crisis and the sky-rocketing urbanisation with new construction,
cheap rents, and low-interest loans, but despite the mass construction, the needs of all those living in dire housing conditions were not met. Secondly, by the 1980s the speed of new construction often came at the expense of the quality of the housing, and benefited those who had closer links with the ruling elite, rather than those who were neediest. Thirdly, in their work with ethnic minorities socialist officials still operated with the figure of ‘otherness’ and ‘contagion’. This was transferred from the poor living condition of Roma to a racist classification of the whole minority, both in terms of perpetual declassifying education and labour, and also with little understanding of their internal divisions and community dynamic. Despite the discourse of desegregation [razrezhdane], the double standard has furthered Roma segregation. I show how the legacy of some of these policies has made Roma vulnerable to neoliberal land and housing reforms after 1989.

Housing is a crucial parameter in Roma poverty. Even if Roma have been given loans and terrains, helped with materials, targeted by slum eradication and slum upgrading policies alike (Slaev, 2007) and sometimes given free flats, mass unemployment and illiteracy makes them – especially women – ineligible to take out loans and become home owners. In 2011 non-Roma had on average 23 square meters of living space per person, whereas for Roma the figure was around ten square meters. Many fear eviction and discrimination (UNDP, 2012:9). Four fifths of them live in houses with an outside toilet, around half the population has access to fresh water, a drainage system, or reliable energy services (OSI, 2008:46-47). Lack of secure housing is a primary problem for Roma, followed by ‘inequality in collective consumption’: access to work, healthcare, and education (Zahariev, 2014:361). In 2006 87 per cent of Roma Bulgarians lived under the poverty threshold (51 EUR per month) and 60-80 per cent were unemployed (MC, 2006:7-8).

Yet, even if the ethnic character of the housing deficit among the Roma is easily identifiable, the mechanisms through which they become collectively vulnerable to eviction under neoliberal land and housing reforms remain to be explored. There is a glaring lack of historical research on property and housing during state socialism, both with reference to Roma communities, and to all Bulgarian citizens. Scholars usually attribute the living conditions of Roma residences to their microcultural and ethnic specifics (Pamporov, 2006), or to the macro state-level construction of ‘otherness’ through the recognition of Roma as a national minority (Greкова et al., 2008). Discussions of the Sofian citizenship has mostly abstained from the discussion of housing conditions (Vezenkov, 2009; Yakimova, 2010; Gigova, 2011). Works on urban planning focus on the revamping of the city centre (Stanoeva, 2010) or the green system (Kovachev, 2005). Structural inequalities, housing crises, and socialist land and property reforms have stayed out of critical scrutiny.

The focus on housing allows me to treat the Roma question in the intersection between ethnicity and class i.e. between structural and ethnic exclusion. I triangulate my findings from archival research at the Central State Archive in Sofia and secondary materials with ethnographic observation and interviews with state representatives, experts, and residents of a predominantly Roma neighbourhood of Sofia, Filipovci. I show some legacies of early twentieth century pro-capitalist regimes in the socialist era, and their impact on the present day. I problematise the doxa of legality in different periods of the Bulgarian recent history. I explore the historical limitations and
compromises of the socialist master plan of wealth redistribution, equality, and social justice. While the socialist effort to construct welfare institutions has been dismantled, its history still needs to be explored and learned from.

1. Filipovci: a reconstruction

The Filipovci mahala is located across the Sofia ring-road from the satellite high-rise neighbourhood of Lyulin. The dilapidated brutalist blocks of Lyulin contrast with Filipovci’s low shanty houses. Both neighbourhoods were state socialist developments, but while Lyulin was built in late socialism, ‘Filipovci was built in the late 1950s to accommodate families who lived along the Konstantin Velichkov and Stamboliyski boulevards, the former Tatarli mahala’. So I was told by Assen Georgiev, chief expert of construction, cadaster and town-planning in the Lyulin Municipality, whom I met before I first visited Filipovci in July 2014. ‘The Roma were housed in small ‘building blocks’. By now these blocks have become unrecognizable under the illegal annexes over and around their initial confines’ he added.

The ‘Gypsy mayor’ [ciganski kmet] Miroslav Kolev showed me these ‘blocks’. At the main plaza, where his reception white tent was positioned, he pointed to two houses with tiled roofs, heavily overbuilt with new construction. ‘The sons of the owners built their own little houses [kyshtichki] around. Out of necessity not to stay put with their parents when they marry, poor boys’. He said this while we were watching a vast modern two-story house with a marble veranda with new-classical columns built as an annex to an original block in the very center of Filipovci. When he led me into the ever-narrowing streets of the neighbourhood, we passed by more such blocks. New encroachments had grown into the surrounding streets: some bigger, some smaller, some built of bricks or cement, painted, plastered or just left with the original, untreated material. ‘This is where my family’s first house was - it stayed with my brother’, Kolev showed me one block. ‘Then I got this one here,’ he said, pointing to the other side of an alley. ‘My sons kept the tradition and moved in with their father’s family. Romani daughters get married and leave the house’ he explained. ‘The land under our houses is of course public, it belongs to the municipality. And I am all for paying rent. But this is how we live out of necessity’, the Roma mayor explained.

Kolev’s position as a Roma mayor is typical of many places with a high concentration of Roma inhabitants. The administrative figure of the Roma mayor was created specifically for Roma mahalas in order to establish distance – and thus spatial segregation – between the Roma community and the ‘regular’ institutions of state power. Having an outpost in the communities, the authorities would solve problems locally and Roma would not need to go to the city centre (Kolev,2003: 140,145). In post-socialist Bulgaria, this figure remained. While some Roma mayors are selected by the municipality, many are chosen by the community. While some are appointed as low-ranking municipal clerks, others are hired as ‘junior experts’. Still, most Roma mayors are men recognised for their power and educational status (Pamporov,2006: 102;109). This precarious position can at any time be opened, closed, filled in or vacated by the elected mayor (Papmorov, 2006:107). Due to low income, many
responsibilities, and little decision-making power many Roma mayors have resigned or looked for extra income schemes (Pamporov, 2006:106; Kolev, 2003).

The presence of the Roma mayor is not surprising, in Filipovci—a neighbourhood that was a herald of a historically documented process of social engineering. Desegregation [razrezhdane] was recommended for those living in bigger congregations in the neighbourhoods of Konyovitsa and around Stambolijski boulevard by the first socialist document regulating the ‘Gypsy problem’: Resolution 258 from 1958 (MC, 1958). According to Resolution 258, Roma people were to be given new houses in ‘relevant’ settlements, avoiding ethnic concentration (MC, 1958:3). Four million BGN were dedicated to this purpose (Greko et al., 2008:73-74). ‘I am a member of one of the first families who settled here,’ Kolev told me when we entered his office, a dark room of sixteen square meters with a cement floor, that led into a room of twelve square meters: one of the original ‘blocks’. ‘This building and around ten more were called blocks and allotted to individual Roma families,’ Kolev recalled. A man in his sixties, Kolev moved to Filipovci in 1958, when he was a child. His parents, their six sons and two daughters were allotted twenty-eight square meters. Initially Filipovci included twenty non-Roma families who gradually left. Altogether Filipovci had 800 inhabitants (Greko et al. 2008:95).

The plan was that by 1964 nearly one third of the whole Roma population, 75,000 people were to settle in 14,000 new flats (Genov et al., 1964:40). Yet, these flats never fully materialised and desegregation mostly failed (Greko et al. 2008:96; 89). Often Roma communities got flats in the blocks built over their destroyed mahala. Under Prime Minister Anton Yugov (1956-1961) Roma were moved from city centers to outskirts and thus concealed from foreign delegations (Kolev, 2003:140,145). Far beyond the confines of 1958 Sofia, Filipovci exemplified this practice. By the 1970s the neighbourhood had doubled (Greko et al., 2008:93). Internal divisions between Roma groups ensued. A letter to Todor Zhivkov, the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) signed ‘group of Gypsies’ expressed ‘energetic protest’ against staying in Filipovci together with the ‘evil Gypsy majority’ who ‘steal, beg, laze, and swindle’. The signatories called themselves the ‘decent twenty percent’ and requested flats in other neighbourhoods of Sofia (CSA 1B, 28:6). The next official Roma policy—Order 7 from January 1° 1979—set 1990 as final deadline for the desegregation and destruction of unregulated mahalas (Greko et al., 2008:89). Throughout the 1980s, the Sofia Municipal Council was trying to move Roma and destroy mahalas, but due to the housing shortage their number and density were growing (Greko et al., 2008:107, 111; Slaev 2007).

Making a full circle through the neighbourhood, Kolev told me that it was in urgent need of reconstruction. He showed me the local school, where the neighbourhood assembly with municipal authorities was to take place the following week to launch a reconstruction process. Before the school we jumped over a vast puddle of water turned into a swamp. An encroachment built into the pavement had infringed on the gutter. ‘The pupils started getting all sorts of allergies... The only way to get this repaired is to destroy this house. But where do these poor people go?’ Kolev said, visibly concerned. ‘The only possible future for us is to go with the plan of the municipality!’ Kolev concluded. Back at his office he showed me the plan for gradual reconstruction: building houses outside the neighbourhood’s original
confines, moving people there, then destroying their old houses, building new blocks and repeating the process till a new neighbourhood is fully rebuilt. The project entailed new housing blocks, kindergartens, schools, gardens, and a community center. ‘Everyone will get a new flat of sixty to hundred square meters, with all facilities’ the architect of the project, Mladenov, told the people gathered at the school yard for the neighbourhood assembly.

This construction was part of a National Program for the Improvement of Housing of Roma (2005-2015) approved in 2006 (MC, 2006). The program recognized numerous problems: the limited financial access to housing given current market prices; the poorly maintained and energy-inefficient Roma houses; the non-existence of public housing; and the abundant empty houses in areas away from employment. The program required that the state invested 1.26 billion BGN for the reinforcement of infrastructure in Roma neighbourhoods (420 million BGN), improving buildings (520 million BGN), and finding new Roma settlement areas and upgrading existing ones (111 million BGN) in one hundred neighbourhoods across Bulgaria. Using sources from the state budget and EU structural funds it had to construct 30,065 new public housing units and improve the living conditions of 412,500 Roma Bulgarians (MC, 2006). Yet, by 2014 only a pilot program had begun. Bourgas, Vidin, Devnia, and Dupnitsa received sums of up to four million BGN to secure flats for a few hundred Roma families.

In Filipovci the impending reconstruction did not please everyone. New divisions emerged along the lines of class and belonging. ‘They are going to destroy our houses,’ said Angel, an elegantly dressed man of visible wealth who owned a three stories’ high luxury annex to his father’s house that blocked a whole street. During the neighbourhood assembly Architect Mladenov and members of the municipality reassured Angel that even if illegal his house was ‘solid’, and could be legalized. Such ‘solid’ houses however mostly belonged to people with higher economic standing. Angel was also the son of one of the first neighbourhood settlers so he seemed entitled to stay in Filipovci after the reconstruction not only on the basis of legality, but also due to the precedence of settlement. A demarcation was drawn between locals and newcomers (see Grekova at al., 2008:183-187). ‘At present around six or seven thousand people live here over the infrastructure built for eight hundred. There are many newcomers [prishylci]. Neither newcomers from Kyustendil, nor such from Pakistan will join the new neighbourhood’, Kolev declared through the megaphone during the neighbourhood assembly, hinting at the recent wave of refugees.

Maya, a divorced of forty with two daughters and a granddaughter, was desperate: ‘I divorced a local man, and bought a house. Now they will destroy it to build the houses for the ‘real locals’ as if I don’t live here!’ she exclaimed. Thus, even if Angel and Maya de jure had illegal houses, de facto they were placed by the authorities on the opposite sides of legality depending on their belonging to the original settler families. Beyond economic privilege institutional culture distinguished those who legalized their property and those who did not. Non-Roma Bulgarians from neighbouring villages had bought land on the outskirts of Filipovci and legalized it. They were now compensated by the municipality. This was not the case with Maya and most Roma in Filipovci: ‘I was not smart enough to get a legal certificate. But I can show you a paper which says it black on white, I paid fifteen thousand Euros for
this house, all my money ... ', Maya said. Some educated Roma people had taken steps to legalize their property. Tania, an NGO worker, told me ‘In all parts of the neighbourhood there are illegal houses, but some of the original inhabitants, such as the members of my family, are good at reading laws and started a legalizing procedure, whereas among the newcomers this was hardly the case’.

According the Bulgarian Property Law, ‘holders’—benevolent or malevolent—of someone else’s property can be legalized and acquired by prescription only in the case of 10 years of non-interrupted dwelling (Law of Property, art. 79). Hence, some Roma encroachments could be considered as having endured the necessary time to gain a legal status. In many cases, despite uninterrupted dwelling and instead of being regulated, the former encroachments were treated as ‘occupations’ and cast as illegal. This process was facilitated by the Law of Property (1999) and Law of Land (2005). Aligned with the neoliberal priorities they removed the restriction on property ownership, divided state and municipal property, and deregulated the property market, allowing foreigners to buy land in Bulgaria. Since the 1990s no public housing has been built in Sofia, which left people in need of housing dependent on their own private savings or credits. While no new public houses were built, a rapid ‘hygienization’ of ‘bad neighbourhoods’ started to free space for the expanding commercial centre (Zahariev, 2013). Roma communities were evicted from their shanty-houses and resorted to occupations (Zahariev, 2013:346).

While this was happening a few campaigns for the legalisation of land ensued within the Frame Program of Roma Integration (2010–2020). The Frame Program stipulated that Roma neighbourhoods in rural (46 per cent) and urban (54 per cent) areas should be regulated within the cadaster by abolishing ‘the turgid bureaucratic procedure of legalisation’, adopting the principle of ‘minimal intervention’. Roma ‘holders’ of property were to receive documents of ownership (Frame Program, VI). A housing fund was to be maintained not through new and expensive construction, but via different forms of ‘aid’ (financial credits, materials, parcels of land, etc.) given to ‘people who show willingness to improve their housing condition’ (Frame Program, VI). Yet Tania and her neighbours have become increasingly disillusioned: ‘Such programmes were designed with a different understanding of legality in mind; what was legal before 1989 simply stopped being legal then.’ Tania told me that the house built by her father was also initially considered illegal. They had kept it as even though he got a one bedroom flat in a distant neighbourhood for him, his wife, his grown up daughters and their families, so it was impossible to move everyone.

Thus, in the post-socialist era, when large-scale town planning has been replaced by piecemeal ‘incident architecture’ (Yanchev, 2014), the new legislation was interpreted to the detriment of the poorest citizens. In this conjuncture, the state and municipal power have been used to create illegal categories of people – Roma being the prime example – whose presence in areas of high value in the capitalist property market threatens the interests of business elites. Against this background, Filipovci’s reconstruction – if it happens at all – would still push newcomers from small towns and rural areas into further outskirts of the city. Natural calamities and growing inter-ethnic conflicts threaten to displace further Roma Bulgarians. While an integral housing policy for Roma and for all Bulgarian citizens is not even looming in the
distance, it is still worth asking how socialist planners provided houses for so many people, and why still so many Roma entered post-socialism in dire housing conditions.

2. Socialism: the build-up

The double standard of state policy towards illegal construction in the aftermath of 1989 has oddly mirrored struggles from before 1944. By the time communists came to power in 1944, the Bulgarian capital had already encountered many housing problems. Urbanization was rapid: in 1879, when Sofia became the capital to allow growth and facilitate unification with the territories divided by the Berlin Treaty, Sofia only had some 11,000 inhabitants. In 1944, despite the devastation of war, the population had already grown to 300,000, and by 1956 it had reached 757,000 (Gaytandzhiev, 1957:4). The ethnic mahalas—part of the Ottoman urban policy—were dissolved into new urban divisions (Pamporov, 2006). ‘Growing but never getting old’—as the motto of Sofia goes—already in the 1880s the capital’s urban authorities had received numerous complaints from tenants in need of housing. As there was no public housing policy in place, newcomers were eventually allowed to build in the outskirts forming the new ‘homeless neighbourhood’ Yutch Bunar (Dimitrova, 2013:367).

While the housing crisis was intensifying, and no public housing was built, a normative civilizing discourse was applied to discuss Sofia’s new neighbourhoods. It used notions such as those used for Roma mahalas today ‘uncontrolled’, ‘unhygienic’, ‘unplanned’, ‘vehement’, and ‘chaos’. The 27,000 small parcels of land given to newcomers were considered to have ruined the master plan of Sofia and made town-planning piecemeal (Sofia Municipality, 1998). To counter this fragmentation of a city that had aspirations to measure up to older European capitals, in the late 1930s the municipality invited German architect Adolph Mussman, who planned cities like Dusseldorf and Stuttgart, to plan Sofia. He planned it as a garden-city that would contract rather than expand (Sofia Municipality, 1998). Because of WWII, however, Mussman’s plan was never implemented. 12,000 buildings in Sofia were destroyed and a new socialist government in 1944 had to face the old pressures while implementing new socialist ideals (Sofia Municipality, 1998). In 1945-1949, a new plan in Sofia was crafted. Sorbonne-trained socialist architect
Lyuben Tonev opposed the pyramidal spatial plan of Mussman and designed a polycentric city plan. The city was to tackle the problems of housing and labour together, decentralizing neighbourhoods according to key industries (Announcements, 1946:3). The city center was renovated, and people from the areas that were demolished to build the central boulevards were moved to the periphery (Gajtandjiev, 1957:9).

The blocks of flats and city buildings from this era were monolithic, with heavy decoration, big rooms, and high ceilings (Gajtandjiev 1957:11,14). Yet, due to the increased postwar price of materials and growing urbanisation, this kind of construction soon gave way to prefabricated panel blocks (Announcements 1946:3). Some families in need received ready-made flats, while others obtained low-interest loans from the Bulgarian Investment Bank and built as private owners and in cooperatives. 50,000 new buildings were built by 1950, partly in the countryside (Gajtandjiev, 1957:3). After a competition in the late 1950s, Lyubomir Neykov of Sofproekt was awarded the task to design the new town plan. He partially continued Mussman’s plan: a city that does not expand. Yet, despite his aspirations, Sofia expanded with the rapid pace of the urbanization and industrialization of the era (Sofia Municipality, 1998).

In the late 1970s, the new urban plan of Sofia was discussed (CSA 1b, 87:220). While BKP and its leadership were never criticised directly, their archived exchange show numerous problems faced by the socialist government. Lyuben Tonev was asked to review the plan. In his "tour-de-force" analysis of Sofia’s urban development, Tonev emphasised the persistent problems of vast population growth: a problem atypical of socialist cities as Budapest, Prague, and Berlin which experienced only stagnant growth after the boom in the inter-war era (Szelenyi, 1996). A borough of 11,000 people in 1878, a century later the capital of Bulgaria counted 1,700,000 inhabitants. Tonev’s review speaks to the lack of adequate policies that would respond to this massive growth. Beyond problems of traffic and pollution, Tonev explained that the new construction of flats did not adhere to any professional standards. Contrary to the recommendations of world experts, Sofia was overbuilt with high-rise prefab blocks: the higher the building, the lower the ceilings, and the less the green space outside (CSA 1b, 87, 220:25).

The review of Tonev signalled an emergent housing crisis (CSA 1b, 87:195). In bulletin from the spring of 1980 Radio Free Europe stated that despite the government’s plan to build 420,000 new flats in the five years’ plan leading to 1979, they only built 370,000 flats (CSA 1b, 87, 195:28). These numbers might sound extraordinarily high in the aftermath of state socialism, when no public housing is constructed. Yet, back then the situation was a matter of serious concern for BKP’s. While Tonev was worried about the quality of housing, the provision of flats was a greater concern for the planners.

In an ongoing debate on the ‘acute housing crisis in Bulgaria’ in 1979 (CSA 1b, 97:191), a special report by the Chairman of the Sofia’s Municipal Council Petar Mezhdurechki addressed to Prime Minister Stanko Todorov, stated that ‘the housing problem is headed towards a dead end street’ (CSA 1b, 97, 191:11). Sofia’s Municipal Council declared that fewer than 5,000 homes were provided for over 50,000 families in dire need. Among those who had a place to live ‘10,000 newlywed families with children are living in uninhabitable conditions and shanty houses [bordel]’ (CSA 1b,
87, 191:6), and ‘14,000 of all 50,000 in need live in ‘non-housing spaces’ [nezhilishtni pomeshtenia]... in less than five square meter per person, whereas the rest of these 50,000 lived with around five square meter, against an average of 13.5 square meter for the rest of the population’ (CSA 1b, 87, 191:13). The term bordei used in Bulgarian to describe exclusively Roma settlements and the specification of ‘newlywed families with children’ amidst a growing demographic crisis in the 1970s, and the square meters per person (CSA 16, 87, 191; 195) all signaled that the majority of these families were of Roma origin.

Mezhdurechki reminded that the Sofia Municipal Council’s construction companies (SOFOSTROY and Housing Construction Company-Sofia) should prioritize building housing for ‘engineering and technical cadres engaged in significant production sectors, for active fighters against fascism, and for people in dire need’. According to Directive 1342 of the State Council, he insisted, ten per cent of all housing had to be dedicated to the category of ‘young newlywed families’ (CSA 1b, 87, 191:10; 14). Instead, Mezhdurechki’s recommendations draw attention to three root causes of the problems of redistribution. Firstly, he emphasized the companies’ full capacity should be used to ‘build new homes, and not to expand the existing living space’ i.e., making certain flats bigger, and building holiday homes for those in possession of housing (CSA 1b, 87, 191:10). He also insisted that no second home be given as compensation to ‘unmarried children of owners of houses destroyed’ to free space for new construction (CSA 1b, 87, 191:12). In these cases, not only did parents get compensated, but so did their adult children regardless of their family situation and actual housing necessity. Thus, as an already propertied class expanded its own property, those in need were pushed further down the priority lists. Last but not least, the report recommended that people working for the State Council, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Culture as well as the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior in specific, he emphasized, had their own building facilities and budgets, which should contribute to the construction of houses for those in need (CSA 1b, 87, 191:14).

In his correspondence with Stanko Todorov, Petar Mezhdurechki reminded that according to Resolution 7 from 10th of March 1974 and two accompanying letters the Army’s facility and budget have been freed from responsibility to share its construction units and facilities with the Sofian Municipal Council. Mezhdurechki pleaded Todorov that the Resolution and the two letters were cancelled, and that that the Ministerial facilities were used for housing construction. He insisted that not only ten, but 30 percent of the budget of the Sofian construction companies was invested in the building of homes for families in dire housing need. He explicitly stated that too much pressure was put on the Municipality’s construction company to construct private villas as well. He also asked that the members of the Army were not granted—as was a common practice—the automatic privilege of Sofian citizenship and a flat ten years into their office, as that deepened the shortage (CSA 1b, 87, 191:14).

Thus, despite the mass construction of housing, the allocation of flats did not start from the bottom. It had served elite privileges at the expense of those most affected by the housing crisis. To this point, as a result of the above mentioned correspondence Resolution 54 of the Ministerial Council, from the 5th of December...
1979, dedicated ten per cent of the new funds for housing to newlyweds: 450,000 new flats were all to be constructed for people in this category (CSA 1b, 87, 191:1). Resolution 54 stated clearly that the way to solve the housing crisis was not to allow the Ministries, who had their own construction facilities, to receive more flats (CSA 1b, 87, 191: 2-3). However, a letter from General Dobri Dzhurov, a Minister of Defense, to Prime Minister Stanko Todorov attempted to block all measures proposed by the Municipal Council (CSA 1b, 87, 191: 20-24). Dzhurov refuted the accusations of Mezhdurechki and insisted that the Army used its construction facilities primarily for military purposes (CSA 1b, 87, 191: 21). He claimed that his Ministry already built homes for its employees, but more flats were needed because otherwise 6,000 Bulgarian Army employees would stay ‘totally houseless... with low self-esteem, in a bad mood, and with lowered labour efficiency’ (CSA 1b, 87, 191: 23).

The heated debates negotiating the solution for the housing crisis in the second half of the 1970s are rather telling. They show, firstly, that the housing crisis from the inter-war era had a heavy impact on the socialist urban planning. Secondly, they reveal an emergent conflict within the hierarchies of the socialist order, as its urban planning went both against the norms of socialist wealth redistribution, and against globally accepted construction standards. Despite the increased number of buildings, the flats were of ever poorer standard. They were allocated not according to necessity, but to an occupational hierarchy within the one-party state. The questions remain: What happened to prevent the desegregation and the accommodation of Roma into the new, rapidly growing neighbourhoods? How can we explain the persistence of illegal construction during state socialism?

3. The old is never fully dying and the new cannot be fully born

Before the socialist era, Roma lived in dire poverty. In line with the Communist Party interpretation, a Fatherland Front publication celebrating the 20th Anniversary of 1944 presented the teleological materialist analysis of the Roma as a repressed proletariat: dignified workers, exploited both by the Ottomans and the Bulgarian bourgeoisie. By 1936, 90 per cent of the Roma were illiterate and one in five children died. Already under Ottoman rule Roma were allowed to do only low-skilled, low-wage, and exploitative work (in the tobacco industry, tin factories, and brick-laying) (Genov et al., 1964:13). Even Roma adherents of the Muslim faith dominant in the Ottoman Empire, who have historically formed one third of the Bulgarian Roma, were allowed only into certain socially undesirable professions, e.g., hangmen, gallows builders, and mercenaries (Genov et al., 1964:10).

During state socialism the processes of urbanization and industrialization happened concurrently with Roma resettlement into towns. Roma—only five per cent of whom were still living a nomadic life—were seen as proletarians in the making, as was the majority of the country’s agrarian population (Marushiakova and Popov, 2012:101). The Fatherland Front made a clear division between the agency of Roma under Ottoman rule as ‘mercilessly turned Turk’ (Genov et al. 1964:8) and their emancipation under Bulgarian rule as urban proletarians in new industrial centers and active members of the anti-capitalist rebellion (Genov et al. 1964: 14; 17). And yet,
when in 1947 the Turkish state allowed Turkish Bulgarians to resettle, as they were considered ‘under siege by communists’, thousands of ‘Turkish’, i.e., Muslim, Roma also applied for permission to become Turkish citizens. This ‘threat’ was sanctioned: newly emerging Roma newspapers were closed; Roma organizations had to enter the Fatherland Front (Marushiakova and Popov 2012:109-110).

After Resolution 258, In the second significant document dealing with Roma in the socialist era, Order 7 from January 1979, which was preceded with months of debates on the housing crisis, Roma identity expression was reduced to their alleged ‘Turkification’. Roma became the target of policies of ‘complete and unconditional assimilation’ and – eventually – of a forced renaming under the so-called Revival process [Vazrozhdenski proces] (1984-1985) (Marushiakova and Popov, 2012). ‘Roma nationalism’ – the very right of self-identification – was considered a national threat. Walls were built around Roma neighbourhoods in middle-sized cities; the question of Roma disappeared from the media (Kolev, 2003:140). This rendered them ever more invisible and segregated (even when framed as ‘newly-wed families’).

Beyond the ‘Turkification’ of the Roma minority, its members were not a priority of BKP (Stoyanova, 2012). Only in 1958 did the Party start dealing with the Roma in specific (Genov et al. 1964:27) by a policy of assimilation. In 1958 the above mentioned Resolution 258 stated that despite the overall progress in its living conditions, Roma were still living as ‘travellers’ [chergari], ‘engaged in begging and robbery’, and ‘spreading disease and contagion’ (BKP, 1958:1). Resolution 258 suggested a sanctioned ‘sedentarization’ of the Roma through a number of measures. The hygienization, reconstruction, and sanitation of Roma neighbourhoods went hand in hand with the admission of Roma into the agrarian and urban proletarian labour force (Genov et al., 1964:39).

Yet, Roma were still treated and spoken of through the notion of ‘contagion’. Their spatial segregation was reinforced firstly by the development of the figure of the Roma mayor who secluded all problems within the space of ‘quarantine’, the mahala (Kolev 2003). As with peasants coming into cities in the rest of Eastern Europe, services for Roma people were kept out of the ‘civilized’ inner city where state institutions were (Petrovic 2012). A similar practice was reinforced via new education institutions dedicated to the Roma ‘re-education’. As the family was seen as the source of ‘contagion’, Roma children were desegregated from their families and re-segregated in schools for special education. As they graduated at a lower age (13) than most pupils in the country (18), and as only Roma students were subject to this policy, in actuality it re-segregated Roma children and disqualified them from higher education (Buechenchuetz 2000).

When it comes to housing, even if since the 1950s some Roma received flats and the Bulgarian Investment Bank was instructed to give up to 5,000 BGN loans to Roma families for the construction of houses (MC, 1958:2), the housing shortage described by the BKP’s expert report in 1979 (CSA 1b, 87, 191; 195) related to a large extent to Roma Bulgarians. Order 7 signaled that well into the 1980s, the socialist government and local authorities were still dealing with illegal Roma settlements through dismantlement and ‘repatriation’. Many Roma remained subject to segregation and further marginalization, and as a result ‘fell out’ (Marushiakova and Popov, 2012; Stoyanova, 2012). As Gospodin Kolev noted, by 1985 only 50 per cent
of Roma people lived in solid constructions, only six per cent had toilet in their house, and only 13 per cent had a bathroom (Kolev, 2003:29-30).

The practice of self-made unregulated housing continued, despite the new construction. The space offered was not adequate to accommodate a numerous household. Roma families who got a new flat would leave it to their eldest son, and stay in their handmade house with the rest of their children, gradually encroaching on the pavements and streets around it to construct new rooms for the new generations (Ivancheva and Krastev, 2012). State officials turned a blind eye to their housing arrangements: never destroying it, but never legalizing the ever growing construction either. As Gospodin Kolev described,

When a Gypsy family’s kids grow up and want to settle down, the family would act. They feared the People’s Power, but counted on its condescension. On a Sunday the Roma family would take a self-taught architect, some materials, and gather friends. From dawn till dusk a new house would be built and celebrated with beer and rakia. The Popular Power is of course quick to react. Men armed with pick-axes and hammers would appear on Monday to destroy the freshly built house. But to their bedazzlement they would find a Bulgarian flag waving from the roof, and the portraits of Stalin, Georgi Dimitrov, and Tito gazing at them with a smiling but stern look in their eyes from the house’s windows and door. A difficult political situation for the Popular Power...

Thus, while a number of mechanisms both inside the Roma minority and outside the confines of this rather heterogeneous group, contributed to exclude rather than include the Roma within state socialism, Class belonging was of definite importance: the majority of Roma did not make it to the forefront of the Bulgarian socialist elite and were thus denied a number of privileges. Beyond that, the importance of patriarchal kin arrangements around property made the allocation of small socialist flats to numerous Roma families futile at best: many of them took the flat but returned to their initial building. The ever decreasing size and living and construction standards of socialist flats did contribute significantly to this tendency, though, arguably, not only Bulgarian Roma, but all Bulgarian citizens suffered from this. Segregation and racialization along ethnic lines was also a factor that contributed to the ongoing marginalization of this ethnic minority: a vulnerability which was quickly exacerbated during the post-socialist era when even the modest redistributive efforts melted into thin air.

**Coda**

My fieldwork took place at the time of the floods in Mizia and in the Roma neighbourhood in Varna in 2014. The mass media were full of stories of homeless Bulgarians especially from the Roma minority, whose houses in the country side were often built on steep hills and banks of rivers which raises significant safety concerns. During my interview with Iskra Dandolova from the Bulgarian Academy of Science, a hail storm raged outside with pieces of ice as big as a hen’s eggs. Seated beside the window at the building of the Union of Bulgarian Architects we watched in numb
silence, concerned that many more people would be homeless or dead after the hail. ‘All the policies to protect displaced citizens disappeared in 1989’, Dandolova uttered when the storm calmed down. ‘Today’s Bulgaria does not understand people as citizens living in a shared space, but treats us as individual property owners.’ Dandolova recalled that despite the housing crisis, there was no homelessness in socialist Bulgaria. ‘There were rotational flats for the displaced. Emergency tenants could eventually obtain the property rights...’. Dandolova recalled 1990s Mayor Stefan Sofiyanski, who ‘...sold all public housing stock in order to build social housing’. Dandolova underlined the contradiction with a bitter smile, ‘His administration actually sold the public housing for low prices to their ‘low income’ relatives and friends. Now people who lose their homes don’t have any shelter.’

Roma property rights on the parcels of land and constructions are often dubious. This is not less the case with the illegal houses, villas, luxury complexes, garages, and balconies that have mushroomed among the majority population. In this paper, however, I show that similar mechanisms have been at play in the production of the Roma as an abject group during and after state socialism. The Bulgarian socialist government inherited a number of problems: the soaring housing crisis, the exclusion of ethnic minorities, and the struggle between old and new elites over property ownership. Before socialist times recurrent housing crises in the city have been treated by successive governments in an ad hoc manner with no mass housing construction in mind. During state socialism there was, on the contrary, a colossal effort to build public housing. Yet, as this effort was compromised by quick fix-solutions, it reproduced elite privileges and institutional racism. In the aftermath of state socialism marginalised groups were increasingly dealt with as surplus populations residing on land of growing financial value.

Whereas post-socialism is dealing with Roma people through exclusion and segregation and pushing them beyond the urban frontier (Smith 1996), during state socialism mahalas underwent what has been called a naturalisation of poverty: identifying economically vulnerable groups through their locality state agents try to turn ‘bad poverty’ into ‘good poverty’ (Murray, 2011:40-43). While taking people out of extreme poverty, this logic showed little understanding of the way communities reproduce economically and socially. The state provided poor housing, low-skilled jobs, and limited access to a full course of education, yet it left a significant gap between the poor and the economic elite.

As under state socialism at present the exclusion of Roma was transferred from the discussion of their poor living conditions to a more ethno-cultural and essentialist interpretation of their living conditions. Culture-centred policies with no structural underpinning and understanding the Roma within a broader stratum of impoverished Bulgarians resulted in always greater segregation and escalating inter-ethnic conflicts. The latter have been used to justify the eviction of Roma from land targeted by new real estate developments within the comprador free market (Ivancheva and Krastev, 2012). Given the current neoliberal dismantlement of all socialist welfare institutions, state socialism needs to be revisited despite the awareness of its historical limitations and intrinsic contradictions. In this line, exploring the state socialist housing policies for Roma, I show that errors were produced by inherent conditions of exclusion and
privilege of the old order before 1944 that never fully died, and engendered some morbid symptoms of the new order that emerged after 1989 (Gramsci, 1971: 276).

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Abstract

The most stigmatised area of Budapest, the Eighth District (Józsefváros) has been undergoing significant urban and social change since 1989. However, compared with what rent gap theory would have forecast, gentrification took off relatively late. After a historical narrative of how rent gap in Józsefváros had been produced throughout the 20th century, we will argue that examining the mechanisms and outcomes of the three dominant dynamics of rescaling urban governance in Hungary – decentralisation without the redistribution of resources in the 1990s; EU accession and Europeanisation of public policies from the 2000s; and recentralisation after 2010 – help us understand when, where and how gentrification has been unwinding in Middle-Józsefváros, the most dilapidated area of the Eighth District. The article will present three case studies of local urban regeneration as paradigmatic for the three rescaling dynamics: Corvin Promenade, Magdolna Quarter Programme, and the ongoing Orczy Quarter project. It will show the underlying revanchist policies and discourses in each case. The main aim of the current paper is to illustrate how a scale-sensitive political economic approach can go beyond the mainstream public and political discourse in scrutinising gentrification, through shedding light on structural factors contributing to exclusion, criminalisation, displacement, and othering.

Keywords: Józsefváros, gentrification, marginalisation, rent gap, uneven development, rescaling.
Introduction

The most stigmatised area of Budapest, the Eighth District (Józsefváros) has been undergoing significant changes in the last fifteen to twenty years. Numerous newly constructed condominiums were built, bohemian and artsy bars began to appear, and a fancy shopping mall was erected – all within the space of a formerly impoverished neighbourhood. Public posters throughout the district display the local municipality’s slogan to promote the new image: ‘Józsefváros is being rebuilt’. The only question is, for whom? Who are the real beneficiaries, and who are the victims of these processes that have been taking place in various forms?

During the decades of state socialism inner-city districts experienced severe disinvestment, resulting in an overall very poor quality housing stock (Szelényi, 1990; Lichtenberger et al., 1995). The post-1989 district governments\(^1\) then desperately sought to get rid of the loss-generating dilapidated stock on the one hand, and on the other, to attract young professionals, the so-called creative class, as well as Western tourists – either to move in, or just to visit and spend – and to become magnets for more and more capital investments in their areas. Not unlike other examples of inner-city urban change worldwide (Smith, 2002), such processes in Budapest tend to entail the displacement of socially marginalised groups, including many poor Roma residents.

There are already studies on how physical infrastructure revitalization in inner-city neighbourhoods leads to gentrification, and the displacement of the underprivileged families from the redeveloped central districts of Budapest (Csanádi et al., 2007; Dósa, 2009; Ladányi, 2008; Tomay, 2008). Yet, there are only a handful of critical analyses of the mechanisms and outcomes of the current social and spatial change in Józsefváros (György, 2012; Lepeltier, 2012; Nagy, 2010). The current article, studying a part of one district, Middle-Józsefváros\(^2\) within the Eighth District (see Figure 1), adopts a critical political economic perspective, and aims to explore how gentrification (Atkinson, 2004; Slater, 2009) may reproduce urban marginalities through the intertwined multi-scalar processes of urban governance (Brenner, 2011). We seek to understand this specific case as embedded in the complex scalar relations of uneven economic development not only within the city, but also within Europe (Smith, 1990).

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\(^1\) Budapest has a two-tier local government system: the Budapest level administration, and 23 independent districts with councils and directly elected mayors. The districts have a relatively high autonomy vis-à-vis the city.

\(^2\) Józsefváros is usually divided into three bigger areas: Inner-, Middle- and Outer-Józsefváros (see Figure 1). Inner-Józsefváros has always had a substantial middle-class population and better reputation thanks to its closeness to the city centre and due to its better quality housing stock. Outer-Józsefváros has large areas with non-residential functions and most of its residential area has a suburban character. We chose Middle-Józsefváros as our research field, since it has been the most stigmatised part of the district and it has had the worst quality housing stock within the District; thus Middle-Józsefváros has had the widest rent gap in the Eighth District.
In the first section of the article we will outline a theoretical framework combining rent gap theory with recent literature on state rescaling. In the second section we will provide a historical overview of political economic conditions that have structurally positioned Józsefváros. This will set the ground for studying urban regeneration projects in Middle-Józsefváros in the framework of three phases of scalar restructuring, illustrated through three different cases of urban redevelopment. These three cases (also depicted on Figure 1) will be discussed in the third section. Finally, we will show the means through which the image of Józsefváros is attempted to be reconstructed, highlighting the fact that the narrative repositioning (rebranding of the district) is often carried out to the detriment of the already underprivileged. Special attention will be paid to revanchist urban policies, which legitimise gentrifying regeneration plans.
‘Closing’ the rent gap through the scalar restructuring of urban regeneration

In his seminal book on gentrification\(^3\), Neil Smith (1996) devoted a whole chapter to three case studies different from the well-known North-American cases on which he based his theories. Besides Paris and Amsterdam, Budapest was one of these three cases. In a very concise but dense analysis Smith argued that in ‘Budapest gentrification did not begin as a largely isolated process in the housing market, but came fully fledged in the arteries of global capital following 1989’ (Smith, 1996: 172). But instead of this, ‘the wholesale gentrification of Budapest – for all of its dramatic momentum amassed in barely a decade – should not be taken entirely for granted. Various economic, social and political forces might well limit the process’ (Smith 1996: 174-5).

The theoretical issue at stake here is to what extent the core of Neil Smith’s argument – namely the mechanism of rent gap\(^4\) as the manifestation of uneven capitalist development on the urban scale – can universally explain urban processes occurring at different localities. He admitted circa 15 years after the publication of this book in an unpublished interview in Budapest that ‘I am a little bit surprised that gentrification has not gone so far I thought it would have gone. I have been tricked by the institutional issues: the complexity of publicly owned vis-à-vis privately owned housing’\(^5\). In his view the theory of rent gap is applicable both to Budapest and to other European localities, but as the two quotations show, he left space for different processes to explain the nature of particular instances of gentrification. However, in the literature on post-socialist cities this space has so far remained largely unexplored (some of the few counterexamples include Badyina and Golubchikov, 2005; Nagy and Timár, 2012; Sykora, 1993).

In the following we would like to focus on this unexplored terrain: our main aim is to show how in different historical periods different institutions in various scalar arrangements were able to shape the way in which gentrification – that is, the process of closing the rent gap – has unfolded in a symbolic area of the Hungarian capital. Throughout presenting our cases from the Eighth District of Budapest, we will juxtapose rent gap theory with theories of rescaling. Our main argument is that the more or less canonised political economic approach focusing on rent gap and uneven development (Smith, 1979, 1987, 1990), supplemented with the more recent theory of rescaling and scalar restructuring (Brenner, 2011; Mackinnon, 2010; Smith, 2003;)

\(^3\) We define gentrification through four parallel processes. An area is being gentrified if the following things are happening at the same time: ‘reinvestment of capital; social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups; landscape change; and direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups’ (Davidson and Lees, 2005: 1170). For a critical overview of gentrification research see Slater (2006).

\(^4\) Throughout the article we use the original concept described by Neil Smith, where the rent gap is defined as ‘the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use’ (Smith, 1979: 545). For a recent overview of the rent gap literature see Slater (2015).

\(^5\) The interview was conducted on 15 June 2010 in Budapest by Zsuzsi Pósfai, Kacper Poblocki and Csaba Jelinek before a lecture delivered by Neil Smith at the Central European University. The interview has never been published.
Swyngedouw, 1997) gives a useful theoretical framework to understand and disclose contemporary Hungarian discourses on urban policy and urban change.

The literature on scales and scalar restructuring has been rapidly expanding in the recent decades. In this article we follow the international literature in human geography and other social sciences which understand social processes as operating on different territorial levels, or *scales*. This approach, furthermore, conceives scales as not fixed, and looks at how social processes are constructing or producing scales (for an overview see Herod, 2011), or how the roles of different scales are changing over time (cf. Brenner, 1998). For example, classic urban theory mostly explained urban social change as happening on the scale of the urban, not taking into account the role of national policies or individuals’ decisions in those processes. The booming globalization discourse throughout the 1990s, and the second wave of decentralisation in numerous European states in the early 1990s reinforced the emphasis on supranational and subnational scales in urban studies. A complex, intricate process of rescaling took place in Europe (see for example Kazepov, 2010) - with slightly different dynamics and directionalities in different regions and countries. Urban policies were also deeply affected, which redefined the context of gentrification at different localities and under different institutional settings. Understanding rescaling as a dynamic process of continuously re-regulating the institutional setup of neoliberal capitalism, and putting a special emphasis on cyclical crises and on the resulting scalar restructuring processes (Brenner, 1998), we will identify three different rescaling dynamics in the case of Middle-Józsefváros, which significantly shaped the ways in which rent gap could be opened or closed.

Our starting point is that while rent gap has been unequivocally present in inner-city Budapest due to systematic disinvestment during socialism, the pace, locality and institutional context of gentrification varied widely within the inner city. We will argue that examining three dominant dynamics of rescaling urban governance in Hungary - decentralization without the redistribution of resources in the 1990s, EU accession and Europeanisation of public policies from the 2000s, and recentralisation after 2010 - will help us understand when, where and how gentrification has been unwinding in Middle-Józsefváros. All of these dynamics are characteristic to a certain historical period, although there are important overlaps. Through three exemplary projects, we will show how these dynamics allowed private and public actors to ‘close’ the rent gap resulting from the longer history of Middle-Józsefváros.

Although our argument attempts to expand the political economic theory of urban social change based mainly on empirical work carried out in ‘Western countries’, we do not want to dismiss the universal features of gentrification. Given the homogenising tendencies of uneven development of global capitalism, the commodification and securisation of inner cities go hand in hand with the displacement of the relatively poor and ‘undeserving’ population, which can also be observed - and should be examined - in our cases. However, as homogenisation is inseparably connected to differentiation (Smith, 1990), we aim to highlight the specificities that first hindered the gentrification of Middle-Józsefváros until the early 2000s, then later made it the testing ground and exemplary case of intensifying urban revanchism (Smith, 1996) in Hungary. These specificities will be explored through a historical approach, understanding the role of different institutions (i.e. different market as well as state actors) linked to different scales. We will find that the rescaling
we can periodically observe has important consequences to how the closing of the rent gap is hindered or supported at different points in time.

**A historical overview of the production of rent gap in Józsefváros**

In order to understand current urban change in Józsefváros, longer historical development of capitalism and its relationship with state rescaling must be taken into account. This section gives a broad historical overview of how the district had become Budapest’s most stigmatised part by the 1980s, with extremely dilapidated housing stock in the Middle-Józsefváros area.

Since capitalist development took impetus in Budapest in the 19th century, rent gap has been a stable and powerful driving force in urban development. The Eighth District of Budapest is a remarkable example of how capital flows have materialised in the physical fabric of the city and how these processes have always been interconnected with state rescaling, social change and the production of urban marginality.

The initial urbanisation in today’s Józsefváros were driven by the excess of capital after the Napoleonic wars: landowners exported Hungarian agricultural products during the war, profits were invested in buying land in the current Eighth District’s area, then the outskirts of the city (Pilinyi, 1997).

Urban development accelerated after the economic crisis of the 1870s, and was also defined by the political-economy of the state structures in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As a result of the lobbying force of landowner elites, legislation favoured high-density construction, which in turn led to the construction of tenement houses that combined upper class (street-front) and lower class residents (backyard) in the very same building (Gyáni, 1992). Wealth and marginality existed within the same house – although inner-city rents were high even in sub-standard backyard flats, keeping away the poorest families from these neighbourhoods (Csanádi and Ladányi, 1986; Bodnár, 2001). According to 2011 census data 57 per cent of the district’s flats were built before 1919, during the construction boom of the turn of the century.6

In the inter-war period upper classes resettled into newly-built tenement houses outside the district, leading to slum-formation. The renovation of the Eighth District’s housing stock (that is, a plan to close the rent gap) was already on the agenda of both national and city-level politicians, as well as the general public in this period (Csanádi and Ladányi, 1986; Kocsis, 2009), but no significant action was taken in the aftermath of the Great Depression.

Buildings then suffered significant damage during World War II. Moreover, the post-war period was characterised by an acute housing shortage, due to the massive inflow of labour force responding to state-led industrialisation. The shortage was initially tackled by splitting larger apartments into smaller ones, and moving multiple households in a single flat as co-tenants. Although housing was partly decommodified in the classical sense (nationalisation of residential buildings began in

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6 Source of all official census data referred in this article is the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO). The HCSO is not responsible for any results and conclusions drawn from this dataset. We thank for the HCSO for providing access to the census micro-data.
1952), housing market dynamics were still a driving force of inner-city development. As Szelényi (1990) pointed out, the state’s housing redistribution policy and the allocation of newly-built houses on a district level, from the late 1950s onwards, indicated and contributed to deepening inner-city socio-spatial inequalities (better-off families were put at the top of the allocation lists). State housing investment was dominant, and almost exclusively concentrated on housing estates (i.e. outside Eighth District). At this time, ‘inner slum-formation’ took place in Józsefváros – that is, within the district middle-class people were living in larger and better buildings, in flats with bathrooms, and in better locations within the buildings (Nemes and Szelényi, 1967).

The outmigration of higher classes from the district continued: privileged groups (including the middle class) moved out, and people with some savings or credit received from state owned banks built private family houses in the outer districts (Ladányi, 1989). This resulted in the further deterioration of housing conditions and a concentration of poor inhabitants in Józsefváros.

The initial answer to these socio-spatial changes at the national and city level was a complex regeneration plan for Middle-Józsefváros, accepted in 1963 (Brenner, 1965). The original development area was planned to reach more than 30,000 people in around 10,000 flats in 550 buildings (three quarters of the latter were to be demolished). The development project slowed down following the lack of state funds due to the 1970s economic crisis and the excessively high costs of the demolishing. Eventually only 4,000 new flats were built until the late 1980s.

The regeneration of the early 1970s was characterised by a displacement of vulnerable groups into unchanged overcrowded living conditions. Investment and renovation of the old housing stock was strictly forbidden in the foreseen development area. The local paper (aptly titled Józsefváros) reported:

’Some years ago residents (...) might have hoped for a brighter future, since there are people who were notified ten years ago that they would be receiving a new flat within a year. But the reconstruction stopped, as if the time did: the neighbourhood is in limbo, there is almost no hope for new flats. [At the same time], because of the reconstructions, the [municipality’s] maintenance company does nothing, prohibits renovation and modernisation by the tenants, being it a reconstruction area.’ (Józsefváros, 1986/1: 7.)

This together led to a change of the local society for lower-class and more marginalised residents, including poor Roma people. Although Roma had been living in the district for a long time (Józsefváros had also been the home for many well-educated Roma musicians since the early 20th century), a state-led programme which dismantled impoverished Roma neighbourhoods in the outskirts (once a stepping stone for people arriving from the countryside to work in Budapest) forced many families to move into run-down flats of inner-city neighbourhoods, including Józsefváros (Ladányi, 1989). Marginalisation of the Roma was driven by different forces at different scales. Firstly, as a direct means, the majority of Roma were considered not deserving newly-built flats: authorities argued that they would damage the dwellings. Secondly, there was a scarcity of multi-room-flats for the needs of larger families. Thirdly, after the crisis deepened in the 1980s, real wages diminished, lower-
class families could not afford the higher rents of the new buildings any more, thereby were forced towards the lower spectrum of the housing stock (Ladányi, 1989).

Following these processes, Józsefváros became highly stigmatised by the end of the 1980s due to its very poor quality housing stock, a comparatively higher proportion of low income Roma population, and the relatively high rates of criminal activity.

The political changes of the end of the 1980s found the Eighth District in social and physical decline, with high levels of stigmatisation and poverty. This, together with the inner-city location of the district, inevitably meant that the rent gap was extensive by this point.

Following the regime change of 1989, privatisation of the housing stock and the change of the local government system have only worsened the situation. From the 1980s, but more intensely in the 1990s the formerly publicly owned flats were privatised to sitting tenants at favourable prices (Dániel, 1996; Bodnár, 2001); better quality dwellings were quickly privatised by more affluent dwellers.

Usually the impact of the radical transformation of the local municipality system on housing outcomes does not receive adequate attention. Several tasks and competences were delegated to lower scales of governance because of the prevailing ideology of subsidiarity in neoliberal economies in the 1990s (Sassen, 1994). This decentralisation also meant the transfer of the state owned housing stock to the municipal scale - together with the responsibility for social housing provision, but without the necessary financial resources to fulfil these tasks (Vigvári, 2008).

Inner-city districts in Budapest opted for different rehabilitation policies (for an overview see Kovács, 2009; Keresztély and Scott, 2012). For example, Ninth District (Ferencváros) chose to carry out a long-term ‘block rehabilitation’ project, regulated by the local authority based on a French model (cf. Jelinek, 2010). In (Inner-) Erzsébetváros (Seventh District) the process of gentrification was largely unregulated by the municipality, and has proceeded in a less planned, and more market-led way (cf. Csanádi et al., 2011).

In case of Józsefváros the situation became critical in the early 1990s. As one council member described the situation at the time: ‘[…] we had no chance at all to acquire funding either from the central state, or from the Municipality of Budapest for developing at least one block in the district; moreover, we had absolutely no financial resources’ (Molnár, 2013a). Since Józsefváros experienced the most worrying tendencies of urban marginalisation in Budapest7 (Ladányi, 1992), and since no ‘spontaneous gentrification’ took place in the district, the local municipality had to create their own approach. In the first few years, municipal leadership aimed to focus on the inner, more developed parts of the district (the best located Inner-Józsefváros on Figure 1). For the changing ownership structure and the usage of the flats in the Eighth District see Figure 2. Then, from 1994, a lobby within the municipality emerged arguing for the development of the ‘slums’ in Middle-Józsefváros (Molnár, 2013b). Although a plan was already published in 1992 proposing to renovate rundown buildings and to build residential buildings on empty lots (Perczel, 1992), it was evident that no funding would be available for such investments in the most

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7 For example in 1992, 24-25 per cent of the families were poor in Middle-Józsefváros compared to the 10 per cent Budapest average, while 21 per cent of the flats in the district had no toilet and bathroom (Echter, Iván and Molnár, 1993).
stigmatised areas of Budapest. It was clear that in order to achieve the desired urban and social change, input (financial and other) from institutions other than the local municipality would have to be involved. This leads to the story presented in the next part.

Figure 2: Ownership structure and usage of flats in Józsefváros (1990, 2001, 2011). Source: HCSO data, authors’ own compilation.

Three phases and three cases of rescaling urban development in Middle-Józsefváros

In the following we are going to show how the scalar structures of urban development have changed since the late 1980s in Budapest. We identify three phases of rescaling urban governance: decentralisation without resources in the 1990s; Europeanisation from the early 2000s onward; and recentralisation efforts since 2010. These different, overlapping phases and scales of governance can be well illustrated through the examples of three urban development projects of Józsefváros. Besides the different dynamics of scalar restructuring, we identify in each example how different strategies of closing the rent gap are enabled by the new scalar arrangements.
Decentralisation without central financial resources: private-public partnership in the Corvin Promenade Project

The rent gap in Middle-Józsefváros could not be ‘closed’ throughout the 1990s due to being a highly stigmatised area, and private actors found it too risky to invest in a neighbourhood that may discourage clients. Recognising this constraint, the same lobby that started to push for the development of the ‘slums’ within the municipality in the mid-1990s started arguing for a more drastic solution: to demolish buildings on a larger contiguous area, and to replace them with buildings attractive to middle-class residents – with the involvement of a larger private investor. Accordingly, the municipality started to create an institutional and legal framework in which the business potential, that is, the conditions of profitably closing the rent gap could be achieved. A new institution, RÉV 8, was set up in 1997 to coordinate urban redevelopment projects, and to facilitate negotiations between the municipality and private investors. The majority owner of RÉV 8 was the local municipality, but both the Budapest Municipality and the largest Hungarian bank, OTP had shares in it. Potential investors were invited to an open tender for reconstructing the largest rundown inner city area in Central and Eastern Europe. The municipality offered to demolish the existing poor quality public housing stock and to relocate the tenants, in exchange for upgrading the urban fabric and providing amenities for middle-class people (cf. Figure 2). While the first tender was unsuccessful, the second was won by a consortium of four large Hungarian construction companies. Finally, they managed to sell the rights to implement the country’s largest urban redevelopment project to Futureal, a Hungarian real estate developer. The project was started in 2000, and its estimated total cost will be EUR 850 million, including EUR 72 million in public investment.

Although the global financial crisis slowed down the development in 2008 – similarly to the 1970s, when the socialist redevelopment plan right next to the newly built Corvin Promenade was halted because of the crisis at the time –, it now seems that the project will be carried out by 2017. So far more than 1,100 old flats were demolished, 70 per cent of which was social housing. These were replaced with a mall, 2,700 new flats and 130,000 sq.m. of new office space. Former inhabitants (or more precisely the ones who had official tenure) were compensated either in kind (exchange flat located in the district but often further away from the inner city), or in cash. Though there was no systematic study to follow up on displaced residents, it is very likely that many of them, including numerous Roma families, ended up in similar or worse conditions. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show how the area of the Corvin Promenade Project became socially ‘upgraded’; and how urban marginality, concerning many Roma, was reproduced and deepened in other parts of the district. The cost of closing the rent gap in the renamed – and rebranded – Corvin Quarter9, that is, to gentrify the area was thus the further intensification of urban marginality elsewhere in the district (see Figure 4), in Budapest, and in the countryside (Ladányi, 2006).

8 In 2000, Józsefváros Municipality took over the shares held by the OTP.
9 The district was divided into 11 administrative ‘quarters’ in 2005, which has not only helped to appoint the different areas of regeneration (i.e. Magdolina Quarter, Orczy Quarter, Szgony Quarter), but also ensured closer control over them.
The institutional preconditions for this to happen were, on the one hand, the radical decentralisation of public tasks carried out in the 1990s, without necessary resources allocated from the central budget, and the reintegration of Hungary’s economy to the global financial markets after the regime change, on the other. This resulted in a situation where local municipalities are forced to compete for thin state funding, as well as for the relatively scarce private capital by making the investment opportunities more favourable, and – if need be – occasionally even adopting pro-investment measures at the detriment of their current population. These institutional arrangements could only be set up by the beginning of the 2000s, which also corresponded to a period of global capital expansion, a large part of which was channelled into real estate development. The convergence of these factors at this given moment also partly explains why the gentrification of Middle-Józsefváros started relatively late compared to what the rent gap theory would have forecast – and what Smith expected (1996). The interplay of transitional recession, the depleted share of public housing even in the District 8 due to rapid privatisation, the stigmatisation of Józsefváros, and possibly even the relatively lower level of capital available to real estate development (compared to Western European or North American counterparts) significantly delayed the process. It could eventually take off nonetheless, once the national economy picked up, municipal governance began to undertake a more proactive coordinating role, and could offer an investment area of a scale large enough to be interesting for a national investor, and when capital available for real estate investment expanded on a global scale, including the boom of foreign currency loans on the Hungarian credit market.

Figure 3: Population change and changing social status in Józsefváros (2011). Source: HCSO data, authors’ own compilation.
Figure 4: Share of the Roma population in Józsefváros on the block level (2001, 2011). Source: HCSO data, authors’ own compilation.
The role of the European Union in local urban development: Magdolna Quarter Programme

While municipalities’ intense competition for financial resources in the 1990s was principally articulated as a quest for private investors, the preparation and achievement of EU accession in the 2000s opened up a new opportunity for funding, introducing a new, supra-national scale in urban governance. In the case of Middle-Józsefváros the major project illustrating this restructuring of scalar arrangements, where EU funds have had an overwhelming role in the regeneration of certain neighbourhoods is the Magdolna Quarter Programme (MQP).

The MQP is one of the few so-called ‘socially sensitive urban rehabilitation programmes’ in the city, and has consisted of three phases: the first one between 2005 and 2008, the second between 2008 and 2010, and a third one, which was deferred after the change of both the local and national government until 2013, to be finished this year (2015). While the majority of the funding for the second and third phase of the Programme was covered from the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund, the first phase started with a cca. EUR 2.3 million contribution of the Municipality of Budapest.\(^\text{10}\) To continue, around EUR 5.3 million was allocated for the second phase, then around EUR 12 million for the third phase of the programme from EU funds; which have clearly significantly exceeded the support of the central city government, let alone that of the district municipality.

MQP truly applied a new approach in Hungarian urban renewal politics, as it has been trying to put more emphasis on the social aspects and the participation of local inhabitants in the urban regeneration process. Based on our interviews with urban developers and chief architects both in Budapest and outside the capital city, the programme is typically considered a pilot project and ‘best practice’ for an integrative form of urban renewal. Nevertheless, according to others, the presumed success of the Magdolna Programme needs, at least, further scrutiny.

Part of the critiques claim that despite the integrative framework, several local civil group representatives were not involved either in the planning or the implementation process, with special attention to Roma as well as migrant organisations (Jakab, 2005; Szabó, 2015). While the so-called Kesztyűgyár - which is a former glove factory, turned into a local community centre in relation to the Magdolna Quarter Programme - could not meet its original goal, namely, to become an inter-ethnic space, used both by local Roma and non-Roma dwellers (György, 2012).

As a study shows, the precondition for carrying out the Magdolna Quarter Programme was not only the availability of EU funds, but also that it was preceded by the gentrification of two other neighbourhoods. Namely, even the people in charge of planning admit that had the gentrification of Inner-Józsefváros and the Corvin Promenade first not attracted private investors, and up-and-coming young middle class inhabitants, the Magdolna Quarter Programme would not have even been conceptualised (György, 2012: 190). The sad irony of the situation is that - as mentioned above - most people displaced from the gentrified areas appeared in the margins of the Magdolna or Orczy Quarters (on the latter, see the next section).

\(^\text{10}\) The whole budget of the Magdolna Programme I. was cca. EUR 2.8 million.
While the Magdolna Programme has undoubtedly had positive effects on a selected group of Józsefváros inhabitants, recent developments in its third phase still suggest that the municipality seeks to close the rent gap under the auspices of its single ‘socially sensitive’ rehabilitation project as well. The privatisation of its commercial real estates (particularly the pro-middle-class redevelopment of the local Teleki Square market) as well as offering tax allowances for selected retail activities (i.e. catering business in Népszínház street bordering the Magdolna Quarter) could very easily result in a form of commercial-led gentrification in the neighbourhood (Rankin, 2008). Furthermore, this emblematic social rehabilitation project, ongoing for about 10 years now, has arguably changed the image of the area. In the private housing stock it started to increase rental prices, and induced a wave of ‘spontaneous’ gentrification (see also Figure 2).

‘Closing the rent gap’ with the aid of EU funds is not a particular case, though. In a general national and regional context of scarcity of resources, it is a prevalent approach applied by municipalities in shortage of direct capital investments - where the significance of and competition for international transfers (such as the funds available based on EU Cohesion Policy) increases. Thus, compared to the 1990s when private capital was sought by local municipalities (through direct investment and privatisation) on the scale of individual investment projects, from 2000 onwards (when Central and Eastern European countries gained access to EU funds) the European Structural Funds have gradually become the main source of investment in urban regeneration. This shift also brought about important changes in the structure of urban governance, which is coined as a process of Europeanisation in the literature (see for example Bukowski et al. 2003).

Return to the national government: the Orczy Quarter

Lastly, we turn to the analysis of the currently ongoing urban social change of one of the Middle-Józsefváros neighbourhoods, called Orczy Quarter. This most stigmatised neighbourhood within the district also accommodated a large part of marginalised populations displaced from other, ‘developing’ areas - not only from within, but also from outside of the district. In the Orczy Quarter housing conditions are worse than in other parts of Józsefváros. Many families live in energy poverty, most typically those living in municipally-owned flats. Socially marginalised and especially vulnerable groups, like Roma people represent a higher proportion of the population than the district average. But the fact that the number of empty flats rose significantly between 2001 and 2011 suggests that this area is at the next forefront of rapid urban change (see Figure 2, 3 and 4).

The renovation of the area is currently on the agenda of the local municipality, but concrete plans and funding sources are not yet made public. However, it seems very probable (based on public statements of the district mayor; lastly, for example at the annual public hearing on the 10th of December 2015) that the district plans to acquire state funding for the planned Orczy Quarter Project. Common scenarios of gentrification to fuel this process in the neighbourhood seem not to be possible for various reasons. The local municipality lacks public money to initiate gentrification, and since this area has remained the most stigmatised part of Józsefváros – after partly
upgrading both the Corvin and the Magdolna Quarters –, private capital investment is also limited; further hindered by the scarcity of loans after the 2008 crisis in Hungary. Furthermore, in the current seven-year long programming period (2014–2020) EU funding for urban rehabilitation became very limited in the capital.

Nonetheless, ‘closing the rent gap’ in the Orczy Quarter seems to become possible by a large-scale university redevelopment project financed from the central government budget, as well as potential direct government support for regenerating the area around the new university of public administration. The National University of Public Service – founded by the state in 2012 to educate the future generation of civil servants, police and army officers – was moved to its new campus in the Orczy Quarter area in 2014. The whole campus redevelopment project is estimated to cost around EUR 100 million, financed mainly from the central budget.\(^\text{11}\) The official brochure of the project emphasises that the investment will potentially result in a boom in the local real estate market (NKE Szolgáltató Kft., n.d.), and as the project website describes:

‘Urban green area will increase by one hectare, the constant presence of the police strengthens public security, cultural-recreational opportunities of Budapest residents expand, a declining neighbourhood renews.’\(^\text{12}\)

The whole project seems to mobilise a mix of policies for marginalisation: displacing lower-class people by the studentification of the area (Smith and Holt, 2007), demolishing housing estates, and using enhanced policing (e.g. building a dormitory of the police academy next to the houses in which many of the poorest families of the neighbourhood live). While the district municipality clearly wishes to secure funding from the state for a regeneration of this kind, it also uses the university development project to frame its exclusionary policy measures, which we will discuss in more detail in the next section. The growing importance of the national scale in urban redevelopment processes corresponds to the general context of scalar restructuring of governance in Hungary in the past few years (Szelényi and Csillag, 2015). Since 2010 the right-wing government – which came to power in the aftermath of the economic crisis – has carried out a number of reforms of state administration. Important elements are the further decentralisation of costly tasks – such as the provision of social aid (see more on this in the next section) – and the recentralisation of decisions on the allocation of large-scale investment funds. Since the mayor of Józsefváros is a prominent representative of the governing party, the Eighth District seems to be able to secure relatively more public resources for investment than many other districts of Budapest.

As one of its consequences, the Orczy Quarter project will most likely end up in future demolitions, and further displacements, too – often of municipal tenants who will have been displaced twice or more within only a decade.

\(^{11}\) http://ludovika-campus.hu/a-campus-projekt/kiemelt-allami-beruhazas

\(^{12}\) http://ludovika-campus.hu/a-campus-projekt/kiemelt-allami-beruhazas
One of the explanatory factors why the gentrification of Józsefváros started relatively late compared to other inner-city districts is the strong stigma attached to it. Apart from the need to attract investment and create adequate institutional structures, altering the image of the district was conceived as a necessary precondition for closing the rent gap by local policy-makers already from the 1990s. However, this need felt for rebranding the district has often led to the ‘othering’ of a particular group of locals, either along ethnic lines, or by the systematic differentiation between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor (Gans, 1995); where the latter may also suffer from certain selective policies that tend to criminalise poverty. These framings of policy measures coupled with the gentrifying processes discussed above, then, result in a radical version of urban revanchism which leaves a very limited space to discuss structural factors behind the marginalisation and displacement of vulnerable groups of residents.

By urban revanchism we understand, more generally, the intertwining of urban politics with punitive politics. Important elements of this process are the further retreat of the welfare state, the scapegoating of poor populations and ethnic minorities, as well as regulations directly supporting spatial exclusion and the criminalisation of poverty.

In fact, there is a rather ‘positive’ narrative of the local municipality legitimising gentrification and urban revanchism: as the mayor most recently claimed, the municipality wants to convert Józsefváros into a ‘new university town’, instead of a ‘ghetto full of criminals’ (Kocsis, 2012). That is, studentification, as a rebranding strategy is seen to be a key factor in the competition for investments. An often proudly cited fact is that the density of university buildings in Budapest is the highest in Józsefváros. Indeed, in all three above mentioned urban regeneration projects students (as potential tenants), or university buildings (as catalysts of socio-spatial transformation) play a crucial role.

However, the local discourse – along with the dynamics of widening and closing the rent gap – is very much influenced by a wide range of ‘negative’, revanchist social policies. For example, the district council decided a few years ago to force out NGOs dealing with serious drug addicts from Józsefváros. This proved to have a significant impact on the increase of Hepatitis C patients and the risk of a national epidemic (TASZ, 2015). In 2011 the municipality – in the name of reinforced public security – started to finance a local paramilitary group. Not too much later, though, the group had to be dissolved as its members were reported for abusing power and harassing the most vulnerable population in the district.

As for the national policies influencing the local scale, the enforcement of the so-called ‘mafia law’ in 1999 – which allowed local municipalities to install CCTV cameras, and ordered the designation of ‘tolerance zones’ for street prostitution – was considered an ‘indispensable support’ for ‘the development of the district’ by urban planners (Alföldi, 2008: 3). Since then, the number of CCTVs has been multiplied, while on some streets mobile police stations were also installed. Last year, the former most notorious places of street prostitution were redesigned, and became well-maintained public transportation hubs for the city’s new underground line.

Similarly, the 2015 reform of national welfare regulations decentralised the competences for numerous housing and social benefits – as also above mentioned – to the municipality scale. It has entitled locally appointed committees to decide on the
eligibility criteria – whether an applicant is ‘deserving’ or not –, and on the actual amount of the benefits. This has made underprivileged groups particularly exposed to and dependent on local politics, leaving the needy without a minimum of welfare guaranteed.

As a result of the ‘negative’, revanchist policies framed by ‘positive’, student-oriented readings of urban change, today Józsefváros has not only become a terrain of ‘development’, but also a symbolic site for both the local and the national government to demonstrate power and control over poverty and delinquency – both within the district and the whole country. In addition to the reconstructions that have attracted students, investors, public resources and middle-class consumers to Józsefváros, the Eighth District was also the first where the mayor – also being in charge of issues of homelessness in the national government – banned dumpster diving and rough sleeping. These measures, then, were up-scaled to the national level: penalising homelessness has become a legal option for all municipalities in Hungary, and in 2012 the regulation was inserted into the country’s Fundamental Law (Constitution). This example shows well how the importance of urban revanchism in Józsefváros reaches far beyond the borders of the district, and how the dialectic relationship between local and national policies influences the characteristics of recent recentralising tendencies.

Conclusions

In our paper we sought to explain the ongoing gentrification processes in the Eighth District of Budapest by combining rent gap theory with an analysis of scalar shifts in urban governance. The Eighth District is an important case to study from several points of view. It is both typical in terms of the historical trajectory of the inner-city neighbourhoods of Budapest, and exceptional due to its highly stigmatised nature. In recent years urban change has been going on here in a very intense manner, performing mainly different forms of gentrification. According to our argument, since the collapse of state socialism there have been different kinds of resources available for channelling investment into closing the rent gap, evolving by different phases of scalar restructuring. Resources and competences have been shifted between different scales of governance; not only supporting different forms of gentrification and of closing the rent gap, but also prompting new power constellations that fuel these processes.

We described different instances of rescaling through three different urban regeneration projects in Middle-Józsefváros. The Corvin Promenade project, the largest urban development project in Hungary realised with private funding, but in close cooperation with the public sector, was introduced as a result of decentralisation and liberalisation throughout the 1990s. The Magdolna Quarter Programme, an exemplary project regularly cited as a ‘best practice’ of EU funded urban regeneration in the country, was presented as a paradigmatic case of Europeanising urban interventions. The planned renovation of the Orczy Quarter is emblematic of the way central resources are channelled into urban development in the current period of recentralisation in Hungary.
There have been important processes of revanchist policy making and policy framing presented, underlying all of these projects. New policies were introduced - sometimes mutually reinforced by national policies - of criminalising poverty and marginalising ‘others’, such as prostitutes, drug addicts, the homeless, and ‘antisocial’ behaviour prompted by marginalised social positions (e.g. dumpster diving), as well as a potential for the covert discrimination of Roma, or migrants in policy implementation practices. The penalising regulations were introduced in the framework of a more general discourse about the ‘undeserving’ and delinquent poor populations, used as references to foster gentrification and changing – ‘studentifying’ – the image of the district. Some of these policies – most notably the criminalisation of homelessness – have been ‘up-scaled’ to the national level as well. This dialectic relation between local and national policies and policy narratives proves to be an important factor in facilitating the gentrification of the area.

To conclude, after a closer scrutiny we can see that although on a general level rent gap is an important explanatory factor of gentrification in Middle-Józsefváros, there are important institutional factors that also shape the spatiality and temporality of particular forms of gentrification. Different processes of scalar restructuring of urban governance have a huge impact on when, where and how the rent gap is closing in a city. Hence, with a scale-sensitive political economic approach not only the mechanisms of gentrification are more understandable in the case of Middle-Józsefváros, but also the misleading narratives of studentification and of ‘othering’ are tackled, and put into a more historical and broader context.

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**JUDIT KELLER, KATALIN FEHÉR, ZSUZSANNA VIDRA, TÜNDE VIRÁG:**

**Developmental Programmes in Local Communities**

This article analyses the impact of developmental programmes on social integration in two Hungarian small towns. It studies changing patterns of social integration in two settlements sharing similar endowments, with respect to a middle-sized Roma population living in segregated neighbourhoods. Drawing on recent studies in economic sociology, social integration is used as a proxy for socio-economic development and explained by differences in the transformation of local institutions. Divergences in institutional change influence the innovation capacity of communities and institutional change distributes authority among a variety of local and central state, non-state, for-profit and non-profit actors providing space for their association and forming the basis of an integrated local community. The main aim of the study is mapping the factors and mechanisms that shape and generate institutional change in support of social cohesion and development. Our cases explore that in the absence of such institutions, public goods are more likely to be appropriated by incumbents, which hinders the evolution of innovative solutions to socio-economic problems and weakens the developmental capacities of communities.

**Keywords:** developmental programmes, embedded developmental model, executive model, institutional models, local communities, social integration.
**Introduction**

This article compares two middle-sized towns’ developmental trajectory based on social integration. It studies changing patterns of social integration in two settlements (Nádas and Rónakeresztes) sharing similar endowments, with respect to a middle-sized Roma population living in segregated neighbourhoods. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section takes stock of actors and stakeholders of local development and provides an overview of the institutional models of developmental change and social integration. Then we explore different mobilisation strategies of economic, social and cultural capital within the developmental networks. In the last section we investigate the cases of the community house in Nádas and the Sure Start House in Rónakeresztes as examples to explore the implementation of developmental projects. The concluding section discusses the developmental process of Nádas and Rónakeresztes on the continuum between the models of embedded and executive development.

**Institutional models of developmental change and social integration: theoretical foundations**

*The enabling state*

International experience of the past two decades has indicated that the efficiency of development programmes financed by transnational organisations (OECD, EU, World Bank) cannot be ensured either by exclusively top-down or bottom-up solutions. In the first case, development projects aiming to achieve social change fail to be sustainable due to the lack of embeddedness, while in the second case failure is due to the lack of involvement of local institutions in the development projects. Bottom-up initiatives financed by international development funds are necessary but not sufficient factors of long-term sustainability of local development. In the absence of the cooperation of local state and non-state actors to bring about institutional change, bottom-up initiatives last until the budget ends (Bruszt and Vedres, 2013; Evans, 1995).

Nevertheless, national and transnational actors can enable and encourage local actors from the top-down to bring about bottom-up networks to use developmental resources more effectively (Evans, 1995; Trigilia 2001). This can be done by setting conditions of and preferences about the institutional structure and resource mobilisation opportunities of developmental networks. Such framework conditions can influence the evolution and character of developmental networks. According to Paraskevopoulos

*Top-down initiatives based on hierarchical (clientelistic), intergovernmental networks cannot constitute a viable basis for the long-standing processes of social capital-building and crossing the public-private divide* (Paraskevopoulos, 2001: 20).
Successful implementation of development projects induced by external actors depends on the formation of local developmental agency. Local development agency is about the capacity/skills of local actors to define and solve developmental gridlocks through the association of diverse actors. Local development agency can be studied in three interrelated dimensions: associating, resource mobilising and politicising. In this context, associating means the extent to which local developmental networks are based on the association of diverse local actors. Resource mobilising is the capacity of these local actors to mobilise various types of resources (financial, human, social capital) for developmental purposes, while politicising means their capacity to define and represent local socio-economic problems causing developmental gridlocks at the local level, higher levels of the state and even at the transnational level (Bruszt and Vedres, 2013).

The embeddedness of the development model relying on both external and endogenous resources, based on the association of diverse actors is guaranteed at multiple levels: it is accommodated to the coherent system of local resources and institutional, geographic and social characteristics, while feeds itself into external (regional, domestic, global) institutional and market channels. The success of local development thus partly depends on institutional change generated by the external framework that can increase developmental capacities of local actors to bring about autonomous developmental coalitions among diverse actors. Through such networks local development actors may mobilise diverse resources for developmental purposes and represent their own developmental priorities across various levels of the developmental state (Evans, 1995; Bruszt and Vedres, 2013).

**Local power relations**

Development is about who can have a say and what counts in developmental planning, in defining developmental goals and priorities; hence development policy ultimately addresses the issue of distribution of resources and authority (Bruszt, 2007). In the field power occurs when enduring structured constraints restrict and/or facilitate the choices, the actions and ultimately influence the autonomy of groups of actors (Lukes, 2005; Scott, 2001; Knight-Farrell, 2003). This can happen in direct and indirect ways. An example of the direct reshaping of power relations among actors would be when institutions are introduced to restrict certain actors in accessing resources. It is more frequent, however, to reshape power relations indirectly: to raise the institutional capacities of a group of actors (providing them with new/separate routes for resource mobilisation) without restricting the actions of others (but without raising their resource mobilisation capacities to the same extent). Such asymmetrical empowering takes place without direct coercion, nevertheless it generates hierarchical relations as it increases the ability of one group of actors to demand concessions from

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1 These can be transnational developmental organisations, such as the EU, OECD, World Bank, or domestic actors, such as the National Development Fund and/or bottom-up organisations not embedded in local societies.

2 About the concept of local development agency see Bruszt and Vedres (2013).
others without making any in return, thus they can change the rules of cooperation) (Farrell and Knight, 2003; Greif and Laitlin, 2004).

As opposed to Western European models, in Hungary – similar to other post-socialist countries – the general weakness of civil society elevated local governments to play a dominant role in local development. Their willingness to cooperate with local non-state actors, however, has gradually decreased since the end of the 1990s due to the diminishing support of the institutional framework of regional and local development policy to encourage institutional experimentation and the formation of win-win alliances of diverse local actors (Keller, 2011). Asymmetries in power relations between local governments and local non-state actors were less visible in the early 1990s as regulations did not favour any particular local actor; hence local governments were rather encouraged to cooperate with non-state actors in developmental planning and the distribution of developmental resources and goods. Towards the millennium, however, the European Commission redefined its principles governing accession by changing its priorities within regional policy from political to financial accountability. This ultimately gave central states the prerogative to control regional policy making, the distribution of resources and implementation (Bruszt, 2007; Keller, 2011). The new institutional framework of regional policy provided privileges in financial assistance and interest representation for local governmental partnerships without offering non-government actors similar mandates. This implied a relatively balanced relationship between local governments and civil actors that had been built on a mutual desire for efficiency gains to solve local socio-economic problems, and instead generated asymmetrical bargaining positions between the two sectors (Bruszt, 2007; Keller, 2011).

Local interpretative frames: the role of social entrepreneurs

However, actors in privileged power positions can decide whether to create frames for heterarchies or to use more coercive forms of power to press for coordination solutions distributionally more advantageous for them. In case they decide not to use privileges offered them by the institutional framework and instead of hierarchies they support association, these actors can strengthen other local actors’ aspirations to bring about interpretative frames of a trustful community.

These interpretative frames about development are prepared by socially skilled entrepreneurs, who can find ways to get disparate groups to cooperate even if external conditions rather encourage hierarchical relations among local actors (Fligstein, 2001). They achieve this by putting themselves into the position of others and frame stories about local development and external conditions in a way that appeals to a variety of local actors. Socially skilled entrepreneurs juggle with several roles in the community that enable them to build bridges across groups with diverse preferences. These common (compromised/collective) identities that are produced during mediation can generate entirely new interpretative frames that can turn previous constraints into opportunities of alternative paths.

\[^3\] Due to the weakness of civil society in post-socialist states, a truly balanced configuration of power never existed between non-governmental and governmental actors.
All in all, it is up to social entrepreneurs to decide how to make use of their privileges or disadvantages. Socially skilled entrepreneurs in the field, however, always aim to accommodate diverse interests and preferences of heterogeneous actors via association (Crouch, 2005; Sabel, 1994; Bruszt, 2002; Grabher, 2005; Grabher and Stark, 1997). Thus, the diverse association of heterogeneous interests comes about through a benevolent cacophony (Bruszt, 2002). The accommodation of diverse interests and preferences through the distribution of authority in decision-making can create alternative pathways for communities to mobilise and sustain resources. The concertation of internal heterogeneity thus can increase the adaptive capacities of the community even in a changing institutional environment.

**Addressing local development – the analytical framework**

The analysis of variation in the outcome of development projects on segregated settlements relies on four dimensions: the role of local opinion leaders (social entrepreneurs), the coordination mechanisms and network-building strategies of local associations, their resource mobilisation strategies and their politicising capacity. Coordination mechanisms and network-building strategies encompass both the scope and the mode of association: while the first covers the kind of sectors, social groups participating in (or alternatively exclude from) the definition of developmental goals and means, the mode of association describes the way these associations take decisions about the goals and means of development. Associations can be hierarchical-centralised that distribute authority in decision-making unevenly, based on formal rules (for instance, if non-state actors or Roma representatives do not have veto power, thus requesting their opinion could be a mere formality). Alternatively, associations can be heterarchic-integrated where decision-making rights about developmental goals and means are distributed more or less equally among heterogeneous actors in the association. Resource mobilisation strategies can range from single-issue, unsustainable resource mobilisation to continuous mobilisation and concertation of various resources for the sake of social developmental purposes. Finally, politicising in this context means the interpretative framework for development: the way developmental gridlocks and developmental goals are defined at the local level and across various state levels.

These dimensions outline two basic models of the way externally funded development projects can affect the integration of marginalised groups at the local level. Developmental cases can be located and move along the continuum of two models depending on changes in institutions affecting any of the four dimensions. The developmental trajectories, defined by a series of developmental cases/projects thus can move between a socially embedded institutional structure that also distributes authority to marginalised groups and induces social change towards a long-term capacity-expansion of the marginalised population, and a hierarchical institutional framework based on clientelism and rent-seeking that distributes authority unevenly among local stakeholders and increases the marginalisation of groups already adrift in society (see Table 1).
Table 1: Institutional models of developmental change and social integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Executive model</th>
<th>Embedded developmental model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opinion leader, Social entrepreneur</strong></td>
<td>Executive attitude: does not take up conflicts of social change (does not have a vision, thinks in hierarchies, his/her goal is to maximise votes)</td>
<td>Socially skilled entrepreneur: His/her vision is social change (can also measure the necessary scale of change) that he/she achieves through brokering, the technique of bricolage and common identity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination mechanisms, network building</strong></td>
<td>based on hierarchies, feudalistic relations, asymmetrical power relations, appropriation of power ordering, execution</td>
<td>more or less symmetrical power relations, heterarchic relations, dialogue, consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource mobilisation</strong></td>
<td>single, parallel projects without synergies, accumulation of resources based on formalities without a developmental framework (vision of social change is missing), accumulation and recombination of social capital is missing</td>
<td>continuous synergistic projects embedded in a local developmental framework, resource mobilisation for the sake of change, accumulation and recombination of social capital during the development process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developmental framework (politicising)</strong></td>
<td>implementation of project follows formalities of tendering rules</td>
<td>implementation of project is based on a developmental vision, embedded in local circumstances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Hungary local developmental projects over the past years have primarily been financed by large-budget EU-funded programmes\(^4\). The majority of these EU funds are colour-blind focusing on the reduction of socio-economic disadvantages, rather than the direct integration of ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, additional spatially targeted funding, such as the Chance for Children Programme (Gyerekesély) discussed in this paper, has been available for towns - like Nádas - situated in regions socio-economically lagging behind (Most Disadvantaged Microregions – LHH)\(^5\). Rónakeresztes, on the other hand, is not located in a region eligible for these funds, and only had access to funding designed to fight poverty and spatial exclusion. During our field work\(^6\) we conducted interviews with local decision makers and actors

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\(^4\) For more on the same subject, see Teller (2012).

\(^5\) The most disadvantaged regions delimited on the basis of economic and social indicators by government decree with dedicated funding for development.

\(^6\) This article is based on the comparative research project “Faces and Causes of Marginalization of the Roma in Local Settings” coordinated by CEU CPS between 2012-2014 with the contribution of Katalin Fehér, Szilvia Rézműves, Gyöngyi Schwarz, Dezső Szegedi, Annamária Uzzoli, Monika Mária Váradi, Zsuzsa Vidra, and Tünde Virág. The research studied faces of marginalisation in 20 Hungarian settlements in four disadvantaged regions relying on semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders, document analyses of local developmental programmes and desktop analysis of quantitative data.
contributing to the projects. Direct observation of the operation of projects enabled us to form an impression of how these projects are implemented in settlements.

**Coordination mechanisms: networking and interpretative frames**

Local social circumstances, such as the willingness of community leaders and local institutions to take up conflicts of social change are important factors in analysing the impact of development projects. This section maps out the way local public actors manage conflicts induced by the changing social status of the marginalised Roma and the process of accommodating diverse local views about the goals and means of development.

*The role of local opinion leaders as committed social entrepreneurs in Nádas*

In the small town of Nádas, situated in North-East Hungary, a local social entrepreneur, well embedded in local society, took up these conflicts and initiated the establishment of institutions of associations between majority and Roma groups. Earlier local experiences supported this approach of social integration as over the last two decades of state socialism Roma representatives were already present in the municipal council (in addition to the shared workplaces and social places).

It is noteworthy that today social and spatial boundaries in Nádas rather lie between the Hungarian-speaking Romungro and the Vlach Roma groups (and much less along the classical line of polarisation between the majority and the Roma population). Traditionally, the two Roma groups never maintained social relations in Nádas: the Romungros have been living in a segregated settlement, while the Vlach Roma progressed more in social and economic integration. Interethnic marriages between Romungros and Vlach Roma have been rare, while the number of marriages between Romungros and the non-Roma population has been increasing.

The current mayor, elected a decade ago, deliberately began to build a network of experts and professionals working for Roma integration and facilitated the transformation of the local institutions to enhance social cohesion. He appointed a new leadership and staff in the new integrated institutions – Family and Childcare Services, Roma Minority Self-Government (RMSG), educational institutions – and initiated additional development programmes. His commitment to organising coalitions can be seen in his willingness to form a developmental team and work together in close cooperation with the head of the local Social Centre in the implementation of local development projects. Both actors are deeply embedded in local society and recognised by diverse local social groups. Their reputation and the diversity of social roles adopted by the mayor (his family is part of the majority society’s local elite, and besides being mayor he is a presbyter of the Protestant community) supported them in their efforts to integrate conflicting local interests under the umbrella of one developmental concept. The frame of “municipal level community development” as a strategy is cautiously positioned between the concepts of social change and the maintenance of status quo.

“Thinking that someone else will come here to solve problems around Gypsies, is wrong. If we do not help them to get into positions and we cannot achieve that they
bring their children neat and not infested with lice to the kindergarten or to school, they will not do that. We have to solve this issue by ourselves.” (Mayor)

The president of the Roma Minority Self-Government (RMSG) is unavoidable in the life of the Roma living in the settlement, the local government and the majority society. Although his political position has been stable for years, his local acceptance and reputation has been controversial among the Roma and non-Roma population. Due to his political position he could influence the recruitment of local participants in public work programmes as well as the distribution of emergency welfare assistance. Moreover, as a building contractor he could offer jobs to Roma men, though he did not become the partner of local government in development projects for Roma integration.

The establishment of the Minority Office in cooperation with the RMSG was an important step in the emancipatory and developmental endeavours of the town’s leadership. The Minority Office, whose function is supplementary to the RMSG, is located in the area used by the majority population. The staff of the Minority Office, two high-school graduate young Roma with good communication skills, help people in need: they write requests for them, prepare tax returns, record applications for public work and help to submit requests for utility providers. In the first years positions in the Minority Office were exclusively held by Vlach Roma but nowadays Romungros can also be recruited, due to the impact of local developments for social integration and emancipatory policies. One of the most important elements of these policies is to make the local Roma youth visible, supporting thus the creation of a local Roma elite and encouraging their studies. As the non-Roma majority recognised local Roma people in a different role from that of the ‘settlement Gypsies’, recruitment of the Roma in local decision-making was accepted by the majority.

Adél, a Vlach Roma woman, who had begun her career as a cleaning lady in the neighbouring town’s hospital at the age of 20, has become a crucial actor in integration programmes in Nádas. From the hospital she moved to work at the Minority Office of Nádas, then at the Family Support Service. During this time she received her high school diploma and a college degree. Her career was facilitated by the mayor and the head of the Social Centre of Nádas, who treated her on equal terms as a partner. After the successful application of the local government to the Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP) Adél was appointed the head and the Vlach Roma woman’s leadership in integration projects has served as positive example for the local Roma population: an increasing number of local Vlachs and Romungros perceived education more important than earlier and an increasing number of them recommenced their (adult) education.

The mayor played an active role in the creation of a developmental coalition between the local social sector and Roma experts. For more than a decade, he has been pursuing the policy of distributed authority in Roma integration, which enabled the alignment of Roma professional elite. Education remained, however, the most vulnerable area of local social integration policy. The present educational situation is the outcome of a deliberate de-segregational and integrational experiment that the current mayor began to promote. Prior to his election, a selection mechanism between parallel classes had served the local status quo. After the mayor’s arrival in office an Integrated Pedagogical System had been introduced, which abolished
Segregation and established Roma and non-Roma mixed classes. In a year or two, a number of non-Roma parents began to enrol their children in the neighbouring village’s school which was in need of students. That is, the transformation of the local institutional system and its integrational implications were hindered by an “escape route” for non-Roma parents offered by an institution external to local circumstances.

“This story is especially painful because we are making lots of efforts to integrate.”

(Mayor)

On the other hand, social integration in the local kindergarten proved to be successful even without an optional “escape route”.

**Lack of local expertise and missing committed social entrepreneur in Rónakeresztes**

The Roma population in Rónakeresztes, a small Hungarian town in the Great Plains, is between 1800-2000 inhabitants. This comprises less than ten percent of the town’s population. Roma families apart from some rare exceptions live at the edge of the city in one block. This so-called “Gipsy town” is separated from other parts of the town by a sharp and clear boundary. In the last decades the urban policy of the town has aimed at the invisibility of the poor and their problems in “Gipsy town” for the majority society. As a result, public spaces and institutions were restricted for residents of “Gipsy town”, and the control over the neighbourhood was transferred to the RMSG’s representatives.

The settlement of “Gipsy town” is not an integral part of the town properly, neither of its mental image. The mayor does not perceive segregation: in her opinion there is no segregated school in the town and Roma children are not in a disadvantageous position because of differences in the quality of education among schools. The appearance of a Church school, however, and a parallel institutional system for Roma and poor people, paves the way for “escape routes” for non-Roma middle-class and some Roma children away from public education, while the majority of Roma children are left behind in public schools. The leadership of Rónakeresztes indeed supports this residential segregation: local elite members do not consider spatial separation as a problem.

“The central part of the town may be regarded wealthy. There are no neglected areas of the town. Roma families also live in houses, not necessarily in settlements.” (Official of the Developmental Office)

Apart from a weak RMSG there are no Roma NGOs or expert organisations that could represent the interests of the poor and Roma people and act as partner organisations of the local government in the planning of development projects. Although the mayor considers the relationship with the RMSG good, RMSG representatives have a different interpretation: they are not involved in meaningful decision-making processes, their opinion is not welcomed and the declaration of their consent is used only as a compulsory element of tendering. The local leadership perceives the RMSG’s head as a mediator and contact person between the decision-makers and the local Roma population without ensuring the RMSG decision-making rights. The effect of this asymmetric, hierarchic relationship on developmental
projects is that representative opinions and different critiques of the Roma are not channelled into the process of developmental planning.

According to the leader of the Developmental Office, the planning process of integration programmes is based on regular meetings with minority and civil society representatives and fulfils all formal requirements. The specific local expertise about Roma integration projects is missing and there is an obvious lack of dialogue between the different actors: from planning throughout implementation tasks are delegated and executed only by the local administrative staff.

To sum up, the two cases of Nádas and Rónakeresztes clearly represent different local developmental policy trajectories, and developmental efforts for social integration have become embedded in local social networks only in Nádas. In this town developmental projects have been implemented as part of the vision and developmental framework of “municipal level community development”. Due to the committed leadership and especially the mayor, various forms of institutional change have been implemented over the years that aim at increasing the capacities of the Roma minority: the Minority Office, the Social Centre that associate various types of local actors (non-roma, Vlach Roma, Romungro Roma) are prime examples of it. As a result of the mayor’s efforts to organise cross-sectoral coalitions the local developmental team comprises representatives of diverse organisations (education, RMSG, Support Service, local government, the Minority Office, the Social Centre) and the distribution of authority is relatively balanced.

On the other hand, in Rónakeresztes institutional transformation did not facilitate social integration. Project generation and implementation here is managed by a project office within the local government whose goal is to implement projects by administrative standards. The developmental framework in Rónakeresztes is about the suppression of the visibility of segregation, poverty and social marginalisation. Only local non-Roma middle class representatives can participate meaningfully in the generation and planning of social integration projects, and local Roma organisations are contacted merely to comply with administrative requirements of EU tendering. As a result, representatives of marginalised groups can neither participate in setting up the local developmental goals, nor do they have veto rights in decision-making. Accordingly, the local government of Rónakeresztes defines local development goals and means based on the perception and interest articulated by representatives of the local middle class.

**Resource mobilisation strategies**

By resource mobilisation strategies we do not only mean the acquisition of developmental resources but the mobilisation of social and cultural capital that can be obtained through the application and reinvestment of these resources. As a general experience that also stands for the towns under analysis, the developmental projects for social and spatial integration only represent a fraction of the total accumulated developmental funds. Significantly greater amount of developmental funds are spent on the renovation of central areas and on health and public education institutions, as well as on the construction of public utilities and roads. The resource mobilisation strategies of towns prioritise the development of the whole settlement and the creation
and renewal of public spaces and renovation of institutions primarily used by the majority society. For town leaderships it is highly important that all social groups receive their share in developmental resources according to their social weight. This means that the indirect aim of the developments is to earn the satisfaction of the majority of voters and to maintain leaders’ legitimacy.

There are important regional differences regarding access to resources for alleviation of poverty and fight against exclusion. Nádas is situated in one of the “Most Disadvantaged Regions” thus it has wider access to locally targeted special resources as well. On the other hand, Rónakeresztes had only access to anti-poverty and exclusion standard funds, such as the Complex Settlement Programme, the Sure Start Project and the Social Urban Rehabilitations Programme.

Even though Nádas is committed to the integration of Roma, in some cases the interest of the majority society is considered more important by local decision makers. The town’s Integrated Urban Development Strategy identified five different segregated neighbourhoods all of which, based on the selection criteria of the call of the Social Urban Rehabilitation Programme, could be designated as a target area. The town leadership, however, decided to select a neighbourhood close to the centre instead of other clearly segregated and impoverished areas. “Our concept was that we find an area not far from the centre, thus the development can be realised in one block. This area is interesting because it is situated between two well developing neighbourhoods, the centre and the area of the Protestant church.” (Mayor) The case suggests that the developmental project – circumventing the local Roma actors – was used to regenerate and widen a central area between two symbolically important spaces of the majority.

Roma integration projects took place gradually, initiated by different actors. The Hungarian NGO, Autonómia Foundation, played a major role in project generation and empowering the local minority. Their project generating activity aimed to develop capacities for a subsequent bottom-up and socially embedded development. This initiation was strengthened by the social network created through the Foundation’s trainings and the emancipatory policies of the local government. As a result of these external efforts, an NGO was founded by local Vlach Roma women, and they could implement numerous minority programmes with the support and financing of other NGOs and corporate social responsibility programmes. Their first big Social Renewal Operational Programme (SROP) application was not successful, but the second one submitted with the help of an external professional company won the tender. Their heavy reliance on external help shows that even highly supported bottom-up organisation NGOs suffer from the lack of capacity and expertise of developmental professionals. This can create developmental gridlocks as newly founded Roma organisations have low chances of winning tenders without external input, while consulting firms not embedded in local society are less motivated to provide qualitative expertise.

On the other hand the local government was a top-down initiator in several local integrational project in which they combined different kinds of funding in various project cycles to create, maintain and enlarge two community houses in the settlement. The first community house was created with the above mentioned SROP funding in the central area of the town. The second one is located at the edge of the
Romungros’ segregated neighbourhood and was first financed by the Chance for Children programme led by the local small regional association. At the end of the grant it was taken over by the newly won tender of the Complex Settlement Programme. This programme also contributed to the maintenance of the first community house but with different social functions. While these various funds apply different approaches, the local government combined them to maintain the continuity of the integrational activity without major differences in the practice of implementation methods, along their general developmental framework.

In Nádas, Adél was appointed as expert manager of the Complex Settlement Programme. Even though her professional competence is unquestionable, some in the town’s leadership and in local society have been critical about her rapid upward social mobility: “a Gipsy cannot be the leader of a project of hundreds of millions.” The fragile new position of the Roma community and the empowered developmental elite could be seen after the completion of our field research. During a short follow-up research it could also be seen that central community space servicing the Roma integration programme started to be used to host civil organisations representing the majority society. In general, the integration of Roma and non-Roma organisations in a common space could be seen as success. However, in Nádas the former manager of the house and the kitchen workers - all ethnic Roma - were laid off and replaced by a non-Roma new staff. A local non-Roma woman became the manager of the house who is employed by a different project funding. The community centre, the old peasant house located in the town centre thus became the locality of symbolic struggles over urban spaces.

In Rónakeresztes, local leadership refuses to face the concentration of social and ethnic problems in the peripheral, segregated neighbourhood. Over the years, the local government’s developmental vision focused on the renewal of the centre and public institutions used by the majority. Developmental resources have been used for infrastructural investments such as building and renovating roads, buildings in the centre, while the segregated neighbourhood has only seen a fraction of the town’s developmental efforts. Development projects in this neighbourhood have been those that the town’s Integrated Urban Developmental Strategy required - a Complex Settlement Programme and a Social Urban Rehabilitation Programme - for future funding eligibility. In addition, the implementation of the Sure Start House has taken place with the specific goal of social integration. All in all, the town formally fulfilled its social integration commitments made in the Strategy but the general rejection of local social and ethnic problems in the segregated neighbourhood prevents the potential for social change.\footnote{The disregard of the social problems rooted in the social and ethnic tensions leaves room for the spread of “simplistic” and “obvious” answers offered by far-right ideology. In the autumn of 2014 the far-right party, Jobbik won the local election in Rónakeresztes.}

Relations between the local government and the RMSG - the only representative of Roma interests- is quite asymmetrical. Roma representation has been reduced to handle problems within the Roma community. This approach supports the local social status quo, which has been about the maintenance of hierarchical relations between the Roma and non-Roma population. Even EU funds with
requirements to advance the integration of segregated neighbourhoods were unable to change this state of equilibrium as representatives of the local Roma population were involved in developmental planning and implementation without mandates for decision-making and veto rights, purely serving administrative purposes of signing documents. This mechanism further enhanced existing hierarchies of the local status quo.

The analysis of resource mobilisation strategies provides illustration of two divergent developmental strategies. In Nádas, interconnected and synergistic projects have been accommodated to an overall developmental framework and helped the coming about of new integrated institutions (minority office, community house, Roma programme leader’s status). As a result of these projects, the human and social capital of the Roma developmental leadership has increased and the Roma community’s living conditions as well as their relationship to majority society have improved. In Rónakeresztes, on the other hand, in the absence of an independent developmental team and prior developmental projects promoting social integration, the resources of the ongoing project are used within exiting administrative mechanisms of the local government.

**Implementation and developmental trajectory**

This section analyses the implementation of two projects aiming at social integration. It focuses on who (which organisations), in what ways and to what degree participated in the coming about of the project on the ground. Special attention is paid to the degree and kind of participation of Roma representatives in projects whose target group is the local Roma community and, which aim at enhancing their emancipation through developments in social integration. The functions of the different community houses are very similar, even though they are defined and detailed differently in every programme: they host services and offer programmes that shape and empower the community. The Sure Start house also delivers similar functions, although it particularly targets families with small children within the community of the segregated neighbourhood.

In Nádas’s settlement a newly purchased house was renovated at the edge of the town to function as a community house (the second one in the settlement). Residents of the settlement regularly pass by the house on their way to the town centre. Social and developmental professionals have a daily contact with residents of the settlement. The project manager had formerly worked for a foster home in a neighbouring town for five years, so she knew almost every family in the settlement. The house has two Romungro employees, both from the settlement which was an important aspect in their selection. Due to the project leader and her colleagues, social experts are not perceived by the poor Roma families of the settlement as authorities but as support. The leadership of the town supports the house financially.

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8 One of them is now studying for her final high school examinations, the other is attending college. Their work schedule is flexibly adjusted to their studies and their educational activity is supported at every level.
as well as symbolically. The mayor and the Protestant reverend attended the opening ceremony of the house and since then they have visited the house weekly. One of the most important community-shaping activities of the house is volunteer work. Since public work can only absorb a limited number of people, it is challenging for many people to provide annual documentation on 30 days of declared employment mandatory for social assistance. As a solution, the unemployed can sign a contract with the family care service about volunteer work in the community house. They get the garden and the house organised, plant flowers etc. “We do not have a cleaner, a guardian, or a maintainer, but these are all provided by the volunteers. Thus we do not have the problem that somebody is working for money, and the other is for free.” In one part of the backyard a kitchen garden has been created and the produces are cooked in the kitchen of the community house. This kind of operation requires almost non-stop opening hours. Officially the house is open from 8 AM to 6 PM, and to 4 PM on Saturdays. But on winter evenings when people stayed to watch TV and to chat only to save heating costs, the leaders decided to remain open at local convenience. Although voluntary work to cover the 30 days of mandatory public work is rooted in a structural constraint, it provided an opportunity for social workers to get in touch with many families living in extreme poverty that had been reserved until then and also with the retired non-Roma residents of the neighbourhood. These people have become active members of the community house since then.

The community house has a profound knowledge of relations and problems of local Roma families; hence services defined in the project application are always adapted to local needs. This happened in the case of the highly debated washing and bathing service provision, which had caused great antipathy and indignation among the residents of the settlement: “we know how to wash, what do they think of us?” Therefore, the leaders of the house have bought a traditional rotary pulsator washer and a spin-dryer that can be borrowed and used at home for free. This eases the everyday housework for the women who have formerly washed the clothes by hand. At the same time, they do not have to bring their poverty-stricken clothes to a community space exposed to the public gaze. Flexible adaptation of strict mandatory hygiene services drawn up in the project application, to local needs allowed the programme to be meaningful in the life of the residents – in contrast to the never used washing machines in Rónakeresztes. Another example of the flexible adaptation was specified in the project tender proposing to include the community house into the warning system of the Child Care Services. According to this questionable but local decision social workers can oblige the family to use the services of the community house for the sake of the child. A similarly questionable decision was that to transfer

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9 The Protestant reverend holds a Bible class for children, while the mayor participates in the weekly community talks. In one of these events he offered to plough over the fields for free and then residents of the settlement can cultivate theirs with the tools lent by the house for free. During our spring field trip people arrived every ten minutes at the community house, bringing back a hoe or borrowing some tools. The majority of the gardens were cultivated and afterwards many home-made fences were erected to protect the plants.

10 The strongest aversion against the children living in the settlement expressed by Roma and non-Roma parents alike is that they come to the kindergarten/school with a neglected appearance. After this coercive measure feedback indicated positive changes in this issue in many families.
the customer services of the family care services to the community house. The premises of the family care services are located on the other side of the town, thus the relocation made services more accessible for the local population, although from the professional point of view it qualifies as segregated service provision.

The Sure Start programme was launched in 2009 in Rónakeresztes. The community house is in the neighbourhood of the segregated part of the Catholic school, situated at the utmost parts of the settlement. As a result it is in an uncomfortable walking distance for a mother with small children from the poorest areas of the settlement. All in all, the Sure Start house is located in a mixed Roma and non-Roma neighbourhood, close to a stigmatised institution, which defines its positions at the symbolic level and explains its stigmatisation in the eyes of the town’s residents.

Initially a former public worker had become the manager of the house, but she soon left for maternity leave. It was the task of the present manager to find the suitable successor but teachers with advanced professional carrier paths were not keen to work for the Sure Start House. As a result, she herself has been appointed as the manager, because as a retired teacher she was also motivated to be employed. She is well embedded in local public life; she enjoys the confidence of the mayor and as the elected local territorial representative she cares about the residents of the settlement.

The Sure Start programme is based on the inclusion of Roma as employees in order to enhance the embedded operation of the community house. One of the three employees of the Sure Start house in Rónakeresztes is the president of the local RMSG. Due to his character, his presence strengthens authoritarian practices rather than trust-building. “They fear him because he is a leader in the public work program and he can say that you don’t come to work tomorrow.” (Manager of the Sure Start house) This situation depicts local circumstances; the way the authoritarian male leader of the RMSG becomes the “Roma colleague” in the community house mostly frequented by women. His role can be understood as the community’s watchdog. His gatekeeper position in all the programs targeting the poor and Roma population (public work, different social projects) legitimates and enhances the strongly hierarchical system in which the poor Roma cannot directly connect to local institutions (parallel institutional system).

The other Roma employee of the Sure Start house is a young woman with a university degree, who formerly had worked in the employment centre, in the Family Care Centre and in other projects. Nevertheless, she has never been employed in a permanent position, because “they don’t like if a Roma is overqualified”. She is very devoted to the question of Roma integration just as her father who had been member of the RMSG for years. Thus she can really identify herself with the aims of the program and the role of a support staff.

The Sure Start house has made several efforts to reach its target group, the poorest families and to make programs attractive for them. Besides giving out leaflets and make appearance at different events, the Roma employee and the district nurses personally visited and informed habitants. However, visits by the Roma colleague were perceived by residents as authority as they mixed her position with the Family and Child Care Services’ workers. They feared that deficiencies about the household will be apparent to her and there will be consequences. This confirms that in an
institutional system based on hierarchies and exclusion feeds mistrust, cooperation and symmetrical partnerships are unfamiliar for every actor. There are no institutional mechanisms for the local community to participate in the work of the Sure Start house as it primarily is linked to personal relations of the leader. Older residents of the neighbouring streets sometimes get involved and help in the programs, but people living in the settlement do not appear as volunteers.

Programmes are organised in line with tendering requirements. Some mandatory services such as laundry opportunities are not used by the locals. According to the manager, poor families are ashamed to bring their clothes to public places, even though it would help them to save money. In spite of recognising this problem, local authorities in Rónakeresztes have been unable to find a convenient solution. In this settlement, authorities have not been able to mobilise the poorest Roma families to participate in the activities of the community house. According to the official programme of the community house, it aims to address disadvantaged families living in the segregated area of the town. In practice, however, the house is open to all disadvantaged families. As result, the target group of services offered by the community house has shifted to lower-middle class families that are unable to pay for services at a market price. In addition, the daily schedule of Roma families does not match the strict opening hours of the house; when it is open, women are engaged with housework. Offering one-two hours of warm shelter a day and some food is not a solution for those living in extreme poverty because they have to ensure a livelihood in the remaining time as well.

The case of the Sure Start house in Rónakeresztes implies that people participating in the implementation of the programme do not address long-term integrational aims and visions. While the leader of the house is working to fulfil the requirements of the project, the RMSG representative appears in an authoritarian role in the local setting. Only their young Roma colleague contemplates integrational opportunities from the point of view of settlement residents. While the house considers it important to reach the poorest, it could not adapt to local circumstances in a flexible manner. In this way the house, instead of pursuing an inclusive strategy, only follows an administrative routine and thus reproduces existing hierarchical relations.

The operation of Nádas’ second community house provides the example of the embedded developmental model, which is based on horizontal equal relations. This model adopts and accommodates the institutional system to local needs within the framework of the programme, integrating external local resources if necessary. The employees who come from the settlement enhance the daily operation and communication, their presence also strengthens the legitimacy of the community house in the settlement. Partnership relations are questioned continuously in this model as well, for example in the case of the Sure Start house’s participation in the child care warning system. But exactly those employees who are working for

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11 According to the manager of the Sure Start House being disadvantaged is not only a financial question. A young woman can also be reckoned as disadvantaged if she arrives by car, but has no family help in the childcare and if she is left alone with her questions.
integration and who are familiar with the local balances of power are able to guide the project in accordance with the original aims.

Conclusions

This paper intended to answer why and how similar developmental projects serving social integration can bring different outcomes in the examples of two Hungarian towns. The analysis mapped out the social context that embedded the developmental framework of programs in the two cases. Studying the implementation of social integration projects, the paper has examined networks, coordination mechanisms and resource mobilisation strategies that provide developmental capacities for the town.

The case studies support the hypothesis that social change and development are the outcome of institutional change that associates heterogeneous interests and distributes authority more or less equally among representative actors. The two cases assume different positions along a continuum, whose two endpoints are the socially embedded and inclusive developmental model that distributes authority more or less evenly, and on the other hand, a hierarchical institutional framework that excludes marginalised groups from developmental associations, mobilisation and decision-making. The developmental trajectory of Nádas has been characterised by a move away from a more or less embedded developmental model towards more hierarchical institutional solutions that began to expropriate achievements of earlier initiatives of social cohesion and shared public goods for the majority society. The developmental trajectory of Rónakeresztes has been stagnating towards the endpoint of the executive model with highly selective developmental networks and the lack of distributed authority in developmental decision-making, strengthening the marginalisation of the Roma minority in local society.

Our empirical findings confirmed expectations that the developmental regime coordinated by the central state can influence characteristics of local developmental networks by either supporting or hindering the distribution of developmental rights evenly among a diversity of local stakeholders. In Rónakeresztes the exclusionary mechanisms of the domestic institutional system were not mitigated by local initiatives for an institutional system that would distribute developmental mandates more evenly among disadvantaged social groups, which led to the strengthening of divisions between the local majority and marginalised groups. In this town, there has been not a single opinion leader who would undertake to disrupt the social status quo within the local community hence the lack of social integration remains invisible. In Nádas, however, the mayor, acting as a socially skilled entrepreneur managed to build local developmental agency, which mitigated the exclusionary mechanisms of the external institutional system for a number of years. During this time, taking the inclusion of poor Roma families as a priority of local policy-making, he took a leading role in supporting the emancipation of Roma and mediating between the local majority and the divided Romungro and Vlach Roma groups.

Mediation was part of the daily operation of developmental associations, as different interests and goals unfolded during the planning and implementation of projects. The association of different local stakeholders (the local government, the
Protestant Church, more privileged Vlach Roma, less emancipated Romungros) throughout various projects, led to the evolution of trust-based relations among social groups with heterogeneous interests and preferences (middle class versus the Roma; Romungros versus Vlach Roma). The mayor supported – and often initiated – those projects that provided synergies in the coming about of integrated institutions, such as the minority office, the community house and the Roma programme leader’s status. These provided space for active participation and developmental decision-making for representatives of marginalised groups. In Rónakeresztes, on the other hand, in the absence of an independent developmental team and prior developmental projects promoting social integration, the resources of the Sure Start House were used within the administrative sphere of the local government. As a result, in Rónakeresztes developmental networks have been selective for decades, leaving the local RMSG an exclusively administrative role to sign tendering documents. Project planning and implementation has been carried out by managers and social workers representing the local middle class. As result, the definition of public good has tilted towards representing the interests of the local middle class that eventually expropriated the project originally organised to represent the interests of families in poverty (the Sure Start House for marginalised families).

The role that external framework conditions can play in the evolution and transformation of local developmental institutions is well illustrated by the shift from a more or less embedded developmental model in Nádas’s earlier developmental history, towards more hierarchical institutional solutions during the follow-up research. Divergence from the original programme requirements in Rónakeresztes, and the gradual exclusion of Roma from the management and use of the community house in Nádas was due to the lack of an overall policy environment that would promote developmental accountability across state levels and sideways towards all representative social groups at the local level. In the absence of monitoring project implementation based on objectively and clearly defined benchmarks and rules for developmental policy-making that distribute authority across state levels, it is hardly possible to resist the local majority’s pressure for exclusive representation. Short-term project cycles, where external funding ends before social change could be consolidated also make development programmes on social integration vulnerable to local social pressure as municipalities that take over project financing find it hard to disrupt a local status quo in which they are also embedded. Even though with the appearance of exclusionary practices, developmental achievements of previous projects came to be questioned lately in Nádas, social and human capital accumulated through them are still important achievements of the town’s development model, with a potential for re-mobilisation at any time.

References


Interview With Deyan Kolev
By Szilvia Rézműves

Efforts Towards Roma Integration with Development Funds – Insight Into Professional Views

Deyan Kolev (Bulgarian) and Ádám Kullmann (Hungarian) are two professionals with field work experience giving an insight into the use of development funds targeted at Roma integration.

Deyan Kolev has an MA in Philosophy and History (Central European University). Currently he is doing his PhD in political science. He is chairman of the AMALIPE Centre for Interethnic Dialogue and Tolerance Association – one of the most active Roma NGOs in Bulgaria.

Szilvia Rézműves, the author of these interviews, is a social politician. She has been an interviewer in several research projects analysing the situation of socially excluded communities. She is national project officer of the ROMACT programme which is a joint programme of the European Commission and the Council of Europe.
“Without Roma integration not only is social inclusion impossible, but sustainable economic development is blocked too.”
- Interview with Deyan Kolev

What kind of EU or otherwise funded projects have been planned in the last five years in order to decrease social and spatial exclusion of people belonging to the Roma minority in Bulgaria?

Several sources were available in Bulgaria. The biggest was the ESF (European Social Fund) financed by the HRDOP (Human Resource Development Operational Programme). During the previous period HRDOP financed activities to improve employment assistance, social and healthcare services and education. Under the HRDOP there were seven – I would say – Roma targeted calls for proposals. However, other minority groups were targeted too, since the phrasing of the calls referred to vulnerable social groups. In fact, these calls became one of the main sources for financing Roma integration activities.

If we take a look at the Hungarian situation, Hungary had a special programme for the most disadvantaged micro region, however that was not the case in Bulgaria. Targeted calls were announced for beneficiaries such as municipalities, NGOs and schools. In fact, the calls caused great competition among beneficiaries and in the end the larger and better prepared municipalities, schools and NGOs managed to obtain funding.

What about other developments, outside of EU funds?

Alternative funds available in Bulgaria are mainly determined by the following donors: the NFM (Norwegian Financial Mechanism), the Swiss Fund, the OSF (Open Society Foundation), the America for Bulgaria Foundation and some Dutch funds. The requirement for 10% Roma participation was among the six priority areas of the NFM. The rate of Roma participation was part of the negotiations between Bulgaria and Norway. Therefore, the Norwegian government and Roma NGOs were active in this requirement. It was an important step, because otherwise nothing could reach Roma people through this mechanism. The requirement contributed to having some funding dedicated to Roma inclusion. The strong will and the support of the Bulgarian Government helped a lot. The Swiss contribution also had a Roma component with a small amount of funding. In the last five years the America for Bulgaria Foundation contributed too, and the OSF continues to work in the field of Roma integration.

For many organisations the situation became difficult due to the decrease of private donors – many NGOs relied on them. However, the advocacy of Roma organisations became successful with EU funds: five calls were announced under HRDOP. Advocacy made it to the Monitoring Committee of the OPs since there were representatives of Roma organisations, for example, I was elected as an observer from the side of Roma organisations. We had the possibility to play an active role in
the Monitoring Committee, and I can state that most of the calls were announced because of the active advocacy of Roma organisations and the support of the European Commission. In the preparation of OPs, especially the HRDOP there was no special investment priority dedicated for Roma integration. We managed to advocate for announcing some targeted calls with some investment priorities. It is not the same now. In the present period we have a special investment priority called social economic integration for marginalised communities such as Roma, which was not there in the previous period. In the previous period Roma were mentioned, but as a possible target group in several investment priorities. That is why we managed to advocate for Roma targeted calls.

**What are the interests of these donors and how are they related to development policies?**

The OSF and the America for Bulgaria Foundation keep Roma priorities high on their agendas. We observe increasing interest of ESF managed by DG Employment in the European Commission (EC) in the past several years. However, it is not as high as desired. It is the same with the Norwegian and the Swiss governments. They are interested in having Roma integration in Bulgaria: they want to put Roma integration among the priorities. I would say that they realised that Roma integration is part of the social inclusion agenda. Without Roma integration not only is social inclusion impossible, but sustainable economic development is blocked too.

**What are the main features of these projects in view of the development policy frame? Do they follow the recommendations?**

The OSF had had a Decade of Roma Inclusion and they more or less tried to follow policy indications they initiated. The other donors are taking into account that there is a Roma Integration Strategy and they follow their own agenda that is usually harmonised with the NRIS (National Roma Integration Strategy), but they have their own priorities. The Swiss Memorandum set education and health as priorities for Bulgaria and for Romania for this year and they support projects within those two categories. Similar to the Norwegian Funds who set several priorities, within which they expect 10% Roma participation. The NRIS formulating process is under the EU regulation, there was Council Recommendation of December 9, 2013, but there are no strict, clear indicators at the EU level.

**How did these projects define the question of “who is Roma”?**

People who are considered as Roma do not declare themselves as Roma. Many of them in Bulgaria declare themselves as Turkish, Bulgarian, and so on. Consequently, there was no clear way to describe who is Roma, and who is not Roma among the final beneficiaries. In some of the calls it was decided by the organisations who implement the projects. The Managing Authority (MA) asked the organisations, municipalities and schools about the percentage of Roma among the final beneficiaries and the organisations provided those numbers. In some of the projects
they asked for self-identification, but the criteria were still not clear. How to identify who are Roma and who are not among the final beneficiaries is an open question.

In my opinion, there are three possible ways to deal with the issue. Firstly, to dedicate the intervention to certain disadvantaged micro regions. It is well known which neighbourhoods are Roma. It does not matter if the people declare themselves as Roma, Turkish or other, they have this specific problem in their neighbourhoods. Secondly, to direct the actions to certain social criteria linked with poverty. In this way the majority of the final beneficiaries, who are in need are Roma.

Or to have the possibility for self-identification for different subgroups in the Roma community. Because in Bulgaria Roma declare themselves as Millet, as Rudari etc., but not Roma. So, when they have to choose whether they are Roma or Bulgarian, they choose Bulgarian not Roma. If they have the choice between Rudari or Bulgarian, they choose Rudari.

Both the first and the second way have some disadvantages. The third way could be better, it can be specific to have more possibilities in taking the different subgroups into consideration. However, also the three ways combined could also be a solution.

How would you describe the access to these calls? What type of organisations/institutions have a better access?

The most accessible funds were the private donors’ funds. OSF and other private donors set very easy criteria and many different types of organisations/institutions opened for the funds. The most serious problem was with the EU Funds at the national level in the previous year. The EC set some criteria, the Managing Authorities at national level set additional criteria because they want every single Euro to be recognised by the EC. The national government set difficult, bureaucratic criteria. In addition, the payment scheme at national level was also very difficult. Small pre-payment of approx. 20% was provided and after that everything was on reimbursement principal. It is different with private donors who provide much bigger pre-payment, even bigger than what their grant was prepared to give. What happened as a result of this bureaucratic criteria for application, for reporting, and for reimbursing? As a result, mainly big municipalities, big beneficiaries managed to obtain funds. Bulgarian municipalities are very different. We have municipalities that vary in size a lot. In the big municipalities the authorities very promptly realised how important the EU Funding is. That’s why they followed entire units and have established a directorate for EU funding, they have engaged experts for writing proposals and they have managed to attract lot of funding.

Big municipalities have big administrations with enough budgetary means and available experts, and they can allow their fees with reimbursement scheme; they can invest money and they can expect reimbursement. At the same time, the small municipalities are in a disadvantaged situation and that’s why small schools and small NGOs didn’t manage to obtain a lot of funding. In Hungary the Programme for the Most Disadvantaged Micro Region was a good model, but that was not the case in Bulgaria. Although it was necessary to have such a programme opened for the most disadvantaged regions, it attracted the smaller amounts of money. It appeared, that
EU Funding didn’t provide cohesion, but even made the differences between the regions much bigger.

**How would you evaluate the outcome of the development projects targeting Roma?**

The overall picture is not very optimistic. Certain good things were achieved at a local level. Notably, not only private donors but even the EU Funds through the Roma targeted calls supported mainly the local level initiatives; municipalities and NGOs applied and implemented activities at the local level. In some municipalities, in some schools good things were achieved. The problem is that these good things achieved at the local level were not converted into national policies. The logic of an intervention in general has 3 stages. 1st stage is piloting, 2nd stage is extension to more places, and the 3rd stage is providing sustainability at a national level. The 1st stage was done in many places. Of course there were cases of bad projects as well. Usually, the donors prefer to show the cases of good and bad practices, which can be useful because one could learn from failures even more than from successes. Regarding the extension, it was done only in few cases. Sustainability is the main task of the national institutions, and it didn’t happened. Hence, funding didn’t bring significant added value, it didn’t bring significant outcomes, because the outcomes were mainly at a local level. Many of the outcomes and many of the activities ceased after the end of the projects.

**What were the outcomes at a local level? Can you give some example?**

In different municipalities there were some very good outcomes. For example, a decrease in the number of school leavers, in the number of school drop-outs, improving the proportion of Roma who attend university. This is in the field of education. There were outcomes regarding healthcare and social services and particularly in some places, in employment. In Bulgaria, if we have to differentiate the fields of Roma integration, we had good results in education in many cases, not so many, but some good cases in the field of healthcare and social services. Limited results in the field of employment and almost no good cases in connection with living conditions.

**How do you see the involvement of Roma through these projects?**

The involvement was higher in the initiatives financed by private donors and significantly less in EU funded projects as well as in the cases of the Norwegian Fund and the Swiss Fund. The logic of the Norwegian and the Swiss funds and the HRDOP was to dedicate more activities at municipal level to municipal authorities and institutions. That’s why the involvement was not high – but there were some good cases. Moreover, as is mentioned above, in the past several years in this very important dangerous tendency many Roma organisations collapsed because of a lack of funding. In fact, only a few organisations at the national level could contribute. They need to invest more in the capacity of Roma organisations and also there is a very important need to outsource activities to Roma organisations who are capable. Because there are some activities that could be implemented especially at grass-roots
level, they could be implemented only by Roma organisations, Roma professionals and experts. But our institutions, up till now, do not have the culture to outsource these activities.

There is a need to increase the capacity of Roma organisations. How do you see it from the donors’ perspective?

I really would advise the donors to outreach some activities to Roma organisations. Especially, when they are linked with the grass roots’ work or with work which could not be done by other institutions. It is very important to delegate such kinds of activity. It is also very important to finance bigger projects of NGOs. What do I mean? In the previous period Bulgaria had a limit of EUR 200,000 for EU funded projects implemented by NGOs. That is why it was not possible to finance national level initiatives implemented by NGOs. There is a need to outreach to finance more activities toward to NGOs.

You already mentioned some blockages which were not a good case for achieving a better outcome. Can you please list some?

First, there were some bad models. Especially, when our institutions tried to transmit some practices from Western Europe that work for the so called new minorities, for the migrants. Roma are not a new minority here. We have been living here for centuries. These models obviously did not work well. For example, in two or three PHARE projects there was an attempt to introduce the so called teaching assistant or school mediator, in order to have a translator in the classroom. Despite having worked for the new minorities in Western Europe, it was inapplicable to Roma people. First, because many Roma speak Bulgarian. Second, if you insert a translator into a classroom, it is not accommodated by the present way of teaching in Bulgaria. In fact, these teaching assistants were trained in PHARE projects and the most well known of them was disappointed together with the school director, because they actually saw that this model is not working. In fact, these projects failed and it is a lot of money spent on a model that does not work. But there are some obstacles, such as the very bureaucratic procedure for reporting, especially within EU funded programmes, within OPs. This bureaucratic procedure took a lot of time from the staff. In fact, the staff involved invested more efforts in reporting rather than on activities; it stopped them from achieving significant results. This is another obstacle. The other important obstacle was the lack of cooperation of synergy between different types of institutions. It appeared to be very difficult to make the institutions work together. Even more difficult to make the institutions work with NGOs and with the local community. The other very important blockage was the lack of involvement of the local community. Especially, when the project was implemented by institutions. They do not have the skills to involve the local community and this is the reason for failure in this activity.
Did these developments meet with the needs and problems of Roma communities living in segregated settlements? Does the municipality consider the real needs of Roma community?

It is a big issue, since usually, when the project proposal is being written, the majority of the beneficiaries, municipalities and NGOs skip the preliminary survey on the real needs. Projects are usually prepared on the basis what the applicant considers an issue of the Roma community. Beneficiaries who are far from Roma communities formulate the issue even more weakly. It caused serious problems and it is linked with the lack of Roma involvement. Unfortunately, if the agent problem of the Roma community missed from the stage of the project design it is guaranteed that the project will not contribute significantly to improving the situation of a marginalised community. This is one of the reason why Bulgaria insisted on having Municipal Roma Integration Plans (MRIP) prepared by municipalities and on inclusion of NGOs to the preparation process. Municipalities can assess submitted projects by considering linkage to MRIP. Obviously, it does not guarantee everything will be perfect but it is a mechanism for consistently accounting the needs of Roma. It is a requirement in Bulgaria (in the NRIS) for every municipality to prepare MRIP. The quality of MRIP varies. In those municipalities where Roma organisations participated actively in the process, the municipal plans are better developed. In some municipalities it was just ‘copy-paste’ versions of some other municipal plans. Nevertheless, a big step was made to have local strategy document counting on Roma inclusion.

The new OPs started to announce their first calls. My colleague and I had the opportunity to advocate in these calls that every project should be in compliance with MRIPs. Realistically that could make projects meet the real needs.

In which field (education, housing, health, employment, culture etc.) are development projects placed more frequently in your opinion? What is the most “popular” field?

Education is the most popular field in Bulgaria. It is followed by healthcare and social services. We have good models in education and more or less well developed models in healthcare. In the case of employment a few good practices can be found. Living conditions is the most problematic field due to lack of expertise. No organisations work on living conditions and neither does the state, nor do municipal institutions have good solutions either. For some municipalities dealing with big Roma ghettos this is an issue. In Plovdiv for instance there is a Roma ghetto with 60,000 people and another one with 20,000 people. Practically they are like separate towns. The local municipalities do not know how to deal with that issue.

A good multi-sectoral pilot initiative by the Minister of EU Funds (and supported by the HRIDOP Regional Development OP) that included housing, employment, education, healthcare and social services has been on for three years.

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1 Deyan Kolev currently is a member of the Monitoring Committee of the Science and Education OP and his colleague from Amalipe Association is a member of the Monitoring Committee of the Human Resources Development OP.
Currently it is implemented in three municipalities, though the initial plan included four. Ultra-nationalists protested against the project and local authorities involved forced the project in the municipality to stop. It seemed to be one of the best projects, and although, the Mayor is very popular and successful in his position, the reaction of the right-wing made him stop the initiative.

Previously, the problem with Roma inclusion activities was the lack of funding. Nowadays the biggest problem is the lack of public support. Hence, the majority is able to make politicians step aside from Roma integration. Therefore, it is essential to hold advocacy – as we managed to include Roma investment priority socio-economic integration at marginalised communities such as Roma during the preparation of the HRDOP. It will be a special sub-priority called development of local communities and overcoming of the Roma stereotypes. However, without creating a favourable public environment, integration policy cannot be implemented.

What do you think about the selection process of these projects? Do you see any differences between East European countries? If so, what are they?

I think the selection process is not very transparent. And private donors are even worse compared with the EU funded programmes. Private donors do intend to support Roma integration projects but the approval of projects lacks transparency.

Do you think that the selection process has to be transparent?

At least the principle should be so and the criteria should be as concrete as possible. Applicants should have the possibility to complain and to receive reasonable answers. Regarding EU funded projects there can be a special commission, experts, and yet there are a lot of doubts about fairness of the process. In Bulgaria the municipalities that follow the same party as the government usually receive more projects compared with the municipalities ruled by the opposition parties. In this case the process is completely unfair.

Are the projects’ objectives coherent with the policies? Do they include know-how learned from any previous development projects? Do they focus on local sources and their reinforcement?

Up till now, new calls have repeated the previous ones to some extent. Their logic is to support local level initiatives and that’s why the tenders provide a broad framework for projects. In fact, within the calls applicants can apply with whatever they want. Actually, after piloting and successful practice proof, it should be improved by independent evaluation and have the guarantee for extension and sustainability. Unfortunately, this has not happened yet.

Our idea for the new planning period is to bring together Managing Authorities of the OPs and civil society to define certain standardised Roma integration interventions with a precise methodology. If someone wants to have a community centre, it should be specified what kind of activities will be provided, the number of people, areas of expertise, etc. Therefore, if a standardised intervention is in hand, a
project can be easily supported by the OPs and new ESF regulations that allow the so
called simplified payments. Paper work will be reduced, as well as bureaucracy. It also
can provide space for certain good standardised practices to be extended in many
municipalities. However, standardisation does not necessarily bring added value. It is
good in providing results within certain frames but not to exceed difference. Hence, it
is important to have possibilities for innovative intervention for piloting, but also to
have possibilities of financing the extension of standardised interventions.

You already mentioned the issue of sustainability of the good models. But how do
you see the opportunity for the sustainability of successful projects? What kind of
tools are available for the implementers in order to ensure sustainability?

As of now almost no tools are available for sustainability. Sustainability should be
provided by the state and its institutions from the state budget. Currently we don’t
have such an engagement by the state. Amalipe Association has been having some
initiative for years and they are expending. We are just trying to raise more and more
funds.

How can development projects affect the dialogue between Roma communities and
local authorities?

They can contribute at very high level and this is important for the success of the
project. No development project could success without cooperation between the local
communities and mainstream institutions. That is why it is important to encourage
partnership between local communities and local institutions.

Do you know of any projects that have their focus on Roma participation in any
phases?

A lot of projects contribute to participation. I’d give an example of projects
implemented by Amalipe using EU financing obtained directly from Brussels. There
are some Brussels operated projects. One of our projects was for establishing
community development centres as a means to activate a community to participate in
the development process, as a means to overcome some patriarchal traditional
practices like early marriages, etc. Within this project we implemented the activity in
11 municipalities in Bulgaria. In all of these municipalities the Community
Development Centres (CDC) were established with the support of the municipal
authorities (MA). The MAs provided locations for the CDCs. We smoothly
cooperated in all of the activities. We established the CDCs together with the MAs
and we developed the activities of the centres, and for four years we were the main
beneficiary of the project.

What if the municipality is the owner of the project? How would they deal with Roma
participation?
We had a lot of such cases and yes, this is can be a real partnership, especially, when every partner has their own part of the budget. This is very important. Now, within the new OPs we are advocating for all the Roma integration projects to be based on the partnership principle – to have the municipality and the NGO on the board and to guarantee that the partnership will be real.

How do you see the possibility to implement the same project in different Roma communities? What was your experience with the implementation of the same project in 11 different municipalities?

We deliver a tool to implement this project in municipalities with different types of Roma communities with different problems. It was our idea from the very beginning. It works well, when you engage local people and this is a very important principle of mine. They should be from the same Roma group, from the same municipality. Not to send someone to this community, but to have someone from the community. Second, the project should provide a space for concrete activities designed from the local level. For example we had an idea for a CDC to work on decreasing early school leaving, on decreasing early marriages, but what exactly was to be done was decided at the local level by the local community.

What kind of challenges did you face during the implementation of CDC project?

It requires more attention and creativity. But I would not say that it was difficult. In some ways it is challenging but it should be like that. For sure it is possible to pay some more attention to the local needs. The local people should be in the position to define what kind of activity should be implemented at the local level.

How can the local people get to this position? For example when there are needs which are related to capacity building.

First it is very important to employ people from the local community and to include them into different kinds of trainings in order to increase their capacity. It should also be a part of the project to establish local volunteer community groups and to work toward raising their capacities. It is a dual game. From the one side we should engage local people and from the other side, raise their capacity.
What do you recommend in order to reduce social and spatial exclusion of Roma in development projects?

I would recommend to have Roma targeted projects. The right approach is to combine mainstreaming projects and targeted projects. Second, it is very important to ensure Roma participation. This is not a moral issue, this is an issue of efficiency. If we want to have the activities implemented efficiently and if we want to achieve real results we should involve Roma people and the Roma community.

It is indispensable to make sure a community - despite the project framework - fits the concept of community development. Local capacity can then be satisfactorily realised and implementers can cultivate, raising low capacities by knowing where the stages are to intervene. No project should be implemented that sees Roma only as passive beneficiaries.

Do you know any country in the East-European area that has a strong integration policy?

No, absolutely not. The Roma integration policies are not strong enough in the countries with significant Roma populations, neither Bulgaria, nor in Romania, nor in Hungary. There are good strategies and good intentions but nothing concrete in terms of actions.
Deyan Kolev (Bulgarian) and Ádám Kullmann (Hungarian) are two professionals with field work experience giving an insight into the use of development funds targeted at Roma integration.

Ádám Kullmann is an economist. He was a programme coordinator in the former National Development Agency 2002-2009. Later he worked in the Open Society Institute where he was the manager of the Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma programme (2009-2015).

Szilvia Rézműves, the author of these interviews, is a social politician. She has been an interviewer in several research projects analysing the situation of socially excluded communities. She is national project officer of the ROMACT programme which is a joint programme of the European Commission and the Council of Europe.
“It is a sad thing that we must not speak of any programme with substantial funding as Roma, but that is the reality.”

- Interview with Ádám Kullmann

What are the most important development programmes for Roma integration in Eastern Europe in your view?

I do not think, we should define every word, but we must clarify the meaning of development programmes aimed at Roma inclusion. In my opinion, often those programmes that are not expressly “Roma programmes”, but reach a lot of Roma people, are the most important.

The importance of the not explicitly Roma programmes is illustrated by the regional programmes that I have the most insight into. In two countries, Hungary and Slovakia, larger programmes were started that could have effects on Roma integration. We have no information on any similar programmes neither in Bulgaria, nor in Romania, nor in the Czech Republic. In Slovakia they tried to achieve complex development in settlements or parts of settlements with a specifically Roma population. A significant amount of funds had been allocated to this, but the implementation failed: the designs of complex plans were completed, but by the time specific projects were planned and approved the allocated funds had been used up for other goals. In Hungary we can mention two attempts: the Programme for Most Disadvantaged Micro-regions (LHH) and the Chances for Children Programme (Gyerekesély Program) that have much in common. First of all – in contrast with the Slovakian programme – neither programme is a specifically “Roma programme”, but Roma integration is among the four or five main objectives of both programmes. This is because neither Hungarian programme targets settlements inhabited by Roma people, but tries the micro regional approach – at district level. However, the development of the most disadvantaged micro-regions is closely related to the development of the micro-regions as a whole – and that is why the regional aspect is important. There is no doubt that only a lesser part of the programmes’ funds are spent on Roma integration, but at least theses programmes are being achieved. I think there were two main causes. First, the Hungarian programmes had no explicit enemies. Since the programmes were not specifically Roma there was no way to attack them for that. It is a sad thing that we must not speak of any programme with substantial funding as Roma, but that is the reality. When few years ago people were asked in a Gallup-poll what level of support different social groups should get for, and how much should receive the answer was that pensioners and large families receive less support than they ought to, however, regarding Roma the response was the opposite. I think that in this respect it is important to say that the “Gyerekesély Program” is trying to reach the Roma through the children, and thus we can presume that they will not fall prey to complaints against the project as others have.

The other reason for the feasibility of the mentioned Hungarian programmes were that the LHH Programme and the Chances for Children Programme in part told to all regions how much funding they would have therefore, the micro-regions did not
compete with each other, but the allocated funds had to be used. To the contrary, in Slovakia they said that not every region will receive money, but only those who submit the best application will get it and so competition became very important from then onward. When the LHH Programme began in the summer of 2008 it really did generate a lot of conflict but by saying how much money each region would receive the local politicians, members of parliament and others saw that they had the opportunity of greater resources than most micro-regions could count on before. In addition, this financial resource was relatively predictable and could be planned for in a single framework. Because of this representatives started to use their parliamentary powers and stop ministers or the prime minister in the corridor of the Parliament to ask them about the Programme. Therefore, we could create allies instead of enemies. Perhaps it is sad that I have to speak about in what kind of political context it is possible to successfully implement such a programme, but I think this is a decisive point. It is least at least as important as the fact that apart from the political realities, we develop something technically perfect. It is interesting that in Slovakia they are rethought things and now they are trying something again, but a little differently this time. They defined some basic improvements e.g. access to drinking water, access to kindergarten, or even partly regulatory things, for instance to settle ownership of houses and lands, and name those as a state responsibility – and they would like to deal with those at the beginning. In this way they also allocate financial resources on the basis of need and not through competition.

**Were there any programmes in the past years directly aimed at Roma integration?**

Before moving on to the specifically targeted Roma integration programmes, let me say that the previously mentioned programmes targeting disadvantaged regions and groups can have an impact on Roma integration when there are built-in guarantees that ensure that. For instance, the employment of equal opportunity experts was such a guarantee in the LHH Programme ranging from problem identification to the evaluation of plans and projects; recasting negatively assessed project designs or changing rejected project proposals to include elements from other [successful] project proposals in the plan. These guarantees played an important role in realising the Roma integration goal.

The Settlement Programmes in Hungary were regional programmes specifically aimed at Roma integration. There were three tenders that had very specific territorial aspects and targeted Roma integration. The first call was the ‘Complex Settlement Programme’ directly targeting Roma settlements but its main problem was that it did not contain elements for desegregation. The second tender announcement was for successful contenders of the ‘Complex Settlement Programme’ for infrastructure development largely through support for renovation within the settlements, but that could also be used for desegregation. The third programme was only realised in the South Transdanubian Region as a pilot programme. The emphasis elements of the last one was on to support the moving of families who had been prepared from segregated environments into integrated environments.

Earlier mentioned programmes were supported by EU. Do you know of any others
for Roma integration financed by other alternative funds?

Obviously, many more programmes ran and are running supported by the EU and other financial sources but I only have a meaningful insight into some of them. If we look specifically for programmes implemented by non-EU sources we can mention a programme supported by the Open Society Foundation (OSF) and implemented in eight settlements. I highlight this programme, because the experts (as the Maltese Charity Service in Monor and Veszprém, Tibor Derdák and János Orsós in Sajókaza, Kriszta Bódis in Ózd and Judit Berki in Bátonyterenye) who worked in the eight municipalities collaborated and have learned a lot from each other. Professionals from very different backgrounds are involved, for example the Maltese Charity Service in social work and Tibor Derdák in education have more experience than the others. They did not have to plan every detail from the beginning, only the main goals and activities and the cooperation was such that projects could implemented in each settlement if the experts who worked at different locations were convinced that the plan made sense. It was not the donor who tried to practice control, but the experts controlled each other and if professionals from different backgrounds agreed, the supporter did not feel that there was any reason to doubt that.

What was the area or forum where participants could control each other?

There was a Managing Board and its members visited each other every month at one of the supported settlements. In the first half of the day they visited the location and in the second half they discussed next steps and the ongoing work they had in the eight settlements. To give a specific example: the operation of the secondary school in Sajókaza raised social issues beyond education and Tibor Derdák wanted advice and experience from the Maltese Charity Service professionals. The professional discussion in Ózd helped to seek a balance between the needed developments in the settlement and to facilitate the moving of at least one or two families to an integrated environment.

From the side of the OSF my task was the follow-up and I experienced that the control of the professionals worked much better than the bureaucratic controls we used to have under EU funding. There have been substantive and constructive professional debates. One of these conversations is very memorable for me. It happened in one of the settlements that participants were rightly proud to report that thanks to the ‘Tanoda’ (Extracurricular activity project) a previously unimaginable thing had happened: no one had to repeat the school year. The debate also expressed appreciation of others, but also pointed out that in addition to avoided school year repetition it is important that more and more people are getting into secondary school and go on to get graduation. Mutual trust has developed between the cooperating professionals and these kinds of remarks were not criticism but could have been very useful advice. Of course, at that time this mechanism worked well, but to develop it everybody’s effort was required to obtain more support for their own development plans. These professionals working in tension strength and without funds this kind of intense cooperation cannot be expected.
To what extent were EU recommendations or aspects of the Roma Integration Strategy addressed during the planning of different EU programmes?

Not at all. When the state explicitly provides resources for Roma integration, we have to make a compromise. The Southern Transdanubian pilot programme was the only where they did not compromise. With regard to the rest, one got the feeling that the tender issuer would like to do something for Roma integration but is afraid that this would be despite the views of the majority of society and makes compromises in the direction of real or perceived expectations of mainstream society. In this respect, the fear to support desegregation is typical.

This is very important, what you say, because it fundamentally defines the development direction of these programmes. In your view, in what areas are these developments actually effective? Education, employment, housing, healthcare?

All donors have different effective strengths, for example, OSF’s is to support local civic projects and the state’s is to strengthen the quality and availability of basic public services primarily in education and health. For instance, the visiting nurse network should not be the strongest in the Buda side of the capital (quite affluent districts), but in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County (which belongs to the most disadvantaged regions). Therefore, if the state channels EU funds to strengthen the quality and availability of the basic public services then I think there would be a good chance for it to be done well. Then there are employment and housing which have dropped out of this. Housing partly because it is very capital-intensive and it would cost very much indeed for those 100 thousand people who are living in the worst housing conditions in the country to be able to live in conditions that give good chances for their children to have a good school performance. On the other hand, living condition improvement rather seems to benefit only particular families, rather than for example, the development of education, which makes it easier for society to believe that it is in the interest of everyone. In my opinion, our society does not have enough solidarity to accept that resources ought to be allocated to improve housing conditions, not today and not tomorrow either. In fact, this depends on the state of society: it is good to see that the Iris programme in Spain allocated significant resources in the environs of Madrid to improve living conditions and Spanish society in spite of the crisis continues to accept that. They understand that it is indeed in the interest of the society to eliminate the ghettos, because in ghettos such things happen and it is a hotbed of things that are bad for society as a whole. They understand that everyone wins with this. This is good. So, one could argue in favour, but I think the East-European society including Hungarian society is not ready for this. In the meantime, it is very important to keep alive some examples of the belief that it is not necessary to wait until a conflict erupts, as it did in Miskolc. I think, most of the housing issues cannot be handled for the time being, but there is a need and we should work to have visible models, that there can be humane and good solutions for everyone.

With employment regarding EU-financed development it is a big dilemma
whether further training or infrastructure investment is worth more. There is little evidence showing what effect can be achieved with one euro support in an employment project with training or infrastructure investment. Meanwhile, employment is very important for integration. Before the crisis everyone stressed education. Since the crisis it is education and employment together, because income-generating opportunities should be given to families.

In your view, what mechanisms dominated the selection of the beneficiaries? How sustainable are the procedures?

This really varies. There are better and worse examples. For me the painful examples are the ‘Tanoda’ projects. Contrary to the Sure Start programme, where EU financing had been changed to normative after the first round, here the ‘Tanoda’ projects had to apply for EU rounds again and again. The problem is that the timing always slips and there are many period when the previous project has ended, but the next round has not yet started. OSF gave support to 25 well-functioning ‘Tanoda’ projects to bridge this kind of period so as not to have to lay off teachers and students. In the next call only half of the 25 ‘Tanoda’ projects were supported, the others were left without resources, while many other new, not unproved ‘Tanoda’ projects won resources from an EU fund. I don’t think that it was a conscious selection or that the supporter wanted to make it impossible for a particular ‘Tanoda’ project, rather it could be that the weight of the content criteria was too low in the selection process while the administrative requirements were too high. In any case, it is a very sad fact, that half of the best performing ‘Tanoda’ projects did not receive funds.

Such random results can be avoided by allocating on the basis of need rather than competition, as happened in the Chances for Children and in the LHH programmes. I think, this should be done in more places. If there is something tangible as a positive example in Hungary, this is it. In many countries they think that it can only happen through a grant application but if they could see concrete, referenced examples they can easily change.

What do you think about the sustainability of good results?

We should not expect a one-time development to bring sustainable results. The EU demands sustainability in respect of investment programmes, not for the educational, employment and social developments. How can the Sure Start programme be sustainable if the state does not budget additional funds anywhere? Obviously, not at all. But the EU does not demand it, only the Hungarian bureaucrats extend it when they meet this term and do not understand what it refers to. Thus the service in the Sure Start programme should be high quality to be able to help children. It is not the services that have to be sustainable but the positive effect which they can achieve with the small children. I believe that these developments - contrary to investments - do not generate money to operate the service but they decrease the necessity of social assistance and thereby they save money for the state. Sustainability is used as a counterargument against any social development and it is based on a misunderstanding.
Approaching from the beneficiaries’ side: in your view, what kind of institutions, organisations have had easier access to these developments?

There are millions of people, companies, NGOs who want to win support from EU funds. The OSF Making the Most of EU Funds for Roma programme was the only one that put money in, in order to allow those to take it out who would not be eligible otherwise. This programme was necessary because if Roma Minority Self-Government and NGOs planned Roma integration targeted project they had very limited access to EU funds. As a results of the professional and financial support given to project preparation and implementation in the frame of the Programme the number of those Roma integration targeted projects implemented by Roma Minority Self-Government and NGOs increased. At the same time, I think, EU funds will always be limited to NGOs and the state should pay more to strengthen the quality and access of relevant public services.

However, I think it is a serious problem that in those public bodies where the amount of EU funding has increased by many billions of forints they have not necessarily taken the steps that would guarantee the efficient and effective use of the increased amount which would really be needed. It is about trivial things: for example, the establishment of a governing body or a supervisory board, the mandate of a major audit, and a managing authority with renowned experts and publishing regular comprehensive reports about implemented projects, etc. I think it is a good direction that the state appoints a state institution as responsible. There is a need to invest a lot of money into the education system and employment services, but guarantees should be created as well.

How important do you consider in these projects the participation of those kind of civil organisations that are aiming at influence and to have a say in public affairs on a civil basis?

It would be important, but I am not sure that for this necessarily EU funds should be used. In slightly more civilised societies this works spontaneously, but here, in the Southern-Eastern edge of Europe it does not work so well, in any country. Not just in Hungary, but in any country.

How do you see the results of these development projects, how do you evaluate them?

One is that obvious, is that society is rather being torn apart than working together while at the same time a lot of money was spent. It also has to be said that more money went to support the more competitive sectors and social groups, than for integration. Measuring in itself how much went on social inclusion, does not matter, I think, if at the same time we do not look at how much money has gone, for example, as enterprise development, or to improve the infrastructure of Budapest and the larger cities.
Much more financial support went on urban development, which improved the centres of the cities.

The previously mentioned South-Transdanubian Region Pécs project-package is a good example of when the people who managing the city have faith to do something to stop or liquidate the breakaway of marginalized society. I am confident that this project-package will prove to be successful indeed.

Overall, it is very difficult to speak of results, because you cannot speak of one indicator which is relevant to all of the developments. Some programmes and projects were successful beyond the expectations, others were definitely not, or they had a negative impact. Overall, I think that the large amounts of EU funding could not have a clear positive impact. They just did not hurt Hungary too much. Before the LHH programme was started (in 2008) in our country fewer resources went to the most disadvantaged micro-regions. The resources for the LHH Programme amounted to 1% of the total resources for the entire period 2007-2013 while the population of the LHH micro-regions is 10% of the total population. 1% could obviously not compensate the amount of funding 10% of the population would need. But this 1% was concretely targetted and generated a positive process. After a few years the original trend turned: finally, more funds were being allocated to LHH micro-regions than to the other regions. In other words, those micro-regions where the Roma proportion is higher had a little bit more resources than other regions. This was not enough to integrate the LHH micro-regions, but it did have an effect in this direction. For example, in Bulgaria the opposite is the case. The situation is not very drastic there either, but the micro-regions where the proportion of Roma is high get a little fewer resources than the other regions. In Slovakia the UNDP (United Nation Development Programme) reached similar conclusions.

**How do you see the inclusion of Roma people? How should they be included into these developments?**

Obviously, there is a lot less than there should be. In the first place, it would have been nice if substantive work had been achieved in the Monitoring Committee. Each Monitoring Committee had at least one member who was delegated by a Roma organisation. However, some of the members had seen little of the operation of development programmes and they could not effectively represent the goals of Roma integration. It happened many times that members who were delegated by women’s organisations and they had seen equal opportunity in a broader range and considered it as a matter close to their hearts and they represented Roma integration more effectively than those members were sitting next to them who had been delegated by Roma organisations.
In fact you are saying that Roma participation is important, but just because someone who is Roma is there, that does not necessarily mean that they can properly represent their own interests.

Absolutely. Members were very much selected from the political field since only Roma organisations could delegate members. In comparison, in Bulgaria the most active Roma NGOs could delegate members into the Monitoring Committees. Thus, Roma members of the Monitoring Committees had the necessary overview, they spoke the language and they could effectively realise the purpose of Roma integration. They could manage to amend the content of substantive calls and to increase resources. In contrast to the fact that in Hungary the Roma members of the Monitoring Committees had voting rights, the Bulgarians at first only had observer rights.

However, not just the Monitoring Committee Members are important, but also the former equal opportunity experts, some of whom were Roma and some were not. In the effectiveness of the equal opportunity experts there were also big differences, not depending on who was Roma and who was not.

In your view, what were the main inhibitory factors preventing the achievement of more efficient results for these development projects?

When I worked at the National Development Agency with 400-500 people, and there were only four or five who had already been at a Roma settlement, and that was the number of people who at least had some impression of how these regions are left out from the development. I think this says a lot. It is not only about there being no intention to support Roma integration, but it is also about lacking the knowledge that could help to reach that intention and to allocate resources for that purpose. Obviously, it is not necessary for everyone who is responsible for development to be an expert on Roma integration, but more people have to have personal experiences. But for this you need to go and look at something and get to know some specific story. To be a bit more personal, I also grew up in the Buda side of the capital, in a middle-class environment, and I had fellows with similar backgrounds even in the primary school. People like me can more easily get into development policy institutions than those who grow up in a Roma settlement. I think this should change gradually. It was a good initiative which targeted the involvement of Roma people into public administration. I consider it important that we hired Romani employees in one of the Units of the National Development Agency, regardless of the previously mentioned initiative. But it did not go by itself. There was not one Roma applicant for years to job vacancies. Therefore, we had to look for a potential Roma candidates first and only then advertise the job. Finally, we managed it and he became a colleague the same as anyone else in the organisation.
What would you suggest in order to somewhat decrease the exclusion of Roma people?

I recently reviewed the operational programmes in Hungary, as to how relevant they are to Roma integration commitments. A good number have such commitments, which is quite substantial, but none of them is quite specific. For example there is a commitment to establish and develop 62,500 nursery and kindergarten places. But there is no specification which reveals that how many of them will be useful for middle-class mothers returning to work and how many of them will be useful for children who grow up in disadvantaged families. This specification could be based on regional aspect (with regard to the degree of development of the concerned municipalities or parts of settlements) or on a social aspect (with regard to the schooling and employment situation of the concerned parents). Unfortunately, there are no such specifications currently. And many more examples could be listed. Now, with the start of the implementation of the new operational programmes it would be important to highlight five or six particularly important planned measures and determine the time frame and the objectives to be achieved. Then there would be something that could be followed up and there would be a basis to evaluate what has been achieved.
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The Hungarian Democratic Opposition in the 1980's: External and Internal Effects and Resources

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Abstract

The basis of the article is that there has been a renewed interest towards the opposition movements of 1980s Central Eastern Europe. One of the most interesting of these movements was the Hungarian opposition which, considering its size was much smaller than the Polish opposition, nevertheless considering its social effect and network, had a significant role in the late Kadar-era. The essay analyzes the relationship of the State-party and the opposition through concrete events as well as analyzing in depth the strategy of the State-party towards the opposition. The piece concludes that concerning the Hungarian democratic opposition not only its ideological influence but its network building must be the source of further research as well.

Keywords: Kádár era, Hungarian democratic opposition, informal politics, human rights.
With the passing of time since the 1989-90 Central and Eastern European transitions, we are beginning to understand what we did not comprehend twenty-five years ago. We knew that opposition movements throughout Central-Eastern Europe played an important role in the disintegration of state party dictatorships, however, it was not clear yet, in what way and how they were of significance. Even today, we can not say that we know everything. Nevertheless, in light of the research carried out during the past two decades, we now hold not just the ideological influence of the opposition decisive, but the principles of organisation represented by the anti-elite (the rehabilitation of “informal politics”) are seen as important as well. Though I speak of the first in greater detail and less (and only in the Conclusion) of the latter, I suggest that the reader keep both in mind. The opposition groups and movements were simultaneously political and public phenomena, meaning they affected the system and the “life-world” at the same time.

As a preface (and with no claim of completeness) let me refer to a few works from which the reader may receive information concerning these movements. The volume edited by Pollack and Wielgohs presents the individual Central-Eastern European opposition groups. Bartkowski discusses the role and significance of the Polish Solidarity movement; Torpey examines the East German intellectual movements and their legacy, while the thematic issue of East European Politics and Societies (Blokker-Brier eds.) covers all Central-Eastern European countries. For those interested in the theory of opposition, I suggest the works of Alfred Stepan as well as Lewis, Hlavacek-Holzer, Helms, and Falk. (See Pollack and Wielgohs, 2004; Bartkowski, 2009; Torpey, 1995; Blokker-Brier eds., 2011; Stepan, 1997; Lewis, 1997; Hlavacek-Holzer, 2009; Helms, 2008, Falk, 2011)

Naturally this piece of writing is mainly about the Hungarian democratic opposition. Writing this essay I built abundantly on my own works, primarily on my three-volume book on the democratic opposition, as well as on my essay written about János Kis, a leading figure of the one-time democratic opposition. I also used the works of other Hungarian authors. (Csizmadia, 1995; Csizmadia, 2005: 289-301; Bozóki, 2008; Bozóki, 2010; Szabó Máté, 2008; Ripp, 1995, Ripp, 2006, as well as Bernard, 2007.)

Out of the Hungarian democratic opposition’s legacy, I am interested in at least two questions: 1. What international effects and external examples did the democratic opposition base its institutionalisation on during the second half of the Kádár-regime? 2. What political programme and strategy did the movement develop, and what role did this programme play in the collapse of the system?

Finally, in the conclusion, I summarise my findings concerning the examination of internal and external factors, and raise an aspect which this analysis can only refer to, but not elaborate on. This is the question of the informal organisation of the democratic opposition. Its “network capacity”, which will have to be the source of future research.
The External Effects: International Trends and Central-Eastern European Examples of Opposition

The birth of the Hungarian opposition is inseparable from the reversal of political reforms - due to Soviet influence - in the beginning of the 1970s. The recoil however, was not final. To such an extent, that the first time the Hungarian opposition really called attention to itself, was in January 1977, when 34 dissidents signed the petition drafted to free Pavel Kohout, the leader of the Czechoslovakian Charter 77 movement. Two factors played part in the fact that a declaration of solidarity could come about and the Hungarian opposition was formed: 1. a unifying concept was created, the idea of human rights; 2. the Polish opposition worked out a highly successful strategy, new evolutionism. The identity of the Hungarian democratic opposition evolved from these.

Helsinki and Human Rights

Though Convergence - the theory of the approach of the two world orders - was quite strong during the mid 70s, nevertheless the socialist countries thought that the general crises of the capitalist countries would continue to “deepen”. This appeared at the Brussels Conference of Western European Communist Parties in January 1974 and in the March 1975 statement of the XI. Party Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP)\(^1\). This evaluation was based on two pillars. Firstly, on the traditional notion that socialism was ab ovo superior to capitalism and that the constant voicing of its superiority is one of the most important comparative legitimating requirements against the de-ideologised system aimed at eliminating Marxism. Secondly, the alleged vantage of socialism seemed to be supported by the Western left’s “feedback”. Not just by the strong left-wing system critique, but the leftist type changing of the system as well (i.e. Greece, Portugal). This was fuelled by the Vietnam conflict and the ambivalent political, economic position of the United States. For the socialist bloc and quite a few left-wing intellectuals, the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Accords fell in line with this perception, as if it had been the fruit of the persistence of the socialist countries.

The West refused to recognise any sort of socialist vantage. On the contrary: starting from the mid-1970s it experimented with creating a new type of capitalism which can only be compared to the real socialism in a positive sense. With the closure of the Vietnam War, and the political, economic and intellectual organisation of the West, the socialist strategy based on comparative legitimacy gradually started to erode. It eventually became impossible to make citizens believe that there could be a positive outcome of a comparison with the West. Between 1975 and 1985, a neo-conservative turn came about in international politics. The leftist illusion of the global victory of socialism, or at least the creation of a democratic socialism - dominant among Western intellectuals following 1945 - dissolved.

\(^1\) Cf: The documents of the XI. Congress of the MSZMP. Társadalmi Szemle, April 1975: 4-39.
The Helsinki Accords had political and human rights antecedents going back many years. (Tőkés, 1977; Haas, 1977) Socialist countries considered the political antecedents their own merit, as the Warsaw Pact’s March 1969 Budapest statement “paved the way” to Helsinki. According to the “old” perception, the statement contained guarantees for the most important questions of European security (for example the assurance of the existing European borders).

On the other hand, the Helsinki Accord’s third basket contained the articles concerning human rights and humanitarian issues. This was strongly connected to the developments of the years preceding CSCE. Several high-profile human rights cases were registered in socialist countries between 1968 and 1975 which justified the need for the question to be dealt with on an international level.

Human rights could become a part of the programme of CSCE because no international treaty guaranteeing the area had been made in the preceding decades. Though the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on December 10, 1948, this was just the first step towards the creation of a legally binding international law concerning human rights. Already at that time the decision was made that two covenants would be necessary: one concerning political and civil rights, and another on economic, social and cultural rights. In the end, the General Assembly adopted the International Covenants and the closely connected Optional Protocol almost two decades later, on December 16, 1966. However, the necessary signatures of at least 35 states could only be reached at the CSCE. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) took effect on January 3, 1976, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), along with its Optional Protocol, on March 23.

In Hungary, the two covenants were proclaimed by statutory rule; however, the leadership did not sign the Optional Protocol. This is important in light of the later events. Article 1 contains the following: “A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a party to the present Protocol.” It is clear from this text that the signature of the Protocol was unthinkable for Soviet-type regimes. Violations of the State against individuals were unknown for the socialist legal systems. Signing the Protocol would have been equal to them giving up on their interpretation of law and politics. As (in the official canon) Marxism was the embodiment of the scientific ideology, the State signified the supremacy of socialism. Just as no initiative could face official Marxism, the State could not be called to account for anything, and especially not through individual appeal.

It is widely held that Hungary put in force the covenants on human rights. In reality we can only talk of this with restrictions. Though Hungary signed the ICCPR,

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by not signing the Optional Protocol it indicated that it still did not recognise external authority in the judgement of disputed issues or violations concerning human rights thereby relativising ICCPR and making their compliance with the obligations a question of interpretation.

The entry into force of the covenants was invaluable for international politics and the evolution of the opposition movements. The notion of human rights, the liberal concept of the innate and inalienable rights of people, became the means of regeneration from the “ideological crisis” of the marginal Hungarian intelligentsia. The social movements created in Central-Eastern Europe starting from 1976 could hardly reckon with a debate starting over the interpretation of the content of the covenants. This was exactly the case though, namely because the ICESR was more important for the socialist countries than the ICCPR. From the beginning of 1977, serious debates took place concerning the violation of human rights in socialist countries, as well as the unilateral Western (American) interpretation of human rights.

The XXIV. Congress of the CPSU decided on the programme for 1976-1990 concerning the construction of complete communism basically at the same time that the covenants took effect. From the perspective of communism, the concept of human rights was another “imperialist strategy” aimed at the destruction of the unity of the “three forces of world revolution” (the proletariat, socialist countries and liberation movements). While the socialist countries wanted to keep up the existing system of international politics, they saw human rights as a dangerous plan aimed at the alteration of relations.

Though the concept of human rights became the basis of regeneration for marginalised intellectuals, the dogmatic forces of the socialist countries strengthened in reaction to the human rights “doctrine”.

The Polish Example: From Revisionism to New Evolutionism

KOR (Workers’ Defense Committee) was the first Central-Eastern European alternative political movement following the Helsinki Accords and the enactment of the ICCPR. But where did this opposition movement come from?

Contrary to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, no reform processes started in Poland during the second half of the sixties. The ideas of 1956 however, were influential; Leszek Kolakowski, who later became a worldwide known philosopher, was expelled from the party for taking part in the commemoration held at the Warsaw University on the tenth anniversary of the October events. The dissatisfaction peaked in 1968, when - following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War - an anti-Semitic campaign started within the State and party leadership. This intensified in March, when Adam Mickiewicz’s piece was banned. At the last authorised performance, a fervent

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4 Társadalmi Szemle, April 1976.
demonstration of sympathy took place, with strong anti-Soviet feelings. A large-scale demonstration was held at the Warsaw University. During the anti-Zionist, nationalist campaign, more than 1600 students were dismissed; certain faculties were completely eliminated, the leaders of the student demonstrations were sentenced to prison. (Mizsei, 1887: 190-191; Rupnik, 1979: 60-65) Though the campaign was predominantly aimed at the displacement of the reform communist party opposition, (following Edward Giersz’s rise to power, close to 100,000 members were expelled) (Körösényi, 1988: 109-110) it became clear, that as the tradition of pluralism lived on in Poland, the line of battle would run not just between the conservatives and reformers within the Party.

As a result of the nationalistic cleansing, the Party could no longer hope for society to accept any sort of reform. Despite the success reached by the Party leadership with the signature of the Treaty of Warsaw recognizing the Polish borders, in December 1970 demonstrations and strikes erupted in several cities toppling the Gomulka regime. A new national programme was accepted in February 1971 which placed emphasis on the overall development of economy instead of selectivity. (Mizsei, 1988: 196)

Prices in Poland were practically frozen from 1956 to 1970 in order to secure consumer legitimacy. The moment they tried to change this, society revolted against the price rises. Economic policy deteriorated into a device for the prevention of social discontent. It was nearly impossible to break free from this vicious circle. Society did not accept the ruling power as authority; however, in order to preserve the living standards, the leadership had to make drastic attempts to try and correct the distorted economic policy. The period between 1971 and 1975 was an expansive period of the new party leadership; economic growth—though financed from external sources—was fast and undiminished. While the economy could not be turned around, the standard of living grew constantly.

In 1975, the amendment of the 1952 Constitution was put on the agenda, with plans to constitutionally anchor two fundamental points: the declaration of the leading role of the Party and the friendship with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, changes were planned in the constitutional definition of civic rights and duties. (Mizsei, 1988: 197; Raina, 1978) Contrary to the factors affecting the development of the Czech and Hungarian opposition, in Poland, the direct actions of the political leadership triggered the protests, and initiated the approach of intellectuals who otherwise held different world views. The protests of various social groups played an important role in the fact that the amendments became significantly milder than originally planned.

The other factor which had an effect on the reorganization and increased political activity of intellectuals, was the June 1976 plan for a price rise of 60%, which was even more drastic than the 36% of 1970. Following the day of the announcement strikes and walkouts were held. As a result of the demonstrations the price rises were repealed. (Mizsei, 1988: 197; Bernhard, 1987: 363-392) Nevertheless, proceedings were started against the participants and many were sentenced to prison terms.

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KOR was created on September 23, 1976 to help to free the convicts; provide support to the families of the victims, wounded and imprisoned, as well as to collect and share information on the events with those concerned. Owing to KOR and international publicity, the Council of State of Poland ordered an amnesty on July 22, 1977, freeing the convicted workers and KOR members who had been imprisoned because of their work.

How and why did KOR have an affect in Hungary? First and foremost, because it was an ideology-free movement. It was the answer to the question troubling young intellectuals who had become marginalised after 1968. KOR made it clear that the strategy of revisionism was over, and designated its main partner in society: the working class. Adam Michnik summarised the new Polish democratic opposition’s strategy – the politics of new evolutionism – in an article which can be considered the backbone of the programme. (Michnik, 1977, 1978)

Two different concepts of evolution came about following 1956. Both started out from the assumption that the communist system was capable of evolving. Michnik called one concept revisionist, the other neopositivist. The Polish revisionists tried to renew the Communist party and Marxism “from within”, hoping that the system could be made more democratic and that Marxist theory would integrate the modern elements of social sciences. The neopositivist view of evolution differed from this, mainly because it originated not within the party, but from the Znak group, a non-party Catholic parliamentary faction led by Stanislaw Stomma. The point of it was that it was not necessary to accept Marxist doctrine and socialist ideology but one had to be loyal to the Soviet Union. Stomma’s aim was to create the seed of a political movement which – at the right time – could lead Poland.

The two evolutionary strategies met the needs of the special situation starting from 1957, which was “a period of social normalization and political thaw, increasing prosperity, and relative expansion of civil liberties. Both groups reflected to a great degree the atmosphere of political peace and socio psychological stability.” (Michnik, 1985: 141) Between 1968 and 1976 however, as a result of the spontaneous social actions, (the 1968 student protests, the 1970 workers strikes, the 1975 protests against the amendment of the Constitution, and the 1976 workers demonstrations) the problems became obvious. Clearly two positions were facing each other: that of the oppressor and that of the oppressed. In the event of crisis revisionists and neopositivists always chose the side of power without examining the nature of their relationship to it.

What should our relationship towards power be like? – asked Michnik. The only possible strategy could be to place pressure on the power apparatus, reaching gradual changes, giving up the XIX. century illusion of the revolutionary toppling of power. One has to set out from reality: both the power of the Soviet Union and the Communist party will survive. However, one must not think that nothing can be done in this situation. The starting-point therefore is that: “...the interests of the Soviet political leadership, the Polish political leadership, and the Polish democratic opposition are basically concurrent. For all three parties a Soviet military intervention
in Poland would be a political disaster.” The Polish opposition had to prevent that catastrophe.

Convergent interests can lead to mutual allowances. As in principle the invasion of Soviet troops in Poland could not be excluded, the “concession” of the Polish opposition was that during the first phase of the change it had to accept the Brezhnev Doctrine, or the theory of “limited sovereignty”. It had to come to terms with the fact that there was no talk of complete sovereignty without accepting the lack of it forever.

Within the circumstances of limited sovereignty, the opposition differs from the position of the “old evolutionists” as it speaks not to the totalitarian power, but is aimed at the independent public. It is somewhat unclear what Michnik meant by independent public, as following this he writes: “New evolutionism” is based on faith in the power of the working class, which, with a steady and unyielding stand, has on several occasions forced the government to make spectacular concessions.” But what should the relationship between the new evolutionist opposition and the intra-party revisionists be like?

Michnik made it clear: there is no such thing as the relationship of democrats and democrats; party “pragmatists” are not democrats, they do not want a multi-party system or workers’ self-governments. However, they do not want to suppress the opposition either. Therefore the democratic opposition can be a partner of the party pragmatists in political concessions, but never an ally. The opposition has to be capable of distinguishing the different tendencies within the party, but should not confuse its own efforts with what the pragmatists want. Revisionists - Michnik suggested - never undertook the task of clearly defining themselves and forming a political trend. The democratic opposition had to do just that: “The democratic opposition must formulate its own political goals and only then, with those goals in hand, reach political compromises.”

This meant not just political, but behavioural reform as well. The intelligentsia had to work out the comportment of the non-conformist person, the “lifestyle of truth”. Michnik articulated these thoughts for the first time at the conference held in Paris on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the 1956 Warsaw and Budapest revolutions. The text of this speech (along with the main documents of KOR) became significant for the Hungarian opposition.

Making Contact with the Polish Opposition and the Western Emigration

1977 was not just an important year because a small group of the Hungarian opposition openly showed solidarity with the Czech Charter 77 movement, but also because it brought a change in the “international relations” of Hungarian dissidents. Even though the opposition existed before 1977, it was not “institutionalised”. Firstly, because prior to 1976 there was no organised opposition in Czechoslovakia or Poland either, and also because we could speak even less of organised dissent in Hungary than in the other mentioned countries. Thirdly, the passports of all affected parties of the “Philosophers’ Trial” and the Haraszi-trial were revoked – making it practically impossible to keep contact with the Western emigration – therefore personal contacts could not develop. There was no Hungarian lecturer yet at the October 1976 Czech-Polish-Hungarian conference in Paris; Gyula Tellér (writing under the pseudonym
János Kovács) sent his essay to the conference. The January 1977 Charter proclamation was indispensable for the breakthrough. This directed attention on the Hungarian dissidents.

Lacking personal contacts, the publications of the Polish and Czech opposition reached the Hungarian dissidents through intermediaries. Pierre (Péter) Kende, György Schöpflin and Bill Lomax played an important role in this. According to several accounts, the first personal contact with the Polish opposition was made in December of 1977.

Miklós Haraszti and István Rév travelled to Warsaw at that time. Miklós Haraszti could travel to the West for the first time in ten years – fulfilling an invitation to West-Berlin. Eventually, Haraszti went to Warsaw and talked with the leaders of the Polish opposition, Jan Litinski and Adam Michnik. The selection titled, 0.1% (edited by György Bence and János Kis) made especially for the Poles, served the strengthening of the ties well.

The second issue of Magyar Füzetek (Hungarian Leaflets) in Paris published all the writings of 0.1%. The following stands in the introduction by the editor: “It is not indifferent concerning the formation of Hungary’s intellectual identity, that there exists a young generation searching for something new, which is just cutting away the umbilical chord connecting it to the Marxist political and ideological ascendants. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind, that the Hungarian manuscript literature is full of authors who approach the question of nation and society with completely different terminologies.” In the introduction three different schools of thought are mentioned: the Christian Church, national traditions and social democracy. The volume only foreshadows these trends, however, it does not represent them. The editor also emphasised, that in the case of a “new movement”, full representation is secondary. It is more important that 0.1% “draws attention to what is new in Hungarian public life, the alienation and path seeking of the intelligentsia raised by the system.”

To speak briefly of the volume, let us see Miklós Haraszi’s introduction. Firstly: what does the title of the publication indicate? Above all the ratio of the representatives of Hungarian “unofficial literature” within the total population, as well as the fact that Hungary’s Western perception is “astoundingly” positive, many people compare it to the West, where the governments represent the will of 99.9% of the population. What could be the key to the Hungarian secret? The author looked for the answer not so much in the loyal behaviour of the people, but mainly in the positions of the opinion leaders (writers, social scientists), the common strategy of internal critique. The West was disarmed by the fact that in Hungary some sort of conciliation came about, and not between the descendants of the jailers and the prison inmates, but between the jailers and the jailed. The West thinks it symbolic if the two camps can make peace with each other; however, this is more than just sheer compromise. According to Haraszti, this conciliation is based on false premises, “it is

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8 János Kenedi’s verbal account.
9 Verbal accounts of István Rév, János Kis, Miklós Haraszti.
10 Cf.: Magyar Füzetek, Issue No. 2: 11.
11 Magyar Füzetek: 11-12.
not a movement evolving towards freedom. On the contrary, the way to freedom could only lead through the disintegration of this compromise.”

In this situation based on the “freedom of counsellors” virtually no one has the right to support the freedom of others. This chronic lack of liberty leads to emigration.

Thus, the background of the samizdat is given by the fact that a small minority of intellectuals had had enough of the “freedom of counsellors”, orientation and self-censorship. At the beginning of 1978 this circle had no other programme yet than the rejection of self-censorship. However, since the social environment was not supportive, it could have no other aim than to be “the symbolic voice of permitted disobedience of 0.1% of the citizens”.

0.1% was a conscious signal from the Hungarian samizdat writers towards the intellectuals of the Polish opposition. At first, 0.1% was published in Pierre Kende’s periodical, *Magyar Füzetek*. According to Kende, he did not have the means to create a publication representing Hungarian critical thought - before the end of the seventies. He must have meant that an organised opposition did not appear in Hungary before 1977. Up until the appearance of *Profil* - Kende did not believe that there were enough manuscripts in Hungary for it to make sense to start *Magyar Füzetek*. The mission of *Magyar Füzetek* was to aid the formation of “professional, systematic, political self-reflection”, to create a forum for non literary, non nostalgic analysis, filling the void within Hungarian (and emigrant Hungarian) public thought. It was even more important though, for a new opposition movement to enter the scene, which had already broken with Marxism. This makes it clear why a closer cooperation could not come about earlier between the emigrants and those at home. Those living abroad saw the budding opposition as too Marxist, and this view remained unchanged between 1973-76. On one hand, the proclamation of solidarity of the Hungarian “34’s” was needed, on the other, the compilation of *Profil* (which could hardly be called Marxist) in order for the conditions for taking up contact to come about. According to Kende, there were two things that the Hungarian dissidents did not understand until the middle of the seventies: that “Marxism does not give a framework for modern democratic civil thought”, and that the nation is a central category of political thinking and political discourse is fundamentally within national frameworks.” Kende thought, that it was they, who spoke from the “outside” who gave these two aspects.

Both the questions of democracy and the nation were issues which appeared very rarely among the Hungarian dissident intelligentsia prior to 1977-78. Of course we have no reason to say that these questions became part of the Hungarian areas of interest solely as a result of the Hungarian emigration in Paris, however, it seems certain that they contributed to the opposition’s later self-definition. We can also say perhaps, that they played part in the opposition turning towards István Bibó, as well as

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12 Miklós Haraszti: Az egytized százalékos terv (The One Tenth Percent Plan), *Magyar Füzetek*, Issue No. 2.: 15.
13 Haraszti: 11-12.
14 Interview with István Kemény, Interjúk: 34.
15 From the Parisian Tower interview: 35.
16 From the Parisian Tower: 36.
in the fact that the dissident Hungarian intellectuals searched for and partly identified, those most important internal problems to which they had earlier paid meagre attention.

Magyar Füzetek, remained the scene of the path finding and debate of the Hungarian opposition later on as well, yet 1978 was the year when the dissident Hungarian intellectuals first reflected upon their “situation”.

The Programme and Strategy of the Hungarian Opposition

The end of the 1970s still meant very difficult circumstances for the budding opposition. Partly because very few people participated in the movement (especially compared to Poland); and partly because the authorities tried to render its existence impossible. Nevertheless, the movement had started living a life of its own, the proof of which was the organisation of the Western and Polish orientation and the establishment of contacts.

The next step could be no other than the creation of the programme, which set the not too numerous Hungarian opposition in front of a huge challenge. This meant weighing the possibilities of following the external examples, especially after the introduction of martial law in Poland (December 13, 1981). Many in the Hungarian opposition thought that the “self containment” movement of the 1971-1977 period could not be continued, and they felt, that a considerable hardening of power will follow, resulting in the certain dissolution of the opposition. (György Bence belonged to this group.)

Others, (e.g. János Kis, Miklós Haraszti and Ottília Soli) thought otherwise. This “optimistic” part of the opposition created the first real samizdat-publication, the Beszélő (Speaker). This periodical became (between 1981 and 1990) the most important organ of the democratic opposition, and this is where the first programmes were laid down, starting in 1982. The need and necessity to define themselves, is important for every movement, and the perpetual debate over self-definition (lasting until 1987) played a significant role in the survival of the Hungarian opposition. The opposition had a great part in shaking the system of János Kádár, but the real breakthrough came with the since then famous document called Társadalmi Szerződés (Social Contract).

The Programme of the Social Contract

The “Social Contract” was not created through the active pressure of large social groups. Such large-scale social movements (similar to the Poles) did not exist in Hungary. It is no accident that the earlier analyses in Beszélő spoke repeatedly of public opinion, trying to deduce an opposition strategy from the condition of public opinion (mainly the opinions of the intelligentsia). Public opinion was a central element of the programme called How to Find a Way out of the Crisis? (Hogyan keresünk kiutat a válságból?). The article titled Fáradt akarók hada (The Army of Tired Activists) which appeared in 1986, reported the “activation of public opinion” (and not of certain social groups) which of course meant dissatisfaction rather than an
intention of political activity. According to the article “the majority” was not politically active; despite the discontent of millions only a few hundred people participated in regular, targeted political activity. In this article, Beszéľő mentioned the possibility to resolve this contradiction by asking: “Should we not try to pull ourselves out of the swamp by our own hair as in the tale of Baron Münchausen?”

This “self-rescue” programme was created only in the middle of 1987, following the appearance of other opposition movements. Why was this so? On the one hand, the economic and systemic crisis was clear, as well as the crisis of the principle of exercising power. On the other hand, as we can read in the February 1987 article titled Vég és kezdet (End and Beginning) “the people haven’t sprung into action yet”. The growing unrest and discontent intensified the activity of the groups of intellectuals who had been formerly loyal to the system but not the activity of the majority. There is a “lively flow of thoughts and patterns of behaviour” between the (oppositional and official) intelligentsia, however a political programme cannot come out of this alone. Beszéľő wanted to remain true to deducing its tasks from the state of public opinion. This is why it stood at the beginning of the Social Contract that: “Public opinion no longer believes that there is a point to further sacrifices.” It goes on to say, that: “The object of general discontent has been personified... There is one thing in which everyone agrees from the worker to party cadre: Kádár must go!”

The editors stated with these sentences that public opinion had changed, it had become the direction and aim of existing discontent; and – parallel to this – that there was an alternative to János Kádár and Kádárism (which the 1986 End and Beginning article viewed pessimistically). The only way to deal with the crisis – which is not solved solely by Kádár leaving – is with a Social Contract reached through open negotiations.

At the same time, it was also clear that the change in public opinion was restricted; even if the public agrees with the need of Kádár’s leaving, the majority continues to remain passive in demanding a different type of politics. This circumstance sheds light on the internal contradictions of the programme: the main tendency of a possible opposition programme can be spelled out from this change in public opinion however, the contents cannot be automatically deduced from this change. This is why the editors said: “The key question of politics today is whether the termination of the tacit agreement will be followed by a push for an open social contract.” Here followed a list of things that had to be done after this: society had to create effective forums of speech; be these forums in workplaces, in KISZ (Hungarian Young Communist League), Hazafias Népfront (Peoples Patriotic Front, PPF), clubs, party open days or elsewhere. After all “power will only enter a dialogue if it feels that it has to negotiate not just with intellectuals.” Strong illusions still lived in the Social Contract towards some sort of workers’ self-organisation which would have been meant to supplement the intellectual character of the reform movements. The relationships of the opposition in this direction were weak however.

The political programme was designed for public opinion in general, not for specific social groups. That is, the role of the opposition, the tasks that followed from

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18 I analyse the Social Contract based upon Volume II. of BÖK (748-791.) I do not indicate the pages of the citations.
the programme were unclear.\textsuperscript{19} The set of additional steps through which the Social Contract would orient itself towards a possible social base was undefined. At the same time, the primary function of the Social Contract is not so much to “extend its base” as to show an alternative of compromise leaning on its already existing base.

One of the essential points of this programme is the stipulation according to which the political demands of 1956 (multi-party system, self-management, neutrality) are not outdated, but untimely. Thus, for a timely programme, one has to go back not to October 1956 but to November (to the suggestions of the democratic parties and Workers’ Councils)\textsuperscript{20} and examine “how could the fundamental political questions which have been postponed since the crushing of the Revolution finally be posed under these circumstances?” (Meaning a one party system). The editors knew that people would want more than just the suggested compromises. However, the aim of the programme was to facilitate that change would start at that time already, not just when the external conditions would change. \textit{Beszélő} suggested the constitutional restriction of party rule; freedom of the press defined by laws; protection for the workers interests guaranteed by the right of assembly; fair social policy and the respect of civic rights in light of this.

Concerning living with the one party system, the Social Contract made it clear that the MSZMP may keep its privileged position if it integrates into the state’s legal system. Public opinion (as well as the majority of the party members) lost its faith in the system and the legal modifications because they left the party’s status as something “above the law” untouched.

Aside from the legal regulation of the party, the programme dealt emphatically with the Parliament, as well as the social checks over government activities. The former held an important place in the previous 1982 programme as well, this time however it was supplemented with new elements (vote of confidence before the appointment of the Council of Ministers (Minisztertanács), extension of the Parliament’s rights for appointment etc.). Along with this, the parliament-substituting role of the Presidential Council had to be terminated, the existing electoral system needed to be modified; public organisations, the party included, would nominate candidates on a larger, national list. In individual constituencies the candidates of the PPF and individual candidates could run. The information law (which fixes the obligation of the government to provide information) and the law on civil initiatives and referendum were mentioned in connection with the social checks on the government.

The chapter concerning the freedom of the press had history too: the ’82 program contained suggestions on book and magazine publication (moreover, in September 1983, \textit{Beszélő} turned to the legal, judicial and administrative commission

\textsuperscript{19} Miklós Gáspár Tamás said in the review and critique cited, that the program does not contain tasks for the opposition much rather an intellectual challenge. Miklós Gáspár Tamás gives the reason for this as well, which is the “relative weight” of the \textit{Beszélő}-group. Without them being asked, \textit{Beszélő} became the programme of the opposition’s non-ideological activists as a result of its special ideological-political authority. (\textit{Hírnöndö}, March-July: 5.)

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Beszélő} did not have a single position on this issue. I.e. Sándor Szilágyi thought from a human rights perspective, that the demands of 1956 - which he thought unquestionable as well - needed to be “suspended”. (Cf. \textit{Legyünk az emberi jogok űskeresztényei} (Let Us Be the Early Christians of Human Rights) speech, October 23, 1986.)
of the Parliament, making a suggestion for the principles of media regulation.) We can also count among the antecedents the Hungarian democratic opposition’s appeal to the European Cultural Forum (in October, 1985), where they fought for the full prevalence of the freedom of the press.

The Social Contract speaks in a more in-depth way about the protection of the freedom of the press than previously. Mass media, publications, publishers as well as unauthorised publications (of which samizdat was only a part) were mentioned separately in the text. According to Beszélő, in all three areas there was conflict between the political requirements of official authorities and members of the media. To what extent can the media be controlled? The authors of the programme stated in this case as well that their goals are humble: “to show how far the official media control can reach, and how the media can gain protection from undue interference.”

The programme saw that the State’s dependence and the taboo-topics of the Warsaw Pact’s military policy will remain. Therefore, the law on censorship was designed to protect these, while ending the arbitrary restrictions. In general, following publication, it can be exercised through judicial means, but in the case of civil associations or natural persons preliminary censorship is possible.

With this, Beszélő clearly stated its position in the debate within the opposition concerning the necessity of censorship. This debate originates from the second half of the seventies. (E.g. in the Túlpartról (From the Opposite Bank) volume or István Eörsi’s speech at the Hungarian Writers’ Association.) An interesting aspect of it was György Bence’s article, Cenzúrázott és alternatív közlési lehetőségek a Magyar kultúrában (Censored and Alternative Possibilities for Publication in Hungarian Culture), as well as Ferenc Kőszeg’s writing, titled Anti-Bence. Bence took a stand against the law on censorship, as the 1985 proclamation of the opposition did not accept the law on censorship, since it contained the sentence that “The government has to tolerate public criticism ranging all the way to the demand of the alteration of social and State order.” According to them, the future law created by Parliament concerning mass-media had to state: all ideas can be freely disseminated in the event that they do not promote violence, war, or racial discrimination. Censorship – encapsulated in this law – can only be used in these cases.21

This was not what appeared in Beszélő’s programme as the 1985 proclamation was not Beszélő’s own programme, but the manifest of the whole opposition, while the Social Contract reflected solely Beszélő’s position.22 (For many, the Social Contract’s suggestion concerning the legalisation of censorship was unacceptable.)

Concerning special interest groups and social policy the most interesting ideas are those on authority-free employment and workers’ self-management. The programme was about equal conditions of competition for the different proprietors of capital in the workplaces. It did not want the concentration of power based on private property. The creation of a unified capital market had to be connected with the vigorous enhancement of workplace self-management.

21 Beszélő No.15. BÖK, Vol. II.: 335.
22 I.e. Demokrata’s 1986 reform programme demanded all – open, veiled or secret – forms of censorship to be terminated. (Demokrata, 1983, Issue No.3.: 3.)
In the part concerning social security and fair social policy, the most important idea was that the “the complete institutional mechanism of social policy has to change”. The introduction of population policy (elementary school, family allowance, healthcare) into the programme was new. It clearly mirrored the experiences of SZETA (Foundation to Support the Poor).

According to this chapter the most serious chronic indicator of the social crisis was the population splitting into, a consolidated majority and an unconsolidated nation of pariahs. This suggests that despite all contrasts, there were strong ties connecting the democratic opposition and the “folk” opposition.

The fifth part dealt with civic rights. The programme built on Beszélő’s earlier positions in this area, but went further regarding the declaration of the ICCPR as the basis of its train of thought. They wrote: “The compromise entailing the maintenance of the one-party system undoubtedly limits civic rights in the public sphere. The compromise does not justify however the restriction of civic rights belonging to the sphere of civil law.” The programme saw social minorities (“vagrants”, mentally impaired, HIV/AIDS-infected persons, drug users etc.) as well as minority groups (believers, conscientious objectors) as belonging to the sphere of civil law. These groups could only be protected through human rights guarantees, for which independent and supervised courts were needed, and - in line with Beszélő’s old wish - a constitutional court. Furthermore, the separation of church and state had to be provided for, as well as a law on religious freedom. This had to secure unarmed or civil service for all conscientious objectors.

The Social Contract dealt with wider issues as well such as “Hungary in the Soviet World Order” or the minority question. The authors pressed for a change in the official minority policy and formulated the principles of a democratic minority policy. They took a stand concerning the collective rights of national minorities based on the individual rights of people. They also made it clear that the minority problem could not be solved with a “fair border revision”. They held the publicity of the minority issue and civil initiatives essential. They held that change was necessary because of the indefensibility of the Romanian minority policy. The actions of the Hungarian leadership to restore the relations were not effective, therefore public debate was inevitable if the “Hungarian State does not want to assist in Romanian Hungarians being ruined and affronted.” The Hungarian government had to make Hungarian minorities feel that they were not on their own. This would inevitably lead to the need for dialogue with the “democratic minded circles” of the given countries.23

Finally, the programme took a stand concerning the role of 1956 in Hungarian politics of the time. The authors saw 1956 as a key issue, which, if not clarified “would cause the Social Contract to be unstable, even if it were created.” The MSZMP however, should not make concessions out of compulsion, but as a step forward. “The work of the party reformers was to reach an interpretation of ’56 which is still

23 The Democratic Opposition traditionally had an opinion about the minority issue. This was most comprehensively expressed in the article titled Magyarország 1983 tavaszán (Hungary in the Spring of 1983). (Beszélő, Issue No. 7. BÖK, Vol. I.: 335-338.) Several elements of this text can be found also in the Társadalmi Szerződé. For the practical aspects of the minority issue see: A kisebbségek kérdése – Magyarországon (The Minority Question - In Hungary): Ervin Csizmadia, 1993: 284-289. For Ellenpontok see: 234-237. For Duray-Bizottság see: 289-292.
compatible with the continuity of power, but does not exclude dialogue.” The authors of the programme were careful that the “Kádár must go”-type call for radical rupture should not mean “discontinuity” for the party as in the case of 1956. The Social Contract imagined a gradation in the official reinterpretation of 1956, but expected a convincing demonstration of the sincerity of intentions. (They had to wait until 1989 for Imre Pozsgay’s “historic” announcement about the classification of 1956 as a popular uprising.)

Erzsébet Nagy, the daughter of the executed Prime Minister, formulated her message (on the 29th anniversary of the death of Imre Nagy) demanding the complete rehabilitation of the revolution; the exhumation of those executed; as well as their burial in a common national mass grave.

The position of the Social Contract was somewhat different. It also required the elimination of all consequences of the retributions following the revolution, however, it argued differently. It turned to the Ministry of Justice in the name of humanity and according to the regulations of the penal law. It expressed the need to settle the situation of those who were convicted in ’56. The Supreme Court has to state: “the relatives can ask for retrial in order to clarify what was the real role of their lost ones in the events of 1956... The elimination of the consequences of the retributions would be the first step towards a real reconciliation without lies and withheld information... If there will be enough courage in the new leadership to convey to the past the historical causes of discord, then there will be a chance for an orderly opening based on compromise.”

This called for a change in the behaviour of those in power as well. The secret to success: we must not be afraid of concessions, even if the motivation to our fear is that the budding social movement will “inevitably surpass its original goals.” The Social Contract signalled that: the fragmentation of society is exactly the stabilising factor that prevents this “over running”, as society is not “facing the power as one” (like in 1956). The final conclusion drawn from this was that: “The political reforms which preoccupy public thought do not create one centre of power facing the party, but several counterbalances working together in a diverse way.”

This last sentence paraphrased the Social Contract’s quintessence: the programme of pluralism of institutions not party politics. Beszélő consciously renounced the creation of a multi-party system or an alternative centre of power. Therefore it was such a “minimal programme”, which was “soft enough for it not to be blow provoking, but hard enough not to go unseen.” It was intentionally softer than it could have been; its self-restraint was born under the shadow of “the power’s fist.”

Despite all disintegration, in the summer of 1987, we cannot say that the ruling power suffered final defeat, namely that it was incapable of demonstrating its strength.

24 Concerning the issue of 1956, the first demands in Beszélő – mainly concerning questions of piety – were made in 1983. Following this, the periodical dealt with the topic several times. Issue No. 18. contained a thematic compilation. Issue No. 19. dealt with the retaliations following the revolution and stated that: “1956-57 became a political issue from a moral issue.”

25 The 1986 editorial article titled Fáradt akarók hada (The Army of Tired Activists) stated that: “For years every initiating group has been trying to figure out how to “exert public resistance that is soft enough not to be blow provoking, but hard enough not to go unseen.” (BÖK, Vol. II.: 351.)

26 See: Beszélő, Issue No. 16.
against the opposition. The power stepped up more forcefully against those groups who exhibited stronger resistance. It can be said, that the degree of resistance became the measure of the reaction of power.

**Conclusion**

In the following, I summarise the conclusions of the review of the two aspects of the phylogeny of the Hungarian democratic opposition. Firstly, the opposition embedded itself to a great extent into the international environment, which was shaped by a wider western and a narrower Central Eastern European project. From a broader perspective, the activities of the Hungarian opposition are connected to the process started in Helsinki in 1975, while ideologically linked to the human rights topic. Without Helsinki, there is no opposition. From a narrower perspective, the more established and institutionally richer Polish opposition was the example which led the way in several aspects for the Hungarian movement.

In addition, the opposition could be successful because it was in touch with domestic realities, and it could develop original ideas and an institutional structure for an “evolutive” coexistence with the Kádár-system which later turned into a multi-faceted critique. In this essay I have presented in detail the key to this strategy, the Social Contract, which, while it did not contain a radical split with the regime, nevertheless starts with the famous words, “Kádár must go”.

It is true that the opposition inflicted the greatest blow on the system by a./ “internationalising” politics and finding external allies for itself in face of the inward turning system b./ rehabilitated political thought and developed a complex political strategy. It did not contribute to the fall of the system merely in these two areas however, but with its informal concept of organisation, which at the time was new. I can only mention these organisational principles at this time, however I could not yet undertake a more in-depth study of this subject. Nowadays - owing to the research carried out in this area over the past 25 years - we know a lot about the fact that informal politics, or network-like organisation, is an integral part of democratic politics. However, less attention was paid so far to the fact that informal politics can have an important role in non-democratic systems as well. The democratic opposition in Hungary - having no other terrain - made this informal principle the central element of its organisation, creating a flexible “anti-structure” against the inflexible formal structure of state power. This did not merely mean a “parallel state” (as many people wrote at the time), but rather a free, fast and mobile organisation, which could be successful exactly because of its speed and network-like character. If we think about what great role velocity and the rapid flow of information plays in the age of the internet, perhaps we can retroactively assess this decisive speciality of pre-information age politics, when the elite groups facing state power could create not just an ideology against it, but an effective network as well.

This is exactly why the role of a couple of hundred members of the opposition became so important, as they possessed such resources that the Party did not have, despite the fact that it had 800,000 members in its heyday. The “network theory” approach to the former opposition however - which, as I mentioned could be the
subject of a later study –, can shed light on the phenomenon of what caused the decline of these groups practically everywhere in Central-Eastern Europe following the 1989-90 transitions. The answer is to be found in the transformation of the concept of professionalism. In the 80s, the creation of informal oppositional cells was the epitome of political professionalism. The socialisation of the Hungarian opposition was built on this as well. In the 1990s however, political actors created their own modern networks within the frameworks of democracy, and parallel to this, the cell-like form of organisation which used to be the privilege of the democratic opposition became devalued. From this point of view, the failure of the Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats), created out of the opposition at the end of 1988, can be explained by the fact that its earlier organisational resources became worthless and its ideological message was not attractive enough for the wider social strata.

This however is another story, and does not change the fact that the history of the Hungarian democratic opposition in the late Kádár-era was a success. Without this group the transition in Hungary would definitely not have happened the way it did. This is the great historic merit of this movement, which can not be challenged, even if in 2015, the ideals that reign in Hungary are largely contrary to the former democratic opposition’s ideals, and the perspectives of the Polish new evolutionism, which had been orienting for the opposition, are perhaps worse then when Michnik originally formulated them.

References


Until recently, social scientists and historians have paid little attention to non-heterosexual “modes of existence” (Bech, 1997) during state socialism in the Eastern Bloc. Important exceptions include the work of Dan Healey (2001) and Josie McLellan (2011) – and from now on the present volume of Glasgow based sociologist, Francesca Stella (whose first degree is in Russian language and literature, enabling her to conduct real participant observation and empirical data collection in Russia/n). Stella’s work is especially important if we consider that in 19th-20th century Europe women with non-heteronormative desires and sexual practices were not persecuted in the same way as men, thus there are less obvious ways to explore their historical traces, and consequently their narratives still remain a rather under-researched topic.1

The empirical base of this book is ethnographic research focussing on the experiences, practices and identities of non-heterosexual women in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Stella decided to refer to them as lesbian, bisexual or non-heterosexual women, while avoiding the example of Laurie Essig who used the ‘queer’ adjective to translate goluboi (literally ‘light blue’ in Russian) as ‘queer man’ and rozovaia (‘pink’) as ‘queer woman’ in her book on Queer in Russia.2

The fieldwork that involved interviewing 61 women (aged between 18 and 56) was conducted during 2004-2005 in Moscow (the capital city of the Russian Federation with more than 12 million residents) and Ulianovsk (a regional centre in the Central Volga region with a population of 650,000). Transgender issues were not explored in this study because gender identity related issues remained marginal in the empirical data collection. Nevertheless, trans women were present in the examined lesbian social networks of Moscow and Ulianovsk, and were encouraged to take part in the study: “two interviewees openly talked about the discrepancy they felt about their bodies and their gender identity. Nonetheless, an element of self-selection operated: two male-identified women declined the invitation to take part in the study, as they felt that their experiences would not be captured by the notion of ‘lesbian’ or same-sex desire” (161).

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1 A recent example of presenting a country-specific 20th century lesbian herstory is provided by Borgos (2015).
2 However, Essig also adds that “[i]n order to convey the fuzziness and inclusiveness of such terms, I try to use “queer” rather than “sexual minorities” I wish I had a better term. […] I just want a word that will describe nonnormative sexual practices in Russia without making the mistake of assuming those practices are “homosexual” (1999: x).
In the introductory chapter on *Locating Russian Sexualities* the author promises to contribute to “theoretical and methodological debates on ethnocentrism and the construction of normative subjects and of Oriental ‘others’” (p1) and to provide a “multisited analysis of women’s negotiations of different ‘everyday’ spaces in metropolitan Moscow and provincial U’lianovsk” (p10). Her goal is avoiding methodological nationalism because social life cannot be explored as something contained within the boundaries of national societies; critical regionalism is proposed to be used instead as a “way to avoid reifying ‘Russian lesbians’ as exceptional vis-à-vis the ‘west’, and to foreground complexity” (p7). Additionally, different geographical scales are examined ranging from the nation (whatever that might mean in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts) through urban localities to the individual body, and it is also considered how sexuality and generation intersect in women’s experiences capturing variations across space and time.

The author interprets intersectional and queer perspectives as sensitising concepts that can increase the visibility of the multi-layered complexities of lived experiences. However, she also notes that since “both intersectionality and queer are somehow ill defined, ‘buzzwords’, it is not terribly helpful, in my view, to talk about intersectional or queer methodologies” (p11) mainly because social scientific debates on intersectionality have been largely theoretical rather than methodological, and queer approaches are often seen as “too abstract and text-based, and therefore inherently unable to come to terms with the empirical world” (p11).

The theoretical framework of the book heavily relies on what Goffman had to say on performances in the context of impression management but also applies some of Judith Butler’s insights, especially those connected to the heterosexual matrix - i.e. the ways “how the discursive production of gendered subjects is informed by heterosexuality” (p14). Additionally, Stella also refreshingly reminds us of an understanding of performativity (another buzzword) in the context of naturalising specific constructs of sexuality and gender “through stylised repetition” (p14), instead of referring to a performance enacted by agentic subjects. Among the central concepts applied in the analyses we can find Goffman’s stigma as well as Ken Plummer’s sexual stigma, negotiations of sexual selves across time and space, and generational sexualities from micro-level perspectives concerned with the life course of individuals and intergenerational perspectives as well as from macro-level perspectives “aimed at historicising narratives of queer globalisation” (p16).

The presented biographical narratives can be examined not only as accounts of individual non-heterosexuals’ lives but also as narratives that are shaped in fundamental ways by the ideas and values of the historical period in which they are embedded. Stella refers to the notion of generational cohorts (i.e., age cohorts can be identified through shared critical life events, which shape a generation’s formative years, and generate shared collective memories) and emphasises that research on generational same-sex sexualities can raise quite a few conceptual issues. For example, the 1960s might emerge as a very relevant reference point in the narratives of many gays and lesbians in the West: in fact, the discursive shift from homosexuality as a form of deviance to homosexuality as a positive social identity during the late 1960s in
the US can be identified in qualitative research findings where gay liberation appears as the defining moment in the interviewee’s ‘identity career’ towards a positive identification as gay or lesbian (Rosenfeld, 2002; 2009). However, this reference point does not really work in non-Western environments with differently constructed normative masculinities and femininities, where gendered sexualities were regulated in different ways and the local functioning of the heterosexual matrix has been mediated through culture-specific social institutions such as heteronormative marriage and family. Empirical findings presented in this book confirm that same-sex desire can be effectively regulated not only through criminalisation and medicalisation, but also through symbolic erasure (i.e., the enforced silence and invisibility surrounding and stigmatising same-sex sexualities); it can also be seen that social invisibility played a more determining part in the women’s lives belonging to the ‘last Soviet generation’ (born in the early 1950s and the 1970s) than in the socialization of women belonging to the ‘transition generation’ (born after the 1970s) who had access to representations of same-sex sexualities from various sources including radio and television programmes and other media products.

Stella is critical about the essentialising East-West polarisations and urges us to interpret the complexities of lived experiences within specific socio-historical contexts. For example, a practical focus on reconciliation techniques of sexual desires and personal aspirations with normative pressures can lead us to the careful reconsideration of socio-historically specific concepts such as bisexuality (often presupposing a sexual identity formation process that takes place in early life, and leading to a stable exclusively heterosexual or homosexual identity during adulthood) or leading a “double life” (being a relatively widespread experience not only among the elderly of the pre-gay liberation generations in the West but also among many people with same-sex relations in the Eastern bloc countries during state-socialism and afterwards). Stella also joins the critiques of the binary notions of sexuality as either gay or straight that ignore the fluidity of sexual desires and identifications leading to research practices that “bracket queers’ experiences of heterosexual relations, married life and parenthood and interpret them as attempts to conform the heteronorm or as a case of ‘double life’ or as a stage on the path leading to an authentic stable gay or lesbian identity” (p18).

Chapter 2 on Same-Sex Sexualities and the Soviet/Post-Soviet Gender Orders provides a socio-historical background to the following presentation of the empirical findings. In this chapter we can learn about the Soviet government’s recriminalisation of male homosexuality in 1934 that “broadly coincided with the campaign to strengthen the heterosexual nuclear family, and can be seen as part of a broader effort to harness sexuality to reproduction and emphasise the value of the nuclear family’s role as the founding unit of Soviet society” (p30). (However, it does not turn out since when male homosexuality was criminalised in Tsarist Russia, and when it became -
This anti-sodomy law remained in operation until 1993. Both male and female homosexualities were interpreted as perverted attractions in medical discourse, but female homosexuality has never been criminalised because it was seen as a “deviance that could be corrected by pressures to conform to ‘compulsory motherhood’” (p30). It is a telling detail that the discipline of sexology was known as “sexopathology” (p34) in the Soviet context, implying that “normal” sex does not need to be examined at all.

By the 1990s the Soviet etacratic (i.e. state-determined) gender order, exclusively based on the ‘working mother’ contract (channelling “women’s sexuality into reproduction through the notion of motherhood as an essential duty to the state” – p43), was replaced by the pluralisation of legitimate gender contracts, including the ‘career-oriented woman’, the ‘housewife’ and the ‘sponsored contract’ (i.e. a transactional relationship where the woman is sponsored by a wealthy lover – p36) as well as an increasing pluralisation of discourses on sexuality. However, decriminalization (1993) and demedicalisation (1999) of male homosexuality came from ‘above’ and was pushed through because of external constraints such as decriminalisation being a precondition for Russia joining the Council of Europe.

The 1990s was characterised by a new visibility of same-sex sexualities rooted in not only LGBT media production and queer subcultural spaces but also in mainstream media and popular culture production leading to the success of such groups as the Zemfira or the t.A.T.u., addressing quite explicitly the (until then) taboo theme of lesbianism. In this context sexual citizenship can be seen as confined to sexual expression and consumption, but not extending to the political sphere of civil rights and liberties.

This period of limited liberalisation was followed by a backlash culminating in the 2013 law against the ‘propaganda’ of ‘non-traditional’ sexuality: “since the 1990s homosexuality has commonly been referred to in the Russian media as a ‘non-traditional sexual orientation’ (netraditsionnaia orientatsiia), a term which is meant to be neutral but conveys the idea of a phenomenon alien to Russian traditions” (p40). In fact, the propaganda law can be seen as part of a broader legislative initiative aiming at defending traditional Russian values and protecting minors from harmful influences – and it can also be identified as a symptom of the ongoing crackdown on civil liberties in Russia over the last few years.

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3 For example, Laura Engelstein’s study on the Soviet policy toward male homosexuality (1995) or Dan Healey’s book on Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent (2001) can be consulted for more details.

4 According to Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2005) the construction of parenthood as primarily a function of the mother and the state, closely connected to the tradition of alienating fatherhood, can be dated from here; they also refer to women’s position between the 1930s and the 1950s, during the Soviet period of “totalitarian androgyny” as being “somewhere between generators and milk cows” (2005:104).

5 The Ministry of Health did not include homosexuality into its new classification of mental illnesses in 1999 (p39).

6 In 2003 the t.A.T.u. represented Russia at the Eurovision Song Contest, where they finished third (Heller, 2007).
Chapter 3 on Lesbian Relationships in Late Soviet Russia shifts the focus from the stigmatising (medical and legal) ‘expert gaze’ to the micro-level of the interviewees’ lived experiences, while acknowledging the fact that the only legitimate discourse about same-sex relations among women produced by medical experts during the Soviet era was of a pathologising nature. Stella’s interviewees did not report on personal experiences of forced psychiatric treatment, though a few of them encountered “sexopathologists” who either provided advice towards heterosexual re-education such as “show an interest in men” (p48) or just registered the fact that there is no cure that can change one’s sexual orientation (or ain’t no cure for love). This chapter also presents stories about how the policing of sexual morals was conducted not only by experts, but also by co-workers and close family members.

Besides policed, being married seemed to be a common experience of the majority of the older interviewed women who saw marriage as an inevitable fact of (Soviet) life and lesbian affairs as being accommodated only on the margins of family life. Stella points to the heteronormative ideals about couple relations and parenthood as well as the lack of long-term prospects of starting a ‘proper’ family with a same-sex partner as contributing to the widespread perception of same-sex relations as not viable. Tamara, one of Stella’s interviewees summarises this point in the following way: “During the Soviet period the majority of women I dated eventually got married and lived a heterosexual life, I mean, same-sex relations had no prospects. For two women, well, you could of course live, sort of, together, but at the time there were huge problems with housing... There was no way around it, lesbian couples simply had nowhere to live” (p56). These findings are consistent with other similar post-socialist studies: perhaps not surprisingly, the inescapability of marriage and housing shortage were also central topics in many of the Hungarian interviews conducted with men and women having same-sex relations before the political system change in the course of the ongoing research on the social history of 20th century homosexuality in Hungary (Takács, 2015). Additionally, the long term socialisation effects of these constraining features could also be detected in Hungary: for example, a study focusing on value orientation of Hungarian gay men in the 1990s found that legal and practical difficulties in establishing one’s own family and living together with a same-sex partner, exacerbated with a heteronormative family definition limited to the classic heterosexual nuclear family, could prevent gay respondents from considering family security as a value to be achieved (Takács, 2007).

The second part of the book shifts the level of analysis from time to space: it problematizes the “ahistorical, aspatial notions of the closet, and the notion of ‘coming out’ as individual choice, detached from any consideration about the specific rules governing interactions in a particular socio-spatial context” (p22); and explores “strategies collectively deployed to carve out ‘lesbian/queer’ space” (p21) as well as practices of disclosure and perceptions of safety/danger in different settings: home, workplace, and the street. In this part of the book the author calls for reassessing and reconceptualising the ‘closet/coming out’ paradigm. One of the main issues here (in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts) is about the validity of the equation of visibility with empowerment: is social visibility always empowering; isn’t it a privilege just for
some, instead of being a universal norm to be followed? While acknowledging that the closet metaphor might be useful in analysing how the construction of the private/public space divide is used to maintain heteronormativity, Stella points to the integration of the “Goffmanian notions of non-heterosexuals as performers who are called to manage self-impressions and ‘fronts’ during social interaction” (p22) into debates about the closet, self-management and disclosure for non-heterosexuals as a way to highlight the role individual agency might play in coming (or not coming) out processes.

Chapter 4 on Family Matters: Negotiating ‘Home’ explores identity negotiations within the parental home and manifestations of everyday homophobia in the family home, rooted in normative expectations about femininity and a ‘healthy’ transition into adulthood. (Note that the focus is on the complex emotional connotations of the ‘home’ and not the family.) Chapter 5 on The Global Closet? Negotiating Public Space focusses on lesbian/bisexual (in)visibility practices at the workplace and the street, by also highlighting the difference between metropolitan Moscow and provincial Ulianovsk. Chapter 6 on Carving Out Queer Space: In/visibility, Belonging and Resistance provides queer mapping of two Russian cities: Moscow, the biggest and most affluent city with a well-developed (and often gender-segregated) commercial and community infrastructure for gays and lesbian – and the not so big and not so affluent Ulianovsk with less stable infrastructure and more informally queered urban spaces. In Stella’s interpretation carving out queer space – which is about “claiming a legitimate presence in the public space” (p121) – can be achieved in various ways and with different levels of ease depending on the perception of safety and danger. For example, in a small provincial town it can happen around an unmarked bench, where members of a lesbian group regularly meet – and for safety reasons neither the bench nor the group being visibly marked as queer.

In the concluding chapter Stella positions her work in the context of critical postsocialism (as opposed to mainstream ‘transitology’, following the logic of “flat Cold War binaries” - p133), where postsocialism is seen as “emerging from empirical micro-level and often ethnographic studies exploring how the deep socio-political and economic transformations which followed the demise of state socialism were experienced by ordinary citizens in former communist states” (p133). In the present study Stella convincingly demonstrates that the intersection of different geographical scales, ranging from the individual body to the postsocialist region, she has focussed on, could lead to a more nuanced and less reifying analysis of Russian sexualities, while at the same time it can also potentially contribute to “provincialise western-centric perspectives within sexuality studies” (p141).

Stella sees the rehabilitation or (as she puts it) the recuperation of postsocialism (as a critical standpoint and a supraregional framework of analysis) as one of her key contributions to the field of studies in sexualities with this monograph: she argues that while postcolonialism has developed into a vastly popular approach in research and theoretical work in and on non-Western societies, “postsocialism is yet to become an established part of the theoretical toolkit of global gender and sexualities studies” (p21). However, this well-researched and well-presented work has many more merits.
In my view, it deserves special praise because Stella was able to integrate queer theory into social scientific research practice by bringing to (social) life the undersocialized «queer» subject (Green, 2002:522) that is said to be quite weakly connected to the empirical world. In fact, this work can be seen as one of the first representatives of a post-queer study of sexuality, incorporating “the criticism of queer theory while maintaining the grounded footing of empirical sociology” (Green 2002: 537) – and a very invigorating one, indeed. We can only hope that it will be followed by additional volumes by Stella and other post-queer social scientists.

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References


My copy of the book – Chasing Warsaw: Socio-Material Dynamics of Urban Change since 1990, has experienced several changes of location and searches for inspiration. Shabby covers, hand notes in different colours, and a travel-stained front edge, might tell a not less compelling and dynamic story than the printed pages themselves.

Edited by Monika Grubbauer and Joanna Kusiak, Chasing Warsaw gathers twelve articles and essays by young established, mostly Polish researchers, sharing perspectives from sociology, cultural theory, architecture, urban studies, anthropology, philosophy as well as an essay by Karl Schlögel, with the aim to explore and address the particularly intense dynamics of urban change since 1990, a distinct nexus of different modes of urbanism.

Structured in four parts, the book treats Warsaw as a profound example of a post-socialist city where difference has become the core of identity and it tries to trace and describe the ongoing transformations and processes creating these differences. As stated in the Introduction, the book is about ‘intense urban change in the context of post-socialism and not about post-socialism in its urban aspects’ (Grubbauer, 2012: 13), therefore it tries to avoid reducing post-socialism to a chronological category, a ‘transition narrative’, or orientalize it by offering cultural explanations that ‘establish new boundaries of exclusion (…), legitimize violence (…) or acquire an almost mystical quality in terms like ‘mentality’, ‘nature’ or ‘soul’ (Grubbauer, 2012: 18).

The book searches and calls for new ways of theorizing and analysing post-socialist urban realities and conditions, intends to go beyond ‘area studies’ and aims to contribute to wider urban debates by examining ‘how global urban changes might be understood when viewed from the ever transforming (Warsaw)’ (Grubbauer, 2012: 15). So although the subjects in the book are widely dispersed in terms of disciplines and approaches, the common ground here is the dedication to explore the ‘intrinsic logic’, as well as the practices, patterns and manifestations of change and continuity in post-socialist Warsaw.

For this purpose, the first section of the book (Post-Socialism and the Dynamics of Urban Change) scrutinizes the relation between post-socialism and urban change on a conceptual level. Monika Grubbauer provides an overview of the current debates about post-socialist cities and suggests theoretical and methodological expansions to make the research findings on the post-socialist urban condition more accessible for urban research in general. Regina Bitter reflects on the distinctiveness of the socialist city and on the specific conditions of urbanization in Central and Eastern Europe that structured the socialist urbanization, as well as on more recent urban development processes.
The second section (Urban Form and Representation) offers an overview and examples of Warsaw's recent transformations in terms of architecture and urban development as well as of collective imagination. Here, Magdalena Staniszkis provides a historical analysis of processes, changes and continuity of urban planning and development in Warsaw, paying particular attention to the most recent phenomena of post-socialist urban transformation (urban sprawl, shrinking of open spaces, development of hypermarkets, underdevelopment of public spaces, revitalization of brownfields and townscape changes). Jacek Gądecki continues by exploring the phenomenon of enclosed and gated housing estates as a 'crucial and most visible sign of post-socialist urban and social structure' (p. 109), drawing on discursive analysis of 'life behind gates, focusing on social profiles, cultural and lifestyle choice and preferences' (page 110). Dominik Bartmánski finalizes the section by looking at how 'the city is narrated, perceived and imagined' (p. 133) using a socio-semiotic approach to urban studies.

The third section (Social Practices and The City) explores the rootedness of different phenomena, processes and social practices in the city’s history and their materialization in urban space. Włodzimierz Karol Pessel analyses disorder in public space by looking at the social form and historical institution and structure of refuse and waste management, drawing on rich empirical data from the author’s research. Aneta Piekut continues by analysing the hidden worlds of Warsaw’s immigrant community, looking at their everyday practices and infrastructure as well as their involvement in various social spaces in Warsaw. And Joanna Kusiak and Wojciech Kacperski finalize the section by reflecting on the emergence of ‘citizen cafés’ in Warsaw, highlighting the selective participation in such an ‘urban fashion’ and conflicts arising in the creation of this ‘new urbanity’.

The fourth section (Metropolitanism) opens up local perspectives to address various problems of contemporary global urbanism as seen from the vantage point of Warsaw. The section starts with Roch Sulima’s chapter on Warsaw’s famous “Stadium-Bazaar”, discussing the functional role and semantic aspects of voids, borderline spaces and encountering ‘the Other’. Kacper Pobłocki analyses the cultural phenomena of Warszawka, exploring the ‘relationship between Warsaw and the outside world’ (p.271). Joanna Kusiak finalizes the section and the book by scrutinizing and breaking down the concept and the zeitgeist of post-socialist transformation – ‘chaos’, both in global urban studies and daily lives of Warsawians.

Although textually dense, and demanding spatial thinking and understanding of the political-economic processes and dynamics as well as the problems associated with post-socialism, the book attempts to enliven, enrich and experiment with the academic language to develop an appropriate language to capture post-socialist Warsaw and describe the current state of affairs. Therefore, some might point out that the book lacks analysis of, and focus on, political and national institutions and governance. Some may question the exemplary role and focus of Warsaw for theorizing post-socialist urban realities and conditions, while others, preferring a more structured, sturdy and factual approach and ways of representation, might at times feel disturbed by the experimental attempts to grasp the ‘intrinsic logic’ of a post-socialist city.
However, *Chasing Warsaw* is an inspiring book for those who agree that ‘city life in post-socialist Europe has not been sufficiently analysed beyond the context of area studies, in terms of global urban change’ (Grubbauer, 2012:14), and who try to keep up with contemporary spatial research as well as with issues concerning academic knowledge production.

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