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## Old Missions in New Clothes: The Reproduction of the Nation as Women's Main Role Perceived by Female Supporters of Golden Dawn and Jobbik

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### Abstract

Although numerous studies on the far right have been conducted, some aspects of the topic are still underresearched. One of these aspects is the gender dimension of far right movements. This paper reveals this poorly researched topic, while seeking women's participation and activism in the far right movements, focusing on women's roles in political parties, movements, and the surrounding subculture. The study presents the results of a comparative research of two parties regarding women's presence: *Jobbik* in Hungary and the Golden Dawn in Greece. I describe the gender gap in the far right, and the forms of women's participation. I argue that although women support the far right in smaller numbers than men, they nonetheless have a significant input in the growing public support that these parties enjoy. This suggests a new picture of mainstream parties for these far right parties that are no longer excessively masculine.

*Keywords: Far right, gender, Greece, Hungary, movement, party.*

### *Comparative analysis between Jobbik and Golden Dawn*

Although the ‘economic-crisis-breeds-extremism thesis’ has failed in general, Greece and Hungary are two countries where the popularity of the far right rose between the pre-crisis period and the crisis (Mudde, 2013). Comparing EU member states, Mudde reveals that only five countries in Europe had a substantial rise of populist radical right electoral support, including Greece and Hungary. Beside the economic crisis, a political crisis also hit Hungary and Greece, when established ruling parties lost much of their support (Malkoutzis, 2011; Grajczár and Tóth, 2011). As a result, political dissatisfaction and mistrust are measured as being among the highest in these countries (Eurobarometer, 2014).

Undoubtedly, these factors contributed to the electoral breakthrough of the Golden Dawn and *Jobbik*, the second and third most supported parties in these two countries respectively in 2014, which are also known as the most extreme far right parties across Europe (Rose, 2014). In addition to extremism, they operate as political movements surrounded by a strong subculture (Rose, 2014) and labelled as strongly masculine (Stratigaki, 2013; Félix, 2012). Thereby, academics started to focus on the so-called ‘radical right gender gap’, or in other words the over-representation of men and the under-representation of women supporters that I examine in the next section.

Women’s position and roles in these social groups need attention because these aspects define and determine the opportunities that women have in politics, especially on the far right scene. In the past few decades, there have been numerous efforts to strengthen gender equality in Greece, supporting a more egalitarian sharing of household chores, and promoting general female employment (Davaki, 2013). Despite these efforts, the crisis starting in 2009 had had multifaceted gender-based negative consequences on women in the labour market, in sharing household work and in exerting women’s power (Kambouri, 2013). In the Hungarian society, gender equality has never been an important topic in public debates; furthermore support for traditional gender roles is also higher than in many other EU states (Fodor, 2011). Although in Hungary the economic crisis did not affect women as much as it did in Greece, from 2010 the rightist government has taken a conservative view, replacing gender equality policies with family policies, resulting in a backlash in women’s position (Frey, 2013). These negative consequences on women could not have been tackled efficiently by the established parties. Paradoxically, the ascendant far right which is originally masculine has offered opportunities to women to achieve their goals inside their movements. The above-mentioned similarities between the Hungarian and the Greek political and social context, the current far right parties and women’s position within them allow me to make a comparative analysis of the two cases.

### *The gender gap cliché and what is beyond the small numbers*

The phenomenon of the radical right gender gap is well-known among scholars (Givens, 2004). Discussing my findings about the gap, I present the actual numbers of women supporters and the extent of the gap in the two countries. According to the

surveys taken in Greece in May 2014, 5.5 per cent of women and 11.5 per cent of men support the Golden Dawn (Kapa Research, 2014). As a result, the so-called radical right gender gap is 6 per cent, which is similar to the figures in 2012, when the party first entered the Parliament (Public Issue, 2012). In 2010 when *Jobbik* first entered the Parliament, it was supported by 3.9 per cent of women and 8.5 per cent of men, thereby the gap was around 4 per cent (Grajczár and Tóth, 2011). Recently *Jobbik* is supported by 8.1 per cent of women and 15.5 per cent of men, which produces a gap of 7.4 per cent.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the gap has been growing in the last four years. Overall, we see that the gap is large in both countries: almost twice as many men than women vote for the far right, and the rates have not changed significantly over time.

Some academics explain this gap with the masculine character of far right parties (Kimmel, 2007), while others see the reason in different levels of religiosity between men and women (Gidengil et al., 2005), or anti-immigrant attitudes and differences in political interest depending on one's gender (Fontana et al., 2006). Although in some cases these factors have certainly had an explanatory impact, Immerzeel et al. (2015) argue that they cannot explain the phenomenon, because they represent only some aspects of the problem. Others have even pointed out that these kinds of statements can be incorrect perceptions which may easily lead us to wrong interpretations of the phenomenon (Elverich, 2007). The existing explanations are not comprehensive enough – therefore there is still a need for identifying other factors or changing the original question in order to understand the relation between women and the far right.

Despite the small proportion of women among the supporters of far-right organizations, in recent years many female leaders have emerged on this scene all across Europe. There are female politicians in the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as in Hungary and Greece. In some countries, they are in leading positions, such as Pia Kjaersgaard in the Danish People's Party and Siv Jensen in the Progress Party in Norway. Their presence is likely to change the meaning of far right activism and might attract more women. The most known case is Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France, whose appearance as a female leader caused growing support among certain groups of women (Mayer, 2013). However, not only leading women can mobilise other women supporters or potential supporters, but simple members and activists can as well. There are women who consistently support the far right in every country, their activity is vitally important, but they are often ignored (Pető, 2012). There are, however, some contributions that seek to understand far right women supporters, highlighting their diversity, studying the complexity of their motivations, and examining women's situations. In a historical perspective, academics have analysed the extent of women's involvement in the fascist and Nazi regimes during the inter-war period (Durham, 1998; Pető, 2008). There are other studies that reveal how the gender approach enables a better understanding, beyond the ascertainment of quantitative gender balance, of contemporary far right movements (Bitzan, 2006; Kimmel 2007; Félix, 2015). These studies reinforce the claim that the gender approach in this field was underestimated for a long time.

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<sup>1</sup> Data is based on a representative survey called "Crisis and Social Innovations Survey" conducted by MTA - ELTE Peripato Research Group in May 2014.

I intend to put them into one comprehensive approach, and as a result we can understand the position of these women within the movements which helps us to reveal the causes of the gap. With this analysis of women's overall presence the far right scene as a whole can be understood better.

The leading research question is based on the claim that women in far right movements sometimes articulate quasi-feminist statements in a strong anti-feminist discourse (Dauber, 2014). My research puzzle is to find out in what forms women participate in the Golden Dawn and *Jobbik*. The two cases will be presented and compared regarding the questions of how women create some agendas inside the anti-modernist framework, whether they are allowed to do their activity on their own and, if so, to what extent. Similarities and differences between the two cases will be explained in order to point out their special characteristics and the common patterns.

Terminology is a key issue for researchers of the far right, as there are many definitions and names used by different authors (Hainsworth, 2008). In order to be able to compare the two cases, I use 'far right' the way Art (2013) defines it, referring to a broad group further right from the established centre-right parties.

In this paper, I use the term 'subculture' after Hebdige (1979) who describes it as a 'whole way of life'. As I will explain, the subcultures around the two parties influence not only supporters' voting behaviour, but also the standards of child-bearing, education of youngsters, and even commercial attitudes. Thereby, the nature of the subculture influences the position and possibilities of women on the far right, which is a topic for assessment in this article. Although using the term 'subculture' is debated in the social and political sciences, in these two cases defining the far right as a political subculture, in the sense Enyedi uses the word, may be appropriate. Specifically, according to this author, political subcultures have special norms, group identity, solidarity and lifestyle, even subcultural institutions that provide ideological education to the members, socialise them from their childhood onward, and create many social activities for them (Enyedi, 1998).

## *Methodology*

The initial idea behind my methodology was to stay hidden as an observer. During my research I made different kinds of participant observations. When I visited demonstrations I could easily stay anonymous without having any contact with the other participants. In some cases I had to register myself under my real name in order to enter the local offices of the parties, but that did not require additional information, so I could stay in an observer position. Later I gave more information about myself in order to gain their trust, so I introduced my research to my subsequent interviewees and at some events the hosts even introduced me to the crowd. I was focusing on how women represent themselves as part of the group during social activities, how they get involved and participate in these movements. At the end of each event, I tried to get in contact with women participants, conducting semi-structured interviews with them afterwards, and using the snowball method to reach new interviewees. The languages of the interviews were Hungarian in Hungary and English in Greece, where I had a Greek research assistant. The Hungarian interviews were made between 2011 and

2012 in Budapest and Böszörpuszta, where one of the biggest far right festivals was held. The Greek interviews were made in 2013 in Athens, where I spent half year to conduct research. My interviewees were women supporters, activists and members of *Jobbik* and the Golden Dawn. In both cases, they were at different levels of engagement; from different age groups and socio-cultural backgrounds. The interviews sought out the motivations and possible paths of engagement to unfold how women represent their role in the parties and the surrounding subcultures. Research on the far right also raises moral and ethical problems (Blee, 1996). My interviewees often wanted to turn me into a potential supporter and I tried to solve this dilemma with keeping a proper distance, being respectful and polite, but never too friendly.

I also analysed the party manifestos of the Golden Dawn and *Jobbik*. My other sources were blogs and websites to examine far right women's online activity. In both cases, besides offline activities women's ideological education and mobilisation is carried on online as well. The online sphere is a very important tool for almost every far right party including also the two cases of the research. Viral online networks and social media have had a huge impact on the success of *Jobbik* and the Golden Dawn as recent studies have shown. (Jeskó et.al, 2012; Siapera, 2013). I did not find any online activity directly related to the *Jobbik* Women's Division. I made qualitative text analyses of women's blogs and websites directly linked to the main pages of *Jobbik*. I followed the links between these detected pages to have a wider sample and I named that methodology 'virtual snowball'. During the text analyses of the blogs I used the previously set up semi-structured interview frame, which let me compare the results with interviews I had made before.

Golden Dawn's Women's Division has a separate blog, the *White Women Front blog*<sup>2</sup> which is the main online media platform for female supporters. Because in Hungary there is no leading far right website for women the freedom in the text is less controlled than in Greece. In my earlier research into the Hungarian case, I distinguished three types of women, who appear to have different characteristics and ways of joining the Hungarian far right. The first type is called the 'Culture Keeper' for whom cultural and biological reproduction is the main issue while conducting her own business inside the subculture. The second type is the 'Fighter' who fights in paramilitary movements almost as fiercely as men do. The third type is labelled as the 'Spiritual woman' who mixes healing with spiritualism, paganism, and the hybrid ideology of the far right subculture. In doing so, she is able to build a quasi-power position and practise it inside the subculture (Félix, 2014a). As a result of the limited range of the Greek part the comparison regarding the above mentioned typology cannot be made. The current study explains the similarities and differences of the role of biological and cultural reproduction in both cases.

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<sup>2</sup>Here I have first translated the whole blog into English with the help of my research assistant.

### *Women in the movement*

In both parties, there are official women's divisions, but their importance and activity are different. In *Jobbik* although women have not been prevented from joining since the party was founded in 1999, for over a decade they were not in leading positions.<sup>3</sup> During the last few years prominent women leaders have appeared like Dóra Dúró and Krisztina Morvai. Since 2013, women's representation has become more visible when the party established a new image, with smiling young girls and boys standing around the party leader (Félix, 2013). Nevertheless, the organized form of women's participation is marginal. The Hungarian Guard, the main paramilitary movement of the Hungarian far right subculture with strong connections to *Jobbik* had no women's division, although women had some special roles in it (Félix, 2014a). There are women's divisions of the party across the country, which mainly work locally and their activities were limited to some charity events organised during the last few years. Women active in the subculture are usually not members of the women's division, but tend to carry on their activities in the subculture independently.

This is not the case in the Golden Dawn, where there is a very well organized Women's Division called White Women Front (from now on I will refer to it as WWF). However, the Golden Dawn was founded as an underground Neo-Nazi organization with no more than a few hundred male members (Psarras, 2012). In the nineties, only a few women were allowed to join. As a party member recalled, the Golden Dawn had only five women members at the time: one of them was Eleni Zaroulia, the wife of the leader Michaloliakos, another was their daughter, Omonia; a third was the woman who founded WWF. According to my interviewee, WWF was founded in 2008, starting mainly as an online blog. About the founding of WWF she told me that:

The woman who founded the Front has been a member of the Golden Dawn for around twenty years and now she owns the blog as well. Of course, this could only happen after she got permission from the leader of the party. ('N' born 1983.)

The fact that the founder had to obtain permission directly from the 'leader' also proves the strict and rigid hierarchy inside the party. The Women's Division was more active from 2009, when suddenly more women started to enter the party. This is the time when the Golden Dawn was coming out of its marginality and started enjoying more support, becoming a popular party rather than an outsider. With the help of WWF, some women gained responsibility to gather more women supporters through their activities. This new attitude can be detected also on the basis of how the content has changed on the blog. At the beginning, the ideological texts dominated. From 2009, there were more articles about the offline activities of WWF, about charity actions, lectures, conferences for women and propaganda activities. This change in content went along with the changing goals of the WWF; and the

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<sup>3</sup> Video about *Jobbik*, 'Jobbik generation'. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R30fmLzFslY> Accessed: 10-09-2014

mobilisation of women supporters (Félix, 2014b). A speech from 2011 demonstrates this change of goals in terms of the importance of a more open and active women's division. It was articulated that the number of women members and supporters were rapidly growing; some of them held important positions and were politically active. According to that speech, women in general have to face more difficulties and dangers than ever, mainly because of immigrants, who pose a threat to them and their children.

The possibility of change is in the hands of Greek people and the White Women Front, whose goal is to involve the new as well as the old members in the activity of the movement with a belief in its values, respecting its leader, showing the female face of nationalism.<sup>4</sup>

My interviewee who holds membership explained that nowadays their problem is that too many women want to join the party, thus they have to be selective. In order to be accepted as a member, the prospective applicant has to attend lectures about the movement's ideology and takes occasional tests about it. Another interviewee, who was in the process of becoming a member, told me that she had had to learn the ideology very well, because if she did not know it well enough, she would not be accepted. The hierarchy also appears on the blog, as the articles sent by activists and members from all around the country are selected and edited by the WWF leader.

In conclusion, in the Golden Dawn the hierarchy is stricter than in *Jobbik*, which appears in the women's organization as well. Based on both cases it can be seen that attracting more women has an impact increasing the number of their female supporters and their popularity among them.

After the explanation of organizational ways of participation, the redefinitions of reproductive roles in the Greek and Hungarian contexts will be introduced, that creates a genuine presence for women in the far right scene. Far-right discourses in both countries claim that women have an important role in reproduction, as they bear and rear children who belong to the "pure nation", and they are the ones responsible for the reproduction of the "pure culture" (Mostov, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997). This is a crucial issue, because according to far right narratives there are always one or more enemies that are demographically dangerous to the nation. These may be certain minorities, who in Western Europe are mainly immigrants, especially Muslims, while in Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe they are the Roma. Although this difference between the two parts of Europe regarding the target group may produce differences in ideology, they share a common core narrative: far right parties can distinguish between "Us" versus "Them" (Nagel, 1998). These minorities are regarded as threats because they allegedly have different reproduction habits than the majority population. Thus, they will outnumber the nation (us) that will, in turn, lose its majority in the country, and may eventually even disappear. This is the typical vision of the death of the nation, which has a strong gender aspect that analysts often ignore. In order to keep the nation both 'quantitatively' and 'qualitatively' pure, far right

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<sup>4</sup> [http://whitewomenfront.blogspot.hu/2011/02/blog-post\\_28.html](http://whitewomenfront.blogspot.hu/2011/02/blog-post_28.html) Accessed: 11-03-2013

movements and parties seek to mobilise ‘proper’ women to bear children, mainly in the frame of eugenic discourses (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

There are different interpretations of the nation’s biological and cultural reproduction as the main mission of women in the Golden Dawn and in *Jobbik*. It appears at the level of party ideologies and platforms as a main issue in both cases. In *Jobbik* the ‘Gypsy question’ is mainly mentioned together with crime, in addition to a strong focus on the alleged ‘overpopulation’ of Roma. According to *Jobbik* MPs’ speeches, Roma have cultural, educational, and childbearing norms different from those of non-Roma, therefore their children should be segregated (Félix, Fokasz and Tóth, 2014). Analysing the speeches of *Jobbik* MPs about Roma, there is a clear gender distinction: this demographic topic clearly belongs to women MPs, meanwhile crime and the so-called ‘Gypsy-crime’ topic belongs to men in the discourse (Félix, Fokasz and Tóth, 2014).

In the Greek case, Eleni Zaroulia, who was the only woman MP of the Golden Dawn, also made some clearly racist remarks related to demography when she referred to migrants as “subhumans” who are “carrying all kinds of diseases”.<sup>5</sup> This warning about diseases can also be understood in the frame of biological reproduction. This demographic discourse can resonate with women who are worried about their children and their family, making them potential supporters. As a result, in both cases at the party level women MPs are more responsible for the racist eugenic discourse.

At the level of the movement, the role of biological reproduction does not appear only as literal reproduction through childbearing, but also as providing the nation with food and with other goods in a symbolic way, contributing to their well-being and health. Thereby, this can be called the material reproduction of the nation (Félix, 2014a). In terms of activities belonging to biological reproduction, women have a strong presence on both sides: as givers on one, and as takers on the other side. In Hungary, this is connected to the far right subculture, which started to rise at the same time as *Jobbik* did, and they mutually strengthen each other. A big part of this subculture is built on consumer ethnocentrism, assuming the existence of some special ethnocentric consumer supply and demand. This trend can be illustrated by the strong presence of allegedly ‘truly Hungarian’ foods and drinks. One of the fields where women can participate in this subculture is connected to the protection and distribution of ‘Hungarian’ goods, including the sales of everyday products. There are food shops, delivery companies and markets where subcultural products are available and where women often hold leading positions. In this way, women can fulfil their attributed reproductive role, by feeding the nation and caring about it. However, realizing the possibilities that the changed conditions open up, they often run highly successful businesses at the same time. Finally, it is financially worthwhile to keep the subculture alive, which is in the interest of *Jobbik* as well. One of my interviewees, the leader of a nationalist shop, told me: *My dream is to create a collector and dealer forum that shows the Hungarian products to the world.* ‘J’ 1950.

One of the subculture’s markets where I did participant observation was managed by a woman, who was very active both online and offline, creating a website

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/\\_w\\_articles\\_wsite1\\_1\\_18/10/2012\\_466513](http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_18/10/2012_466513) Accessed: 09-04-2014

where she was blogging and editing a newspaper about the market. She was the market coordinator, to whom other sellers with organizational problems would turn for assistance. The majority of the sellers as well as the customers were women, but with very different socio-demographic backgrounds. They were selling mainly food including juices, jams, meat and bread. They often label healthy and organic products as 'truly Hungarian', which is a highly successful strategy. It should be noted that not every visitor of these markets is connected to the subculture or supports *Jobbik*. Some customers are just interested in healthy or organic products. After a visit to the market, there is a chance that they might be influenced by the subculture or the ideology behind it, and later they might turn into supporters of the far right.

Connected to the different characteristics of the movements, the role of biological reproduction appears in another form in the Greek case, but the consequences are almost the same as in Hungary. There are also women in important positions and women who are just potential new supporters on the other hand. The activities at the heart of this mechanism are the country-wide Golden Dawn charity actions, organized several times a year. There are food and sometimes blood donations only for those people who can prove with papers that they have Greek origin. I did participant observation at one food donation event organized by the Golden Dawn in April, 2013. The activists in charge of the donation could easily be distinguished from participants by their uniform: black T-shirts inscribed with 'Golden Dawn'. The majority of the participants and the organizers were women, from different socio-demographic backgrounds. Among the organizers mainly young and middle-aged women were present, who did almost the same jobs as men. They were packing food from the containers and handing out the packages to those waiting in the queue. There were only some moments when women were pushed behind, especially in the case of conflicts and physical attacks – for instance, when the police came and started to disperse the event. At first, mostly men were involved in the fight, but when the police used tear-gas, everybody had to escape. Younger and older women with children, and entire families were waiting in the line. This observation correlates with the statement outlined above, that women with multiple disadvantages, which may even intersect with each other, are more vulnerable to the dire consequences of the crisis. Golden Dawn reacts to their vulnerability with these food donations and thus the party gains more supporters. These charity actions make a clear distinction between those who give and those who get the donation (Zakariás, 2014). The receivers may feel bonded to the Golden Dawn, and the party can use them as symbols of a pure nation, whether they adopt this image about themselves or not. One of my interviewees told me that she had given blood before Golden Dawn actions, but now she was happy, because she knew that her blood went to Greeks only. She made this comment on the blood donation:

It does not matter who it will go to (her blood A. F.), they might as well be communists as long as they are Greek. ('M' born 1975.)

As this remark demonstrates, the fact that these donations are aimed at helping only "true Greeks" is a clear racist act by Golden Dawn. The distinction between 'us' and 'them' may legitimize the prevalence of "true Greeks", only of those who are

members of the Greek nation by their birth. It also shows how the Golden Dawn donation may change the thinking of a woman who always used to participate, but now she is more content to know that her blood goes only to Greeks. As a result, the Golden Dawn actions manage to mobilise more women, especially those who need material support. Women who are already activists can fulfil their role of biological reproduction; meanwhile, they are in leading, organizing positions during the events.

Nevertheless, donations with some other events organized by the Golden Dawn can be defined as quasi civil actions.<sup>6</sup> It may be proposed that charity actions of the far right belong to the sphere of civil society. Early studies refer to the Golden Dawn as 'dubious civil society manifestations', as a possible part of the informal civil society in Greece besides the existing but weak civil society (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 16). In Hungary, where studies show that civil society is very weak as well, there are also organizations and actions in the far right scene with some civil characteristics.<sup>7</sup> Some studies already examined the relation between civil society and the far right, suggesting possible changes to our definition such as including the actions of the far right especially in the Central-Eastern European region (Polyakova, 2012). Andrea Pető argues that women easily join NGOs because they feel more comfortable in them than in official organizations. These far right parties often start as NGOs, an organizational form that offers better access to women (Pető, 2012). I would go even further, and argue that these parties and movements have actions and characteristics that can be regarded as part of civil society, and this profile may attract subgroups of women more.

Activities connected to material reproduction are common parts of the women's agenda in both cases. It is also common that this type of reproduction appears in a racist frame with the 'Truly Hungarian' products and the food handouts only for Greek citizens. An important difference is that *Jobbik* puts women into favourable financial positions and gives them power, while they are able to practise their biological reproduction roles. On the other hand, Golden Dawn's strong hierarchy restricts women's possibilities to managing only the party's donation events. They cannot create their own spheres where they can extend their personal agency. However, it is an important common feature that these activities are strongly supported by both parties because they attract new, mainly female supporters.

In the following part of the paper, I am describing the dynamic of the other typical role of women in the far right of contemporary Greece and Hungary. Besides the biological reproduction the nations' reproduction happens in a symbolic way as well, which is supported by women by preserving what is considered to be the national culture. This is also connected to the growing consumer ethnocentrism that is organized around food and also a wide range of cultural products, from the sabretache decorated with the symbols of the subculture, books, music (Szele, 2012) and festivals at their own University.<sup>8</sup> According to the literature, women in charge of cultural reproduction teach children (Yuval-Davis, 1997) and even the whole community in

<sup>6</sup> For instance, the protection of old people by the Golden Dawn.

[http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/\\_w\\_articles\\_wsite3\\_1\\_03/06/2014\\_540256](http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite3_1_03/06/2014_540256) Accessed: 14-09-2014.

<sup>7</sup> One of them is the 'Koppány group', where they have also a women's division called 'Amazon'.

<sup>8</sup> <http://atillakiraly.hu/> Accessed: 13-08-2014

order to keep the nation's values alive. For this reason, many of them have a professional background as teachers and continue teaching inside the subculture. It is not just about teaching itself, but also the organization and propagation of cultural programmes like exhibitions or performances. Women with a cultural mission often work for book publishers or even lead them, and might have jobs at the subculture's periodicals or radio stations as editors or writers. In some cases, they run their own shops labelled as 'truly Hungarian' where they take part in cultural reproduction, teaching the younger generations:

There are youngsters who come back all the time, who are growing up here. I could say I see them growing up. There are students in colleges, who have moved to the city, and they keep coming back. ('K' born 1969.)

Another interviewee who used to be a kindergarten teacher is now managing a book publishing company. Her husband and her father-in-law were writers. These women often have one or more close male relatives already active in the subculture as writers or other intellectuals, or even politicians, which builds a connection and an easier way for women to legitimize their activity. As a result, the researched pattern emerges: women are often involved in the far right through their male relatives (Durham, 1998). It can be concluded that these women are successful in the subculture, teach their ideology to children, youngsters and the whole subculture, thereby attracting more supporters for the far right.

In the Greek case, in the WWF's activities the role of cultural as well as biological reproduction seems to be more organized. Besides the charity actions, the Women's Division is active on the cultural reproduction side as well. In general, the Golden Dawn as a party and a movement emphasizes the importance of the 'proper' teaching of 'real' history, visiting schools and sometimes interfering with education.<sup>9</sup> They have visited kindergartens and nurseries, stressing that it is never too early to start a proper ideological education. The party offers alternative education to children in its local offices. This informal education includes talks for children from nursery school age upwards, telling them about mythology and history according to the movement's narrative. WWF plays a major role in this, since typically they are the ones who organize these sessions. My member interviewee also ran such sessions for children. There are numerous articles on the blog about children's education.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, WWF also organizes meetings about the ideology for members and potential members and there are some specific presentations only for women.<sup>11</sup> These events have a strict routine. For example, they address both the participants and the presenters as "comrades"<sup>12</sup> and they always finish with the Golden Dawn anthem.<sup>13</sup> My interviewee told me that the lectures usually address important current problems faced by women, the proper habits of a Greek woman or general contemporary

<sup>9</sup> <http://myplacefp7.wordpress.com/2012/08/23/343/> Accessed: 24-03-2013

<sup>10</sup> <http://whitewomenfront.blogspot.gr/2013/03/protagongr.html> Accessed 21-03-2013

<sup>11</sup> <http://whitewomenfront.blogspot.gr/2013/03/blog-post.html> Accessed 30-04-2013

<sup>12</sup> [http://whitewomenfront.blogspot.gr/2013/02/blog-post\\_6253.html](http://whitewomenfront.blogspot.gr/2013/02/blog-post_6253.html) Accessed: 08-08-2013

<sup>13</sup> I participated in 'mixed-gender' events at local offices of the Golden Dawn, because eventually they refused to let me go to the lectures for women only.

issues. She further explained that in her most recent session she had talked about the connection between drug-addicts and immigrants, arguing that this social illness was due to foreigners, who brought the disease to Greek people.

Likewise, as in the Hungarian case, I have found some connection between emerging consumer attitudes within the Greek subculture and women's role in cultural reproduction. In a 2013 protest in Athens, where I did participant observation, women were selling books, relics, badges and T-shirts of the Golden Dawn. They told me that part of the proceeds from selling these products supports the party. These women, actually mostly young girls, informed me that they were not allowed to say more about the products and their thoughts without permission from upper levels. When I was talking to them, after a while, a man came up to us and started to answer my questions instead of the girls. This story reflects the internal hierarchy and women's role on the consumer side. They cannot conduct their own business the way it is done in Hungary, because they are bonded by the hierarchy and its strict rules.

The meaning and the degree of cultural reproduction and women's activities is different in the two cases. The "cultural war against the enemies" is a stronger focus for the Golden Dawn, with more explicit racist explanations and actions. It is an organized fight and its proper ways are defined by the party. At seminars for children and supporters, women may be in leading positions, but are not given as much freedom as in the Hungarian case, where they can educate the youngsters in their own way. A common pattern is the trade with subcultural products, but while women can conduct their own business in Hungary, they appear only as sales employees in Greece.

## *Conclusion*

This paper has presented different kinds of female participation in the Hungarian and the Greek far right. Two different levels of women's engagement have been introduced. In both contexts, participation happens inside the anti-modernist framework, but putting the mission in 'new clothes' with the reinterpretation of biological and cultural reproductive roles. In the Greek case, this reform is more limited because of the rigid hierarchy in the whole movement and inside the Women's Division. However, some women can be in leading positions both in offline and online activities, mobilising other women to join. As a result, there are far more women in the Golden Dawn now than there were before.

In the Hungarian case, the *Jobbik* Women's Division is weak, the party controls women's participation to a lesser extent, thus it offers them more freedom and opportunities. Here the main playing field is the fruitful subculture around the party, where it is even financially beneficial for women to invest in participation as a female. At the same time, their activity also brings new female supporters to the party. In both cases, participation in such movements can give women a strong identity that former mainstream parties cannot provide. In the far right subculture they can find a community, and occasionally even partners. Furthermore, these parties may have some opportunities for women who suffer from their unequal situation and the

multiple disadvantages of the economic crisis. As a result, these phenomena are embedded in a wider social and political context in both cases.

Golden Dawn and *Jobbik* have made use of women's impact in two ways. Firstly, they mobilize other women in the same way as the National Front did in France with Marine Le Pen (Mayer, 2013). Through their activities women have had a huge impact on the growing public support that these parties enjoy. Secondly, women's presence corresponds to the development of a less radical, more mainstream image that is one of the main interests of these parties nowadays. Therefore, women's presence and activities are likely to be supported even more strongly by the Golden Dawn and *Jobbik* in the future.

Although every case is embedded into its national context, some general patterns definitely seem to emerge. Far right parties are no longer outsiders to the party system. In many European countries, they are among the most supported parties and have been elected as members of their domestic parliaments and of the European Parliament as well. Their position and interest change and form the frames and aspects of women's position and representation in many fields. However, the reproductive roles of women are still the main issue for every far right party, but their actual realization can vary from country to country. This is why further comparative investigations should be conducted.

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