Mainstreaming the extreme political factors, social conditions and cultural perceptions propelling the far-right and neo-nationalism in Europe
Editor-in-Chief:
Margit Feischmidt

Section Editors:
Margit Feischmidt
Peter Hervik

Copyeditor:
Chris Swart

The current issue supported by:

Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Centre for Social Sciences

PUBLISHER:
András Körösényi, General Director
Centre for Social Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30.
E-mail: intersections@tk.mta.hu
intersections.tk.mta.hu

Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics
is an Open Access peer-reviewed electronic journal.
When citing an article, please use the article’s DOI identifier.
# Table of Contents

## Editorial Introduction
**Margit Feischmidt and Peter Hervik**
Mainstreaming the Extreme: Intersecting Challenges from the Far Right in Europe

## Special Section
**Tamás Csillag and Iván Szélényi**
Drifting from Liberal Democracy: Traditionalist/Neo-conservative Ideology of Managed Illiberal Democratic Capitalism in Post-communist Europe

**Sindre Bangstad**
The Racism that Dares not Speak its Name: Rethinking Neo-nationalism and Neo-racism

**Peter Hervik**
What is in the Scandinavian Nexus of “Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and Muslim-Western Relations”?

**Giorgos Tsimouris**
From Mainstream to Extreme: Casino Capitalism, Fascism and the Re-bordering of Immigration in Greece

**Domonkos Sik**
Incubating Radicalism in Hungary – the Case of Sopron and Ózd

**Gabriella Szabó and Márton Bene**
Mainstream or an Alternate Universe? Locating and Analysing the Radical Right Media Products in the Hungarian Media Network

**Aleña Kluknavská**
A Right-wing Extremist or People’s Protector? Media Coverage of Extreme Right Leader Marian Kotleba in 2013 Regional Elections in Slovakia

**Anikó Félix**
Old Missions in New Clothes: The Reproduction of the Nation as Women’s Main Role Perceived by Female Supporters of Golden Dawn and Jobbik

**Isidora Stakić**
Securitization of LGBTIQ Minorities in Serbian Far-right Discourses: A Post-structuralist Perspective

## Book Reviews
- Juraj Buzalke
This is the first issue of the new journal *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics* (IEEJSP). As our point of departure, we take a timely subject for European societies: the far-right phenomenon as related to mainstream politics and discourse. Instead of relying exclusively on views of radical developments prevalent in the field of politics, our aim was to bring together insights from sociology, social anthropology, political science and media studies, as well as from discourse and network analysis, and integrate them into a comparative and interdisciplinary study of the phenomenon. As far as the investigated topics are concerned, special attention has been paid to the interplay of media and politics, the discursive aspects of politics, and the role of cultural commodification beyond ideologies on the supply side as well as recent developments explaining increasing interest on the demand side.

Most of the contributions are empirical case studies, the variety and diverse methodology of which is one virtue of our collection, but comparative and theoretical papers also contribute to the understanding of the global socio-political processes which are also shaped by the framework of the mainstreaming effect. But before presenting the articles of this issue, as introductory essays usually do, we would like to expand our own position on the topic. We begin by highlighting the significance of the discursive criminalization of migrants and minorities by Europe’s far-right politics and media, as also adopted by many actors in mainstream media and politics. Presented as collective threats, the racialized “others” legitimize another set of discourses intended to reassert or re-sanctify native communities, especially the homogeneous perception of nation based on ethnicity and cultural values. This is what we claim in the second part of our essay, and we support this with predominantly Danish and Hungarian examples.

Finally we conclude by claiming that neo-nationalism and neo-racism are the main engines of the process that we call ‘mainstreaming the extreme’. Our statements lean

---

*The theme was covered at two conference panels organized by the editors (‘Cultural strategies and social conditions of neo-nationalism in Europe’ panel at the biannual conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, 2014, Tallinn, and the panel ‘Neo-nationalism and the Youths’ Radical Responses to Economic and Political Crises in Central and Eastern Europe’ at the conference of the Association for Studies of Nationalities in Budapest, 2014) and was also motivated by a comparative workshop (‘Far-right extremism in crisis-ridden Greece and beyond’, organized by St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, in June 2014). Nevertheless, most of the studies we publish here were submitted in response to our call for papers, and all underwent a standard journal peer review procedure.*
primarily on a discursive approach, one that is also employed by most of the studies we publish here.

Raising the level of the threat in media and politics

The far right, as portrayed in today’s academia, is an unparalleled, extreme and unforeseen deviancy of European societies. Its extreme nature is overstated which means that the representation of the far right has focused on uncommon, extreme forms of politics, with a special emphasis on the processes of radicalization into violent activism and terrorism (Bjørgo, 1997: 3).

In contrast, we claim here that the radical distinction and perceived difference between extreme and mainstream forms of politics has been exaggerated, and has therefore hindered analysts in observing the various and close relations between the two. But before raising the question of what has actually been disregarded, and what mainstreaming of the extreme implies exactly, we would like to look behind this bias and ask how this focus on the extreme and the exceptional has developed.

There is a consensus in media studies and political science that politics has to a large extent become saturated by the news and tabloid media. Ellinas (2009) highlights the role of media communication and appropriation in the recent success of European far-right parties, emphasizing more specifically how politics has become the dumping of simplistic slogans and gripping events easily accessible to the broader public. Furthermore, the disproportionate success of some of these parties, Ellinas claims, can be explained by the excessive exposure they receive in the media. As our previous investigations (Feischmidt et al., 2014, Hervik, 2008, 2011) have revealed, the relationship also works the other way around: certain media institutions have become successful in the media business precisely because they have found and presented far-right issues in an attractive and popular way.

The relationship between media and politics can be seen as part of a larger process, which some experts call the mediatization of society: a process whereby institutions, companies and individuals no longer operate independently of the news media, its logic and its experts. Thus, the understanding and the analysis of the news media or politics can only be understood as a single integral process (Hjarvard, 2008; Strömbeck, 2008). This has been particularly clear in the conduct of war, most notably since the Vietnam War, where the myth of winning the media war was born as a necessary condition for winning the war itself. In modern wars, the relationship between cause and effect has effectively become blurred (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010), as reflected in news media coverage.

Similarly, the rise of the far right in recent years would not have been possible without massive media support. Examples include the Austrian tabloid New Kronen Zeitung and its relationship to Freedom Party of Austria (Wodak and Pelinka, 2002), and the Danish tabloid paper Ekstra Bladet’s three-month ‘The Foreigners’ campaign.

---

2 We are convinced that the sociological investigation of the structurally increasingly diverse categories of far-right supporters is important, and in this regard we think that the research direction of Don Kalb and his co-authors (cf. Kalb – Halmai 2011) is worth following. This is not fully implemented in our special issue and its introductory essay, however.
and the establishment of the Danish People’s Party in the spring of 1997. The invention by the highly intense radical online media world in Hungary of “gypsy crime” contributed in a similar way to the rise of the country’s far-right Jobbik party. Moreover, the dual platform of far-right media and politics was supported by a growing media enterprise, with different actors moving back and forth between extreme and mainstream politics.

Ekstra Bladet’s campaign against immigration was introduced as a call for a referendum on whether Denmark should become a multi-ethnic society. The editor argued that Danes had never been asked whether they accepted the immigration of foreigners. To meet the demand for a free political debate, Ekstra Bladet made this campaign appear to serve a crucial democratic function. The transformation of Denmark “from a peaceful society to a multi-ethnic one” is repeated again and again in the paper as a crime committed by politicians against the Danish people.

Ekstra Bladet placed itself squarely on the side of the ordinary and straightforward public with an aggressive, even vulgar, slogan: “daring where others don’t”. It might be, the editor argued, that “most politicians do not see any problems, but still there is a contract between voters and those who are supposed to rule us”. But the rule is enacted without including the people. This populist stance and the idea of a referendum are two of the areas that blur the relationship between news media and political party. Others include the dominance of the Danish People’s Party’s sympathizers during the campaign: journalists interviewed authors of letters to the editor for full articles, who mostly turned out to be sympathizers of the Danish People’s Party, while authors of letters to the editor would automatically receive letters of invitation to join the Danish People’s Party. Finally, a key story in the campaign was a story about a Somali immigrant, Ali, his wife, ex-wife and children. These individuals were lumped together and presented as if Ali had received an enormous sum of social welfare payment as a single person. The story was invented by a journalist who, shortly after the campaign, wrote a manifesto-type book for the Danish People’s Party and became the party’s candidate for the European Parliament. New terms that emerged from Dahlerup’s story became artefacts of the dominant neo-nationalist discourse: “Ali-lofi”, for example, a reference to the alleged need for legislating a limit (‘loft’ literally means ‘ceiling’ in Danish) to how much social welfare benefits foreigners could receive.

The broader tendencies of the symbiotic campaign can best be described as basic populism: against the elite, for the people, and against foreigners. In the wake of this successful campaign, polls showed that Danes experienced a drastic increase in fear of the presence of new foreign cultures and visibly different minorities (Hervik 2011), and of course expressed a new demand for authoritarian rule to be strengthened.

The news media discourse on “gypsy crime” in Hungary presents a similar situation. The introduction of the term “gypsy crime” for a new journalistic genre generated unprecedented success for, and proliferation of, the far-right (mainly online) media. The most popular far-right portal, kuruc.info, launched a special section on “gypsy crime”, updated several times a day, almost exclusively listing Roma (always called “gypsy”) suspects in connection with crime reports. Secondly, “gypsy crime” very soon became the clarion call for rising far-right party Jobbik and for even more
extreme far-right movements and paramilitary organizations in Hungary. Moreover, as an in-depth description of the discourse on “gypsy crime” has shown, it is not only that with the notion of “gypsy crime” an openly racist language was introduced in Hungary, but that the term has become the symbol of “telling the truth”, of breaking taboos in politics and public discourse. Of all incidents eliciting the expression “gypsy crime”, the greatest amount of media coverage was generated by the “Olaszliszka lynching” incident and the establishment of the Hungarian Guard, a far-right paramilitary movement (Juhász, 2010).

The incident took place on 15 October 2006 in a village in the eastern part of Hungary. A passing car nearly hit a local Roma girl who had been walking on the street. When the driver, a teacher from a nearby town, stopped to see if the girl was all right, members of the girl’s family and other Roma individuals who had witnessed the accident, wrongly believing that the girl had been severely wounded, beat the driver to death. The brutal scene, witnessed by the driver’s two children, became known as the “Olaszliszka lynching” and was quickly turned into a metaphor for “gypsy crime”. The ‘Goy Riders’, an organization claiming “to defend Hungarian national and Christian ideas and values”, labelled the teacher a martyr and erected a monument in his memory at the site of the murder. The monument has since become a “place of pilgrimage” for members of far-right organizations claiming to fight “gypsy crime” in the country.

The second important event was the foundation of the Hungarian Guard in June 2007 (less than a year after the Olaszliszka tragedy). According to its statutes, the new paramilitary organization seeks to play a role in “the strengthening of national self-defence”. It is under this pretext that members of the organization, wearing a uniform reminiscent of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian Nazi party in the 1940s, marched through a number of villages inhabited by Roma, demanding the prosecution of “gypsy criminals” together with the restoration of public order and security in the countryside. Although the Hungarian Guard was not directly responsible for the so-called “Roma murders” that shook the country in 2008-2009, the four men charged with the nine attacks committed against innocent Roma, which claimed six lives were, according to the state prosecution’s charges, in contact with far-right groups. It is also worth noting that the scene of the most infamous attack of the “death brigade” was the village where the Guard first marched: Tatárszentgyörgy, where a 28-year-old father and his five-year-old-son were shot and killed while attempting to escape from their house (Feischmidt et al., 2013).

Although they play a key role, it is not only far-right organizations that criminalize the Roma and create an atmosphere prone to violence. Online news portals usually report smaller conflicts that would otherwise go unnoticed, with blogs specializing in “gypsy crime”. Mainstream media and politicians pick up accounts from the new media associated with the far right, partly because they are often the only ones to report on an event, and partly because they fabricate and circulate interpretative frameworks that are easy to apply to mainstream media contexts as well. The same transfer strategy legitimized by taboo-breaking was applied in the case of some other topics (like the political and media discourses on penal populism in Hungary; see Boda et al., 2015).
Analysing two of the above criminal cases (one where the victim was a non-Roma Hungarian and the perpetrator was a Roma person, and another where the perpetrator was a non-Roma Hungarian citizen and follower of one of the far-right paramilitary organizations), Vidra and Fox come to the conclusion that far-right media and politics have managed to set the agenda together by thematizing the Roma and by introducing the term “gypsy crime”. Moreover, they claim, the far right’s racism has become accepted into the mainstream, which has embraced the radical right’s propositions and turned them into a “digestible” rhetoric, while breaking the taboos of anti-racism (Vidra – Fox, 2014: 52).

There are two further points to be made in the light of the Danish and the Hungarian cases that support our first general claim that the focus on the extreme plays on media coverage of violent acts. First, acts committed by fanatic followers of a far-right ideology against members of minorities and other perceived enemies; second, violent acts committed by members of minorities against members of the majority. Even more importantly, the far-right media plays an instigating and defining role in the narrative framework of both. The ‘politics of fear’, characteristic, as Ruth Wodak and her co-authors argue, of far-right discourse, depends on performative strategies, which claim victimhood through such dramatized and exaggerated media events (Wodak et al., 2013; Glózer, 2014).

**Restoring a nation’s pride by blaming others**

Media coverage mentions the minority actors involved as well as the reasons for their acts. Articles tend to define non-nationals in cultural and moral terms, while the relation of minority actors to the nation is set up as a hierarchical difference associated with incompatibility. New racism first of all means the recovery of this hierarchical view, as produced by discriminatory and exclusionary language that seeks to justify and naturalize difference. As some new publications have revealed (Wodak – KhosraviNik, 2013), in recent years racism has operated in more pervasive and diffuse forms, but its basic principles remain unaltered. The notion of an imagined community of cultural homogeneity implies that some people are included and others excluded, and that it is those who have this notion in common who decide on these matters. Those who subscribe to the notion claim that they have some “natural” right to the territory, that they have particular origins, often with certain racial features in common, and that they are part of a certain horizontal comradeship. Since the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy tends to fall precisely along “cultural” and/or “racial” lines, we can claim that neo-nationalism and neo-racism are two sides of the same phenomenon (Hervik, 2011).

One of the core issues of neo-racism is the adherence to the idea of incompatibility of non-Western or non-European “cultures” (Hervik, 2012); to the idea that living among one’s own kind is natural, and that the inclination and right to defend your culture and territory is instinctive (Barker, 1981); to the ethno-theory of xenophobia as a natural and therefore justifiable reaction to the unwanted presence of annoyingly different migrants; to the denial of racism; and to the coding of race in terms of “difference”, “culture” and “ethnicity”. These different criteria are present in
the far right’s anti-migration and neo-nationalist scheme, yet each of them includes (pseudo-)denials of racism and other processes that in themselves constitute efforts at mainstreaming.

The claims of far-right actors for essential differences that the culturally inferior aliens represent in immigrant societies is supported by collective emotion, in particular by any collective threat. Analysing the case of Muhammad cartoons in Denmark and Sweden, Stig Arne Nohrsted (2013) goes further, claiming that mediated speculation regarding fears and dangers has created a culture of fear which acts as a breeding ground for new right-wing populism. Other researchers have revealed a close relationship between a high level of anti-migrant or anti-minority attitudes and the acceptance of new racist discourses (Lubbers et al., 2002), warranting the claim that these attitudes are the key to understand where and why far-right parties have emerged and established themselves successfully. As regards Hungary, home to the post-communist world’s most successful far-right party (Jobbik), researchers have pointed out that anti-gypsyism was the main cause of Jobbik’s breakthrough in 2009 (Biró-Nagy – Róna, 2013) and that a greater proportion of Jobbik’s sympathizers hold anti-gypsy attitudes than is the case for competing right- or left-wing parties. The general level of xenophobia in Hungary is also very high in comparison to other European countries (Krekó et al., 2011).

Hervik has found an increasing level of xenophobia amongst Danish youth. As one of his interviewees directly formulated, “It has become more acceptable today to say immigrants are a nuisance and should simply be sent home. This has become more acceptable” (Anne, student, 23 years). Similarly, Feischmidt has also found a high level of acceptance of racist discourse amongst Hungarian youth. The prevalent attitude of rejection vis-à-vis members of the Roma minority (which, in terms of its objective forms of expression, ranges from avoidance to calls for ethnic cleansing) was legitimized in two ways by the members of the focus groups she conducted: by reference to statistics or to (a small number of) tragic events that are widely circulated in the mainstream media, and by reference to criminal acts – typically theft, robbery or bodily harm – perpetrated by Roma individuals against the speaker or members of their family. Most of the participants used these sources of legitimation simultaneously, blurring allusions to “well-known” facts or events with personal stories used to buttress generalized statements. If this combination of mediated criminal acts (such as the lynching of a teacher in front of his children in 2006 or the murder of a handball player in 2009) and personal complaints is explosive, it is because they mutually reinforce each other, generating a climate of fear and paranoia as upheld by the fantasy image of “gypsy crime” (Feischmidt 2014a).

Far-right rhetoric that reproduces racist images and arguments has not only spread in our societies because of their public resonance based on pre-existing prejudices – it has also been able to do so because serious political and media actors have failed to denounce these new forms of racism. In the Hungarian case, as Vidra and Fox argue, this is a result of the mainstream political elite either condoning or adopting this far-right rhetoric for fear of losing votes from the large segment of society that holds racist views and anti-Roma attitudes (Vidra and Fox, 2014).

As part of his view on the clash of civilizations, Samuel Huntington, one of the world’s most influential intellectuals, emphasized “the necessity to hate someone in
order to know who you are”. His inspiration comes from German professor of law and political theorist Carl Schmitt, who wrote this key statement on his approach to the political friend (or foe) in the post-World War I period: “We don’t know who we are, if we don’t know our enemies”. Huntington evokes Dibdin’s novel Dead Lagoon: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.” Statesmen and scholars cannot ignore the unfortunate poignancy in these old truths. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the enmities that are potentially most dangerous occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilizations (Huntington, 1996: 21).

Only at first is the relationship between these actors a distant one. Nevertheless, as our earlier research revealed, there is an emerging network relationship and a sharing of core values by a cluster of radical right-wing anti-Islam writers amongst Danish and North American neo-conservatives. A group of Denmark’s most notorious far-right figures wrote hundreds of news articles and more than a dozen books on what they saw as the dangers of Islam. These authors form a network of people who present the Danish Muhammad cartoon conflict as a manifestation of the clash of civilizations, where Islam and Islamists have to be met with zero-tolerance and confrontation (Hervik, 2008, 2011). According to this view, Muslim cultural identity is irreconcilable with Danish or Western culture, because, as neo-conservatives declare again and again, there can be no moral equivalency between Western democracy and other forms of rule. “Our system of government” is morally superior and it is our duty to spread this to the rest of the world, they claim. Politically, they add, your opponent should be treated as an enemy with antagonistic zero-tolerance, even with a view to injure, overthrow or confound this opponent, sometimes harmfully or deadly (Coll, 2004; Mann, 2004). Such values and practices imply that adherents will go further with their rhetoric than their opponents, and thereby always attract more of the news media’s attention.

Mainstreaming the extreme starts with accepting intolerance, as Kouki and Vidra (2014) argue or with accepting racism, as we claim here. The shift of the radical right towards the mainstream takes place through the reconfiguration of public speech on immigrants (above all Muslims) in most parts of Europe and through discourse on the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. As we argued above, this can happen not only because Islam and Roma have become key issues for the political mobilization of various right-wing parties, and not even because large parts of our societies are receptive (for certain structural reasons) to anti-minority mobilization, but also because the far-right discourse has some basic concepts and arguments in common with mainstream thinking. Besides these causes, there is the intricate yet crucial question of how exactly this shift of racist discursive blocks from the margins to the centre takes place, or rather how this can be explained in societies that claim to be rational, egalitarian and democratic.

Images and arguments of the extreme right are incorporated by discourses considered to be moderate by responding to the demand created by themselves to come forward with “real problems”, consciously hidden by the established actors of
the mainstream. Examining Dutch public debates on multiculturalism through the 1990s into the late 2000s, Prins and Saharso (2010) observe the emergence of what they call “new realism”, which can also be seen in the case of the tabloid paper Ekstra Bladet’s self-presentation. “New realism” is characterized by a special discursive position that presents the author as someone who speaks “frankly” about the “truths” that the dominant political correct discourse has covered up; the author sets himself up as a spokesperson of ordinary people, spelling out the negative consequences of the increasing number of immigrants and minorities, such as high rates of criminality and an unwillingness to adapt to the cultural norms of the majority (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010: 33).

The mediatized political narrative of multiculturalism in crisis creates and defuses a new set of arguments which emphasize the way cultural differences lead to communal separateness, and how this separateness deepens socio-economic standing, intensifies the breakdown of social relations, and provides an incubator for extremism and possible terrorism. Within this line of thinking, blaming multiculturalism also entails putting the blame on immigrant/ethnic minorities themselves. With some rhetorical sleight-of-hand, moreover, the political elite which promoted multiculturalism can also be blamed (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010: 12-13). However, the alleged backlash against multiculturalism is really just a means to expand the far-right to such an extent that it becomes large enough to take over the mainstream. The mechanism is to build strength by fighting an enemy. This building of strength through this enemy’s denigration is thus more than merely a matter of neo-nationalist celebration and neo-racist exclusion; rather, as rightly observed by Gingrich and Banks (2006), this may not be an end itself, and instead functions as a smokescreen that serves to hide and shield socio-economic priorities (2006: 18).

**Neo-racism and neo-nationalism: engines of mainstreaming**

In conclusion, we would like to summarize certain aspects of the process which we call mainstreaming the extreme. Mainstreaming refers first and foremost to a process of accommodation between the democratic political system and the populist far right. Scholars analysing this relationship in a broader context have identified three typical strategies that established political parties employ towards the rising far right: delegitimizing it (due to its incompatibility with democratic values), isolating it (by excluding it from electoral or executive alliances and public discussions) and embracing it (Pelinka, 2013). The last of these gives a greater chance to control far-right actors, and more opportunity to unveil their professional inadequacies once they are brought into the fold. The problem becomes more acute and insistent when a government coalition of the moderate right and the populist far-right comes to power.

This was the case in Austria in 2000, when, after a long political reconciliation followed by a mostly critical public debate, ÖVP accepted a coalition with FPÖ. When analysing the impact of this decision, scholars have mostly emphasized the losses for the far-right and the benefits for the conservatives in the short term. This is not true, though, from a long-term perspective (Swoboda and Wiersma, 2008; Wodak, 2013). The coalition fosters an accommodation not only in one direction,
namely of the extreme-right to the democratic mainstream, but also in the other: the adaptation of mainstream political discourse to the issues and logic of the extreme right. Moreover, in order for this interaction to come about, there is no need for a formal coalition. The literature has repeatedly pointed to the same claim made by our special issue: that this act of neo-conservatism embracing the far right is inevitably followed by adapting itself to it.

At the level of political discourse – as proposed in this introductory essay – this means that while there is a move away from the overt neo-fascist discourse of the far right, this does not indicate a decline in discriminatory and exclusionary language, but merely that racism has come to take more pervasive and diffuse forms (Wodak, 2013). Furthermore, the focus of the discourse is rephrased: the nation, national identity and the national territory turn out to be the main values, and their protection the main political aim. This is true not only of the old far-right movements in Western Europe, but also for most of their East European counterparts.

There is at the same time a move of the mainstream towards a politics of national identity which promotes collective values along with value-based and identity-based politics. The logic of this discursive shift is well exemplified in the following quote from a speech by the neo-conservative Danish prime minister: “It is actually my opinion that setting the agenda in the debate of values changes society much more than those changes to the law. When I speak broadly about culture; it is the outcome of the culture war that decides Denmark’s future. Not the economic policies. Not the technocratic changes of the judicial system. What is decisive is who has the good fortune to set the agenda in the debate on values” (Hervik, 2014).

The Hungarian example also unambiguously shows what embracing and adaptation might mean, and what their political and symbolic consequences might be. The far-right movements and organizations broke into the public sphere in the first decade of the 21st century with two issues: the first, the Roma issue, was presented in detail above. The second concerns a controversial, both politically and emotionally loaded moment of historical memory: 1920, the Treaty of Trianon, when Hungary lost two-thirds of its former territory and one half of its former population. This not only had practical consequences but deeply affected Hungarians’ self-perception: from being a nation that took pride in its imperial superiority to being just one of the small countries of the region. Yet neither this loss nor identification with past glory was emphasized in the last decades (unlike the mainstream revisionism of the inter-war period), and was instead more likely to be avoided. This is why the topic became so appealing and attractive when in around 2006 far-right organizations began organizing Trianon commemorations, followed by far-right entrepreneurs who in a very short time created a nationalist popular culture employing the revisionist message. This is where the governing moderate right, which also employs a nationalist rhetoric and is always looking for timely forms for its identity politics, could not be left out. It has embraced and adopted the Trianon symbol for the official politics of memory (Feischmidt, 2014b).

Similarly, the radical right Danish People’s Party invested in historical events to increase contemporary moral arguments when it turned to a poignant referendum in 1920 on the future border of southern Denmark and northern Germany. One of the posters for the campaign before the referendum showed a Danish child telling her
mother: “Mum! Vote Danish. Think of me”. The Danish People’s Party republished the poster and adopted the “Vote Danish” slogan for the parliamentary election in 1990.3

Of course, this process is not unique to one country or two; the political ambiguity of and the concurrent attachment to the moderate and extreme right are inherent to neo-nationalism in Europe (Gingrich-Banks, 2006). Studies of political culture and of media and political discourse have attempted to investigate the political visions and social perceptions employed by far-right figures, as well as the ways they have become acceptable and even desirable for a considerable proportion of society. Scholars have identified the decisive role of the re-imagination of “traditional” communities as against individualism and transnational identities, and of “integralist” world-views as opposed to Enlightenment-based visions of society; they also point to the controversial application of the values of European modernity (such as emancipation and tolerance) against the non-European (mostly Muslim) ‘Others’ (Holmes 2009). These perceptions are usually embedded in neo-nationalist discourses on the “endangered” cultural and moral integrity of the nation, along with discursive reifications of “annoying” or “dangerous” aliens. Though domestic social conditions and the history of nationalist thought vary widely, neo-nationalisms, like far-right politics, show numerous similarities in different parts of Europe. It is these similarities we aim to use our comparative and interdisciplinary approach to understand here.

**Intersecting challenges of the far right in Europe: this issue of IEEJSP**

The first paper in this issue describes the broader context of the mainstreaming of far-right phenomena by applying a political theory approach and analysing liberalism and democracy (as two distinct dimensions of “good governance”) as well as their current and their unfolding alternatives. Iván Szelényi and Tamás Csillag review versions of illiberal democratic capitalism in post-communist European societies, with particular emphasis on Russia and Hungary. They point out the characteristics inherent to national ideologies, and they emphasize their relationship to neo-conservative politics and thinking beyond the two countries, for example in the US and the EU.

Three papers analyse the relationship between the rise of the far right and the effects of new racism on the discourse on immigrants. Sindre Bangtsad convincingly portrays how much the process of mainstreaming is facilitated by the racist discourses and structures of European societies, a perspective that has not previously enjoyed much attention. Not even in a country like Norway, which both domestic and foreign scholars seem to have thought had overcome racism. Contrary to such general assumptions, Bangstad contextualizes Norwegian neo-racism with reference to persistent fears about a lack of social and national cohesion arising from modern mass immigration and an increasingly multicultural Norwegian society.

---

Peter Hervik explores how xenophobia, more exactly islamophobia embeds negative images of emancipative movements (multiculturalism, feminism) and of leftist or liberal political alternatives in Northern Europe. He approaches the coexistence of these negative images as “Scandinavian Nexus” with its blurred relations and taken for granted assumptions in the Muhammad Cartoon Affair in Denmark, the media coverage of the terrorist attack in Norway 2011 and two more recent media events.

Giorgos Tsimouris investigates a country with completely different economic and political conditions, yet arrives at similar conclusions. He claims that the electoral success of the Greek far right is closely associated with its anti-immigrant discourse and with actions in Athens and other Greek cities. Tsimouris acknowledges the significance of Golden Dawn’s attempt to provide protection to the Greek public after the state retreated to a large extent from welfare services. He nevertheless emphasizes the effects of mainstream anti-immigrant discourse and representation, which have further deteriorated, intensified and expanded during economic crisis. The ‘immigrant other’, as Tsimouris formulates it, came to the forefront of political debate as the dangerous and contaminating ‘other’ refabricating the popular ‘deep structures’ of nationalism and patriarchal relations.

Sik investigates social and historical factors determining the political culture of young Hungarians. Based on semi-structured interviews conducted in two Hungarian cities he argues that two typical forms of political culture (the ‘hopeless’ and the ‘indifferent’) characteristic for the younger generation create the opportunity for antidemocratic tendencies and the space in which these tendencies can evolve.

Two papers are based on empirical media investigations. Szabó and Bene have studied the relationship of radical-right media actors (and their networks) with the mainstream (the networks of the general media sphere) through media coverage of particular issues. They argue that the transfer of topics and their discursive framework is limited, and that the far-right media is isolated by the mainstream. Compared with the results of other research on the Hungarian media (Messing and Bernáth, 2012; Vidra and Fox, 2014; Juhász, 2010), the difference is evident, and can be explained by the selection of topics for investigation. While certain issues (like “gypsy crime”) have indeed generated the mainstreaming process, others (e.g. the issue of the nuclear power station at Paks) tend to work against it.

The other media analysis is a classic investigation of media coverage of far-right actors. Kluknavska studied the ways Slovak far-right politician Marian Kotleba was presented in the media during the 2013 regional elections. She argues that the discourse on the far right was mainly framed in terms of it being a threat, which contributed greatly to the increase of its popularity.

Two further papers in this issue apply a gender perspective on the study of the far right, and reveal the relevance of the representation of women and LGBTIQ people in the process of mainstreaming. Anikó Félix analyses forms of female participation and the discourse which provides a framework for this in public debate. She demonstrates that, for the far right, the ideal woman is limited to her reproductive role, which has not only a biological but also a cultural aspect. The feminine version of “true Hungrianness” is more attractive for those who sympathize with the far right but who are as yet not devoted to it. Thus it appears to be an efficient medium in the mainstreaming process.
Izidora Stakić analyses the representation of homosexuality and LGBTIQ people within the discourse of the Serbian far right, emphasizing the discursive construction of LGBTIQ minorities as a security threat. She argues that the narratives of Serbian far-right groups acquire legitimacy due to their coherence with the mainstream discourse on homosexuality and LGBTIQ rights. Moreover, through the securitization of sexual minorities in far-right discourse, Serbian national identity is being both reified and strengthened.

References


Drifting from Liberal Democracy: Traditionalist/Neo-conservative Ideology of Managed Illiberal Democratic Capitalism in Post-communist Europe

* Tamás Csillag (Central European University) and Iván Szelényi (ivan.szelenyi@nyu.edu) (Yale University/NYUAD)

Abstract

Most European post-communist societies after 1989-1991 appeared to be on the road to liberal democratic capitalism. However, a quarter of century after the change of the system, at least some of the countries - Russia and Hungary in particular (arguably setting a trend for many other nations) - began to drift sharply away from liberal democracy. We treat liberalism and democracy as two distinct dimensions of “good governance”. We interpret liberalism as separation of powers and security of private property rights. We interpret democracy as majoritarian rule. As the regimes shift to illiberalism, secure private property tends to be converted into “fief” (neo-patrimonialism – like during the rule of Yeltsin), or eventually into “benefice” (neo-prebendalism, this turn happened with the rise of Putin to power). While the principle of majoritarian rule is retained, it is also “managed”. But as long as democratic institutions operate, as long as leaders are elected to office the ruling elites of illiberal democracies need a legitimating ideology which can appeal to a broader electorate. We call this post-communist traditionalist/neo-conservative ideology. Post-communist traditionalism/neo-conservatism emphasizes the value of patriotism, religion and traditional family values much like some of the socially conservative republicans in the USA do.

Keywords: post-communist capitalism, managed and illiberal democracy, transition from communism to capitalism, neo-patrimonial and neo-prebendal forms of ownership, traditionalism/neo-conservatism.
Introduction: Political systems, forms of ownership, ideologies

Formulating the problem

Bálint Magyar, one of the leading Hungarian post-communist liberal politicians expressed his frustration with post-communist politics in the introduction of his 2014-edited book, “The Hungarian Octopus, Volume 2”. He stated: “After the fall of the Soviet Empire many of us shared the illusion that communist dictatorships – at least in Europe – can only be succeeded by Western style liberal democracies” (2014:7).

Many liberal democrats in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe shared this sentiment with him. Indeed in 1989-91 liberal democracy and market capitalism were the legitimating ideologies of the new political elites in most of the former socialist countries of Europe. Even in Russia, during the first year of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency it appeared that Russia might be heading toward liberalism. Yegor Gaidar who was acting Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for the second half of 1992 was widely recognized as a liberal and an advocate of shock therapy, a major neo-liberal economic policy tool. Some basic institutions of liberal democracy and market capitalism were indeed in the making. A multi-party political system was established. Reasonably free and fair elections were held. The media became substantially free in most formerly socialist European countries. The emergent new societies were governed by the rule of law. The executive branch (be it parliamentary or presidential) had to deal with freely elected legislatures. Constitutional courts checked whether the laws passed by the legislature were in accordance with the constitution (even in Russia a powerful Constitutional court operated between 1991 and 1993). It looked like the three branches of government (the executive, the legislative and the judiciary) were rather autonomous and some system of checks and balances were operating. At the same time, institutions of market capitalism were evolving. Private ownership was sacrosanct and attempts were made to pass legislation regulating the orderly conversion of public property into private wealth. Basic institutions of free market economy (bankruptcy laws, central bank with relative autonomy from the legislature and from the executive, free flow of labor and capital) were also designed.

A quarter of century after “Die Wende”, as the above citation from Bálint Magyar indicates, the road to liberal democracy and market capitalism turned out to be rockier than expected. By the middle of the second decade of the 21st century one begins to wonder if the previously widely accepted doctrine “democratic teleology”

---

1 In this paper, we use the terms democracy in a narrower definition of the concept. Some authors use the term democracy to write about liberal democracy (rule of law, separation of powers, security of property and majoritarian rule), others merely define democracy as a system in which leaders were elected by majoritarian rule. We do not cast our vote one way or another in this complex theoretical debate, but we use the term in the second, narrower sense of the term.

2 Some East European countries did not experiment with liberal democracy at all. Tudjman’s Croatia or Milosevic’s Serbia, Bulgaria or Romania in the early 1990s were far from any conception of liberal democracy or even free market capitalism. As Ken Jewitt, a Romanian expert at UC Berkeley pointed out (1996) it was not quite clear, which direction post-communist societies would take: will they become “civic”, or “ethnic” (and Jewitt predicted the ethnic turn would be more likely. Unfortunately almost 20 years later we have to concede: he made a good point, valid not only for Romania.)
“Transitiology” and the “third wave of democratization theory” acknowledged that consolidation of democracy may take a long time, but usually it is assumed that deviations in early stages of the transition from models of liberal democracy are only transitional. At one point or another all societies would eventually arrive at the final destination, liberal democracy.

Francis Fukuyama, who exactly 25 years ago announced the end of history, shares Bálint Magyar’s anxieties. Fukuyama, in his recent book, Political Order and Political Decay (2014) did not only acknowledge that some countries in transit have not only not proceeded to democracy but he also shows that some even made U-turns and reverted to autocracy. Fukuyama successfully demonstrates that democratic intuitions do not only evolve, but that they can also decay, even in consolidated democracies (hence the title of Berman’s review of this book in New York Times: “Global warning”).

In this paper, our aim is not as grandiose as Fukuyama’s. We merely try to understand the nature of political economies of post-communist countries, which did embark on the road to liberal capitalism and which now appear to be diverging from liberalism. We pay particular attention to Russia and Hungary; however, the phenomenon may be taking place in several other countries as well.

One could of course follow Fukuyama’s argument and suggest that such a divergence from liberal democracy is taking place generally on the semi-periphery or periphery of the world system. This may very well be the case, but in this paper we face a challenging enough task to understand this shift in post-communist Europe.

Indeed, the drift from the road to liberal democracy in post-communist Eastern Europe occurs at different points in time, and the degree of deviation varies. Furthermore, the institutions affected by the changes differ from country to country. We also need to note that moving from one system to another is certainly not a one-way street; countries often shift back and forth between trajectories.

We describe the features of the emergent illiberal post-communist systems in political terms. Authors often write about “autocracies”, “electoral or competitive autocracies” (Shevtsova, 2000, Levitsky and Way, 2002 and 2010, Levitsky and Way use the term also for some countries in Africa and Latin America), “managed democracies” (Anderson, 2007), “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria, 1997) – we wrote about “managed illiberal democracy” combining Gati and Anderson). Some analysts emphasize the features that distinguish these systems economically from free market

---

3 His book, The End of History was published only in 1992, but he already presented the same ideas in an article in 1989.
capitalism. Hence they call it “political capitalism” (Staniszkis, 1990), “state capitalism”, “crony capitalism” (Sharafutdinova, 2011). Others describe these systems as some sort of “neo-patrimonialism” or “neo-prebendalism” (King and Szelenyi, 2005). The most recent formulation of this concept - specifically applied to Hungary - calls the second and third Orbán government “mafia state” (Magyar, 2013, 2014, see also for an earlier and broader definition of mafia state Naim, 2012) Naim refers to Russia and Bulgaria, but also to countries in Latin America and elsewhere in the world.

The powerful theory of “mafia state” sees the recent Hungarian post-communist state not as the organized “under world” but rather as an organized “upper world”. In such a system the prime minister acts as a Godfather, (capofamiglia, the Don) and uses public authority to pursue his own economic interests and the economic interests of his real and “adopted” families (composed of all loyal followers) in an unpredictable (un-orthodox), illegitimate and un-ideological way (2014:10 and 14).

Less attention is paid in the literature to the ideology of the emerging post-communist system. We call it post-communist traditionalism/neo-conservatism. We will elaborate in the last section of this paper what that ideology is and why it seems to have substantial popular support.

The aim of this paper is to offer a synthesis of various conceptualizations. Our aim is to propose a genealogy of what we call post-communist managed illiberal democracy where property relations shift from private property and market capitalism to neo-patrimonial and eventually neo-prebendal property relations. Rather than dismissing the emergent system as illegitimate we want to understand the
mechanisms, how the system legitimates itself, hence what the ideology of the system is (that is what we call “post-communist traditionalism”/neo-conservatism).

We have three sets of “variables”: economic institutions, political organization and ideologies. These variables or dimension, interact with each other. To put it with Weber: we want to explore the elective affinities\(^\text{13}\) between political systems, economic institutions and ideologies. Most attempts to explain the nature of post-communist system do focus on one of these dimensions. We, on the other hand, try to explore the interaction of them.

Before we proceed further, we have to define our terminology.

**Defining the concept of liberalism and democracy**

We make a critical - and we concede: controversial - distinction, much like Montesquieu ([1748] 1989: 157), John Stuart Mill ([1859] 1993: 72-73) or recently Zakaria (1997: 24-25) between democracy and liberalism. In this paper we define democracy and liberalism as two distinct dimensions of “good governance”. In fact we distinguish between four types of governance: liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, liberal autocracy and illiberal autocracy (which in extreme cases can be called despotism or dictatorship). These are of course ideal types in the weberian sense of the term. Liberal vs. illiberal; democratic vs. autocratic are two opposing poles on a scale. There is hardly any actually existing system which perfectly fits one of these polar concepts. Hence we are reluctant to use a 2x2 table and fit individual cases into each of the boxes\(^\text{14}\), our aim is not to fit individual countries into one of the boxes, but try to estimate the distance of these cases from two or even from each of these boxes.

**Democracy**

We start this definition of democracy with Samuel Huntington, who offered a “minimalist definition” that can accommodate both liberal and illiberal practices and in this paper we follow Huntington’s conception:

“Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities make such governments undesirable but they do not make

\(^{13}\) Weber did not believe in the possibility of causal explanation in the study of social life. Relationship between economic interests and ideologies can be best understood as “elective affinities” (Wahlverwandschaften, see Gerth and Mills, 1946: 62 and 284)

\(^{14}\) It is useful to use the democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit to distinguish between “democracy” and “liberalism”. They measure “democracy” in five dimensions: 1/electoral process; 2/functioning of government; 3/political participation; 4/political culture and 5/civil liberties. For this paper we use dimension 1/ as a definition of democracy and especially dimensions 2 and 5 as definition of liberalism. For details, see http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=demo2010 Accessed: 30-10-2014.
them undemocratic. Democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from other characteristics of political system” (Huntington, 1991:9; cited by Zakaria, 1997: 25).

In agreement with Huntington and Zakaria, we use the term democracy merely to refer to “majoritarian” legitimation of domination, selection of leaders by votes of the majority. Even this simple definition has many complex issues with many miniscule details. Whose majority? What are the rules, which guarantee “open, free and fair” elections?

In the late 18th century, the United States was close to the ideal type of liberal democracy, despite the fact that women and blacks did not have the right to vote. There were severe restrictions even on white men’s electoral rights that conditioned the power to vote on property ownership or the ability to pay taxes. There never were and most likely, there never will be elections, which are completely “open, free and fair”. Although democracies are generally becoming more inclusive, there are still major fluctuations in terms of fairness and openness of elections, both in the positive and negative directions. At one point, some electoral rules may become so restrictive that one begins to wonder whether this system is still “democratic”. In addition, the notion of democracy is relative. In the world today, the liberal form of democracy is hegemonic. Thus, Putin’s and Orbán’s illiberal democracies are questioned whether they are democratic at all (Levitsky and Way challenged Zakaria and see illiberal democracy as a contradiction in terms, 2002 and 2010). Freedom House for the last decade re-classified for instance Russia from democracy to autocracy (indeed there were reasonably credible claims of fraud in recent elections, nevertheless Russia held regular elections and the ruling party at its last elections almost lost its parliamentary majority – hence elections, even in Putin’s Russia are not without stakes).

Liberalism

We define liberalism as the political system in which various branches of power (the executive, legislative and judiciary and arguably in our time a fourth branch, the media) are separated from each other and private/individual freedom and property is sacrosanct.

In July 26, 2014, Prime Minister Orbán in the Romanian resort Bâile Tușnad (Tusnadfürdő) called the political system he is dedicated to construct – in our terminology quite accurately – an “illiberal democracy”. He used the term “illiberal” in a somewhat different way than we use it. “Liberalism” for Orbán means the excessive emphasis of individual interest over the “national” interest. One can interpret “national interest” as “public interest” (we will explain later the potential difference between “national” and “public” interest). George Schöpflin also criticized what he calls the “liberal consensus” for ignoring “collective identities” (among them

---

15 Around 1790 about 60-70 percent of white men had voting rights in the newly formed USA under the arguably most liberal constitution in the history of humankind. No women, no blacks and no people without any property, or at least no people who did not pay any taxes could vote.
“national” identity appears to be the most critical for him) and advocates “illiberalism” (2014:12; 17).

Viktor Orbán is quite right: how much emphasis we put on individual liberty and national (public) interest is a key question of good governance.

There are neo-liberals who indeed can be seen as believing that public interest is merely an aggregation of individual interests. Adam Smith is often interpreted as an advocate of this view. Indeed, in The Wealth of Nations he wrote “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but their regard of their own interest” (Smith [1776] 1977:15). This seems to be what Orbán sees as “liberalism”.

However, what is “self-interest”? In classical liberal theory (and in the practices of the most liberal political regimes of our times) it is nothing opposed to public interest, as Orbán’s speech seems to imply. Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments is very clear about this: “No matter how selfish you think man is, it is obvious that there are some principles in his nature that give him an interest in the welfare of others, and make their happiness necessary to him” (Smith [1759] 2006: §1).

The critical point of reference of Smith’s “sympathetic theory of human nature” is not the “nation”, but it includes into the concept of self-interest the interest of all “others” we interact with, irrespective of their ethnic or national identity. In this sense, such a public interest results from the interest of individuals, rather than from the interest of some “imagined community”, like the “nation” (Anderson, 1991). Furthermore, who can question the 20th or 21st century liberalism of the Swedish or Danish state and acknowledge they have a well-developed notion of the “public good”, which arguably is consistent with Adam Smith’s sympathetic theory of human nature.

The emphatic reference to national interest is of a different order. National interest does not stem from interests of interacting individuals, but from the interests of the “imagined community” of the nation (if imagined communities can have interests) to use Benedict Anderson’s theory (Anderson, 1991).

Hence, it is possible to argue that for Putin (or Orbán) the emphasis on national interest drives their desire to achieve the dominance of the executive branch over the other branches of government. It is the executive branch which sees the national interest and should not be bogged down on this effectively by a politically divided legislature or a bureaucratic judiciary. Similarly, the media must also be constrained not to question the national interest in the name of individual liberties.

Let us return to Montesquieu and Mill. The problem of the post 2010 Hungarian regime (or post 2000 politics of Putin) is not so much that it violates the rules of majoritarian (democratic) policy (it actually does do that too). United Russia and Fidesz did manipulate electoral rules and United Russia may have even cheated during the 2011 elections, but the unique feature of these regimes is that they exercise power in an illiberal, non-moderate manner. Are Russia under Putin or Hungary

16 The critical question is whether an opposition party, which at least in principle can rotate governmental power, exists or not. In a parliamentary system if the ruling party has a two-third majority, the separation of the executive and legislative branches basically becomes a fiction. If such a supermajority manipulates electoral rules so the ruling party keeps winning elections, the system is on the verge of becoming undemocratic, or autocratic. Freedom House does not regard Russia since 2004 as democratic, but listed Hungary even in 2014 among the democracies.
under Orbán illiberal democracies? Even Putin or Orbán would not contest the “illiberal” label, they are proudly illiberal. But are their regimes “democratic”? There is no simple yes/no answer to this question. With counter-factual reasoning we would suggest they can be regarded as democratic as long as according to the established electoral rules those in position of authority can be removed from power in regularly held elections.

There are also liberal autocracies, those are typically constitutional monarchies. Zakaria gives the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as an example (1997:29) of a liberal autocracy. Nevertheless even the Hobbesian “good monarch”, hence an absolute monarch can act in reasonably liberal (moderate) ways. We are pushing our luck now: for instance the rule of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the absolute ruler of Abu Dhabi is quite “moderate”. Well, the record of Abu Dhabi on civil liberties is miserable, but it certainly has a sort of “rule of law”, it offers a predictable environment to business and security of private property. It is “legal-rational order”...

While the ruler is the source of law, the law is upheld, predictable and though Abu Dhabi does not offer much individual liberty it operates with a quite efficient and non-corrupt government. We certainly would not call UAE “liberal”, but it is somewhat inbetween the “liberal” and “illiberal” poles of governance. What about Singapore? Singapore is of course not much of a democracy (though it does have a more and more competitive electoral system), but it certainly has some “liberal” features. It falls short of liberalism in guaranteeing individual liberties, but it performs reasonably well in terms of rule of law, predictability of the legal system and property rights and non/corrupt, efficient functioning of the government. While Putin’s Russia and Orbán’s Hungary are illiberal managed democracies, Singapore is an autocracy with some liberal features. While we are in some pain in calling any of the existing autocracies in the world today liberal in the full sense of the term, some autocracies tend to have more “liberal” components than some of the “managed democracies”.

John Stuart Mill believed that separation of powers, or liberalism, the guarantee of individual liberties is more important for good governance than majoritarian approval of the person in authority. Mill (just like Tocqueville, [1835-40] 2003) was greatly concerned about the “tyranny by the majority”, a situation in which a democratically elected leader is not bound by liberal principles and by the separation of powers (J.S. Mill [1859] 1993: 72-73).

By the late 20th and early 21st centuries, however, there is a consensus in the North-Atlantic region: the “best government” is liberal and democratic, a combination of the two dimensions of “good governance” (see Levitsky and Way, 2010 and others17). In our view it does not make the analytic distinction between these two dimensions redundant, but explains the hegemony of the ideology of liberal democracy.

---

A critical question of liberalism is that individual/private property rights are sacrosanct. Liberalism turns into illiberalism, when one questions the security of individual property rights.

In post-communist capitalism, there are at least two challenges for the legitimacy of individual private property. These are arguably unique features of post-communism, which may not be found in all, or even most semi-peripheral of peripheral economies.

First, the conversion of public property into private wealth happened over a short period of time, 500 days or five years. Especially when there is a legal vacuum, how to do it, upholding principles of legal-rational authority is extremely complex. It is next to impossible to do this in market consistent and legally/morally legitimate ways. Most – if not all of those – whom benefited from this conversion process have a “skeleton in their closet”, if not in legal, then at least in ethical terms.

In principle, the conversion of common property into individual wealth could have occurred if the new owners could have purchased the collectively owned assets in competitive bidding at market prices. However, that was often impossible for two reasons. 1/ The domestic bidders did not have the capital to pay the value of common property and 2/ even if they did (foreign large investors certainly did), then they did not have good enough information to evaluate the real value of the property they would have purchased. So even with the best intentions the emergent legal-rational authority, the liberal system needed to rely on some sort of neo-patrimonial support to decide who the new owners would be (domestic investors needed “connections” to get credits, foreign investors needed “connections” to obtain information about the real value of the firms they wanted to purchase).

In this paper, we distinguish between three systems of property right allocation:

1/ A market driven system, supported by a secondary neo-patrimonial mechanism: public property was sold on the competitive market place, but access to credit for domestic investors (with little or no capital) and access to information for foreign investors depended on some neo-patrimonial connection to those who controlled credit/and information. In Central Europe during the 1990’s the dominant system of property allocation was mainly market driven.

2/ Neo-patrimonial allocation of public goods to private investors within a legal-rational framework: political authorities operate in a democratic framework (even if it is somewhat already managed) and have to win elections so they need loyal supporters especially among big businesses who controlled the media hence they “appoint” the new grand bourgeoisie, anticipating their loyalty. The property allocated this way was at the grace of political powers. Nevertheless property rights were rather secure. This was like fief, however unlike classical fief this was closer to private property since it was alienable. The new property owners felt empowered by the security of their newly acquired wealth aspired even for political power. The archetype of this system was Yeltsin’s Russia. Some commentators of Yeltsin’s Russia suggested that by the end of Yeltsin’s rule some oligarchs had de facto privatized the state. This was a case of state capture.
3/ Attempt by a new generation of political leaders to turn neo-patrimonial property into neo-prebendal one: once the “commons were enclosed”, there was no more public property to be privatized, nevertheless the (quasi) democratic framework of politics still required the political rulers to create political support. Under such conditions, they had no option but to redistribute property already allocated. They did so by withdrawing property from owners who were not seen as sufficiently loyal, or suspected to have too high political ambitions and reallocating this property (as “benefice”) to owners who were believed to loyally serve the political powers. We call this the system of neo-prebendalism, which operates with a much-reduced system of legal-rational authority. It appears to be a system of rule of law, but since the legislative branch is not sufficiently autonomous the laws change easily if the executive branch needs this, occasionally even retrospectively. If the opposition is too weak and rotation of government becomes difficult. The political regime – even if there are regular elections – may cease to be democratic and can turn into an autocracy. Putin’s Russia comes close to this type. The Orbán government in Hungary is next in line. Arguably, the road from democracy to autocracy is paved with the “stones” of illiberalism. While illiberalism does not necessarily eliminate democracy, it creates conditions (given the weakness of Constitutional Courts and the legislative branch) for particularly powerful political leaders to flirt with abandoning democratic procedures if they may sense their electoral support eroded and they may not win the next elections.

*The ideology, which legitimates the illiberal neo-prebendal system of post-communist capitalism: traditionalism/neo-conservatism*

However, as long as the political rulers operate in a democratic framework the elites need more than just the support of big money (they are important especially due to their control over the media). They also need the popular vote. Hence, they have to come up with an ideology, which would appeal to “ordinary people”, and especially to people with very strong national (and religious) collective identity.

The extraordinary success Putin and Orbán had at the polls has a lot to do with their ability to formulate an ideology fitting into the world view of a substantial proportion of their electorate. Manipulating the rules of elections is only part of the story. The other part is finding an ideology that is appealing to people who would later vote. We call this ideology post-communist traditionalism/neo-conservatism.

What are the key elements of traditionalism/neo-conservatisms?

These were the major building blocks (and remain so) for all conservative/traditionalist movements: patria, the church and the (traditional) family. What is “neo” or “post-communist” about them?

Mainstream conservatives (such as the CDU in Germany or the “moderate” Republicans in the US) are often critical of left-wing, JFK, liberalism (especially on their efforts to build “excessive” welfare systems – hence they tend to stand by “small states” – and they were critical of “affirmative action” programs). Classical conservatives however, tend to retain respect for individual liberty and if there is a conflict between traditional values and individual liberties they may defer to individual
liberties and stand by the separation of powers. (Ironically the traditional conservative opposition to affirmative action is cast in “liberal” terms”: it violates individual liberty of whites against underprivileged African-Americans or Latinos)

As Skocpol and her co-authors (Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin, 2011) pointed out, there has been a revival of conservatism in the US (and we may add, elsewhere in the advanced world). In the US this was especially prominent with the rise of the so called Tea Party (which is of course no “party”, just a movement within the Republican Party), especially in its “socially conservative wing”\textsuperscript{18}. We call this new conservative revival - and we will argue it has a great deal of affinity with the ideologies emerging in some post-communist countries - as traditionalism/neo-conservatism. In the US the main characteristics of this conservative revival according to Skocpol and he co-authors are: 1/ they identify themselves primarily as social conservatives (Pat Buchanan - one of the forerunners of the movement - as we will show, calls himself paleo-conservative/traditionalist); 2/ they are “populists” in the sense they do inspire a popular movement, stage “culture wars” - extra parliamentarian actions – around socially conservative issues (like abortion, gay rights etc.); 3/ they make a critical distinction between “workers” and “people who do not work” and they oppose only government which gives “hand-outs” to the “undeserving poor” (hence they are not as anti-statist as it appears in their rhetoric); 4/ they are anti-immigrants, most of their support comes from white males and tends to be opposed to racial/ethnic affirmative action; 5/ they tend to be patriotic and religious, advocate teaching of creationism, prayers in school etc.

The value system of post-communist traditionalists/neo-conservatives and the palinites wing Tea Party values are rather similar\textsuperscript{19}. However, there are some differences. The Tea Party neo-conservatives/traditionalists are at least rhetorically against “big governments” though they use governmental powers to promote social conservative causes and some universal insurance schemes such social security and Medicare. Post-communist traditionalists/neo-conservatives are rather statist, not only in social issues but also in matters of economic policy.

\textsuperscript{18} The Tea Party is a multi-faceted movement within the Republican Party. Ron Paul, a libertarian who was in foreign policy matters an isolationist initiated the movement. By 2010 Sarah Palin become one of the most influential figure of the Tea Party and she is a rather extreme social conservative and a foreign policy hawk. During the 1960-1990’s, before Palin neo-cons were merely that wing of the Republican Party which were foreign policy hawks and advocated that the US has play its role at the great power of the world, but most neo-cons did not take strong stances in social conservatism. Palin combined now the two and emerged as a Tea Party version of neo-conservatism combined with traditionalism. Nevertheless, Rand Paul retained the libertarianism and isolationism of his father, so the Tea Party movement has two wings: the palinites and the paulites. Post-communist traditionalism/neo-conservatism is the closest to the palinite version of Tea Party: emphasis on patria and religion combined with social conservatism (See Hunter, J. (2011) What is a Neoconservative? The American Conservative, June 23. http://www.theamericanconservative.com/whats-a-neoconservative/ Accessed: 30-10-2014.), and they are also “hawks” in foreign policy. See Putin’s policies in Ukraine or Orbán’s position towards the EU and USA and his emphasis on “freedom fight”.

Challenges of liberal democratic ways to capitalism in Central Europe

As we pointed out earlier, in 1989-1991 the legitimating ideology of the new political elites was liberal democracy and free market capitalism in most European post-communist societies.

It is important though to see that these societies were at least for the first decade “transitional”. These societies struggled with the rather extraordinary challenges to build “capitalism without capitalists” within a very short period of time (Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley, 1998) – a non-trivial task indeed.

While free market capitalism was the hegemonic ideology, even the most liberal countries of the region faced some difficulties to grow up to their ideals. The single most important challenge was the rapid conversion of property rights. Most neo-classical economists believed that the crucial step was to create identifiable private owners for the formerly public property. The Yeltsin-Gaidar team promised to “create” capitalism in 500 days. Central Europe may not have been in quite such a rush but was not far behind. While in England the “enclosure of the commons” took hundreds of years, in post-communist societies the original accumulation of capital took place within a few years. This inevitably brought some “neo-patrimonial” elements even in the liberal version of post-communist systems. While this greatly varied from country to country the legal rules which regulated the conversion from public goods to private property were not sufficiently well defined and left a great deal of room to discretion of political authorities, personal networks to create private ownership.

In countries where vouchers were critical in the process (like in the Czech Republic, Poland and most of all in Russia) there was much more room for clientelistic manipulation of the process. The new private property was secure, but the new owners needed the good will of political powers, bureaucratic office holders to acquire their property. Privatization agencies, banks had to decide who would qualify for loans and they could not use the classical mechanisms of creditworthiness since virtually no one had a credit history.

Even in the case of the most liberal country, Hungary during the 1990s it was useful to have some “patrimonial” connections. We give here two examples (see Kolosi and Szelenyi, 2010). One could have had enormous advantage given sufficient inside knowledge what the real value of the public good offered for privatization was. For the purposes of privatization, one could borrow up to 90 percent of the purchase price in the form of a very low interest rate government loan. It is obvious that people with authority could “help” that the “right” people would get the privatized assets. Hungary was arguable the weakest or at least one of the weakest cases of neo-patrimonialism. Russia under Yeltsin was the strong case.

We will suggest in the next section that Russia played a leading role in shifting property allocation from one primarily based on the market and turn its democratic system increasingly illiberal. In retrospect, one can see some early signs in a number of Central/East European countries - even in the more liberal ones - to move in this direction. The crucial issue was privatization, to what extent governments/political powers can/shall leave privatization to the “blind” forces of the market. Some “neo-
The neo-patrimonial way to capitalism in Yeltsin’s Russia

The privatization practices of Russia during the 1990’s were overdetermined by the desire to “create capitalism” in 500 days. Advocates of voucher believed that it is a democratic mechanism to achieve fast and fair privatization. The vouchers mailed out to every citizen of Russia were supposed to represent a certain share of the public wealth. When Yeltsin announced the program, he stated the following: “We need millions of owners rather than a handful of millionaires.” He might have believed that, but that was not the case in reality. In 1996, just five years after the collapse of the USSR Yeltsin was facing a challenging re-election with a serious communist candidate (Zyuganov). The seven biggest financiers of Russia, who otherwise were fighting each other, combined forces to help his re-election, just to prevent the victory of a communist in the presidential elections ... and they achieved their aim. The seven claimed - just five years after the collapse of communism - that they owned half of all the wealth in Russia. These seven oligarchs owned most of the media as well ...

How could that happen? Yeltsin “managed” the privatization process from the Kremlin. It turned out most Russian did not know what to do with their vouchers (like most Hungarians did not know what to do with the “compensation tickets”) - and the

---

20 Hence in year 2000 unsurprisingly only two major Central European countries, Hungary (#32) and the Czech Republic (#42) were ranked by Transparency International (TI) among the 50% least corrupt countries (out of the 90 countries they investigated), Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia were in the bottom half. The ranking remains the same in 2008 while by 2013 out of 177 countries Poland (#38) overtakes Hungary (#47), but Hungary remains solid #2 since it is ahead of the Czech Republic (#57) and is way ahead of Slovakia and Romania. Russia is close to the bottom all along. Russia ranked as #82-83 out of 90 in 2000. Its ranking improved slightly to # 127 out of 177 by 2013. (www.transparency.org/country. The degree of corruption is substantial, but especially in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic rather constant and “mediocre” over the past 25 years. October 29, 2014 Miklós Ligeti the Hungarian director of TI in Népszabadság (p.3) suggested Hungary is now #119 out of 144 countries, but these data are not yet on the official website of TI so we have to take this with a grain of salt. A fall from #44 to #119 in one year sounds like a stretch – if true it would support a rapid fall into the mafia state category very recently.

21 Cited by Ashlund, 1995: 235

story is similar in the Czech Republic and Poland with various types of vouchers) hence they sold those well under nominal value to various investors.

These investors turned up at privatization auctions and the Kremlin had to decide who would win those auctions. When theory turned into practice, Yeltsin de facto “appointed” a handful of billionaires. According to Klebnikov Yeltsin relied mostly on advice from his beloved daughter, Tatyana. When a major auction was coming up Tatyana told Yeltsin: this is a good man, should get the property, this is a bad man, should not get property (Klebnikov, 2000: 202-203). Public property was often grossly undervalued. There were also various mechanisms of manipulating the process of privatization. This was the way in which very young people like Abramovich (who eventually moved to live in the Kremlin, with the “family” as the Yeltsin circle was referred to) and entertained Tatyana for weekends in his dacha. Similar was the trajectory of Deripaska who married Tatyana’s stepdaughter, the beautiful Polina Yumashev so he indeed joined the family (Tatyana’ second husband was Yumashev, a journalist who became an influential adviser of Yeltsin and Polina was his daughter from an earlier marriage).

Was the Russian state in the 1990s a “mafia state”? Not quite. Klebnikov uses terminology not unlike the one used by Magyar, hence he calls Yeltsin the “godfather” and refers to his circle of protégées as the “family”. In some ways it was an organized “upper world”, Yeltsin appointed a new grand bourgeoisie, one may be tempted to call it a class of “boyars” now referred to as “oligarchs” - but he did this in order to consolidate his political power rather than maximize his personal wealth. Under Yeltsin’s neo-patrimonial system, the oligarchs did indeed behave like the boyars. They not only felt that their property rights were secure but also they had political ambitions, control over the media, taking public office (like Berezovsky was for a while Yeltsin’s national security adviser). How much Yeltsin benefited financially from the system is hard to tell - Tatyana after Yeltsin’s fall from power moved to London and lives obviously comfortably but in all likelihood these financial benefits were trivial in comparison with the enormous wealth of the oligarchs Yeltsin appointed.

Russia under Yeltsin started to shift away from the liberal model very early on. Russia did retain to some extent the “democratic system” (if that merely means leaders are elected in reasonably free elections to office - as Yeltsin was in 1996 and as Putin was in 2000 and later two more times). True, the system was “managed”; in 1996 by the oligarchs who controlled the media stood behind Yeltsin (some of them also supported Putin in 2000). The system was turning “illiberal” under Yeltsin not only by overruling the procedural, market driven logic of property allocation by a paternalistic or neo-patrimonial way to do it, but also by limiting the powers of the legislature. In 1993 Russian parliament intended to impeach Yeltsin, Yeltsin counterattacked, stormed the parliament by military force. He adopted a new constitution that gave him greater powers. He dismissed parliament and called a new election. This election (December 1993) did not go his way and resulted in a parliament, which was opposed to many of his policies - an ironic reminder of the

---

23 Klebnikov gives a detailed description how the Kremlin manipulated auctions. He also gives an interesting example of undervalued assets. According to Klebnikov Gazprom was valued to be worth $250 million when privatized in 1994. It was estimated to be worth $40 billion in 1997 (Klebnikov, 2000:135).
importance of “democracy” even in Yeltsin’s Russia. Elections in Russia still had a stake. Yeltsin also dissolved the Constitutional Court and when he re-established the Court, he greatly diminished its powers. The key point is this: Yeltsin not only exercised illiberal, non-market ways to allocate property, he also moved in an illiberal direction by reducing the separations of powers of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary and greatly increasing the powers of the executive. The Yeltsin (and later on Putin) regime was drifting away from liberalism, but was retaining at least some elements of majoritarian rule (hence democracy in our terminology) as the way office holders are selected and as the (most important or at least one of the most important) legitimating principles of the system.

The neo-prebendal turn: Putin’s redistribution of property rights and managed illiberal democracy

As Putin came to power, in 1999 as Prime minister and in 2000 as President he was rather uncomfortable with the excessive power of the “boyars” or “oligarchs”. While the oligarchs supported him, they did not know whom they supported. They expected another Yeltsin and they anticipated money would stay in power. The dominant oligarch of the Yeltsin’s years, Berezovsky learned otherwise really soon and the hard way. Berezovsky was the owner of one of the most popular TV channels. According to one anecdote (whether it is true or not, who can tell? – it is a case of he-said-so-she-said-so) once Putin was elected as President asked Berezovsky – one of his strong supporters – to visit him in his office. He told Berezovsky who the CEO of TV6 should be. But Mr. President, Berezovsky responded, this is a capitalist society, the owner appoints the CEO … Well, you wanted me to be president; you got me responded Putin. Berezovsky got the message – unlike Khodorkovsky – so he got on the plane and went to London. He passed away there in 2013 – the circumstances of his death are rather mysterious.

There are two points we would like to raise at this time. 1/ The “oligarchs” were becoming too powerful, Putin wanted to put them on a leash and persuade them to keep out of politics. 2/ All the commons were already “enclosed”, the only way one could recruit new followers to redistribute to wealth allocated to the first round of oligarchs to a second round of oligarchs. Putin was ready to face both challenges. He was ready to submit the first round of oligarchs to a loyalty test and to dismiss them if they did not pass. He was also ready to redistribute the fortunes confiscated from the disloyal oligarchs to a new set of owners. The political genius of Putin was to convert the neo-patrimonial property relations to neo-prebendal ones. Under Putinism only those who served the political boss well could keep their property. He converted the “boyars” into “pomeshchiks”, into “serving nobility.” His mission was to complete the transformation started by Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great: to create an obedient class of property holders and make property rights much less secure and much more dependent on the political authority: the first, fatal step toward illiberalism.

However, there were major constraints Putin faced in accomplishing what he had set out to do. He was dancing in the chains of “democracy”. He tried to combine democratic procedures of election of political leaders with illiberal practices.
Given the worldwide hegemony in 1991 of liberal democracy that was as far as Putin could back-pedal: while he could place severe restrictions on liberalism (such as a stronger executive and weakened legislature and judiciary), he still needed the majority approval of his leadership. He needed regularly held, reasonably free and fair elections to legitimate his rule as prime minister or president.

Putin did stay fairly close to “democracy” or “republican rule” as defined by Montesquieu or Huntington (see description of both in the Introduction) though he tried to “manage” the process as much as possible.

We should acknowledge that democratic processes are “managed” in all “actually existing democracies”. In the United States, for instance, if one of the parties gains sufficient electoral majority they often change the boundaries of electoral districts. Criteria of when one can cast a vote are repeatedly renegotiated (can ex-convicts vote – if not, that is clearly a restriction of the Democratic Black vote\(^{24}\)), do people have to identify themselves when registering or actually voting with their driver’s license (clearly a disadvantage for Black/Democratic voters). Putin “managed” the system not only with such technical procedures. Since the political system was not consolidated, he “manufactured” his own opposition, kept his “opposition” parties, like the communists alive (Anderson, 2007). Zoltán Ripp makes a similar argument about the incorporation of political opposition into the Fidesz system, Ripp, 2014: 97) to make sure the system looks like a genuine “multi-party system” (whether it is or not, is hard to tell).

The main point is this: given the “democratic constraints” on his rule and the iron laws of capitalism and market economy Putin needed a bourgeoisie that would support him unconditionally. While the claim, or “pretense” of democratic/majoritarian legitimacy is so important for “illiberal democracies” would need further elaboration, given the constraints of space here it should be sufficient to note that in the “third wave of democratization” it is hard or impossible to achieve international reputation without holding regular and apparently free elections of political leaders.

There were various technologies at the disposal of political authority to achieve the aim of redistribution of wealth acquired in the first stage of the accumulation of capital: 1/ the (selective) criminalization of his enemies and 2/ the “transit nationalization” of firms (Békési, 2004:248, also Magyar, 2014: 37). There are some other technologies of power, such as giving concessions of profitable businesses (such as offering monopolistic rights to the sale of tobacco or alcohol to certain merchants) to a network of loyal followers; imposing extraordinary taxes (such as taxes on banks or advertisement, or internet users) – often retroactively, hence contradicting the basic principles of liberal legislation, etc. However, focusing on these two should be sufficient for the time being.

Early in his rule, Putin launched an anti-corruption campaign (noble cause indeed). However, this anti-corruption campaign turned very soon into a campaign against political enemies. This is happening in China, for instance, the campaign against Bo Xilai. His imprisonment is politically motivated, but it was justified by “economic corruption”. Bo Xilai received a “present” of $3.5 million from a

\(^{24}\) Manza and Unger, 2006
businessperson and is now serving a long jail term for this, while the former Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao whose family supposedly accumulated $2.7 billion during his premiership was never investigated and never prosecuted. This is what we mean by “selective criminalization”. Authorities use criminalization against oligarchs who grew too big and started to have their own political ambitions. Commentators on Russian politics did see in this more like a change in the nature of corruption rather than a real attempt to eliminate corruption. According to Perry Anderson corruption became the essence of the system (Anderson, 2007). Putin put oligarchs, who acquired billions of dollars under Yeltsin, to a “loyalty test”. Those who renounced political ambitions and swore loyalty to the new “tsar” could go on (even people like Abramovich and Deripaska, who were in Yeltsin’s “family”) who did not face either emigration or jail. Bálint Magyar’s mafia state theory makes a similar point. He does not deny corruption existed in previous post-communist regimes, but he claims that after 2010 under the Orbán regime it became government policy, it became the essence of the system.

Undoubtedly, all oligarchs have “skeletons” in their closets. Many nouveau riche cheated on taxes. They paid high officials for their “help” and even if they did not break laws, at least they certainly manipulated them. Authorities can criminalize anybody. However, criminalization is a system or technology of governance (to put it with Foucault). It is a selective process in which some are prosecuted while others are not. Criminalization as a technology of power creates a sense of fear. You never know when they will come after you, unless you express your loyalty all the time.

The technology of criminalization is not restricted to the very rich. Authorities can criminalize even middle class bourgeoisie or small entrepreneurs. According to some estimates, the number of entrepreneurs in jail in Russia can be several hundreds of thousands. According to other estimates, during the past ten years, up to three million entrepreneurs may have gotten jail sentences. If a small entrepreneur has an appetite for the property of his/her neighbor and does have some connections to the police/prosecution they may bribe them in order to prosecute their competition/neighbor so they can put their hands on their property. In the system of Putin, corruption – and criminalization of neighbors or competition – became government instruments (Perry Anderson. 2007).

Another technology of redistribution of wealth from “boyars” to “pomeshchiks” is (from the “bad” oligarchs to the “good” oligarchs) “transitional nationalization” (see Békesi. 2004:248). The re-nationalization of private property in Russia caught the attention of commentators, but at least according to the data by Perry Anderson during the Putin regime public ownership of productive assets grew only by some 5 percent. While no reliable data are available, it is reasonable to assume that most of the re-nationalized property is re-privatized. The government first works on bankrupting a firm. Once it is in serious trouble, they help the firm out by “nationalizing” it and once this is done it is sold again – often supposedly under-priced – to the new, by now loyal oligarchs.


Putin’s firm hand in fighting corruption turned out to appeal to the public. His popularity rose to the stratosphere into to 70’s. It was in part driven by the rising oil prices in the early 2000s, which led to annual GDP growth of 6-7 percent and some improvement in the living standards of most classes, especially of the upper middle class (whose members are the most likely to vote during national elections).

**Post-communist traditionalism/neo-conservatism**

Nevertheless, even before the global financial crisis there were commentators - mainly on the political right, but not all of them right-wingers - who were reluctant to attribute the popularity of Putin only to high oil prices and increased living standards. Some observers argued that Putin managed to restore the traditional system of domination in Russia: an “autocratic” system in which citizens do not have to take responsibility for public affairs. Instead, they can rely on a caring government that would defend them against some real economic perils and some imaginary foreign enemy. Since this new regime was pro-business, it was more reasonable to see it as retro-tsarist rather than neo-Stalinist (Anderson, 2007; Pipes, 2005; Cannady and Kubicek, 2014). The manufacturing of a common enemy is a common feature of the Central European post-communism neo-conservative right wing parties. The Fidesz regime in Hungary, after 2010 is a rather extreme case of this, blaming the IMF, Brussels and more recently the USA for many of the country’s troubles. This strategy is not only capable of pacifying the public, it is also capable of mobilizing masses and can result in pro-government and anti-foreign enemy demonstrations.

The Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis, hence it is not surprising that Putin and his United Russia party - despite the weaknesses of its opposition and the lack of an alternative view of the future - lost a great deal of support. Under these circumstances, it became more and more obvious that the regime needs an ideological self-justification. In October 2013 Nikita Mikhalkov, a movie director with good ties to the Kremlin demanded a reinvention of a national ideology, what in his view became a “national security question”27. Putinism up to this point was sort of latently conservative. It needed an aggressively adopted neo-conservative/traditionalist ideological stance.

Putin began to build his ideological image already when he became prime minister in 1999. He published his “Turn of the Millennium” manifesto* which was the first step to get rid of his KGB past and to create for himself a new political and ideological identity (Cannady and Kubicek, 2014). Already in the Turn of Millennium Putin laid down the principles of his future governance. These were patriotism, order and effective governance (he is reluctant to call it autocracy).

Those who suspect a “communist restoration” behind this project, when the chips come down, may be wrong. The Putin regime is far from being anti-business. The assets of the wealthiest Russian grew fast during the Putin’s years. Forbes reports

---

Accessed: 30-10-2014.

* http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_milleneum
year after year more dollar billionaires in Russia. Today more billionaires live in Moscow than in London. (Perry Anderson, 2007).

At least the appearance of democracy and constitutionalism is also rather important for the Putin regime. Communist regimes also had constitutions and held elections – but none of those were in any way consequential. Under communist regimes, usually no one can sue the executive and the institution of a Constitutional Court typically does not exist. Elections are not competitive and the executive appoints candidates for the legislative branch. That is certainly not the case for Russia under Putin. Putin took the appearance of the constitutionalism so seriously that he did not alter the constitution (though legally he could have done so) to enable him to run for a third consecutive term of presidency. Instead, he swapped places for one term with Medvedev. The emphasis on Christianity or orthodoxy is also important in the constitution of several other Central Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Bulgaria.

Given the weaker performance of United Russia in 2011 and Putin in 2012 (and the subsequent anti-Putin demonstrations), it was indeed justified to call for a stronger ideological appeal. On December 10, 2013 the major Kremlin think-tank The Center for Strategic Communication issued a report entitled Putin: World Conservatism’s New Leader (Center for Strategic Communication, 2013). Putin gave his annual presidential address just two days later and he aggressively followed the ideology proposed by the Center for Strategic Communication. In our times – stated Putin (we do not quote him verbatim but try to capture the essence of his message) – several nations (he does not name any of them, but he obviously has the “West” and especially the USA in his mind) are re-evaluating their moral values. In the name of globalization, they tend to undermine the cultural differences among people and nations. The destruction of these traditional values has significant negative consequences for the societal order. Putin in fact claimed this process is not only destructive but it is also anti-democratic since it attempts to impose the value system of a militantly secular, multicultural and transnational elite. On the other hand, Putin had some good news for his audience: The number of people who are ready to defend those traditional values, the foundation of spiritual and moral values is increasing in every nation. Among those values, Putin names the traditional family. In the address he did not elaborate but given his well-known objection to homosexuality he obviously meant family among heterosexuals, he also emphasized the need the defend “life” (likely a somewhat coded objection to abortion) and he emphasized the need to see the primacy of religious life and spirituality over material

29 According to Gábor Hamza only Yugoslavia had a Constitutional Court since 1963. Hungary created an “embrionic” constitutional court in 1984, followed by Poland in 1985. China also created a Constitutional Court with limited powers in 1982 (Hamza, n.d: 5)
existence. “This is of course a conservative position” – this is almost a verbatim citation from Putin.

The Center for Strategic Communication and Putin’s 2013 presidential address were trying to find an ideology which would unite Putin’s supporters and divide his opponents, not only in Russia, but globally. There are two camps in the world: the conservatives (and Putin would like to think in this address even of Merkel as someone belonging to this camp) and the left-liberal “populists”. What a fascinating twist in terminology. Neo-liberals normally use this term to discredit opponents on both ends of the political spectrum. However, Putin is explicit who are on his mind: Obama and Hollande, the two politicians who are losing popular support despite their populist promises.

Putin wants to kill two birds with one stone: he wants to gain the sympathy of Western, especially American neo-conservatives and traditionalists and at the same time he wants to offer an ideology for Russia, which restores its messianic vocation faced with the declining West. Russia becomes again the “third Rome”, the most dedicated defender of traditional values: the values of religion, orthodoxy, family and patriotism.

However, which are the historical precedents, models for such a leader and such an ideology? (Pipes posed this question already in 2005, and see Cannady and Kubicek, 2014)32 None of the Soviet leaders – especially not Stalin with whom Putin, given his KGB past, is so often compared – fits the bill. As Pipes already noted (2005) the closest historical precedent is Tsar Nicolas I the ruler with an iron fist, who mercilessly cracked down on Decembrists and re-established “law and order”. Nicholas I in his doctrine released in 1826 legitimated his rule by three principles: orthodoxy, autocracy and patriotism (as Cannady and Kubicek point out Nicholas I is not “nationalist” in the sense of the French revolution, it is the “narod” which constitutes “patria”). Already in 1999, Putin recognized the importance of religion (he now claims his mother secretly baptized him when he was a young boy) and he managed to establish cordial relationships with the Orthodox Church, which has a long history in accepting state authority. It is intriguing that Yelena Mizulina, a representative of United Russia Party in Duma proposed on November 13, 2013 to include in the preamble of the Russian Constitution that Russia is an Orthodox country. Mizulina also proposed the bill to ban gay “propaganda”. For her staunch support of Putin President Obama penalized her in March 2014 by freezing her assets in the USA.

Some commentators (Whitman, 2013) interpret the report by the Center for Strategic Communication and Putin’s December 2013 address as a call to create a new “International”. This time, however, this would be an “International of Conservatives” supposedly led by Vladimir Putin.

Can this become reality, or is (was) Putin daydreaming? Before the Ukrainian crisis blew up Forbes listed in 2013 Putin as the most influential person in the world, ahead of President Obama. Forbes retained his position as #1 even for 2014, after the

crisis in the Ukraine. Interestingly on the 2013 and 2014 lists of 10 leaders there are only four politicians and only two were democratically elected (Obama listed as #2 and Merkel, listed as #5). The “free and fair” election of Putin to office was contested in Russia and President Xi has no claim to have democratic credentials. On this list of “ten most influential people in the world there is only one person who can be vaguely associated with the political left (Obama). The others (with the exception of the popular new Pope, Francis) are representatives of the business world, people like Bill Gates, Bernanke, or Mario Draghi in a way indicating the limited – and arguably weakening – importance of democratically legitimated power in the world.

Even before the explosion of the Ukrainian crisis, Putin had little chance to win the classical conservatives like Merkel or Cameron over into his International. However, the right wing of the American spectrum heard his message. Pat Buchanan, one of the smartest and most articulated voices on the far-right of the Republican Party, expressed sympathy or even admiration for Putin and his presidential address. This is a non-trivial endorsement. Buchanan was adviser to Presidents Nixon and Reagan. He also ran in the Republican presidential primaries in 1992 and 1996 (running against G.H.W Bush he got 23% of the votes at the Republican convention in 1992 and in 1996 he got 21% against Dole). Hence, he is a serious conservative American voice. On December 17, 2013, just five days after Putin’s presidential address he put a piece on his blog “Is Putin one of us?” and his answer at that time was: yes. Buchanan sees in Putin the leader in the world who is fighting against militant secularism, abortion, gay marriage, pornography, promiscuity and against the whole “Hollywood panoply”. Buchanan sees a new global “culture war” emerging (The term “culture war” is usually attributed to Buchanan, who used it in 1992 in the Republican Convention). In Buchanan’s own words: “President Reagan once called the old Soviet Empire “the focus of the evil in the modern world”. President Putin is implying that Barack Obama’s America may deserve that title in the 21st century”. He continued: during the second half of the 20th century, the struggle was vertical: The West fought against the East. In the 21st century, the struggle becomes horizontal: today the conservatives, the traditionalists are fighting the militant secularists, the multicultural and trans-national elite. The similarity of the terminology of Buchanan and Putin is striking. Buchanan poses the question: why don’t we call Putin “paleo-conservative” (a term he likes to use to describe himself). In his blog he already acknowledged at the end of December 2013 that his position can be seen as “blasphemy” by Western intellectuals, but if you read Putin’s 2013 presidential address, he has a point.

Buchanan did not cross the “red-line” which marks the difference between Republicans and the far-right for the first time in Republican politics. (In fact in 1999 he quit the Republican party, in 2000 he was trying to get a “third party” nomination for the presidency”, but eventually he decided to endorse in 2004 G.W. Bush and 2012 Mit Romney as presidential candidates though he is closer to the Tea Party than the Republican main-stream. He did not identify himself as a neo-con. He sees himself as a paleo-conservative, traditionalist independent). Unlike Buchanan, most

---

American conservatives and British Tories were not thrilled to welcome Putin to the family even before the Ukrainian crisis.

Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the world is shifting to the Right. The palinite wing of the Tea Party shares almost the same values as Putin on social issues and that is also true for Le Pen’s FN, which in May 2014 at the EU parliamentary elections turned out to be the largest party in France and Marine Le Pen is a serious contender for the next presidential elections. There are many indications that Putin is rather close to the traditionalist far-right in Europe (and in the US).

Nevertheless, Republican Party conservatives do not have to be Tea Party social conservatives to express admiration for Putin. Rudy Giuliani, the popular former mayor of New York City noted after Putin invaded Ukraine without debate and deliberation: “That is what you call a leader”.

For the time being we focus on the social conservatives within the Tea Party. Indeed if one reads the texts of Putin, he sounds like a card-carrying member of the Tea Party. However, at least in two respects Putinism is sharply different from American social conservative neo-cons in the Tea Party. Sarah Palin may agree on many issues with Putin: on the question of traditional family, gay rights, the role of religion (the need to teach creationism in schools). However, at least in two respects there are fundamental differences between the palinite Tea Party and Putinism and that is the question of the state and illiberalism.

The Tea Party – even in its most radical version – subscribes to a Jeffersonian view, anti-federalist, anti-statist position. Skocpol and her co/authors (2011) pointed out that the palinite wing of the Tea Party has a complex attitude toward the government. Its rhetoric is against “big government”, but most Tea Party supporters only object to hand-outs to the “undeserving poor” and to affirmative action for racial minorities. They support social security and medicare, the “working people” deserve governmental support. Furthermore on ethical issues, such as abortion, prostitution, pornography, drugs, gay rights traditionalists in the Tea Party acknowledge a critical role for governments – there is some “etatism”. The formula for Putinism, or to put it more generally the post-communist neo-conservatism is: Tea Party + East European statism

No matter how much Putin would have loved to, it seems unlikely characters like Thatcher, Reagan or Merkel would consider themselves part of his International. Putin has better chances appealing to the “new right” of Le Pen or Jobbik in Hungary. There is indeed some evidence that Putin is working hard to attract the anti-EU far-right in Europe to his camp. Some American and British neo-conservatives before the Ukrainian crisis distanced themselves from Buchanan’s endorsement of Putin. Some


US neo-conservatives also distanced themselves from Putin “autocratic” tendencies” (as David Frum stated, Putin is a coldblooded murderer but at least he hates the gays37).

With the confrontation between the West and Russia, the US and Russia the positions have changed somewhat. Now for the “interventionist” subsection of the right wing in the US, Russia is emerging as public enemy number one and they attack the Obama administration not being forceful enough on the issue of Ukraine. But the Tea Party and the right wing of the Republican Party have their “isolationist” elements as well. Pat Buchanan (and Rand Paul, a presidential hopeful for 2016) is one of the leading forces in this respect and Buchanan remains committed to Putin (see his blog: “Is Putting worse than Stalin?” July 28, 2014. Buchanan’s answer is: Common ... he is no Stalin, he is just playing the geo-political game, only Obama does not understand this). Nevertheless the Ukrainian crisis undoubtedly damaged badly – if Putin ever really had - the ambitions to create a new “conservative international” for short-term benefits (cashing in the support he gained from Russian patriotism for regaining the Crimea for Russia and standing up for Russians in Eastern Ukraine).

However, unlike the West, post-communist Central and Eastern Europe may be much more receptive to that type of conservatism which combines traditionalism, the trinity of “family, patria and God” with some version of statism. Such an ideology is appealing in the whole region. Many elements of the statist neo-conservatism/traditionalism could be spotted as early as 1990 (in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary) Zoltán Gábor Szűcs is quite correct locating the definite discourse change – using Hungary as a case study – in the 2000s (Szűcs, 2006: 99-128; Szűcs, 2012: 133-141). However, this is far from just a Hungarian receptivity to Putinism. There is virtually no country in the region not open to this idea. Think of Mečiar, Roberto Fico (who is often seen just a more sophisticated version of Vladimir Mečiar), Traian Băsescu, Bojko Borisov, the Kacziński brothers and most recently the Czech “Berlusconi”, Andrezej Babiš and of course Belarus under Lukashenko and the Ukraine under Yanukovych (and arguably under Poroshenko as well), Serbia under Milošević, Croatia under Tudman. In terms of their ideology, they are soul brothers of Putin’s and of course Orbán’s.

It is reasonable to assume that this may at least in part be some longue-durée effect. Conservatism had a somewhat different meaning during the 19th century or during the inter-war years than in the West. What we consider East or West is another question. Was Bismarck East or West? Certainly Hungarian conservatives by the end of the 19th and early 20th century (István Tisza or Miklós Horthy) were not particularly loved by the Tories or other Western conservatives38; even by conservative tastes they were not sufficiently tolerant towards minorities. They also tended to be “statist”, especially the Horthy regime during the premiership of Gyula Gömbös. Interestingly the Fidesz ideologues are silent about Gömbös, leaving this heritage to the far-right Jobbik, and searching for their historical precedents more in

---


38 Tamás G. M. (2014) Az ellenzéket is le kell váltni (The Opposition Also Should Be Changed). Élet és Irodalom, January 3.
Horthy, Bethlen and Tisza. However, we can have non-Hungarian examples. Marshall Piłsudski was hardly more acceptable to the Tories in Britain. The Kaczyński brothers would not mind to see Piłsudski as their historical predecessor. Stepan Bandera – a Horthy or Piłsudski kind of Ukrainian politician – is also the hero of the Ukrainian right wing.

Postscript: Is Hungary after 2010 a Case of Putinism?

The Hungarian ruling party and its prime minister, Viktor Orbán (since 2010) deserve special attention. While in world-view, ideology Fidesz is close, at least since 2010 there is one feature that makes Orbán different from Fico, Kaczyński, Borisov etc. (and similar to Putin). Namely, Orbán can win and recently has won elections with overwhelming majorities. No-one can doubt that at least the 2010 election when Fidesz won a two third majority in parliament was free and fair – only Putin’s popular appeal can be compared with this (though how “free and fair elections” of Putin and his party ever were is disputed by the opposition and Hungarian and non-Hungarian political scientists). De facto Fidesz only secured 53% of the votes, in an election where only 64% of the electorate voted. With this result – given the curious nature of Hungarian law (never challenged by any of the major political forces as long as it served their interests and not unprecedented in other democracies) Fidesz obtained 68% of the parliamentary seats, hence had a virtually unchecked and almost unlimited power to change laws, pass a new constitution etc. The party, now with a two third majority, passed a new constitution, which expressed the traditionalist/neo-conservative worldviews of the new government - amongst others insisting that Hungary lost its sovereignty on March 19, 1944 when Germany militarily occupied Hungary - hence the country is not responsible for the 600,000 Jews who perished mainly in Auschwitz after the German invasion.

The two third majority of Fidesz in Hungarian parliament was used to legitimate the adoption of a new constitution and to change it at any time since. The political opposition indeed had a good point that the government adopted the new constitution without sufficient consultation with opposition parties and the electorate. Parliament approved it in 18 months.39 Finally, the new Constitution (now officially called the Fundamental Law) also limited the powers of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.

There were also attempts to bring the judiciary and the media under executive control (see for detailed, outstanding account of the limitations of divisions of powers in Vörös, 2014).

39 The US constitution was not adopted by a body (Continental Congress) elected by universal suffrage, but the writing of the constitution was a long process and it had to be ratified by all of the 13 members states. Incidentally the US constitution was amended 33 times in its history in its more than 200 years history in a very complicated process. In the first 20 months the Hungarian constitution was amended five times with a simple two third majority again without any requirement of consultation (we should note the first ten amendments to the US constitution also took place in the first year, but each time with a complex process of consultations).
János Kornai in his excellent paper already announced the end of democracy, mainly arguing his case by the limitation of separation of powers. It may be useful to cite Montesquieu, Huntington and Zakaria once again. If democracy (republic) only means the rule by the majority, it is hard to contest that Fidesz acted at least between 2010 and 2014 according to democratic principles (that does not mean it ruled with “moderation”). During the times when Fidesz had two third majority in parliament Fidesz passed legislation – in accordance with the regulations of existing constitution – what incidentally served its party interest (it is not unheard of in the history of democratic governance when parties when they have legal justification change the boundaries of electoral districts, regulations who is eligible to vote etc.). The change in electoral laws, which had the most significant impact on the election results, was the introduction of the single round elections for individual candidates (previously if a candidate did not win 50%+1 vote in their first round, there was a second round of election between the top candidates). This obviously benefited the party, which had a strong majority ... though it is an electoral rule followed in many countries. The Fidesz government also pushed through legislation that gave voting rights for Hungarians living abroad – since the liberal parties and the Left wing party opposed such legislation in an earlier plebiscite this also gave an advantage Fidesz. Fidesz supported voting right for all Hungarians irrespective of their residence for a long time. Hence: no one can doubt Fidesz won the 2010 elections by rules accepted by all parties as “democratic”. While by 2014 they managed those rules to their own benefit, those new electoral technologies existed in other “democratic” countries and all those changes passed according the legislative and procedural rules. Hence to call this regime “dictatorship” or “autocracy” can only be based on its limitations of liberal separation of powers, but it is hard to question the majoritarian legitimacy of the Fidesz government (which was reconfirmed by three elections in 2014 – one for the national parliament, one for European Parliament and one for local governments – all handsomely won by Fidesz).

If we call the systems of Putin or Orbán “democracy”, it is a far cry from calling it “good”, or “moderate” governance. Good governance implies a moderate/liberal rule by democratically elected polity.

The bottom line of this paper: Putin’s United Russia and Orbán’s Fidesz are rather close to each other and it is reasonable to describe them as post-communist neo-conservatism/traditionalism and managed illiberal democracies. However, there is also a unique feature of Central European traditionalism/neoconservatism that makes them different from Russia. Putin accused Obama and Hollande to be “left-leaning and liberal populists”. Putin is strongly pro-business. One cannot accuse him of being a “populist”. The liberal opposition in Central Europe often calls the Orbán regimes “populist” and indeed some of their economic policies (that is especially true for Orbán, but also relevant for Mečiar/Fico, Kaczyński, Borisov or even Klaus) can appear to be “left-wing” (being anti-EU, anti-globalization, nationalist in economic polices). Zsuzsa Hegedűs went so far as to call Mr. Orbán

41 Hegedűs Zs. (2013). Orbán igazi szociáldemokrata (Orbán, a Genuine Social Democrat), Heti Válasz, December 4.
“the true social democrat”. In the political mess post-communist Eastern Europe finds itself it is hard to tell who is “left” and who is “right”.

G.M. Tamás (according to the local popular abbreviation "TGM") offered some persuasive arguments and Ágnes Gagyi (2014) echoes his thoughts. The right wing, or center-right parties of Eastern Europe often express more understanding of popular needs and demands rather than the somewhat missionary liberals (see Eyal, 2000). As Gagyi puts it the competition between “democratic anti-populism and anti-democratic populism” is the catch 22 of post-communist politics. The framing of this question as democracy vs. anti-democratic may not be the most accurate but the dilemma is well formulated. There is certainly a strong anti-populist commitment of liberals (and the “left” if it can be called by this name) and the populism of the patriotic right-wing movements. Whom will win elections? Of course, the populist, nationalist right (or center right). Why should one vote for a party, which promises only sweat, and blood, while the other party promises to be responsive to popular needs (they will promise to tax banks, rather than the borrowers, will reduce costs of gas, electricity and heating at the expenses of the profit of monopoly companies etc.). Whether the Center right is “populist” or just using a populist rhetoric is another question. The Fidesz government in Hungary for instance proved to be responsive to problems people had on their minds. Eyal is undoubtedly right: the former dissidents turned liberals by insisting to “live in truth” seem to be doing a self-defeating job in democratic politics. They lose elections, and after not knowing how to play the democratic game better, they tend to label their opposition as anti-democratic or even dictatorial. The game of democratic politics is about winning votes, and this practice does not achieve this for them.

Are the right-wing parties genuinely “for the people” and “against business”? Hard to tell. The Fidesz government in Hungary after 2010 certainly impressed the observer as “exemplary student” in “austerity”. It reduced budget deficit well beyond 3% required by the EU, reduced inflation, cut welfare spending (in the Clintonian name of workfare from welfare policies) and did not increase the national debt in times of recession when governments are supposed – at least according to Keynes or more recently Krugman – to increase public debts and budget deficits. So “populist” rhetoric’s policies were carried out with the anti-populist policies of “actually existing” neo-liberals.

Let us conclude with the question of ideology and search for historical precedents. Image creation is a crucial component of politics. This is one of the fatal weaknesses of theories, which try to label the Centre-right post-communist neo-conservative/traditionalist regimes as “fascist”, “dictatorial,” “neo-communist”, comparing them with Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin or Kádár or just designating them as “mafia”. These regimes make a desperate effort to find reasonably respectable historical precedents and a respectable ideology. Traditionalism is at least as important to their self-identity as neo-conservatism. Nothing can be further from truth.

---

Note: All the cited authors are as follows

42 Tamás G. M. (2014) Az ellenzéket is le kell váltani (The Opposition Also Should Be Changed). Élet és Irodalom, January 3.

than the claim: they are unideological... Nicholas I for Putin, Piłsudski for Kaczyński, Admiral Horthy (eminently before the German occupation of Hungary in March 19th, 1944) and especially its roots in Bethlen and Tisza are extremely important ideological exercises. The post-communist traditionalists/neo-cons want to legitimate themselves with the (rather right-wing) conservatives of the pre-communist times, just as US neo-cons want to reach back to Jefferson. These claims require careful analysis and balanced evaluation.

Both for analytical purposes and for political aims it is crucially important to make a distinction between the post-communist traditionalists/neo-cons and the radical far-right, which does not have - at least so far - a chance of electoral victories. Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe is not (yet) the Weimar Republic, ready for a revolutionary radical right (or left). The post-communist traditionalists/neo-cons with their populist rhetoric are capable of winning elections as long as they only have to compete with an anti-populist left/liberal opposition, which can only promise a painful treatment by the good doctor44.

Post-communist traditionalism/neo-conservatism, a neo-prebendal system of property re-allocation and a managed illiberal democracy is the new model formulated by Putin and Hungary seems to be the closest case to such a system for the time being. The Fidesz government expressed support for Putin on more than one occasion. They supported the “Southern Stream” and even in the Ukrainian crisis tended to side with Russia (Slovakia, Serbia and Bulgaria - and most recently Greece under the new Syriza government - took similar stands). However, who is next in line? While none of the other Central European countries have charismatic leaders who can win elections with such a program - especially not with two third majorities - the potential is there in virtually every country. This is a sobering lesson of history.

---

References


Hamza, G. (n.d.) Past and Present of Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe. MS.

Hegedűs Zs. (2013). Orbán igazi szociáldemokrata (Orbán, a Genuine Social Democrat), Heti Válasz, December 4.


Tamás, G. M. (2014) Az ellenéket is le kell váltani (The Opposition Also Should Be Changed). Élet és Irodalom, January 3.


Abstract

In contemporary Norway, the mere referral to the term racism has for all practical purposes become a taboo in the public sphere. This is both the result of a strategic far-right distancing from classical forms of racism and a conscious effort by numerous Norwegian academics and public intellectuals to restrict its meaning and reference in the course of recent decades. Norway has a comparatively weak tradition of social science scholarship on racism, and persistent claims to the right to name racism on the part of minorities in Norway often come up against social and political imaginaries in which Norway andNorwegians are cast as ‘exceptional’ and ‘virtuous.’ In this article I contextualize Norwegian neo-racism with reference to persistent fears about lack of social and national cohesion arising from modern mass immigration and an increasingly multicultural Norwegian society. Using the methodology of critical discourse analysis, I take as my empirical starting point media and popular discourses on Islam and Muslims in Norway from 1987 to 2014. The rise of far-right political formations in Norway, I argue, must be understood not primarily through economic determinants, but seen as a result of a successful ‘culturalization of politics’ characteristic of neo-liberalism more generally.

Keywords: racism, neo-nationalism, neo-racism, islamophobia, muslims, Norway, far-right, populist right-wing, Progress Party.
Introduction

In July 2004, the long-standing chairman and unrivalled leader of the Norwegian populist right-wing party the Progress Party or Fremskrittspartiet between 1977 and 2006, Mr Carl I. Hagen (1945-) delivered a speech to a Christian-evangelical congregation Levende Ord [The Living Word] in the city of Bergen on the Norwegian West Coast. At the backdrop of al-Qaida’s terror attacks on the USA on September 11 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’ which had by then led to the participation of Norwegian military troops in the NATO-led international military intervention (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2002 onwards, and the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Hagen declared to the enthusiastic crowd of thousands of Norwegian evangelical Christians gathered in the enormous assembly hall that “small Muslim children are used as suicide bombers [by Muslims] in order to Islamize the world.” “We Christians”, Hagen asserted, “are very concerned with children”. “Let the small children come unto me, said Jesus. I cannot understand that [the Prophet] Muhammad could have said the same. In case he had said anything reminiscent, it would have been ‘let the small children come to me, so that I can exploit them in my struggle to Islamize the world’” (Alstadsæter 2004). Hagen noted the rhetoric up even further by asserting that “Muslims have, like Adolf Hitler, made it clear a long time ago that their long-term aim is to Islamize the world” (Tjønn et. al. 2004).

Yet in a newspaper interview in 2007, the doyen of Norwegian social anthropologists, Professor Fredrik W. Barth, declared in categorical terms that “when Norwegians talk about racism, they mean to refer to prejudices and stereotypes ... racist views are hardly found among Norwegians” (as cited in Gjerdåker 2007). And in the aftermath of the worst terrorist attacks in Norwegian history perpetrated by the racist extreme-right wing and intensely Islamophobic Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian Professor of the History of Ideas, Professor Trond Berg Eriksen, declared in a newspaper interview that “harassment of Muslims in Norway is not racism” and that “anti-racists are the only ones who maintain the concept of race” (Simenstad 2011).

Modern academic scholarship on racism seems to make it reasonably clear that racism in its various articulations is a more or less universal phenomenon - and that there are no known societies in the world where racism has been rendered nonexistent (Back and Solomos 2000, Bethencourt 2013, Bulmer and Solomos 1999, Fredrickson 2002). So how then, does one account for the rather extraordinary claim from two senior and distinguished Norwegian academics that (a) racism hardly exists in contemporary Norway and that (b) the harassment of specific minority groups in Norway is not racism” and that “anti-racists are the only ones who maintain the concept of race” (Simenstad 2011).

In this article, I will, on the basis of an analysis of media and popular discourses on Islam and Muslims in Norway from 1987 and 2014 and by using the tools of what has become known as Critical Discourse Analysis or (CDA) (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000, Wodak 1995, Fairclough 1992, Van Dijk 1992), argue that there is in fact little sustainable empirical evidence of a disappearance of racism and discrimination against minorities marked as ‘other’ through various processes of racialization (Barot and Bird 2001, Meer 2014) in present-day Norway. What we are seeing, rather, are the classical signs of liberal 'elite denials' of racism (van Dijk 1992), as articulated and
refracted in academic literature, media practices, the legal sphere and so on. A central strategy in such ‘elite denials’ of racism in the Norwegian context in the modern era has been to restrict the concept of racism to a very narrow biological definition of racism, which explicitly requires the existence and expression of ideas about ‘racial’ hierarchies. In actual fact, academic literature has of course long made it abundantly clear that historical forms of racism from the very outset combined biological and cultural factors (Bethencourt 2013, Gilroy 2000), and that the high tide of biologically inflected racism which marked the era of so-called ‘scientific racism’ (Sussman 2014) is now long past us. In contemporary Norway, the mere referral to the term racism as indexing anything other than this now largely defunct historical racism based on biological indicators has for all practical purposes become taboo in the public sphere (Rogstad and Midtbøen 2010). A practical consequence of this development has also been that Norwegian courts tasked with applying the legal framework of Norwegian General Penal Code § 135 (a), first introduced in its present form in Norway in 1970 as a direct result of the Norwegian state’s ratification of the UN’s International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 1965) in the same year, have by and large limited the applicability of the law to instances of classical biological racism, even though the text of General Penal Code § 135 (a) makes it perfectly clear that it also applies to non-biological forms of racist and/or discriminatory speech (see Bangstad 2012 for this). The implication of this state of affairs in Norway is that it has to most intents and purposes become easier to be convicted for defaming individuals by publicly accusing them of racism under Norwegian General Penal Code § 247, than to get any individual convicted for racist and/or discriminatory speech under Norwegian General Penal Code § 135 (a).

There is also another aspect to liberal ‘elite denials’ of racism in the Norwegian context since the 1980s. And this is that liberal academics in Norway of the kind referred to above who have insisted on a narrow and restrictive biological definition of racism have not only failed to register and to reflect upon the substantial international academic scholarship on ‘cultural racism’ (Fanon 1967), ‘new racism’ (Baker 1981) and ‘neo-racism’ (Balibar 1991) since the 1980s internationally, they have also failed to note that far-right actors and activists in the Norwegian societal context ever since the 1980s have known perfectly well that in order to avoid accusations of racism and to increase one’s appeal in, and to the political mainstream, one had better cease referring to ‘race’ and skin colour as indicators of immigrants and/or minority individuals alleged ‘inferiority’, and rather talk about ‘culture’ and/or ‘ethnicity’. In this process, far-right actors and activists not only in Europe, but also in the context of wider Western Europe, have replaced ‘race talk’ with ‘culture talk’ (Mamdani 2002) and have shifted their primary targets from Jews to Muslims. Both these shift have in fact been documented in scholarly and other literature. In her ethnographic work on Norwegian neo-Nazis in and around the Norwegian capital of Oslo in the 1990s, the Norwegian sociologist Katrine Fangen found that though the discourses of these young, largely uneducated and socially marginalized white males from the Eastern suburbs of Oslo were shot through with racist and nationalistic assumptions, they generally avoided the terms ‘race’ and instead preferred the terms ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ in talking about the immigrants and minorities they both despised and targeted (Fangen 2001: 155, 167, 168). It was from this very neo-Nazi milieu that the
three murderers of fifteen-year old Benjamin Hermansen, a young Norwegian man of mixed Norwegian-African descent and a random victim of a brutal racist murder in Oslo would emerge in early 2001. Fangen actually notes that very few of her neo-Nazi informants had any interest whatsoever in books – either in Norwegian or English – but these young neo-Nazis had actually understood perfectly well the strategic advantages of avoiding talk about ‘race’ and ‘racial inferiority.’ And this lesson has been learnt well by numerous Norwegian far-right activist organizations. More or less every far-right organization from The Popular Movement Against Immigration [Folkebevegelsen mot innvandring, FMI] via the Norwegian Defence League (NDL) to Stop the Islamisation of Norway [Stopp Islamiseringen av Norge] active in Norway in recent decades now routinely proclaim on their websites to be ‘opposed to all forms of racism and xenophobia’ and declare that they are merely ‘opposed to the Islamisation of Norway’, the ‘Islamic colonization of Norway’ or ‘the introduction of shari’ā in Norway.’ Another cue is provided by the Norwegian far-right blogger Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen, known in international ‘counter-jihadist’ and Islamophobic circles under the alias ‘Fjordman’, who became a household name in Norway when it turned out that the mass murdering Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik was profoundly inspired by his internet writings and had reproduced some forty-three blog essays of his in his chilling 1518 pages long cut-and-paste tract 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. For in a key section of this tract, excerpted from ‘Fjordman’, Breivik declares that he – and by implication his fellow ideological travellers – “will not accept any accusations of racism.” He goes on to advice his would-be-followers to avoid using the term ‘race’ as a means through which to avoid accusations of racism. What gives this rhetorical parlour game away in the case of both ‘Fjordman’ and Behring Breivik, however, is their mutual obsession with the question of ‘racial purity’ and the supposed perils of ‘racial mixing’ (Enebakk 2012: 66, Bangstad 2014: 93). For these were of course among the chief obsessions and concerns of every known racist state regime in modern history, from Jim Crow in the Southern states of the USA after the Civil War (1875-1960) via Nazi Germany (1933-1945) to apartheid South Africa (1948-1990). The historian Bjørn Westlie has for his part documented how former Norwegian volunteers to the Waffen SS during the German Nazi occupation of Norway (1940-45) by the late 1970s and early 1980s had simply shifted from regarding Jews as their primary enemies to regarding Muslims, who had gradually become more numerous as a result of labour migration from Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey to Norway from the late 1960s to 1975, subsequent family re-unification processes and an increased number of refugees in the 1980s, as the pre-eminent threat (Westlie 2008).

‘Raceless racism’

We are in an era of what the sociologist David Theo Goldberg has described as ‘raceless racism’ (Goldberg 2006), and more than any other minority population in Norway, Muslims have proved eminently useful targets for the far-right in avoiding accusations of racism by enabling racist discourses centred upon Muslims’ alleged or real ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and ‘lifestyle’. A by now well-rehearsed argument even in
liberal elite circles in Norway is that Muslims cannot under any circumstances be subject to racism, since Muslims do not constitute a ‘race’. That argument of course pre-supposes that ‘race’ is ontologically ‘real’ rather than a mere artefact of socially constructed imaginaries – a view that finds very little support in serious scholarly literature on the topic (see Sussman 2014). But as the sociologists Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer have argued, it is by now more than clear that Muslims came to become subject to racism through processes of racialization, whereby individuals who ‘look’ Muslim in public are ascribed innate characteristics analogous to those of ‘race’ and these characteristics are cast as unchangeable and as a marker of alleged inferiority (Meer and Modood 2009). The question as to whether a person born to Muslim parents is a practising Muslim who identifies with the descriptor ‘Muslim’ as a category of self-definition or self-characterization or not is, as the religious scientist Mattias Gardell has noted, irrelevant in and to this process of racialization of Muslims (Gardell 2010). In the hard and crude forms of Islamophobia, by which here I mean to refer to “socially reproduced prejudices and aversions against Islam and Muslims, and actions and practices which attack, exclude and discriminate against people on account of these people either being, or being presumed to be Muslim, and to be associated with Islam” (Gardell 2010: 17, the author’s translation) and “indiscriminate negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims” (Bleich 2011: 1581), a ‘Muslim is a Muslim is a Muslim’, the signifier is over-determined and not for the Muslim herself to decide anything about what the term signifies. Islamophobia is in this – but not at all in all respects (Klug 2014) – analogous to classical anti-Semitism as analysed by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in his classical work Anti-Semite and Jew (Sartre 1995). This form of essentialization and its instrumentalization in processes of de-historizing the emergence and maintenance of modern politico-religious identities is of course also – and paradoxically – found among Muslims themselves (Bowen 2012), making it even harder to do the hard analytical work required to avoid these conceptual entanglements. The caveat inferred by Bleich’s emphasis on ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes’ for some attitudes, statements and/or practices to qualify as ‘Islamophobic’ is nevertheless important: fears relating to the ideas and practices of, for example, salafi-jihadists must in light of the terror threat from al-Qaida and other affiliate salafi-jihadi organizations and individuals that Western Europe – including Norway – has faced at least since 2001 are perfectly legitimate, as are fears and concerns relating to anti-Semitism, sectarian intolerance, homophobia and misogyny among certain groups of Muslims in Western Europe and Norway. It should also be clear that not all forms of Islamophobia qualify as racist. As the sociologist Ali Rattansi has pointed out, it is rather the hard and crude forms of Islamophobia which so qualify (Rattansi 2007: 108-109).1

1 Rattansi exemplifies what he refers to as ‘hard’ and ‘crude’ forms of Islamophobia – which he characterizes as racist – by reference to Serbian ultra-nationalist discourses on Islam and Muslims which preceded the attempted genocide on Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnia War from 1992 to 1996. For detailed analyses of these discourses, see Sells (2003) and Cigar (2003). In the Norwegian context, ‘hard’ and ‘crude’ forms of Islamophobia which are indisputably racist – and also in a biological racist sense – can be exemplified by the writings of Peder Are Nøstvold Jensen – aka ‘Fjordman’ who has repeatedly
Neo-nationalism and neo-racism

So what about the relationship between neo-nationalism and neo-racism then? Though there are certainly material determinants involved in the emergence of a new form of nationalism premised on opposition and hostility towards Islam and Muslims in Norway and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway), material factors are insufficient explanatory variables on and of their own. In a pun, the political scientist Cas Mudde refers to this as a case of it being “not the economy, stupid!” (Mudde 2007). Norway has of course weathered the financial crises affecting other Western European – and particularly Southern European – countries in dramatic ways exceptionally well. For Norway has remarkably low levels of youth and other unemployment, a stable economy, low levels of crime and social problems, and runs large state budget surpluses every year. Norway, in other words, still has all the features of the well-functioning welfare state with comparatively low levels of socio-economic inequalities (Piketty 2014) which make it one of the best societies on earth to live in for the average citizen according to social scientists (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Where Mudde’s pun becomes too simplistic, however, is in indicating that material determinants have little or nothing at all to do with the increased appeal of far-right political formations who have all traded on popular anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments in the Nordic countries in recent decades. For it is hardly co-incidental in this context that the part of the electorate most likely to sympathize with, and to vote for the populist right-wing Progress Party in Norway are also the most likely to be lowly educated, be engaged in low-skilled and unstable service sector work, to be living on social welfare or unemployment benefits, and to be male and elderly of the electorate of any political party in Norway. In an era of a more or less permanent ‘neo-liberal revolution’ (Hall 2011), widening socio-economic inequalities and less access to stable, secure and permanent employment for the average citizen, these are then also as it happens among the Norwegians who rightly or wrongly feel that they have the most to fear from globalization and immigration. What populist right-wing political formations have succeeded in to a great extent not only in Norway but also in neighbouring Denmark, Sweden and Finland in recent decades and years is to render these material fears and anxieties, which affects a significant section of the electorate in profound ways, into what with reference to the political scientist Wendy Brown can be referred to as a ‘culturalization of politics’ (Brown 2006). In this ‘culturalized politics’, socio-economic problems and challenges are rendered as primarily cultural problems and challenges, so that for example immigrants and minorities facing exclusion on the labour and housing markets (a documented fact in Norway too) are understood to incited violence against, and called for the ethnic cleansing of Muslims from Norway and Europe (Enebakk 2012: 73-74). It is perhaps not entirely co-incidental that Serbian ultra-nationalist discourses on Islam and Muslims have acted as a significant influence on authors in the far-right ‘counter-jihadist’ ‘Eurabia’-genre in which ‘Fjordman’ writes: The doyenne of ‘Eurabia’-authors is the Egyptian-born Swiss-Israeli popular author Bat Ye’or (Gisèle Littman), who in the course of the 1990s established close contact with Serbian ultra-nationalist through her personal acquaintance with the one-time personal advisor to Radovan Karadžić and Biljana Plavšić, namely the US-based Serbian intellectual Sjirđa (Serge) Trifković. It is a matter of record that ‘Fjordman’ has at least since 2006 had close contact with both Littman and Trifković.
have brought this situation upon themselves by a ‘refusal to integrate’ and a ‘refusal to live by societal norms’ rather than for example as a result of labour market and housing discrimination on the part of Norwegians. In this ‘culturalized politics’, liberal norms and values, which the native population is seen as not only having, but being the very embodiment of, and the immigrant and/or minority populations as either lacking in or being incapable of aspiring to, assumes a central role. Taking its cue from the wildfire successes of the slain Dutch populist right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn’s in assuming the mantle of a national guardian of liberal values that immigrants in general and Muslims in particular were cast as posing a threat to, as well as the changing societal norms on this in Norway and in Western Europe, populist right-wingers in Norway who had in the past cared precious little about LGBT and women’s rights all of a sudden recast themselves as champions and bastions of liberal values and ideas. Hence we got what the Danish sociologist Sune Laegaard has insightfully referred to as a ‘liberal nationalism’ (Laegaard 2007). It is an analytical mistake to assume that the new nationalism’s hostility to Islam and Muslims is limited to the far right (extreme or populist): part of its appeal lies precisely in its transcending left/right divides. A case in point is the fact that among the more vociferous proponents of the far-right, conspiratorial and profoundly Islamophobic ‘Eurabia’-genre in Norway (see Bangstad 2013, Larsson 2012, Pilbeam 2011), the central tenet of which is that the EU, European states and Muslim states in North Africa and the Middle East have since the onset of the EU’s so-called ‘Euro-Arab Dialogue’ in the late 1970s secretly plotted to turn Europe into an Islamic dominion (state or caliphate) through inter alia mass immigration of Muslims, are people who have a background on the radical left in Norway in the 1970s. But it is certainly more widespread among the far-right sections of the electorate, opposition to immigration in general and Muslim immigration in particular having demonstrably been not only a central plank in the Norwegian populist right-wing Progress Party’s political platform since the mid-1980s, but also the single most attractive part of its political platform for its voters since then (see Hagelund 2003: 48 for this). That is however not to suggest that the PP is a proverbial ‘one-issue party’: the party turned from its origins as an anti-taxation and anti-bureaucratic party on the libertarian far-right in the 1970s to its full-scale embrace of the welfare state, women’s and LGBT rights from the 1990s onwards. In analysing the ‘neo-racism’ and ‘neo-nationalism’ central to far-right discourses on Islam, Muslims and immigration in Norway since the 1980s, this article highlights the far-right ‘realities’ constructed in and through discourse, and how this discourse mobilizes what the cognitive linguist George M. Lakoff has referred to as ‘hard-wired connotations’ (Lakoff 2008) in which fears relating to the Muslim ‘other’ (whether male or female, but especially male) feature prominently. Though this far-right discourse is long-standing, it also forms part of quite a flexible discursive repertoire, which can be turned up and down according to political circumstances and electoral fortunes. As a case in point, it is noteworthy that the discourse on Islam and Muslims coming from the PP’s central leadership in the immediate aftermath of the 22/7 2011 terror attacks in Norway was remarkably more civil in tone and tenor than what had been the case in the preceding months. This was partly a result of the early revelation that the extreme right-wing mass murdering terrorist Anders Behring Breivik had been a one time member of the Progress Party and its youth wing for no less than ten
years in total until the onset of his withdrawal from society and spiralling radicalization from 2006 onwards and the revelation that his main motivation for these terror attacks was to instigate a civil war aimed at the ethnic cleansing of Norway and Europe of Muslims. Though the PP’s central leadership has consistently refused to apologize for the PP’s long-standing contribution to Islamophobia in Norway since 2001 by means of the mainstreaming of rhetorical tropes and ideas about Islam and Muslims which are clearly and discernibly of extreme right-wing provenance, the central party leadership’s rhetoric on Islam and Muslims has since it entered government for the first time in the party’s history after the September 2013 parliamentary elections, also been considerably more restrained, civil and courteous. All the while however, the party has lavished state funding on its long-standing supporters among far-right civil society activists in Norway, such as Hege Storhaug’s Human Rights Service (HRS), and offered tacit approval for Progress Party MPs who continue to express and support Islamophobic ideas and sentiments in public in a game of rhetorical double play obviously geared towards keeping the 16 per cent of the party’s voters who as late as in 2009 identified themselves as belonging to the ‘extreme right’ on the political spectrum within the party’s political tent. With the party having together with its senior partner in government, the Conservative Party [Høyre] proposed a state budget in September 2014 entailing enormous inheritance and income tax rebates for the corporate elite which makes up Norway’s wealthiest 1 per cent and significant reductions in the welfare state support for poor people on disability grants lost much credibility and support among its key supporters in the electorate, it was hardly surprising that some of these erstwhile extreme-right wing supporters of the party had by then taken to describe the party’s chairperson Ms Siv Jensen as a ‘quisling’ or ‘traitor to the nation’ on various social media, in a direct rhetorical mimicry of terms hitherto reserved for Norwegian social democrats of the Labour Party [Arbeiderpartiet].

2 The data comes from a survey conducted by Axel West Pedersen at the Institute for Social Research (ISF) in Oslo, Norway in 2009 in which respondents were asked to identify which party they had voted for and to place themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right) on the political spectrum. It is however difficult to know what individual respondents may have meant by declaring themselves as belonging to the ‘extreme right’ on the political spectrum within the party’s political tent.2 With the party having together with its senior partner in government, the Conservative Party [Høyre] proposed a state budget in September 2014 entailing enormous inheritance and income tax rebates for the corporate elite which makes up Norway’s wealthiest 1 per cent and significant reductions in the welfare state support for poor people on disability grants lost much credibility and support among its key supporters in the electorate, it was hardly surprising that some of these erstwhile extreme-right wing supporters of the party had by then taken to describe the party’s chairperson Ms Siv Jensen as a ‘quisling’ or ‘traitor to the nation’ on various social media, in a direct rhetorical mimicry of terms hitherto reserved for Norwegian social democrats of the Labour Party [Arbeiderpartiet].
The Progress Party discovers the electoral appeal of anti-Muslim rhetoric

It was ahead of the 1987 parliamentary elections that the Progress Party under its legendary chairman Carl I. Hagen (1944 -) first discovered the popular appeal of anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric in Norway. At an election rally in September 1987 Carl Hagen read out a letter he alleged to have received from a Norwegian Muslim citizen by the name of Muhammad Mustafa. In the letter Mustafa was cited as having written the following:

Allah is Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet! You are fighting in vain, Mr. Hagen! Islam, the only true faith, will conquer Norway too. One day, mosques will be as common in Norway as churches are today, and the children of my grandchildren will live to see this. I know, and all Muslims in Norway know, that one day, the Norwegian population will come to [the Islamic] faith, and that this country will be Muslim! We give birth to more children than you, and many a right-believing Muslim come to Norway each year, men in fertile age. One day, the heathen cross in the flag will be gone too!’

The letter was a complete fabrication. The real Muhammad Mustafa, a pizza baker from Tøyen in Oslo, was paid out a substantial sum by the PP when he threatened Hagen with a defamation lawsuit. In the parliamentary elections of 1987, the PP obtained its hitherto best electoral result, gaining 12.1 per cent of the national vote. The background to the PP’s success in channelling anti-immigrant sentiment lay in a significant rise in the number of people applying for asylum in Norway from 1986 to 1987, after Denmark had implemented new restrictions on asylum in 1986 (Jupskås 2009). A pattern had been set, and the PP’s anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric would hereafter become a regular staple of the party’s political platform.

In May 2005, the PP’s then spokesperson on immigration, the MP Per Sandberg, appeared in the tabloid newspaper VG stating that the PP parliamentary caucus had received ‘information’ from ‘sources in the Pakistani milieu in Oslo’ about a secretive extremist Muslim network in Oslo with ‘30 000 members of Pakistani origin’ involved (VG 23.05.05). These 30 000 members, Sandberg declared, had sworn an ‘oath of loyalty’ to the network. The network was said to be “fundamentalist, anti-democratic and potentially violent.” Members of the network, Sandberg alleged, had been looking for properties around Oslo with the intention of building mosques and facilities to be used for “training in violence.” Sandberg duly informed the media that he was meeting the PST in order to report on the information he had obtained. Hege Storhaug’s Human Right’s Service (HRS) had also obtained the same ‘information’ and contacted the PST about it. The PST never made any statement on the case to the Norwegian media. The fabricated nature of the ‘information’ the PP and HRS had generously shared with the Norwegian public through the tabloid Verdens Gang (VG) would be demonstrated through the fact that there were, as of

---

3 A copy of the letter that Hagen alleged to have received is available here: http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/05/23/nyheter/politikk/frp/siv_jensen/carl_i_hagen/27336391/

4 Verdens Gang, VG, is Norway’s second largest print newspaper as measured in circulation, and the most widely read newspaper among PP voters.
2004, only 26,286 individuals of Pakistani origin in the whole of Norway - women and children included (Østby 2008: 18). The VG reporters who covered this news story appear not to have asked any critical questions whatsoever of Sandberg and Storhaug regarding their sources or figures.

*Islamization by stealth*

Ahead of the parliamentary election in September 2009, the PP leader Siv Jensen (1969-) who succeeded Carl I. Hagen after he had resigned as party leader in 2006, in a speech to the Party Congress warned against what she referred to as the “islamization by stealth” [“snikislamisering”] of Norwegian society. “The reality is that we are at the point of allowing a stealth islamization of this society [i.e. Norway], and we have to put a stop to it”, she asserted. “We cannot allow particular groups to decide the direction of societal development in Norway”, rather, she averred, “We [i.e. in the PP] will not allow special demands [særkrav] from particular groups”. Jensen listed as evidence of ‘stealth islamization’ demands by Muslim women to wear the hijab as part of police uniform; that Muslim inmates in Norwegian prisons be provided with halal food, and that some schools in Oslo were allegedly practising gender-segregated education. These demands had of course not been put forward in any ‘stealthy’ way, but very openly, and as a normal part of interest group politics in any liberal and secular democracy. The concept of ‘islamization by stealth’, which had been used by discussants on the web debate platform of the tabloid VG as early as 2003 (Strømmen 2011: 191) is, regardless of its actual etymological origins, a rhetorical concept which is strikingly similar to that found among counter-jihadists and ‘Eurabia’ fantasists who inspired Anders Breivik in the years leading up to 2011 (Strømmen op. cit.: 152). The prominent US Islamophobic author Robert Spencer in his book on ‘stealth jihad’, which seems to have popularized the term in ‘counter-jihadist’ circles on the web, dates from 2008 (Spencer 2008). References to Spencer’s work appear no less than 162 times in Breivik’s 2083 (Lean 2012: 167), making Spencer the arguably most central ideological influence on Breivik (The Guardian 07.09.11) apart from the Norwegian blogger Peder Are ‘Fjordman’ Nøstvold Jensen. Spencer’s concept of what stealth jihad entails is in many respects strikingly similar to that of Siv Jensen - namely a quiet subversion of ‘our values’ by Muslims using various non-violent and democratic means to further their purported agenda of ‘Islamizing’ Western societies. The PP’s usage of this term provides a clear example of how political terms with a provenance in extreme right-wing and Islamophobic milieus online become part of mainstream political discourse (Døving 2012: 88).
The Rhetoric Intensifies: 2010 and 2011

2010 and 2011 saw an intensification of Islamophobic rhetoric emanating from PP MPs. In May 2011, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, an MP for the party from Oslo and Chairman of the Oslo PP, addressed the party’s national congress. In his October 2010 speech to the ‘Friends of Document.no’, a speech later made available on the internet by Document.no, Tybring-Gjedde alleged that ‘90 percent of all immigration to Europe after 1990 had been from Muslim countries’, and that there would be ‘an estimated 52 million Muslims in Europe by 2025’ (see VG.no 01.09.11). Both claims are grossly inaccurate, and are based on fabricated demographic scenarios found in ‘Eurabia’-literature (see Larsson 2012, and Pilbaum 2011).

In an opinion piece published by Aftenposten in August 2010 Tybring-Gjedde and his PP party colleague Kent Andersen had accused the governing Norwegian Labour Party of ‘wanting to tear the country apart’ by allowing ‘thousands of immigrants’ with their ‘un-culture’ [ukultur] into the country every year: ‘What is wrong with Norwegian culture, since the Labour Party wants to replace it with multiculture?’, thundered Tybring-Gjedde. Indeed, Tybring-Gjedde and Andersen stated that multiculturalism ‘represents structured rootlessness, and will tear our country apart’ (Aftenposten 25.08.10). In January 2011 Andersen wrote on his personal blog that there were ‘striking similarities between the three great ideologies of humankind: Nazism, Communism and Islam’. One notes here how Islam is deliberately construed as a political ideology rather than a religion. This construction is central to much Islamophobic and Eurabia literature from recent years, and can also be found in Breivik’s 2083. The analogy between Islam and Nazism and/or Communism, a rhetorical trope used by Islamophobic right-wing European politicians from Geert Wilders of the Dutch PVV to Marine Le Pen of the French FN, does of course also suggest that Islam will have to be fought by non-Muslim Europeans in manners similar to those used to fight Nazism and Communism. And this ‘fighting’ in Andersen’s conceptualization, would seem not to exclude violence.

Andersen also raised the question, on his blog, as to whether ‘moderate Muslims’ actually exist – ‘as if there was something like’”moderate Nazis”’ (Dagsavisen 01.02.11). This rhetorical trope also stands in debt to Islamophobic and ‘Eurabia’ literature, in which a central tenet is that, to the extent Muslims publicly abhor violence, terrorism, and so forth, they are being disingenuous about ‘real Islam’, that is, the Islam of violence and terrorism, and in fact practice dissimulation, or taqiyya. But in the work of the Eurabia author Bat Ye’or, and in the understandings of her followers, among them Anders Behring Breivik, taqiyya is rather understood as ‘lies’ or ‘deceptions’ through which Muslims everywhere in the world ‘conceal’ their ‘real’ intentions of Islamic dominance over non-Muslim peoples. Accordingly, Muslims, whatever their orientation or beliefs, are never to be trusted. All Muslims and Islamists (whether radical or moderate) are part of the same plot. The term taqiyya had in fact been known and used in PP circles for quite some time before 2011. When the then leader, Carl Hagen, in August 2004 protested against the Norwegian Conservative Party-dominated government’s permitting the Pakistani politician MP Qazi Hussein Ahmed of the Islamist Jamaat e-Islami to visit Norway and Oslo for Pakistani national day celebrations, he alleged to the liberal tabloid VG that ‘according
to the Qur’an, it is perfectly acceptable to lie to and deceive the infidels, including us Christians’ (VG 10.08.04). In two following letters to the editor at VG, Hagen, referencing a 2002 book in Danish by Lars Hedegaard on the alleged impending Islamic colonization of the West referred the ‘so-called tactic of taqiyya’, which ‘permits fanatical Islamists to walk around in Western attire, drink alcohol, behave like well-integrated immigrants, in short, to conceal their real aims to their surroundings and Western police’ (VG 23.08.04).

The significance of this concept for Islamophobes is that it raises the prospect that there are no people of Muslim background that are to be trusted under any circumstances, since the practice of taqiyya, to their minds, gives license to dissimulating even the absence of Islamic faith. There are, consequently, no such things as ‘good’ and bad’ Muslims (Mamdani 2004). The division between those two categories is by and large a product of fiction. Andersen was unapologetic when contacted about these postings by a Norwegian newspaper in February 2011. Tybring-Gjedde refused to take any exceptions to Andersen’s statements about Islam; PP Party Chairman Siv Jensen refused to comment and the PP’s then Spokesperson on Immigration and Integration, MP Per Willy Amundsen, characterized Andersen’s statements as ‘interesting’ and ‘completely unproblematic’ (Dagsavisen 01.02.11). Tybring-Gjedde’s address to the PP party congress in May 2011 would take this one step further. Here, with reference to Groruddalen in Oslo East, he would argue that immigrant boys were ‘hissigere’ [‘angrier’] than Norwegian boys. In Norwegian, hissig is a term which connotes anger and resentment and a lack of self-control and self-restraint which potentially leads to violence (VG.no 13.05.11). Groruddalen, a large area in Oslo East built on the initiative of post World War II social democratic governments as areas meant to offer affordable housing units for Oslo’s working-class population, today has some of the residential areas in Oslo and in Norway with the highest proportion of residents of non-Western background. It is by no means dominated by Muslims, as popular legend and Progress Party rhetoric have long suggested. It was Muslim residents of Groruddalen in particular that Tybring-Gjedde had in mind. That much was also evident from the assertion later in his speech to the effect that ‘Islam cannot stand values of freedom, and the power of Islam [in Norway] increases day by day. Therefore, immigration from Muslim countries must be substantially reduced.’ Returning to his charge of the social-democratic and governing Labour Party having turned Norway into a ‘multicultural Disneyland’, Tybring-Gjedde concluded by listing a series of political demands from the Labour Party as well as the Conservative Party [Høyre]. Among these were the demand that new immigrants in Norway were to be welcomed with ‘unconditional love [ubetinget kjærlighet] to Norway and our [my emphasis] Christian cultural heritage.’
The Progress Party in government, 2013-14

The PP came to power as a junior partner in government for the first time in its forty year history after the parliamentary elections of September 2013. That led to cabinet ministers and the central party leadership – which is drawn from the party’s educated technocratic elite – adopting a much more civil discourse on Islam, Muslims and immigration than what had been the case in opposition. Yet this faction of the party continued to display a high level of tolerance for MPs who engaged in Islamophobic rhetoric. For cases in point, one could point to the PP’s vice-chairman Per Sandberg MP, who, as we have seen previously, has a long-standing record of problems in sorting empirical facts from personal fantasies, in his autobiography from 2013 (Sandberg 2013) fabricated claims to the effect that a small local municipality on the West Coast of Norway had been forced to build an entire new school to accommodate the biological offspring of one Norwegian-Somaliaman man who had allegedly tricked Norwegian immigration authorities into allowing him to settle with his polygynous wives in Norway in breach of Norwegian law (which only permits a man to have one wife at a time), and producing no fewer than twenty-two children. When a local newspaper reporter documented that the story was a complete fabrication (Hattestad 2013a), Sandberg responded with a shrug of the shoulders and alleged that “my readers would understand – for it could have happened” (Hattestad 2013b). There was no reaction from the PP’s central leadership. A further case in point is provided by the case of the vice chairman of the party’s parliamentary caucus and spokesperson on Justice MP Ulf Leirstein (1973 -), whose September 2014 endorsement of doctored You Tube-videos suggesting that his fellow MP Hadia Tajik (1983 -) on the Justice Committee was practicing taqiyya and in reality supported ISIS’ beheadings and other human rights violations perpetrated by ISIS on Facebook went completely unsanctioned and were even tacitly supported in the name of a purported defence of ‘freedom of expression’ by the PP’s central leadership.

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that the referral to the term racism has for all practical purposes become taboo in the public sphere. The enabling circumstance for this state of affairs has been the rise of populist right-wing formations in Norwegian politics on a discernibly anti-immigration and anti-Muslim platform, the shifting rhetorical registers of racism from biological to cultural and/or religious markers of hierarchized difference, liberal ‘elite denials’ of racism, and the comparatively weak traditions of social science scholarship on racism in Norway. This article has analysed far-right discourses on Islam and Muslims and immigration in Norway in the period between

---

5 Tajik is a former Minister of Culture for the Labour Party 2012-2013, the first ever cabinet minister of Muslim background in Norway and Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice. She is the second child of a Pakistani-Afghan migrant labour couple who arrived in Norway in the 1970s, and is known for her vocal opposition to salafi-jihadism.

1987 and 2014. I have demonstrated that much of this discourse, while not being static and unchangeable, mobilizes popular fears and sentiments by casting Muslims as perennial outsiders in neo-nationalist imaginaries. Though not necessarily and inevitably neo-racist, this Islamophobic discourse has been and is certainly at times based on the hierarchical inferiorization of Muslims by means of the over-determination of the signifier ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ and the essentialization of their inter-linkages. Liberal ‘elite denials’ of racism which proceeds from a narrow and restrictive definition of racism as being exclusively biological cannot and will not countenance recognizing ‘hard’ and ‘crude’ forms of Islamophobia as racist, and to acknowledge the existence of racism directed at Muslims in Norway. Whether the vicious cycles this has set in motion in recent Norwegian history can be broken in the years to come remains to be seen.

References


Simenstad, L. M. (2011) Antirasistene er de eneste som opprettholder rasebegrepet (Anti-Racists Are the Only Ones Who Maintain the Concept of Race), Klassekampen 25 August.


What is in the Scandinavian Nexus of “Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, and Muslim-Western Relations”?

* [hervik@cgs.aau.dk] (Aalborg University, Denmark)

Abstract

Studies of European political party programmes, social movements, news media coverage, scores of books, and social media networks have embraced a negative dialogue towards migrants, whose identities are increasingly seen as incompatible with ‘Western’ values and presenting a major challenge to democracy. Sponsors of these public discourses support anti-immigration and oppositional stances to ‘migrant sympathizers’, who are often represented as traitors or cowards. They also fuel a process where xenophobia, Islamophobia and zero-tolerance have become naturalized and morally accepted ways to respond to the non-Western migrants. The objective of this article is to explore how this position embeds a number of other negativities, such as multiculturalists, feminists, and ‘liberals’ (left-wingers). The article approaches this coexistence of negativities as a ‘nexus of exclusionary beliefs’ with its blurred relations and taken for granted assumptions in the Muhammad Cartoon Affair in Denmark, the media coverage of the terrorist attack in Norway 2011; a blog entry about Radical Islam, feminism and left-wingers; and discussion about immigrant youth and drinking on a website connected to one of Denmark’s most popular radio programmes targeting younger listeners.

Keywords: cultural incompatibility, Islamophobia, neo-nationalism, exclusionary beliefs, social media blogs, Scandinavia.
Since the early 1990s the attempts to strengthen the nation-state and the proliferation of morality in Denmark have become a basis for looking at ‘difference’. There is no clear beginning of this neo-nationalism in Denmark, but two milestones stand out in the post-1989 world. A national referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 about the expansion of the European Union left a populist slot wide open, when Danish voters defied their politicians and voted “No” to the treaty. A few years later groups of politicians in the newly formed radical right wing populist party, The Danish People’s Party and a tabloid newspaper, Ekstra Bladet opportunistically teamed up and decided to play the nationalist card and to use crass and brutal confrontational rhetoric against foreigners and policies on foreigners in Denmark (Hervik, 1999; 2011). A new emphasis on ‘Danish values’ as opposed ‘non-Western’ migrants, particularly Muslims with a ‘democratic deficit’ and annoyingly different values entered the public debates frequently. Being ‘for’ or ‘against’ people, ‘liking’ or ‘disliking’ them, and dividing ‘different’ people into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Mamdani, 2005), became a new moralizing way of reasoning about other ‘different’ people that is particularly apt for creating community and negativities toward ‘cultural’ others (Hervik, 2014).

The totalizing discourses that emerged in the course of the 2000s have reified the different actions and discourse of Muslims in Denmark (and around the world). This happened to such an extent that the news media reified Danish discourses and actions, treating ‘Denmark’ as a unitary actor that opposes itself to ‘Islam’, ‘Muslim culture’, ‘The Muslim World’, and ‘The Muslim Community’, and the process recast Danish Muslims as ‘Muslims’. The objective of this article is to explore how this position embeds a number of other negativities, such as multiculturalists, feminists, and ‘liberals’ (left-wingers).1

Robert Miles has convincingly argued that ideologies of racism and nationalism are relational and the ideas of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ (the outcome of racial discrimination and ‘nationalism’) are categories of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion (1993:55). If we follow Benedict Anderson and see nationalism as the idea of an imagined community of cultural homogeneity the implication is that some people are included and others excluded and that those who hold this idea in common decide upon these matters. To build inclusion, neo-nationalism offers a firm control of immigration, a zero-tolerance policy toward labour migrants, and a promise to restore familiar forms of identification, particularly around the nation (Gingrich and Banks, 2006). Since the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy tends to fall precisely along cultural and/or racial lines, neo-nationalism and neo-racism are two sides of the same phenomenon. The discourse of incompatibility between so-called Western or democratic values and so-called non-Western or undemocratic values along with the ‘War on terror’ have led to a polarization in society and adaptation of negative dialogue as a dominant approach to newcomers to the country (Hervik, 2011; 2012b; 2014). A negative dialogue is destructive in that it relies on a belief that certain conflicts are unavoidable and certain cultural encounters are impossible to resolve since verbal dialogue was deemed impossible. It is destructive because it constitutes an active refusal to engage in dialogue. Even in those instances when it employs a vocabulary of

1 The explorative nature of the article has to be seen in relation to a larger research project embarked upon in 2014.
dialogue this is only to mask what is actually a monologue. These discourses rely on simple binaries that deflect attention from actual differences and similarities. By making this distinction, I emphasize the difference between ‘cultures’ and stories about these differences. On closer inspection other differences are implicit and constituted at the same time as anti-migration is.

Another milestone appeared at the start of the new millennium, when a strategy that is known as a ‘cultural war of values’ was instigated by the government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, when he took over and formed a nationalist populist oriented coalition with a strong anti-migration agenda in November 2001 (Hervik, 2014). This political strategy led to the emergence in public circulation of ideas of cultural incompatibility. It naturalized xenophobic reactions (Bonilla-Silva, 2009; Hervik, 1999; 2011). This proliferation of morality in the public sphere is a further mainstreaming of radical right ideas and values.

Oppositional cultural logics seem in the last decades to be particularly important for identity formation in Western thought, not least because actions that exclude and include spring from them. They are exclusionary sentiments and practices based on what scholars characterize as an oppositional bipolar logic between ‘us’ as similar and ‘them’ as different and therefore incompatible. In all ‘us’/‘them’ divisions there is a totality of unequal bipolarity: the ‘us’ (the ‘we-group’ or ‘in-group’) is valued positively and superior, ‘they’ (‘out-group’) are associated with negativity and inferiority (Danesi, 2009).

The news media and politicians’ choice of words and categories like ‘Non-Westerners’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Islamists’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘integration’ and ‘terrorists’ contributes to painting the radical ‘Other’ as threatening ‘national values’. This is made understandable through publicly circulating narratives of clashing cultures operating on strong dichotomies of US, usually the West, the good guys, and those who belong together ‘naturally’ and They, as the out-group, and non-West, who do not belong. This othering process represents a ‘Them’ as negative, and inferior, threatening out of which a new positive national ‘I’ is constructed (Døving, 2010; Gad, 2008). Resistance to an ‘external Other’ and ideas of incompatible values have fostered a surprising agreement among Danes that xenophobic reactions to immigrants particularly from non-Western countries are both natural and acceptable (Hervik, 2011; forthcoming). In practice of course, such reactions are naturalized rather than being natural (Baumann, 1999).

However, there is a whole box full of co-existing binaries that are present in the public discourses and strategies, but also in people’s everyday reasoning. I will pursue the argument that the entrenched ‘West’ and ‘Islam’ binary is a gross simplification of what goes on in what I will call the Scandinavian Nexus of exclusionary thinking that primarily seems to revolve around anti-Muslim racism. First, I will briefly introduce a theoretical inspiration for the argument about co-existing negativities. Then I will turn to two recent historical mega-events, the Muhammad Cartoon Story of 2005/6 and the terrorist attack in Norway on July 22, 2011 committed by Anders Breivik. From these I will infer the negativities that risks being devoured by the dominant narrative of a

---

1 Increasing such negative sentiments towards immigrants form a ‘problematic nexus of Islamophobia, multiculturalism, and Muslim-West relations’ (Kalin, 2011:xxvi) with new nationalism and Eurocentrism as two exclusionary nodes.
‘West vs. Islam’ global conflict. After that I turn to two social media entries to explore the debates on issues of Islam and immigration.

**Who is the target of neo-nationalism, neo-racism and the cultural war of values?**

Hellström and Hervik (2014) found that Danish political parties, including the Danish People’s party of the radical right, see non-Western migrants and particularly Islam and Muslims, as ‘the beast’, which is to be contained, if not kept away from coming to Denmark. The political competition falls along the lines of how far you will go in rhetoric and policies about immigrants. In Sweden, political parties were equally tough in the tone of language against the radical right wing party, the Sweden Democrats. Although changes were taking place in Sweden, the difference was clear: the ‘beast’ so to speak in Denmark was Islam. In Sweden it was the Sweden Democrats. This difference may explain why Danish politicians favour economic support for initiatives that curb ‘radicalization’ of Danish Muslim youth, the Swedish counter-reaction apart from addressing this radicalization tend to see the Sweden Democrats as an incubator for Islamophobia.

The Danish strategy of cultural war of value as mentioned above has always been associated with a harsh tone and confrontational language when referring to Muslims in Denmark and in the rest of the world. However, there seems to be a blind spot in the debate about Muslims. The Muslims are the object of the debate, but the very strategy, it can be argued, is not based on an analysis of what Muslims say or do in Denmark or in the world, but is directed at domestic political adversaries and certain opinion makers. When the new government came into power, one of the first things they did was to sign an agreement with the Danish People’s Party about closing the Danish Centre for Human Rights and certain semi-public bodies such as The Board for Ethnic Equality on the grounds that their chairpersons were too politically correct. The Danish People’s Party was particularly critical of the two chairpersons, Morten Kjærum of the Centre for Human Rights and Kjeld Holm of the Board for Ethnic Equality, whom they accused of being politically correct because of their criticism of the party’s politics. After intense discussion and foreign pressure, a new deal was struck. The Board for Ethnic Equality was closed, the Centre for Human Rights was closed as an independent institution, since they had been critical about the Danish People’s Party’s political statements. The centre was finally saved, but restructured. Nevertheless, the initial agreement shows domestic opposition is central to the cultural war of value initiatives.

In Robert Miles’ terms racism correlates with different kinds of ‘-isms’, which share a common content or generalized object, which allows them to be joined together or interrelated, to be expressed in ways in which elements of one are incorporated in the other (1989). For example, ‘new racist’ ideas are often implied under ‘human rights’ (with logics like ‘veiled, oppressed and in need of rescue”

---

restore rights)) (Abu-Lughod, 2013), de-moralization of society and democratic citizenship discourses. Etienne Balibar is operating along similar lines but goes further, when he reviewed political debates in anthropology on the status of migrants and refugees with respect to rights of citizenship and residence, indicated that behind the positions and identity categories a specific we-group emerges that promotes itself through its opposite, which it negates (Balibar, 2005). The we-group does identity-work by opposing the cultural other or establishing ‘itself as the other’s other’ (Balibar, 2005). Contradicting the norm by either deviating from or threatening to destroy it is also central to Michel Foucault’s famous argument that the definition of normality takes place through a simultaneous negation of its opposite (Foucault, 2003). By introducing ‘normality’ as the point of departure for establishing identity through an opposite (Balibar, 2012), in addition to ‘nation’ (Balibar, 2005). Balibar’s call to rework definitions of racism makes sense. The cultural logic of social exclusion understood through the establishment of intrinsic relations to other forms of exclusion entailed by for instance sexism, nationalism, imperialism, social or ‘bio-political’ marginalization. In other words, neonationalism and neoracism are intrinsically related to other forms of exclusion. Racism is about class (Miles, 1993), but also a political project (Anthias, 2012). Racism is also about whiteness, lost masculine authoritarianism (Keskinen, 2013), and the narcissism of minor differences (Appadurai, 2006, Ignatieff, 1998) so we must think of these as a nexus of not just one form of exclusionary belief or practice. Therefore the question is who are the targets of these accusations of racism, anti-racism, Islamophobia, and tolerance?

Two recent dramatic episodes are particularly relevant in this regard: The Muhammad Cartoon Crisis in Denmark 2005/6 and the massacre on July 22 in Norway (known in Scandinavia simple as ‘22/7’).

The debate on integration during the Muhammad Cartoon crisis in 2005/2006

The Muhammad Cartoon conflict revolves around the Danish newspaper, Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, which published 12 cartoons of the prophet Muhammad by Danish cartoonist. The drawings offended Danish Muslims, but stories about what the publication represented and a general denial of dialogue with Muslims about cartoons and other issues lead to strong, violent global reactions four and a half months after the publication. All over the world where the stories were debated and talked about, the debate was first and foremost couched in terms of a global conflict between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West.’

Nonetheless, the Muhammad Cartoon controversy has also shown that there is much more to this than a global narrative of bipolar clashes along the fault-lines of Islam, the so-called West, and Chinese civilizations. In Denmark a study of articles in Jyllands-Posten in the first months of 2006 by journalists and external commentators revealed a dominant discourse that we can call freedom of speech as a Danish freedom. This voiced the radical right and anti-Islamic ideology. The study revealed, on the one hand, that the writers were part of a social-political network including the American neo-conservative community on the East Coast of the US (Berg and
Hervik, 2007; Hervik 2012a; b). On the other hand, it showed shared neo-conservative core values and cultural logics that extended beyond the radical right far into the mainstream conversations and exchanges in the Danish media. I found that the identity narrative told as the clash of civilization was based on the question of “who we are not” (or whom we dislike), which creates an empty tautology: “We are who we are not”. The history of this idea can be traced to German ideologue of the Nazi period, Carl Schmitt, and his work on ‘the political’. In his scheme a politician treats his adversary as a ‘foe or friend’ without compromise, apologies or negotiations. However, Schmitt was not talking about Islam, civilizations or cultures, but argued for what was the responsible way to treat a political opponent generally and enact ‘the political’. In recent decades, Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy has been used against left-wingers, multiculturalists, liberals, relativists, conflict-resolvers who used dollars rather than guns, and the politically correct who stood in the way and hindered the ‘just’ fight against the so-called threatening and dangerous Muslim enemy (Rasch, 2000; Schmitt, [1932] 1996).

Upon analysing the media debate in France and Denmark, Boe and Hervik (2008) found that Islam was not the only ‘enemy’. Specific cultural figures emerged within the rigid dichotomies of Orientalist representations. For instance, non-Muslim opponents of the publications appear as ‘Traitors’ or ‘Cowards’. ‘Traitors’ – politicians and others who had let Muslims into Europe were attacked in equally strong rhetoric, and ‘cowards’ – those who did not stand up to defend ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘democracy’ when it really counted, were also under attack. A third figure emerges that of the ‘apostate’ or the ‘civilized other’, a person of Muslim background who has embraced ‘Our’ values and denounces Islam and ‘Islamism’.

The analysis of the media coverage of the Muhammad Cartoon crisis has shown that the opposition that emerges between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in their rhetoric is not simply based on a global conflict of ‘the West against the Muslim world’, but sublety includes figures of ‘Internal Enemies’ and ‘Others’ who have adopted ‘Our’ ways.

From this emerges the reproduction the perception of ‘Good’ Muslims and ‘Bad’ Muslims, so familiar in religion, the entertainment industry and in news coverage. A ‘good’ Muslim, explains Mamdani (2005), is a Muslim anxious to detach himself from terrorism and supporting US. Those not proven good become justifiable prey.

**Terrorist Anders Behring Breivik’s attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011**

Radical and extreme right wing populists are known to subscribe to these narratives of clashing cultures, but they also attack domestic political enemies; cultural personalities; and opinion makers. This became shockingly clear when terrorist Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people and wounded more in this bomb-attack in Oslo and killing spree on the island of Utöya in the fjord of Oslo. Breivik had attacked young defenseless social democrats at a peaceful summer camp, and became himself an icon of the enemy within: a Norwegian killing Norwegians for their political views.
When Breivik’s identity had not yet been revealed, newspapers framed its headlines as an attack on Norway: “This is why Norway has become a target for terror”; “The West condemns Oslo-terror”; “Norway under attack”; “Norway under attack”; The most severe terror attack against Europe since 2005’ and “Drawings make Norway a target for terror” (Boisen and Hervik, 2013).

Breivik’s ideological compendium and assassination of domestic ‘tyrants’ of course did have an ultimate war against Islam objective. The young politicians were in the way for making the war against Islam efficient. In his copy-past compendium (emailed to more than 1000 people prior to the attacks) Breivik claimed that the ‘multicultural elite’, ‘cultural Marxists’, and feminists are responsible for the Islamization of Europe through their support for European multiculturalism; that multiculturalism is “as evil and racist as Nazism and as brutal as Stalinism”, and that Multiculturalism is defined as internationalist Marxism (Keskinen, 2013; Bangstad, 2014; Boisen and Hervik, 2013). Indeed multiculturalism was the main motivator for Breivik’s attacks (Eide et al. 2013) and one that is often represented by women in powerful positions (Keskinen, 2010).

The research on the Muhammad Cartoon Conflict and the Massacre on 22/7 in Norway illustrate that there is much more to the dichotomization, than a simple global conflict of “the West against the Muslim world”, than visually different out-groups of people, but also their sympathizers and supporters regardless of appearance and background.

In the following I will use two debates in the Danish media to illustrate and explore this co-existence, which we can approach as synchronicities. The different ‘-isms’ are clearly meaningfully connected, which is seen in Breivik’s self-justification and in the media-coverage of the Muhammad Cartoon affair, but there is no clear causality between them.

Blog: “Radical Islam must be fought by several groups”

The first blog is a blog connected to the tabloid paper, B.T, the newspaper with the fourth largest circulation in Denmark that portrays itself as a popular family newspaper (Hervik, 2011). Former editor-in-chief, Peter Brüchmann, has had a blog since 2012, where he writes his personal opinion stories while still being paid by the newspaper. This particular blog entry series is chosen for its direct commentary on a contemporary theme that combines strong rhetoric on Islam, feminism and multiculturalism. The subtitle: “It would do the debate on Islam good, if left-wingers and feminists would dare to object”. Most right-wing blogs have between 100 and 150 comments on popular themes like this. The comments are posted within a few days before the theme looses momentum and commentators move on to new entries. Comments on left-wing blogs follow a different pattern with only a small number of 10-15 entries within a few days.

In the “Radical Islam” blog entry Brüchmann brings up two current incidents in Denmark for discussion,4 which he finds are examples of incidents that are so clear

---

and indisputable that even left-wingers and feminists should support them. The first incident is the publishing of news coming out about a Danish middle court’s verdict concerning a Somali boy convicted of raping a 10-year-old girl. The story is that the court found that the 18-year-old “Somali” is not be expelled from the country after serving his sentence, thus going against the lower court’s ruling. This gap between the two court-rulings provided the news and the topic for the blog treatment.

The boy has been found guilty and sentenced, which is not at issue for the new court ruling. For the blog Brüchmann does not, however, raise the question whether or not the boy should be expelled, but why some people (a left-winger and a feminist) in Denmark cannot see the common-sense logic of expelling him.

The second ongoing case discussed in the blog is an incident where a schoolteacher who is in the role of being an external examiner in the school system reportedly refused to shake hands with female students on religious grounds. Being a man of Palestinian and Muslim background triggers strong moral reactions, and as we shall see crude simplifications.

Blogs are by definition personal opinions and as such not restricted by issues of facts (Garden, 2012). Nevertheless, the blogging and how it tells stories does reveal, I argue, important information about how the different anti-beliefs relate. As such they follow the logic of story-telling in the news that emphasize attention to the stories and not the elements that go into them (facts) (Peterson, 2003) and turn stories into simple variations of the same archetypical stories (Lule, 2001).

In the first case the author and commentators leave out information to make their point more simple. Brüchmann edits out that the boy was 16 years old at the time of the rape, therefore a minor; that the court found he had no relationship to Somalia; that he was caught up in difficult family conditions that most likely were resulted in psychological problems that eventually led to the rape that rather than Islam, Somali ethnicity, or “foreign” culture. Generally, Muslims in Denmark are perceived as thinking and acting according to an Islamic way of thinking.

In the schoolteacher’s case background articles revealed important details also left out of the blog-entries. The teacher does greet people (eye contact and right hand on his heart); weeks prior specific assignment as external examiner he contacts the teacher of the class to be examined by email informing him or her about his practice, thus establishing contact before the examination.

The study of commentaries to the Brüchmann’s entry relied on some basic frame-analysis questions developed by Sophie Boisen and Peter Hervik (2013). In these studies the authors’ simplified Entman (1993) and de Vreese (2003) and came up with these general questions: What is the problem? Who created the problem? What actors are presented in what roles? Who are the good ones, who are the bad ones? What can be done? What is the language of the frame? (Berg and Hervik, 2007; Boisen and Hervik, 2013).

For this journal article I want to make two points from the analysis of the blog author’s entry and the 159 comments it evoked. The debate entries about the Somali boy convicted of rape and the Muslim teacher, who greets female students in an unconventional way, are discussed under the heading of “Radical Islam”, which goes

unnoticed by commentators. In other words, the blog author and commentaries slip automatically into talking about Radical Islam and the Middle East. At this point the Somali convict, the teacher, Muslims in Denmark, the Middle East and Somalia becomes categories of the same kinds of people. When maxp writes “Refugees are welcome, stop Muslims” (maxp, 19 June 2013) the automatic slip is obvious and basically appear unrelated to Brüchmann’s call for agreement on expelling persons from the country. The Somali boy’s parents are refugees. If he by that token were a refugee also, being a refugee would outweigh his criminal act. Then again his mother is a Muslim and his father is not mentioned.

In the statement of Henrik D., the idea of a slippery slope is the point of his entry comment.

Obviously, there is far between a handshake to the Pedophile Somali rapist from Gullestrup, but everything begins with a detail. (Henrik D., 10 June 2013)

A point he makes by way of exaggeration and distortion (calling the Somali boy/rapist Pedophile), and by being careless or indifferent to the school teachers’ lack of handshake and choice of a different way of greet female students. In another comment he asserts that:

If you are a Muhammedanian, then you have taken the whole package (Henrik D., 10 June 2013)

In this case the idea is that being a ‘Muhammedanian’ is a total package. If you are Muslim then everything you stand for is troublesome as indicated by the derogatory term ‘Muhammedanian’ – a favourite term chosen by radical right populist, Mogens Glistrup, who established the Progressive Party in 1972, which eventually in 1995 grew into the Danish People’s Party.

Obviously, Rasmus is not writing specifically about the two stories, when he declares:

We are in the process of a destruction of the European culture (Rasmus, 20 June 2013)

Rather, Rasmus is subscribing to a larger narrative, where not shaking hands and a ‘foreign’ rapist not expelled verifies the narrative.

Thomas H. Rasmussen connects the two men in the stories, or is it “Radical Islam” to Nazism, which is an often-made link by the radical right populists between Islamism and Nazism.

In 1939 there were also some naive people who did not take a little man with a moustache seriously (Thomas H. Rasmussen, 20 June 2013).

Perhaps more importantly are the allusions to certain people, who are “naive”, who in Brüchmann’s blog entry are the left-winger and the feminist. In other words, the
Danish population, by implication, is either naïve, the target of Thomas’ critique, or they are like him, people who see what is really going on.

Brüchmann, how many Muslims, Africans and Roma do you think there is room for in Denmark, and how will you stop the current, when the number is reached (Inga Svångberg, 20 June 2013)

According to a quick Google search Inga is an experienced debater and provocateur with hundreds of entries. But more interestingly, she is addressing Brüchmann with a question that is both unrelated to the theme he raised, and even missing, that Brüchmann advocates expulsion of the Somali boy and non-tolerance of the school teacher’s practice of greeting female students.

This fact is ignored by well intending creators of society since the alternative, to acknowledge that Islam IS radical and IS a death threat for a democracy that builds on equal worth, equality, freedom, individuality, open-mindedness and civilized behaviour. So how is Islam contained? (Claus, 20 June 2013)

Commentator Claus raises the stake by insisting on Islam being a deadly threat to democracy, and therefore incompatible. At the same time he praises democracy for building on equal worth and being open-minded.

In general, there is little concern with the Brüchmann’s original argument or the facts of the two incidents. Instead there is a rehearsal of an antagonistic image Muslims applied to these two migrants in Denmark, who become tokens of European democracy in disarray and not as persons, with unique histories and psychological complexities.

While the gross simplification of the two incidents and the rehearsal of antagonistic relations are fairly direct, the second point is less so. Time and again the authors construct categories of people, who are criticized for their ‘tolerance’, ‘historical openness’, ‘naivety’, and ‘humanitarian’ points of view, while they make strong calls for more ‘authoritarianism’, ‘firmness’, ‘guts’ and ‘punishments’. While this may sometimes be explicitly summarized under the heading of ‘multiculturalism’. Or, the theme could just as easily be summarized as what is going on as ‘neonationalism’ with its celebration of authoritarian values, whose strengthening is proposed as a solution to problems of unruly Muslims, whether through national values, families values, or associated with masculine values. Still, I will rather suggest a linguistic rephrasing of the statements into questions of who causes the problems and who the actors are. If excessive tolerance is attacked, who is too tolerant? If historical openness and naivety, and humanitarian values are causing problems in Denmark, who is it that is historically open-minded, naïve, and humanitarian? All of these people are domestic adversaries, who are attacked fiercely. If authoritarianism is seen as a solution, who are the callers for authoritarian strengthening of national, family and masculine values? If firmness and guts are needed as part of the solution, then who is it that asks for more firmness and gutsy reactions? If more punishment is needed, who is asking for punishment, who is to decide who is to determine the punishment, and whom is it directed against? Certainly, we can argue that the opponents in the
discussion are other Danes, i.e., other segments of the Danish population and not exclusively directed against Muslims or non-Western migrants. These categories are the object of the debate, but they are not talked about or included in the debate.

**Website discussion: ‘Drunk Student: Do I need to be sober at Hasan’s place’**

The second theme for debate is taken from a weekly Danish radio show for young listeners, called “Mads og Monopolet” Considering the program is 11 years old with a regular audience of 600,000 - 800,000 listeners in a country of 5.5 million people, and a Facebook profile with more than 100,000 likes, it is fair to say that this is a successful mainstream radio program.

At the programme’s website listeners can participate actively either by submitted questions or dilemmas or as the commenting audience.6 This specific story starts with Sarah’s question about drinking.7 She is finishing her three-year intermediary education called the gymnasium, which provides access to higher education in Denmark. During the three years students follow different modules, but they also form a basic core group (homeroom, klasse in Danish) of 20-30 students who stays together for the three years.

At the end of gymnasium traditional celebrations include the klasse visiting every parents’ home in the span of a single day. Usually, transportation takes place in a decorated truck or similar vehicle. During the 10-20 minute visits students are served small snacks and small drinks, which are complemented with beer drinking during the truck ride from one home to the next. During this drive students greet every human being in sight with loud cheers.

Sarah is responsible for organizing the transportation for her klasse. She explains to “Mads and Monopolet” that one immigrant student asked her to be the first home visited, so that drinking and being drunk would not collide with the parents’ wishes. The problem is not, that in the last moment the ten immigrants in the klasse all want to be first homes visited, since their families do not want to be visited by drunken people. If we accept this outcome, she complains, “We cannot drink alcohol until after 8 pm”.

An overview of the comments shows that the problem is variously represented as drinking; failed immigration; Muslims; old-fashion morality (keeping deadlines); and accusations of racism.

Many of the commentators turn to confrontation as the preferred solution in their entry and refuse to compromise: “Nobody should change Danish culture (including drinking)”; “religion does not come first in this country”. “They have to bear the consequences”; “then they cannot participate”; “they can do what they want”. “THEY have come to our country”; “they are intolerant since they do not tolerate drinking”.

---

One of the keys to understanding how the debate orbits into these generalized narratives of explanation lies in the use of the word ‘immigrant’ as a frame for the dilemma. The term, *indvandrer* (migrant) is generally used in Denmark for migrants who entered the country for the purpose of staying. In the process of integration the term immigrant is applied to visibly different people regardless whether they are parents, children or grandchildren. The category has come to otherness, the problematized collective other that is contrasted negatively with Danes.

However among students in the gymnasium, it is unusual to use of the term for classmates, since they either entered the country at a young age, or more likely, were born in Denmark. Sarah uses this in her question about the non-drinking classmates, who came to her shortly before the deadline. It has not been possible to establish whether she was annoyed with these students’ behaviour and therefore chose the negative term immigrant, or if she used the term on positive occasions as well. 

Journalist Tine Godsk Hansen, who is in charge of running the website, reformulated Sarah’s question. In the headline, Hansen uses the name Hassan, although Sarah did not use this name. Thus, the migrants in the class are not simply any migrant, but associated with either Arab or Muslim culture or both. The website also includes a voting possibility with three alternatives:

1) Sarah is totally right - the student part is all about drinking
2) She is incredible egoistic - Muslims are also part of the class
3) They must find a compromise

At this point the category Muslim is used for the first time without Sarah having used it in her question. The term ‘Immigrant’ simply became ‘Muslim’, which is not an uncommon association. But Hansen’s re-framing transforms the story and places it within the media logic, where conflict and controversy are the best stories, which thus ties into the narrative of a global conflict between positively depicted native Danes (Westerners) on one side and negatively portrayed Muslim immigrants on the other.

Three of the categories used in the commentaries are ‘Muslim’, ‘immigrant’ and ‘for religious reasons’, which are associated with foreignness or otherness. A few comments do bring up the issue as a problem of drinking for other categories, but they are few. One could argue polemically, as journalists I spoke to told me, if the issue of limiting the drinking is a problem for indigenous Danish students, the story would not capture much attention.

Using the immigrant frame and seeing students as foreigners, commentators argue that they (the Muslim immigrant students) should follow the Danish culture and norms; adjust or leave the country. However that does not solve Sarah’s dilemma, nor is it relevant for her dilemma.

**Conclusion**

When doing research on these incidents and the web commentaries, it quickly becomes clear that the original questions are not really being debated. Brüchmann argued that left-wingers and feminist should use common sense and support the
expulsion of the 18-year-old convicted Somali rapist and he wanted them to support sanctions of the Muslim external examiner, who did not greet female students with a conventional handshake. Or, phrased differently: the debate is readily transformed into rehearsing generalized cultural narratives permeating Danish society. The vehicles for this transformation are slips from the specific incidents to the radical Islam and the Middle East, the slippery slope argument, and strategies of exaggeration and carelessness about facts. We can argue that the debate does not receive its meaning from the dilemmas of expelling minors; from Danes with minority backgrounds who do not greet female students with conventional handshakes; or Danes who drink heavily. In fact there is hardly any debate.

This should not come as a big surprise. Vertovec and Wessendorf (2009) recently looked at the way the concept of Multiculturalism has been used. Portrayals of multiculturalism they show are “demonstrably partial, erroneous or false” (2009:6). Gavan Tittley reminds us that much research showing “that the facts of migration and migrant lives are not only subject to dedicated forms of spin and racial distortion, but that debates on migration are hostage to what de Certeau calls recited truths, social facts produced and made factual through their circulation” (Tittley, 2012:54). “They are destroying our culture”, if you are a Muslim you “come with the whole package” and “everything begins with the details” are three such recited truths that are used in everyday conversations about Muslims and then introduced as a blog entry response to what become instances of the recited truths. In Deborah Tannen’s conceptualization ‘argument culture’ is when you are having an argument with someone, your goal is not to listen and understand. Instead, you use every tactic you can think of – including distorting what your opponent just said – in order to win the argument (Tannen, 1999:5).

Rather than a simple bad habit, the political spin communication and media debate during the Danish Muhammad Cartoon Crisis in 2005/2006 with ideological roots in neoconservativism translated into a confrontational approach to the public sphere.

The public sphere is not for dialogue but an area for serious battling and confrontation. Within this scheme, spinning is a weapon on the battlefield, a field where your enemies are known and attacked, since you fear the final outcome. With the philosophy of Strauss and Schmitt in your arsenal, there is no limit to how far your uncompromising stance can go and how radical your language can become, since you seek a confrontation, which is the responsible way to do politics (Hervik, 2008; 2011; 2012a).

In sum, the messages conveyed in the blog exchanges do not come from a meaningful dialogue where participants exchange facts and arguments and respond to them. There is no debate in that sense. There is no opponent. A group forms a community of authors who share the same narratives and there are only a couple of opposing voices.

The two blog-stories (as well as the Muhammad cartoon affair and the coverage of ‘22/7’) must distinguish analytically between the actual dilemma (as posed by Brüchmann and Sarah); the stories of the dilemma; and the systems of belief they
draw on for making sense of these events and producing stories about them. In all four cases the actual dilemma is relegated to the historians’ scrutiny of “what actually happened” and soon loses its significance in the gradual forming of social memory. Stories about the dilemma or more precisely, stories evoked by categories and signs within the texts, such as ‘Muslim’, ‘immigrant’, and ‘foreigner’ are simply latched on to the dilemma. They represent what Tannen called ‘ritualized opposition’: “Each listens to the opponent’s statements not in order to learn but in order to refute; the goal is not to better understand the other’s position but to win the debate.” (Tannen, 2002:1655).

In the stories (the recited truths and the argument culture) one will find the relations to other forms of exclusion such as the populism-based neo-nationalism, authoritarianism, anti-left-wingers or anti-blue-eyed tolerant people. The dynamics of this is a kind of ‘predatory narcissism’ (Appadurai, 2006), where those who are tolerant, naïve, open and subscribe to humanitarian values are contested, while the commentators celebrate their common sense and dedication to swift action ensures that they are not fooled by tolerance, not blue-eyed and naïve, and with authoritarian values that will offer protection that the liberals do not.

Our future research will address the function of this development in the profound matter that these first findings are indicative of. Yet, we also need to go further and deeper into the shared cultural understandings (what Balibar called intrinsic relations) behind everyday popular reasoning based on large systems of belief to find how the implicitly, out-of-awareness exclusionary thinking and practices work. Not least since at this point of the out-of-awareness they co-occur and appear as inseparable.

References


https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/32361/011_04_titley.pdf?sequence=1


The electoral success of the far-right in Greece deals, not only, with the retreat of the state from the provision of public goods such as welfare services and security, but predominantly, with mainstream anti-immigrant discourses and representations, which have been further deteriorated, intensified and expanded during economic crisis. Over the last years, official and media discourses, re-fabricating the popular 'deep structures' of nationalism and masculinity, targeted immigrants as responsible for the deterioration of social life, especially in the urban centres. As a result, 'the immigrant other' came to the forefront of the political debate as the dangerous and contaminating 'other'. In this framework, my aim is to approach the popularity and the quick rise of fascism not as an accident, but as 'a chronicle of death foretold', strongly interconnected with media representations and official public statements and interventions, framed by casino capitalism and the expansion of mainstream nationalist, as well as racist discourses and accounts. As it emerges from the immigration histories of Europe and the USA, xenophobia and the rise of fascism under the cover of nationalism and patriotism in times of economic recession, is a rather banal phenomenon. What however needs further examination is the close interconnection between official representations disseminated through state-controlled media and fascist action. My main point is that fascists in Greece pushed to the edges mainstream xenophobic representations, further popularized in the era of crisis.

Keywords: Fascism, Greece, Golden Dawn, immigration, borders, xenophobia, racism.

---

1 Casino capitalism is the title of Susan Strange’s book published in 1986. According to Strange ‘the roots of the world’s economic disorder are monetary and financial’ and that economic disorder is closely associated with US state’s decisions enabling the markets to operate without political control, what has been phrased as market fundamentalism (Strange, 1986: 60).
**Theoretical issues and methodological considerations**

Fascism, like other exceptional regimes, is not a ‘disease’ or an ‘accident’ it is not something that only happens to other people (Poulantzas 1970:359).

The rising of the neo-Nazis of Golden Dawn\(^2\) in the Parliament during the last elections and their regular presence in the Greek public life through murderous and provocative performances, that would have been unimaginable only a few years ago, shocked the Greek public, policy makers, journalists and certainly academic and non-academic intellectuals. Although, shock is not an interpretative framework for understanding the rise of organised fascism in Greece, it can operate as a motive in our search for the social parameters of the empowerment and the expansion of this murderous, Nazi organisation, virtually the most violent in Europe.

In my attempt to understand the establishment of fascism in Greece, I address my main enquiry on the interconnections between the economic crisis, immigration policies and mainstream representations of immigration. For this aim, a very short account of Greece as an immigration country is necessary. From early 90s, Greece has been transformed from a migration to an immigration country with a large number of non-documentated immigrants, mainly, but not exclusively in Athens. The absence of any long-term vision policies, vis-à-vis immigration, accompanied with negative representations and the criminalisation of immigrants in the media (Karidis, 1996:93; Papastergiou and Takou, 2013:43) contributed significantly to the construction of a negative public image of immigrants.

As a consequence of the collapse of the communist regime in Albania and the pressure of immigration flows from post-communist countries and from Turkey, especially from the early 1990s onwards, Greece was transformed rather abruptly from a migration to an immigration country. By the mid-1990s the number of immigrants in Greece had reached one million, about 10% of the indigenous population, and a large number of them were undocumented. In spite of the fact that immigrants undertook mainly demanding and low paid jobs and that there was limited antagonism with natives in the labour market, immigration policies viewed the presence of immigrants as a temporary phenomenon and as a problem. Several approaches document that Greek immigration policies were preventative, authoritarian and repressive (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Marvakis, Parsanoglou and Pavlou, 2001; Papastergiou and Takou, 2013).

This is eloquently phrased by Baldwin-Edwards when he argues that “the main justification for a repressive law was the allegation of criminality with the mass-media playing central role in the development of a ‘dangerous immigrant’ stereotype” (Baldwin-Edwards 2004:3). Therefore, official policies coupled with relevant political and media discourses contributed significantly to the criminalisation of immigrants. These hysterical discourses found a fruitful space during the crisis especially in urban sites where there was a high concentration of unemployed, non-documentated immigrants.

\(^2\) G.D., as abbreviation.
Restrictive policies are also detected in the strict implementation of the *jus sanguinis* principle in the procedures of provision of citizenship. As a consequence, a large number of the so-called second generation, that is, persons of immigrant origin growing up in Greece were deprived of Greek citizenship even though most of them do not have any other homeland (Papastergiou and Takou, 2013).

Public debates in the official and the less official arenas often fuelled questions regarding to what extent the Greeks became racists, if there was racism in Greece at all, or what the statistics of racism were, when Greece was compared with other European countries. Even the most pessimistic like me, used to conclude that ‘at least Greece is not Nazi Germany, or apartheid South Africa and that it will never go so far’. The main argument before 2012 was that there was no significant fascist organisation despite the high percentage of immigrants in the country and despite the absence of any strict anti-racist legislation. Of course, nobody could argue in the same way anymore, especially after the elections of May 2012.

In sum, my main aims in this paper are the following: Firstly, I want to argue that immigration policies and hegemonic representations on the territorial and symbolic borders of the nation vis-à-vis immigration created a space to be filled by fascist action especially in the course of austerity measures. Secondly, I am going to foreground some of the overlapping factors, such as the acts of the state and of the state controlled media, which provided fertile space for the development and the consolidation of fascism in Greece. Thirdly, I will argue that while neoliberal austerity measures had a catalytic effect on the popularisation and the consolidation of organised fascism in Greece, we should take into consideration the banal, but nevertheless deep ideological structures, that are the profound, long term institutionalised and mundane structures of nationalism and masculinity.

In this respect, fascism cannot be reduced to capitalist crises as an economic reductionist approach would argue (Cox, 1948) but, at the same time, it cannot be disentangled from economic recession. I argue therefore, that the rise of extreme right radicalism and fascism not specifically in Greece but across Europe (Kitschelt, 1995) should be approached and analysed not merely as the outcome of neoliberal capitalism but as a phenomenon tightly linked to nationalist institutional culture and history. As such, we need to shed light on the interconnections and the interplay of racist ideas and practices between Greek state institutions, such as the police and the armed forces with more mundane popular racial ideological structures. Finally, we need to historicise fascism in Greece and to pinpoint Golden Dawn’s predecessors in the state’s institutions. As will become clear, these can be detected particularly in the armed forces and in their peculiar involvement in the political history of modern Greece. This approach will enable us to deal with fascism not as an autonomous phenomenon but rather as part of social relations in which state power, broadly defined, and specific state institutions are strongly implicated.

Methodologically, I focus particularly on the ways in which immigration issues are associated with the rise of fascism in Greece. In this respect, I attempt to explore to what extent preventive and repressive policies on immigration deteriorated for reasons of governmentality during the crisis, coupled with how negative media representations of immigrants as well as with police action against immigrants created a fertile space for the culmination of the Nazi project. To this end, I explore the ways
in which immigrants have been portrayed in the media especially the period that preceded the elections of 2012 in relation to state action against immigrants during the same period. This exploration is selective rather than systematic in the sense that I focus on certain particular moments and expressions that dominated the public debate. My hypothesis is that the simultaneous cross-examination of repressive policies, negative representations and repressive interventions are part and parcel of right-wing policies, which sought to ease and to reorient and, finally, to govern popular discontent turning the most vulnerable subjects into scapegoats of the crisis.

Apart from media representations of immigration issues and fascist public performances, my main ethnographic material comes from debates taking place in the new social media and particularly on Facebook. The fact that both immigration issues and the rise of Golden Dawn, particularly after May 2012, became central themes of public debate in the social media, provided a broad space of argumentation and ideological exchange in the social media. While the analysis of this material is beyond the scope of this article, I found the meetings and the dialogues on Facebook of people with the most diverse educational and political backgrounds exceptionally challenging. I was directly involved in these debates trying, in certain cases, to understand the ways in which ordinary people were theorizing and justifying their support of right wing extremists.

**Immigration on trial for reasons of governmentality**

Sandelind, in her introduction to a book dealing with populism in relation to immigration in contemporary Europe argues that mainstream parties and the civil society together must be able to offer a vision where immigration is not seen as a threat, yet which takes seriously the concerns of voters (Sandelind, 2014:12). This view is absolutely relevant for Greece. Despite the fact that immigrants existed as a significant labour force in the country since the 1990s, they have been treated as a problem by hegemonic political discourse and the media. For this reason, they have been pushed into the borderlands and the margins of the constitutional and legal order and they were turned into ‘bare lives’ deprived of their human rights, according Agamben’s approach (1995). In Greece, news as follows is not rare:

On January 20, 2013, a boat carrying twenty-eight Afghan and Syrian migrants capsized near the Greek island of Farmakonisi in the Dodecanese area of the Aegean Sea, while being towed by a Greek coastguard vessel.

In their statements to the representatives of the Greek office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, survivors of the tragedy insisted that the accident occurred as the coastguard was towing the boat at high speed towards the Turkish coast during a storm.³

³ [http://www.equaltimes.org/farmakonisi-migrant-tragedy-sparks-eu-policy-debate#.VEwN0VfxB8](http://www.equaltimes.org/farmakonisi-migrant-tragedy-sparks-eu-policy-debate#.VEwN0VfxB8)
Indeed, between 1993 and 2007, nearly 9000 immigrants lost their lives in their attempt to cross the borders of Greece and the Aegean maritime borders are among the most dangerous passages in the world. Mainstream media news for some more immigrants who perished in their attempt to cross the borders of the Aegean Sea is rather banal information for the Greek public.

Due to the state’s inability to control its territorial and maritime borders, much emphasis has been placed on inner borders, multiplying them and making them more fluid. The establishment of ‘Border Control Police’, (sinoriotilakes), acting mainly in the centre of Athens, but also in other cities is part of this enterprise. Andreas, drawing on Deleuze (1992), is right to argue that “debordering is being accompanied in many places by a partial rebordering in the form of enhanced policing … (t)hus, it may be more accurate to say that the importance of territoriality is shifting rather than simply diminishing” (Andreas, 2000: 3).

The multiplication of these ‘inner city’ controls in ports, airports, stations, checkpoints and at immigrant sites, the ‘sweep up’ actions by police, multiplied in the pre-election period, supported by media discourses criminalising immigration, created a space to be covered by extreme right volunteers wishing in their words “to get rid of the filth”, meaning the immigrants. The exposure and the scapegoating by Lomverdos, the Minister of Public Health, of the so-called immigrant HIV-positive sex workers, as responsible for “the contamination of the Greek family” needs no further comment. As I clarify in another text:

Out of the great number of women who were forced to be checked, only twelve were eventually found to be HIV-positive; most of them were homeless and drug addicts - and one of them was under-age. Ten of them were of Greek

---

origin, one from Russia and one from Bulgaria. Even though the way in which this extensive ‘sweep’ operation took place, provoked furious reactions between doctors, lawyers and activists – concerning evident law violations and the human rights of these women alike – the media presented the whole operation as a major success story for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Protection of the Citizen; and proof of the care for Greek male sex clients and the Greek family alike (Tsimouris, 2014: 80-81).

Similarly, the repressive police enterprises against immigrants, the persecution of non-documentated immigrants in the centre of Athens and the detainment of immigrants in camps, in large numbers and under inhuman conditions including that of non-accompanied children, contributed immensely to the criminalisation of immigration in Greece. These acts of state intervention were coupled and encouraged by acts of misrepresentation of immigrants regarding the exaggeration of their number, their share in delinquency (Karidis, 1996) and their responsibility for domestic unemployment. In Greece as elsewhere they “... saw immigration itself as an intrinsic delinquency” (Sayad, 1999:283). Soon, media coverage contributed significantly to the panic and the fear of ‘the other’ settled among ‘us’. As is the case in other European countries the media ‘played the nationalist card’ (Ellinas, 2010).

Deleuze warns us that in modern societies of control “enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other” (Deleuze, 1990: 4). In this respect, re-bordering and embodying control implies that fear and anxiety are permanently dispersed and diffused within society for reasons of governmentality. According to Foucault’s approach, ‘governmentality’ operates as “a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (Foucault, 1982: 789). Representing therefore the ‘other’, as a source of pollution or as a long-standing threat is an act of reworking anew the symbolic borders between ‘Greeks’ and ‘non-Greeks’ in order to manage domestic anxieties. In this respect, if the newcomers, stigmatised as responsible for domestic discontent, were forced out from the territorial or the symbolic borders of the nation, mainstream political parties could recuperate their political legitimacy and support.

**Media (mis)representations and fascist interventions**

Indeed, during the last elections both the Prime Minister Samaras and the leader of the G.D., Mihaloliakos, rallied, competing with each other, regarding whose anti-immigrant project was more strict and effective. In the same spirit Syriza, the main opposition party of the left, has been castigated by mainstream politicians and media commentators as the political force, responsible for the large number of non-documentated immigrants in the country. The expression ‘Greece is not a borderless vineyard’, was a shared one among the leaders of our coalition government and the leaders of the G.D.
The attacks, and in some cases, the physical extermination of immigrants undertaken by the members of G.D., may be seen as the direct consequence of a sequence of official acts of anti-immigrant policies and media representations. Mainstream political parties, hand in hand with media and corporate interests contributed significantly to in this enterprise, seeking to ensure their political status quo in the course of the imposition of austerity measures.

The orientation of the media in these campaigns is hardly surprising if we consider that they are entirely controlled by the state. Both scholarly research and journalistic reports reveal the strong client ties among the media, the governing political elites and the business sector. According to a European Commission report of 2011, reproduced by Reuters, Greek media policy “has remained highly centralized in the hands of the government of the day”, and that it “has been thoroughly influenced, albeit in opaque and informal ways, by powerful economic and business interests who have sought to gain power, profit, or both”.

This explains why G.D. appeared to gain 1% nationwide in November 2011, and a few months later, in the elections of May 2012, got almost 7% of votes. The period in-between Zenakos, a journalist of the left journal *Unihollow* stressed, “illegal immigration is focused on by the Media, representing immigrants as the first and foremost threat that Greece is faced with”. For just one thing G.D. cannot be accused as irresponsible: their anti-immigrant hate campaigns. Apart from fatal attacks against preferably Asian immigrants in the centre of Athens they diffuse false information. They "propose(s) to reinstall the anti-personnel landmine fields on the Greek borders – a criminal weapon, banned by the Ottawa Treaty, which Greece has of course

---

signed\(^7\). Their concern about the borders is so intense that they diffuse false information that “Turkish soldiers drew their guns on Greek border guards”. This information was vehemently denied by a police spokesman, according to the daily conservative journal “Kathimerini”\(^8\).

**Economic recession and fascism in Greece and elsewhere**

The history of fascism in Europe has some similarities with the interconnection of the inter-war economic crisis with the rallying of Nazism in Germany. Similarly, an account of postwar European immigration history leaves no doubts on the links between the recession of the 1970s, due to the oil crisis, and the expansion of xenophobic action, sometimes murderous, in West European countries such as France and Germany. Indeed, from the 1970s, antifascism ceased to be the hegemonic ideal in West European countries (Fenner and Weitz, 2004).

Due to mainstream Eurocentric ideas, these attacks were addressed mainly against immigrants of colour, but also against all non-Europeans as well as those coming from South European countries, those not adequately European. In the same line, John Higham a scholar of US immigration history argued already in the 1950s that while xenophobia was not uncommon in the USA it deteriorated in times of economic recession (Higham, 1955). Indeed, during international economic recessions, which affect nation-states of the periphery more than those at the European centre, national stereotypes and essentialist categories of ‘otherness’ were reworked, solidified and popularised.

---


\(^8\) Journal “Kathimerini”, 17-8-2012, (a conservative daily newspaper).
An important aspect of the Greek crisis was the re-production and re-circulation of oriental, nationalistic stereotypes in the conservative European media regarding Greece and Greeks and similarly, essentialised images of Germany and Germans became more popular in Greece. According to Slavoj Žižek:

There are two main stories about the Greek crisis in the media: the German-European story (the Greeks are irresponsible, lazy, free-spending, tax-dodging etc. and have to be brought under control and taught financial discipline) and the Greek story (our national sovereignty is threatened by the neoliberal technocracy imposed by Brussels) (Žižek 2012).

Both these stories encouraged essentialist and nationalist voices in Greece emphasising Greek cultural superiority (a usual saying among these circles in Greece is that ‘when we were building the Parthenon and the Acropolis, Europeans were still climbing trees’) and at the same time targeted immigrants as non assimilable inferiors, responsible for the shortage of employment opportunities and for urban delinquency and violence. This anti-immigrant populism was not a novelty in Greece, nevertheless, it has intensified in a time of crisis and was supported significantly by distrustful and preventative immigration policies coupled with media panic crusades.

Due to monetary policies imposed by Central European Bank and the IMF, the Greek state, that has never demonstrated high performance as a welfare state, retreated further from the provision of public services and social security and at the same time placed much emphasis on mechanisms of repression and control. The deterioration of life in the urban centres under the austerity measures imposed over the last years by EU-IMF, provided fertile space for the fascist project. In this environment, G.D.’s understandings of ‘authentic Greek’ in biological terms, those with ‘Greek blood’ became more popular. As a consequence, they handed out food, only to the Greek poor, under the condition that they could prove their ‘Greekness’, and they established a ‘blood deposit’, only for those of Greek origin having ‘Greek blood’.

Caption 4.
Kassidaris providing blood for Greeks only

The historical and institutionalised roots of fascism in Greece

The rise of organised fascism in Greece, apart from the economic crisis, and the diverse hegemonic ideological aspects of nationalism is closely associated with the ways in which state repressive institutions were organised, staffed and operating after the Greek Civil War. Indeed, as Papaioannou emphasises, the far Right has a long history in Greece and did not cease to exist after the fall of the Junta in 1974 (Papaioannou, 2013: 20). It has always been thriving in the Army and the Police (Kousouris, 2014). It is strongly arguable that the Greek Police has never overcome its post-civil war right-wing syndrome. Despite the interventions by post-Junta PASOK administrations, which mainly sought to democratise its headquarters, the Greek Police mostly remained the ideological cradle of right-wing fanatics (Christopoulos, 2014: 14). This ideological profile was further intensified by the fact that their ‘professional enemies’ were mostly left-wing strikers, demonstrators, immigrant supporters, feminist and gay activists, certainly gypsies and other subaltern groups. In short, all those deprived of the credentials of a full cultural Hellenic citizenship.

Not surprisingly, many army officers and ex-officers are nostalgic of ‘the good days’ of the military Junta that dominated Greece from 1967 to 1974. Similarly, the process of getting rid of the remnants and the vestiges of the military dictatorship in the public administration after Junta’s fall, called ‘apohoundopoiisi’, very popular in the student movement of the 1970s was never completed in Greece. Regarding the number of policemen who support G.D., Michalis Chrysochoidis, the Minister of the Protection of the Citizen under the PASOK administration said during an interview after the elections of May 2012: “I don't know whether it is 50% or 60%. But there are many. Even if it is 40%, there are too many”. Moreover, the ways in which state institutions, such as education were operating after WWII and the Greek Civil war provided the ideological ground for nationalist ideas to flourish.

Therefore, the murder of the fifteen year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos in cold blood by a Special Police Guard in December, 2008, despite the shock and the reaction it provoked in Greek society, should be seen as the tip of the iceberg, rather than as an act that came out of the blue. Similar murders of young Roma or anarchists by police guns have occurred repeatedly in the recent past without, however, provoking mass mobilisations, when compared to those of December 2008.
There are many reported incidents documenting the interconnections of the Greek police with G.D.: Amateur videos showing members of the G.D. taking refuge among Riot Police (MAT) in action during popular demonstrations, the high percentage – more than 50% – of votes that they got in the departments, in which policemen voted during the last elections, the indifference of local police directors, when G.D.’s members and MPs were impersonating police officers.

Indeed, on one occasion G.D.’s cadres practised control and attacked immigrant petty-sellers on camera in an open-air market without any intervention by the local police. There are also incidents of threats addressed by policemen against immigrants that they will be delivered into the hands of G.D. to be punished, the list is too long. The torture and the humiliation of young activists campaigning against fascist violence in the centre of Athens, at the headquarters of the police (GADA), is just one more incident on this list. These inter-connections between this paramilitary organisation and the Greek police facilitated their distasteful endeavour.

Caption 6. Open market, run by immigrants after G.D.‘s intervention

*Mainstream ‘deep ideological structures’ as the underlying path driving to the extreme*

The events following the murder of left wing rapper Pavlos Fyssas by G.D.’s cadre Roupakias in September 2013, ratifies Agamben’s statement about immigrants in Greece as ‘bare lives’. In Athens particularly, attacks against immigrants, were rather ordinary phenomena during the last years. In certain cases immigrants were found stabbed and murdered and at least in one case the murderers were caught and identified as G.D.’s followers if not members. In none of these cases was G.D. characterised as a criminal organisation by the Greek courts.

Only after the stabbing of a Greek musician in cold blood and the involvement of the Anti-terrorist Police in the investigation were many members and MPs of G.D. 
arrested, facing severe charges as criminals. Indeed, after the verdicts of public prosecutors and the publicity of the organisation’s illegal activities G.D. lost some of its popular support. My point is that the Prime Minister’s attempt in this process was to win back the lost votes from G.D. rather than to deal with fascism in Greece. To this end, the death of a Greek person was more appropriate than the death of a Pakistani immigrant who had been the previous victim of the Nazis. To draw again from Agamben, the government, in a time of crisis, sought to manage disorder for reasons of governmentality rather than to impose order and to attack fascism effectively.

One more aspect of the popularity of fascism in Greece, less elaborated and debated, is the plethora of practices of masculinity, sexism and the aggressive manhood of the personnel of this paramilitary organisation, an issue that became more obvious between the two elections in the spring of 2012. The violent attack and the slapping of Ms Kaneli on camera, a journalist and MP of KKE (Communist Party), by G.D.’s spokesman, Kasidiaris, made the most optimistic commentators conclude that this act is going to reveal the ethos of the fascists and that it will diminish their electoral support significantly. As became clear a few days later, this was not the case. As Avdela and Psara conclude in their account of this episode:

It is certain the crisis led to a paroxysm in some ‘deep structures’ of Greek society, transforming them into common sense. It is equally clear that the aggressive idiom that adopts in its public discourse and practice, a version of aggressive manhood that is closely intertwined with nationalism has been allowed to become publicly acceptable (Avdela and Psara, 2012).

As they explain, these ‘deep structures’ of masculinity and nationalism had been marginalised in the course of the first post-junta decades. Speaking from a feminist perspective, Avdela and Psara clarify this viewpoint. There are several incidents documenting their point. Tatsopoulos, an ex MP of Syriza and a well-known Greek novelist, answering back to Kassidiaris, who accused him of being gay, argued on his facebook page, that this is not true because he had ‘f***ed’ half of the women of Athens. This incident is not unique. Kassidiaris attacked Tsipras, the leader of the left coalition, advising him to ‘be careful not to destroy his feminine underwear’. As a matter of fact, Tsipras did not answer back in the same way to demonstrate his manhood. However, the reaction of Tatsopoulos reveals that sexism and aggressive manhood is a ‘deep structure’ embracing many arguably non fascists, mainstream men, including intellectuals of the left and not merely the members of the G.D. This case reveals that one does not have to scratch a progressive male intellectual too deeply in order to find the homophobic essentialist. For G.D. this is not strange if we consider that militarism is closely articulated with masculinity and with a very peculiar version of manhood that was always present in the army. Along these lines, Kassidiaris is keen to remind us that he served in the Special Armed Forces.

Similarly, in the course of the opening day of a theatre rehearsal dealing with
gender issues, Panagiotaros, an MP of G.D., shouted on camera at the director of the
play, a man of Greek-Albanian origin, “F*** you, f***ing Albanian a***holes”.
These examples at hand and many more others can illustrate that G.D. drives certain
latent, deep ideological structures that are banal and yet ‘common sense’ values, quite
popular in Greek society, to extremes.

These events, occurred at the theatre Chityrio, when Laertis Vasileiou, the
director of Greek-Albanian origin, decided to rehearse Terrence McNally’s play,
reveal both homophobic and brutal attitudes and its alliance in that matter with other
dark forces in Greek society, namely fundamentalist Orthodox nuns and priests. The
play was shut down violently by this attack orchestrated both by G.D.’s thugs and
Orthodox hooligans. Laurie Penny in her electronic article under the title, “Greece's
Fascist Homophobes Have God and Police on Their Side” reports that:

Last night, Athens police looked the other way while fascists beat up
theatre-goers outside Corpus Christi. Tonight they’ve got the place on lockdown.
What’s changed? It might have something to do with the gaggle of reporters,
cameras and news organisations from all over Greece who’ve turned up to see
what happens. On opening night, when few cameras had arrived, Manolis V, a
blogger for Lifo magazine, was taking pictures of priests ripping down Corpus
Christi posters, when he found himself surrounded by neo-nazis. ‘I told them
that I write for Lifo, thinking that that would protect me. Instead they started
yelling, “This fag works for Lifo, come and see this faggot.” They ganged up on
me, started swearing at me and pulling my beard, and one of the G.D. MPs spat
in my face.

The fact that educational institutions in Greece contribute significantly to ethnocentric
and to nationalist ideals and to a certain extent reproduce stereotypical gender images
in Greek society (Freideikou 1995) may be considered as a significant institutional
contribution to the consolidation of students’ ‘deep structures’ regarding nationalism
and masculinity. Indeed, an extensive research study examining the books of
language, history and geography in compulsory education revealed that their content
was openly ethnocentric. The same research also brought to light that the views of
most teachers were ethnocentric as well (Frangoudaki and Dragona, 1998). These are
particularly important for a country in which almost 10% of the student population is
of immigrant origin.

Political corruption may also be seen as a condition that contributes to the Nazi
project. The shared belief among Greeks of diverse political orientations that a large
proportion of politicians are corrupt (Psarras, 2012) contributes significantly to the
empowerment of fascists in Greece. It is a rather widespread belief that there is no
accountability among MPs and Ministers. Despite the fact that the names of some
among the protagonists of well-known and significant scandals became public
(Siemens, Langard’s list) they have never been on trial. This feeds into a general

03-2015).
distrust of politics and particularly of the governing institutions, providing a space to be covered by fascist populism. This has been phrased eloquently by Verney as a “broader delegitimation of the national political system” in Greece (Verney, 2014:18).

Let us not forget that a similar discourse on corruption among politicians, political parties and the parliament was also very popular and was strongly propagated by Nazis in inter-war Germany.

The most prominent political scandal confirming the links and the cooperation between the Nazis and New Democracy, the major right-wing party of the government, was the release of a video testifying the secret agreement between Baltakos, cabinet’s secretary and close advisor of the Prime Minister, with G.D.’s spokesman Ilias Kassidiaris. During their meeting, filmed secretly by Kassidiaris, Baltakos argues that the criminal investigation against G.D. was encouraged by the Prime Minister himself in order to get back the conservative votes from G.D. Through this and other testimonies, it became quite clear that Baltakos was operating as the link between the conservative party and the fascists. Kassidiaris publicly threatened to release more videos of the same kind. After that, Baltakos resigned from the government trying to protect the Prime Minister.

It is also important to stress that the anti-racist bill, long debated in the Greek parliament and among the Greek public was never voted into law. Among the main provisions of this bill, were the penalisation of racist propaganda and the incitement to racial attacks, as well as the denial of Nazi atrocities. It is important to note that the reluctance of the conservatives to pass the anti-racist bill is closely associated with their immigration bio-policies. Indeed, this attitude of the coalition government justified criticism over this blatant governmental indifference and was seen as a clear mark of their political affinities with the extremists.

**Epilogue**

As a conclusion, I argue that the rise of fascism in Greece in the age of crisis was not an accident, but ‘a chronicle of death foretold’. Because of the domination of casino capitalism and market fundamentalism that leaves behind deserted lands, what Jean and John Comaroff’s call “zones of ambiguity between the presence and the absence of the law”, (2006) discourses over the national glories and nationalist pride came back with a new force bringing up issues on immigration, the territorial and imaginary boundaries of the nation, the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, pushing the newcomers further into the dark side of national purity and legal protection. To this end, new regimes of control and policing were established and disseminated in society in the form of walls, fences, concentration camps, checkpoints and digital controls driving to intensify purifying enterprises against ‘contaminating others’. The transformation into scapegoats of the most precarious subjects, those deprived of ethnic, cultural, legal and other symbolic credentials of national purity in a time of crisis is not a Greek peculiarity. Paul Gilroy is right to argue that:
We increasingly face a racism which avoids being recognized as such because it is able to line up ‘race’ with nationhood, patriotism and nationalism ... It constructs and defends an image of national culture – homogeneous in its whiteness yet precarious and perpetually vulnerable to attack from enemies within and without ... This is a racism that answers the social and political turbulence of crisis and crisis management by the recovery of national greatness in the imagination (Gilroy, 1992: 53).

In Greece, mainstream debates on the ‘condition of exception’ and the need for a new patriotism override democratic principles, pushing those not bearing Greek or European essentials and prerequisites into the dark side of the national order of things. What further facilitated the job of fascist gangs in Greece, apart from austerity measures, should be sought in the nationalist core of fundamental social institutions such as the nationalisation of history, gender and religious education and the post-civil war history of repressive institutions of the state such as the police. The complex exchanges between media, corporate interests and government had a significant share in the production of ‘zones of ambiguity’. Most importantly, the exposure of the covert collaboration of fascists with New Democracy, the main party of the governing coalition, is saying enough on the close affinities between the mainstream Right and extreme Right in Greece.

The fading of the welfare state – as an institution operating for social coherence and the redistribution of social resources – called into play the repressive state and forms of governmentality based on disseminating fear in general and the fear of ‘others’ in particular. Strategies of biopolitical control and governmentality, through fear and precariousness, implied a ‘return back to the roots’ and to a patriotic, biological national absolutism that “provides special comfort against the ravages of [national] decline” (Gilroy, 1992: 53).

Despite G.D.’s anti-systemic discourse, this paramilitary organisation operates if not as the long arm of the governing regime, yet as a police par excellence manipulated for the governmentality of crisis. To this end, popular cultural values concerning the diverse borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’, patriotism and masculinity, are re-articulated and re-activated. Despite the fact that the main leaders of G.D. including Michaloliakos, the General Secretary of the organisation, are under arrest facing severe sentences for their criminal activities, the Nazi’s consolidated their electoral support gaining 6.28% of the total votes in the election of 25 January 2015. For this reason I argue that the threat of fascism in Greece is not a temporary economic outcome associated merely with marginal and extremist group action. Accordingly, the struggle against fascism exceeds the economic domain and deals with effective immigration policies and with the transformation of mainstream nationalist ideological and institutional structures which make the extreme and the unthinkable possible in Greece.
References


Abstract

The paper analyses young people’s interpretation of the past, evaluation of the present and political behaviour patterns based on semi-structured interviews (n=60) conducted in two contrasting constellations of modernization, Sopron and Ózd. First the perception of the most pressing social and political problems, second the potential of political and civic actions are compared. Finally an attempt is made to outline a “hopeless” and an “indifferent” idealtype of political culture. Together they create the opportunity for both the birth of antidemocratic tendencies and the space in which they can evolve. In this sense they provide the preconditions for “mainstreaming the extreme” that is the incubation of radicalism in Hungary.

Keywords: political culture, modernization, radicalism, Hungary.

Acknowledgement - The research has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 266831 - Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement (MYPLACE).
From the point of view of democratic principles, the Hungarian transition can hardly be called a success story. Not only has the nationalistic, intolerant, antidemocratic semantics of the far right become part of the mainstream political discourses (Feischmidt et al., 2014), but also the basic principles of the rule of law have been ignored by the government since 2010 (Tóth, 2012). Even though these two phenomena differ in many ways, they are both symptoms of a modernization failure that is the distortion of political culture in post-transition Hungary (Sik, 2011). Most attempts at explaining the emergence of radicalism – similarly to the international literature (Rydgren, 2007) – in Hungary focus on the pull and push factors of radical semantics (Barkóczi, 2010; Csepeli et al. 2010; Grajczár and Tóth, 2011; Karácsony and Róna, 2010; Szele, 2012), while being unaware of the contribution of the indifferent masses in the process of spreading radical semantics. Others consider both the radical and the apathetic political cultures (Szabó, 2012), however miss the chance of elaborating the link between the two. In order to outline a more comprehensive picture exploring the interference of radicalism and indifference, the horizon of analysis must be expanded by understanding radicalization in its relation to the various challenges of modernization.

This paper aims at revealing the mechanisms resulting in the various distortions of political culture from the perspective of the ambivalent Hungarian modernization. From this perspective the tendency of “mainstreaming the extreme” is understood as the consequence of the interaction of various modernization failures: beside the constellations resulting in despair and anger fuelling radical political culture, those patterns of modernization are also investigated, which lead to indifference enabling the spread of antidemocratic attitudes. The notion of political culture has been elaborated by Almond and Verba (1963) as the outcome of the process of political socialization including the formation of the knowledge about the political system, the attitudes toward it and the political behaviour patterns. This approach refers to a dynamic model of political culture focusing on those mechanisms, which reproduce citizens as political actors.

Since the beginning, research studies on political culture and political socialization have found themselves at the border of several academic fields. Sociology (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Percheron, 1993), political science (e.g. Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Dalton, 1996), psychology (e.g. Renhson, 1975) or social history (e.g. Sears and Valentino, 1997; Thomas, 1979) equally found their way to the interdisciplinary questions of political and civic formation. While such a heterogeneous conceptual tradition has the potential of comprehensively grasping the various factors of political formation, it also threatens theoretical inconsistency. In order to avoid this danger, the analysis is embedded in a meta-theoretical framework capable of mediating between various disciplines, namely the critical theories of modernization (Sik, 2014). The aim of critical theory, as introduced by the classics of the Frankfurt School, is the critical evaluation of social processes based on multidisciplinary empirical evidence from a transcendental normative basis (Horkheimer, 1976). From Marx to Habermas this meant the parallel analysis of the phenomenological and system level of modernization (Habermas, 1985). Since the first generation of the Frankfurt School, critical theories have not only paid special attention to the questions of radicalization (Adorno, 1950; Habermas, 1990), but also interpreted it as a “pathological”
consequence of the very processes of modernization (Horkheimer and Adorno, [1944] 1972; Habermas, 1985).

Following this approach, the transformation of Hungarian political culture since the transition is critically interpreted from a modernization theoretical point of view by analysing the political socialization processes of young people. In order to understand the processes of political socialization from the broader perspective of post-transition modernization, two contrasting locations were chosen, Ózd and Sopron, where idealtypical patterns of political culture could be explored. 30-30 semi-structured interviews (length: 60-90 minutes) were conducted with young people between 16-25 years of age mapping their perception of the social and political spheres. The interviews were used as empirical tools for elaborating “case studies” of Sopron and Ózd. While case study methodology is surrounded by many controversies (Flyvbjerg, 2006), it is capable of realizing the goals of an interpretative sociology relying on “idealtypes” in a Weberian sense, with up to date methodological rigor (Thomas, 2011).

The chosen towns have similar population sizes, while having inverse social histories throughout the 20th century. Sopron and Ózd, as ideal typical scenarios of Hungarian modernization, represent two contrasting frames of the individual processes of political socialization. In a certain sense the horizon of modernity differs in these two places, which determines not only the relation to the past, but also the relation to the present and the future as expressed in collective memory, political identity and behaviour patterns. Accordingly the interviews made in the two locations express two contrasting phenomenological horizons and two consequent semantic universes. Firstly the interviews were individually coded (with the help of qualitative data analysing software), then the different patterns of narrating social and political issues were compared in the two locations enabling the construction of idealtypical political cultures and the elaboration of a diagnosis of time in post-socialist Hungary.

The ambivalences of Hungarian modernization

From a critical theoretical point of view, modernization is a paradox process including emancipatory tendencies and pathological potentials at the same time. In what follows, out of many theoretical perspectives, Habermas’, Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s diagnoses are taken into consideration (Sik, 2014). The pattern of actualized emancipatory and pathological potentials in Central European countries is affected by specific local factors. In what follows, some relevant diagnoses about the periods of nation building, state socialism and post-socialism are taken into consideration (Sik, 2015b). The

---

2 On the one hand the two towns have similar population sizes (30,000), function (micro-regional centres) and position (both far from Budapest, the economic and cultural centre of Hungary). On the other hand they have a completely different, inverse geographical context (Sopron is near to the Austrian border, while Ózd is close to Slovakia) and also different histories throughout the 20th century, which result in contrasting social and political constellations in the present.

3 From a similar theoretical point of view the processes of memory transmission and political socialization were also analysed (Sik, 2015a).
constellations represented by the cases of Sopron and Ózd can be characterized as the mixtures of these various components. In this sense they have consequences not only for Hungary, but also for the other Central European countries characterized by a similar pattern of modernization.

According to Habermas, the key tendency of modernization is rationalization including the potential of improvement of the political public sphere, the democratization of everyday interactions and social institutions or the potential of subordination of lifeworld to market relations and the logic of bureaucracy, the consequent alienation, objectification and loss of meaning (Habermas, 1985). According to Giddens, late modernity is the age of uncertainty and risks, which threatens with ontological insecurity, identity crises and global catastrophes, while it enables individual and institutional reflexivity, new ways of identity construction, consumption, relationships or political participation (Giddens, 1991). According to Bourdieu (1998), modernity is based on the logic of fields, veiling and reproducing structural inequalities, while outlining naturalized interpretations of social differences and creating class habitus determining the set of accessible practices.

Obviously these universal characteristics of modernization are always embedded in local social historical context resulting in the various patterns of emancipatory and pathological factors. In Central Europe the process of modernization is inseparable from the difficulties of building nation states including national institutions, rites and identities. While in many Western countries the national identity was complemented by the identities of the bourgeois and the citizen, in Central Europe an obligate concept of the nation emerged (Trenčsényi, 2011). Perceived as a metaphysically grounded identity, the nation was beyond criticism, which means that its exact interpretation and its consequences for the social world were not subject to debates based on argumentation and reflection. As a consequence, they grounded a dogmatic or hysterical political culture (Bibó, 1991). This means that early modernization was burdened with a dogmatic concept of nation limiting communicative rationalization (in a Habermasian sense), dominating the logic of fields (in a Bourdieuan sense), while providing a source for regressive identity patterns in late modernity (in a Giddensian sense).

After World War II, the emergence of a Soviet type state socialist dictatorship completely reshaped the social structure. The traditional forms of interpersonal and institutional interactions were demolished and replaced by ambitions towards totalitarian control on the part of the state party (Buchowski, 2001; Verdery, 1996). This period of “negative modernization” was transformed slowly during the consolidation period following the revolution of 1956. The state party gave up its claim for complete control and offered an implicit deal of civic privatism. In exchange for material security and a limited version of private freedom (Meyer, 2003), it expected popular withdrawal from public political life. This latent agreement led to the emergence of a new kind of duplication of social spheres. Society became divided into a “first society” integrated by the official party politics and “second society” including the unofficial public sphere and small scale profit-oriented economic activity. In the final decades of state socialism these two spheres interacted increasingly with each other, creating “hybrid” frames of interpersonal and institutional interactions, wherein ideological constraints also became part of negotiable issues
This means that socialist modernization was also burdened with a dogmatic concept, namely the communist state ideology, further preventing communicative rationalization (in a Habermasian sense) and the expansion of reflexive institutions (in a Giddensian sense). On the other hand state socialist modernization partly decreased structural inequalities, partly predominated the fields (in a Bourdieuan sense).

The emancipatory transformations of the political and economic institutions occurred in this constellation. After a short euphoric period of renewal, the more painful social and economic aspects of the transformations appeared (Mrozowicki, 2011). Furthermore, as the country integrated into global cultural and economic networks, the effects of late modernity – including the emergence of the “risk”, the “information” or the “experience” society – also strengthened, creating not only new horizons, but also new inequalities and tensions (Eyal et al., 1998; Ferge, 2002; Szalai, 2007). These difficulties reactivated those former strategies, which were habitualized during the paradox conditions of modernity and slowly started to reshape the new institutions (Ost, 2006; Koczanowicz, 2008; Sik, 2010). However, this does not mean that the state socialist heritage simply reshaped the post-transition constellation in its own image. Instead, the ambiguities of the transition resulted in a deep identity crisis, disillusionment and loss of faith in the values and possibility of an emancipatory modernization as such. This resulted in the increase of inequalities, an ambiguous communicative rationalization and difficult adaptation to the challenges of late modernity.

Similarly to other Central European countries Hungarian modernization in general is characterized by these local variants of universal emancipatory and pathological tendencies. In order to analyse political formation within these frames the observation of two contrasting constellations of modernization within Hungary, Ózd and Sopron was chosen. Sopron being a traditional commercial centre was heavily involved in the early processes of modernization. This means that the emancipatory (capital accumulation) and pathological (growing inequalities) potentials of instrumental rationalization were experienced since the 19th century. During the state socialist period, being close to the Western border of the Soviet bloc, Sopron became a heavily controlled, isolated town. This meant that neither the negative (limitation of communicative rationality and reflexivity) nor the positive consequences (industrialization, decrease of inequalities) of socialist modernization affected it significantly. After the transition Sopron once again found itself in a quickly modernizing state resulting in the emergence of new chances (Western job opportunities, consumption potentials, identity patterns) and new difficulties (uncertainty, risks, objectification, inequalities).

The social history of Ózd is somehow the inverse of Sopron’s. It dropped out from the first phase of modernization, thus it lacks any bourgeois or nationalist local traditions, while historically lagging economically. During state socialism Ózd got special attention from the state, as massive heavy industry investment took place in the city, which resulted in exposure to both the positive (material security, decrease of inequality) and negative effects (distortion of political culture, lack of post-material values, limitation of communicative rationalization and reflexivity) of state socialist modernization. Since the transition Ózd lost its economic basis and became one of
the most depressed parts of Hungary. It is excluded in many ways from the processes of late modernity, economic hopelessness (ontological insecurity) lead to ethnicized conflicts, identity crisis (limitation of reflexivity) and the expansion of the extreme right (regressive identity patterns).4

In sum, Sopron and Ózd represent inverse scenarios of modernization, which occurred across Hungary in a mixed form. The experiences of modernization are constitutive elements of a political culture in a sense that they frame the interpretation of social problems and desirable goals, while providing paradigms of collective action. In this sense the correspondences found in Sopron and Ózd are informative about the patterns of political formation in divergent constellations of modernization, which determine together the political climate in Hungary and in other Central European countries sharing the same social historical background.

**The challenges of post-socialist modernity: the perception of social and political problems**

The perception of social and political problems is embedded in the context of personal experiences. In this sense both their identification and evaluation depends on the difficulties young people face in their family, school, workplace or peer group. Following this logic, in this section, first the basic problems identified by young people living in Sopron and Ózd are analysed; second the consequences for political institutions and actors are evaluated.

Both in Ózd and Sopron many young people mentioned the problem of low living standards and the lack of adequate income. Of course a satisfactory economic situation is always relative; it is the result of a comparison to an actual or virtual reference group. Therefore it is not surprising that young people living in the two towns refer to completely different things, when talking about low living standards. In Ózd it means the lack of basic needs: ‘They live from month to month, because the money isn’t enough and there is no potential for work’ (Dabas, Ózd). In Sopron, however, young people mention less urgent needs, including either lack of money for extra tuition fees or independent flats: “I thought that I would be able to pay for my rent and tuition during the last year of college, but I got only 53 thousand forints and the rent was 45 thousand” (Emma, Sopron). In Ózd the lack of raw economic capital is at the centre of attention (in a Bourdieuan sense), while in Sopron the dissatisfaction with the possibilities of consumption is a terrain of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense).

This difference can be further explained by referring to those specific problems that trouble young people. In Ózd unemployment was mentioned by almost everyone as a fundamental difficulty crippling life chances: “When will we give work to those who need it? Let them take away the social benefits, but give them work in exchange!

---

4 Since 2014 the mayor of Ózd is the representative of Jobbik, the Hungarian extreme right party, whose ideology and political actions not simply neglect the principles of basic human rights, but also include an irredentist interpretation of the past, an oversimplifying, populist, ethnicizing explanation of the social problems and the proposing of authoritarian solutions (Karácsony and Róna, 2010).
Like before, when everyone was working” (Lexa, Ózd). In Sopron the central problem was the transformation of higher education, which at the time of recording of the interviews was strongly opposed by students through the organisation of demonstrations throughout the country. Many criticized the efforts of the government to force the students to either pay or to sign a contract that they would not leave the country for five years: “To be honest I don’t like this idea of a contract at all, because I understand that they want to keep the people in Hungary, but they shouldn’t do it like this, because it’s a really aggressive way of doing it” (Klaudia, Sopron).

Unemployment and tuition fees are perfect symbols for the most burning questions in the divergent constellations of modernization. In Ózd the main problem is extreme structural inequality, which cripples any sort of constructive countermeasures. In Sopron the most burning problem concerns the risks of individual careers, which can be handled in the frames of “lifepolitics” (in a Giddensian sense).

Beyond structural problems many young people criticised the political and economic institutions, which either do not function efficiently enough, or do not function as a system orientated by institutionalized principles - such as profit or the law - at all. In Sopron there is a special sensitivity concerning the high level of corruption and the lack of legality in economic and political life. This means that a great variety of different types of corruption or misconduct in public office are identified by them, including the dysfunction of jurisprudence:

I was hit by a car in February and the car drove off [...] a few months later I received a letter that they had closed the case, because they couldn’t prove if it was the suspect or not, even though it was unambiguous, because I recognized him. (Andrea, Sopron)

Also companies that “do not pay for services provided even though work is turned around quickly and correctly” (Tamás, Sopron) are mentioned. These indicate the presence of a civic and bourgeois identity, which is based on the principles of universal justice as the criteria of legitimacy (in a Habermasian sense). In Ózd these issues are not only mentioned less, but are also presented in a less elaborate frame. Corruption is treated as a general law, which cannot be altered: “The whole system is corrupt. And those who talk about this are either silenced, or in my opinion murdered, or paid off” (Mónika, Ózd).

The opposite can be said about the perception of crime and safety. Basically young people in both places have a negative opinion about the security of their town. However there are certain differences in the narratives. In Ózd there are detailed descriptions of actual incidents experienced by the participants:

*Interviewer*: Is it common for people to fight?

*Respondent*: Not nowadays.

I: How about in the past?

R: Every day.

I: Let’s say two families fought. And this wasn’t rare [...] The father of a kid was beaten up, so, just recently, he took revenge, so the other ended up in hospital. That’s why I don’t go out nowadays (Adrian, Ózd)
In Sopron, in contrast, narratives of crime are mostly second hand experiences and stories “heard”. Of course these kinds of stories often exaggerate and tend to generate panic. As they are not based on personal experiences the stories cannot be subject to counter-evidence proofs and may be instrumentalized by political forces interested in strengthening mass hysteria. This is exemplified by a rumour about “settling Roma people in Sopron”: “There used to be families, which were born and raised here, but these new ones, who were let’s say ‘moved in’ are really terrible. I was walking with my friend and these frightening figures approached” (Ecser, Sopron).5

Social problems at the structural level and the functioning of systems constitute the basis for the perception of everyday and institutional democracy. The democratic or authoritarian experiences of family, peer group, school or workplace interactions play a crucial role in the political formation of young people, which was expressed in the rich and detailed narration of these relations. These interactions have the potential for allowing the experience of democratic communication and through it democratic general will formation. Without such experiences, democratic institutions and values are inaccessible, which makes them invaluable. As a general difference between the two locations it can be said that in Ózd the demand for democracy is not present on the horizon of young people. In school they almost exclusively reported the misuse of seemingly democratic forms of interactions:

I tried to express my opinion, but in school it’s impossible. Everyone wants to hear only their own opinion. At least in our class. When we were preparing for the students’ day everyone had to write down five ideas. I started to read mine, they were cool, but the teacher didn’t even let me finish, which made me feel quite bad. He said they were no good. Because he already had a plan in his mind, because he’s quite a selfish man! (Leonóra, Ózd)

In the workplace, respondents also expressed the need to obey the employer: “Well, in the workplace, basically you have to obey the boss. I consider working as a must. [...] I must endure certain things” (Mónika, Ózd). And in the family also several participants reported authoritarian relations: “Well, it usually goes the way – and I think it’s similar in other families as well – that the father is the head of the family. We do, as he says. He leads us and controls us” (Feri, Ózd). In Sopron however, a general claim for democracy was expressed by many respondents, which serves as a normative basis for evaluating social relations: “I think we usually discuss things in a democratic way. We are interested in each other’s opinion, obviously. We learn from each other this way, because if I don’t agree, someone might correct me, because they probably see it from a different angle” (Lilla, Sopron). Even in schools or workplaces, where hierarchical relations are more frequent, the demand for fairness emerges. According to Habermas the structure of interaction plays a decisive role in the democratic

5 As these narratives express it, inter-ethnic relations have various difficulties if not complemented with mechanisms ensuring social cohesion (Cockburn, 2007).
competences, which means that in this sense the experiences of young people growing up in Ózd and in Sopron are in sharp contrast.

These everyday experiences of democracy also have a huge impact on the evaluation of political institutions. Even though in both places there is an almost exclusively negative perception of politicians blaming them for neglecting people’s interest, manipulating and dividing the country, there is great difference at the level of framing these stereotypical problems. While in Ózd these characteristics are mentioned usually as an unchangeable, natural state of political life expressing the opinion of a hopeless, disillusioned citizen, in Sopron they are stated as criticisms of the outraged citizen. The ignorance of politicians is interpreted in Ózd as a historical constant expressing the naturalization of helplessness and a consequent deprived class habitus (in a Bourdieuan sense): “In my eyes most of the politicians are defined as people who look after their own interests only. And it’s always been like this, throughout history” (András, Ózd). In Sopron, in contrast, this is seen as a correctable dysfunction expressing the claim of the politically empowered citizen (in a Habermasian or Giddensian sense): “The people who should be elected are not those who want to realize their personal goals and become rich, but those who are interested in the country, who want to end our suffering” (Lelez, Sopron).

The evaluation of political actors frames the interpretation of other questions, such as those concerning national identity. National identity in Hungary has been controversial since the transition. On the one hand myths about the unique talents of Hungarians prevail, while, on the other hand, the historical experiences of defeat and the discourses of underdevelopment or backwardness haunt the collective identity. Therefore national identities vary according to the local social constellations. In those places, where there is space for realizing individual potentials, one can go without a positive collective identity, which allows a more critical approach towards the nation. In those places, where the social recognition of the self is limited, there is greater need for a positive collective identity, which leaves lesser room for reflecting on the antidemocratic potential of nationalism. The differences between Ózd and Sopron express these correspondences.

In Ózd patriotism has a strong emotional charge expressing a return to the ontological concept of the nation that is a regressive answer to the challenge of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense). It is framed in the context of “Hungarian fate”, which must be undertaken on the individual level, notwithstanding hopeless local circumstances:

I like living here, because at the end of the day this is my home country, we were destined to be born here and we are Hungarian citizens. Well, it would be great here, only if there wasn’t this great hopelessness! (Feri, Ózd).

---

6 Gingrich and Banks described how new forms of nationalism are used for self-legitimization by new radical right movements. These movements use them as semantics capable of translating the fears and uncertainties caused by globalization into tendencies threatening the nation itself (Gingrich and Banks, 2006: 17). In Ózd similar patterns were experienced, as the locally strong Jobbik’s nationalist interpretations reappeared in the narratives of young people.
In Sopron patriotism is much less significant. There it appears as a romanticizing emotion, which is, however, overwritten by the profound economic interest. In most cases aspirations to leave the country trigger this mechanism:

I: Is it important for you that such a thing as Hungary exists?
R: Well, it is. [...] We’ve got beautiful cities and countryside [...] and if I go to Somogy county and eat an apple, well then we know that’s ours, because it’s Hungarian!
I: OK, but you said that you want to move to Zurich...
R: Yeah... but my heart belongs here... Even if I have known since I was 11 that I will live in Italy. That’s my temperament! (Emma, Sopron)

This loose relation to national identity is explained by the actual chances of realizing individual goals and constructing identity through carrier (in a Giddensian sense). The differences at the level of evaluating public institutions and national identity result in contrasting political landscapes as well. In Ózd young people tend to distance from the sphere of mainstream politics. The two big parties, which have governed the country since 1994 – MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) and Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) – are both rejected. Moreover, this opinion is expressed usually in an emotionally charged tone. The Fidesz is treated as an ignorant party: “Fidesz – now I will express myself impolitely – doesn’t give a s*%t about the problems of young people” (Lucilla, Ózd). The socialists are usually blamed for their incompetent and corrupt governance: “The socialists are demagogues blah-blah. They won’t achieve any results if you ask me, only take away money” (András, Ózd).

In Ózd, the rejection of the biggest parties and the emotionally charged nationalism together opens a space for identifying with the extreme right party, the Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary). Jobbik is at the centre of political discourses among young people. Almost everyone has personal experiences related to it, either on the street, or through others, which provokes emotionally charged reactions. Many young people find their communication convincing, which indicates the insensitivity to questions of authoritarianism or intolerance (in a Habermasian sense): “I think that only Jobbik cares about us, for you and for me. I don’t know much about your life, but I am sure that it would be better for us all, if they governed” (Emericus, Ózd). This however does not mean that everybody identifies with Jobbik. There are some, who condemn it for making only trouble:

There is one political organization, which generates the tension between the Roma and Hungarian people [...] and this resulted in quite a big problem in the town. [...] I am not an educated man, I am not a clever man, but even I understand that across the country, everyone could distance themselves from Jobbik [...] and when their representative talks, than all the other parties should ignore it. (Alexander, Ózd)

7 About the growing popularity of Jobbik among young people see Feischmidt et al. (2014) and Szele (2012).
Furthermore many young Roma people, who constitute the target group of the party's provocative, often racist, propaganda, reported strong fear generated by Jobbik and its paramilitary organizations, which held several demonstrations in the town:

If Jobbik organised a demonstration I would surely avoid it, because if the Gypsies gathered they would certainly kill us [...] They are capable of it. There have been enough examples, when Jobbik supporters, and Guardsmen, have murdered people. They burned the houses of families in Tatárszentgyörgy and murdered a little boy. (Hunor, Ózd)

In Sopron the political landscape is in a certain way the complete opposite of the one described in Ózd. There the two major political parties have strong bases, transmitted from generation to generation. Some had voted for the MSZP “because it’s a typical left party” (Adél, Sopron), while others preferred the Fidesz: “I was hoping that after the MSZP the Fidesz would better represent the interests of the country. That hope was fulfilled partly, but we still need something more to make things better” (Anita, Sopron). As the two big parties are at the centre of the political landscape of young people living in Sopron, the alternative parties have much less space. On the one hand this affects the perception of the alternative democratic parties, which – unlike in Ózd – at least appear on the horizon, even if they play only a marginal role: “Well I don’t have a favourite party, but I like the LMP (Politics Can be Different) [...] they talked well, at least didn’t talk crap, so they were attractive for me and positive” (Lelez, Sopron). On the other hand this affects the perception of extreme right political groups. First of all they appear much less in the narratives of politically informed young people. Second, they are commented on in a much more critical manner. Many young people state that the politics of the Jobbik is unacceptable, because of its racist nature:

R: Discrimination is the main reason. So the Roma... I know sometimes they do stupid things, but if the country really decided to educate them and trust their capacity to change, probably they could change, of course not within four years. [...] and this continuous labelling of Jewish people! I simply can’t understand it. They also suffered a lot, so I don’t understand why they should be exterminated.
I: Where do you hear these kind of ideas?
R: Jobbik. Of course not in the public sphere, but this prejudice is there...
(Adél, Sopron)

Having outlined the perception of social and political problems in the two towns, it is possible to analyse the impact of the divergent constellations of modernity on the different views. The most important detected challenges of modernization affect the perception of political life both at a formal and a substantive level. In Ózd the majority of young people perceive the present as a cruel, uncertain, hopeless period, which is characterized by the everyday struggle to provide their basic needs. These interpretations express the experience of the post-transition stuck of modernization,
aggregated by identity crisis. From this perspective a detailed picture of subordination becomes evident, including inequality, lack of recognition and personal experience of crime. As these experiences add up, the difficulties of a faltering/paused modernization are naturalized and ground a politically indifferent habitus (in a Bourdieuan sense). For a generation growing up in such a constellation the promise of democracy is discredited, the emancipatory potential of modernization in a Habermasian sense is inaccessible. As its principles are absent in everyday interactions, its institutionalized forms are emptied out.

This results either in a resigned approval of democracy, which is actually the alienation from it, or in the angry, frustrated rejection of the political sphere, which is on the one hand responsible for the suffering and, on the other, unchangeable. For many young people the way of escaping such a depressing experience of modernity preventing the realization of personal dreams, is an ontologically grounded, dogmatic national identity that is a regressive answer (in a Giddensian sense). This could serve as a potential “theodicy” in the sense that the greater goal of preserving the nation could give meaning to personal suffering and ease ontological insecurity. Of course this is just an option, and it is not one open to everyone. Those, who cannot engage with this kind of regressive handling of the identity crisis, are often turned off politics as is evident from the large number of those young people who are in complete semantic uncertainty. These correspondences appear at the level of the political landscape as well, which is based on the rejection of mainstream political forces and instead centred around the extreme right party. Either identification or condemnation of this extreme party indicates that, in this paused constellation of modernization the frames of representative democracy are suspended and politics becomes reminiscent of civil war.

In Sopron the majority of young people perceive the present from a completely different perspective. For them it is not basic needs, which are at stake, but the realization of individual goals, the consumption and the realization of their identity (in a Giddensian sense). The dividing line is not between unemployment or working, but between good and bad jobs. Therefore young people living in Sopron have a much less personal experience of inequalities and lack of recognition. For them these are the problems of others, or abstract systemic problems, which do not provoke strong emotional reactions. From this perspective democratic rights are treated as self-evident and natural, which can be applied as a normative basis in everyday interactions and institutional problems as well. Consequently national identity plays a less crucial role, as it is only an optional romanticized bonus, which is overshadowed by personal achievements. These experiences ground a political landscape where the political status quo is not questioned that is a habitus of the privileged classes (in a Bourdieuan sense). The big parties are in the centre, while those parties which are critical of the system get less attention and extreme parties are rejected. In this constellation, democracy is not viewed as a flawlessly functioning system either; however unlike in

---

8 Holmes describes the anti-Enlightenment tendency, which handles the uncertainties and anxieties caused by modernization by identifying with closed local communities “integralism” (Holmes, 2000: 3-4). According to our experiences – which are similar to other observations (Feischmidt et al., 2014: 87) – the political culture of the Ózdian young people can also be explained within this framework.
Ózd it is not rejected as such, instead it is criticized in the hope of improvement expressing a certain civic consciousness (in a Habermasian sense).

On the one hand this implicit trust in democracy is the result of the lack of economic traumas of the transition. On the other hand it is the result of historical heritage. The pre-socialist traditions of modernity and the lower impact of state socialist modernity both foster the emergence of a non-paternalist civic culture. The former provide patterns of an autonomous, civic mentality, which is based on dignity and the claim to respect. Based on such a mentality not only social problems can be criticized, but also extremist ideologies can be rejected. The latter provides immunity to patterns of behaviour, which were formed in the paradoxical socialization processes of state socialism. As the pact of material security for lack of democracy was always less embedded in the strictly controlled Sopron, so too its eroding effect is less damaging.

Reactions to the challenges of post-socialist modernity: ignorance, activism and radicalism

The most basic form of political activity in a representative democracy is participating in elections. Therefore it is a central question how young people relate to this symbolic act of democratic will formation. In Ózd the basic attitude towards the elections was uncertainty concerning both the meaning and value of voting:

I: You mentioned that you don’t like to vote. Have you ever voted?
R: Yes, once.
I: And how was it?
R: Well, a big nothing. [...] I thought I’d try it once but I can’t even recall which party I voted for, or why, but as I remember it didn’t win.
I: How did you decide which party you would support?
R: Well, whoever lied better to me through the media, maybe that was it. “This looks like a cool guy, hey let’s vote for him!” (Mónika, Ózd).

These opinions express an overall disillusionment towards elections, which does not have much significance as solutions to local problems are not expected from a new government: “People go to vote, but the government does as it pleases. It doesn’t matter who wins, neither of them is good, both have negative consequences” (Igar, Ózd).

In Sopron two characteristic opinions can be discerned. On the one hand many young people have a strong civic identity, which implies respect for the elections: “Yes, in a certain sense you can shape your own destiny by voting. They say that one’s freedom is limited only by the freedom of the other, but also the laws, whose makers - the government - is elected by me!” (Janka, Sopron). On the other hand many young people argue that voting is simply irrelevant, as one vote does not make any difference: “Well, I don’t think it’s really important to vote, because, you know, I would be surprised if it would be particularly me, who influences the results” (Klaudia, Sopron). This kind of opinion expresses a different type of passivity: while in Ózd the
source of ignorance is a loss of hope in democratic will formation through voting, in Sopron it is the unsatisfactory level of individual impact, which results in indifference. The former expresses a defeatist class habitus, while the latter expresses the habitus of the dissatisfied customer (in a Bourdieuian sense).

These patterns of relating to the institutional forms of decision making also affect other forms of political action, such as demonstrations. In this dimension – as a consequence of previously described patterns – there are significant differences between the two locations. In Ózd, where the institutional forms of democratic will formation are discredited and have lost their significance, demonstrations play a central role. Such forms of expressing one’s opinion – unlike the institutionalized, abstract elections – are collective rites in a Durkheimian sense (Durkheim, 2008). They generate “collective effervescence” and strengthen a neo-tribal collective identity, which resonates perfectly with the regressive identity patterns many young people in Ózd share.

There have been several demonstrations organized by the extreme right party or its satellite organizations. On the one hand these demonstrations attract many young people, despite being barely legal or even illegal:

Well I’m member of the Hungarian Guardsmen [...] and the police don’t like it that we were marching in uniforms and it frightens others and there many of us had our vests and clothes seized, so there were some conflicts because of this. (Csele, Ózd).

On the other hand many opposing young people are mobilized for these often dangerous occasions:

I participated in a counter-demonstration [...] as we were looking for the Roma block, first we were lost and ended up among the supporters of Jobbik. You should’ve seen that police protection [...] there was a really black skinned Roma couple among us and they were threatened by them, so we had to ask for the help of the police, it was so frightening [...] it was good to face these experiences. (Mónika, Ózd)

In Sopron, as the institutionalized forms of participation are better embedded, demonstrations have less significance. Most of the respondents consider demonstrations futile. As they do not provide opportunity for serious impact, they cannot contribute to the process of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense):

These protests against the government, I wouldn’t participate in them, because they are actually futile [...] thousands of people may go out, but it’s completely uncertain that it will have any impact on the government. If a few thousand people were demonstrating, well it would be different, because the proportion is different. But that. (Ferenc, Sopron)

Despite the fact that these various institutionalized or informal forms of activities are present in the lives of several young people, it should also be emphasized that the
majority of them were disinclined towards any sort of political or civic actions. However the argument for completely rejecting the political sphere differed in the two locations.

In Ózd young people articulated their frustrations and hopelessness due to the everyday failure of the political sphere. This often led to an angry rejection of politics and the diversion of personal responsibility that is an overall politically neutralized class habitus: “Politics doesn’t interest me. I think that it’s not my duty to solve these problems! Someone else can solve them, someone who is interested. But me, just leave me alone! I don’t care” (Adri, Ózd). In other cases respondents avoid talking about political issues as they feel helpless to change anything, which is the expression of the naturalization of subordination: “Sometimes I give massages, so we talk about this. About work. But not about politics. We don’t talk about that politics at all, because why would we?! It won’t be better just because we get angry, because there’s nothing we could do!” (Pálma, Ózd). In Sopron young people rejecting politics are less frustrated; they simply do not care about it. They rather focus on their identity projects and the individual solutions to their problems, which, unlike in Ózd, are available to them:

I: Have you ever thought of participating in any sort of activity? Given the fact that I see you are pretty well informed.
R: No, I never thought of that, because it doesn’t really interest me. You know I’ve got other things to do. (András, Sopron).

It is important to note that political ignorance is in a certain sense a liminal state: it may either evolve into lifelong passivity, activism or radicalism. From this perspective, the different reasons for political indifference imply different potentials. Frustrations experienced in Ózd, which are currently held back by a rejection of the political sphere, have the potential to turn into radicalism, while disinterestedness experienced in Sopron lacks this kind of potential. However this does not mean that it is completely safe. Disinterestedness produces moral indifference, the incapability to experience solidarity with the suffering “other”. Indirectly such insensibility may have a similar effect to frustrations in the sense that they make people susceptible to antidemocratic ideas and prejudices.

The reality of this danger is confirmed by the patterns of intolerance. Anti-Roma prejudices were equally present in the two locations, which indicates that the different types of alienation from politics may be accompanied by a similar lack of recognition, which is the basis of antidemocratic interactions (in a Habermasian sense). The differences appear only at a semantic level. In Ózd racist and antidemocratic political intentions are expressed without hesitation⁹:

---

⁹ Recently class based analyses of radicalization have become popular (Kalb and Halmai, 2011), whose conclusions are supported by the differences between the experiences of young people living in Ózd and Sopron. However, in our understanding, instead of a reductionist class approach, a more complex approach is needed, which reflects beside structural inequalities on the pathological and emancipatory potentials of rationalization or the newly emerging uncertainties, risks and challenges of identity construction.
Well, if I look around my neighbourhood and see this overbreeding, I think I would take a risk, well it’s difficult to say, but there was an example, there was a doctor, who wanted to sterilize the women after the third child. I think that wouldn’t have harmed. I would support this. (Csele, Ózd)

In Sopron however there is often a gesture of reluctance, expressing ambivalence about identification with extreme ideas:

I: You mentioned that you would prefer not to have them around. What do you think, where should they be instead?
R: I don’t know. Somewhere else. [...] maybe another city should be created for them.
I: There should be a city, where only they would live?
R: Yeah, only they would live there. There would be no problems and everything would be nice [...] But unfortunately, this is not possible. (Andrea, Sopron)

Following this overview of the potential reactions to the social and political problems, once again the impact of the divergent constellations of modernity on the different behaviour patterns can be analysed. Since in Ózd most of the young people are disappointed with the mainstream parties, parliamentary elections also had no particular significance for them. The mainstream parties’ abandonment of Ózd since 1989 was experienced as an act of treason and created an exceptionally distrustful atmosphere. In this atmosphere a frustrated ignorance was born as a result of the experienced extreme inequalities, which could in many cases turn into radicalism. In Sopron however, most of the young people take democratic institutions for granted. This means that they allow themselves the luxury of ignorance and disinterestedness, while focusing on individual ambitions and identity projects. Accordingly, they criticize representative democracy for not being effective enough, which means that it does not satisfy their individual needs appropriately. However they are not troubled by this so much as to be motivated to seek alternative political means, which expresses the lacking intention of participating in the public sphere. Instead they turn away from activism and remain satisfied with superficial criticism of social and political problems while withdrawing into their private lives. However ignorance has its own dangers: as it focuses on individual goals, it has the potential to eliminate solidarity, which opens the way for the tacit approval of antidemocratic tendencies.

In her analysis Miller-Idriss found that in Germany the damaged and silenced national pride is among the most important factors of youth radicalization (Miller-Idriss, 2009: 63). The patterns experienced in Sopron are close to this model: unlike in Ózd where radicalism was fuelled by experiences of inequalities, there the damaged pride may result in extremist attitudes.
Incubating radicalism in Hungary

Having analysed the perception of social and political problems and reactions to these problems, the main question may be approached once again: what do the examples of Ózd and Sopron tell us about the relation of modernization and political culture in Hungary? In other words, what kind of diagnosis of time can be elaborated based on these observations? It has been argued here that Ózd and Sopron represent two contrasting constellations of modernization framing various paths of political socialization. Accordingly, the Hungarian political culture can be characterized as a result of the interaction of these two idealtypical models.

The example of Ózd represents a constellation of modernization resulting in the emergence of a hopeless political culture in the sense that the personal horizon of expectations lacks any viable perspectives. As the job market is not seen as a fair, meritocratic environment, interactions are not seen as the terrain of mutual respect, structural subordination is naturalized and a helpless or frustrated habitus emerges (in a Bourdieuan sense). These characteristics create an environment, which is in contradiction with the principles of modernity and democracy that is an open society based on knowledge and the respect for dignity. Therefore in this constellation both the instrumental and the communicative rationality potentials of modernization are hindered (in a Habermasian sense), resulting in a lack of reflexivity and difficulties of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense). Moreover these factors are often complemented with the experience of ethnic conflicts or the turning to the ontological concept of the nation. As the traumatic experiences cannot be interpreted in any constractive way, they either result in learned helplessness or in radicalization, which are the outcome of the adding up of various modernization disadvantages.

The example of Sopron represents a constellation of modernization resulting in the emergence of an indifferent political culture in the sense that the personal horizon of expectations includes not only viable perspectives, but also the lack of solidarity and ignorance of political dangers. Such a perspective is grounded by the encouraging experiences of job market and interactions resulting in a class habitus enabling reflexive identity construction (in a Giddensian sense). The individualized, reflexive horizon of expectations frames the perception of social and political problems and the potential reactions as well. In this context the key problems are those that hinder the realization of individual identity projects. Also these problems are perceived as abstract dysfunctions of redistribution, which could and should be handled at the system level. Such diagnosis may either result in identification with one of the mainstream parties, or in the turning away from politics depending on what is seen as relevant or irrelevant for personal life. In both cases however, there is a strong potential for indifference to those problems of social and political life, which do not affect individual prospects directly, such as growing inequalities and ethnic tensions. As exit strategies are always available, these difficult problems are more easily distanced through rationalization. In this sense young people living in Sopron despite their relatively advantageous modernization perspectives does not seem to realize the democratization potentials (in a Habermasian sense). Instead they focus on the questions of their individual identity construction while naturalizing the inequalities.
These two patterns of political culture in a certain way complement each other. While in the hopeless position tensions erupt, which generate actual - often ethnicized - conflicts, the indifferent position implies the ignorance of tensions and conflicts functioning as an incubator, allowing their escalation and aggravation. In this sense the combination of the two ideal types, characterizing Hungarian society as a whole, creates an extremely dangerous compound, which includes the opportunity for both the birth of antidemocratic tendencies and the space in which they can evolve. The interaction of these two patterns - originating fundamentally from the neglected challenges of modernization and transmitted through the distorted processes of political formation - enables the spreading of radical political views, which threatens the radicalization of the mainstream discourses, that is, the fading away of democratic principles and institutions. Even though such a frightening potential is probably the most prevalent in Hungary at the moment, it has consequences for any similar societies, as Ózd and Sopron are not unique cases, but the typical constellations of Central European modernity.

The above analyses also have some conclusion for the debates on the emergence of new forms of radicalism often fuelled by nationalist semantics. On the one hand contemporary radicalism is explained as a reaction to the processes of globalization (Gingrich and Banks, 2006; Feischmidt et al., 2014), which approach can be connected to the patterns in Sopron. Others interpret radicalization as the expression of the repressed class conflict (Kalb and Halmai, 2011), which approach seems to explain the patterns in Ózd. While the first approach attempts to understand the everyday embeddedness of radicalism, thus providing a phenomenological explanation for the attraction to extremist semantics, the second one focuses on unveiling structural mechanisms. In this sense these approaches are complementary in at least two senses: concerning their focus (everyday practices versus structure) and the broadest explanatory level (globalization versus class struggle).

As the present analyses show, sticking to one or the other approach may result in inadequate conclusions, as often the interaction between social spheres shaped by various frames is the key to understanding the social dynamics of radicalization. By inserting the question of radicalization into the context of modernization these difficulties may be overcome. A modernization theoretical approach grounded on general social theoretical level (such as Bourdieu’s, Giddens’ or Habermas’ theories) includes both the phenomenological and the structural level, while capable of interpreting both the processes of globalization and class struggle. In this sense it may provide a framework capable of synthesizing the inevitably one-sided diagnoses in a comprehensive approach. The elaboration of such an approach is particularly important, as globalization, class struggle, the everyday practices and structural coercion are all parts of the complex equation of radicalization.

---

\[11\] That explains why case studies focusing solely on radical cultures (e.g. Dechezelles, 2008) or the inter-ethnic conflicts framing radical cultures (e.g. Shoshan, 2008) remain inevitably one-sided: understanding the genesis and expansion of radical culture requires reflection on the non-radicals’ reaction to radicalism as well. If radicalism is actively contested, the political formation of radicals is framed completely differently (Vysotsky, 2013) compared to those cases, when the majority is indifferent, like in Hungary.
References


Sik, D. (2015a) Towards a critical theory of Central European Societies. East Central Europe. MS.


Sik, D.: Incubating Radicalism in Hungary


Mainstream or an Alternate Universe?
Locating and Analysing the Radical Right Media Products in the Hungarian Media Network

Abstract
Despite voluminous literature explaining the emergence and the electoral contours of right wing radicalism in Europe, little is known about the location of radical right mass communication channels in the media sphere. The aim of this article is to fill the gap by identifying and analysing the positions of the radical right media within the network structure of the general media sphere. To do so, Hungary is an excellent illustrative case as a country in which the radical right wing Jobbik party won 21 percent of the votes in the 2014 parliamentary election that cemented its status as by far the largest radical right group in Central Europe. We provide an issue-centred approach in which the media networks of two of the most controversial political topics of the year 2014 in Hungarian politics are explored. To compose the networks, we concentrate on the interaction ties that are defined here as direct, and explicit citations or hyperlinks to the content of other media products. The empirical test of ideal typical networks reveals that the radical right products stay under the radar of the mainstream media. It is our finding that the representatives of the radical media remain on the fringe of the media sphere in Hungary.

Keywords: radical right, media, network analysis, interaction, Hungary.

1 The study is supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund under Grant Agreement No. 112323. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Anna Antal and Attila Farkas in collecting and coding the data of the study. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions to improve the article.
**Introduction**

One of the toughest challenges for contemporary social science is to comprehend the characteristics of radical right politics in Europe. Monographs and articles address the question why right wing radicalism enjoys increasing electoral success at the national and local levels throughout the continent (Carter 2005; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007; Mammone et al. 2012), its effects on the party system (Mudde 2014) and public policies (Minkenberg 2001).

The majority of the literature concentrates on the causes by seeking demand or supply-centred explanations of the radical right’s popularity (Rydgren 2007). Cross-country comparisons have highlighted the complexity and context of the growth of right wing radicalism. The advance and the performance of new movements and parties have been interpreted in multiple ways, but an important segment remained unconsidered so far: the position of the radical right media products in the media sphere. In this article, we provide an innovative social network analysis to map and measure the relationship between radical right and non-radical right media outlets by exploring their interaction patterns. Our results show that the radical right media products have not been integrated into the mainstream media sphere in Hungary. It is also demonstrated that right wing radicalism has not formulated a single or unified group of media outlets.

The first section of the article addresses the importance and the complex phenomenon of media visibility concerning right wing radicalism. The second section introduces the methodological terms of the analysis and explains the metrics of the examination. Then, we present and finally interpret our findings.

**The radical right and the media**

Previous analyses have already highlighted the pivotal role of the mass communication channels in the rise of the right wing radicalism during the past couple of decades. Koopmans and Olzak (2004) introduced the concept of ‘discursive opportunity structure’ into the literature on radical right politics. They argue that the political atmosphere is heavily influenced by the dominant public discourses. If the dominant discourses are favourable for the radical right politics, extremist parties have a very high chance to blossom and obtain political support from the electorates. The meaning of ‘favourable’ varies in the different forms and at the different levels of political communication, but it is safe to say that the mass media as the main carrier of public discourse have made impact on the emergence of right wing radicalism (see: Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Walgrave and De Swert 2004; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Ellinas 2010). The key question is in what ways media contribute to the current political situation in which radical right parties and movements have become non-negligible political actors in many European countries, including Hungary as well. Koopmans’s work, published before the boom in social media, emphasises gatekeeping power; it is the press and the broadcasters who select the issues to be discussed and dominate the interpretations of the stories (Koopmans 2004). Nowadays it is dubious how strongly the traditional mass communication channels are
able to control the public agenda, the questions of visibility and access to mass media however, remain relevant factors. In other words: today’s mediatization of politics does not mean the dominance of old media, radical right parties and movements should simultaneously consider the mind set of different types of media outlets in managing their political activities (Krotz 2009: 26).

Radicalisation of media discourses

There is also a wide consensus over the statement that the media partially responsible for the radicalisation of the public discourse by covering the preferred topics of the radical right intensively. Scholars suggest that there is a clear-cut correlation between the salience and framing of certain issues in the news media and the electoral fortune of the radical parties. Birenbaum and Villa (2003) assess the success of the Front National in France as a result of the emerging media attention to the topics that were introduced and forced by Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Stewart and her colleagues (2003) observe that due to financial reasons media tend to cover shocking stories (also in politics) and the radical right parties are more than happy to feed the news media with provocative actions and slogans. Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007) also discuss the interrelationship between the prominence of the news dealing with immigrants and the dynamics of the public support of the radical right parties in the Netherlands. Their findings are straightforward: the more news on immigration was covered by the press in a certain period of time, the more individual intention for voting for the radical right was detected in the same period (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007). The radical right parties have often attracted media attention merely because they are the ‘new kids on the block’ with often extravagant and charismatic leaders such as Pim Fortuyn and Jörg Haider (Rydgren and Holsteyn, 2004; Eatwell, 2005; Bos et al., 2010).

Research studies on the Hungarian public discourse highly resonate with the international literature. In studying the euroscepticism in the European Parliament Elections of 2009 in Hungary, Heller Mária notices that the lines between the discourses of moderate right and radical right politics have been blurring. As the boundaries become more and more porous, the languages of right wing radicalism become more and more accepted in Hungary (Heller, 2010: 15). The thesis of radicalisation is supported by numerous content analyses, especially when Roma people and issues of the Roma communities are covered by the mainstream media in Hungary. The increasing media attention towards the Roma people within the context of criminalisation and problematisation has been detected and connected to the growing popularity of radicalism in Hungary since 2006 and onwards (see: Gimes et

---

2 On 17 October 2006 in a small village of Eastern Hungary (Olaszliszka) a middle aged teacher was beaten to death by an angry mob after he accidentally hit a girl with his car. The attackers were members of the Roma community. The incident provoked emotional responses and a significant part of the discourse continued to rely on stereotyped representations of the event and the Roma people. There is a wide consensus on the statement that the public discourses of the attack in Olaszliszka was the early sign of the radicalisation of the public sphere in Hungary (see: Vidra and Fox 2014).
al., 2009; Bernát et al., 2013; Vidra and Fox 2014; Munk, 2013). Moreover, labelling the Roma and Jewish communities as foes of Hungarians has been studied to be the integral part of the discursive repertoire of radical right media (Glózer 2013, 2014).

Based on the concept of issue-ownership (see Petrocik, 1996), Karácsony and Róna (2010) compellingly demonstrate that the Hungarian media consciously or unconsciously but clearly supported the Jobbik by giving high visibility to the issues that were broadly associated with the party in the campaign period of the European Parliamentary Election of 2009. 2009 was the year of the electoral breakthrough of Jobbik in Hungary, when it gained 427,773 votes (14.7%) and delegated three MEPs to the European Parliament. Jobbik party achieved further support in the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2010 gaining 855,436 votes (16.6%). Jobbik has cemented its status as by far the largest radical right group in Central and Eastern Europe by winning 20.54 percent of the votes in the 2014 parliamentary election.

The evident lack of journalistic consensus on reporting on Jobbik party and leading figures of the radical right scene suggests that there are multiple ways to respond to radicalism in Hungary. It is demonstrated that most of the journalists employ a strategy of exclusion against the radical right parties and politicians. In spite of the norm of objectivity and balanced coverage, the majority of journalists prefer to provide as little media visibility for Jobbik as possible. Paradoxically, the quarantine of Jobbik does not go hand in hand with neglecting the topics and frames that are heavily advocated by the radical right party (crime, corruption, criminalisation of Roma population etc.). Here is the confusing message: the issues and the narratives of right wing radicalism have appeared in the media discourse, but the party and the representatives have been treated as ‘persona non grata’ of the Hungarian media space (Bernáth 2014).

The media behaviour towards the radical right actors

The media behaviour towards the radical right movements and parties is explicitly criticised by Judit Barta (2008). The Hungarian left leaning media outlets tend to ‘overdramatise’ the influence of the extremism on the Hungarian political landscape, other ones rather ‘bagatelize’ it, while others from the moderate right scene ‘accept and apply’ the language kits and the vocabulary of the right wing radicals to some extent. The study sketches the argument for media empowerment: Barta assesses the reaction of Hungarian journalists as ‘inadequate’ and ‘unprofessional’ which empowers the extremist parties and movements (Barta 2008).

The argument for the empowerment has been echoed and refined by Antonis Ellinas (2010). The author claims that the editorial boards and the journalists play an important role in determining how much prominence the radical right parties or their representatives are given by a certain media outlet. If the mainstream media, which are defined as the most popular television channels and written press with the highest circulation rates, are willing to deal with radical parties and present their viewpoints on certain political issues, it has a positive influence on the electoral performance of those radical right parties. Succinctly, the more media attention is paid to the radical right, the more votes they gain in national and sub-national elections. The case of Austria
has convincingly demonstrated that the Neue Kronen Zeitung, the biggest tabloid paper in the country, heavily supported the FPÖ by giving them publicity and framing the political issues in ways that were favourable for the radical party during the 1990s. This supportive behaviour contributed to the great success of the FPÖ both at the local and state-levels in the elections of 1999 (Ellinas 2010: 41-75). At the opposite side of the argument, the German case reveals the way how representatives of the mainstream media firmly and strictly isolate the right wing radicalism by giving them zero visibility. According to Ellinas, the quarantine might be one of the reasons of the low electoral support that neo-nazi and radical right parties enjoy in the Federal elections in Germany (Ellinas 2010: 76-124).

The French case also shows that emerging media visibility correlates with an increase in popularity. As soon as Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of Front National, was granted regular exposure by the public broadcaster in 1984 after the long-term media boycott of his party, FN won 11% of the total votes in the European Parliament election and ten seats in the EP (Ellinas 2010: 167-198, see also Shields 2007: 196-197). Last but not least, the case of Greece is an example of the sudden rise of radical right parties. In his later article, Ellinas discusses the emergence of Golden Dawn in relation with the attitudes of mainstream media towards the party (Ellinas 2013). It is examined that most of the media outlets have kept ‘critical distance’ from the party and have covered the Golden Dawn by using hostile tones. Surprisingly, the negative publicity of the party has been rewarded by the electorate: Golden Dawn received six times more votes in the parliamentary election of 2012 (6.97% of the overall vote) than in the one of 2009 (0.29 % of the overall vote).

The extended research of Antonis Ellinas suggests that the relationship between the media products and right wing radicalism does make a real difference. First and foremost, the visibility matters regardless of the tones and the frames of the coverage. If the media deal with the representatives of the radical right, they are able to exploit even any negative publicity to connect with the voters and offer them a viable political alternative which is more and more popular in many European countries. In addition, right wing radicalism is keen to establish its own media universe with a powerful mix of social media, traditional formats of written press and radio stations to balance the hostile mainstream media environment, which looks to be continuous in the case of the established radical parties too (see Skenderovic 2009; Udris 2012).

The same is obviously true for Hungary as well: the changes in the public sphere have been beneficial for the radical right and the actors of the radical right have successfully navigated themselves into the new media/discourse opportunity structure (see Jeskó et al., 2012). The mainstream position of the Jobbik party in Hungarian politics is not a forecast or a prophecy any more, it is a political fact. Jobbik seems to be well aware that contemporary politics is heavily influenced by the media. Little information is available about the media management strategy of the party, it is however known that the leaders of Jobbik regularly initiate legal cases against television broadcasting companies to demand more visibility for the party and

---

3 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria).
balanced coverage in news programmes.4 Jobbik seeks the attention of the mainstream media. The radical right is however very active in the online spaces: social media platforms, blogs (‘Bombagvár’), online news portals (alfahir.hu; hunhir.hu), web-based radio station (‘Szent Korona Rádió’) and video channel (‘N1TV’) have been operating. ‘Kuruc.info’, a semi-illegal online news portal, is the iconic platform of right wing radicalism with approximately 60000 individual page visitors per day5 and is owned by a Hungarian-born American citizen.6 The political weekly ‘Barikád’ is directly connected with the party; its editor-in-chief is known to be an advisor of the Jobbik president Gábor Vona.7 Right wing radicalism is present in the market of free-sheets as well: 2 million copies of ‘Hazai Pálya’ are claimed to be distributed bimonthly.

This observation immediately raises the question about the location of the radical right media outlets in relation to the mainstream media.

Inspired by Ellinas’s conclusion, this study addresses the issue of media visibility of right wing radicalism in Hungary. Visibility has been mostly conceptualised by focusing on textual aspects; quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the media coverage of radical parties or hot issues is a fruitful way of analysing radicalisation (see Vliegenthart et al. 2012). Visibility however can be approached as chains of interactions between the key actors of the mainstream and radical media, which is rather a neglected aspect in researching right wing radicalism.

Why do interactions matter?

Interactions are important indicators of connections. The characteristics of connections between the media products perfectly outline the structure of the media sphere. If the mainstream media outlets connect strongly with radical platforms and vice versa, the media sphere can be evaluated as an integrated space. One might say that this condition indicates the mainstreaming of the extreme which legitimises the position of radicalism. Zero connections indicate that the mainstream media isolate right wing radicalism by refusing any interactions, neither positive nor negative references as is demonstrated in the case of Germany by Ellinas. If the representatives of the right wing radical media are integrated into the mainstream public sphere, it suggests that they are legitimate and important participants in the public discussion. Or on the contrary, if the mainstream does not connect with radical right media outlets, it means that they are excluded from the circle of the speakers whose voices matter in debating public affairs. In our mind, the interaction ties signal the moments of inclusion or exclusion as far as the media sphere is concerned. A negative context of publicity therefore does not necessarily create an isolation of the radical right. The case of the Greek Golden Dawn party shows that hostile interactions between

---

4 Több Jobbikot a tévébe!, mertek.lvg.hu, May 4 2014.
5 Data available at webaudit.hu for December 2014.
6 Bemutatjuk a kuruc.info tulajdonosát, atlatso.hu, September 4 2012.
7 Pörzse Sándor távozik a parlamentből - bemutatták a Jobbik listáját, atv.hu, February 5 2014.
journalists and party leaders are rewarded by certain segments of the electorate (Ellinas 2013: 550).

Interactions provide new insights for the branch of literature, which concerns itself with the discourses of radicalism (Wodak et al. 2013) as well. The interaction ties or the lack of them between media products indicate which agents of communication are able to influence the direction of public discourses. It is plausible to assume that the more radical right media are integrated into the flow of the mass communication, the higher their chance of producing effects in public discussions. And also the other way around: it is likely that little or no interaction ties create an unfavourable climate for right-wing radicalism to have an impact on political debates.

Therefore, we claim that interactions do matter in understanding the relationship between right-wing radicalism and media. In the present study, we investigate the interaction ties between the media products in order to shed some light on the location of right-wing radical media outlets in the media sphere in Hungary. To evaluate whether the radical right media have entered the mainstream or not, we provide issue-centred empirical examinations of two of the most controversial political issues of the year 2014 in Hungarian politics. As for the method, we run network analysis (for the application in political science, see: Waugh et al. 2009; Conover et al. 2011). We test five ideal types of the network to assess which one is valid for describing the general structure of the media sphere and analyse the location of the radical right media products within the media networks in Hungary.

**Research question and method**

**Research question**

The examination is driven by the main research question:

*What is the location of the radical right products in the interaction network of Hungarian media outlets?*

To answer the question, we study both the general connection structure of the media network and the ego network of the radical right media outlets. The ego network provides information on the neighbourhood of the radical right media products. However, we need to comprehend the general structure of the whole network to assess the embeddedness of the radical right media.

Five ideal typical network structures are defined to measure the general structure of the whole network. The ideal types model the distribution of ties between nodes of the network. The number of ties is presumed to be a basic characteristic of the network. Our aim is to discover how the ties have been distributed among the nodes and whether the distribution follows any specific patterns or not. The ideal typical structures were predefined by the metrics as follows: the maximum modularity
score of the edge-betweenness community detection algorithm\textsuperscript{8}, fitness score of the core-periphery model\textsuperscript{9}, global clustering coefficient\textsuperscript{10} and the average shortest path\textsuperscript{11}.

We propose making distinctions between cohesive and non-cohesive structures. The structure in cluster-free networks and in small-world networks (see: Watts–Strogatz, 1998) is cohesive because we can easily reach all nodes of the network by taking very few hops. Certain nodes of a small-world network tend to cluster together. The groups are however strongly connected with each other. In the case of the cluster-free type, as the name suggests, the nodes do not form tightly knit groups. Clusters are also lacking in the diffuse network. The diffuse network however differs from the cohesive networks (cluster-free networks and small-world networks) by requiring many

\textsuperscript{8} The idea of this algorithm is that it is likely that edges connecting separate modules have a high edge-betweenness score and if we remove this edge, we can get cohesive subgroups. It is a hierarchical method: first, all nodes are in separated groups and finally all nodes are in one group (Girvan and Newman 2002). The algorithm indicates the division, which has the highest modularity of the network. The modularity discovers the strength of the group division in the networks. “The modularity is, up to a multiplicative constant, the number of edges falling within groups minus the expected number in an equivalent network with edges placed at random” (Newman 2006). The higher scores (score ranges from -0.5 to 1) signal that there is a strong community structure. Based on Clauset et al. (2004) 0.3 score is often deemed as the benchmark value of the relevant community structure, but the modularity value is sensitive to the network’s size and the overall connectivity. Hence, in addition to accepting the 0.3 score as a kind of benchmark value, we also examined the deviation of the observed value from the mean value of 1000 random reshuffled versions of that network.

\textsuperscript{9} Borgatti and Everett (1999) have formalised the ideal structure of the core-periphery model and they worked out an algorithm for detecting core/periphery structure. It finds a partition of the observed network which best fits the idealised matrix. The fitness score shows how well the observed network fits the ideal core/periphery structure. The 0 value of the fitness indicates there is no core-periphery structure in the observed data and a value of 1 shows that our network perfectly fits the idealised network. In accordance with other studies we pre-defined the 0.5 score of fitness as a benchmark value (see also: Vercellone–Smith et al. 2012).

\textsuperscript{10} The global clustering coefficient is a measure of the clustering tendency of nodes based on triplets of nodes. A triplet consist of three nodes connecting by either two (open triplet) or three (closed triplet) ties. The clustering coefficient is the number of closed triplet over the total number of triplet (Opsahl and Panzarasa 2009). We used Opsahl and Panzarasa’s generalisation of the global clustering coefficient of a weighted network (Opsahl and Panzarasa 2009). The value of global clustering coefficient lies between 0 and 1. A lower value means most triplets are open, the network is low-clustered. A higher value means most triplets are closed, that is the network is highly clustered. However, the value is sensitive to the overall number of links and nodes which makes it difficult to define what ‘high’ and ‘low’ values mean exactly. Defining the benchmark value, we create 1000 random networks with the same properties (number of nodes, links, weights) as those of the observed network by reshuffling the links among nodes (Opsahl et al. 2008). The benchmark value is the mean value of the 1000 random networks, but an observed value is deemed significantly high or low if it deviates from the mean value of the 1000 random networks by at least 2 standard deviations.

\textsuperscript{11} The shortest path is the shortest distance between two nodes, and the average metric of that says something about the cohesiveness of the whole network. A low value indicates that there are no greater distances between nodes which mean the network is cohesive. In contrast, a high value shows that there are substantial distances between nodes which reveal the non-cohesiveness of the network. However, as in the case of global clustering coefficients, it is hard to define what counts as a ‘high’ or ‘low’ value as this metric is also sensitive to the overall number of links and nodes. We use Opsahl’s generalisation of the average shortest path to the weighted network which takes into account the weights of the links in the calculation of the shortest path between nodes (Opsahl et al. 2010). The benchmark value is defined in the same way as the clustering coefficient.
hops to reach all the nodes. The core-periphery type has a non-cohesive structure by having some densely connected nodes in the core position and the other one in the periphery. It assumes that the core nodes is maximally connected to each other, there are no connection among periphery nodes, and the connections from periphery to core are more frequent than the reverse. We can also observe non-cohesive structure in the polarised networks, in which there are clusters with dense in-group connections and sparse out-group ties.

The comprehensive summary of the ideal types can be found in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal typical community structures</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Conditions (benchmark values)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster-free network (CFN)</td>
<td>- cohesive network</td>
<td>Modularity</td>
<td>low (&lt;0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- there are no tight-knit groups in the network.</td>
<td>Clustering coefficient</td>
<td>not high (&lt; EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average short path</td>
<td>low (&lt; EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitness</td>
<td>not high (&lt;0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-world network (SWN)</td>
<td>- cohesive network</td>
<td>Modularity</td>
<td>low (&lt;0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of steps.</td>
<td>Clustering coefficient</td>
<td>high (&gt;EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- there are clusters in the network which are strongly connected with each other.</td>
<td>Average short path</td>
<td>low (&lt; EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitness</td>
<td>not high (&lt;0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core-periphery network (CPN)</td>
<td>- generalization of the maximally centralized graph (see Freeman 1979)</td>
<td>Modularity</td>
<td>low (&lt;0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- well-connected core</td>
<td>Clustering coefficient</td>
<td>higher in the core;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a periphery which sends links toward the core, but inverse is rarely, and nodes from the periphery do not connect to each other (see: Borgatti – Everett 1999).</td>
<td>Average short path</td>
<td>lower in the periphery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitness</td>
<td>Average or low high (&gt;0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarised network (PN)</td>
<td>- highly clustered subgroups with no or sparse connections between them.</td>
<td>Modularity</td>
<td>high (&gt;0.3 and &gt;EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Clustering coefficient</td>
<td>high (&gt;EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average short path</td>
<td>varied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitness</td>
<td>not high (&lt;0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse network (DN)</td>
<td>- there are no tight-knit groups in the network.</td>
<td>Modularity</td>
<td>low (&lt;0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- huge distances between the nodes.</td>
<td>Clustering coefficient</td>
<td>low (&lt;EV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average short path</td>
<td>high (&gt;EV+2SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitness</td>
<td>not high (&gt;0.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Ideal typical community structures of networks (features and measurements)*
Once we have identified the ideal typical structure of the networks, we have to define the main variations of the hypothesised location of the radical right media products within the networks. If our data show that the networks of the Hungarian media are cohesive, we can expect very little or no difference between the location of radical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrated position of RRM nodes</th>
<th>RRM nodes connect to RRM nodes</th>
<th>RRM nodes are connected by non-RRM nodes</th>
<th>RRM nodes connect to non-RRM nodes</th>
<th>Hypothetical occurrence of ideal types of network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clusters of RRM nodes with connections between almost any two nodes within the network.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Small world (cohesive network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No clusters of RRM nodes with connections between almost any two nodes within the network.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Cluster-free (cohesive network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters of RRM nodes with incoming connections from non-RRM nodes.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Small world (cohesive network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core position of RRM nodes.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Core-periphery (non-cohesive network)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Isolated position of RRM nodes</th>
<th>RRM nodes without connections of non-RRM nodes.</th>
<th>Clusters of RRM nodes without connections of non-RRM nodes.</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>Polarisated (non-cohesive network)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clusters of RRM nodes without connections of non-RRM nodes.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Polarisated (non-cohesive network)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No clusters of RRM nodes without connections between the nodes of the network.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Diffuse (non-cohesive network)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peripheral position of RRM nodes</th>
<th>RRM nodes without connections of non-RRM nodes.</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>Polarisated (non-cohesive network)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clusters of RRM nodes with outgoing connections from RRM nodes towards non-RRM nodes.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Small world (cohesive network)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The main variation of the hypothesised position of the radical right media outlets within the ideal types of network (RRM nodes=radical right media nodes, non-RRM nodes=non-radical right media nodes).
right media nodes and the place of non-radical right media nodes. This finding would indicate that the radical right media outlets are highly integrated into the mainstream media sphere and function as important actors of the public space in Hungary. Given the fact that the radical right Jobbik party is the third biggest formation in Hungarian politics, this is not an inconceivable scenario.

If we find evidence for the non-cohesive networks of the Hungarian media, we expect the radical right media nodes to be placed in the periphery of the network. This result would mean that the radical right remain on the fringe of the public sphere in Hungary. Alternatively, the radical right media nodes can form into a cluster that is characterised by dense in-group connections and few or zero out-group ties. In this constellation, we might conclude that the radical right media are the products of an alternative communication universe which has its own distinctive mechanisms to discuss politics. The main variations of the hypothesised location of radical right parties is summarised in the Table 2.

It must be emphasised that the above discussed formation of structures and the locations of radical right media nodes should be considered as hypothetical constellations. Our aim is to assess which one describes the interaction networks of the Hungarian media outlets in the best possible way or highlight a hybrid pattern, if data suggest that.

**Nodes and edges of the networks**

We provide an issue-centred network analysis that investigates the interaction ties between media outlets. In our study, two media networks have been compiled. First one is to describe the media network of Paks-issue and the second one is to describe the media network of Tamás Sneider-issue. Both are n*n directed, weighted networks. The media outlets are considered as the nodes of the networks. Edges are the connections between nodes which are defined here as interaction ties. This means that we examine the connection between media products via their interactions (references, citations, quotations and hyperlinks of other news items).

**Issue selections**

Two controversial issues of the Hungarian politics have been examined; the Paks-issue and the Tamás Sneider-issue. The Paks-issue is organised around an agreement that was signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. According to the deal, the Russian state-owned nuclear firm Rosatom is to build additional units to extend Hungary’s nuclear power plant. Russia would provide loans for financing the two units.

The parliamentary opposition parties and the NGOs which have been advocating anti-corruption policies urged the government to withdraw the signature by claiming that the process lacked the requirement of transparency and open
consultation. The issue has been quickly politicised; thousands protested in the streets of Budapest against the agreement and anti-government organisation made huge efforts to mobilise electoral supports around the issue. It is safe to say that Paks-issue was one of the most important topics for the left-leaning and liberal political forces in attacking the right wing government which was led by PM Viktor Orbán. From that point of view, the Paks-issue can be considered as a *typical case* of the Hungarian politics. In the Tamás Sneider-issue, the protagonist of the story was an MP of Jobbik party, Tamás Sneider, who was nominated as one of the five deputies of the President of the Hungarian Parliament on the 24th of April 2014. As soon as his nomination has been publicised, Tamás Sneider’s controversial past (he was known as a leading figure in violent skinhead groups in the 1990s, and he is a convicted felon as well) has received increasing media attention. This issue was an excellent opportunity for radical right media to make them attractive for the mainstream media by providing exclusive information on Tamás Sneider or introducing new arguments, frames and narratives of the topic. The Tamás Sneider-issue, therefore should produce evidence that could compellingly demonstrate whether the radical right media have moved closer to the mainstream public sphere or remains on the fringes. This is the reason we consider that the Tamás Sneider-issue is a *crucial case* for locating the radical right media in the Hungarian media sphere (see Gerring 2007).

**Data collection**

The systematic data collection of the study required a complex procedure with several steps and careful observation of the material. The entire coding process was done by the authors of the article and two other competent raters, then the results were compared. When discrepancy was detected the research team discussed the issue and took a stance on it. The intercoder reliability was estimated by using Krippendorff’s $\alpha$ which resulted in 0.70 (see: Krippendorff, 2004). First, we made an ex-ante calculation of the products of mainstream media: these are the most read, most watched and most listened daily newspapers (including tabloids), online news portals, television and radio broadcasts that contain editorial work covering politics. We compiled a list of 36 media products to start the data collection.\(^{12}\) In addition, we pre-defined the list of radical right media outlets to include them in our analysis.\(^{13}\) All in all, 43 media products were involved in the data collection.

Second, we scrutinised all of them by searching the keywords for the Paks-issue as follows: ‘Paks’, ‘atomerőmű’ (nuclear plant), ‘Rosatom’ (name of the Russian state company which was contracted) and keywords for the Tamás Sneider-issue as follows:

\(^{12}\) List of the starting points of data collection concerning the mainstream media: ATV, mno.hu, origo.hu, vs.hu, rol.hu, index.hu, hvg.hu, borsonline, M1, Hir TV, Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság, Magyar Hírlap, Világgazdaság, Népszava, RTL Klub, Kossuth Rádió, TV2, 444.hu, Mandiner, nap.hu, cink.hu, nepszava.hu, magyarhirlap.hu, Hír 24, Blikk online, info.radio, portfolio.hu, Blikk, HVG, Magyar Narancs, Figyelő, Magyar Demokrata, 168 óra, Heti Válasz, Metropol.

\(^{13}\) List of the starting points of data collection concerning the radical right media: kuruc.info, alfahir.hu, N1 TV, Barrikád, Deres TV, Szentkorona Rádió, Hunhir.hu.
‘Sneider Tamás’, ‘skinhead’, ‘szkinhed’. The time-frame of the data collection of the Paks-issue was the seven day period between 14th of January 2014 and 21st of January 2014. The time-frame of the data collection of the Tamás Sneider-issue covered the days between 24th of April 2014 and 15th of May 2014. All the news items which cover the Paks-issue or the Tamás Sneider-issue have been included into our database. Third, every quotation, reference, citation or hyperlink of other media products has been coded as an out-going interaction tie (excluding self-references), if they signified published news items of the time period between the starting and closing day of data collection. Following the rule of the saturation, we were continuously expanding the data collection with the media outlets that had been referred by other ones. In the last stage of the data collection, our database contained 59 elements of the Paks-issue and 49 elements of the Tamás Sneider-issue which had been referred by other ones. We found 12 nodes in the Paks-issue and 16 nodes in the Tamás Sneider-issue that had no ties. These were labelled as isolated nodes and were removed from the network analysis.

As a software support for calculation, we applied the igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006) and the tnet (Opsahl 2009) packages for R as well as the Ucinet 6 software (Borgatti et al. 2002). To visualise the findings, NetDraw has been employed.

Results

In this section of the article, we present and discuss our findings concerning the two issues that we analysed. Let us commence with the typical case of our study which is the Paks-issue.

Typical case: Paks-issue

Here, the interaction ties signal a network in which web-based, non web-based and mixed media products connect strongly to each other. It means that both online and offline media channels are important components of the contemporary media sphere in Hungary. Interestingly, there are no tabloid dailies in the Paks-network, and out of the largest commercial television channels only RTL appeared in our analysis. Apart from only one example (Szegedma.hu), the local media outlets are also missing. The lack of in-coming and out-going ties suggests that the tabloid daily papers, commercial broadcasters and local journals might have covered the issue, but their coverage remained unreported by other media outlets. And vice versa, they also did not initiate any interactions with other media products. For a visual illustration of the Paks-network, please see Figure 1.
The structure of Paks-network is in accordance with the core-periphery network type. The low level of the maximum modularity score of the edge-betweenness community detection algorithm (0.075<0.3) indicates that there are no strong clustering activities between the nodes. The distance between the nodes is quite large as is demonstrated by the mean shortest distance metric which happens to be greater (but not significantly) than would be expected randomly (4.079>3.7). The fitness score of the network provides more support for the applicability of the core-periphery network type. The algorithm has made a distinction between groups of nodes with dense interaction ties (core) and groups of nodes with sparse connections with each other (periphery). The round value of the fitness score is 0.5 (the exact figure is 0.458) which is exactly the same figure that we pre-defined as the threshold value for signalling a core-periphery type of structure in our findings. More precisely, it is observed that the nodes with dense interaction receive more in-coming ties from the nodes that have sparse connections. The latter rather initiate out-going ties towards the core nodes than receiving in-coming ones from the core. This is a text-book indicator of the core-periphery network structure which seems to be valid for the Paks-issue. Therefore, we can say that the Paks-network fits quite well into the ideal core-periphery structure as it was elaborated by Borgatti and Everett (1999).

Following the intuitive idea of Borgatti and Everett’s block modelling (1999: 376), one class for core nodes and another one for peripheral nodes were created. In the matrix of Table 3 items in the upper left corner are the core nodes and items in the right-bottom corner are the nodes of the periphery. The core contains only nine nodes, but the density among them is quite high (0.861). The connections among the periphery nodes are sparse and there are slightly more links from periphery to core than the reverse. All the radical right media items are located in the periphery.
Table 3: Blockmodelling the core-periphery structure of the Paks-network.

Table 4 provides a comprehensive summary of the metrics and values concerning the media network of the Paks-issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Modularity (edge betweenness)</th>
<th>Clustering coeff.</th>
<th>Mean shortest distance</th>
<th>Fitness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paks-network</td>
<td>0.07508162</td>
<td>0.3635606</td>
<td>4.079266</td>
<td>0.458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random networks</td>
<td>M= 0.03758791</td>
<td>M= 0.3363052</td>
<td>M= 3.703475</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean, Standard</td>
<td>SD= 0.02137029</td>
<td>SD= 0.02904479</td>
<td>SD= 0.48031</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviation (in SD)</td>
<td>1.754478</td>
<td>0.9383932</td>
<td>0.7823923</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of metrics and values in the media network of ‘Paks’-issue.

After identifying the structure of the Paks-network as a core-periphery type, our second task is to assess the place of right wing radical media outlets within the network. Do we find them in the periphery or in the core? Data suggest that right wing radical nodes are located in the periphery of the media network of the Paks-issue. If we take a look at the visual image of the ego network of the radical right nodes, we will immediately see that they are represented as either peripheral or isolated nodes (see Figure 2).
The peripheral radical nodes prefer connecting with non-radical right nodes. Table 5 shows which nodes are the most cited in the network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media products in the core of the Paks-network</th>
<th>In-degree centrality (alpha=0.5)$^{14}$</th>
<th>Number of in-coming ties of core nodes from radical right media products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kossuth Rádió (public service radio broadcaster)</td>
<td>26.314147</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hir TV (private broadcaster, right wing)</td>
<td>22.449944</td>
<td>1 (alfahir.hu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Népszabadság (left leaning daily newspaper)</td>
<td>12.247449</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nol.hu (online edition of the Népszabadság, left leaning daily newspaper)</td>
<td>9.899495</td>
<td>1 (HunHir.hu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index.hu (independent online news portal)</td>
<td>9.165151</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTV 1 (public service television broadcaster)</td>
<td>6.000000</td>
<td>2 (kuruc.info, HunHir.hu)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{14}$ In-degree centrality after removing the radical right media.

The non-radical right media nodes however, do not send any interaction ties towards the radical right. Interestingly, the radical right nodes keep a distance from
each other: no connection is found between them. Notwithstanding the fact that there are growing numbers of products which can be associated with the extreme right in the Hungarian media market, they do not create a tight knit group of ideologically oriented mass communication channels.

The typical case of our analysis, the Paks-issue provided empirical evidence that the structure of the Hungarian media sphere is somewhat similar to the structure as it is known in the core-periphery type of network from the view point of radical right media. Right wing radical media products appeared as isolated and peripheral nodes in the media network. This means that they can be considered as excluded and non-contacted elements of the public sphere.

**Crucial case: Tamás Sneider-issue**

Similar to the Paks-issue, the interaction ties show a network in which web-based, non web-based and mixed media products connect to each other in the case of the Tamás Sneider-issue as well. Only one tabloid paper has been reached and integrated into the network (Blikk) as a node which has one single out-going tie. Compared with the Paks-network, the ties of the Tamás Sneider-network are rather sparse (see Figure 3).

![Figure 3: Network of the Tamás Sneider-issue (isolates are removed; sizes=in-degree centrality; red=radical right media).](image)

Talking about the metrics, the clustering willingness of the nodes of the Tamás Sneider-network is also measured by the clustering coefficient which indicates no significant group constructing activates. The value of the mean shortest distance shows no significant difference from the expected value, but is smaller, unlike in the case of the Paks-network, where the observed mean shortest distance is higher than is randomly expected. The structure is therefore more cohesive than that observed in the Paks-network. The value of fitness (0.416) in the Tamás Sneider-network is close
to the score of the Paks-network, which signals that our second branch of findings might be evaluated as a core-periphery structure.

To examine whether the core-periphery structure is valid for the Tamás Sneidier-network we run the core-periphery block model. The model highlights the directions of connections from core to periphery and backwards and the density values of the interactions between and within blocks. It tells us that the core creates a sub-graph with less dense interactions than in the case of the Paks-network (density=0.431). In addition, the peripheral nodes tend to connect with the core as is generally observed in the core-periphery structure. Remarkably, the block modelling analysis suggests that there are two radical right media nodes in the core of the network (kuruc.info and alfahir.hu). This is the case because these two nodes have out-going ties towards the other elements of the core and there are mutually initiated ties between the kuruc.info and the alfahir.hu. It is tempting to assess that the representatives of the radical right media possess a core position in the Tamás Sneidier-network. The lack of in-coming interaction ties of the kuruc.info and alfahir.hu from the core however, signals the need of careful interpretation concerning the location of the radical right media outlets.

Our doubts regarding the core position of the radical right nodes has been confirmed by the re-run of the block modelling. Once we removed the out-going ties of the kuruc.info and the alfahir.hu, the model immediately placed them out from the core. Moreover, the value of the fitness score is now a lot lower than our previously defined threshold values (0.333 <0.5) which indicates that there is no core-periphery structure in the Tamás Sneider-network.

In spite of the fact that one of our criteria is not perfectly realised, as the mean shortest path is not smaller by two standard deviations from the random expected value, we suggest describing the Tamás Sneider-network as a kind of cluster-free network, because it has a more cohesive structure than the ‘Paks’-network and lacks any tight-knit groups.

To summarise our findings in the Tamás Sneider-network, please see Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Modularity (edge betweenness)</th>
<th>Clustering coeff.</th>
<th>Mean shortest distance</th>
<th>Fitness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tamás Sneider-network</td>
<td>0.1043721</td>
<td>0.2793244</td>
<td>1.421875</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean, Standard</td>
<td>M= 0.09567168;</td>
<td>M=0.23515;</td>
<td>M=2.456609;</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviation (in SD)</td>
<td>SD=0.093036954;</td>
<td>SD=0.04241483;</td>
<td>SD=0.7609375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.2846116</td>
<td>1.046202</td>
<td>-1.359779</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Summary of metrics and values in the media network of Tamás Sneider-issue.

Now, our task is to locate the radical right media nodes within this cluster-free network. We provide the visualisation of the ego network of the radical right media products in the Tamás Sneider-issue (see Figure 4).
The ego network is conclusive regarding the location of the radical right nodes: fringe and isolated positions can be detected in the Tamás Sneider-issue. We however must observe that there are dense ties and triangle shape of interaction flow between three online radical products: kuruc.info, alfahir.hu and N1TV.hu. Perhaps it is more than just pure speculation if we say that this triad contains the key actors of the media force of right wing radicalism in Hungary.

Those which are on the fringes prefer connecting to non-radical nodes as well. Moreover, most of the out-going ties of the radical right nodes go towards the prominent nodes of the Tamás Sneider-network as is illustrated by Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most prominent media products of the Tamás Sneider-network</th>
<th>In-degree centrality (alpha=0.5)</th>
<th>Number of in-coming ties of most prominent nodes from radical right media products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euronews</td>
<td>9.486833</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTV 1</td>
<td>7.483315</td>
<td>2 (alfahir.hu) 1 (kuruc.info)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mno.hu (online edition of Magyar Nemzet, right wing daily newspaper)</td>
<td>6.324555</td>
<td>1 (Barikád) 1 (alfahir.hu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index.hu (independent online news portal)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 (kuruc.info)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATV (private broadcaster, left leaning)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 (kuruc.info) 1 (alfahir.hu) 1 (HunHir.hu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hir TV (private broadcaster, left leaning, right wing)</td>
<td>2.449490</td>
<td>1 (kuruc.info) 1 (alfahir.hu)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: In-degree centrality scores of the most prominent nodes and the number of in-coming ties of the most prominent nodes from radical right media products in the Tamás Sneider-network.

15 In-degree centrality after removing the radical right-wing media.
Conclusion

We set out to provide empirical evidence for the importance of location of radical right media products in the network structure of the media when explaining the rise and the performance of right wing radicalism in Hungary. We argue that interaction is key to comprehend the relationship between radical right media and other media products. In our concept, dense and strong interaction ties would indicate that right wing radical press products have entered into the mainstream media sphere by being integrated, and are hence important and legitimate actors in public discussions. Surprisingly, our findings confirm neither the ‘mainstreaming the extreme’ nor the ‘alternative media universe’ theses concerning the location of the radical right media. Relying on the data of the network analyses of two issues in Hungarian politics in 2014, it is safe to say that the radical right products possess neither the core nor the prominent place in the Hungarian media sphere. In our typical case, the radical right media outlets are located in isolated and peripheral positions of a core-periphery type of media network. Only three products connect to the mainstream media: kuruc.info, hunhir.hu and alfahir.hu. Radical right media outlets receive no incoming ties at all, which supports the claim of the quarantine of radical right actors as was highlighted by previous studies.

The Tamás Sneider-issue, the crucial case of our study, has been expected to give chance for the radical right media to make they more important and worthwhile to be quoted, cited, referred and hyperlinked which might create a constellation of mainstreaming the extreme in the public sphere in Hungary. The cluster-free cohesive media network of the crucial case shows fewer isolated radical right nodes (Barikád and hunhir.hu) than the typical case does. This indicates that the interactions of the radical right have been dynamised by the Tamás Sneider-issue. Unlike the typical case, here we identify a triangle formation of connection between three radical right media nodes (N1TV, kuruc.info and alfahir.hu). The components of the triangle however, do not create an exclusive cluster of interactions: kuruc.info and alfahir.hu initiate out-going ties towards the non-radical right nodes as well. Our findings suggest that some actors of the radical right media scene aim to enter into the mainstream. The mainstream media, however, do not respond compliantly to that ambition. Again, quarantine works.

Despite all the differences, the radical right remains on the fringes in both networks. Radical right media outlets may connect to each other closely in issues important to them, but the interactions do not construct an ideologically homogeneous cluster. In other words, there is no sign of a well-identifiable tight-knit radical right media sub-network in the Hungarian media sphere. From the radical right media’s point of view, there were no relevant differences between the typical and the crucial cases of our analysis. Regardless of the dissimilar structure of the two observed networks, the places of the radical right are very much alike.

Of course, the research has its limitations. The probability of other potential constellations can never be excluded: we might reach different findings in the case of a media network which is organised around an issue that is initiated by the Jobbik party. In addition, our study does not reflect on the context of the interactions. Further qualitative analysis is much needed to discover whether media outlets quote, refer or
cite each other in positive or negative ways. More empirical knowledge is needed to explore to what extent media interactions contribute to identity construction in right wing radicalism.

However, we believe that our results are sufficient to conclude that the mainstream media separate the right wing radical products and restrict their influence on public debates. This observation does not contradict previous studies on the radicalisation of media discourses in Hungary, on the contrary, it resonates with the investigation of Gábor Bernáth (2014): the media, or at least a part of the mass communication channels may accept the vocabulary and the narratives of the radical right, but the representatives of radicalism are treated as pariahs. Perhaps this phenomenon contributes to the evolution of Jobbik’s strategy which makes tremendous efforts on establishing face-to-face and direct interactions with citizens.

References


The paper focuses on the coverage of the extreme right leader Marian Kotleba in the media during the 2013 regional elections in Slovakia. It examines how the media shaped the discourse regarding Kotleba in a six-week period, covering the time before and after the elections. Applying the frame analysis, it identifies ten issue-specific frames that problematize Kotleba in relation to either his general political actions or the regional elections and analyses 359 articles, leading to 1095 claims made by various sources. The findings show that the extreme right politician was mainly framed in terms of extremist threat and the failure of authorities. However, although the prevalent framing in the media may be perceived as negative, the media attention for the leader radically increased after the elections' first round, making Kotleba highly salient in the public debate, while the counter-frames appealing to legitimate side of politician’s candidacy can be observed. The paper contributes to the literature on the media representation of the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe.

Keywords: extreme right, media, discourse, frame analysis, xenophobia.
Introduction

During the last three decades several extreme right parties have risen and established themselves electorally throughout Europe (Betz, 1994; Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Because of their negative and hostile attitudes towards immigrants, national or ethnic minorities, packed in ethnocentric and xenophobic stances (Betz and Johnson, 2004) and their anti-establishment and anti-elite positions (Rydgren, 2007), scholars have devoted a great deal of research to this group of parties and movements. Various explanations have been put forward for their successes in different countries, focusing mainly on structural and socio-economic factors (e.g. Jackman and Volpert, 1996) and at the level of individual voters (e.g. Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003) in Western Europe. Having neglected the contextual factors, the mass media have in recent years been identified as a variable that affects fortunes of extreme right parties (e.g. Walgrave and De Swert, 2004; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; Ellinas, 2010; Akkerman, 2011).

To explain the public attitudes and beliefs towards the extreme right, and extreme right leaders in particular, media coverage and the exposure to information in news are argued to matter (Boomgaard and Vliegenthart, 2007; Bos and van der Brug, 2010; Bos et al., 2011). The extreme right leaders depend on the media for their public image as they cannot entirely rely on reputation and therefore need the media to provide them with a stage to share their agenda and ideas in order to attract wider electoral support. This is the key especially for small parties such as the People’s Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS), which lacks most forms of mobilization due to the largely non-existent party organization. By focusing on particular issues and by providing public space for extreme right parties, the media intentionally or unintentionally provide an environment, in which electoral support for these parties increases (Boomgaard and Vliegenthart, 2007).

The media can help the parties of the extreme right in three different ways: by granting them exposure, by highlighting the issues they emphasize (such as immigration in Western Europe and Roma issues in Central and Eastern Europe) or by framing the parties or their issues in a favourable way. The extreme right can build upon the tendencies of the media to personalize issues within the media and to focus on the scandalous aspects of politics that contribute to anti-establishment (Mudde, 2004) and anti-minorities sentiments. These sentiments both benefit parties like the extreme right that give a (charismatic) party leader a pronounced central role (Eatwell, 2006) and engage in anti-elitist and xenophobic discourse (Kluknavská, 2014). The leader of the ĽSNS Marian Kotleba has attracted the media despite (or thanks to) his radical nature, at first by organising marches through Slovak towns that were seen as neo-Nazi or extremist, and then by pointing to misbehaviour of the government and Roma minority (Kluknavská, 2013). He was also able to build upon the negative public attitudes towards Roma (Kluknavská, 2014) and the inclination of the media to either negatively or stereotypically depict Roma in the country (Dráľ, 2009; Kroon et al. 2014). Although the literature to some extent deals with the media attention for the extreme right and the way how Roma are covered in the media, we know less about the way how the extreme right is framed by the media. Aspiring to succeed electorally,
the framing is especially important since the extreme right leaders need voters to perceive them to be effective and legitimate (Bos et al., 2011).

Given that the research on the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe is inconsistent and the knowledge about the media coverage on the extreme right in this region is rather scarce, this work is designed to fill this gap. Through the exploratory case study of the 2013 regional elections in Slovakia (the elections to the Bodies of regional governments), the paper analyses how the media shaped the discourse and framed the extreme right leader Marian Kotleba. It does not aim to explain differences in the coverage of particular media outlets, but to explore the overall media discourse in relation to the extreme right politician who transformed from marginalized politician to the governor of the region in a matter of weeks. The paper focuses on the coverage of Kotleba in the media during a six-week period, covering the time both before and after the elections. We expected the media coverage to be of negative tone, with a prevalent frame putting an emphasis on the extremist nature of Kotleba’s candidacy. With the discursive examination of the short period spanning the elections, we are able to look at the deeper media narrative concerning this extreme right actor. The paper aims to contribute to the literature on the representation of extreme right actors in the media in Central and Eastern Europe.

The paper is structured into six parts. After the introduction it sets the scene of the case study, outlining the electoral gains of the party, its media presentation and the context surrounding the regional elections. The paper then proceeds with drawing the connection between the extreme right and the media, where it looks at the theoretical assumptions about the role the media play in electoral successes of the extreme right. Then it presents the methodological considerations of the analysis and follows with the results. The paper concludes with summary of the findings and discussion.

**The context: the Roma issue and beyond**

Marian Kotleba began to make public appearances in 2004 and 2005 as then-leader of the political movement Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť, SP) and the emerging political party Slovak Togetherness – our party (Slovenská pospolitosť – národná strana, SP-NS). As the most visible movement/party representative, he attracted media attention mostly through controversial appeals to the fascist Slovak state and appraisals of its political and religious figures, and to some extent also through anti-Hungarian and anti-Roma stances (Kluknavská 2013). His appearances in the media, such as marches in various towns across Slovakia in the uniforms that resembled the uniforms of the war-time Slovak state, were usually linked to right-wing extremism or neo-Nazism with highly negative connotations (Kluknavská, 2013). For instance, the party condemned “Zionists” and other political adversaries, and advocated “estate-based” society, in which the people would be divided into ten separate groups, out of which one group would be comprised solely of “national minorities” (Slovenská pospolitosť – národná strana, 2006). After the party was dissolved by the Supreme Court in the early 2006 based on violation of civil and human rights and encouraging xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, 2006), Marian Kotleba stepped aside as a leader of the
political movement. He came to public attention only after almost three years when he announced his intention to run in the 2009 regional elections as an independent candidate. At that time, several media covered his candidacy, including the public broadcaster in the television debate. Despite his political inactivity in the previous years, he gained 10.03 per cent of the votes (13,629 in total).

The relative success of Kotleba in the 2009 regional elections ended the movement’s internal crisis and the new party was formed at the beginning of 2010. Though the party never got into the national parliament, its electoral gains have been on the rise. This can be in part attributed to the thematic and discursive change in their strategy (Kluknavská, 2013). While at first the party tried to gain public support and media attention through glorifying the Slovak state, in recent years it has been mobilizing support on anti-Roma and anti-establishment sentiment by organizing active protests in areas with tense relations between Roma and non-Roma populations.

Beginning already in 2009 during the election campaign, Kotleba had an extensive poster campaign, which stated that “with your support, I can certainly eliminate unfair favouritism of not only Gypsy parasites against decent people” (Ludová strana Naše Slovensko, 2011). After 2010, the ŽSNS fully engaged in an anti-elitist and xenophobic discourse, emphasizing the perceived threat of the Roma for the society, the corrupted nature of the political elites and their combined blame over the misdeeds of the ordinary people (Kluknavská, 2014). Combining the xenophobia and anti-establishment populism, according to which the extreme right parties mobilise xenophobic attitudes and pose a critique on contemporary democratic systems (Rydgren, 2007), the party has built upon the public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment, the appeal to the common people, and anti-minorities attitudes (Kluknavská, 2014).

In electoral terms, while in the 2006 national elections the party gained only 0.16 per cent of the votes (3,815 votes), in 2010 and 2012 national elections the ŽSNS received 1.33 per cent (33,724 votes) and 1.58 per cent (40,460 votes) respectively. Moreover, in the 2010 and 2012 elections, the party was the most successful primarily in those municipalities with a high number of Roma settlements and where the relations between Roma and non-Roma people are perceived problematic, including Banská Bystrica region (Kluknavská, 2013).

---

2 The then Minister of Justice Lucia Žitňanská filed a criminal lawsuit against Marian Kotleba on the grounds that he may have committed the crime of defamation of the nation, race and belief. However, in 2013 the Supreme Court found Kotleba not guilty (Verdict no. 4 Tdo 49/2012).

3 After the dissolution of the SP-NS, its members ran on the list of the extreme right Slovak People’s Party (Slovenská ľudová strana).

4 The party gained votes in areas where the local leaders concentrated.

5 The research looked at the level of municipalities, where the party received more than 5 per cent.
The 2013 regional elections: not surprising surprise?

In the 2013 Slovak regional elections the extreme right leader of the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) Marian Kotleba has, to the surprise of many observers, become the governor of the Banská Bystrica region. The politician won 55.5 per cent of the vote (71,397 votes) in the second round of the elections against then incumbent Vladimír Maňka of the ruling Smer – Social Democracy (Smer – sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD) party. He was placed second in the first round of the elections with 21.3 per cent of the vote (26,251 votes), but qualified for a second round run-off in the governor’s race; he had been given little to no chance of winning in both the media and political discourse.

Months before the regional elections 2013, Kotleba built upon the local political potential gained from previous elections and from publicised events such as the burning down of the Krásna Hôrka castle6 (which is located in the region of Banská Bystrica) in 2012 during which he positioned himself in the role of the protector of “decent people” that are harmed by “unadaptable” Roma (Kluknavská, 2013) or “gypsy extremists” (Naše Slovensko, 2014). Organising several marches against Roma in the village spanning several months after the incident and receiving rather wide media attention, he described the party’s actions as “tidying up” the Roma village (Slovak Spectator, 2012) that was needed in order to protect people after the inactivity of the state and police (Naše Slovensko, 2014).

After the first round of the 2013 regional elections, various reactions from the politicians and the media appeared. The media outlets expressed a dilemma in reporting about Kotleba. Several media stated they would not address Kotleba or report about his campaign. Nevertheless, the SME daily ran an interview with Kotleba the day after the first round, claiming that it is no longer possible to ignore the politician (Slovak Spectator, 2013). The extreme right leader was also featured on live election debate with other candidates (which aired for each region) on news channel TA3, for which the channel earned media and political criticism. In political arena, Vladimír Maňka blamed Kotleba’s appearance on TA3 for the results (Slovak Spectator, 2013), while the Prime Minister and chairman of the Smer-SD Robert Fico at first expressed satisfaction with Maňka’s strong showing for the party (Slovak Spectator, 2013), but after the second round declared that the right-wing parties along with the media, which he argued did a massive campaign for Kotleba, carry direct responsibility (TASR, 2013). For Marian Kotleba, the results were not surprising because according to him the people realized that the vote for him was not a lost vote (STTA, 2013a).

---

6 The police announced that the fire had been caused by two local Roma boys, while lighting cigarettes. The LSNS framed the situation as a consequence of the “unadaptable” way of life of Roma living in the settlement.
The media for the extreme right: enemy and friend

For the extreme right, and especially for the smaller extreme right parties, the media represent one of their main enemies, as they claim the media misinform the public and mistreat the extreme right members (Kluhnávká, 2014). They blame the media for the lack of opportunities and the intentional obstruction of their actions (Eatwell, 2006). Having said that, extreme right parties usually depend on the media for their electoral breakthrough even more than the established parties (van der Pas et al., 2011), mainly because they must appear in the media in order to make themselves known to the wider electorate. The media could be related to a party’s success in three ways: the party or its politicians receive a great deal of coverage (attention); the issues of the party are overexposed (agenda-setting) and/or the media framing favours the party (framing) (Walgrave and De Swert, 2004). In other words, the media can highlight the parties and leaders within the media content, create a favourable ground by covering the issues, over which they claim issue ownership (Walgrave and De Swert, 2004) or take part in framing the party or their issues in a favourable way.

The media may be either supportive of the extreme right, which can allow extreme right parties to overcome their marginalization and attract more supporters, or denounce and launch campaigns against them, which is more likely to weaken public support (Art, 2006). However, even if the media take negative stances to the extreme right, they can keep them visible in public by granting them exposure (the higher salience of the extreme right) and take part in agenda-setting and framing (Rydgren, 2007; Ellinas, 2010) of the issues, such as immigration in Western Europe, or Roma issues in Central and Eastern Europe.

The media in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 tended to report about nationalist or extreme right organizations in a quite positive manner, but nowadays the mainstream media report negatively on most events, especially when neo-Nazi symbolism is present (Mudde, 2005). Nevertheless, some of the coverage of the incidents of the extreme right in relation to ethnic minorities, particularly Roma, tends to be “highly ambiguous” (Mudde 2005: 257) and along with the prevalent coverage on Roma minority may easily favour the extreme right (Kluhnávká and Zagibová, 2013). Although the extreme right is usually the most extreme when targeting Roma (Mudde 2007), it is not the only actor sharing negative attitudes towards the minority. In East European countries, specifically in Slovakia, studies examining the media coverage on Roma generally conclude that the minority is presented in a negative and prejudiced way, however, sometimes with offering a positive, though often stereotypical alternative. Roma communities tend to be generalized and silenced in the news coverage and usually referred to in collective terms and in connection to criminality and violence with an emphasis on their ethnicity (Cangár, 2008), presenting Roma as a cause of social unrest or as inherently lazy people (Dráľ, 2009).

This environment can create favourable discursive opportunity structures, where the radical agenda finds a space to be effective (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004) and legitimate (Bos et al., 2011). This is especially important for the extreme right leaders as in order to be electorally successful, they not only have to be known by the public, but they also need voters to have a positive image about them (Bos et al., 2011). With the purpose to effectively diffuse the message in public, the claims must
have a visibility in the media, a resonance, to which others react to a message and a legitimacy in public (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Expecting to build upon negative portrayal of Roma in the media, less is known about how the extreme right leaders in Slovakia are salient and framed in the media discourse.

**Methods, data and coding procedure**

*Frame analysis.* To investigate how the extreme right leader is portrayed in the media, we build upon the framing theory (Snow et al., 1986). Framing refers to interpretive processes that render events and occurrences subjectively meaningful (Snow et al., 2007). Media frames are considered as schemes for presenting and comprehending news, which turn meaningless and otherwise unrecognizable happenings into perceptible events (Scheufele, 1999). Entman (1993: 55) defines framing as selecting “some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.” Central to this definition are ‘core framing tasks’ (Benford and Snow 2000) articulated through diagnoses (problem definitions – what is seen as a problem), prognoses (solution definitions) and motivations (calls for action). In the paper we adapt a diagnostic framing to analyse variations in problem attributions of a specific topic across various media outlets. We build on the qualitative frame analysis, using discursive techniques, analysing underlying structures behind the text and quantifying the frames that were used in the media (salience of selected frames). We also look at the leader’s media salience.

*Sample.* The data are derived from an analysis of 359 articles on Marian Kotleba that appeared in ten major media outlets in Slovakia in a timespan of six weeks. We searched the media outlets with the straightforward word “Kotleba”. In the analysis we cover the print, electronic and internet-based media: four daily newspapers: tabloids Nový čas (13 articles), Plus 1 Deň (21 articles), and daily newspapers SME (114 articles), Pravda (34 articles); TV stations: private stations TV Markíza (16 programmes), TV JOJ (17 programmes), news channel TA3 (13 programmes), and public broadcaster RTVS (26 programmes); web news portals: Aktuality.sk (45 articles), Topky.sk (60 articles). We focus on a six-week period between 17 October 2013 and 30 November 2013, thus focusing on the three weeks prior to the first round of the elections, two weeks between the first and the second round, and a week after the second round. The first round of the elections took place on 9 November and the second round of the elections on 23 November 2013.

*Frames.* We identified ten issue-specific frames in the qualitative analysis on the sample of articles and programmes across all media outlets. First, we analysed the sample of articles to identify the main frames, i.e. what is presented as a problem in relation to either Kotleba’s general political actions or the regional elections. After defining the initial set of frames, we then refined those categories and repeat pre-testing on another set of articles. After establishing the final coding scheme we coded the articles in further analysis, which resulted in 1095 claims. A claim is present when one of the sources (who can be either a journalist or any other actor making a
statement) referred to the problematic aspect in relation to Kotleba, in accordance with the predefined frames. We distinguish between the actor-related, emphasizing the politician’s characteristics, and the structure-related, emphasizing the electoral circumstances. Within these characteristics, we also distinguish the frames that denote Kotleba either as unacceptable (politician) or legitimate (politician). The following frames were distinguished: 1) Extremist threat, 2) Spurious protector (Actor oriented – unacceptable); 3) Isolated politician, 4) People’s protector, 5) Legitimate candidate (Actor oriented – legitimate); 6) Failure of authorities, 7) Election surprise and anomaly (Structure-oriented – unacceptable); 8) Frustrated people, 9) Anti-campaign, 10) Protest (Structure-oriented – legitimate). We elaborate more on the frames in the next part of the paper.

**Media framing of the extreme right leader**

We present the results of our analyses in two parts. Before proceeding to the analyses of frame variations in the media, we first discuss the results regarding media attention for Marian Kotleba. Our findings regarding total media attention for the extreme right leader are summarized in Figure 1. Strong differences in salience are visible with regard to time period and different media outlets. In the total sample of 359 articles, the extreme right leader was the most visible in the daily newspaper SME (31.8 per cent), which was followed by the two on-line news portals Topky.sk and Aktuality.sk with 16.7 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively. Other media account for less than 10 per cent each.

In time, we can see that the high media attention for Kotleba was triggered immediately after each election round. Before the first round of the elections, the attention was minimal. However, Kotleba did participate in the live election debate on TA3 news channel. The media visibility of the politician radically changed with the first results of the elections. After intensive two-day coverage following the first round of the elections, the media reported about the politician in a steady manner (around 10 articles per day) up until the second round, which triggered another spell of intense coverage, as Kotleba became the governor of the region.
Before elaboration on the variation of media frames, we turn to the absolute prominence of framing across different sources and frames in coverage about Marian Kotleba (Table 1). The media or the journalists were the source in most of the claims; they account for 43.4 per cent of the frames, followed by experts (14.6 per cent) and opposition parties (8.3 per cent). Various political actors, including members of non-parliamentary parties and members of local and regional political formations, made claims in 7.4 per cent of all frames, the people in 4.8 per cent and the Roma only in 0.9 per cent. Despite public declarations of Kotleba not gaining access to the media, the leader or LSNS’ members made 7.1 per cent of all claims, while the party Smer-SD and Vladimir Maňka only 4.7 per cent. However, as the Prime Minister Robert Fico is also the chairman of the ruling Smer-SD, there are additional to 4.1 per cent. Regarding different frames, the Extremist threat (24.8 per cent) and the Failure of authorities (18.7 per cent) frames are the most prominent, followed by Election surprise (10.1 per cent) and Frustrated people (8.7 per cent) frames. Actor-related frames account for 48.8 per cent of all framings and structure-related frames account for 51.2 per cent of frames. Given the division of the frames as those, which present Kotleba as an unacceptable politician and those that present him as a legitimate political actor are divided in the media discourse in 60 to 40 per cent of the claims.

The Extremist threat appears to be especially salient in the claim-making of opposition parties (34.1 per cent), public authorities (34 per cent), the media (31.2 per
cent), the Smer-SD party and Vladimír Maňka (26.9 per cent), political actors (23.5 per cent) and experts (20 per cent). Within this frame at the unacceptable-level, Kotleba is seen as an extremist or radical politician, known for extreme or racist and xenophobic stances towards various minorities. As shown in Table 2, the adjectives used to name the politician ranged from “radical Marian Kotleba” to “controversial politician” with links to “extremism” (both Topky.sk, 10. 11., 11. 11.). A Roma referred to him as a “fascist” (SME, 11. 11) and a public authority as “a person who presents anti-Semitic and racist ideas” (SME, 13. 11.). The media described him as “the leader of extremists” (SME, 15. 11.). After the second round, the foreign media, reported through the domestic media, described him as a “neo-Nazi” (TV JOJ, 25. 11.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2013)</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.11.</td>
<td>Topky</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The radical Marian Kotleba advanced to the second round of the election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.11.</td>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>We do not need fascists in Slovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.11.</td>
<td>Topky</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Controversial politician, whose political party was in the past dissolved because of the extremism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.11.</td>
<td>Aktuality</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The extremist who in public acts as a tribune of the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.11.</td>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Public authority</td>
<td>I find it unacceptable that a person who presents anti-Semitic and racist ideas and considers the Roma minority as the only problem in Slovakia would become a governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.11.</td>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The leader of extremists only wants to speak in television live.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.11.</td>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Nothing Kotleba ever said about Roma or Roma issues was acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.11.</td>
<td>Pravda</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The battle between Smer and extremist party of Marian Kotleba. Marian Kotleba is not hiding his extremist opinions towards Roma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.11.</td>
<td>TV JOJ</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The foreign media warn and denote him as a neo-Nazi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.11.</td>
<td>TV Markíza</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The most significant increase in votes can be observed in the case of the radical Marian Kotleba.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Extremist threat frame. The claims by various sources in different media outlets, 17 October 2013 – 30 November 2013. Source: the author

The second most prominent frame in the media coverage was the Failure of authorities (again at the unacceptable-level), according to which the elections reflect the failure of (political or public) authorities to take action vis-à-vis problems in society and the difficulties that people encounter every day. The frame was salient mainly in the claim-making of the Prime Minister Robert Fico (68.9 per cent), who blamed the opposition parties, first for nominating a wrong candidate and then for not clearly supporting Kotleba’s opponent. The frame was also prominent in the discourse of the opposition parties (33 per cent), various political actors (27.2 per cent), experts (21.3 per cent), Vladimír Maňka (19.2 per cent) and the media (12.6 per cent). The experts concluded that “unsolved problems” create “a breeding ground for right-wing extremists” (RTVS, 10. 11.) and the media blamed “the whole political spectrum of so-called standard political parties” (Pravda, 16. 11.). Claims used by various sources are shown in Table 3.
In addition, there is considerable attention for the Election surprise frame, which encompasses claims about the shocking results and electoral anomaly, which should not have been repeated because the politician was not supposed to stand a chance in a political competition. The frame was reproduced mainly by the media, according to which the elections were “undoubtedly the biggest surprise” (TV Markíza, 10. 11.), which came “without warning” (Nový Čas, 11. 11. 2013), when “the extremist Kotleba shockingly advanced to the second round” (Plus 1 Deň, 11. 11.). The second round of the elections triggered the same reactions, when the media reported about “the biggest surprise” (Aktuality.sk; RTVS, 24. 11.) and “the shocking election results” (TV Markíza, 24. 11.). Politicians stated that “Let’s face it, it is a kick that none of us expected” (leader of the SDKÚ-DS, Topky.sk, 24. 11.).

The fourth most emphasized frame, Frustrated people, claims that the election results mirror anger, discontent, frustration and despair in society, caused by economic and political or moral crisis. Located more at the legitimate-level by giving the impression of genuine political competition, it was mostly emphasized by the experts who claimed that “people feel disgust from politics” (SME, 16. 11.) and the results are “an expression of not solving social and social-economic problems in the region” (RTVS, 24. 11.), when “frustrated voters came and voted for Kotleba” (Plus 1 Deň, 25. 11.). According to the media, “the results are reflected through
dissatisfaction of people with the quality of their life” and “the frustration, scepticism and general disenchantment of people are apparent” (Plus 1 Deň, 25. 11.). The frame also explains the Kotleba’s success through “the dissatisfaction of people and their feeling of not solving the problems that directly concern them” (Opposition party, RTVS, 11. 11.).

The Anti-campaign (8 per cent) frame, located at the legitimate-level, claims that either the media or politicians launch actual or reported anti-campaigns against Kotleba. It was mostly emphasized by the extreme right leader himself (39.7 per cent), who repeated the claim about “media pressures from all sides” (Aktuality.sk, 24. 11.). Kotleba stated that “Maňka has compared me to Adolf Hitler, but I will not lower myself to comparing someone to something” (Plus 1 Deň, 11. 11.) or accused the media of bias, when “we have the worst experience with pre-recorded statements – my speech edited to the level I could not recognize myself, pictures of healing skinheads, fights at football stadiums. We do not need this” (Topky.sk, 18. 11.). The media (8 per cent) claimed that “some parts of the media did not report about this candidate because he is supposed to have racist opinions and attitudes” (RTVS, 11. 11.) or “the right-wing politics took a good and united stance at least in two regions – all for Frešo and all against Kotleba” (SME, 13. 11., 18. 11.).

On the actor-oriented side of frames, two contrasting frames can be observed. At the legitimate-level, the frame claimed that Kotleba is the protector of people (8.1 per cent), at the unacceptable-level, the frame suggested he is a spurious protector of people (6.3 per cent). In the People’s protector frame, the politician is presented as a voice and a protector of people, who is following rules and law and order. This frame was mostly emphasized by the people (43.4 per cent) and Kotleba or members of the LSNS (44.9 per cent). The people claimed that “I will vote for Kotleba. He wants what five million Slovaks want”; “I like it that he openly identifies problems that I find important” (SME, 11. 11.); or “The result reflects what people think” (TV Markíza, 24. 11.). Kotleba declared that his goal is “to increase the safety of decent people even in the distant parts of the Banská Bystrica region, because the state cannot guarantee it” (SME, 11. 11.). After becoming the governor, Kotleba stated that “the change in the whole society is approaching” (TV JOJ, 24. 11.), when “we are facing very responsible work for all decent people in our region” (Plus 1 Deň, 25. 11.). In some cases, even the media inclined to this frame (4.4 per cent), reporting that “If elected, leader of the People’s Party Our Slovakia, a 36-year old IT specialist from Banská Bystrica, would try to improve the social and housing situation of decent families so that they will not leave the region” (Topky.sk, 5. 11.).

The Spurious protector of people frame presents Kotleba’s claims and intentions as populist and false, misleadingly easy to attract ordinary people. According to Roma, who were mostly inclined to frame Kotleba this way (40 per cent), the politician claims that he “will take the Roma problem into his own hands and will solve it. And people believed him” (SME, 11. 11.). A public authority (12 per cent) declared that “People once again allowed themselves to be deceived by someone who pretends to be a strong leader” (SME, 26. 11.).

The least emphasized frame on structure-oriented side is the Protest frame. Despite being often presented by experts (13.8 per cent) as one of the main reason standing behind Kotleba’s success, this frame was used only in 5.6 per cent of frames.
It claims that the election gains are the result of people voting against the current establishment. An expert saw “a protest vote of disappointed voters” (SME, 16.11.2013) and a person (11.3 per cent) confirmed that “I would vote for anyone against Maňka” (SME, 11.11.). Maňka (and Smer-SD, 11.5 per cent) concluded that the results are “a certain protest of a citizen” (Topky.sk, 24.11.).

The two least emphasized frames on the actor-oriented side are Legitimate candidate (5.8 per cent) and Isolated politician (3.7 per cent). The former, mostly pursued by various political actors (12.3 per cent) and public authorities (12 per cent), sees Kotleba and his party as legitimate political actors, registered according to the law. Within the frame, multiple sources referred to the principles of democracy. A political actor argued that “Mr. Kotleba was legitimately elected, and we respect it” (Topky.sk, 24.11.), followed by a public authority stating that “We do not have to like it and we can be disappointed, but this is how democracy works” (TV JOJ, 25.11.). The latter frame surfaced mainly after the second round. It presents Kotleba as having no political management skills or people around him. Journalists (5.5 per cent) concluded that he probably “will not have the support of any MP, and politicians and the media reject him because of his extremist opinions” (SME, 25.11.).

As presented in Figure 2, the results showing variations of frames in the course of the elections demonstrate that the Extremist threat was persistently the most salient frame over time. The failure of authorities was mostly emphasized immediately after both the first and second rounds of the elections. A week before the second round, the Anti-campaign frame was highlighted in the overall media discourse. The rest of the frames were used rather steadily during the whole period. In the weeks preceding the first round of the elections, hardly any articles appeared in the media about Kotleba and so no frames appeared either.

![Figure 2. Variations in media frames about Marian Kotleba over time, 17 October 2013 – 30 November 2013. Source: the author](image-url)

However, while after the first round, the frames were relatively diffused, in the following period the two most salient frames prevailed, leaving other frames clustered
in close percentage proximity. It suggests that while the media continually emphasised the extremist side of Kotleba’s candidacy and authorities’ responsibility, that are both at the “unacceptable” level of frames, the public debate before the second vote switched to highlighting the possible anti-campaign against Kotleba, and thus to the “legitimate” level of frames.

From the presented data, we can look at the reversed picture and identify the most emphasised frames by respective sources. While the media mostly stressed the extremist nature of Kotleba and his candidacy, the experts equally pointed to the authorities’ failure and the frustration of people along with the politician’s extremist character. The threat and failure were also prominent in the discourse of various political actors and opposition parties, while public authorities only emphasised the former. Regarding the two main candidates, Marian Kotleba aimed at underlining the notions that he is a protector of people and that an anti-campaign against him had been launched. Vladimír Maňka accentuated mainly the extremist frame and along with the Prime Minister and the chairman of the Smer-SD highlighted the failure of authorities, pointing mainly at the opposition parties. The people saw Kotleba as their protector, while Roma mostly saw him as a spurious protector of people.

Conclusion and discussion: between unacceptability and legitimacy

This study was set out in an attempt to further our understanding about the media coverage of the extreme right leader in 2013 regional elections in Slovakia. It focused on the media attention devoted to the politician and the way in which he was framed in a six-week period during the elections. The findings can be structured in accordance to the media attention and the media framing. First, regarding the media attention, we can see the rapid increase in the media visibility of Marian Kotleba after the first results that persisted over the course of the elections. Second, regarding the media framing, the extreme right leader was equally portrayed with frames on both actor-related and structure-related sides and almost equally covered by frames emphasizing his unacceptability and his legitimacy. At the “unacceptable politician” level, the media discourse mainly stressed the extremist threat and the failure of authorities frames, while at the “legitimate politician” level there was an attempt at counter-framing, pointing to an anti-campaign against Kotleba and his role as a protector of people.

Because the leader of the LSNS in the past attracted the media mostly through controversial appeals and local mobilization, he gained little visibility in the close period preceding the elections. After the elections’ first round, Kotleba’s media presence significantly increased and the leader attracted a lot of attention in the public debate, as his electoral gains were considered unexpected, which is in line with the media tendency to focus on the scandalous aspects of politics (Mudde, 2004). Noting that the right-wing extremist gained unforeseen public support, the media reproduced the idea of authorities failing to prevent such an outcome. In between the election rounds, a debate about the media anti-campaign arose, claiming it was set to delegitimize Kotleba ahead of the second round of the elections. In fact, it was Kotleba himself, who mostly pointed to the anti-campaign against him. Kotleba’s
media salience after the second round was even higher; however, this was to be expected since his victory was received with even greater surprise than the results of the first round.

Despite the fact that we cannot draw conclusions on how the media coverage of Marian Kotleba directly affected the election results, we can identify several processes indicating the final outcome of the elections. Since the prevalent framing in the media may be perceived as negative, this would support the claim that the media report on the extreme right negatively (Mudde, 2005), but would go against Art’s (2006) conclusion that negative media evaluations against the extreme right are likely to weaken their public support. However, though the prevalent frame was indeed negative, we can see three clear trends that might have affected the elections, leading to Kotleba’s victory. First, the media attention for the politician radically increased after the first round of the elections, making Kotleba highly salient in the public debate. Second, apart from the link between Kotleba and extremism, we can observe counter-frames appealing to the legitimate side of the politician’s candidacy. Third, the overall media discourse might have resonated well with the extreme right discourse and public attitudes towards elites and the Roma minority. As the visibility, legitimacy, and resonance are crucial in successful diffusion of the message (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Bos et al., 2011), these three trends might have a profound effect on the Kotleba’s victory.

Specifically, as the higher salience in the media is one of the keys for voter support (e.g. Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007), the rapid increase in Kotleba’s visibility made him more salient and known to the wider electorate. Though the media attention for Kotleba cannot explain the results of the first round, we may find help in the media framing of the politician. The framing of Kotleba during the elections was not unilaterally negatively-skewed, but the division of frames that underline his unacceptability to those stressing his legitimacy was 60 to 40. The extremist threat and other “unacceptable” frames were counter-framed by the “legitimate” frames that put Kotleba in a position of a genuine politician and a scapegoat that was only trying to help the people. Moreover, the main “unacceptable” frames were mostly emphasised by political and public actors, while “legitimate” frames by Kotleba and the people.

The focus on the frames claiming that while Kotleba tried to protect the people from the Roma menace (People’s protector), he was being oppressed by corrupted political and cultural elites (Anti-campaign), created successful counter-frames, which made it possible for Kotleba to fully build upon the anti-establishment and xenophobic discourse. Such discourse was able to resonate with the electorate, as not only the public tend to hold negative attitudes towards Roma, but also the political and media discourses reproduce negative stereotypes and prejudices (e.g. Draž, 2009). As the LSNS and its leader since 2010 fully engaged in the anti-elitist and xenophobic discourse, the extreme right strategy appeared to be resonant with the public in regions with perceived problematic relations between the majority and the Roma minority (Kluknavská, 2013). This was also the case in the Banská Bystrica region, which is affected by high unemployment and where numerous Roma settlements are situated.
Therefore, even if the media take negative stances against the politician and may not be sympathetic towards him, they can make a politician salient in the public debate (Ellinas, 2010) and frame him in a favourable way, granting him visibility, legitimacy and resonance (Koopmans and Olza, 2004; Bos et al., 2011). As Kotleba and the LSNS in their discourse consider various out-groups as malicious for society and especially target the Roma minority and political elites, blaming them for misdeeds against “decent people” (Kluknavská, 2014), this strategy might have found itself successful during 2013 regional elections. This finding is supported by the poll, conducted by Polis agency between 24 and 28 November 2013, asking whether the respondents consider the victory of Marian Kotleba to be a sign of a growing extremism. Almost half of the respondents did not consider his victory to be a sign of a growing extremism in the country (48.8 per cent), while only 29.9 per cent did consider it as an expansion of the extremism (SITA, 2013b).

In the light of these findings and given the constraints of the exploratory case study, future research could follow with analyses on the media presentation of the extreme right leader building upon the framing theory by adopting and adaptation of presented issue-specific frames, looking at the politicians’ or parties’ salience and legitimacy in the discourse. Such research could be based on longitudinal analysis, aiming at linking the media content with the electoral results.

References


INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 1 (1)
KLUKNAVSKÁ, A.: A RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST OR PEOPLE’S PROTECTOR?

164


Abstract

Although numerous studies on the far right have been conducted, some aspects of the topic are still underresearched. One of these aspects is the gender dimension of far right movements. This paper reveals this poorly researched topic, while seeking women’s participation and activism in the far right movements, focusing on women’s roles in political parties, movements, and the surrounding subculture. The study presents the results of a comparative research of two parties regarding women’s presence: Jobbik in Hungary and the Golden Dawn in Greece. I describe the gender gap in the far right, and the forms of women’s participation. I argue that although women support the far right in smaller numbers than men, they nonetheless have a significant input in the growing public support that these parties enjoy. This suggests a new picture of mainstream parties for these far right parties that are no longer excessively masculine.

Keywords: Far right, gender, Greece, Hungary, movement, party.
Comparative analysis between Jobbik and Golden Dawn

Although the ‘economic-crisis-breeds-extremism thesis’ has failed in general, Greece and Hungary are two countries where the popularity of the far right rose between the pre-crisis period and the crisis (Mudde, 2013). Comparing EU member states, Mudde reveals that only five countries in Europe had a substantial rise of populist radical right electoral support, including Greece and Hungary. Beside the economic crisis, a political crisis also hit Hungary and Greece, when established ruling parties lost much of their support (Malkoutzis, 2011; Grajczár and Tóth, 2011). As a result, political dissatisfaction and mistrust are measured as being among the highest in these countries (Eurobarometer, 2014).

Undoubtedly, these factors contributed to the electoral breakthrough of the Golden Dawn and Jobbik, the second and third most supported parties in these two countries respectively in 2014, which are also known as the most extreme far right parties across Europe (Rose, 2014). In addition to extremism, they operate as political movements surrounded by a strong subculture (Rose, 2014) and labelled as strongly masculine (Stratigaki, 2013; Félix, 2012). Thereby, academics started to focus on the so-called ‘radical right gender gap’, or in other words the over-representation of men and the under-representation of women supporters that I examine in the next section.

Women’s position and roles in these social groups need attention because these aspects define and determine the opportunities that women have in politics, especially on the far right scene. In the past few decades, there have been numerous efforts to strengthen gender equality in Greece, supporting a more egalitarian sharing of household chores, and promoting general female employment (Davaki, 2013). Despite these efforts, the crisis starting in 2009 had had multifaceted gender-based negative consequences on women in the labour market, in sharing household work and in exerting women’s power (Kambouri, 2013). In the Hungarian society, gender equality has never been an important topic in public debates; furthermore support for traditional gender roles is also higher than in many other EU states (Fodor, 2011). Although in Hungary the economic crisis did not affect women as much as it did in Greece, from 2010 the rightist government has taken a conservative view, replacing gender equality policies with family policies, resulting in a backlash in women’s position (Frey, 2013). These negative consequences on women could not have been tackled efficiently by the established parties. Paradoxically, the ascendant far right which is originally masculine has offered opportunities to women to achieve their goals inside their movements. The above-mentioned similarities between the Hungarian and the Greek political and social context, the current far right parties and women’s position within them allow me to make a comparative analysis of the two cases.

The gender gap cliché and what is beyond the small numbers

The phenomenon of the radical right gender gap is well-known among scholars (Givens, 2004). Discussing my findings about the gap, I present the actual numbers of women supporters and the extent of the gap in the two countries. According to the
surveys taken in Greece in May 2014, 5.5 per cent of women and 11.5 per cent of men support the Golden Dawn (Kapa Research, 2014). As a result, the so-called radical right gender gap is 6 per cent, which is similar to the figures in 2012, when the party first entered the Parliament (Public Issue, 2012). In 2010 when Jobbik first entered the Parliament, it was supported by 3.9 per cent of women and 8.5 per cent of men, thereby the gap was around 4 per cent (Grajczár and Tóth, 2011). Recently Jobbik is supported by 8.1 per cent of women and 15.5 per cent of men, which produces a gap of 7.4 per cent.1 Thus, the gap has been growing in the last four years. Overall, we see that the gap is large in both countries: almost twice as many men than women vote for the far right, and the rates have not changed significantly over time.

Some academics explain this gap with the masculine character of far right parties (Kimmel, 2007), while others see the reason in different levels of religiosity between men and women (Gidengil et al., 2005), or anti-immigrant attitudes and differences in political interest depending on one’s gender (Fontana et al., 2006). Although in some cases these factors have certainly had an explanatory impact, Immerzeel et al. (2015) argue that they cannot explain the phenomenon, because they represent only some aspects of the problem. Others have even pointed out that these kinds of statements can be incorrect perceptions which may easily lead us to wrong interpretations of the phenomenon (Elverich, 2007). The existing explanations are not comprehensive enough – therefore there is still a need for identifying other factors or changing the original question in order to understand the relation between women and the far right.

Despite the small proportion of women among the supporters of far-right organizations, in recent years many female leaders have emerged on this scene all across Europe. There are female politicians in the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as in Hungary and Greece. In some countries, they are in leading positions, such as Pia Kjærsgaard in the Danish People’s Party and Siv Jensen in the Progress Party in Norway. Their presence is likely to change the meaning of far right activism and might attract more women. The most known case is Marine Le Pen of the National Front in France, whose appearance as a female leader caused growing support among certain groups of women (Mayer, 2013). However, not only leading women can mobilise other women supporters or potential supporters, but simple members and activists can as well. There are women who consistently support the far right in every country, their activity is vitally important, but they are often ignored (Pető, 2012). There are, however, some contributions that seek to understand far right women supporters, highlighting their diversity, studying the complexity of their motivations, and examining women’s situations. In a historical perspective, academics have analysed the extent of women’s involvement in the fascist and Nazi regimes during the inter-war period (Durham, 1998; Pető, 2008). There are other studies that reveal how the gender approach enables a better understanding, beyond the ascertainment of quantitative gender balance, of contemporary far right movements (Bitzan, 2006; Kimmel 2007; Félix, 2015). These studies reinforce the claim that the gender approach in this field was underestimated for a long time.

---

1 Data is based on a representative survey called “Crisis and Social Innovations Survey” conducted by MTA - ELTE Peripato Research Group in May 2014.
I intend to put them into one comprehensive approach, and as a result we can understand the position of these women within the movements which helps us to reveal the causes of the gap. With this analysis of women’s overall presence the far right scene as a whole can be understood better.

The leading research question is based on the claim that women in far right movements sometimes articulate quasi-feminist statements in a strong anti-feminist discourse (Dauber, 2014). My research puzzle is to find out in what forms women participate in the Golden Dawn and Jobbik. The two cases will be presented and compared regarding the questions of how women create some agendas inside the anti-modernist framework, whether they are allowed to do their activity on their own and, if so, to what extent. Similarities and differences between the two cases will be explained in order to point out their special characteristics and the common patterns.

Terminology is a key issue for researchers of the far right, as there are many definitions and names used by different authors (Hainsworth, 2008). In order to be able to compare the two cases, I use ‘far right’ the way Art (2013) defines it, referring to a broad group further right from the established centre-right parties.

In this paper, I use the term ‘subculture’ after Hebdige (1979) who describes it as a ‘whole way of life’. As I will explain, the subcultures around the two parties influence not only supporters’ voting behaviour, but also the standards of childbearing, education of youngsters, and even commercial attitudes. Thereby, the nature of the subculture influences the position and possibilities of women on the far right, which is a topic for assessment in this article. Although using the term ‘subculture’ is debated in the social and political sciences, in these two cases defining the far right as a political subculture, in the sense Enyedi uses the word, may be appropriate. Specifically, according to this author, political subcultures have special norms, group identity, solidarity and lifestyle, even subcultural institutions that provide ideological education to the members, socialise them from their childhood onward, and create many social activities for them (Enyedi, 1998).

**Methodology**

The initial idea behind my methodology was to stay hidden as an observer. During my research I made different kinds of participant observations. When I visited demonstrations I could easily stay anonymous without having any contact with the other participants. In some cases I had to register myself under my real name in order to enter the local offices of the parties, but that did not require additional information, so I could stay in an observer position. Later I gave more information about myself in order to gain their trust, so I introduced my research to my subsequent interviewees and at some events the hosts even introduced me to the crowd. I was focusing on how women represent themselves as part of the group during social activities, how they get involved and participate in these movements. At the end of each event, I tried to get in contact with women participants, conducting semi-structured interviews with them afterwards, and using the snowball method to reach new interviewees. The languages of the interviews were Hungarian in Hungary and English in Greece, where I had a Greek research assistant. The Hungarian interviews were made between 2011 and
2012 in Budapest and Bösztörpuszta, where one of the biggest far right festivals was held. The Greek interviews were made in 2013 in Athens, where I spent half year to conduct research. My interviewees were women supporters, activists and members of Jobbik and the Golden Dawn. In both cases, they were at different levels of engagement; from different age groups and socio-cultural backgrounds. The interviews sought out the motivations and possible paths of engagement to unfold how women represent their role in the parties and the surrounding subcultures. Research on the far right also raises moral and ethical problems (Blee, 1996). My interviewees often wanted to turn me into a potential supporter and I tried to solve this dilemma with keeping a proper distance, being respectful and polite, but never too friendly.

I also analysed the party manifestos of the Golden Dawn and Jobbik. My other sources were blogs and websites to examine far right women’s online activity. In both cases, besides offline activities women’s ideological education and mobilisation is carried on online as well. The online sphere is a very important tool for almost every far right party including also the two cases of the research. Viral online networks and social media have had a huge impact on the success of Jobbik and the Golden Dawn as recent studies have shown. (Jeskó et.al, 2012; Siapera, 2013). I did not find any online activity directly related to the Jobbik Women’s Division. I made qualitative text analyses of women’s blogs and websites directly linked to the main pages of Jobbik. I followed the links between these detected pages to have a wider sample and I named that methodology ‘virtual snowball’. During the text analyses of the blogs I used the previously set up semi-structured interview frame, which let me compare the results with interviews I had made before.

Golden Dawn’s Women’s Division has a separate blog, the White Women Front blog which is the main online media platform for female supporters. Because in Hungary there is no leading far right website for women the freedom in the text is less controlled than in Greece. In my earlier research into the Hungarian case, I distinguished three types of women, who appear to have different characteristics and ways of joining the Hungarian far right. The first type is called the ‘Culture Keeper’ for whom cultural and biological reproduction is the main issue while conducting her own business inside the subculture. The second type is the ‘Fighter’ who fights in paramilitary movements almost as fiercely as men do. The third type is labelled as the ‘Spiritual woman’ who mixes healing with spiritualism, paganism, and the hybrid ideology of the far right subculture. In doing so, she is able to build a quasi-power position and practise it inside the subculture (Félix, 2014a). As a result of the limited range of the Greek part the comparison regarding the above mentioned typology cannot be made. The current study explains the similarities and differences of the role of biological and cultural reproduction in both cases.

---

2Here I have first translated the whole blog into English with the help of my research assistant.
**Women in the movement**

In both parties, there are official women’s divisions, but their importance and activity are different. In *Jobbik* although women have not been prevented from joining since the party was founded in 1999, for over a decade they were not in leading positions.³ During the last few years prominent women leaders have appeared like Dóra Dúró and Krisztina Morvai. Since 2013, women’s representation has become more visible when the party established a new image, with smiling young girls and boys standing around the party leader (Félix, 2013). Nevertheless, the organized form of women’s participation is marginal. The Hungarian Guard, the main paramilitary movement of the Hungarian far right subculture with strong connections to *Jobbik* had no women’s division, although women had some special roles in it (Félix, 2014a). There are women’s divisions of the party across the country, which mainly work locally and their activities were limited to some charity events organised during the last few years. Women active in the subculture are usually not members of the women’s division, but tend to carry on their activities in the subculture independently.

This is not the case in the Golden Dawn, where there is a very well organized Women’s Division called White Women Front (from now on I will refer to it as WWF). However, the Golden Dawn was founded as an underground Neo-Nazi organization with no more than a few hundred male members (Psarras, 2012). In the nineties, only a few women were allowed to join. As a party member recalled, the Golden Dawn had only five women members at the time: one of them was Eleni Zaroulia, the wife of the leader Michaloliakos, another was their daughter, Omonia; a third was the woman who founded WWF. According to my interviewee, WWF was founded in 2008, starting mainly as an online blog. About the founding of WWF she told me that:

> The woman who founded the Front has been a member of the Golden Dawn for around twenty years and now she owns the blog as well. Of course, this could only happen after she got permission from the leader of the party. (*’N’* born 1983.)

The fact that the founder had to obtain permission directly from the ‘leader’ also proves the strict and rigid hierarchy inside the party. The Women’s Division was more active from 2009, when suddenly more women started to enter the party. This is the time when the Golden Dawn was coming out of its marginality and started enjoying more support, becoming a popular party rather than an outsider. With the help of WWF, some women gained responsibility to gather more women supporters through their activities. This new attitude can be detected also on the basis of how the content has changed on the blog. At the beginning, the ideological texts dominated. From 2009, there were more articles about the offline activities of WWF, about charity actions, lectures, conferences for women and propaganda activities. This change in content went along with the changing goals of the WWF; and the

---

mobilisation of women supporters (Félix, 2014b). A speech from 2011 demonstrates this change of goals in terms of the importance of a more open and active women’s division. It was articulated that the number of women members and supporters were rapidly growing; some of them held important positions and were politically active. According to that speech, women in general have to face more difficulties and dangers than ever, mainly because of immigrants, who pose a threat to them and their children.

The possibility of change is in the hands of Greek people and the White Women Front, whose goal is to involve the new as well as the old members in the activity of the movement with a belief in its values, respecting its leader, showing the female face of nationalism.⁴

My interviewee who holds membership explained that nowadays their problem is that too many women want to join the party, thus they have to be selective. In order to be accepted as a member, the prospective applicant has to attend lectures about the movement’s ideology and takes occasional tests about it. Another interviewee, who was in the process of becoming a member, told me that she had had to learn the ideology very well, because if she did not know it well enough, she would not be accepted. The hierarchy also appears on the blog, as the articles sent by activists and members from all around the country are selected and edited by the WWF leader.

In conclusion, in the Golden Dawn the hierarchy is stricter than in Jobbik, which appears in the women’s organization as well. Based on both cases it can be seen that attracting more women has an impact increasing the number of their female supporters and their popularity among them.

After the explanation of organizational ways of participation, the redefinitions of reproductive roles in the Greek and Hungarian contexts will be introduced, that creates a genuine presence for women in the far right scene. Far-right discourses in both countries claim that women have an important role in reproduction, as they bear and rear children who belong to the “pure nation”, and they are the ones responsible for the reproduction of the “pure culture” (Mostov, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997). This is a crucial issue, because according to far right narratives there are always one or more enemies that are demographically dangerous to the nation. These may be certain minorities, who in Western Europe are mainly immigrants, especially Muslims, while in Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe they are the Roma. Although this difference between the two parts of Europe regarding the target group may produce differences in ideology, they share a common core narrative: far right parties can distinguish between “Us” versus “Them” (Nagel, 1998). These minorities are regarded as threats because they allegedly have different reproduction habits than the majority population. Thus, they will outnumber the nation (us) that will, in turn, lose its majority in the country, and may eventually even disappear. This is the typical vision of the death of the nation, which has a strong gender aspect that analysts often ignore.

In order to keep the nation both ‘quantitatively’ and ‘qualitatively’ pure, far right

movements and parties seek to mobilise ‘proper’ women to bear children, mainly in the frame of eugenic discourses (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

There are different interpretations of the nation’s biological and cultural reproduction as the main mission of women in the Golden Dawn and in Jobbik. It appears at the level of party ideologies and platforms as a main issue in both cases. In Jobbik the ‘Gypsy question’ is mainly mentioned together with crime, in addition to a strong focus on the alleged ‘overpopulation’ of Roma. According to Jobbik MPs’ speeches, Roma have cultural, educational, and childbearing norms different from those of non-Roma, therefore their children should be segregated (Félix, Fokasz and Tóth, 2014). Analysing the speeches of Jobbik MPs about Roma, there is a clear gender distinction: this demographic topic clearly belongs to women MPs, meanwhile crime and the so-called ‘Gypsy-crime’ topic belongs to men in the discourse (Félix, Fokasz and Tóth, 2014).

In the Greek case, Eleni Zaroulia, who was the only woman MP of the Golden Dawn, also made some clearly racist remarks related to demography when she referred to migrants as “subhumans” who are “carrying all kinds of diseases”⁵. This warning about diseases can also be understood in the frame of biological reproduction. This demographic discourse can resonate with women who are worried about their children and their family, making them potential supporters. As a result, in both cases at the party level women MPs are more responsible for the racist eugenic discourse.

At the level of the movement, the role of biological reproduction does not appear only as literal reproduction through childbearing, but also as providing the nation with food and with other goods in a symbolic way, contributing to their well-being and health. Thereby, this can be called the material reproduction of the nation (Félix, 2014a). In terms of activities belonging to biological reproduction, women have a strong presence on both sides: as givers on one, and as takers on the other side. In Hungary, this is connected to the far right subculture, which started to rise at the same time as Jobbik did, and they mutually strengthen each other. A big part of this subculture is built on consumer ethnocentrism, assuming the existence of some special ethnocentric consumer supply and demand. This trend can be illustrated by the strong presence of allegedly ‘truly Hungarian’ foods and drinks. One of the fields where women can participate in this subculture is connected to the protection and distribution of ‘Hungarian’ goods, including the sales of everyday products. There are food shops, delivery companies and markets where subcultural products are available and where women often hold leading positions. In this way, women can fulfil their attributed reproductive role, by feeding the nation and caring about it. However, realizing the possibilities that the changed conditions open up, they often run highly successful businesses at the same time. Finally, it is financially worthwhile to keep the subculture alive, which is in the interest of Jobbik as well. One of my interviewees, the leader of a nationalist shop, told me: My dream is to create a collector and dealer forum that shows the Hungarian products to the world. ‘J’ 1950.

⁵ http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_18/10/2012_466513 Accessed: 09-04-2014
where she was blogging and editing a newspaper about the market. She was the market coordinator, to whom other sellers with organizational problems would turn for assistance. The majority of the sellers as well as the customers were women, but with very different socio-demographic backgrounds. They were selling mainly food including juices, jams, meat and bread. They often label healthy and organic products as ‘truly Hungarian’, which is a highly successful strategy. It should be noted that not every visitor of these markets is connected to the subculture or supports Jobbik. Some customers are just interested in healthy or organic products. After a visit to the market, there is a chance that they might be influenced by the subculture or the ideology behind it, and later they might turn into supporters of the far right.

Connected to the different characteristics of the movements, the role of biological reproduction appears in another form in the Greek case, but the consequences are almost the same as in Hungary. There are also women in important positions and women who are just potential new supporters on the other hand. The activities at the heart of this mechanism are the country-wide Golden Dawn charity actions, organized several times a year. There are food and sometimes blood donations only for those people who can prove with papers that they have Greek origin. I did participant observation at one food donation event organized by the Golden Dawn in April, 2013. The activists in charge of the donation could easily be distinguished from participants by their uniform: black T-shirts inscribed with ‘Golden Dawn’. The majority of the participants and the organizers were women, from different socio-demographic backgrounds. Among the organizers mainly young and middle-aged women were present, who did almost the same jobs as men. They were packing food from the containers and handing out the packages to those waiting in the queue. There were only some moments when women were pushed behind, especially in the case of conflicts and physical attacks – for instance, when the police came and started to disperse the event. At first, mostly men were involved in the fight, but when the police used tear-gas, everybody had to escape. Younger and older women with children, and entire families were waiting in the line. This observation correlates with the statement outlined above, that women with multiple disadvantages, which may even intersect with each other, are more vulnerable to the dire consequences of the crisis. Golden Dawn reacts to their vulnerability with these food donations and thus the party gains more supporters. These charity actions make a clear distinction between those who give and those who get the donation (Zakariás, 2014). The receivers may feel bonded to the Golden Dawn, and the party can use them as symbols of a pure nation, whether they adopt this image about themselves or not. One of my interviewees told me that she had given blood before Golden Dawn actions, but now she was happy, because she knew that her blood went to Greeks only. She made this comment on the blood donation:

"It does not matter who it will go to (her blood A. F.), they might as well be communists as long as they are Greek. (‘M’ born 1975.)"

As this remark demonstrates, the fact that these donations are aimed at helping only “true Greeks” is a clear racist act by Golden Dawn. The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ may legitimize the prevalence of “true Greeks”, only of those who are
members of the Greek nation by their birth. It also shows how the Golden Dawn donation may change the thinking of a woman who always used to participate, but now she is more content to know that her blood goes only to Greeks. As a result, the Golden Dawn actions manage to mobilise more women, especially those who need material support. Women who are already activists can fulfil their role of biological reproduction; meanwhile, they are in leading, organizing positions during the events.

Nevertheless, donations with some other events organized by the Golden Dawn can be defined as quasi civil actions. It may be proposed that charity actions of the far right belong to the sphere of civil society. Early studies refer to the Golden Dawn as ‘dubious civil society manifestations’, as a possible part of the informal civil society in Greece besides the existing but weak civil society (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 16). In Hungary, where studies show that civil society is very weak as well, there are also organizations and actions in the far right scene with some civil characteristics. Some studies already examined the relation between civil society and the far right, suggesting possible changes to our definition such as including the actions of the far right especially in the Central-Eastern European region (Polyakova, 2012). Andrea Pető argues that women easily join NGOs because they feel more comfortable in them than in official organizations. These far right parties often start as NGOs, an organizational form that offers better access to women (Pető, 2012). I would go even further, and argue that these parties and movements have actions and characteristics that can be regarded as part of civil society, and this profile may attract subgroups of women more.

Activities connected to material reproduction are common parts of the women’s agenda in both cases. It is also common that this type of reproduction appears in a racist frame with the ‘Truly Hungarian’ products and the food handouts only for Greek citizens. An important difference is that Jobbik puts women into favourable financial positions and gives them power, while they are able to practise their biological reproduction roles. On the other hand, Golden Dawn’s strong hierarchy restricts women’s possibilities to managing only the party’s donation events. They cannot create their own spheres where they can extend their personal agency. However, it is an important common feature that the these activities are strongly supported by both parties because they attract new, mainly female supporters.

In the following part of the paper, I am describing the dynamic of the other typical role of women in the far right of contemporary Greece and Hungary. Besides the biological reproduction the nations’ reproduction happens in a symbolic way as well, which is supported by women by preserving what is considered to be the national culture. This is also connected to the growing consumer ethnocentrism that is organized around food and also a wide range of cultural products, from the sabretache decorated with the symbols of the subculture, books, music (Szele, 2012) and festivals at their own University. According to the literature, women in charge of cultural reproduction teach children (Yuval-Davis, 1997) and even the whole community in

---


7 One of them is the ’Koppány group’, where they have also a women’s division called ‘Amazon’.

order to keep the nation’s values alive. For this reason, many of them have a professional background as teachers and continue teaching inside the subculture. It is not just about teaching itself, but also the organization and propagation of cultural programmes like exhibitions or performances. Women with a cultural mission often work for book publishers or even lead them, and might have jobs at the subculture’s periodicals or radio stations as editors or writers. In some cases, they run their own shops labelled as ‘truly Hungarian’ where they take part in cultural reproduction, teaching the younger generations:

There are youngsters who come back all the time, who are growing up here. I could say I see them growing up. There are students in colleges, who have moved to the city, and they keep coming back. (‘K’ born 1969.)

Another interviewee who used to be a kindergarten teacher is now managing a book publishing company. Her husband and her father-in-law were writers. These women often have one or more close male relatives already active in the subculture as writers or other intellectuals, or even politicians, which builds a connection and an easier way for women to legitimize their activity. As a result, the researched pattern emerges: women are often involved in the far right through their male relatives (Durham, 1998). It can be concluded that these women are successful in the subculture, teach their ideology to children, youngsters and the whole subculture, thereby attracting more supporters for the far right.

In the Greek case, in the WWF’s activities the role of cultural as well as biological reproduction seems to be more organized. Besides the charity actions, the Women’s Division is active on the cultural reproduction side as well. In general, the Golden Dawn as a party and a movement emphasizes the importance of the ‘proper’ teaching of ‘real’ history, visiting schools and sometimes interfering with education. They have visited kindergartens and nurseries, stressing that it is never too early to start a proper ideological education. The party offers alternative education to children in its local offices. This informal education includes talks for children from nursery school age upwards, telling them about mythology and history according to the movement’s narrative. WWF plays a major role in this, since typically they are the ones who organize these sessions. My member interviewee also ran such sessions for children. There are numerous articles on the blog about children’s education.

Furthermore, WWF also organizes meetings about the ideology for members and potential members and there are some specific presentations only for women. These events have a strict routine. For example, they address both the participants and the presenters as “comrades” and they always finish with the Golden Dawn anthem.

My interviewee told me that the lectures usually address important current problems faced by women, the proper habits of a Greek woman or general contemporary
issues. She further explained that in her most recent session she had talked about the connection between drug-addicts and immigrants, arguing that this social illness was due to foreigners, who brought the disease to Greek people.

Likewise, as in the Hungarian case, I have found some connection between emerging consumer attitudes within the Greek subculture and women’s role in cultural reproduction. In a 2013 protest in Athens, where I did participant observation, women were selling books, relics, badges and T-shirts of the Golden Dawn. They told me that part of the proceeds from selling these products supports the party. These women, actually mostly young girls, informed me that they were not allowed to say more about the products and their thoughts without permission from upper levels. When I was talking to them, after a while, a man came up to us and started to answer my questions instead of the girls. This story reflects the internal hierarchy and women’s role on the consumer side. They cannot conduct their own business the way it is done in Hungary, because they are bonded by the hierarchy and its strict rules.

The meaning and the degree of cultural reproduction and women’s activities is different in the two cases. The “cultural war against the enemies” is a stronger focus for the Golden Dawn, with more explicit racist explanations and actions. It is an organized fight and its proper ways are defined by the party. At seminars for children and supporters, women may be in leading positions, but are not given as much freedom as in the Hungarian case, where they can educate the youngsters in their own way. A common pattern is the trade with subcultural products, but while women can conduct their own business in Hungary, they appear only as sales employees in Greece.

Conclusion

This paper has presented different kinds of female participation in the Hungarian and the Greek far right. Two different levels of women’s engagement have been introduced. In both contexts, participation happens inside the anti-modernist framework, but putting the mission in ‘new clothes’ with the reinterpretation of biological and cultural reproductive roles. In the Greek case, this reform is more limited because of the rigid hierarchy in the whole movement and inside the Women’s Division. However, some women can be in leading positions both in offline and online activities, mobilising other women to join. As a result, there are far more women in the Golden Dawn now than there were before.

In the Hungarian case, the Jobbik Women’s Division is weak, the party controls women’s participation to a lesser extent, thus it offers them more freedom and opportunities. Here the main playing field is the fruitful subculture around the party, where it is even financially beneficial for women to invest in participation as a female. At the same time, their activity also brings new female supporters to the party. In both cases, participation in such movements can give women a strong identity that former mainstream parties cannot provide. In the far right subculture they can find a community, and occasionally even partners. Furthermore, these parties may have some opportunities for women who suffer from their unequal situation and the
multiple disadvantages of the economic crisis. As a result, these phenomena are embedded in a wider social and political context in both cases.

Golden Dawn and Jobbik have made use of women’s impact in two ways. Firstly, they mobilize other women in the same way as the National Front did in France with Marine Le Pen (Mayer, 2013). Through their activities women have had a huge impact on the growing public support that these parties enjoy. Secondly, women’s presence corresponds to the development of a less radical, more mainstream image that is one of the main interests of these parties nowadays. Therefore, women’s presence and activities are likely to be supported even more strongly by the Golden Dawn and Jobbik in the future.

Although every case is embedded into its national context, some general patterns definitely seem to emerge. Far right parties are no longer outsiders to the party system. In many European countries, they are among the most supported parties and have been elected as members of their domestic parliaments and of the European Parliament as well. Their position and interest change and form the frames and aspects of women’s position and representation in many fields. However, the reproductive roles of women are still the main issue for every far right party, but their actual realization can vary from country to country. This is why further comparative investigations should be conducted.

References


Securitization of LGBTIQ Minorities in Serbian Far-right Discourses: A Post-structuralist Perspective

Abstract

This article analyses the securitization of LGBTIQ population in the narratives of Serbian far-right organizations, i.e. the discursive construction of the LGBTIQ minorities as a threat. The analysis relies on securitization theory in order to demonstrate how the issue of gay rights is taken beyond ‘normal politics’ and constructed as a security issue. By drawing upon post-structuralist reading of securitization theory, this article argues that the narratives of Serbian far-right groups acquire legitimacy due to their coherence with the mainstream discourses on homosexuality and LGBTIQ rights. Moreover, it argues that through the securitization of sexual minorities in the far-right discourses, the Serbian national identity is being re-defined and strengthened. This article uses discourse analysis as main method. The sources of data include press statements and other media pieces, reports by civil society organizations and government institutions, public opinion surveys and websites of the far-right groups. The analysis is focused on the period from the adoption of the Anti-discrimination Law in 2009 onwards, as the period in which the issue of LGBTIQ rights has become increasingly topical in the Serbian public sphere.

Keywords: LGBTIQ, Serbia, securitization, far-right, extremism, discourse.

1 This article was drafted during the research visit to Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) which was a part of the project ‘Renewed and Revised Cooperation between the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and NUPT’.
**Introduction**

Over the past decade Serbia has established a solid legal framework for the protection of human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and questioning (hereinafter: LGBTIQ) persons. Besides the general ban on discrimination contained in the Article 21 of the Serbian Constitution, a series of laws, including the comprehensive Anti-discrimination Law adopted in 2009, contain provisions that explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity. In spite of the sound normative framework (European Commission, 2014: 13; Gay Straight Alliance [hereinafter: GSA] 2013: 10), LGBTIQ population in Serbia is among the most marginalized and vulnerable groups (GSA, 2013; Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 2014: 451-452; Commissioner for Protection of Equality [hereinafter: CPE], 2014: 85). The most vocal opponents of gay rights are Serbian far-right groups and organizations which, although institutionally marginal, manage to get their voices heard, particularly when it comes to the LGBTIQ issues. Serbian right-wing extremists are engaged not only in the violent attacks and direct threats to the LGBTIQ population, but also in a discursive process of radical othering of the sexual minorities and portraying the LGBTIQ identities as a threat to the Serbian national Self. This discursive construction of a group or a phenomenon as a security threat is called securitization.

The analysis of securitization processes will contribute to understanding of the gap between norms and practices of LGBTIQ rights in Serbia, and the importance of this article stems from this contribution. The article focuses on the securitization moves by the extreme nationalists, and seeks to explain how the extremists’ narratives acquire legitimacy and become acceptable for a significant audience or, in other words, how the extreme is getting mainstreamed. The main argument that I am developing is that the audience acceptance of the far-right organizations’ narratives is achieved due to their compatibility with the mainstream discourses in which nationalism, gender inequality and homophobia are already installed as dominant norms. I am also arguing that the securitization of sexual minorities by the extreme nationalists contributes to the re-shaping and strengthening of the Serbian national identity through the establishment of a binary opposition between the referent object of securitization (Serbian nation) and the threat (LGBTIQ population).

In this article, I am using a post-structuralist reading of securitization theory as the theoretical framework for the analysis of the Serbian far-right discourses related to homosexuality and LGBTIQ rights. This particular reading of the securitization theory supports the premise that identities and power positions are not stable and extra-discursively determined, but changeable and continually (re)produced through the discourse. The post-structuralist approach has been chosen in order to demonstrate that success of securitization does not depend on positional power of a securitizing actor – in this case Serbian far-right groups – but, on the contrary, that

---

2 The abbreviation LGBTIQ signifies a heterogeneous social group composed of a variety of sexual identities. Without intention to reduce the LGBTIQ population to a single identity, or to represent them as a unified group, this article will use the abbreviation LGBTIQ to signify all the sexual identities that differ from heterosexuality, the dominant sexual norm in Serbian society.
Securitization itself could empower certain actors and their agendas. The empirical part of this article is based on discourse analysis. Post-structuralist approach and its central preposition that social reality does not exist independently from our ideas and representations of this reality, renders discourse analysis not only desirable but necessary (Wilhelmsen, 2013: 58). The sources of data in this article include press statements and other media pieces, reports by civil society organizations and government institutions, public opinion surveys and websites of the far-right groups. The empirical analysis encompasses the period since 2009, the year in which the Serbian Parliament adopted the Anti-discrimination Law and the LGBTIQ community, encouraged by the new Law, started with the attempts to organize Pride Parades. As a consequence, the issue of homosexuality and LGBTIQ rights became increasingly topical in the nationalist discourse.

**Post-structuralist Reading of Securitization Theory as a Framework for Analysis**

Unlike traditional approaches to the concept of security that treat security as an objectively given reality existing prior to language, securitization theory places emphasis on the processes of discursive construction of security, i.e. the ways security is spoken about. While the former are primarily concerned with how to maximize security/eliminate insecurity, the latter dismisses the binary opposition security/insecurity and focuses on how an issue becomes a security issue (Wæver 1995). Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, the main architects of securitization theory and central figures of the Copenhagen School of security studies, define securitization as a ‘discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 491). This process implies that a securitizing actor articulates an issue as an existential security threat to a referent object, and this articulation is accepted by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998: 35-36). Through a speech act, the issue at stake is being moved from the domain of politics governed by established rules and taken to the security realm thus allowing for extraordinary measures (Ibid: 23-24).

---

3 Since 2009, the Belgrade Pride was held only twice, in 2010 and 2014, although it was announced every year. The other four attempts of the LGBTIQ community in Serbia to hold the Pride Parade ended with Government bans. All four times the Government representatives cited security reasons, i.e. the threats by the far-right organizations, as the reason for banning the Pride Parade. Those bans pointed to the critical lack of will and/or interest of the Serbian Governments to deal with the right wing extremism.
Securitization Process: Key Components

Taking the stance that no subject or object is stable, finished and pre-determined in terms of identity and power position, post-structuralist approach to securitization theory places emphasis on discursivity, intersubjectivity/intertextuality and changeability of structures. In other words, instead of focusing on actors and objects of securitization, post-structuralist approach focuses on representations, processes and interactions/inter-relations between texts. Therefore, I chose to focus on four components of the securitization process that are suggested and taken from Julie Wilhelmsen (2013), however, adapted to fit the scope and case study presented in this article. These four components are: discursive context, securitizing narrative, legitimation process, and re-production of the referent object.

**Discursive context:** Michel Foucault, who has played the central role in the development of discourse analysis, sees discourses as specific regimes of knowledge consisting of series of statements that impose rules on what gives meaning (Foucault, 1972). Building upon Michael Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) developed a theory which aims at understanding of the social world as fully discursive. For Laclau and Mouffe, there is no distinction between discourse and material world, discourses are material and, therefore, all social phenomena could be analysed using the concept of discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 34-36). Unlike Foucault, who strived to identify only one knowledge regime for each historical period, Laclau and Mouffe are building a more conflictual picture in which different and often antagonistic discourses exist simultaneously and struggle over the creation of meaning (Ibid: 13). Drawing upon Laclau’s and Mouffe’s concept of discourse, this article will examine the Serbian context, more specifically, the dominant discourse on gender and LGBTIQ rights. It will seek to identify a series of signifiers – norms, political and everyday practices, statements by public figures, as well as media representations – that taken together represent a specific knowledge regime on gender and sexual difference.

**Securitizing narrative:** Talking about securitization as a speech act, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998: 33) point out certain criteria that securitizing narrative has to fulfil in order for securitization to be successful. They argue that such a narrative has to follow the ‘general grammar of security’, i.e. to signify existential threat, point of no return and possible way out. Moreover, securitizing narrative has to include the ‘dialects’ of specific domains in which securitization occurs (Ibid). For example, as Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde suggest, in the societal sector securitizing narratives often refer to identity (See also: McSweeney, 1996). Post-structuralists take stance that identity is always relational, in the sense it is being constructed in relation to what it is not, i.e. in relation to the Other that is substantially different (Barth, 1969; Connolly, 1991; Hansen, 2006). Laclau and Mouffe analysed the process of identity formation through a pair of concepts, namely ‘the logic of equivalence’ and ‘the logic of difference’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 44-45). These concepts suggest that identities are constructed along two lines; the series of signs are interlinked in the way they constitute relation of sameness and, at the same time, they are juxtaposed to another series of sign thus constituting the relation of difference. Lene Hansen (2006: 41-45) refers to this process as to the process of linking and differentiation.
examination of a broader discursive context in Serbia, this article will analyse the
securitizing narratives of far-right organizations - the security grammar of these
narratives, as well as the ways in which they construct LGBTIQ identities as opposed
to the Serbian national identity.

Legitimation process: Securitization, as an intersubjective process, will be
successful if the audience, by accepting a specific articulation of a threat, gives
legitimacy to the employment of such measures that otherwise would not be
legitimate. Since the post-structuralist reading of securitization theory suggests that
neither the securitizing actor, the audience nor the referent object are given nor stable
entities, the focus of this analysis will be on the relationship between discursive context
and the securitizing narrative. In line with this approach, Wæver (2002: 29) points out:
‘Subjects, objects and concepts cannot be seen as existing independent of discourse.
Certain categories and arguments that are powerful in one period or at one place can
sound non-sensible or absurd at others.’ Within specific terrain of securitization
theory, this translates as follows: no securitization attempt, as an individual
statement/utterance, takes place nor can produce effects independently of a broader
discursive context. Drawing upon Wæver conceptualization, this paper will offer an
understanding of how the discursive context in Serbia enables securitization of the
LGBTIQ population by far-right actors.

Re-production of the referent object: In order to declare something a threat, the
securitizing actor inevitably has to declare what is being threatened, namely the
referent object. Post-structuralist reading of securitization theory suggests that all
objects of our knowledge are constantly being re-produced through various discourses,
thus the referent object in a securitization process is not only being described as
something that deserves protection, but is also being re-defined and re-evaluated
(Wilhelmsen, 2013:40-41). Through securitization, the referent object acquires new
meaning in juxtaposition to the existential threat (Ibid). According to Derrida (cited in
Wilhelmsen, 2013:41), such binary oppositions are never neutral in terms of power –
one element is privileged and assumes a role of dominance over the other. Therefore,
the referent object, as the privileged element in the binary opposition, is being re-
produced in such a way that it is being strengthened and empowered. In that sense, I
will seek to analyse how the Serbian national identity, as the referent object of the far-
right securitization moves, acquires new qualities and a new strength due to the
processes of securitization.

Nationalism, Gender and Homosexuality – Theoretical Assumptions

Before starting the empirical analysis of securitization components, it would be useful
to outline the theoretical assumptions that helped me understand the dominant
discourse on LGBTIQ issues in Serbia, characterized by interplay of nationalism,
patriarchy and homophobia. Among scholars exploring the relationship between
gender and nationalism it is widely accepted that nationalist discourse promotes
women as mothers, wives, and caretakers responsible for the biological reproduction
of the nation, while depriving them of political subjectivity. (Papić, 1994; Bracewell,
1996; Yuval-Davis, 1998). Talking about the transition from ‘state socialism’ to ‘state nationalism’ in Serbia, Zarana Papić (1994: 13) points out:

[...] One of the most pertinent features of all these new post-Communist democracies is the fact that they are male dominated, overtly patriarchal, traditional, and conservative regarding the position of women, their social role and significance. In the Eastern former socialist countries the new patriarchy is now the prevailing social reality for women, as well as for men.

Papić adds that during the period of Yugoslav socialism women’s legal rights were more progressive and emancipatory then the actual reality of women’s lives that were still governed by patriarchal rules. However, nationalism sanctioned gender inequality and formalised the confinement of women to the private domain (Ibid).

With regards to the construction of sexuality and sexual orientation in nationalist discourse, it is important to take into consideration the work of George Mosse who analysed the relationship between nationalism and sexuality in the bourgeois societies of the 19th and the first half of 20th century. Mosse (1985) introduced the concept of ‘bourgeois respectability’, which signifies a set of norms, morals, manners and sexual attitudes that represent normality. Nationalism, he argues, played the crucial role in spreading respectability to all classes of the society (Ibid: 9). One of the key signifiers of the nationalist/respectability discourse was the ideal of manliness, that reinforced the division between gender roles and also served as a powerful symbol of the nation’s spiritual and material vitality (Ibid: 23-24). Most importantly, manliness, as a stereotype, needed a counter-type – an image against which it could define itself (Mosse, 1996). The list of those remaining outside the notion of manliness was rather long and heterogeneous, and it included, among others, homosexuals (Ibid). In the nationalist discourse, those who failed to attain the qualities of manliness were not seen as deserving pity or compassion, but, on the contrary, they were regarded as the enemies of nation, and the ones representing an active threat to the normative order of the society (Ibid: 63).

The alignment between nationalism and masculinity is not imminent only to the bourgeois societies that Mosse’s work was concerned with. Wendy Bracewell (2000) points out that in the post-communist Serbia the re-emergence of nationalism was fuelled by an appealing narrative that explicitly linked national honour with the ideal of manliness. In the middle of social and economic crisis, Bracewell argues, the nationalist programme promoted the re-building of national dignity through the enforcement of strict division between genders and a particular type of manliness – militaristic, tough and heterosexual (Ibid: 569-570). Further, Jessica Greenberg (2006) analyses the antagonism between two forms of citizenships in post-Milošević Serbia:

---

4 Yugoslav socialism departed in many ways from the totalitarian Stalinist-Bolshevik ideology and the practice of the Eastern bloc countries – through liberalization of economy, the introduction of workers’ self-management, decentralization of political power, openness to the West, etc. However, the patriarchal order remained. ‘The socialist regime was a communist, and male dominated, patriarchal, and authoritarian conglomerate which, paradoxically was stabilized even more by the mixture of progressive women’s legal rights, and existent patriarchy that governed women’s real lives’, Papić argues (1994: 13).
nationalist and multicultural citizenship. While the former is organized around the principles of masculinity, ethnic belonging and exclusion of the Other, the latter is liberal democratic, inclusive and based on the recognition of difference, including sexual difference. However, as Greenberg points out, the inclusiveness of multicultural citizenship is paradoxical in that it excludes those who once occupied the site of ‘absolute privilege’, i.e. it abolishes their privileged position in relation to others (Ibid: 326). Therefore, those who were dominant within the nationalist framework feel threatened by the new forms of citizenship, and their struggle to retain political relevance results in violence, homophobia, misogyny and racism (Ibid: 336).

**Discursive Context in Serbia**

Throughout 1990s, ethnic nationalism in Serbia was successfully imposed by Slobodan Milošević’s regime as the official ideology and hegemonic discourse, thus replacing Yugoslav socialism after almost half a century of its hegemony. After the downfall of Milošević, Serbia started transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime through a series of reforms. In the course of this democratic transition, new discourses emerged – a Europeanization discourse, a human rights discourse, a transitional justice discourse, a neo-liberal discourse, and a number of other discourses competing over the creation of meaning. The antagonism between the emerging discourses and nationalism reflected the struggle of what Greenberg (2006) calls multicultural and nationalist citizenship. Although the hegemonic position of nationalist discourse was challenged, new elites never made a radical break with nationalism (Kuljić, 2002; Atanacković, 2011). Therefore, it managed not only to survive but to remain dominant and, in some sense, the official discourse. Article 1 of the Serbian Constitution adopted in 2006 states: [the] ‘Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it, […]’ (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2006), therefore establishing a hierarchy between Serbs and non-Serbs living in Serbia. Other indicators – such as the large ethnic distance of Serbian citizens to the members of some other nations, particularly Albanians, historical revisionism and glorification of the nationalist past, as well as the high electoral support for

---

5 According to the public opinion research ‘Citizens’ Attitudes towards Discrimination in Serbia’ from 2013, conducted by CeSID (Centre for Free Elections and Democracy) for the Commissioner for Protection of Equality (Available at: http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs/downloads/files/izvestaj_diskriminacija_cesid_undp_poverenik_2013_y_21_02_2014_final_sajt.pdf), citizens of Serbia have the largest ethnic distance towards Albanians, comparing with other nationalities, in all eight types of social interactions that were examined – from being citizens of the same country, to being family members. For example, 33 per cent of Serbian citizens would not want an ethnic Albanian for a friend, while 41 per cent would mind an Albanian teaching their children. Ethnic distance of Serbian citizens to other ethnic groups is smaller, but still significant.

6 Todor Kuljić (2002) argues that the re-emergence of Serbian nationalism was made possible through a revision of historical memory of the WWII and a radical critique of Yugoslav socialism by the nationalist elites. This process started during the 1990s, but intensified after the democratic changes in 2000. WWII veterans of the ultra-nationalist Chetniks and antifascist Partisan movement were legally declared equal in rights; legal rehabilitations processes of Chetniks started; history textbooks were changed; streets named
nationalist and populist political parties from 1990s onwards – confirm the strength of nationalist discourse in today's Serbia.

Nationalist discourse reinforced traditional gender roles. The Gender Barometer (Blagojević Hughson, 2012), a survey offering complex analysis of the gender dimension of everyday life in Serbia, points out the trends of re-traditionalization and re-patriarchalization of Serbian society that coincide with the re-emergence of nationalism and are discursively connected to it. In spite of a certain progress towards more gender equality in everyday practices, patriarchy is still the dominant discourse on family life (Ibid: 133). Within this discourse, two interdependent normative models are promoted – heterosexuality and care-taking as women’s practice (Ibid: 175, 195-199). Therefore, care-taking, as the activity belonging to the private realm, has been naturalized as the responsibility of (heterosexual) women. The implication of this is that women invest more time than men into unpaid work, which affects women’s position on the labour market negatively (Ibid: 133). Traditional, patriarchal gender stereotypes dominate not only family relations and labour, but all areas of social life (CPE, 2012: 27-28; 2014: 77). ‘Gender-based discrimination is usually inflicted against women, and its key causes are firm traditional and patriarchal stereotypes about gender roles in the family and wider community’ (CPE, 2012: 27-28).

Homosexuality has been frequently depicted by Serbian nationalist politicians as an illness and abnormality. In other words, it has been explicitly excluded from the set of ‘normal’ practices and behaviours that Mosse (1985) calls ‘bourgeois respectability.’ For instance, Dragan Marković, MP and the president of the right-wing United Serbia party, which is a part of the current ruling coalition, stated on several occasions that homosexuality is ‘an illness’ (Congradin et al., 2009; Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 2013: 45). Because of that, in 2011 Palma was found guilty of severe discrimination against the LGBTIQ population and banned by the Court from repeating his discriminatory behaviour. Since the Court of Appeal revoked the first-instance verdict, it took three years for the verdict against Dragan Marković to be confirmed and to become final. Nevertheless, only one day after the final verdict, on 12 July 2014, Marković stated in an open letter that he will never change his views regarding homosexuality, thus making the Court verdict pointless (GSA, 2014). Further, during his mandate as the Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, the leader of the Serbian Socialist Party (the party of Slobodan Milošević), insisted that homosexuality ‘is not normal’ and that it ‘could not be the model for bringing up children’ (Kurir, 2013). He also stated that the Pride Parade is not a human rights issue, but only a matter of security concern,8 implying that this event does not contribute to the

after Partisan heroes changed their names. According to Kuljić (2012), the consequence of historical revisionism is the relativization of fascism and antifascism, which further leads to the affirmation and normalization of nationalism.


betterment of the LGBTIQ minorities but only endangers its participants. Although the mainstream politicians do not explicitly link the LGBTIQ rights with the identity of Serbian nation, they either connect homosexuality with the decline of the Serbian population, like Marković (GSA, 2014), or suggest that LGBTIQ rights are forcefully imposed by the EU, like Dačić (Kurir, 2013), which reveals the connection between their homophobia and nationalist values.

The re-emergence of Serbian nationalism was followed by a drastic increase of the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church that, despite the declarative secularity of the state, openly tends to interfere in political decision-making. The Church’s narratives are strikingly similar to the narratives of extreme nationalist organizations. However, the high rate of religious identification, as well as the high level of trust that the Church enjoys in post-communist Serbia, suggest that this institution belongs to the societal mainstream. Therefore, I chose to approach the Church’s discourse as a part of the mainstream. On numerous occasions, the Church dignitaries equated homosexuality with paedophilia,9,10 claimed that LGBTIQ persons are deviant and ill,11,12 called the Pride Parade the ‘Shame Parade’ and compared it with Sodom and Gomorrah13,14. For instance, after the first Pride Parade held in Belgrade in 2010, Metropolitan Amfilohije stated that homosexuality destroys, among other things, ‘the spirit of the folk’, which indicates the nationalist character of his narrative. He said:

Something terrible happened yesterday in Belgrade. [...] It is terrible, as the event that took place today poisons; and it is dictated by today’s strongmen of the world. That is something that destroys not only the body itself but also the spiritual organism, the spirit of the folk, denies human life, and desecrates the holiness of the human body, human spirit, community, and

---


leads to nothingness and self-destruction.’ (Amfilohije, cited in Jovanović, 2013: 84)

Equally significant is the discourse of print media and television. Findings of the media analysis conducted by Labris (Organization for Lesbian Human Rights from Belgrade) show that topics related to sexual minorities have become more frequent in the Serbian mainstream media during the past decade. However, the number of media pieces with negative or neutral connotation has been higher than the number of those breaking off with negative stereotypes and promoting a positive image of the LGBTIQ minorities (Labris, 2007; Višnjić, 2012). Labris’s analysis points out that media discourse on LGBTIQ issues abounds in derogatory language and hate speech, which contributes to othering of sexual minorities and generates fear and hatred. The role of media in shaping the public image of the LGBTIQ population is particularly prominent before the announcements of Pride Parades. Mina Pejić (2013) argues that the media contribute to securitization of Pride Parades in four ways: by using derogatory terms (such as ‘faggots’, ‘Shame Parade’, etc.), by giving significant space to the right-wing extremists who threaten the Pride participants, by publishing statements of politicians and other public figures that constitute hate speech, and by presenting Pride Parades as a threat to public order and the security of citizens (Ibid).

To sum up this section, the dominant discourses on gender and sexuality in Serbia are significantly influenced by nationalism, patriarchal values and homophobia. The re-emergence of nationalism in the 1990s, and its normalization after the democratic changes of 2000, entailed a specific gender regime. The ideal of manliness, as an intrinsic feature of nationalism (Mosse, 1985, 1996; Bracewell, 2000), imposed gender inequality as natural, and heterosexuality as the only acceptable sexual behaviour. Therefore, non-heterosexual people remained outside of the notion of normality, which prepared the terrain for the securitization of LGBTIQ identities by the extreme nationalists.

Securitizing Narratives of the Far-right Organizations

Serbian far-right organizations are institutionally marginal, in the sense that the great majority of them are extra-parliamentary actors. Yet, when it comes to LGBTIQ issues, their narratives have a powerful resonance in Serbian society. The analysis in

---

15 Media research conducted by Labris analysed twelve TV programmes about lesbian and gay population broadcast on four Serbian TV channels in 2007. The analysis pointed out that only one programme positively contextualised the subject, three media pieces had very negative connotations, while eight pieces were neutral (Labris, 2007: 9, 14). During 2011, the same organization monitored printed media in Serbia and analysed 1785 articles about LGBTIQ persons in 18 newspapers with high circulation. This research showed an unchanging trend in reporting on LGBTIQ population – more than half of the articles used a neutral tone, while the articles with negative attitudes towards LGBTIQ outnumbered those with positive (Višnjić, 2012: 13).

16 Serbian Radical Party, the party that belongs to the extreme right, was a parliamentary party until the elections in 2012 at which, for the first time in its history, it did not win any seats in the National Parliament.
this chapter will include three organisations: Dveri\textsuperscript{17}, Obraz\textsuperscript{18} and SNP Naši\textsuperscript{19}. It should be noted that there are other far-right organizations in Serbia that all share the anti-gay sentiment. However, a high level of similarity between their agendas and ideological foundations allows me to focus on the above mentioned three as those with the most elaborated and structured political programmes, including elaborated anti-gay agendas and narratives that explicitly securitize LGBTIQ identities. These three organizations also have the highest media prominence, due to their ambition to enter institutional politics, i.e. the participation at parliamentary elections, as well as due to their continuous involvement in homophobic and nationalist propaganda.

\textbf{Dveri: ‘We are not a party, we are a family!’}\textsuperscript{20}

Dveri is a Serbian far-right political organization that was founded in the late 1990s as an Orthodox Christian right-wing student organisation. Until today, Dveri participated in two parliamentary elections, in 2012 and 2014, but both times remained below the threshold which left them out of the Serbian Parliament. The political programme of Dveri is based on the values of extreme nationalism with elements of fascism (Dinić, 2010). A very prominent element of the political programme of Dveri is care for the family (Dveri website). In the narrative of Dveri, the notion of family signifies a traditional, patriarchal family, based on marriage between a man and a woman, and with the primary purpose of procreation.

Each year since 2009, as a response to the announced Pride Parades, Dveri has been organising the so called Family Walks - the counter-parades promoting traditional values and patriarchal morals. In 2009, Dveri announced ‘Ten reasons to join the Family Walk’ (Obradović, 2009). Those ten reasons were ten statements about the Serbian family being threatened, not only by homosexuality and Pride Parades, but also by other trends of democratization and modernization in Serbian society, as well as by market liberalization.\textsuperscript{21} Ten out of nine statements ended with the word ‘threatened’ and an exclamation mark suggesting urgency of the threat or, in terms of securitization theory, the point of no return (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). One of the statements was directly related to homosexuality and it read: ‘Family morality is threatened!’ (Obradović, 2009). In the explanation of this threat, Boško Obradović, a member of Dveri, described homosexuality as an ideology that has been forcibly imposed on Serbian people by Western powers and argued that the recognition of rights of sexual minorities would force people to give up parenthood. This narrative, by describing homosexuality as foreign to Serbian people and blaming it for a

\textsuperscript{17} Dveri website. \url{http://dverisrpske.com/sr/}. Accessed: 10-02-2015.
\textsuperscript{18} Obraz website. \url{http://www.obraz.rs/}. Accessed: 10-02-2015.
\textsuperscript{19} SNP Naši website. \url{http://nasisrbija.org/}. Accessed: 10-02-2015.
\textsuperscript{20} One of the official slogans of Dveri.
\textsuperscript{21} The reasons are listed as follows: ‘The future of your family is threatened! Healthy childhood of your children is threatened! Schooling of your children is threatened! Upbringing of your children is threatened! Family morality is threatened! Health of your family is threatened! Privacy of your family is threatened! Financial situation of your family is threatened! Social environment of your family is threatened! Political organization of our families does not exist!’
potential population decline, reveals once again the connection between homophobia and Serbian nationalism.

In 2010, the year in which the first Pride Parade was held in Serbia, Dveri were marked as one of the far-right groups that were campaigning against the Pride and inciting street riots. Srdjan Nogo, a member of Dveri, said on that occasion: ‘They [the Government] have destroyed everything, and now they want our family. This is the defence of the family and the future of the Serbian people’. This statement was directed against the Serbian Government, but the reason was the Government’s support for the Pride. Again, the ‘general grammar of security’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 33), is striking in this narrative – family is being threatened and, consequently, the future of the nation is at danger. From 2011 onwards, representatives of Dveri started referring to Pride Parades as to the ‘promotion of totalitarian ideology of homosexualism’ that aims at destroying family values. The association with totalitarianism suggests that the respect for human rights of LGBTIQ persons will lead to the violation of rights of other individuals. It is based on a binary logic in which heterosexuality and homosexuality are opposed to each other and only one can ‘win’. This rhetorical move contributed to the securitization of LGBTIQ issues by moving them from the domain of normal politics to the security domain.

Obraz: For the Orthodox Theocracy

The Serbian Patriotic Movement ‘Obraz’ was a Serbian clerical-fascist organization that was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2012 due to the involvement in violent activities against the constitutional order, violation of human rights, and incitement of racial, ethnic and religious hatred. Nevertheless, this organization continued to exist with a slightly changed name – Serbian Obraz (hereinafter: Obraz), and with an unchanged organizational infrastructure and ideology. The ideological orientation of Obraz is very similar to that of Dveri, except that Obraz is more pronouncedly clerical (Obraz website). They advocate for the establishment of Serbia as an Orthodox theocracy and derive their agenda from the political programme of Serbian fascists from the 1930s and 1940s (Petakov, 2009: 47).

The discourse of Obraz regarding the issues of LGBTIQ rights and Pride Parades is primarily a discourse of violence and threats. Nevertheless, anti-gay violence and discrimination need justification in the form of a securitizing narrative. Before the announced Pride Parade in 2009, the leader of Obraz Mladen Obradović said: ‘We will not let the Pride Parade be held. [...] Serbs have never been in favour of spreading evil, and they [Pride Parade organizers and the Government] are trying to impose what is evil in the eyes of God. Our duty is to defend the traditional values’. By referring to religious values, this narrative depicts the emancipatory strategies of LGBTIQ community as evil and godless, and, at the same time, it presents Serbs as good and god-fearing. In other words, it constructs the identity of Serbian people in a process that Hansen (2006: 41-45) refers to as linking and differentiation, i.e. through a binary opposition between Serbs and the LGBTIQ population. Following the security grammar, it establishes the Pride Parade as a security threat to traditional values of Serbian people, pointing out the duty of patriotic Serbs to defend those values.

In 2011, Obradović confirmed his views:

Serbian nationalists are not against the Shame Parade because they have nothing else to do, nor because, God forbid, they hate someone, but because such a parade is the image of a regime that aims at destroying the Serbian nation and everything that is sacred and close to dear God. Thus, by fighting against Sodom and Gomorrha on the streets of Serbian cities, people are actually fighting against the treacherous Government! Obraz, therefore, invites all god-fearing and patriotic Serbian men and women, [...] to the Prayer walk for a healthy family. We want it to be a peaceful promotion of healthy family and national values.

Once again, Obradović portrayed the Pride Parade as opposed to God, the national values and a ‘healthy’ family and, consequently, as threatening to the god-fearing Serbian nation. Further, referring to Pride Parades as to ‘Shame Parades’ is typical for the discourse of the Serbian right wing, as well as comparing the LGBTIQ community with Sodom and Gomorrha, which originates in the discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church. By invoking this religious narrative, Obradović suggested that

---

26 The leader of Obraz, Mladen Obradović, was sentenced twice before the courts of first instance – in 2011 for organizing the riots during the Pride Parade in 2010, and in 2012 for the threats to LGBTIQ population and for advocating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 2009. The Court of Appeal abolished both verdicts. In the retrial, Obradović was sentenced to four months of house arrest.


Serbia, if it allows LGBTIQ rights and Pride Parades, will have the same fate as Sodom and Gomorrah.29

SNP Naši: The Law against Gay Pride Propaganda

SNP Naši30 is another extreme right organization in Serbia. Just as Obraz, the ideology of SNP Naši represents a mixture of extreme nationalism and Orthodox clericalism (SNP Naši website). At the parliamentary elections in Serbia in March 2014, SNP Naši participated in a coalition with Obraz and the Serbian Radical Party. However, this coalition, like Dveri, remained below the threshold. SNP Naši actively campaign against LGBTIQ rights and Pride Parades, and their discourse is strikingly similar to those of Dveri and Obraz. They strongly oppose Pride Parades and refer to them as to ‘satanic’ events31 that aim at destroying the Serbian family and the foundations of a ‘normal’ society.32 Also, one of the key points of the securitization moves by SNP Naši is that the Pride Parade violates the rights of Serbian people and is in breach of the Serbian Constitution and other laws.33 34 This organization has been the initiator of the ban of the so-called ‘gay pride propaganda’. In 2012, SNP Naši proposed the draft of the Law against Gay Pride Propaganda – an elaborate document that is in violation of anti-discrimination laws, laws prohibiting hate speech, and other laws protecting the human rights of LGBTIQ persons (SNP Naši website).35 The mere word ‘propaganda’, which is one of the key signifiers of this draft, suggests a false or exaggerated narrative that aims at advancing a certain cause. Therefore, the draft is based on the premise that the discourse of LGBTIQ rights actually falsifies facts, which has been explicitly stated in the text. The draft has been supplemented with a section explaining the reasons for the adoption of such a law. This section begins with the statement:

29 Talking about the Pride Parade that was supposed to take place in 2013, Obradović explicitly used security language and pointed out that the term ‘defence’ implies ‘the defence of family, Serbdom and Belgrade, in a dignified, prayerful way’ (Jovanović, 2013).
30 SNP stands for Serbian Popular Movement (Serbian: Srpski narodni pokret).
33 In 2011, SNP Naši published a media announcement stating, inter alia ‘The whole project of the “Pride Parade” represents a series of crimes and reveals the connections between state officials and organized crime. The current political regime, in coordination with the organizers of the “Parade of Immorality,” deceives the public by saying that the “Pride Parade” is a “constitutional obligation”. This is based on the false interpretation of some laws, with no regard to the Constitution.’ (Source: SNP Naši, http://nasisrbija.org/snp-nasi-parada-krstene-ustava/)
The adoption of this law banning gay pride propaganda is necessary for a number of reasons, but primarily for the preservation of the public morals of Serbian society, the protection of families and children, for preventing serious forms of discrimination against the Serbian people in their motherland, as well as for the protection of the constitutional right to freedom of expression of moral and religious beliefs. (SNP Nasi website, translated by the author)

Another key signifier in the text of the draft is the word ‘protection’ – of the families, children, public morals, Serbs and their constitutional rights – implying that the Serbian nation is existentially threatened by a distorted image of reality offered by the LGBTIQ community. Consequently, the draft proposes measures – ‘the way out’ of this alleged emergency situation. These measures consist of a series of bans; the ban of the establishment of LGBTIQ civil society organizations, the ban of LGBTIQ advocacy, the prohibition of the use of LGBTIQ symbols such as the rainbow flag, the ban for political parties and media to promote LGBTIQ equality, etc.

The narratives of the Serbian extreme right organizations frame the subject of LGBTIQ rights as a security matter, thus taking it out of the domain of ‘normal politics’ (See: Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). These narratives follow the ‘grammar of security’ by discursively constructing existential threats, points of no return and possible ways out. First, they portray the LGBTIQ minorities and their activism, as well as other actors supporting gay rights, as an existential threat to the Serbian nation, perceived mainly through family iconography and structured according to the same patterns as a patriarchal family. Second, they suggest the urgency and seriousness of the situation (point of no return) through the use of specific words and phrases such as ‘destruction’, ‘necessity of protection’, ‘duty to react’, ‘defence’, ‘breach of the constitution’, ‘totalitarianism’, etc. Third, they propose extraordinary measures to remove existential threats, and these measures include violations of the guaranteed LGBTIQ rights, i.e. the suspension of the existing laws, as well as violence against sexual minorities. The security grammar in the narratives of Serbian far-right organizations intertwines with the identity construction that, according to Buzan et al. (1998), is characteristic of the specific ‘dialect’ of the societal sector. As was previously said, the identity is discursively constructed in relation to certain Otherness, and through the process of linking and differentiation (Hansen, 2006: 41-45) or, in other words, through the establishment of the chains of equivalence and the chains of difference (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 50). I argue that the narratives of the Serbian extreme right re-construct the Serbian national identity by juxtaposing it to the LGBTIQ identities. In these narratives, the LGBTIQ identities are associated with immorality, crime, destruction of family, godlessness, evil, totalitarianism, shame, sin, and Western imperialism, while the identity of the Serbian nation is contrasted to this chain of signifiers. Although the securitizing narratives are focused primarily on the description of the LGBTIQ identities, I argue later in this paper that they also have the function of strengthening Serbian national identity.
Legitimation Process: Acceptance by the Audience

The Serbian audience, as public opinion surveys show, has proven to be pronouncedly homophobic. For example, a survey from 2010, specifically examining the attitudes towards homosexuality, shows that two thirds of the population of Serbia still thinks that homosexuality is a disease, while more than half believes that homosexuality is dangerous for society (56 per cent) and that state institutions should work on suppressing homosexuality (53 per cent) (GSA, 36 2010: 8). More than one third of the population (38 per cent) agrees with the claim that homosexuality was fabricated in the West, with the aim of destroying the family and Serbian tradition (Ibid). Every fifth citizen of Serbia thinks that violence against the participants of Pride Parades is justifiable – ‘if it cannot be prevented in any other way’, while 14 per cent believes that violence and beatings are the only ways of eliminating homosexuality (Ibid: 16). Also, 45 per cent of citizens of Serbia sees Pride Parades as mere provocations aimed at people of ‘normal’ sexual orientation (Ibid: 8), and 69 per cent disagrees with the statement that pride Parades are legitimate means of fighting for gay rights and that they should be held (Ibid: 10). Another piece of research from 2013 shows that citizens of Serbia have the largest social distance vis-à-vis LGBTIQ, in comparison to other minority groups. For instance, eight out of ten respondents would not like to have LGBTIQ person in their family, while almost a half of population (46 per cent) would not want a member of LGBTQ population for a friend (CPE, 2013: 33).

The results of the public opinion surveys indicate that a great part of the citizens of Serbia have negative views on homosexuality and the LGBTIQ population. The attitudes of a significant audience coincide with some of the extremists’ representations of LGBTIQ population, such as those of homosexuality being a threat to the family and Serbian tradition. What is even more important, a significant audience approve of the extraordinary measures towards homosexuals – state suppression (53 per cent) and violence (20 per cent). Further, the number of those who oppose the Pride parades – 69 per cent of the population – suggests that more than two thirds of Serbian citizens would not mind the ban of the Parade, i.e. the suspension of the constitutional rights of citizens. The question is how this acceptance of the extraordinary measures towards LGBTIQ persons has been achieved, having in mind the institutional marginality of the extreme right in Serbia. In this article I argue that the discourses of far-right groups acquire hegemony due to their compatibility and coherence with the official discourses on homosexuality and LGBTIQ rights, and this will be discussed in the following section.

36 The public opinion survey for the needs of Gay Straight Alliance (http://en.gsa.org.rs/) was conducted by CeSID (Centre for Free Elections and Democracy), the Serbian polling agency specialized on socio-political issues. The survey was conducted on a representative sample of 1405 respondents, in the entire territory of Serbia, during March 2010.

37 This public opinion survey was also conducted by CeSID, at the behest of the Commissioner for Protection of Equality (http://www.ravnopravnost.gov.rs). The survey was conducted on a representative sample of 1200 respondents, in the entire territory of Serbia, during November 2013.
As already pointed out, post-structuralist reading of securitization theory suggests that securitizing narratives could not be seen as isolated and self-explanatory moves, nor could the acceptance by the audience be treated as a moment of rational choice (Wilhelmsen, 2013: 45-46). Rather, the securitizing narratives are seen as embedded in a wider discursive terrain, and the acceptance of these narratives by the audience as an on-going process contingent on how a particular representation fits with other representations in a broader discourse (Wæver, 2002; Wilhelmsen, 2013). At this point, it is necessary to go back and look at the main features of the previously discussed discursive terrain in Serbia. I argue here that the securitization of the LGBTIQ population by the right-wing extremists was made possible through the discursive normalization of nationalism and the consequent normalization of gender inequality and homophobia. Normalisation of nationalism occurred after the democratic changes in 2000, when Serbia, instead of making a radical break with the ethnic-nationalist past of the 1990s, provided a legitimation framework for nationalist ideology – through legal norms, historical revisionism and the promotion of the so-called ‘democratic nationalism’ (See, for example: Kuljić, 2002; Milosavljević, 2007; Atanacković, 2011). This normalization affirmed the extreme nationalists as legitimate political actors by bringing them closer to mainstream politics, or, perhaps more accurately, by moving the political mainstream closer to the radical right. Further, normalization of nationalism enforced a certain gender regime, based on inequality in rights and duties for men and women. Re-traditionalization and re-patriarchalization of Serbian society led to the establishment of traditional gender roles as being natural and desirable (Blagojević-Hughson, 2012).

Finally, the normalization of nationalism and gender inequality induced normalization of homophobia. Homosexuality could not fit the patriarchal and heteronormative order imposed by the dominant nationalist discourse and, therefore, homosexuals were seen as the enemy Other, threatening the societal order. The degree of otherness ascribed to sexual minorities has not always reflected the hostility of the extreme nationalists. However, the discursive association of the LGBTIQ population with illness, abnormality, sin, and shame, prepared the terrain for securitization moves. As Krebs and Jackson (2007: 46) argue, ‘Arguments can prove powerful only when the commonplaces on which they draw are already present in the rhetorical field, which is shaped both by the unintended consequences of prior episodes of (rhetorical) contestation and/or by campaigns undertaken in advance with the express purpose of reconfiguring the rhetorical terrain.’ The commonplaces of the extremists’ narratives related to LGBTIQ identities already exist in the rhetorical field shaped by the mainstream discourses, and are reflected in the normalization of nationalism, gender inequality and homophobia. Such a rhetorical field provides fertile ground for the securitization of sexual minorities. In other words, once the nationalist and patriarchal image of sexual difference becomes hegemonic, a significant audience is more likely to accept that the LGBTIQ population, by requesting their rights, actually threaten the rights and security of others.

Re-production of Serbian National Identity

As previously pointed out, post-structuralism takes the stand that identity is always constructed in opposition to some Otherness (see, for example: Barth, 1969; Connolly, 1991; Hansen, 2006). In the Serbian nationalist discourse the construction of national identity is twofold. The first line of construction is against the external Other – this is the construction of the Serbian national Self in opposition to, for example, NATO (as the symbol of Western power), Kosovo Albanians and other ethnic groups that Serbia had disputes with in the recent past. On the other hand, the national identity has also been built against the internal Other, i.e. through securitization of differences among groups within Serbian population, inter alia, the differences related to sexual orientation and gender identity. Serbian nationalist narratives are facing challenges, as a result of the changing regional and global political dynamics and the subsequent de-radicalization of the external Other. The conflicts with neighbouring nations have ended, and Serbia has established solid relations – political, economic and cultural – with the majority of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Regarding the last conflict in the Balkans, the Kosovo conflict, the breakthrough was achieved in April 2013, with the signing of the Agreement on normalization of relations between Belgrade and Prishtina, the so called Brussels agreement. Kosovar Albanians are, nonetheless, perceived by a significant part of the Serbian population as the radical Other, and the Kosovo myth preserved its critical place in the nationalist mythology. However, the mere fact that the Serbian Government has shown dedication to a peaceful dialogue with the Government of Kosovo contributes to de-radicalization of the Albanian Other and holds the potential for releasing the tensions between the two nations. Furthermore, the growing support of Serbian citizens for EU integration indicates that the representation of ‘the West’ as the enemy of the Serbian nation is losing its appeal. The once powerful narrative of the alleged anti-Serbian character of the Hague Tribunal for war crimes, and the Serbian resistance to it, ceased to be one of the major reference points of the nationalist discourse. The issue of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal has become a closed chapter in Serbian politics, after the Serbian authorities had arrested and extradited all the accused sought by the Tribunal.

In the circumstances in which the external Other has been diluted and weakened, the nationalist narratives needed an internal Otherness against which the Serbian national Self would be re-defined. Such an internal Otherness has been found in sexual minorities. All nationalisms define gender in a way that implies inequality between men and women and that does not allow for alterations of the gender roles (See, for example: Papić, 1994; Bracewell, 1996; Yuval-Davis, 1998). As long as both women and men stay within their prescribed roles, they will not be perceived as the enemy Other (Mosse, 1996: 12). However, the demand for recognition of the rights of LGBTIQ persons jeopardized the strict division between genders, thus threatening heteronormativity as one of the core principles of nationalism. Therefore, the LGBTIQ identities have been represented in the narratives of the Serbian far-right as an existential threat to the referent object – the Serbian national identity. According to the post-structuralist reading of securitization theory, the referent object is never only identified and described as such, but also re-defined in relation to the threat
Given that the masculine stereotype and homophobic attitudes are intrinsic to nationalism, some might rightfully ask how the securitization of the LGBTIQ population contributed to re-evaluation of the Serbian Self. First, in the context of de-radicalization of the external Other, homophobia and masculinity – as related to the internal Other – emerged as more prominent features of the Serbian national identity. Patriotic feelings have become incompatible with the tolerance of sexual difference. But, more importantly, the binary opposition between the referent object and the threat has benefited Serbian national identity as the privileged element in this construction. By linking the LGBTIQ identities with evil, immorality and godlessness, the extremists’ narratives confirmed the Serbian national Self as the opposite – good, pious and morally superior.

Finally, the securitization of the LGBTIQ minorities by the extreme nationalists contributed not only to re-defining of the Serbian national identity, but also to its strengthening through national cohesion. As was previously established, homophobia is one of the very few remaining threads that connect the right-wing extremists with the political mainstream. Dominant political actors in Serbia departed, at least declaratively, from their nationalist agendas, and announced EU integration and liberal-democratic reforms as the priorities of state politics. However, homophobic attitudes are still widespread among the mainstream political and social actors, as well as among a large part of the Serbian population. In that sense, the securitization of LGBTIQ minorities acts as some kind of glue that keeps the extreme nationalists and a larger audience prone to homophobia unified against the alleged threat. The language of security, ever present in the extremists’ securitization narratives, contributes to this unification. Based on the binary opposition between the Serbian nation and LGBTIQ population, securitization moves reinforce nationalist feelings among a significant audience thus providing a solid platform for mainstreaming the extremist groups and their agendas.

**Conclusion**

This article analysed the processes of securitization of the LGBTIQ minorities in the discourse of Serbian extreme nationalists, as well as the relations between extremists’ and the mainstream discourses that result in mainstreaming the extreme. The analysis took a constructivist approach to security and drew upon securitization theory in order to demonstrate how a human rights issue becomes a security issue and how a minority identity is discursively constructed as a threat to the national Self. It adopted post-structuralist view on securitization theory, which emphasizes discursivity, intersubjectivity/intertextuality and changeability of social phenomena. The theoretical framework of this article relied heavily on the work of Julie Wilhelmsen, which grounds securitization theory more firmly in post-structuralism. Following Wilhelmsen’s re-writing of securitization theory, the article focused on four components of the securitization process: discursive context, securitizing narratives, legitimation process and re-production of the referent object. This framework allowed me to address the securitization of the LGBTIQ minorities by the right-wing extremists in a structured and analytical manner.
Regarding the discursive context in Serbia, ethnic nationalism, although officially defeated with Slobodan Milošević’s fall from power, continues to be a powerful mobilization force in Serbian society. Normalization of nationalism entailed a specific gender regime characterized by inequality between sexes and intolerance of alternative sexualities. Dominant ideas about sexual minorities, promoted by mainstream politicians, religious leaders and the media, associate LGBTIQ identities with abnormality, illness, sin and shame, which provided a fertile soil for the securitization moves by the extreme nationalists. In the focus of empirical analysis were the far-right organizations’ narratives related to homosexuality and LGBTIQ rights. The analysis demonstrated how these narratives constructed the LGBTIQ identities as radically different and incompatible with the Serbian national identity. By employing the language of security, they framed the subject of LGBTIQ rights as a security issue and portrayed the LGBTIQ minorities as a threat to the referent object - the Serbian national Self. Further, I argued that these securitizing attempts found their way to a wider audience thanks to their coherence with the mainstream discourses on homosexuality. In a discursive context in which nationalism, gender inequality and homophobia are normalized through the official narratives and accepted by a significant part of the population, the extreme nationalists’ representations of sexual minorities cease to be perceived as extreme and become acceptable. Finally, these representations contribute to re-defining of the Serbian national identity that, in juxtaposition to the LGBTIQ identities, acquires new qualities and strength. The binary opposition between the referent object of securitization and the threat benefits the former as the privileged element in the binary. In other words, the extremists’ description of the LGBTIQ identities as evil, immoral and godless promotes the Serbian national Self as the opposite. Moreover, the securitizing attempts by the right-wing extremists, situated in the context characterized by widespread anti-gay sentiment, enable unification of the extreme nationalists and a larger homophobic audience around the idea of the threat to the national identity posed by the LGBTIQ population. In such circumstances, nationalist feelings become consolidated which broadens the manoeuvring space for the placement and promotion of extremists’ ideas.

References


The edited volume ‘The Gypsy “Menace”: Populism and the New Anti-Gypsy Politics’ has already become a widely cited work on contemporary social movements in Europe. The reason for this success lies especially in the currently very relevant topic the editor has chosen: the phenomenon of ‘anti-gypsism’, ‘anti-tsiganism’ or ‘anti-Roma’ attitudes, the editor of the volume, Michael Stewart, calls the ‘Gypsy Menace’. According to him this menace is a pan-European phenomenon. This finding represents a breakthrough in social sciences with a somewhat orientalist treatment of the Roma. The volume shows how Roma/gypsies have become the ‘other’ not only for East Europeans but also for many Westerners who have learned more about them along with the enlargement of the European Union. As Michael Stewart argues, anti-gypsism has to be understood within broader shifts in European politics and culture, especially in the wide growth of populism, a by-product of European project. Stewart’s perspective heavily relies on the well-known work of anthropologist Douglas Holmes and his concept of ‘integral Europe’ published a decade and a half ago. Stewart also takes inspiration from Mabel Berezin’s sociological perspective on social and political security under European integration published several years later. This cultural analysis - argues Stewart - shows more about ‘anti-Romany politics today than economic crisis and fears of insecurity’ (p. xxiii) analyses do. The book should therefore be seen as balancing the structural economic accounts emphasising the role of neoliberalism and crisis in the treatment of social movements in Europe.

The book is divided into three sections. The first deals with the social and political contours of current anti-gypsism. The second focuses on social imagery of anti-gypsism. The third discusses extreme politics and how to combat it. The book is prefaced by Misha Glenny, the well-known British journalist, followed by an editor’s foreword of the editor that serves as an introduction to the book. Michael Stewart also offers a theoretical framework for analyses of anti-gypsy politics in the first chapter of the book. However, his analytical perspective has not been entirely followed by all the authors of the volume. Fifteen chapters were written by experts including sociologists, social anthropologists, lawyers and political scientists. Despite this diversity in these accounts, the editor’s perspective deserves close attention.

Michael Stewart in Chapter 1 reminds us that the EU project ‘creates the broad conditions of receptivity to xenophobic politics’. This politics is based on a shift away from mid-twentieth century racism to cultural politics resembling ‘popular versions of

---

Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” (pp 3-4). Difference here is being ‘re-framed as incomparability and purportedly culturally distinct behaviors is being used to justify radical demands for “root and branch” reform of educational, welfare, and, in extreme cases, citizenship regimes’ (p. 9). The supporters of new cultural reform are not the new poor. Rather they represent those who feel that they find themselves on the margin of decision-making. Current populism, therefore, is also the revolt of the ‘silent majority’, Stewart reminds us.

The next chapters of Part 1 bring new perspective on the role of local politics as a source of the ‘Gypsy Menace’ in Hungary (János Zolnay), narratives of ‘Gypsiness’ in civilizational terms in Bulgaria (Georgia Efremova), and radicalising attitudes towards Roma in the Czech Republic (Karel Čada). The Western European accounts on anti-gypsism discuss Romany migrants in Italy as a novel source of intolerant politics of the mainstream left (Giovanni Picker), and the historical development of exclusionary categorisation of Roma in France (Ilser About).

Part 2 opens up the theme of public representation of Roma before and after state socialism’s fall in Hungary (Kata Horváth). Chapter 8 presents the development of the extreme-right in the Czech Republic enhanced by the feeling of existential anxiety of the Czechs, as they are constructed by their national narrative (Gwendolyn Albert). Colin Clark and Gareth Rice open the discussion on Romanian Roma in Northern Ireland from the perspective of enduring sectarian violence. Stefánia Toma (chapter 10) elaborates the topic of a ‘last drop’ event causing the conflict between Roma and non-Roma in rural Transylvania by stressing the need for complex knowledge of the local context for developing mediation strategies.

Chapter 11 opens Part 3 of the book. The themes include the Roma migrants in the Austrian city of Graz and some counter-productive initiatives of NGO-type institutions towards Roma (Stefan Benedik, Wolfgang Göderle, Barbara Tiefenbacher). Lidia Balogh compares two communities in Northern Hungary and how the settlement of a conflict can succeed in them. Very instructive is the policy-oriented text by Brita Stellenberg on combating right-wing populism and racism based on a Bertelsmann Foundation report (chapter 13). Cecilia Kovai attempts to discuss the hidden potential of ‘naming the Gypsy’ via concepts of kinship in order to transcend the ethnic difference in public. The book is concluded by well-argued account of András L. Pap on the need to strengthen liberal democratic constitutionalism in Hungary. His critique of the inability of Hungarian courts and prosecutors to recognise crimes against Roma and the inability to outlaw extremists groups such as the Magyar Gárda represent paramount problems the post-socialist judicial system faces in all of Eastern Europe.

It is difficult for a reader to follow such a diverse number of texts at once and the reading requires time (plus the volume has almost four hundred pages). For more substantive comments it would be useful to provide the reader with a brief historical account on the Roma in modern Europe. Although some authors opted for this perspective in their respective chapters it would still help readers less familiar with Roma to understand the historical-cultural depth of the ‘Gypsy Menace’. The issue of ethnicity has definitely been over-studied, especially in Europe. This does not mean, however, that there is nothing specific on Eastern and Western ethno-nationalist projects, not least with regard to state socialism and multi-ethnic tolerance. It would
also be interesting to read analyses dedicated to the role of the economy. Not only by continuing in looking at the economy from ‘cultural’ perspectives but also challenging inadequacies of some top-down ‘world system’ perspectives.

Even though there might still be some sources and topics of anti-gypsism to be wished for, this book has now been published and it is the first of its kind. It strikingly well portrays the ‘Gypsy menace’ to be a much more systematic pan-European phenomenon than anyone has realised or has wished to know. The book therefore represents a must-read for everyone researching European social movements today.

Juraj Buzalka (Juraj.Buzalka@fhes.uniba.sk), Social and Economic Department, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia
Book Review


The terms ‘extreme right’ and ‘youth’ are mostly associated with neo-Nazis, skinheads and violence. The cover of the book ‘Youth and the Extreme Right’ edited by Cas Mudde reflects these stereotypical images visually with the shouting faces of young people presenting the Nazi hand salute. The book aims to investigate the relation between youth and extreme right attitudes, their engagement in organisations and in violent racist acts. The studies explore the possible connections and correlations between these three groups of phenomena from different perspectives using a multidisciplinary approach and various methods. The book is divided into three thematic sections. ‘Explanations’ gives the general reasoning for the attraction of certain youth to extreme right groups and ideas, including studies at the macro-, meso- and micro levels. ‘Issues’ deals with prejudices and violence marked as the main issues regarding youth and the extreme right, while ‘Prevention and Intervention’ describes prevention and intervention strategies.

The first study in ‘Explanations’, ‘Youth, Unemployment and Political Marginalisation’ by Ann-Hélén Bay and Morten Blekesaune seeks the influence of unemployment on political marginalisation. Political confidence, political interest and political extremism were measured in relation to marginalisation. Although results have shown differences among countries regarding the extent of marginalisation between employed and unemployed youth, weak empirical evidence supports that unemployed youth in general are politically more marginalised than their employed peers.

The study ‘Parenting and Right-Wing Extremism: An Analysis of the Biographical Genesis of Racism Among Young People’ by Thomas Gabriel focuses on the impact of family and the immediate social environment on the development of racist attitudes and behaviour among young actors. Using a multi-generational analysis the author examines the genesis of extremism, arguing that it is not a simple transmission of attitudes from one generation to another, but it is influenced by various factors. An important finding here is that racist attitudes or behaviour do not result from a bad socio-economic background, but more from family conflicts and their impact on the family.

Stéphanie Dechezelles discusses the different cultural frameworks of two Italian extreme right groups. These frameworks are constructed and composed of three elements: the vision of an ideal model of society, legendary narratives, and perceptions of symbolic territory. Highlighting the differences in the history, narratives, activities, symbols and meanings of the youth groups of Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale, Dechezelles reveals the cultural dimensions of political involvement. Focusing on the similarities and differences this leads to a more profound understanding of the motivations and self-positioning strategies of the organisations and their members.
Michael Kimmel presents a piece of research at the individual level of youth engagement in the neo-Nazi scene in Sweden from a gender perspective. Both entrance to and exit from the right wing are interpreted less as politically motivated acts, but more as expressions of masculinity for young males, which the author calls ‘rite of passage’ (p. 79). For young boys who feel emasculated, a neo-Nazi gang could appeal as an embodied gender practice to express a hypermasculine identity.

Although Islamophobia is labelled as the strongest prejudice in contemporary Western Europe, there is little evidence about what this exactly means, to what degree and how this prejudice works among youth. The first study of the second part called ‘Issues’ by Pieter Bevelander and Jonas Otterbeck presents the results of a survey conducted on non-Muslim youth in Sweden divided by gender, regarding their attitudes towards Muslims. After the authors carefully lead us through the theoretical explanations, a number of background factors are included in a multiple regression. They conclude that many factors influence the formulation of the attitudes of youth towards Muslims. At each level different factors have an impact: at the individual level socio-psychological and socio-economic background, at the meso level friendship networks and at the local level a high proportion of immigrants in the surrounding environment.

Conducting a comparative analysis of Canadian and Belgian samples of young populations, political tolerance is addressed in ‘The Limits of Tolerance in Diverse Societies: Hate Speech and Political Tolerance Norms Among Youth’. Allison Harrell argues that the current measurement of political tolerance is limited to the two extreme cases of absolute tolerance and absolute intolerance and offers a third type called ‘multicultural political tolerance’ (p.112). As found in both samples, people who are of this latter type are able to distinguish between hate speech by skinheads and racists and other types of objectionable speech from groups like gay rights activists or Flemish/Quebec separatists. However, this type’s profile is not ‘in the middle’ between absolute tolerance and intolerance regarding its socio-economic and democratic background. For instance they share the democratic qualities of absolute tolerators, while their social background is closer to that of the intolerants.

Heléne Lööw’s study looks at ‘Right-Wing Extremist Perpetrators from an International Perspective’, while Meredith W. Watts addresses ‘Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime: Skinheads and Xenophobic Youth in Germany’. The significance of these studies is that they distinguish between different groups like racists, skinheads, neo-Nazis and young perpetrators, reveal how these groups are divided by motivations, subcultural logics and organizational features, but also show how they connect and even cooperate with each other. Watts repeatedly highlights that ‘only some skinheads are racist, and most racists are not skinheads’ (p.152). Both authors claim that in most cases the number one motivation of young people to join such groups is not the attraction to their ideology, but the ‘sense of identity – of being part of something much larger’ (p.158).

The third part ‘Prevention and Intervention’ presents existing proactive and reactive programmes about how to avoid youth engagement in the far right. ‘Preventing Right-Wing Extremism: European and International Research’ by Andreas Beelmann highlights that every strategy should accurately specify the nature
of the problem it intends to solve. Different programmes are applicable to prevent the emergence of extreme right attitudes, violence, or to intervene against crime. It is also necessary to clarify the target group: whether the prevention programme targets a whole age cohort group or a specified extreme right group with already engaged youths who are also divided by many factors such as gender or class. The suspected causes and their development, the possible trajectory of the programme, the risk factors and the optimal time for the implementation are also important questions. Beelmann explains how different comprehensive prevention programmes on prejudice can promote intergroup relations that would have a substantial long-term impact. Other programmes to prevent violence and crime are also discussed in detail. Two country-cases are discussed as existing examples. In-depth interviews of former members of extremist groups are reported in ‘Youth Engagement in Right-Wing Extremism: Comparative Cases from the Netherlands’ explores the causes of entry into and exit from the extreme right scene. Similarly to Watts and Lööw, Ineke Van der Valk argues that the most common motivation of engagement is not ideology, but the search for social belonging, the wish to make new friends. Many factors may interplay in the decision to leave, but the main motivation is the desire for a more conventional, socially integrated life. Whether these social programmes intending to help offer a chance of a new life has a crucial impact. Violence appears as a factor both when entering and leaving the group, as newcomers have to participate in violent acts and the ‘leavers’ sometimes have to suffer violence as part of the community’s revenge.

Yngve Carlsson’s Norwegian case study presents prevention and intervention practices and strategies applied in Norway. Carlsson argues that if the extreme right appears, the danger has to be taken into consideration immediately from its genesis; it must not be denied or belittled. The responsibility of local communities is emphasised suggesting the involvement of local governments, schools, police, and parents. Strategies need to combine police suppression, prevention and intervention programmes, as well as different measures of formal and informal social control. The author notes that most youths are not racist or neo-Nazi for their whole life, their identity is subject to change, so we have to focus on their reintegration, not on their exclusion.

The last study by Cynthia Miller-Idriss ‘Raising the Right-Wing Educators’ Struggle to Confront the Radical Right’ shows the situation from educators’ perspective in the German context. The author emphasises the lack of proper curricula and guidelines for teachers on how to talk about xenophobia, how to disperse misinformation and how to be prepared with good arguments. In order to identify young people who are already engaged or at potential risk, Miller states that educators should have relevant information about the different subcultures and subgroups within the radical right scene.

Although there is abundant research on the extreme right, we still have little relevant knowledge about it. This is partly because of the difficulties and sometimes dangers that researchers have to face during research on this topic. Furthermore, there is a lack of complex, well-designed longitudinal and comparative studies with control groups and systematic evaluation. The situation is the same in the case of prevention and intervention programmes. There are good and bad examples focusing on
individual cases, but they frequently lack an accurate design, evaluation and measurement of long-term effects. ‘Youth and the Extreme Right’ reflects on these problems and reading it is highly recommended for academics and non-academics alike.

Anikó Félix (aniko.felix@gmail.com),
MTA-ELTE Peripato Research Group