Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics is an Open Access, double blind peer-reviewed online journal. When citing an article, please use the article’s DOI identifier.

E-ISSN 2416-089X
# Table of Contents

**Introduction**

**Manuela Caiani**  
Between Contextual Opportunities and Discursive Resources. Understanding the Politics of the Enemy in Central and Eastern Europe  

**Mobilization through Enemy Images in Central and Eastern Europe**

**Márton Geró, Piotr P. Plucienniczak, Alena Kluknavska, Jiří Navrátil and Kostas Kanellopoulos**  
Understanding Enemy Images in Central and Eastern European Politics. Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach  

**Milan Hrubeš and Jiří Navrátil**  
Constructing a Political Enemy. Anti-communist Framing in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 2010  

**Dániel Kovarek, Dániel Róna, Bulcsú Hunyadi and Péter Krekó**  
Scapegoat-Based Policy Making in Hungary. Qualitative Evidence for How Jobbik and its Mayors Govern Municipalities  

**Justyna Kajta**  
Discursive Strategies of Polish Nationalists in the Construction of the Other. The Case of Muslims and Homosexuals  

**Pál Susánszky, Ákos Kopper, Gergely Tóth and Márton Geró**  
Creating Suspicion and Vigilance. Using Enemy Images for Hindering Mobilization  

**Article**

**Luca Kristóf**  
Cultural Policy in an Illiberal State. A Case Study of Hungary after 2010
Book Reviews


PATRYK WAWRZYŃSKI 148


TAMÁS DEZSŐ ZIEGLER 153


ÁKOS BOCSKOR, MÁRTON HUNYADI AND DÁNIEL VINCE 157

Authors’ Biographies 161
Social dissatisfaction and the corresponding political backlash is one of the central concerns of contemporary political and scholarly debate. From the sovereign debt crisis and unrelenting economic hardships throughout the European space (either Western and Central and Eastern Europe), to increasingly strong Eurosceptic, right-wing and anti-establishment political forces, from the debate and increasing pressures surrounding immigration and refugees, there has never been a more challenging time for Europe and the European states and a more important time for the question of legitimacy and the democratic deficit of representative institutions and traditional political actors. And Central and Eastern Europe is not an exception. In recent years, Europe has experienced the rise of politics based on antagonism, which – as correctly noticed by some authors of this special issue (see the article, ‘Understanding the Usage of Enemy Images in Central and Eastern European Politics. Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach’) – is often discussed from the perspectives of populism and mainstreaming the radical right ideologies.

A particular focus of scholarly attention has therefore been on the support expressed for populists and radical right nationalistic parties and movements, as well as their antagonists (i.e. various ‘others’ from the establishment to minorities, as well as to counter movements), which has been increasing rapidly in recent decades. Although the case that citizens increasingly give their support to parties and movements that promote xenophobia, ethno-nationalism, and anti-system populism (Rydgren, 2007) and in general the emphasis on some common ‘enemies’ can reinforce a collective identity and give meaning to political actions, this may not be the cause for any comfort. The election of Donald Trump as President of the USA has been taken as further evidence of the ‘mainstreaming of radical right politics’, which has affected other democracies beyond Europe (Mudde, 2016). Recently, in fact, growing concerns over EU austerity programmes, the current economic crisis and the national and European responses to that the crisis, immigration and multiculturalism issues, combined with disillusion with mainstream politics and representative democracy (Caiani and della Porta, 2011), have all fuelled sharp criticism from the populist far right (e.g. Kriesi and Pappas, 2016), as well as, it is argued in many contributions in the present special issue, the ‘enemization’ of politics and debate. European integration and globalization, as argued by the first article of this special issue (Gerő et al., 2017.), play a role in these developments in CEE countries as well. They have restructured social and cultural cleavages, developing an opposition between the positions of trans-and supranational integration on the one hand, and those of national demarcation, with radical right parties and movements standing on the side of the defense of positions of ‘demarcation’ through economic and cultural
protectionism on the other (Kriesi et al., 2008). However, reactions to European integration and globalization generally take various forms: the radical left’s opposition to the opening up of the border is mainly an opposition to economic liberalization and to the threat it poses to the left’s achievements at the national level. The populist right’s opposition to the opening up of the borders is first of all an opposition to the social and cultural forms of competition and the threat they pose to national identity (ibid., 2008: 18; see also: Wodak, 2015) and the ‘We’.

Whether one agrees or not on the definitions of the phenomenon, what is certain is that it is widely accepted that at present there is a clear and widespread trend towards an increase in support for populist parties and discourses, which are based as core aspect on the antagonistic relation between an ‘us’ and various ‘others’ (from the political corrupt elites to minorities) (Caiani and Graziano, 2016) and an increase in the ‘appeal’ of this ideology everywhere (Kriesi and Pappas, 2016).

As testified also by the electoral overview offered in the article of Kovarek et al. and Gerő et al., the populist right-wing re-vitalization has been particularly strong in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe. However, as has been pointed out, the two types of surges show different patterns:

While Southern Europe populism is generally highly polarizing and often anti-systemic, the more recent wave of CEE populism and anti-establishment mobilization more generally is partly (but certainly not exclusively) related to the emergence of ‘purifier’ parties promising better and scandal-free governance (Kriesi and Pappas, 2016: 323).

Moreover, most CEE countries, as for example, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic are experiencing heavy unrest in the form of right-wing extremist incidents targeting Roma people (TE-SAT, 2012: 30). Alongside the growing importance of radical right populist actors and politics, new forms of right-wing social movements, as underlined by the articles of this special issue, emerge that function as incubators of new political and organizational ideas. The current resurgence of the radical right in the East-Central European countries has extensively been covered (see, for example: Minkenberg 2011). However the studies of cultural aspects of radical right wing groups and populism are sporadic and anecdotal.

This special issue will address these topics by providing an overview of the mobilization and the image of the enemy in Central and Eastern Europe. More specifically it investigates the transformation of civil societies of Central European countries, including recent developments such as the rising of populist and radical right nationalist parties, as well as the intensification of discourses against several minorities, by focusing, from different angles and different perspectives, on one particular technique of mobilization: the usage of narratives about an enemy.

From the empirical point of view, this type of mobilization has been generally associated with far-right or radical populist parties that treat immigrants and ethnic or sexual minorities as enemies of their own imagined communities. The strategy of antagonizing is, however, employed by actors from all across the political spectrum. This special issue therefore empirically analyses and discusses (similarities and differences in) the usage of the image of enemy in processes of political mobilization
made by various political actors in CEE countries: nationalists radical right organizations (as in the article of Kajta), but also political elites and parties (as in the paper of Gerő et al.; Susánszky et al.; and Kovarek et al.), as well as the entire society (article of Hrubeš and Navrátil). In turn, the ‘enemies’ might be immigrants, other minorities, or any distinct social group portrayed as ‘enemy’ in political communication (as communists, foreign agents etc.). The focus is therefore on strategies and practices employed by different political actors, including parties, social movements and civil society organizations. In fact, as explained by the first article of this volume, with prolonging economic crisis, such type of ‘antagonizing’ politics creeps more and more into mainstream politics. Despite claims that populism is just a ‘flash in the pan’ and will disintegrate before long, antagonizing politics have continued to prosper and in some countries have achieved a remarkable level of influence.

From the theoretical point of view, this special issue adopts an interdisciplinary and multi-dimensional approach (see: Gerő et al. and Kovarek et al.) paying attention to the cultural, historical, but also economic and political aspects of the construction and usage of the enemy/ies in Central and Eastern Europe. More specifically, in order to investigate the politics of enemy and populist-radical right traits in Eastern and Central Europe, the articles of this special issue, building mostly on a constructivist perspective, pay particular attention to a concept developed especially (but not exclusively) in social movement studies: the interpretative frame. Frames, as duly described in the article of Hrubeš and Navrátil (2017) in this special issue, are defined as cognitive instruments that allow one to make sense of the external reality (Snow and Benford, 1992). They seem a particularly useful approach to study the transformation of civil societies in CEE countries and the increasing politics of antagonism (‘enemization’), since they are very often produced by organizational leadership, which provides the necessary background within which individual activists can locate their actions (Snow et al., 1986; Gamson, 1988; Snow and Benford, 1988).

In fact, any type of collective actor (including radical right and populist nationalist organizations and governments, e.g. the Orbán government as is shown carefully by Susánszky et al. in this volume), have to motivate individuals to action, providing followers and potential followers with rationales for participating and supporting their organizations and political action. This seems particularly crucial in time of crises, characterized - also in Central and Eastern Europe as in the West - by party systems’ de-alignment, the emergence of new political actors, the decrease in traditional political loyalties and the increase in institutional and social mistrust. As has been argued: ‘[C]ompared to Western Europe, most of the newer, as well as poorer European democracies score far below in institutional and interpersonal trust. These findings suggest that there may be a complex, probably circular, self-reinforcing causal mechanism between the level of economic development and the general level of interpersonal and institutional trust’ (Boda, Medve-Bálint, 2014: 15). In addition, ‘along with the critique of dominant representations of order and of social patterns, interpretative frames produce new definitions of the foundations of collective solidarity, to transform actors’ identity in a way which favours action’ (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 79). In doing so, framing processes also allow for the definition of the

In particular the contributions in this special issue pay special attention to interpretative frames and discourses through which the image of the enemy is constructed, conveyed and propagated. What do such images owe to anti-Semitism, fascism or national chauvinism, how do past ideologies shape contemporary politics, but also what are the differences? What are the roots of the emergence and continuing success of antagonizing politics? Does it pose a threat to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? These are some of the empirical questions that will lead the studies in this special issue, which – as one of its main merits – tries to capture the dynamics of the discourse or the operation of movements built on ‘the picture of the enemy’.

Indeed in academic literature, explanations for the development of populism and the radical right (as well as, we could argue, the ‘politics’ of ‘enemy’ [...] or the ‘othernization’ of the political adversaries) have stressed the negative consequences of economic globalization, in terms of the mobilization of the ‘losers’ as well as ethnic competition (Rydgren, 2005). This implies political discontent towards liberal democracies that have emphasized constitutional counterweights over electoral accountability (Mény and Surel, 2002), but also a mix of modernization crisis, insecurity and authoritarian legacy (Mudde, 2007). Without denying the presence of grievances, the papers in this special issue (in line with social movement studies), analytically speaking, tend to give more leverage to the capacity of political actors to adapt to contextual resources and constraints, or, as has been said with specific references to extreme right movements, ‘to take advantage of the available opportunities’ (Rydgren, 2003: 49). In sum, the studies in this special issue underline the importance, in order to understand the recent developments in CEE politics, to look at the social and symbolic construction of the political and social reality made by various actors, which operate within those political systems and societies, and to look at their capacity to construct their own opportunities and resources. Indeed, as has been underlined, discontent, resources and opportunities have to be constructed, communicated and shared, in order to become a basis for collective action (Caiani et al., 2012).

Beyond the descriptive aim, the contributions in this special issue also attempt to develop some explanations for the presence and forms of ‘enemy politics’ and discourses in CEE countries. In this sense particular attention is paid to the role of context and the ‘political and cultural’ (historically determined) opportunities (in the words of social movement studies) provided by the country in which the various political actors mobilize. Studies on collective political action have emphasized that levels and forms of mobilization by social movements, interest groups and citizens’ initiatives are strongly influenced by so-called political and cultural opportunity structures (POS and COS), namely the set of opportunities and constraints offered by the institutional structure and political culture of the political systems in which these groups operate (Kriesi, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2005). Most importantly, the papers in the present special issue underline that the analysis of political opportunities available for political actors has to take into account another important aspect of the context: the political culture. Political culture refers ‘to the pattern of beliefs and assumptions
ordinary people have towards the world, as these pertain to politics’ (Tepperman and Bell, 1979). The concept, introduced for the first time by Almond and Verba in the late 1950s to address the values (i.e. the ‘civic culture’) that are at the basis of a stable and wealthy democratic regime (Almond and Verba, 1963), is made up of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards the political system. If the political culture of a country is relatively stable over time and reproduced by political socialization, influenced by this aspect are the more contingent cultural and discursive opportunities that determine what kinds of ideas become visible to the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘legitimate by the audience’ (Kriesi, 2004: 72). For example, of interest for this special issue, a favorable political culture (e.g. discursive opportunities created by the political elites in defining migrants and asylum seekers as a social problem) is recognized as a fundamental factor for the success of the extreme right and populism both in terms of electoral outcomes and persistence (Mudde, 2007; Koopmans et al., 2005). Also this special issue considers the importance of the context (and in particular its discursive opportunities, e.g. see: Kaita and Susánsky et al.) as a crucial variable for the (construction and) mobilization of ‘the enemy’, since it can affect the degree of acceptability or stigmatization of various actors (e.g. the extreme right, immigrants, the communist past elites, etc.). As shown by Gerő et al. (2017) for example, the use of ‘enmification’ by political actors is more likely in contexts, as in the CEE countries, where the social structure is more hierarchical and members of society are constantly exposed to uncertainty and to relative deprivation. These historically embedded factors are strengthened by more recent developments, as a transnational, Europeanized political context, or the economic crisis in 2008. Similarly, in the article by Hrubeš and Navrátil (2017), the Communist era and its legacy is shown to be an important part of Czech (political) culture and identity after 1989, since it offers models of or for (political) behavior and thinking to different actors (political parties, social movements or individual agents), when seeking public support or legitimacy. Finally, the paper by Kovarek et al. also underlines the importance of the local scale context and that by Susányszky et al. speaks of the repressive action of government.

Traditional social movement and mobilization studies, in order to explain the emergence of collective action and discourses, look at the conditions that enable discontent to be transformed into mobilization. Thus, they are more interested in the material (e.g. organizational) and symbolic resources necessary for collective action than cognitive capacities (see for example: Koopmans et al., 2005; Caiani et al., 2012). Another merit of the contributions in this special issue is that they pay particular attention, in line with the most recent strands of civil society and mobilization literature, to cognitive resources. On the one hand, there has been growing focus on the cultural and symbolic dimension of social movements (Jasper, Goodwin and Polletta, 2001; Flam and King, 2005). On the other, a more relational vision of protest has been promoted, with attention paid to the social mechanisms that intervene between macro-causes and macro-effects (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). This special issue locates itself within this track. In an (indirect) critique of the ‘structuralist bias’ of previous approaches (either the political opportunity approach and resource mobilization theory approach), attention of most of the papers is focused on the relational, cognitive, and affective mechanisms through which contextual input is
filtered and acquires meaning. Indeed, as underlined by Gerő et al., 2017, the role of emotions becomes more important with increasing vagueness of the enemy. The effects of political opportunities depend in fact on the social construction of these opportunities by the relevant actors. Finally, instead of considering only the ‘usual suspects’ of the construction of the ‘Other’, namely radical right and populist parties, the papers in this special issue consider the broader field of contention – as populated by many different political actors. The articles in this volume therefore pay a particular attention to processes of interactions between the extreme right, populist and nationalist movements’ other actors, both allies and opponents, embracing in that what social movement studies call a ‘relational approach’. In social movement studies for example, radical right groups have been addressed under the label of counter-movements (della Porta, 2012). Conflicts between social movements (usually identified with left-wing or progressive groups) and counter-movements (right-wing and conservative) might resemble debates to the extent that they are based on an attempt to persuade opponents and authorities. Sometimes, however, their interaction far more resembles a battle in which the objective is to annihilate the ‘enemy’ (della Porta, 2012). Interactions between movements and counter-movements, as well as between any kind of ‘we’ and ‘them’, as shown in most of the articles in the present volume, lead to a strong sense of conflictuality and the prevalence of a Manichean view of politics (della Porta, 1995).

Methodological choices follow, in the articles of this special issue, these analytical approaches. The studies illustrated in this special issue focus in fact on data coming from news reports retrieved from the electronic archives of The Czech News Agency (ČTK) between 1990 and 2010 (Hrubeš and Navrátil); critical discourse analysis of 30 biographical narrative interviews with the members of three main Polish nationalist organizations (Kaita); Viktor Orbán’s main speeches before 2015 (Susánszky et al.); and in-depth interviews and content analysis of local sources (Kovarek et al.). Moreover, in terms of research design, whereas usually there is a lack of comparative studies, this special issue tries to analyze those changes not only in the scale of a given country, but also at the regional and European levels.

To conclude, populism and the extreme right are increasingly discussed, as also argued in Gerő et al., 2017, as interrelated syndromes in various (academic and political) interpretations of current challenges to liberal democracies (Caiani and della Porta, 2011). This special issue adds another broader concept which is the ‘enemization of politics’, or the ‘construction of the image of the other’, which similarly poses a crucial normative problem to Democracies, which is worth of future reflections. We are indeed witnessing a ‘Populist momentum’. However, in contrast to the extremist right-wing parties of the 1930s, new populist movements in Europe, as well as beyond, do not aim to abolish democracy: quite the opposite, as they thrive on democratic support. It is a conflict between elites ‘that are becoming increasingly suspicious of democracy and angry publics that are becoming increasingly illiberal’. The articles in this special issue contribute to developing this possible future debate. Arguably, the emphasis on the threat that outsider groups presents for the community contradicts principles of pluralism and equal participation in the public sphere. On

---

the other hand, political mobilization can be a source of participation that fuels democracy. Is there any essential difference between mobilization that assumes a homogeneous ethnic community and one that does not presuppose any impassable boundaries between groups? What is the political purpose of invoking an image of the enemy? What are the consequences of such claims? These are some of the questions that arise from the contributions in the present volume.

References


Understanding Enemy Images in Central and Eastern European Politics. Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach

Abstract

In recent years, Europe has experienced a rise in politics based on antagonism, often discussed from the perspectives of populism and the mainstreaming of the ideologies of the radical right. In this study, we argue that there is a need for an interdisciplinary, theoretically broader and more empirically focused approach that fosters understanding of these developments. To explore the causal factors, we focus on the enemy images that are constructed and diffused by politicians, and their specific historical and structural contexts. The paper thus has two main components: First, we review what political theory, research on populism and on the extreme right and social psychology say about the functions of the use and development of enemy images. Second, we highlight the contextual factors that we consider make the success of a politics based on enemy images more likely in Central and Eastern Europe.

Keywords: Enemy Images; Populism; Central and Eastern Europe; Politics.
I. Introduction

In recent years, Europe has experienced the rise of a politics based on antagonism. Right-wing populist parties have won national elections in Hungary and Poland, there has been an intense ‘blame game’ between Germany and Greece in relation to the debt crisis (Mylonas, 2012; Wodak and Angouri, 2014), anti-immigration discourse has been on the rise since mid-2015, Central and Eastern European immigrants have been blamed for taking British jobs (Fitzgerald and Smoczynski, 2015), and Central and Eastern Europeans tend to blame Middle Eastern refugees who are fleeing war for spreading terror (Tremlett and Messing, 2015; Győri, 2016; Klaus, 2017). Those phenomena have usually been discussed from the perspectives of populism and the mainstreaming of radical right-wing ideologies. Here we argue that there is a dire need for an interdisciplinary, theoretically broader and empirically more focused approach to understanding the recent developments, in which the key is a focus on the ‘images of the enemy’ constructed by political actors, and their historical and structural context.

Enemy-making has essentially always been a part of politics. For Carl Schmitt, the friend-enemy distinction is the ultimate, defining distinction of politics to which every political action and motive can be reduced’ (Schmitt, 2008: 26). Through this distinction, politics defines ing- and out-groups, political communities and Others, be they a state, organization or an abstract power. Although in contemporary European politics threats of violence and their actual use are relatively rare, the enemy is invariably pictured as someone who poses an existential threat to the community. In consequence, enmification and the possibility of the actual annihilation of ‘the enemy’ is still an important part of politics, even when hidden or left unmentioned.

Although enemy-making is a substantial part of politics, its intensity and forms are always changing. Open antagonism has recently overtaken the political mainstream in Europe. The use of the ‘enemy’ narrative is now intense, regardless of electoral campaign cycles that have regulated it before. Enemies are invoked to fuel various mobilization efforts outside of elections: popular votes, pro- and anti-government protests, mobilizations pro- and against refugees, consultations, petitions, contentious activities of the left and right wing, and so on.

The discourse on enemies has become more aggressive, and the identification of enemies increasingly more explicit and open: on the one hand, hostile labelling of vulnerable social groups (the poor, immigrants, Muslims, the Roma, LGBT people) is probably more prevalent now than it has been since WW II. On the other hand, political adversaries (opposition parties, civil society organizations and movements, trade unions) are explicitly referred to as those who need to be disciplined and restricted in their activity.

Why has the use of the concept of the enemy intensified lately? Why do politicians in Central and Eastern Europe target vulnerable groups as enemies, and link them to their political adversaries? We argue that answering these questions

---

1 For example, measures against NGOs that criticize the government have been taken to a new level by the Russian and Hungarian governments. NGOs that receive funding from abroad now have to register themselves as foreign agents in Russia, and label themselves as being ‘supported from foreign resources’ in Hungary. See: Yasmeen Serhan: Hungary’s Anti-foreign NGO law. The Atlantic, 13/06/2017.
requires an interdisciplinary approach. Such an approach should combine considerations of political theory about the functions of the concept of enemy in politics, pre-existing empirical research about the use of enemy images by political actors, and the contextual factors that provide favorable conditions for such a politics.

Naturally, one such study cannot cover all this ground; therefore, we now focus on two tasks. First, we review what political theory, research on populism and on the extreme right and social psychology say about the use and development of enemy images. Second, we highlight the contextual factors that make the success of politics based on enemy images more likely in Central and Eastern Europe.

By doing this, we intend to support our claim not only that ‘the enemy’ still has an important role in political theory, but that 1) this issue should be empirically examined more broadly than just in relation to populism and the extreme right, and 2) this examination should go beyond the political process approach by including more sociological, and even social psychological, aspects. This approach would clarify how structural conditions lead to group processes and to a social psychological state in which politics based on enemy-making seems more likely. Furthermore, this type of politics triggers the creation of structural conditions that encourage further radicalization.

After venturing into the problems involved with defining the enemy, we turn to political theory – namely, to Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe, whose works focus on the fundamental role of enemies in politics. Political sociology is more empirically focused. The extreme right and modern populism are considered to use enemy images extensively; thus, through a short review we summarize the use of enemy images by these actors. We complete the first task with an explanation based on studies from social psychology of why the intensity of the development of enemy images might be different in various contexts.7

After reviewing the literature, we examine the factors that condition the political actors of Central and Eastern Europe to use enmification in their politics. Enmification is more likely when the social structure is more hierarchical, and members of society are constantly exposed to uncertainty and to relative deprivation. These historically embedded factors are strengthened by more recent developments such as a transnational, Europeanized political context, and the results of the economic crisis of 2008. Finally, we suggest that the changes in the media and the mediated public sphere play a decisive role in intensifying the use of enemies as a main platform for public discourse.

II. The ‘enemy’ in politics

One would expect the term ‘enemy’ to have a simple and consensual definition. However, what we have found is that proper definition of this term in studies that deal with enemies in politics is lacking. Despite the ambiguities, there are three domains –

---

7The use and development of enemy images could involve more disciplines and research areas. We are well aware that the issue of the perception of the Other has been well addressed by research on identity, on constructing the in-group and Otherness, on prejudices, anti-Semitism, and racism or securitization. These approaches have much to say about the topic. Here, however, we only build on the disciplines we consider address more closely the mechanisms of recent political processes.
political theory, political sociology and social psychology – where the concept of the enemy has received more attention. Thus, after elaborating the concept itself, we summarize what political theory (namely that of Schmitt and Mouffe) and students of populism and the extreme right tell us about the use of enemies. We then turn to the mechanisms of the development of enemy images, as examined by social psychology.

II.1. Concepts and definition

At first sight, understanding the ‘enemy’ as a concept seems simple: the enemy is someone (a group, a nation, a person) who tries to destroy ‘Us.’ Yet, as simple it may seem, it is hard to find a clear, well-formulated definition of ‘the enemy’. Some studies lack definitions entirely, using the term as if the meaning is evident, or as used in public discourse (e.g. Fergusson et al. 2014; Holt and Silverstein, 1989; Silverstein, 1989). Others who have defined the enemy use various terms and concepts. For example, Schmitt (2008) defines an enemy as an actor who poses an existential threat to a community considered an in-group, while Oppenheimer defines an enemy only as a ‘specific form of a negative stereotype’, (Oppenheimer, 2006: 269). Volkan (1985) describes the enemy as the antithesis of an ally. This always involves ‘attributing to [the ally] all the qualities the culture considers good: honesty, integrity, cleanliness and loyalty’ (Volkan, 1985: 224). Thus, the enemy must be dishonest, amoral and non-loyal. Ramet (1999) applies a similar strategy. He also describes the enemy through its attributes, and cites an enumeration of these by James Aho: “Dregs” of the society, from its lower part, [...] it is sewage from the gutter, “trash” excreted as poison from society’s affairs’ (Aho, 1994 cited by Ramet, 1999: 4).

It seems that scholars generally try to express the notion of enmity, instead of defining it by capturing the emotional content of the concept. The important thing is that enmification always involves strong feelings: perception of hostility, anger, hatred from and towards the enemy, which points towards their dehumanization.

The role of emotions becomes more important with an increase in the vagueness of the description of the enemy. Here, making a distinction between traditional images of the enemy and enemy images used in modern politics seems crucial. Traditional enemies are associated with warfare; they are external actors that pose a physical threat, while modern, political enemies are not necessarily outsiders, the threat of physical elimination is relatively uncommon and the image itself is much less clear (Holt, 1989; Schmitt, 2008; Schwab, 1987). In the latter case, the enemy may be internal, such as the elite’ for populists, ‘the Roma’, ‘Muslims’, ‘immigrants’ or ‘Jews’ for the extreme right, but also various hidden, invisible groups or traitors (Szabó, 2007) or simply political adversaries, parties and movements (Schmitt, 2008; Szabó 2007). While the traditional enemy is an external actor before it becomes an enemy, the modern enemy is externalized because it is an enemy. Thus, groups or actors labeled enemies are externalized by a discursive act of exclusion.

Enemies can be personal or collective. Holt (1989) differentiates between personal and public (or national) enemies, while Jung et al. (2002) distinguish between

---

1Volkan relies on a definition suggested by Murray Edelman in a presentation at the International Society of Political Psychology (Volkan 1985:224).
individual and national perceptions in the enmification of countries. In Holt’s study, American college students treated both private and public (political) enemies as threatening. Perceptions about private enemies, however, were associated with strong feelings such as hate, while students were more likely to associate public enemies with ideological and axiological differences.

Although the concept of the enemy is not as clear as one might expect, its use affects the political process. Silverstein (1989) points to cognitive studies that assume that enemy images distort information processing. Nations considered enemies are not only seen as more hostile, but information processing about them is selective. People are more likely to notice information about the enemy’s aggressive actions than about their peaceful acts. Furthermore, people attribute harmful, aggressive actions to their enemies even when other actors carry them out. In line with this observation, social mediation studies found that negative articles about the U.S.’s main enemy, the Soviet Union, were more prevalent than positive ones in significant American newspapers. Fergusson et al. (2014) argue that politicians need an enemy to obtain an electoral advantage. Such actors might present the problem of the existence of enemies as a task which they are best suited for managing. Accordingly, the authors suggest, enmification is an action-legitimizing strategy. Moreover, keeping the image of the enemy alive and visible is also an important method of avoiding being perceived as superfluous.

The most important advantage of creating and maintaining enemy images is the contribution this makes to the sustainability of the imagined political community. This is so because ‘group identity is defined by contrast to other groups and is the result of systematic comparisons with and differentiation from other groups’ (Oppenheimer, 2006: 271). In cases of international conflicts, the relevant group might be a nation, while in internal conflicts it might be true Hungarians, Czech, Poles, true democrats, or any other group. Pointing out the enemy may be the main method of creating a group, since the enemy should be precisely the opposite of ‘Us’. By strengthening loyalty and evoking strong emotions, collective enemy images are able to strengthen the capacity for mobilization of these imagined communities. By reference to such an imagined community, we have already arrived at the terrain of political theory: The idea that the role of the enemy is its use in group formation is very much in line with the idea that the function of the enemy is the creation and maintenance of a political community, as proposed by Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe.

II.2. The concept of the enemy according to Carl Schmitt

Carl Schmitt is considered the most important thinker on the role of enemies in politics. For him, the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ is the founding stone of politics. In The Concept of the Political (2008) he argues that this distinction has an existential character, suggesting that the search for enemies is part of human nature and there can be no political community without its Others (i.e. 4 In an imagined community, members know only a small proportion of the community, since it is too large. Thus a nation is clearly an imagined community (Anderson, 2006).
without those who are not members and, what is more, who threaten the integrity of the latter). In other words, the very identity of every group depends on the existence of its opposite. He stresses the relational character of every group identity and stresses the virtual impossibility of sustaining political pluralism, as every distinction inevitably leads to conflict. Those conclusions are in line with Carl Schmitt’s conservatism and his disdain for liberal democracy.

In his late book, *The Theory of the Partisan* (2007), Schmitt expands his theory by describing three distinct types of enemies: limited, real, and absolute. Antagonism with the first is limited by norms or rules (such as international law), thus such foes are not to be annihilated, but rather defeated or dislodged from one’s territory. The latter types are more dangerous, as their aim is always to overthrow the political order, to destroy the very essence of their opponents. Yet while the ‘real’ enemy acts to defend their land or identity from intruders, the ‘absolute’ enemy wants to further their revolutionary cause. The partisan, or shall we say, terrorist, hides among civilians, does not follow any rules, and constantly plots the overthrow of the existing order. War with an ‘absolute’ enemy can be only absolute, using every possible means.

Schmitt’s argument was recently revived by Chantal Mouffe (2005) as a counter to the liberal utopia of post-political democracy cherished by thinkers such as John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and, especially, Francis Fukuyama in his hotly debated *The End of History?* (1989). For Mouffe, the presupposed erasure of antagonism from contemporary liberal politics creates a symbolic space for populist politicians who are liberated to use the basic drive behind group identity and mobilize their supporters through name-calling. The author argues for the political recognition of the need for distinctions, yet in a ‘limited’ (to use Schmitt’s term) version. Democratic politics should be fueled with ‘agonism’ (Mouffe, 2005: 20), which means struggle that does not infringe one’s right to exist, as struggle itself is rooted in shared culture, institutions, language, symbolic space, etcetera. In her vision, conflict is contained by law and regulations, and opponents are rather adversaries than enemies. This is, of course, a normative vision, as in reality the processes of enemy-making breaches institutional barriers.

### II.3. Populism, and the enemies of the people

Despite the generalistic nature of ‘the enemy’s’ function, as proposed by political theory, in political sociology the use of enemies is attributed mainly to populist and extreme-right parties and movements. Populists divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and consider society to be inalienably separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups of ‘good people’ and ‘corrupt elite’. For populism, ‘the centrepiece of identity politics is the construction of ‘the people’ or the in-group’. (Woods, 2014: 12) The populist argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde, 2007; Taggart, 2004), and always ‘justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 322). Populism generally politicizes identity, and claims to represent those who are true and honest. Populists consider ‘the people’ as a monolithic group without internal differences; however, some specific categories of individuals are subject to exclusion. While idealizing and worshipping the people, populists degrade and blame elites,
accusing them of being alienated from the people, self-centered, arrogant, incompetent, and of having no idea what ordinary people need (Barr, 2009; Rooduijn et al., 2012).

In extreme-right discourse, one can clearly distinguish this populist attempt to delineate who ‘the people’ are, and who does and should not be part of the people (Betz and Johnson, 2004). However, while for the populists the central subject is the construction of the people, for the extreme right the central focus is the enemy. Moreover, while in the populist vision the world is divided between ‘pure people’ and ‘corrupted elites’, the extreme right interprets the world through ‘black and white’ or ‘good and bad’ categories (Eatwell, 2000). The world, according to such a vision, is separated between friends, who support the extreme right’s causes, and enemies, who oppose them (Caiani and Parenti, 2013). Especially in times of political and social changes, the extreme right identifies and mobilizes against scapegoats that are held responsible for anything that goes wrong (Minkenberg, 2011). Specifying the Other is crucial for the identity-building of the extreme right, since the movement largely defines itself through constructing itself as a mirror image of the out-group (Mudde, 2007; Woods, 2014). According to Ramet, ‘the Other lies at the heart of radical right politics, and for the radical right, [...] the Other is translated into “Enemy”’ (Ramet, 1999: 4).

While the defining features of the in-group in politics often remain rather vague, descriptions of the out-groups tend to be very clear. For populists, ‘them’ consist mostly of elites, defined in strict opposition to the people, and usually referred to as corrupt. Extreme-right parties go further in their appeals in comparison to populists, turning the category of ‘them’ into the excluding category of ‘enemies’, and going beyond blaming just political elites. In the discourse of the extreme right, enemies are usually demonized and often dehumanized (Mudde, 2007). Dehumanization operates at the level of victimization – the object is stripped of any identity and humanity, reified into an enemy who is selected not by reason of their personal characteristics, but on the basis of their group belonging. According to Heitmeyer (2003), dehumanization, along with promoting the superiority of one’s own group and the inferiority and depersonalization of the Other, is a major part of a more general belief in inequality and values attached to the demonstration of power. The extreme right projects a ‘group-focused enmity’, which is directed:

‘not only against those who are ethnically/culturally or religiously different but even against those who are ‘the same’ but are defined as ‘deviant’ from the standpoint of the right-wing extremist ideology of inequality’ (Heitmeyer, 2003: 401).

Enemies are targeted through symbolic and/or physical violence, and depicted as human decision-makers, rather than impersonal forces such as industrialization or the market (Caiani et al., 2012; Gamson, 1992; Polletta and Kai Ho, 2006).

While populism is a very important part of extreme right-wing ideology, there is more to it. Most authors define the extreme right movement as nationalist, xenophobic and supportive of antidemocratic authoritarianism. Wimmer (2002) and Koopmans et al. (2006) stress that the movement combines attachment to a strong, sovereign nation-state with an exclusive, ethnocultural idea of citizenship. Eatwell (1996) argues that all movements that belong to that category share a commitment to an ideology that reflects a belief in the intrinsic inequality of humans, and the
acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of political expression. This means that the world of the extreme right is divided into inseparable communities that cannot be reconciled.

John Downes (2015) analyses European national election results and concludes that the radical right-wing parties succeeded by employing a policy of antagonism; however, the author does not use this specific term. What is interesting is that successful radical right movements did not refer to economic problems that emerged during the recent crisis. Downes argues that: ‘it does not make rational sense for extreme right-wing parties to play the economic card and emphasize economic policies as they are not trusted by the majority of the electorate on this policy area’ (Downes, 2015: 10). The crisis rewarded, he claims, a ‘clarity of issues’ in politics. In other words, the right successfully constructed ‘the enemy’ using the ‘immigration crisis’ as a trigger and means of delineating clear-cut borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ at a time of turmoil. Studies of the extreme right have confirmed the observation that immigration and cultural differences have been used as ideological fuel for centuries (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). The issue of immigration, clearly linked to antagonism, has become, in Kitschelt’s words, an electoral ‘winning formula’ (Kitschelt and McGann, 1997), and even moderate right-wing parties thus ‘rationally’ decided to employ it. Downes’ research suggests that there exists a process of dissemination of enmification in the public sphere that can be grounded in electoral arena choices and their consequences.

II.4. The development of collective enemy images

Political theory and political sociology explain the function of enemy images in politics and how they are used by political actors. However, they are less inclined to explain why the intensity of enmification varies spatially or chronologically. To understand the changes in the intensity of enmification, we turn to examining the processes that condition the development of enemy images.

Social psychologists have examined the issue of the development of enemy images on both the individual and the group level. Most argue that this is a natural process at the individual level (Jung et al., 2002; Murray and Meyers, 1999; Oppenheimer, 2006; Volkan, 1985). Therefore group-level processes should explain why the intensity of enmification is different in various groups and periods. However, to understand group processes, we must first summarize intra-psychic processes as well.

The most important intra-psychic process that leads to the development of enemy images is the projection of internal anxieties and stress. Volkan (1985) suggests that when a child is not able to integrate all their feelings towards an object (such as negative feelings towards parents) s/he will project some ‘unintegrated aspects of him[her]self and perceived others onto suitable targets [of externalization]’ (Volkan, 1985: 234). These targets could be objects such as medals or images of enemies. Objects associated with enemies generate negative feelings and aggression. Silverstein argues that this process can also happen in adulthood (1989: 905): ‘people who are unable to deal on a conscious level with their anxieties and hostilities may project or displace them onto a socially accepted source of hostility and fear such as an enemy
nation’. Jung et al. (2002) argue that this stress projected and turned into animosity may be evoked by an actor or event perceived as hostile or threatening.

People might turn to this coping mechanism because of their specific personality traits. This argument suggests that people who tend to handle their anxieties and insecurity by developing enemy images will do it independently of the broader social context. Such an argument was first developed by Rokeach (1960). Rokeach and Restle (1960) distinguish between open and closed systems as ideal-typical models of cognitive structures. While the open mind sees the world as a friendly place, the closed mind perceives it as threatening. Thus, supported by its other characteristics, the closed mind is more likely to accept enemy images as a cause of problems. Naturally, in their empirical findings the acceptance of others and the closed/openness of the mind appeared as a continuum rather than a dichotomous categorization (Rokeach, 1960).

People with an authoritarian personality are more likely to experience threats and dangers around them (Altemeyer 1981, 1996; Cohrs 2013). Murray and Meyers (1999) found that opinion leaders of the United States who saw the Soviet Union as an enemy in 1988 maintained their opinion towards Russia after the end of the Cold War as well. However, the authors were unable to confirm that these feelings could be transferred to different, new enemies when the old enemies disappeared.

Aside from personality traits, group processes and structural characteristics can also cause stressful situations that might be turned into animosity. As we argued earlier, the perception of a common enemy is one of the most effective tools for forming groups or enhancing their coherence, since contrast and comparison both contribute to group identity (Oppenheimer 2006). Groups are defined by enemy images too, because group formation serves as a defense mechanism during conflicts. When people perceive threats, they are more likely to engage with groups they consider their own. This is a regressive defense mechanism, since the need for group cohesion ‘switches off’ certain functions of the mind that are responsible for critical thinking and the sustaining of individual autonomy (Volkan, 1985). When a group is faced with a crisis and the breakdown of its institutionalized task-structure, unconscious expectations towards the group leader can arise. One of these is to expect the leader to fight the crisis (in the form of the enemy) that threatens the group (Volkan 1985).

Besides group crisis and external threats, group structures cause internal stress and contribute to the development of enemy images. Kurt Lewin’s classic research (Lewin et al., 1939) shows that the intensity of scapegoating and hostile behavior towards other groups is significantly influenced by the level of authoritarianism of group leadership.

Authoritarian group leadership creates a high level of frustration, which leads either to aggressive behavior, or to apathy. Frustration is caused by pressure, and the

---

5 As reliance on authority, mixing up the content of information with the intentions of the source of this information (e.g. what the source wants the recipient to believe) rejecting disbelief, and evaluating people based on their agreement with one’s own beliefs, it is likely that the source of information about out-groups (and groups that are perceived as threats) is indirect (Rokeach and Restle 1960:55,56).

6 Or both: In Lewin’s experiments, when autocratic leaders left a room the level of aggression among group members grew rapidly (Lewin et al. 1939).
inflexibility of group structure (Lewin et al., 1939). Frustration is also increased by relative deprivation (Pettigrew, 2016) as groups might be faced with an unwinnable race when comparing their in-group to other groups. One response to these constant failures is raising one’s own status against the odds by finding a scapegoat, an enemy to whom blame can be allocated (Pataki, 1993).

Even the earliest studies acknowledge that historical embeddedness and the value structure and lifestyles prevalent in a given society are important factors that influence individual and group-level processes (Adorno et al., 1950; Lewin et al., 1939; Rokeach, 1960). Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Inglehart, 2008) measure the openness and closeness of a society using an index of self-expressive values. They argue that the value structure of a cohort is explained by the affluence of resources experienced during its formative years. Thus, put in a simplistic way, scarcity or affluence of resources influences in the long run how open or closed societies are. The value structure shapes political institutions: open societies are more likely to develop stable democratic institutions.

Oppenheimer (2006) argues similarly, but suggests that the chain of causation is reversed. Collective enemy images are easily developed in societies with a hierarchical social structure and a non-democratic political system, and where the authoritarian parenting style is more prevalent. Culture and national identity affect the categorization processes and inculcate certain types of racist beliefs in even young children. What is more important is that political ideologies and structure play an important role in the types of attribution awarded any given event, person or group.

One can also argue that different political ideologies use different attribution processes on the level of nation-states. In parallel with the assumption that totalitarian political systems stimulate hostility and antagonism to a greater degree than democratic political systems (Barnet, 1985), totalitarian systems may make greater use of external attribution than democratic systems, which more commonly use the tactic of internal attribution (Oppenheimer, 2006: 279).

The literature discussed above highlights many aspects important for understanding the recent situation. However, it also has shortcomings. First, although many studies have investigated the populist turn and mainstreaming of the extreme right, they tend to be descriptive about the recent phenomena. Studies of populism and the extreme right have been successful at exploring how enemies are pictured, the discursive strategies of political actors, and changes in public discourse. On the other hand, they are less inclined to incorporate an analysis of the structural conditions that foster the dynamics under study. Social psychology, on the other hand, focuses on the structural patterns, but in a generalized way. Since it is embedded in the psychological literature, it focuses more on the general mechanisms of group behavior instead of explaining how certain structures develop in any given context. Thus, in the third section of this paper we focus on the actors which play a role in contextualizing the discursive and group patterns we perceive in the politics of enemy making.
III. Why are Central and Eastern European societies responsive to the politics of enmification?

In this section we provide an outline of the factors considered grounds for enmification in the region. While our list here cannot be complete, we describe the most important processes and regional characteristics that have led to the hollowing out of politics (III.1) and, later on, to bringing political conflict back through various - including extreme - means (III.2-III.4). These processes may be classified according to the functions and mechanisms proposed above.

First, we enumerate the political culture and economic processes which, embedded in their historical and social context, have led to the maintenance of a structure favoring enmification. The fall of the Soviet Bloc led to an increase in hope for the blooming of a multitude of possible social, economic and political logics in the region (Krapfl and Hrebíček, 2009; Shields, 2012). It seems, however, that the historical legacy of Central and Eastern Europe, combined with its geopolitical context and its historical path dependency, led to the establishment of a specific political and economic model whose societies might be described as ‘hypercapitalist’ or ‘privatized’ (Elster et al. 1998; Jacobsson, 2015; Stark, 1994) and also to the neutralization of politics through the pacification of protest, the economization of society, and the transnationalization of politics.

Second, specific factors contribute to the need for enemies in politics: Multilevel governance, joining the European Union, and the strengthened system of international governance have led to increased uncertainty and less controllable political opportunities in the region.

Third, the economic crisis appeared as a threat to local and national communities and might have activated the regressive defense mechanisms Volkan (1985) refers to. The crisis has led to disappointment with the elites, the destabilization of political systems and enforced austerity measures. Political actors sought out discursive tools to explain these measures in a way that preserved or even increased the loyalty of voters. Fourth, the changes in public discourse are connected to changes in the mass media involving processes that provide space to actors that employ hostile language.

III.1 Demobilization of society

Pacification of protest

The processes of the demobilization of CEE societies during and just after the transition to the liberal regime were meant to curtail any opportunities for the radicalization of citizens that would disrupt the transformation, and to restore the presumed ‘normal’, rational and standardized working of political and economic institutions (Krapfl and Hrebíček, 2009). More general accounts of the pacification of political conflict in CEE countries have been provided by students of political culture. According to these, the general political passivity in the region is a result of historical cultural patterns which were further reinforced during the authoritarian rule of socialist states and triumphed after the time when its champions - the pre-1989
dissident elite – became part of the new political elite. Sometimes labels such as ‘non-political politics’ or ‘anti-politics’ are used to describe the widespread ethos of maintaining a distance from institutionalized politics, political parties and policymaking in general. CEE dissidents – most notably Václav Havel and György Konrád – and their conception of civil society and politics supported a non-political, ethical and anti-authoritarian politics (Celichowski, 2004; Rupnik, 2007; Smolar, 1996). This, together with anti-communist resentment, has constituted an obstacle to the politicization of social problems in CEE societies and has a long-term pathological impact on democratic politics through the negative assessment of processes of interest representation (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Renwick, 2006; Tucker et al., 2000).

Sociologists of social movements have proposed several explanations for the strange absence of mass mobilizations during the processes of economic transformation in post-socialist countries in the 1990s (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; Greskovits, 1998; Vanhuysse, 2006). First, it was the legal framework and fragmentation of trade unions that ultimately led to the pacification of large conflicts – even if the trade unions were one of the most important actors in the regime change before 1989 (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998). Second, a more complex explanation builds on a comparison between Latin America in the late 1970s and Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s – two regions undergoing processes of radical socio-economic transition –, finding that the absence of significant mobilizations was a consequence of the relative lack of economic inequality, a lower level of urbanization and the absence of a tradition of violent struggles and preexisting forms of social protection (Greskovits, 1998: 85). Third, the relative absence of mobilizations after the fall of socialism was also explained as the outcome of the strategies of policymakers who succeeded in dealing with the situation of the most ‘dangerous’ social groups by providing them with selective incentives (in the form of social policies) that dissuaded them from protesting, such as early retirement schemes for miners, pro-employment policies for youngsters, etc. (Vanhuysse, 2006).

Economization of society

Another dimension of the neutralization of protest was the economization of CEE societies after 1989, by which we mean ‘the assembly and qualification of actions, devices and analytical/practical descriptions as ‘economic’ by social scientists and market actors’ (Çalışkan and Callon, 2009). This directly refers to Schmitt’s critique of liberalism as an economic and thus non-political type of argumentation. Processes that were earlier observed in Western societies and have been conceptualized in various ways started to rage in Eastern Europe: namely, the ‘increasing influence of economic factors and values on the political agenda and other areas of society’ (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 210), the ‘economic turn’ (Smart, 2003), the fetishization of the economy (Foucault, 2008) and the ‘economization of every sphere of existence’ (Kane, 2010:81). In short, these processes could be traced in CEE because the political transition was perceived and described in dominantly economic terms, and the notion of the market economy was as important as the notion of democracy (while the two were made interchangeable). A large part of the new political elite was recruited from a pool of academic economists or people
dealing with finances and management, and key principles and models of neoclassical economics started to be professed publicly as ‘natural framework for politics and society’ – with the aim of endless liberalization and privatization. New public management became the new Marxism-Leninism of both public administration and academic economists, revealing the naïve idea of the straightforwardness of the transformation from one system to another.

Generally, the problem was the marginalization of other functions and areas of society, and most importantly, suppression of the political dimension of societal coordination. The processes of economization are linked to the prominence awarded the neoliberal perspective in economy and politics, which – in contrast to classical liberalism which sought to protect the economy (market) from the state and politics – attempted to actively ‘construct the necessary conditions for markets and non-market institutions to function, primarily to govern the social by restructuring the state according to a competitive logic through a generalization of the logic of economic incentives throughout the state apparatus and beyond the economic domain’ (Madra and Adaman, 2013: 22). And it was precisely this perspective that prevailed among CEE elites in the 1990s. Key reformists in CEE countries (such as Balcerowicz in Poland and Klaus in the Czech Republic) utilized and popularized purely economic perspectives on politics and society which, together with the vanishing or dramatic transformation of political institutions, democratic political culture in the making, and the quest for broader legitimizing narratives for new societal order, led to the dominance of economic concerns over politics and culture. This evolution is nicely illustrated by a comment that was often used in the late 1990s in the Czech Republic when the first broadly negative reflections on post-1989 economic and political development arose: ‘the economists simply overhauled the lawyers’.

Transnationalization of politics

Finally, the period of transformation was also accompanied by the restructuring, even collapse, of a number of national economies (Christensen, 1998) and also by the integration of national states into larger supra-national structures, most importantly, the EU. The process of political integration into the EU and the pressures of membership led to similar outcomes as did the adoption of support for neoliberal hegemony in the sphere of the economy: it significantly contributed to the shift in the important functions of economic management and functions vital to the state management of the economy, from national political institutions to supposedly neutral objective institutions, technocrats, and juridical frameworks (Shields, 2012). This led to gradual changes in national policy fields as it transformed the relation between citizens, national politicians, and ‘real’ policy-makers and norm-makers. The ties between citizens and their national representatives slowly started to hollow out: reversals or reforms of policies implemented at the EU level became highly unlikely and out of the control of national policy-makers, which further neutralized national policy discourses and decreased political conflict – at least within the mainstream ‘pro-EU camp’ of national politics which clearly dominated throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Often, national political representatives used the membership of their country in the EU to legitimize their unwillingness to deal with new problems, while after
animosity towards the EU started to increase, many politicians started to blame the EU for both everyday and large-scale problems. However, the perceived distance of ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ only seldom led to contentious action or the re-politicization of domestic conflicts. The consequent resignation of citizens and some part of the elite resulting from the localization of politics and the transnationalization of governance further de-politicized the national arena, which became a part of a ‘normative and strategic environment that they have as yet only partially mastered’ (Mény et al., 1996: 8). Furthermore, this process was interlinked with the increasing importance awarded the neoliberal paradigm in politics and economy which further negatively affected the vitality and importance of domestic politics vis-à-vis the rising power of international governance and economy structures (Grabbe, 2003).

III.2. The role of Europeanization

The effects of Europeanization and multilevel governance

The above-mentioned transnationalization of politics and the transnational means of handling the economic crisis, together with other mechanisms that strengthened supra-national institutions, led to an increase in the multi-level characteristics of governance whereby national institutions started to operate on the meso-level. Moreover, the former processes also contributed to the vilification of supra- and transnational institutions, opened a discursive space for the mutual blame-game throughout Europe, and changed the relations inherent in political and discursive opportunity structures.

Social movement studies – and, increasingly, mainstream political science – often analyse the behavior of political actors in the context of various political or discursive opportunity structures. Political opportunity structure basically refers to the characteristics of a political system: i.e. with what ease social movements, NGOs or other non-governmental actors can influence decisions. Influence is had through different ‘access points’ such as processes of social dialogue, elections or internal allies of non-governmental actors. When a political system is open, it has many access points; when it is closed, it has none, or at least the government tries to control these. Discursive opportunity structures, on the other hand, refer to a characteristic of the social environment in terms of to what extent the environment resonates with the aims and values the movement (or any actor) represents (Kriesi, 2004). The configuration of political and discursive opportunities defines the relation among the dominant actors and their challengers: When opportunity structures are closed, the challenger will not be able to gain support, nor will they be able to influence decisions. Open discursive opportunities and closed political opportunities mean that dominant actors will consider and respond to demands, while the reverse situation will lead to the co-optation of the challenger. The openness of both opportunity structures creates the ground for the inclusion of the challenger and the representation of their demands as well (Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Kriesi, 2004).

This model is proposed mainly for national (or smaller) settings, where it is supposed that major political actors, such as governing parties, are able to control political opportunities, thus a closed opportunity structure is possible. However, the
actual European system of governance is more complex, trans- and international, and provides various opportunity structures for civil society organizations to intervene and influence decision-making processes (Holzhacker, 2006). These processes not only make it possible to influence decision-making processes on the supra-national level, but - through the supra-national level - the national level as well. Basically, this means that a perfectly closed system of political opportunities on the national level is not possible. This fact increases the importance of the other dimension of opportunities: to prevent the effective intrusion of challengers at the supra-national level, dominant actors have to ‘close’ discursive opportunities by questioning the legitimacy of challenging actors and limiting their right to speak within the political community.

Strengthening of Euroscepticism

EU membership and European integration have provided political actors with a powerful issue about which to compete, as the former may be the catalysts of political dissent (Almeida, 2010), creating favorable conditions for building upon nationalistic appeals and anti-European frames (Bustikova, 2009). Euroscepticism is no longer necessarily a fundamental predisposition of peripheral parties (Pirro and van Kessel, 2013), yet the Eurosceptic and extreme right groups in the region are usually the biggest opponents of EU integration. Though most of the extreme right parties in CEE (accession) countries were at the beginning of the 1990s initially pro-European as a result of a general embrace of a ‘return to Europe’ (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002) and the fear of being kept ‘outside’ after the fall of communism (Riishøj, 2007), they soon became increasingly negative about the drive towards EU membership. By being linked in many cases to the anti-communist struggle or the US as an alleged model of integration (Mudde, 2007), the ER has located itself on the side of the defense of positions of national demarcation through economic and cultural protectionism (Kriesi, 2008). Often accepting the historical and cultural roots of Europe, the ER in CEE opposes the political dimension of the EU by claiming that EU membership creates a negative comparative disadvantage in terms of the national sovereignty of nation states, and a loss of recently regained independence (Pirro, 2014). Culturally, it rejects the diffusion of Western or liberal attitudes (Neumayer, 2008) and the liberal agenda of the European Union, such as the protection of ethnic and sexual minorities and the promotion of gender equality (Bustikova, 2009). As the focus of attention moved from ‘accession’ to ‘integration’ in CEE countries, anti-European frames have become more prevalent (Pirro and van Kessel, 2013), and the financial and refugee crises of recent years have led to the politicization of the issue, making the EU, as an enemy, more salient in the political discourse of extreme right-wing parties.

This might explain the recent upsurge in regulations affecting NGOs capable of taking cases to the European Court of Human Rights, lobbying on the European level, or which are embedded in international networks. Both Russia and Hungary have recently passed laws stigmatizing organizations that accept funds from foreign donors. For more information, see for example: Independent Civil Society Under attack in Hungary: http://www.helsinki.hu/en/antingo/. Accessed 10/09/2014.
III.3 Economic crisis and economic voting

The ‘Great Recession’ that started with the 2008 global financial crash (Balakrishnan, 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Rodrik, 2011) was mainly dealt with using austerity measures and a new package of neoliberal policies. These policies were opposed in the streets by the mounting of large protests or/and in the ballot box with the destabilization of political systems. Especially in Europe, the banking crisis was soon transformed into a sovereign debt crisis affecting most EU-peripheral member states (Lapavitsas, 2012; Patomäki, 2013). Countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain (all Eurozone members), and Hungary, Romania and Latvia in fact went bankrupt, and a special bailout mechanism had to be crafted at the transnational level to ‘rescue’ them. This mechanism included not only EU institutions like the European Commission and the European Central Bank, but also the IMF, which guaranteed the strict implementation and technical surveillance of the rescue programs. In short, the three institutions offered bailout loans to countries that could not borrow money from the international markets in exchange for austerity measures and structural adjustment programs.

Everywhere in Europe, politics became more contentious, political actors intensified the blame game, and most European governments were ousted. Kriesi (2014) found that in European countries one of the first signs of popular discontent was a drastic shift in voting patterns (Beissinger et al., 2014; Bermeo and Bartels, 2013; Kanellopoulos and Kousis, forthcoming). Extending the literature on economic voting, he argues that, depending on the party system, disaffected voters turned to established opposition parties or, in the face of austerity cuts and job losses, opted to ‘exit’ by 1) rejecting all mainstream parties, the established political elites, or the ‘political class’, 2) opting for new challengers in the party system who typically adopted populist appeals – i.e. the new populist right in Western Europe, or 3) turning against all political parties; i.e., abstaining from voting.

In Central and Eastern European- as well as Western European countries there were protests against austerity policies and electoral outcomes were affected. In Western countries the economic crisis triggered protest and most governments were ousted. In CEE countries the same happened, but protests were already in full swing when the crisis intervened due to corruption scandals and the malfunctioning of party systems. In spite of the pressure from the public, austerity measures across Europe have not (at least yet) been significantly modified. Protest, however, has gradually subsided and political participation has fallen. And ‘not because the discontented population starts to trust the government, but because it has lost faith in the effectiveness of protest and/or because it is forced to acknowledge the constraints imposed on the government. Given the constraints of the situation, resigned acceptance of the inevitable may replace contention’ (Kriesi, 2014: 304-305).

Regarding the rise of nationalistic sentiments, the electoral advance of far-right parties and growing significance of populism, we argue that the politics of protest were replaced and/or continued by the politics of enemy-making. Since no real adjustment to neoliberal policies has occurred, social inequalities have become deeper and economic disparity endures: a plausible solution for the stabilization of the political systems across Europe is thus appearing in the construction of ‘enemies’. Depending
on the specific political and historical context of each country, these ‘enemies’ can be found among the national minorities, establishment political parties, newly arrived refugees from the Middle East, EU bureaucracy, etc. More specifically, it has been shown recently that the dynamics of economic protest in Visegrad countries (for example) are not directly related to the economic grievances suffered by the population, but rather to the (perception) of austerity policies, and that their magnitude relates rather to the structure of national political fields. In other words, even traditional forms of contention such as economic protests are determined by the strategy of elites of framing particular grievances or problems, and their capacity/willingness to represent these in the sphere of institutional politics (Císař and Navrátil, 2015). Consequently, our exploration of the use of enemies in politics in CEE aims also at the analysis of strategies of political and cultural elites, the media, and their interaction with extra-institutional mobilizations.

**III.4. The role of the media**

In explaining public attitudes and beliefs towards minority groups (or ‘Others’), the media are said to have great significance. As they focus on particular issues, perhaps framing them in a negative and stereotypical way, and provide public space for actors who intentionally use enemy images in their agendas, the media intentionally or unintentionally provide an environment in which such politics becomes the norm. This can happen in several ways: by granting exposure to actors who engage in a hostile propaganda, or by highlighting and/or negatively framing the issues which are on their agendas (such as immigration in Western Europe, or the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe). The tendency of the media is to personalize issues and focus on the scandalous features of society and politics that contribute to anti-establishment and anti-minority sentiments. For instance, studies that have examined the media coverage of Roma generally conclude that this minority is presented in a negative and prejudiced way, and that media rarely offer a positive, though often also stereotypical, alternative image. Roma communities tend to be generalized and silenced in news coverage and are usually referred to in collective terms and in connection with criminality and violence, with an emphasis on ethnicity (Cangár, 2008; Messing and Bernáth, 2013; Kroon et al., 2016). Media also present Roma as a cause of social unrest (Zagibová and Kluknavská, 2013). These sentiments not only affect the public opinion of minority groups, but can benefit parties and movements such as the extreme right, which engage in anti-minority and xenophobic discourse (Kluknavská, 2014). In other words, the media can create favorable discursive opportunity structures that affect public opinion, and where the radical agenda that creates the ‘us-them’ divide is given space to thrive (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004) and be legitimized (Bos et al., 2011).
IV. Summary

In the last few years, there has been an increase in the use of ‘enemy images’ in Central and Eastern European politics. In this paper we have put forward an answer to the question ‘what stands behind these developments?’ We argued that, to understand this process of enmification, we need to use an interdisciplinary approach and explore the contextual factors that create the favorable conditions for such a politics.

The existing research is both too narrow and too broad: While the concept of ‘the enemy’ has been widely recognized in political theory for decades, its empirical application is rare. Empirical research studies of populists and the extreme right movement elaborate how those two types of actors use the concept of the enemy in their politics, but it is rare to find empirical studies that refer to other actors (e.g. social movements) that also employ this notion.

In social psychology and research into values, however, we find useful mechanisms for explaining why the intensity of enmification is changing at the group and the national level. It seems that the general process of projecting internal anxieties is strengthened by hierarchical structures, demobilized societies, authoritarian leadership, and events perceived as threats. It is tempting to compare those factors with the political culture and historical development of Central and Eastern Europe, or to the recent crises.

Thus, in the second part of this study we highlighted factors connected to the mechanisms elaborated in the literature review of the concept and general mechanisms of enemy-making. The legacy of the elite-led transition to democracy left societies politically demobilized, without institutions that could allow them to legitimately represent their interests. This, combined with the economization of politics and its transnationalization led to the hollowing out of the political sphere in CEE. Subsequent processes then led to the return of politics, often via radical means.

The strengthening of multi-level governance has encouraged the use of enemy images in politics because supra-national institutions become part of domestic fights and provide an external faction to blame. When politicians portray European institutions as enemies, Western-oriented adversaries who see European institutions as a means of enforcing ‘more rational’ policies on governments are easily painted as traitors. This suggests that, despite the transnationalization of politics, the main interests of the elites are still connected to national-level politics.

The economic crisis (or other phenomena perceived of as crises) provide an opportunity for politicians to trigger the regressive defense mechanisms of forming cohesive groups loyal to their leaders, and exploiting discursive opportunities that a tabloidized media already provide, such as access to an audience sensitive to threats and stereotypical images.

Economic and political processes are interlinked with historically embedded political culture. Haerpfer and Kizilova (2014) found that support for democratic institutions and democratic political culture is strongly correlated to the success of

---

8 There is plenty of research that deals with the perceptions of minorities and out-groups. We highlight that this is not connected to the concept we employ in this study.
Central and Eastern European transitions and institutional performance. In this regard, most Central European countries show important deficits.

Based on this review, we suspect that these factors contribute to the structural conditions that enhance the prevalence of a social psychological status that favors enmification as a copying strategy. The actual mechanism of how these conditions, elites and people interact is not entirely clear. Most empirical and theoretical research until now has dealt with the political use of enemies to small groups, or at the level of the individual psyche. Recent phenomena and empirical research suggest that imagined communities might react to threats in a similar way to that of small groups (Pettigrew, 2016). One of these reactions is the regressive defense mechanism of strengthening group cohesion, identifying with the group leader, and projecting stress onto an external object, usually an out-group. (Pataki, 1993) The out-group is not necessarily - and in the region in question, increasingly not - a foreign nation, but rather takes the form of a hidden, internal enemy, vague social groups, and international institutions.

The rise of authoritarian populism in Central and Eastern Europe illustrates the troublesome consequences of contemporary politics. This type of community building undermines the possibility of re-negotiating problems and of creating discursive reactions to newly emerging issues, and leads to the translation of social and economic problems into antagonistic conflicts. In this paper, we argue that the recent developments of European politics must be interpreted and explored from different perspectives to allow us to understand both the general and contextual dimensions of the uses of enemies in politics. For this, we need more empirical research that shows these processes ‘from below’, considering their specific historical and economic circumstances, and, moreover, the psychological conditions inherent in the functioning of the friend-enemy distinction.

In such research we need to combine different levels of analysis. Discursive approaches and research on media and organizations may capture the dynamics of political systems, while research on participation and citizens’ reactions to the discourses might tell us why they are working. This multilevel analysis should be supported by an analysis of the historically embedded dynamics and transformations of the social and economic structure. Existing, unidisciplinary research is clearly limited in its attempt to describe the multi-dimensional processes that are taking place on the ground in Central and Eastern Europe.
References


---

**INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 14-40.**


Abstract

The Communist era and its legacy became an important part of Czech (political) culture and identity after 1989. This phenomenon is especially powerful in relation to the meaning making of the communist era after 1989 and the way Czechs are getting over it. Labels such as communist, Bolshevik, normalization, nationalization of property and many others related to the communist era became powerful vehicles for stigmatization and creating a public enemy in almost any sphere, be it political, show business, or public. What makes it especially powerful is that the cultural and historical legacies (understood as deliberately propagated representations of selected fragments of the group’s past), when expressed explicitly, offer models of or for behaviour and thinking. In other words, public memory is often one of the constitutive factors of contentious and politically motivated mobilizations undertaken by different actors like political parties, social movements or individual agents when seeking public support or legitimacy, or just aiming to achieve their goals. In post-communist countries these actors often strive to mobilize participants, supporters or even opponents using legacies of the Communist past. In this text we seek to uncover how various situations, events or people are constructed as public enemies by using the communist legacy. In particular, we ask the following questions: How is anti-communist framing constructed and how does anti-communist framing resonate with popular images and understanding of Communism, the Communist era in the Czech Republic and related matters? We analyse anti-communist framing (i.e. directly or indirectly identify the situation, adversaries, institutions or activities with the Communist regime) and via constructing metaphors provide readers with deep understanding of how particular Communist legacies in specific contexts create public enemies who lose sympathy and support from the public.

Keywords: Anti-communism; Post-communism; Framing; Political Claims; Czech Republic.
Introduction

Public memory is often one of the constitutive factors of contentious and politically motivated mobilizations undertaken by different actors, be they political parties, social movements or individual agents when seeking public support or legitimacy, or just trying to achieve their goals. In post-communist countries, these actors often strive to mobilize participants, supporters or even opponents using legacies of the Communist past. In other words, mobilization implies imposing a particular understanding of the situation and consequent agency related to the shared definition of history. Interrelation between memory, the past and its symbols, and contemporary collective action has been subjected to social science inquiry (e.g. Edy, 2006; Harris, 2006; Meyer, 2006; Polletta, 2006; Zelizer, 2008; Mayer, 2014), however, there is still only a small number of studies dealing specifically (and at least partly) with anti-communist framing in post-communist countries (e.g. Sükösd, 1999; Eyal et al., 2001; Gjuričová et al., 2011; Koubek and Polášek, 2013), especially those showing how anti-communist framing is used to label political opponents as public enemies, no matter what they promote.

In this paper we provide an analysis of anti-communist framing used during mobilizations in the Czech Republic after 1989. We understand anti-communist framing as directly or indirectly identifying the situation, adversaries, institutions or activities with the Communist regime. Our goal is to analyse and provide thorough understanding of the way anti-communist framing was used during the peak years of various mobilizations in the Czech Republic to construct the meaning of political opponents as public enemies. We want to answer following question: How is anti-communist framing constructed and how does this anti-communist framing resonate with popular images and understanding of Communism, the Communist era in the Czech Republic and related matters so it constructs the meaning of political opponents as public enemies?

In our analysis we proceed as follows: first, we outline our theoretical framework consisting of constructivist aspects of collective action. Second, we introduce our data and methods. Third, we analyse anti-communist framing in four selected years to see how it was constructed, on what occasions it was used, and how it has changed over time. Finally, we draw conclusions from our analysis and discuss further implications.

Framing political protest

Since the 1980s, social movement scholars and researchers have focused their attention on framing tasks when trying to understand why certain social movements are successful in attracting new supporters while others are not. In particular, the major question of social movements’ research focused on when arguments used by social movements were accepted by those who were not involved in their activities. The framing concept in social movement research is basically associated with the frame alignment process originally proposed by David Snow and his colleagues. They define frame alignment as the ‘linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO
activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary’ (Snow et al., 1986: 464) while borrowing Goffman’s concept of frame – ‘schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary... ... one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of a scene into something that is meaningful’ (Goffman, 1974: 21). In other words, this means that social movements’ activists strive for providing such explanations of given situations so that what they say and how they say it corresponds to the recipients’ belief and serves as an incentive to action in various situations. In this sense, framing is a strategic activity which is applied by social movements’ activists to mobilize potential adherents and bystanders or demobilize antagonists. As these activities are sometimes successful and sometimes not, the core question is: why are people sometimes mobilized and sometimes not; and under what conditions does the social movements’ framing resonate within the recipients (Snow and Benford, 1988: 198)?

These questions are central to the frame resonance concept. Frame resonance refers to ‘conjunction of the frame content and ideational elements present in the wider cultural milieu’ (McCammon, 2013: 525), while ‘the higher the degree of the frame resonance, the greater the probability that the framing effort will be relatively successful’ (Snow et al., 1986: 477). Thus social movements’ activists are exposed to a continuous struggle for making their framing resonant with the recipients. They invoke dominant ideas embedded in culture, myths, narratives, ideology as well as certain values and beliefs to appeal to potential adherents. These could be seen as components of the tool kit (Swindler, 1986). In this sense, culture is understood as public symbols which display system of meanings and that are external to the minds of particular individuals. Social movements’ activists select different pieces of the tool kit to give meaning to their demands and action (Swindler, 1986: 277). Meaning itself is defined as a context here, as are the other practices in which the component is embedded. The task of the activists is then to identify e.g. a text or symbol, and then situate it in the rich web of associated cultural practices, beliefs, social structural realities and others that allow its recipients to find it meaningful (Swindler, 1995: 28). This is exactly the case for using Communist legacy (anti-communist) framing. Choosing symbols of the Communist era, be they slogans, labels, texts or banners and using them in post-communist countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, in various situations might resonate quite well because of the presence of anti-communism as a part of the cultural hegemony in the way Gramsci conceptualized it (Koubek, Buben and Polášek, 2012: 58-64).

The Communist era and its legacy is an important part of the Czech (political) culture and identity after 1989. Generally, anti-communism has only rarely become the object of systematic empirical reflection in post-socialist societies. Anti-communist rhetoric has been conceptualized as a political strategy of the new political elite against both hard-line communist bureaucrats and communist technocrats negotiating the political transition, which conflated all actors into the one and interpreted socialism as ‘not only as a failure, but a Gulag’ (Eyal et al., 2000: 130-131). Similarly, Gjuričová et al. have illustrated how the anti-communist sentiments and framing have been part of the process of the establishment of post-1989 political traditions and the images of the past, which was ‘in no way arbitrary or accidental’ (Gjuričová et al., 2011: 382). In other words, the process of the establishment of political anti-communism was
determined by both the historical development of political elites and community, and by pragmatic political decisions (ibid.). In the Czech Republic, the phenomenon of anti-communism is especially powerful in relation to the meaning making of the Communist era after 1989 and the way Czechs are getting over it. Labels such as Communist, Bolshevik, normalization, nationalization of property and many others related to the Communist era became powerful vehicles for stigmatization in almost any sphere; be it a political, cultural, business, or generally the public sphere. What makes it especially powerful is that the cultural and historical legacies (understood as deliberately propagated representations of selected fragments of the group’s past), when expressed explicitly, offer models of or for behaviour and thinking (Kubik, 2003: 319). These legacies expressed by: ‘symbols, stories, rituals, world views which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems’ (Swindler, 1986: 273), are also used to: ‘stake positions in power struggles and to exercise power over others by redefining (or attempting to redefine) the world for them’ (Kubik, 2003: 321). Carefully selected cultural and historical legacies then become important elements of the political struggle because they frame demands and activities in a resonant way. In other words, they might be used to construct a quite complex image of a public enemy.

To sum up, the post-communist context in the Czech Republic gives clear meaning to Communist legacy frames and framing used by activists when seeking support or trying to delegitimize political opponents. From the activist’s point of view this way of framing seems to be a rational and pragmatic choice because it raises the chances that the framing will be highly resonant and successful, at least during some periods of political development.

(3) Data and methods

This paper draws on the news reports retrieved from the electronic archives of The Czech News Agency (ČTK) between 1990 and 2010. These reports refer to protest events (mobilizations) defined as gatherings of at least three people convened in a public space in order to make claims that bear on the interests of an institution/collective actor. Only real episodes of collective action are included; threats of resorting to collective action, such as strike warnings, were excluded. At the same time these mobilizations had to incorporate some anti-communist feature or symbol, which was identified based on two criteria: first, news reports had to contain at least one of certain words1 (communist, totalitarian, KSČM/KSC, ČSTB, Bolshevik, comrade, normalization, 1950s,5 nationalization of property, 1989 and November5). Consequently, these notions of Communism were analysed and further validated in terms of their reference to direct or indirect identification of the situation, adversaries,

---

1 As well as its modifications.
2 KSČM refers to the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia which is in fact the former Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which ruled until the Velvet revolution in 1989.
3 ČSTB refers to pre-1989 state security service (counterintelligence), formal part of state uniformed forces including police. Estebák is a slang expression for state security agent.
4 1950s refers to the period of the totalitarian socialist regime in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s.
5 Both 1989 and November refer to the Velvet revolution.
institutions or activities with the Communist regime. It means that we proceeded with reports containing only anti-communist framing no matter in which kind of protest event they appeared. If the news reports met both criteria they were included. Finally, the sample consisted of 81 protest events where anti-communist framing was employed.

Frame analysis was carried out in the peak years of the protest events where anti-communist frames were present in order to increase variability of data and validity of our analysis. Peak years are the years in which protest events in which anti-communist frames were present were the most frequent. These peak years were: 1991, 1997, 2000 and 2006. First we proceeded with the news/reports retrieved form the electronic archives of The Czech News Agency that were identified by the coders as events with anti-communist framing (for the definition of anti-communist framing see above). We checked these news/reports once again and excluded those that did not provide rich material for framing analysis. In this way we identified events where anti-communist framing was used in the years under study. Then we searched for these events in the electronic archive of Czech Anopress IT media database, specifically in the newspapers with nationwide coverage. We collected news/reports related to these events where anti-communist framing was identified to extend the corpus for frame analysis. The corpus then comprised 70 news/reports in total, covering all the analysed events. Within the frame analysis we focused on identifying various micro-frames that constitute an anti-communist master frame and on identifying the core framing tasks: diagnostic and prognostic (Benford and Snow, 1988; 2000). By diagnostic task we understand identification of a problem and the attribution of blame and causality; by prognostic framing, suggesting solutions to the defined problem and also identifying strategies, tactics and targets, in other words, what is to be done (Benford and Snow 1988: 200-203). Reconstructed micro-frames are then contextualized and explained in terms of their contribution to constructing the target of the protest as a public enemy by using specific meanings related to the Communist era.

We analysed framing in two steps. First we identified what the problem was (diagnostic framing) and who is responsible for it (prognostic framing). Basically, we used coding for this (see Donati, 1992; Koenig 2004). Then we (re)constructed a conceptual metaphor that gives meaning (as well as a name) to the micro-frame. Here we draw on the experiences and methods of Yanow, who links metaphors and metaphorical concepts to the concept of framing (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2014; Yanow, 1996). Constructing the conceptual metaphor proceeded as follows: because conceptual metaphors need not necessarily be part of ordinary language, we had to identify them with the aid of metaphorical expressions. These are defined as linguistic expressions (e.g. words, phrases, sentences, etc.) that we use regularly in our everyday language without assigning any usual meaning/significance to them (Lakoff, 1993: 203, 209). Therefore, we searched for these expressions. Based on them we

---

There are no news/reports available for the year 1991 in electronic archive of Anopress IT, since the archive collects news/reports only since the year 1996.

Texts retrieved from this source were mostly helpful in contextualizing protest events under study.

We did not opt for motivational framing because of its contested conceptualization and lack of rich text data to retrieve it from.
(re)constructed conceptual metaphors. Individual metaphorical expressions are the expressions that refer to the source system. It is thus not possible to focus solely on the expressions that we find in a text, but rather it is always necessary to think about and interpret the given expressions in the sense of how they form a particular system. This is because it is not just individual aspects but the entire system that is conveyed, even though in a given instance it may be only individual aspects that are mentioned.

(4) Understanding the anti-communist mobilizing grievances

As mentioned above, we focus on the peaks of anti-communist mobilization in particular years, starting with 1991. Analytically we can differentiate between the protests that took place in the year 1991 based on their focus. There were two categories. The first one was protest concerning foreign affairs, the other one oriented on domestic affairs, specifically on the post-1989 political situation in Czechoslovakia.

(4.1.) The year 1991: Communism persevering

(4.1.1.) ‘Communism against nation’

Protest events concerning foreign affairs related to two incidents that occurred in 1991. The first one was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Iraq-Kuwait War) and the second one was the January set of events in Lithuania. In both cases, diagnostic framing identified the problem as an invasion by a foreign state (Iraq and the Soviet Union) of some other, independent (ethnic) nation state. These states were blamed for unjustified and illegal intervention in independent states. In terms of prognostic framing, suggested solutions consisted of declaring solidarity with the affected states and of addressing declarations of disagreement with the intervention by the intervening states. In fact, there was no call for any direct act; rather it was an appeal for declaring disagreement with such an act of intervention.

In all these protest events the activists framed both incidents with the label 1968 intervention/occupation:

‘Remembering of inauspicious and tragic consequences of military intervention in Czechoslovakia in the year 1968, we declare our categorical disagreement with violating sovereignty [...]’(ČTK, 15.1.1991)

They tried to persuade people to understand ongoing incidents as the intervention/occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the states of Warsaw pact, well known as the Prague Spring. To understand why they did so, we need to look at the meaning of the Prague Spring in the early 1990s as well as the context.

Czechoslovakia in 1991 was a state that has only recently gained its independence from the Soviet Union and started its democratization process. Although in the year 1991 Czechoslovakia was making huge progress both in terms of

* Lithuania declared independence early in the year 1990, although formally still remaining part of the Soviet Union.
domestic development as well as in terms of its return to Europe, there were still Soviet troops present in Czechoslovakia. They entered Czechoslovakia in 1968 to secure the normalization, that is the restoration of the leading role of the Communist party and eliminate contra-revolutionists. Presence of these troops still reminded Czechoslovaks of their former affiliation to the Communist bloc and kept them to a certain amount uncertain about the final result of the Velvet Revolution.

The meaning of the Prague Spring and the invasion by the Warsaw pact troops enables us to understand this particular use of the 1968 micro-frame. According to Holubec (2015: 132-135), the Prague Spring became a much discussed issue in 1991 and 1992, involving emotional debates between its sympathizers and opponents about its essence and its legacy. The Prague Spring was perceived as an era attempting significant democratization driven by a part of the political and cultural elites and supported by most of the citizens as well as the media. This was a dominant meaning of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovak society even though anti-communists were trying to portray it as a clash between two oppositional wings within the Communist party (Holubec, 2015: 205). In this context, the Soviets were perceived as the ones who intervened and stopped the national democratization process and secured the restoration of Communist Party dominance from abroad. Thus they were seen as the first agent of the following era of normalization, which is considered as one of the most unjust and painful eras of Czech (and Slovak) history. To get the full understanding of this particular frame, we need to look at how people perceived Communism at that time. Holubec (2015: 125) found out that shortly after the Velvet Revolution the label Communism was associated with adjectives like: insane, perverse, outrageous, blinded and substantitives like: juggernaut, decay, gutter, utopia, experiment, genocide, oppression, cancer, epidemic, totality and dictatorship. Moreover, after the Communist reign Czechoslovakia was characterized as economically destroyed, physically devastated and morally ill. The discourse on Communism has been homogenized, although some aspects of its components have been stressed in different phases of the post-1989 development in Czechoslovakia and later in the Czech Republic (Holubec, 2015: 129).

Interpreting the above mentioned incidents in terms of the Prague Spring aimed at describing the situation in Kuwait and Lithuania as highly unjust and to describe the situation in terms of morality. It might be indicated by the public attitude towards Russia, which turned from negative to very negative after the January events in Lithuania (Holubec, 2015: 199).

---

10 Return to Europe was one of the main slogans of the Velvet Revolution in 1989. The meaning of this slogan was to adopt western - democratic traditions again as well as to become part of the ongoing European integration process that later resulted in establishing of the European Union.

11 The departure of the Soviet troops was a long-lasting process that started early during the transition in 1989 and finished in summer 1991.

12 We will continuously further elaborate on this in the following paragraphs introducing micro-frames.
(4.1.2.) ‘Communist conspiracy’

Protests events framed in terms of *Communist conspiracy* were directed mostly at the then Czechoslovak and Czech governments. These institutions were diagnosed as the problematic elements causing poor social conditions for many Czechs, while the prognostic framing called on the governments to resign immediately and stressed calling early elections.

The *Communist conspiracy* micro-frame was used in a political contest to gain support for oppositional parties and movements. Activists who were using this way of framing tried to construct the image of the situation then as a *de facto* continuation of the Communist regime with only minor changes in the political elite. During protest meetings they called governmental officials’ names and associated them directly with the Communist party or State Security service, spoke about revolutionary Civic Forum (Občanské fórum, OF) officials as crypto-communists, accused court and state officials of being former Communists and accused journalists of being the servants of the new totality:

‘[Benda] stated that secret collaborators of State Security not only live among us but also work in various positions. According to him they are even still tasked by both former and contemporary rulers both from within and outside the state and the slow work of the cabinets, Parliament, and the bad performance of the media are due to these people. As Václav Benda said, it is possible to forgive but first it is necessary to disable and defeat the enemies.’ (ČTK, 25.2. 1991).

They constructed the reality as totally penetrated by the Communists and the change of the regime in 1989 as an illusion imposed by the then governmental politicians. What was tacitly implied was the activists’ self-portrait of the only reformists and democrats in Czechoslovakia.

There are two important factors that provide understanding of this way of framing, besides the abovementioned associations of Communism that were established in the early 1990s and persisted over time. The first one is the context of the starting process of extensive economic reforms (e.g. small privatization) and further institutional changes that initiated tangible social stratification clearly differentiating between what would later at the end of 1990s be called the losers and the winners of the transformation process. Losers in the context of the transformation meant people who were willing to change the regime and expecting that their economic and social status would increase after that, but who had not succeeded and struggled with their economic situation and social status. These comprised the target audience of mainly (extreme) right parties and movements (Mareš, 2000: 164) concerning e.g. Coalition for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR- RČS), a party considered as extreme right-wing populist and nationalist. The other factor was one of the prevailing discourses which dominated in early post 1989 development, the year 1991 included. This discourse was radically critical of the Velvet Revolution, calling it a *puppet theatre* and a *huge deception* on the Czech nation orchestrated by the Communists from the backstage (Holubec, 2015: 196-197). This was enabled also by the pressure from parties, movements as well as individuals,
who started to express strong dissatisfaction with the Communist era settlement (Holubec, 2015: 128). This discourse opened an opportunity for Communist conspiracy framing as it made use of discontent to amplify the frame.

(4.1.3.) ‘Communist Disease’

Within the discourse of the discontent we identified another micro-frame which we called Communist disease. The problem was seen in that people affiliated with the Communist regime were still holding important offices as well as having influence in business. Prognostic framing very clearly stated that these people must be removed from these positions and they must lose their influence. Generally, some form of ‘cleansing’ or ‘curing’ the politics and society from Communism was proposed. This included also a ban on the Communist party and punishing its members guilty of ‘crimes of Communism’. The Communist disease micro-frame was constructed with the use of labels such as: State Security, Communists, de-bolshevisation; adjectives like: criminal and totalitarian and verbs like remove, clear away, destroy and cleanse.

The idea of Communism and its advocates were presented as annoying insects…:

‘Miroslav Macek mentioned the problem of the existence of the Communist Party. He said that Communists are clothes moths and it is not possible to eliminate them one by one but it is necessary to create such an environment that is unfriendly to moths.’ (ČTK 25.2. 1991)

… or something thoroughly inhuman, lethal and destructive:

‘Over the last year and a half the devastation of the Czechoslovak Republic continued; it has destroyed everything that was not destroyed by the Communists and it is high time to stop the raging of the Communist State Security-Civic Forum’s clique.’ (ČTK, 6.4. 1991)

Although people who were labelled by the activists as Communists were not directly associated with the parasites or destruction, the way they were described together with the actual discourse gave them the meaning of the disease that must be cured. It was because of one particular meaning that the Communist era was given after 1989. This was the meaning of an illness, which destroyed almost all values of all of us (Holubec, 2015: 125). The link is then obvious. Former Communist officials and State Security agents were seen as bacteria or viruses that caused and fed the disease. ‘Normal’ people – meaning everyone else - were seen rather as the victims and those paralyzed by this disease (Communism) (cf. Blaive, 2011: 164).
(4.2.) Year 1997: Communism reloaded

(4.2.1.) ‘Communism as a zombie’

While the framing of the year 1991 was influenced by the reverberation and the discourse of the Velvet Revolution, the anti-communist framing in 1997 was significantly influenced by the development of the political sphere as well as the economic situation. Expectations of the citizens were quite high concerning both political and economic development and when the first serious crisis came, the disappointment of the citizens quickly deepened and the responsibility for this situation needed to be attributed to someone or something. This was the case of the *Communism as a zombie* framing which was present in the framing of the protest events in the year 1997:

‘He arrived in a 1950s jeep with People’s Militias symbols, equipped with a cannon, a machine gun and other tools of the ‘armed fist of the working class’. The aim of this parade was to ‘show the people what it felt like then and how it could maybe even come back again if the Communist Party won again.’’ (ČTK, 1.5. 1997)

This quote illustrates how using labels such as *Communist* were used to construct the meaning of an opponent who is not legitimate and eligible for discussion. This construction was enabled by the discourse that was accepted shortly after the revolution by the majority.

It promoted the idea that the exact opposite of socialism (Communism) was the best for society (Holubec, 2015: 255). In the Czech Republic, this ‘best for society’ was represented by conservative political parties, mainly Civic democrats (ODS) led by Václav Klaus. He used the anti-communist rhetoric strategically as a political manoeuvre (Blaive, 2011: 164) to gain political support as could be seen in the following Klaus quotation commenting on the situation when people criticized his politics:

‘I don’t believe that these men were rattling keys [...]’ (ČTK 2. 6. 1997)\footnote{Rattling keys in the demonstrations against the communist regime during the 1989 revolution in Czechoslovakia - meaning ‘this is the end of story, Communists should go’ became one of the symbols of the Velvet Revolution. Generally, this rhetoric further illustrates another important aspect of anti-communism, which is its exclusivism. Similar practices such as the isolation of the Communist party in parliamentary politics have soon become embedded in the broader society and culture thus creating a ‘second society’ with explicit – but allegedly immoral and illegitimate - nostalgia for the era of socialism or some of its features.}

*Communism as a zombie* framing was also used by ordinary people or people who did not participate in politics. This is a significant change in comparison to the year 1991. It was also manifested in prognostic and diagnostic framing. Diagnostic framing shows that the way public institutions (courts, police, etc.) acted was perceived as a problematic aspect of the democratic functioning of the state. This was so in one
legal case in which a publisher was accused of propagation of drug addiction and later of an attack on the state authority because he commented on the way the court decided in the first instance:

‘I consider it as fragments of fascist, restricting and totalitarian behaviour. We are again controlled by the posthumous children of Communism.’ (ČTK 20.1.1997)

In general, various institutions were blamed for acting against democratic principles be it e.g. freedom of speech or the use of violence. This shows how the diagnostic framing changed. In 1997, public institutions, often the ones constituting everyday direct experience of the democracy for citizens, were blamed for violating basic principles of democracy. It shows how the construction of the frame turned to incorporate the living experience of democracy. Within prognostic framing there was the dominance of stressing the need to follow and respect democratic principles, such as freedom of speech.

(4.2.2.) ‘Communism as left wing Fascism’

The Communist as a zombie micro-frame was often amplified by comparing Communism to Nazism or fascism. This was something that was present mainly in the radical anti-communist discourse, but later in 1995 also appeared in Havel’s talks (Holubec, 2015: 221) and became widely shared. This amplification was constructed by simply adding labels Nazism or fascism next to the label Communism thus providing Communism with the meaning of Nazism and fascism as well. It could be seen in the above mentioned quotation or in the following one:

‘[…] the Ministry of Finance […] fits into the category of German fascists […] and Czech Communists […]’ (ČTK 1.5. 1997)

When trying to understand the use of Communist legacy in the protest framing in the year 1997, we have to bear in mind the context of the protest. As has already been mentioned, the Czech Republic experienced its first serious political and economic crisis in that year which seemed to contribute to the restoration of anti-communism after its decline in the mid-1990s (Holubec, 2015: 199). The political and economic crisis was something unexpected due to high expectations of citizens raised by politicians after the 1992 elections and because of the official discourse of non-problematic and smooth development of recently renewed capitalism and democracy. When all these factors met, taking into account the meaning of the then government as genuine and indisputable democrats, the question of who might have

14 Actually, we would expect this frame to be one of the most prevalent anti-communist frames as this symbolical equivalence has penetrated the entire society and has become one of the most frequent common-sense arguments against any actor or strategy related to Communism. This equivalence sometimes builds on the claim that both Communism and Fascism/Nazism were left-wing ideologies (while often referring to the terms “Socialist” and “Workers” in the name of the German Nazi party, NSDAP).
been responsible for this situation appeared. According to the framing analysed, it was the Communists.

(4.3.) Year 2000: Communism resurrected

In 1999, ten years after the Velvet Revolution, huge protests against the existing political order broke out. These protests concentrated on initiatives called ‘Thank You, Time to Go’ and ‘Impulse 99’. These activities were mostly organized by former Velvet Revolution activists, some of the pre-1989 dissidents (from non-socialist dissent groups) and their sympathizers. They criticized the then politics and society and demanded changes that would lead to an improvement in the political situation (Dvořáková, 2003). These activities and other similar ones were very resonant and attracted quite a lot of supporters who were willing to openly and actively support its organizers, e.g. come to a meeting or sign a petition (Dvořáková, 2003: 130-152). These activities persisted into the year 2000, although decreasing in intensity with time. Another important factor seems to be the support for the Communist party which was reported by the election polls. At the end of the year 1999, elections polls showed the highest support for the Communist party since the Velvet Revolution reaching nearly 20 per cent (Vandrovcová and Přiběnská, 2012).

We identified three micro-frames in this year. Two of them are already known to us, one is Communism as a zombie and the other one is the Communist disease. The third one is Communism as a technology of power.

(4.3.1.) ‘Communism as a zombie’ and the ‘Communist disease’

These micro-frames occur in the protests simultaneously. The Communism as a zombie micro-frame was mostly supplemented by the micro-frame Communist Disease and together they reinforced the meaning which these micro-frames built. The problem was diagnosed as Communists not having been punished for their crimes as well as their ‘normal’ occurrence within the society with ambitions to carry out various public activities. It was suggested and vehemently claimed that Communist despotism must be commemorated but also punished. Communism must be banned and its adherents prevented from any return to the public space:

‘Ruml said it was very sad that none of the Communist crimes has been punished yet. “It is a debt we have to repay. It is also an invitation to Czech politicians to think about themselves,” Ruml told ČTK. He also thinks that it is still not too late to get even with Communism.’ (ČTK, 27.5.2000)

The Communism as a zombie micro-frame is constructed based on using the label crime(s), which is directly associated with the term Communism usually followed by stressing that Communists are again talking about taking over. In this way anti-communists are creating a discourse of fear:
'Not only have Communist not been punished for their crimes, but they have not even left public life and their current representatives are again talking about taking over.' (ČTK 30. 7. 2000)

There are no particular former Communist politicians or State Security agents and collaborators mentioned to be accused of any crime and then punished. The activists portray Communism as a criminal agent, in other words, it is Communism that is responsible for the crimes. People are usually the victims of the Communist ideas; they are the ones who were infected by this nasty disease:

‘According to Kyjovský Communism is “against human beings, against their nature. It is a parasitic, malignant ideology that must be extirpated. If it is not extirpated, it will bother us for a quite long time.”’ (ČTK, 1.5. 2000)

‘We asked for de-bolshevisation but bold lines below history were drawn.’ (ČTK, 27.5. 2000)

The micro-frame of the Communist disease is related to the depersonalization of the Communist regime in Czech public discourse (Holubec, 2015: 136). The regime is thus not associated with any people, there are neither particular individuals nor any groups of people who could be identified. Moreover, this depersonalization is evident in the fact that the representatives of the pre-1989 Communist regime had been out of the focus of the media and there had hardly been any mention of them. Our framing analysis shows the same, the focus is not on particular individuals accused of committing a crime but on Communism itself as can be seen above in the text.

The Communist disease micro-frame was constructed explicitly as well as implicitly. This means that Communism was directly described as a disease or infection as could be seen in the previous quotation. Implicit constructions of this micro-frame were built with the help of using verbs like purge, remove and clear away:

‘Purging the political realm as well as business from former Communists was claimed on the protest gathering [...]’ (ČTK, 21.8.2000)

This way of constructing the meaning of the situation of 2000 was exactly the same as was used in framing in the year 1991. It seems to be not very surprising because this way of framing was used by the same activists or groups of anti-communists mostly recruiting from former dissidents, political prisoners and the like.

(4.3.2.) ‘Communism as a technology of power’

As was mentioned above, the year 2000 was a year with a high number of various political activities and an increased sensitivity to social and political affairs. There was an impression of a deeper political and social crisis caused by political elites and their way of understanding democracy. The situation was perceived as a crisis of democracy in the public discourse (Nekvapil, 2003). At the end of the year a
crisis in the Czech Television (public television broadcaster) burst out because of disagreements between the employees of the Czech Television (Česká televize - ČT) and the newly elected management. ČT employees considered it as an attempt by the political elite to take control of ČT.

The *Communism as a technology of power* micro-frame was the most common frame used in the framing of the protest events organized to support ČT employees dissatisfied with the new management. During the year 2000 when the crisis in ČT burst out the problem was diagnosed as a threat to the independence of the public service and as an attempt on the part of political elite to take control over ČT. The ones to be blamed were first of all the new management and the political elites who had put them in charge. Prognostic framing was very extensive and elaborated in this case. The solution of this problem was seen in the resignation of the disputed management and later even more fundamental changes in the way the management of ČT was elected.

‘Normalization purges have been triggered in the Czech Television and there is a danger that Czech Television will become an obedient tool for those who hold the power at the moment [...]’ (ČTK 23. 12. 2000)

This quotation shows the way the *Communism as a technology of power* micro-frame was constructed. The main label giving the meaning to the situation was normalization - the historical period of 1969-1987 in Czechoslovakia. This era is mostly interpreted as one of the worst in Czech history representing mainly political purges, manipulation of the media and the total political suppression of society (Holubec, 2015: 135). The interpretation of the situation as a threat of normalization was also reinforced by the involvement of former dissidents and former student leaders of the Velvet Revolution (again) in the protests, and also by protest strategies which included demonstrations, petitions; occupying the public television building, as well as the public reading of the protest proclamation in theatres (recalling the events of 1989) and looking for celebrities’ support among e.g. famous athletes, pop stars or scholars.

The micro-frame also appeared in the discussion on the decision on important technical-political issues (here on the construction of a nuclear power plant):

‘Bolsheviks still decide on Temelin.’ (ČTK, 29.9. 2000)

(4.4.) The Year 2006: Communism imagined

There are two important events that constitute the context for the framing in the year 2006. The first one took place a year earlier. It was a techno party organized in the summer of 2005 which was violently broken up by the police. The police intervention was defended by the then prime minister Jiří Paroubek calling the techno party participants ‘dangerous people’. The intervention and the question whether it was adequate became part of the public discourse and remained current during the next year, 2006. In this year parliamentary elections were held in the beginning of the summer and the election campaign opened an opportunity for using various means of
political contest. One of them seemed to be framing with Communism. To be more specific it means associating political opponents with Communism in various aspects while constructing and using *Communism as a disease* and *Communism as a zombie* micro-frames.

(4.4.1.) ‘Communism as a zombie’ and ‘Communist disease’

The common denominator of nearly all of the protests organized in this year is the Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická - ČSSD) and it’s the then leader and prime minister Jiří Paroubek and his fellow party member, the then Minister of Health David Rath. These two men and their political activities were identified as the main problem in the diagnostic framing. Both of them were accused of trying to concentrate power in their own hands by means of their office and political capital. Prognostic framing focused on the resignation of both of them, ideally resignation from the government and from the leadership of the party (Paroubek) and complete withdrawal from politics. In other words, both of them were seen as a *persona non grata*:

‘We want to avert the return of the Czech health care system to its state before the year 1989 [...]’ (ČTK, 14. 4. 2006)

‘Paroubek and Rath stands for the return to before 1989.’ (ČTK, 25.2. 2006)

These two quotations illustrate the construction of the *Communism as a zombie* micro-frame. The activists associated the politics of ČSSD with the persisting negative image of the era of Communism. What is interesting is that when the protests against ČSSD and its politics started, they used a particular era of Communism: the early 1950s. This era of Communism is associated with the hardest repressions and nationalization, but later they associated it with the whole era of Communism. In this case, the activists extended the frame to let more people to identify with it. This seems to be strategic act because more people remembered the era of normalization rather than the era of early 1950s.

The other way this framing was constructed is associating ČSSD with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy - KSČM):

‘According to him [Jehlička], there is almost no difference between ČSSD and KSČM. He thinks that the situation in this country is the same as it was before the revolution in 1989.’ (ČTK 31. 5. 2006)

Explicit portraying of these two parties one beside the other constructed the meaning of them as close allies with a common ideological base. In the context of approaching parliamentary elections this meant that voting for ČSSD is voting for KSČM as well.

\* As this framing share a lot with the one used in the previous analysed year, we focus only on the difference between these two.
This is exactly what was perhaps well-recognized by several conservative parties. Shortly before the parliamentary elections that took place in summer 2006, they and their youth organizations organized several anti-communist protest events. During these events they used the same micro-frames - *Communism as a zombie* and *Communist disease*. They constructed them in a similar way as was mentioned in the analysis of the year 2000 with the help of many elaborated labels, catch phrases, likening and metaphors while adding the information about forthcoming elections:

"We claimed allegiance to this idea to express our determination to face criminal Communism. Our anti-communism is not cheap. Also, today we are threatened by ostensible democracy. That is why we called for the mobilization of force," said the chair of *KDU-ČSL*. (ČTK 1. 5. 2006)

'The manifestation under the placard which says: "Use your vote as long as you have time to" should warn of the danger of Communists coming into the government.' (ČTK 1. 6. 2006)

It seems that these activists made use of the previously built discourse which portrayed Communists as a serious threat because of its solely negative meaning and reproduced it to harm their political opponents. While reproducing it they tried to associate Communism in its various aspects with their opponents to persuade voters to not to vote for left wing parties. Implicitly they constructed their own image as the real guardians of democracy who can secure it.

(4.5.) Framing with Communism

Framing analysis shows that anti-communist framing has changed over the years (see Table 3) while some of the identified micro-frames persisted for years. These are the *Communism as a zombie* and *Communist disease* micro-frames.

---

*Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová - The Christian and Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party.*

*INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 41-62.*
Both these frames are widely used when anti-communist framing appears. Since 1997 the communism as a zombie micro-frame became one of the dominant components of anti-communist framing. Later in the year 2000 this micro-frame was supplemented with Communist disease, a micro-frame that appeared just after the Velvet Revolution and then for some period disappeared from the discourse.\footnote{Even though these two ways of framing might seem to be in contradiction we argue that they are compatible. The communism as a zombie frame reflects the meaning that communism should be ‘dead’ but it somehow again rises from the dead. The communism as a disease frame reflects – comprises the meaning of e.g. cancer, which might happen to be cured, but might appear again. However, there are some differences in these two frames (mentioned in the text) they are compatible in stressing the return of ‘something undesirable’.} First of all, these two micro-frames draw from the prevailing discourse in which Communism stands for the very bad experience as Holubec (2015) elucidates in his research. This experience is usually expressed in various aspects of Communism, according to the context. That means according to what the problem is and in which circumstances this problem appears. If there is some well recognizable aspect that can be associated with any well-known and clearly defined aspect of Communism then another, specific frame might appear. These are the Communist conspiracy, Communism against the nation and Communism as a technology of power micro-frames. While the meaning of Communism is negative, evoking the feeling that this era could return raises fear among people. This seems to be the basis of the Communism as a zombie micro-frame. The Communist disease micro-frame works similarly. Associating any phenomenon with Communism and then interpreting Communism as a disease constructs an emergent need to get rid of it. It seems that political actors are aware of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Micro-frame</th>
<th>Communism against nation</th>
<th>Communist conspiracy</th>
<th>Communist disease</th>
<th>Communism as Zombie</th>
<th>Communism as left Fascism</th>
<th>Communism as a technology of power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Communism Persevering</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Communism Reloaded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Communism Resurrected</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Communism Imagined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors
this, because it was mostly they who used these two micro-frames when waging political battles with their opponents.

(5) Conclusions

In our analysis we have shown how anti-communist framing in the Czech Republic is used to construct the image of public enemy. The answer to the question asking about how it is possible to construct the image of a public enemy by using anti-communist framing lies in understanding of the meaning of Communism in the public discourse in the Czech Republic as well as in the way various situations, problems or actors someone wanted to delegitimize were connected to the discourse.

The discourse on the Communist era evolved in early 1990s of the 20th century. At the very beginning of Czech post-communist politics and despite the peaceful transition and comparatively decent living conditions, a communism/anti-communism (or pro-communist regime vs. anti-communist regime) conflict cleavage arose as it was constructed, interpreted and perceived by the most of the actors as the most important issue in the political landscape. Consequently, it drove the political conflicts in the country and in fact contained other conflict lines such as socio-economic or ethnic ones (Mansfeldová, 2013). The process of differentiation during which different actors with different agendas stepped up appeared with the second democratic elections in 1992 and was paralleled by the split in the broad anti-communist initiative (OF) and the debates on the nature and scope of the economic transformation of the country. Since 1992, the key political conflict in Czech politics was transformed into a socio-economic one (Hloušek and Kopeček, 2004: 11-41), even if it was addressed through different agendas.

In terms of constructing a public enemy, the shift in cleavages was crucial. The analysis shows that anti-communist framing in the year 1991 was mostly used with anti-communist claims, that is with direct demands for getting rid of former Communists holding public administration positions, de-bolshevization, prosecuting of Communist crimes, etcetera. It was in this era that the public meaning of Communism was built. It was not the image of communism in general that had been constructed. Communism was defined and given meaning through various aspects and periods of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, e.g. normalization to recall the analysis of the year 1991. The discourse structured as mentioned above has worked as the context that provides activists with a certain (restricted) field of meanings within which they choose and use certain labels, symbols, metaphors and beliefs. This is the Swindler’s (1986) tool kit in use. The tool kit (or specific tools) has been used by various actors and activists. They have chosen various aspects of Communism in accordance to the situation to delegitimize their opponents and give them the meaning of a public enemy.

This is the case in all the following years (1997, 2000 and 2006) included in our analysis. We can see how certain situations, problems and actors were strategically framed by referring to diverse discursive components of Communism. Many politicians shared the anti-communist discourse elaborated in the early 1990s. At the same time, they enriched it with their own political goals; thus they started to use anti-communist framing to construct an image of someone or something not connected to
Communism as a public enemy. This is the shift of the early communist vs. anti-communist cleavage to a socio-economic one, because Communism vs. democracy was no longer the conflict to be resolved. There was no fight with Communists, such as democratic forces vs. Communists. There was a political fight between a (democratic) government and the parliamentary opposition over various public policies to be implemented. This can be illustrated by the practice of e.g. Vaclav Klaus, prime minister of the Czech government in the 1997. He was one of the first to use the tool kit mentioned above to delegitimize the ČSSD and its political programme. This means that he directly labelled e.g. the social policy of the ČSSD with central planning and restrictions on freedom by the former Communist regime; thus constructing ČSSD (and the left as a whole) as Communist trying to carry out what they did before 1989 (Holubec, 2015: 221-222). In other words, a public enemy was constructed. More precisely the pattern of anti-communist framing (almost) universally applicable was discovered. The universality was based on the early anti-communist public discourse (as mentioned above), while the contextual component of the framing always had to be re-invented for the specific case. This is the strategic part of the framing, the specific tool in use. Thus, as mentioned in the analysis of the year 2006, the era of 1950s of the 20th century, connected to putting ‘almost everything’ under state ownership and control was used to give meaning to the ČSSD’s health reform proposal which was supposed to strengthen the role of the state and stop privatization.

To sum up, the anti-communist discourse elaborated in the early 1990s of the 20th century provided various actors with some set of shared meaning of Communism. When the communist vs. anti-communist cleavage shifted to the socio-economic plain and various actors started to compete with each other (not all of them against Communists) and they started to employ e. g. symbols, metaphors, labels of Communism strategically. This tool kit, with specific tools used in particular contexts then became a way of delegitimizing opponents. It was quite resonant at least for a certain group of people and at least for a certain period of time. The question is then, if this way of constructing a public enemy is still viable today. Since 2010, the anti-communist public discourse seems to be undergoing major changes, as contemporary (2017) political competition for the office of prime minister seems not be influenced by accusation of one of the candidates of cooperation with the Communist state security service. That is something not even imaginable a decade ago.
References


Czech Press Agency Database (http://www.ctk.eu/).


DÁNIEL KOVAREK, DÁNIEL RÓNÁ, BULCSÚ HUNYADI AND PÉTER KREKÓ *

Scapegoat-Based Policy Making in Hungary: Qualitative Evidence for How Jobbik and its Mayors Govern Municipalities

* [kovarekd@ceu.edu] (Central European University, Department of Political Science); [daniel.rona@uni-corvinus.hu] (Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Corvinus University of Budapest); [hunyadi@politicalcapital.hu] (Political Capital Institute); [kreko.peter@ppk.elte.hu] (Eötvös Lorand University of Sciences, Pedagogy and Psychology Faculty, Department of Social Psychology; Political Capital Institute)

Abstract

The far-right has been widely studied in the last decades, but little attention has been paid to its local activities. Nonetheless, in countries without far-right national government records, like Hungary, this might be the only way to explore the aims and characteristics of the former parties. This study sets out to explore the activities and main policy initiatives of local far-right leadership in Hungary that are driven by ideological scapegoating mechanisms. The research this paper is based on employed qualitative techniques – in-depth interviews and content analysis of local sources – to grasp the patterns of the local governance of Jobbik. The main foci of the fieldwork-based research are the manifestations of enemy images and ideological scapegoating in the field of symbolic politics, Roma – non-Roma cohabitation, social policy, the public work scheme and public safety – fields where (Jobbik) mayors have substantial room for maneuver, and also areas to which the party’s ideological predisposition and scapegoating can be traced back. The paper also examines how local enemy images relate to national ones and to the political strategy of Jobbik during a period when the party underwent important changes such as moderation and de-radicalization, having lost their ownership of the migration issue and witnessed the government take over the monopoly on enemy images. The analysis reveals how Jobbik-mayors employ conscious strategies for enemy-making and scapegoating with respect to – chiefly, but not exclusively – the Roma population, and how this drives the policies they try to implement. The research also sheds light on the remarkable tension between ideological and pragmatic considerations, and on how the former limits the enforcement of scapegoat-based policies.

Keywords: Local Politics; Far-right; Jobbik; Mayors; Scapegoat-based Policy Making; Hungary.
1. Introduction

In 2015, a small Hungarian village close to the Serbian border, Ásotthalom, made headlines in the international media when its Jobbik-affiliated mayor formed a ‘migrant-hunter’ militia and introduced a plan to ban Muslims and gay people from the village from 2016. Érpatak – another Hungarian village led by a far-right politician – attracted similar attention when its mayor symbolically hanged the effigies of Simon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu in protest against the Gaza War. While these events may only appear to be sensation-seeking activities aimed at attracting one minute of fame, they are still symptomatic of local far-right politics. The initiatives and approaches of these two politicians currently or previously serve(d) as models for Jobbik when the party was designing the national policies it planned to implement in the case that it had a chance to form a government.

This article sets out to explore the activities and main policy initiatives of the far-right at the local level in Hungary with a special focus on how scapegoats and enemy images serve as starting points or ideological inspiration for mayors when implementing and designing policy measures for mobilizing constituencies and maintaining power. We examine ‘scapegoat-based policymaking’: a reliance on ideologically construed enemy images and scapegoats in policy-related decision-making. We mainly employed in-depth interviews and content analysis of local sources to address this issues. With two dozen Jobbik-supported mayors gaining mandates at the 2014 municipal elections, Hungary provided a great opportunity for such research.

The results of our fieldwork have a theoretical and practical relevance for many reasons. First, according to party chairman Gábor Vona, local governance is a laboratory for national governance. Out of the six members of Jobbik’s presidium, three are mayors of cities discussed in this study. Secondly, how the far-right governs on the local level is rarely examined, despite the relatively robust literature about the far-right. Third, we examine if the general ‘rule’ about far-right politicians and parties becoming ‘domesticated’, losing their radicalism and gravitating towards the center after gaining executive power (Akkerman and Lange, 2012) is applicable at the local level. Related to this, this study examines whether Jobbik’s conscious strategy of ‘moderation’ and centrist shift at the national level since 2013 is manifest at the level of settlements - or, in contrast, the local level remains the ‘reservoir for radicalism’ for the party; a place in which to implement the most extreme ideas from its manifesto. In the context of Jobbik’s moderate shift, the question is whether the enemy images of Jobbik rather reflect a populist, anti-elitist approach by referring to ‘the People’, or an extremist approach that involves pointing to specific (minority) groups and enemies (Gerő et al., 2017). We also aim to generate some insight into how the refugee crisis

---

1 The research and the current study that summarizes its results were supported by the Heinrich Böll Foundation within the project ‘Strategies against the Far-Right’.
4 https://alfahir.hu/vona_gabor_tiszavasvari_mintavrosz-20101012
and the Hungarian government’s anti-immigrant campaign changed the enemy images on the far-right: i.e., to what extent the far-right ‘adopted’ the newcomers as enemies, and whether it depicted them as an even more dangerous group than Jobbik’s ‘usual’ scapegoats, the Roma and Jewry. What is not the aim of this exploratory study, however, is to provide an explanation for the reasons behind Jobbik’s success at the national level (see: Karácsony and Róna, 2011) or even at the local level. A qualitative inquiry such as that described in this paper is not suitable for this purpose; nor can such an approach be used to assess the impact of the decisions made by local politicians of the far-right.

The focus of the research is thus on examining how scapegoats and enemy images shape the symbolic politics and policy initiatives of these Jobbik-affiliated mayors. This is done by reviewing initiatives mostly related to cohabitation of Roma and non-Roma, public safety, the public work program and social policy. In other policy dimensions – such as education or health care – municipalities have very limited jurisdiction and budgets due to the legal changes introduced by the second Orbán government to the municipal system, which were designed to centralize these policy fields (Hegedűs and Péteri, 2015). These recent changes signaled the intentions of the Orbán-regime to separate and dissociate ‘grand politics’ from subnational ones, as well as to eliminate the latter’s autonomy and accentuate its secondary nature. Legal changes such as forbidding dual mandates served the role of depriving MPs of their hinterlands (that they had had as mayors) and centralizing the system by suppressing a group that could potentially challenge (and rival) the central party (Várnagy, 2012: 143) – as well as emphasizing the superiority of national politics.

Consequently, the analysis only covers policy dimensions where local governments have substantial room to maneuver. Despite benefits and public work programs being financed by the central budget, municipalities can define a wide range of criteria for beneficiaries or those volunteering for work. Town halls are free to organize events and community programs; local (symbolic) measures thus reflect the worldview of mayors and their aides. Hence, these areas reveal how Jobbik exercises power at the local level. It is noteworthy that Gábor Vona, chairman of the party, clearly valued experience in local governance when nominating Jobbik’s new vice chairmen in 2016; his statement about Jobbik aiming to govern the country ‘the way its mayors govern locally’ received widespread publicity and attention.

In this article, we first provide a brief overview of the role of enemy concepts and scapegoating in the ideology of the far-right. This is followed by a summary of the context-specific literature on Hungarian local politics and far-right ideology. After elaborating on the methodology we used, the article explores the main patterns of local-level leadership in settlements governed by Jobbik. Finally, the paper highlights some possible implications from this study of the nature of local governance of the far-right in general.
2. Theoretical background

The dramatic upswing of Jobbik in 2009 and 2010 – at European Parliamentary and general elections, respectively – provides fertile ground for an exploration of the factors that contributed to the electoral success of the party (Karács and Róna, 2011; Biró-Nagy and Róna, 2011; Krekó, Juhász and Molnár, 2011; Varga, 2014; Havlík and Mares, 2016; Róna, 2016). Recent scholarly research has presented analyses of Jobbik’s MPs (Hajdú, 2014) and candidates of single-member districts (Hajdú, 2016; Kovarek and Farkas, 2017), mass communication channels and internet presence (Jeskó, Bakó and Tóth, 2012; Szabó and Bene, 2015; Karl, 2017), voter base (B. Szabó, 2013) – with a special emphasis on the party’s outstanding support among the youth (A. Szabó, 2013) – the construction of the party’s internal organization (Kovarek and Soós, 2016), policy relevance and legislative influence (Böcskei and Molnár, 2017), rhetoric and discourse (Pytlas, 2013; Vidra and Fox, 2014; Petsinis, 2015; Kyriazi, 2016), electoral campaigns (Zentai, 2011) and ideology (Enyedi, 2016). The latest works also focus on the de-radicalization of Jobbik, emphasizing that efforts to establish a more moderate and ‘detoxified’ image were restricted to communications and campaigns, and left the party’s elite and rank-and-file membership largely untouched (Krekó and Mayer, 2015; Biró-Nagy and Boros, 2016; Kovarek and Farkas, 2017).

Nonetheless, the municipal-level political activity of the party – whether campaigning, activism or local governance – has never been subject to empirical investigation. This is partly explained by the smaller number of relevant Jobbik-affiliated political actors – the party was able to seize only a handful of municipal positions both in 2010 and 2014 – and the under-researched nature of subnational politics in Hungary in general. While some of the aforementioned empirical work does study the party in office with respect to Jobbik, it was solely the party’s parliamentary group and parliamentary candidates that have been subject to excessive scrutiny – never its mayors or local councilors. Similarly, the very few comprehensive studies of Hungarian local politics and its recent developments (Hajnal and Rosta, 2014; Soós and Kákai, 2011; Támas, 2014; Dobos and Papp, 2017) almost entirely ignore the activity of Jobbik at the subnational level. In the first two papers listed above, for instance, the party is not mentioned on a single occasion, while the third cited source, a detailed monograph about the politics of municipalities in Hungary, touches upon Jobbik exclusively in connection with the mayor of Érpatak, who is not a member of the party and won his two consecutive mandates as an independent candidate. If at all, Jobbik’s presence on the municipal level is only illustrated by case studies which involve the presence of the Hungarian Guard or other paramilitary groups (formerly) affiliated with the party (Virág, 2016).

The intersection of local politics and the far right is not completely neglected by the international literature, but most scholars have restricted themselves to explaining their electoral success at the municipal or federal level. The former typically use formal models and the statistical analysis of vote share and turnout data (Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir, 2007; Kestila and Söderlund, 2007; Arzheimer and Carter, 2009; Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler, 2009; Rydgren and Ruth, 2011). Other researchers have employed data about the grassroots activities of far-right
organizations gathered from interviews and content-analysis of the press (Goodwin, 2010; Art, 2011; De Lange and Art, 2011; Dinas and Rori, 2016; Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2016). This line of research usually highlights the links between leadership and local organizations: how solid (extra-parliamentary) organizations have resulted in the party’s persistence at the national electoral level (Art, 2011; Bolleyer and Bytzek, 2013), or how local far-right party organizations have reacted to national leadership crises (Heinisch and Mazzoleni, 2016).

Some studies have relied on extensive fieldwork and municipal-level case studies (for example, see: Váradi and Virág, 2014), but they did not examine how the far-right governs locally; instead they concentrated on understanding the experience of female activists who promote the far-right’s culturally racist agenda at the municipality level (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2015) or the way extremist parties exploit the circulation of violence at the local level to attract sympathizers and discourage opponents (Petrou and Kandylis, 2016). A few scholars have focused on the impact of the far-right on other political actors at the local level (Loxbo, 2010; Bracco, Paola and Green, 2017), but they did not investigate cases where the far-right was in power.

The extensive use of enemy images is, in most cases, not irrational, but strategic, and can pay off politically. The need for enemies and allies is a general feature of humans and human communities (see, for example: Volkan, 1985). Due to their utmost importance in human societies, enemy concepts and enemy images have a central role in politics (Szabó, 1998). The ‘enemy’ is different from the ‘rival’: while the latter is an integral part of the political community, and therefore a legitimate player in the democratic process, the former is not – therefore it should be excluded or even eliminated from the political community (Edelman, 1988; Szabó, 2007). But of course, enemies do not just divide communities, but can unite and mobilize them as well. As Kenneth Burke (1974: 193) wrote in his essay about Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf: ‘Men who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all.’

Enemy images and concepts, as well as ideology-based scapegoating, are the ‘sine qua non’ of the politics and policies of far-right parties and movements, which are best defined and characterized by their enemies (Mudde, 2007). Given that the core feature of the ideology of the far-right is nativism, enemies of the far-right are defined on an ethnic, national or racial basis. Examination of enemy images is important not only for understanding the far right’s ideology: enemy images influence not only the rhetorical, but the political and the policy output and ‘behavior’ of far-right parties, movements and leaders.

The importance of enemy concepts and images lies in their capacity to drive political and policy processes in the direction of escalating intergroup conflict. Enemy images are the prerequisites of racism, discrimination and armed conflict (Oppenheimer, 2006). In the presence of frustrations over perceived difficulties (for example: economic problems, crime, ethnic conflicts) and pre-existing stereotypes about scapegoated enemy groups, the scapegoating ideology can mobilize not only spontaneous, but organized action against this outgroup – from verbal attacks through discriminative measures to mass violence and even genocide. Such actions can be justified as necessary and ethical, ‘a matter of self-defense against an inherently malevolent “enemy”’ (Glick, 2002: 119).
The enemy images and concepts of the Hungarian far-right share the more ‘universal’ logic of the ethnicized enemy images in Europe (Szele and Tófalvi, 2012). The image of the criminal, lazy minority shows many similarities in two substantially different European countries – Hungary and the United Kingdom – towards two totally different minority groups: the Roma, and Muslims. The two most important aspects of these stereotypes are parasitism and criminality (ibid; Bernáth-Messing, 2011). Both have policy implications. According to Jobbik’s narrative, the parasitism and laziness of the Roma go hand in hand with the notion that they receive a lot of unjustified social benefits that they do not deserve – and that this injustice calls for urgent correction.

The most trivial enemy for the Hungarian far-right is the Roma minority, the most unpopular minority group in Central-Eastern Europe, who face widespread political efforts to criminalize or mobilize against them (Feischmidt, Szombati and Szuhay, 2013). As a consequence, the ownership and appropriation of the ‘Gypsy crime’ issue, and Jobbik’s successful attempts to put this issue on the political agenda, were the main reasons for the electoral breakthrough of the Hungarian far-right (Karácsony and Róna, 2011). Nonetheless, enemy images of the Hungarian far-right are not limited to the Roma, as they are frequently directed at other enemies: the liberal international political, cultural and financial elites and their ethnic symbol, the Jew. As the narrative goes, lobby groups financed by international capital, through their local lackeys, are executing their plot to destroy nations and indigenous values. The main ‘axiomatic enemy’ for the Hungarian far right – which can serve as a final explanation for the World’s ills – is traditionally the international liberal elite and Jewry, who, through conspiring with the pseudo-national elites, and using the Roma as a tool, are ruining the country. So, in Mudde’s typology (2007), this is a grand conspiracy involving players who are ‘within the state, outside the nation’ (the Roma, and more generally, the ‘parasites’), along with others who are ‘outside the state, and outside the nation’ (Jews, the international financial elite, ‘background powers’).

Jobbik’s politicians frequently combine enemy images to simplify the scapegoating process, claiming that ‘Gypsy crime’ is a weapon in the hand of ‘Zionism’ that weakens the Hungarian nation. This ideological scapegoating mechanism serves as a basis of political and policy actions on the local level as well. The mobilization by Jobbik’s paramilitary organizations against the ‘aggressive Roma’, for example, led to the violent escalation of ethnic tensions in a small locality in Northern Hungary in 2011 and consequently to the election of a Jobbik-affiliated mayor who promised to make order. The former village thus became a successful laboratory of anti-Roma mobilization on the local level for the Hungarian far-right (Political Capital, 2011). Feischmidt and Szombati (2017) describe in detail this successful grassroots mobilization of the far-right using enemy images, the dynamics these images can bring

---


6 As did, inter alia, Lajos Rig , who is currently the only MP of Jobbik to gain a mandate in a single-member district in 2015, on his Facebook page a few years ago: http://24.hu/belfold/2015/02/14/tapolcai-jobbik-jelolt-a-ciganyok-a-zsidok-biologiai-legyvere/
to local politics, and the way they escalate intergroup conflict. Our research starts where theirs ends, seeking to answer the question whether anti-minority mobilization, rooted in structurally generated antagonisms and discourses that build on enemy images, can provide fertile ground not just for winning local elections, but for governing municipalities afterwards through the employment of scapegoat-based policy making.

3. Methodological considerations and case selection

We explore the scapegoating attempts of Jobbik politicians at the local level and compare enemy images used in various localities, while also trying to relate them to the earlier scapegoating strategies of the party at the national level. The selected cases are settlements where the far-right is already in power, hence we do not aim to explain local or national electoral success, but rather to investigate the extent to which scapegoating and enemy-making serve as inspiration for policies and regulations. To achieve this, we employed qualitative methods (mainly in-depth interviews and on-site fieldwork); the exploratory phase of the inquiry similarly relied on non-quantified desktop research such as content analysis of national and local media - independent, Jobbik-affiliated and local government-financed alike -, budget proposals, as well as cultural and welfare policies. The research was carried out in five of the total eighteen municipalities that are led by Jobbik mayors: Ásotthalom, Devecser, Ózd, Tapolca, and Tiszavasvári. Four of the municipalities selected are towns (Jobbik only controls five towns in Hungary), while Ásotthalom is a village. The list of municipalities under investigation includes settlements from Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Hungary, as well as Jobbik’s politically most significant three municipalities whose mayors are vice-chairmen of the party.

Also, these settlements represent policy areas that are of utmost importance for Jobbik. Ásotthalom, led by László Toroczkai, one of the most radical far-right politicians in Hungary, stands for the extremist stance and the strict anti-immigration policy of Jobbik. Devecser, Ózd and Tiszavasvári are of key importance because of their Roma population. Tapolca, a former Fidesz-stronghold with a small Roma population, represents Jobbik’s challenge of gaining support beyond its core electorate while abandoning its anti-Roma rhetoric. In addition, the case studies are diverse in terms of political composition: divided town halls and an absolute majority in the council behind the far-right mayor are both present in the selection. Our aim was to create a diverse pool of settlements with the expectation that this would yield more generalizable results. It also enabled us to create ‘settlement pairs’, which were similar to each other in many respects, yet differed in one or two key variables relevant from Jobbik’s perspective, using Mill’s Method of Difference (MSSD). As a rule of thumb, the larger settlements are, the more political relevance they possess; nevertheless, by selecting towns, we also had the chance to do fieldwork on settlements that spend a sizeable portion of their budget on freely designated objectives, reflecting the local government’s ideological (or pragmatic) priorities. Table 1 provides a brief overview of the demographics, ethnic distribution and political characteristics of municipalities selected as cases for analysis.
Table 1. Main features of the settlements examined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asotthalom</td>
<td>4218</td>
<td>3871</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>5.26%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser</td>
<td>5161</td>
<td>4390</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>12.38%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd</td>
<td>38 405</td>
<td>34 481</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>38.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapolca</td>
<td>16 964</td>
<td>15 582</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>39.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári</td>
<td>14 698</td>
<td>13 040</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>10 322 099</td>
<td>9 855 571</td>
<td>1.84%</td>
<td>3.18%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given our aim of understanding the style and character of (and motivation behind) Jobbik’s municipal-level governance, the research primarily relied on in-depth interviews with a wide circle of local public actors with considerable experience in local public life and a deep understanding of the local characteristics of Roma–non-Roma cohabitation. Altogether, 36 interviews were conducted with mayors, opposition politicians, entrepreneurs, activists and representatives of Roma communities and local NGOs. The interviews focused on the social and political circumstances, key policy areas and the performance of the local government, and the impact of local policies on the Roma and the local community in general.

All interviews were conducted by one or two authors of this paper; interviewees received no financial compensation, were assured of their anonymity and that conversations would be recorded and transcribed. Unless specified otherwise, statements presented with quotation marks and references to our fieldwork denote ascertainments based on interviewees’ everyday experiences and beliefs. Topic guides were semi-formalized: while detailed templates existed for specific groups of interviewees, researchers were free to expand and personalize guides based on their pre-existing knowledge about local specificities. The latter also conveyed to respondents that we ‘did our homework’, i.e. helped us to be taken more seriously, using context-specific details as effective tools in the power play between interviewer(s) and interviewee (Rivera, Kozyreva and Sarovskii, 2002: 685). While the positive relationship between the ‘publicness’ of interview location and the extent of control a researcher can claim over the interview situation (Ostrander, 1995) is well-known, the vast majority of venues were selected by the interview subjects – either for reasons related to their convenience or with the aim of ensuring the secrecy of their participation. Table 2 in the Appendix includes some relevant characteristics about all of the interview subjects we talked with.
4. Empirical results

4.1 Symbolic politics

We found that symbolic political measures play a key role for Jobbik and are usually starting points for their scapegoat-based policy making. The party uses symbolic politics to present both the inclusionary and exclusionary elements of the party’s ideology. In addition, symbolic politics might be used by local authorities to divert attention from some pressing issues and to soften the expectations of the electorate until practical policy solutions are created. Our fieldwork indicated that mayors of Jobbik felt the pressure to carry out spectacular changes in symbolic politics after coming to power. Interviewees from Özd often ridiculed how ‘statutes were relocated to here and there’, and similarly, the leadership of Tiszavasvári also financed the restoration or renovation of existing monuments instead of installing new ones. After his election, Mayor László Toroczkai was also keen to renovate existing statues in Ásotthalom. This is also the result of the hollowing out of Jobbik’s own ideological space. While the party’s most popular role models and symbols have already been ‘domesticated’ by Fidesz as part of its efforts to put Jobbik’s political program into practice, Jobbik has also started to present the image of a ‘mainstream’ party, leaving little room for maneuver when trying to identify new right-wing topics or heroes without returning to its extreme and toxic image.

As far as enemy images are concerned, the Roma constitute the main target of Jobbik, which is also reflected in their symbolic politics. In Özd, Jobbik used the topic of the Roma Cultural Centre to score points by inciting anti-Roma sentiment before the 2014 elections. In Tiszavasvári, when replacing street names commemorating ‘heroes’ of the Socialist system, one of the new eponyms was Lajos Szögi, a local teacher, who was lynched and murdered by a Roma gang in the nearby town of Olaszliszka. Naming a street after the victim of this highly politicized murder is interpreted by some as an ‘ever-hanging threat over [the head of] Gypsies’.

Anti-communism, which is another key area of Jobbik’s identity, is reflected in symbolic measures too. After Gábor Ferenczi became mayor of Devecser, he introduced a commemoration honoring the victims of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919. Based on our discourse analysis of articles from local media (daily and weekly newspapers with county- or settlement-wide circulation), this occasion serves as a ‘valve’ for releasing anti-communist sentiments and feelings. Ancestors of the mayor and the vice-mayor – both Jobbik members and nominees – had been murdered or imprisoned by local officials of the short-lived Soviet Republic. These memorial days are also used to present communism as the direct cause of Hungary’s territorial losses following the Treaty of Trianon. Such discourse is underpinned by artistic performances – for example, by the radical-right rock band Ismerős Arcok, or recitation of the poetry of Albert Wass, who mainly wrote about the loss of Transylvania to Romania – emphasizing the painful fate of the Hungarian minority abroad. Whereas anti-communist sentiment is indeed a clearly identifiable stance in programmatic documents of the party (Bíró-Nagy and Róna, 2011), it rarely manifests at the level of individual politicians (Kovarek and Farkas, 2017: 47).
Even though anti-Semitism constitutes a core element of far-right ideology in Hungary, Jews are less frequently targets of symbolic political measures at the local level. While there are some examples of symbolic local actions of an anti-Semitic nature from across the country, we did not identify any such measures initiated by the local Jobbik leadership in the municipalities that were researched. Tapolca’s mayor even abandoned the party’s campaign promise to revise the Holocaust Remembrance Day after getting elected in 2014 (Vajda, 2010: 2).

While an anti-immigration and anti-Muslim stance were not significant elements of far-right ideology in Hungary before 2015, refugees, migrants and Muslims have become a major enemy since then. A symptomatic example is the initiative of Devecser’s mayor, Gábor Ferenczi, who proposed the exclusion of migrants from the public works program to the local council and called on mayors of nearby villages to act likewise. Given that the town was not affected by the migration crisis and no migrant ever intended to join the program in Devecser, the move can only be considered a symbolic political action intended to build on xenophobic attitudes that culminated at the time of the refugee crisis. A similar symbolic act was the resolution of Ásotthalom’s local council that, upon the proposal of the mayor, banned the building of mosques, muezzins for reciting the call to prayer, wearing of the burqa, chador, niqāb or burkini, as well as the dissemination of ‘gay propaganda’ in the village’s public areas in late 2016. Another symbolic measure of Ásotthalom’s mayor was an initiative to erect a statue of Saint John of Capestrano kneeling on the body of a defeated Muslim fighter, representing that ‘Europe would be defended against the invasion’, a reference to the mayor’s strong animosity towards (predominantly Muslim) refugees and migrants.

Liberalism and liberal, globalist elites constitute another enemy group of the Hungarian far-right. Whereas the fight against them was less prevalent at the municipal level than in Jobbik’s national-level communication, an example was offered by the party organization in Tapolca, which called for the ‘immediate extermination of the liberal, foreign-hearted approach’ from public education in 2010 (Vajda, 2010: 2). The ‘cultural war’ against liberal elites is reflected in the unveiling ceremony of the statue of Archangel Michael in Ásotthalom, which provided Mayor Toroczkai with an opportunity to mock Brussels for its Manneken Pis statue.

Besides pointing out enemies and scapegoats, symbolic political measures also aim at fostering a common community identity by creating positive heroes and other elements. Despite the efforts of Jobbik’s politicians, many topics and symbols have been taken over and ‘domesticated’ by Fidesz. While installing the Szekler flag on public facilities is a measure that is just as likely to be taken by Fidesz-led municipalities, the use of the Arpád-striped flag is exclusive to Jobbik mayors: Tiszavasvári’s Mayor Erik Fülöp replaced the EU flag with the latter in his study room, while Dávid Janiczak, mayor of Ózd, even had the interior walls of the City Hall painted with red-and-white stripes. The installation of flags in Ózd reflects the

\footnote{Ferenczi’s declaration was met with strong objection from his colleagues who criticized his endangering of governmental funds for the public works program for the sake of politicizing the sub-regional administration along party lines. See: the majority opinion of the Sub-Regional Association’s Presidium. Available at: http://www.devecser.hu/sites/default/files/articles/files/elnokseg_tajekoztatas.pdf}

\footnote{The proposal was later rejected by the constitutional court.}
‘theatrical’ nature of symbolic politics: locals reported that ‘at first, there were lots of Árpád-striped flags, but it’s no longer typical nowadays.’

Among the municipalities researched, symbolic politics was used by the local Jobbik leadership in Tapolca least. Here, Mayor Zoltán Dobó has not effectuated visible changes in symbolic politics, because topics and issues jointly owned by Fidesz and Jobbik had already been realized by the previous Fidesz mayor. In contrast, Ásotthalom’s Mayor Toroczkai has been most active in terms of applying the tools of symbolic politics, also with respect to constructing ‘positive’ elements of identity. Toroczkai has created the cult of a local hero via the ‘rediscovery’ of Sándor Rózsa, a nationally well-known outlaw from the nineteenth century of local origin. Toroczkai, a co-founder of the paramilitary ‘Army of Outlaws’ organization, created an annual festival, an house of entertainment, and a statue dedicated to the outlaw, who is praised for confronting the law and fighting against the injustices of the elites - just as Toroczkai is by his followers. Toroczkai, who also founded the revisionist organization the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, has been utilizing symbolic tools to commemorate territories that Hungary lost due to the Treaty of Trianon. Close to the Serbian-Hungarian border, he created the Memorial to Hungarian Martyrdom.

4.2 Roma-non-Roma cohabitation

Scapegoating the Roma has been the most important element of Jobbik’s political strategy. This has had a key effect on Jobbik’s agenda and served as the main source of policy making at the local level. The cohabitation of Roma and non-Roma was on the top of the political agenda in three Jobbik-led localities: Tiszavasvári, Ózd, and Devecser. Roma and non-Roma relations were hallmarkd by violent and/or rancorous events before the radical right came to power, deciding the outcome of local elections. In Tiszavasvári, the saddest of such events was the death of the town’s geography teacher, Lajos Szögi, but this was not the first ethnicity-based conflict: generations remember the segregated graduation ceremonies of 1997, organized separately for Roma children.

In Ózd, Jobbik radicals experienced a rapid upswing in support due to the protests they organized against the planned Roma Cultural Centre. This would have been a methodological and educational institution realized from EU funds. Jobbik depicted the project as something that would ‘turn Ózd into a Gipsy capital, help settle Roma in, and support murderous families’ and organized a sizable-for-the-locality crowd of cca. 700 protesters for a demonstration in front of the town hall. Local party activists also managed to collect enough signatures for a local referendum on the issue, exploiting not only anti-Roma sentiment and the fears of locals, but also the fact that the local Roma self-government was not consulted beforehand, and that the city council made its supporting decision to adopt the project during a closed session.

In Devecser, a violent confrontation escalated between a Roma and a non-Roma family following a petty conflict over car parking; after the story was made

---

*E.g. Trianon Park, signs with Hungarian runic script on them, or renaming the city library after Albert Wass.*
public on an extremist website, far-right groups (the Hungarian Guard, Army of Outlaws, etc.) held a demonstration against ‘gypsy crime’ with Ferenczi, who was to become Jobbik’s mayoral candidate two years later, as a speaker. Afterwards, the extremists marched to the house of the Roma family and started throwing stones at them, with riot police present at the scene but not intervening. Interviewees underlined how this incident gained Jobbik local fame, while substantially damaging the relationship of the local ethnic minority with non-Roma inhabitants at the same time.

One issue our interviews uncovered in Jobbik-led municipalities was how mayors consciously exploited internal conflicts within the Roma community. In these settlements, lines of division were, *inter alia*, ethnicity (Romungros vs. Vlachs), place of origin/birth (Ózd and Tiszavasvári had a significant share of Roma relocated from nearby cities, often with serious crime records), the segregated neighborhoods they live in – and, of course, their stance on how to relate to Jobbik. Shortly after winning the mayoral mandate in Ózd, Dávid Janiczak appointed a so-called local Roma rapporteur who had previously held a high-ranking position in the Roma self-government, but in the most recent election his electoral list was largely ignored by Roma voters, thus the rapporteur failed to gain a seat in the ethnic minority self-government. Janiczak’s move is best understood as an attempt to ‘weaken the voter base of the local minority self-government’ and form a new, alternative political pole within the Roma community. After Lungo Drom, a Fidesz-ally, obtained most of the seats in the local Roma self-government, Jobbik-councilors cut its annual budget by more than 33 percent.

In Tiszavasvári, local leaders either attempted to force local Roma into a situation where they were dependent on the local government (e.g. through the public works scheme) or – according to our interviewees – by promising several million forints to the Roma minority self-government if they were willing to support a cooperation agreement with Mihály Zoltán Orosz, the infamous extremist mayor of Érpatak. This issue has led to division among local Roma – councilors and politically active citizens alike –, and the local minority government was eventually dissolved in 2011 because the ‘pro-Jobbik’ and ‘anti-Jobbik’ members could not agree on who should be president, consequently followed by an ‘interregnum’ that lasted until 2014. In Devecser, several well-to-do and widely respected Roma are required to explain themselves to others for cultivating a positive, fruitful relationship with the political leaders of the town; at the same time, discourse has emerged on the side of non-Roma Jobbik supporters that labels the aforementioned group ‘Roma, but not like the rest – better than the others’.

The introduction to this subchapter already mentioned how the Roma World Tent project was able to amplify and invoke the anti-Roma sentiment of locals, but also helped Jobbik to successfully frame Fidesz as a party that locally represents solely Roma interests. In Ózd, multiple interviewees confirmed that the second (repeated) round of local elections was ‘basically about the antagonism between Hungarians and the Roma.’ They referred to the large-scale campaign event of Fidesz, held shortly before the second election, which targeted Roma voters only, attracting a sizeable crowd and effectively generating fear in non-Roma voters. Another advantageous strategy for Jobbik in these settlements was colligating corruption (related to the then-
governing Fidesz politicians) and the Roma question: a good illustration of this strategy concerns the Türr István Program, an educational initiative designed to help Roma to catch up, which offered either ‘superficial’ courses and ones ‘of dubious value’, or did not even enroll students on fictitious ones.

The Jobbik-led government of Ózd also swore to fight against those who fail to pay their utility bills on time. Animosity against the insolvent locals from the underclass prevails, as it became clear that Janiczak was more interested in punishment than a long-term solution: the mayor refused to co-operate with the Roma self-government and Reformed Church Aid in installing prepayment electric meters. Moreover, the government installed spikes on electricity pylons and raised their height to combat power theft. Similarly, the local government of Tiszavasvári, in cooperation with service providers, switched off electricity to large areas of the town as part of a crackdown on electricity theft. As this was done in the cold season, leaving numerous people without heating, the measure generated considerable media attention that eventually led to its revocation.

One way to assess local governments’ attempts to shape the public image and perception of Roma is to review what literary works are available locally that were purchased from public funds. Our brief content analysis of library holdings revealed that in Devecser only two Roma-related acquisitions have been made since Jobbik took power: one deals with the events of the murder spree against Roma in 2008/09, while the other – according to its blurb – ‘declares war on human rights activists and gypsies who do politics for a living.’ It says a lot that Berhida – a nearby town led by an independent mayor, with a sizeable Roma population and situated in Veszprém county, just like Tapolca and Devecser – purchased books both ‘on topics related to Roma and in Romani language’ whenever it had funds for expanding its stock in the 2000s and the 2010s alike.

Whereas Jobbik’s mayors (except for Tiszavasvári’s) have proven to be quite pragmatic concerning their relationship with Fidesz appointees in public administration (or representatives and MPs from the governing party) with regard to issues of regional development, public safety and education and welfare, NGOs and alternative schools struggling to make progress with the same causes were treated badly and with strong hostility, especially with regard to initiatives aimed at helping the Roma and the underclass in general. Foundations (Van Helyed!), remedial schools and extracurricular vocational training institutions (Abigél, dr. Ambédkar, Abakusz), and even well-established charity organizations (a high school founded and maintained by the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta) were displaced, chased away – or at best, support was withdrawn from them – because of their perceived liberal affiliations, or simply due to the fear that they would attract the poor (and especially the Roma) from the surrounding communities.

4.3 Social policy and the public works scheme

In Hungary, social benefits are covered by the central budget, but their distribution has largely been the prerogative of local governments since March 2015. Consequently, the nature of local welfare benefit systems are quite illustrative of the attitudes of local government. In many cases, provision of social assistance is closely
connected to ‘law and order’ policies, thus this becomes a tool of pacification by being bound to requirements unrelated to the financial situation of applicants.

Tying social assistance to the neatness of the applicant’s place of residence is a common practice employed throughout Hungary. The principle is based on the scapegoating of certain groups of society, mainly the Roma. The resolution in Asotthalom defines the maintenance of hygienic conditions, the preservation of a usable state, and the consistency and cleanliness of the estate, gardens, pavements and storm water ditches as preconditions for receiving housing benefits. In Özd, the mayor wanted to tie the accelerated, fast-track lease of apartments - one of his discretionary powers - to a certificate of good conduct, but this idea was not implemented due to legal obstacles. On the other hand, the ‘clean garden, neat house’ policy was in place under the previous Fidesz leadership as well, giving the public area oversight authority the power to fine residents for breaching this rule. In Tapolca, this policy is complemented by ‘soft’ requirements (e.g. concerning applicants’ ‘way of life’) involving significant room for subjective and arbitrary decision-making by the mayor.

The desire to pacify the minority is engrained in the welfare system: another example of this is the public works scheme. Public work is financed by the state budget but operated and supervised by the municipality; the way the latter selects workers, monitors their activities and evaluates their work tells us much about the approach of the local authority. For Jobbik, the public works scheme is thought of not as a means of training participants and preparing them for reintegration into the labor market, but for the protection of public safety, and for ‘teaching a lesson’. This may be one of the reasons why Janiczak wanted to monitor public workers in Özd with cameras - so he could check their performance. He was forced to give up this policy proposal, as it would have violated the basic rights of workers. The public works scheme became one of the key elements of the law-and-order program in Tiszavasvári, under the oversight of ‘public safety expert’ György Gyula Zagyva, a former Jobbik MP. Public workers are under tight control, expected to show maximum discipline, and the local government also restricts the rights provided to them by law.

4.4 Public safety

The topic of public safety, utilized by Jobbik to incite anti-Roma sentiment, has been on the top of the party’s agenda ever since its foundation. Jobbik’s policy proposals and measures regarding public safety are clearly based on the scapegoated image of the Roma. Party politicians claim that Roma are overrepresented among criminals and that the Roma disproportionately commit certain crimes. The invention and conscious usage of the term ‘Gypsy crime’ was the main reason for Jobbik’s rapid upswing in the late 2000s (Karácsony and Róna, 2011). Even though the term has disappeared from the party’s discourse since 2013, local politics takes more time to change: topics of public safety and the crimes reportedly perpetrated by Roma were

---

10 The resolution on social benefits contains examples: firewood should not be scattered around, there should be no trash in gardens, and on arable areas residents must grow vegetables. See http://www.njt.hu/njtonkorm.php?njtcp=eh6ecgel88j09eo6dt7ee0em9ej4ec17bd2c9b4bx1k
the engines behind the increasing popularity and electoral victories of Jobbik both in Ózd and Tiszavasvári. The examples of Tapolca and Asotthalom show that even in places where the proportion of Roma population is low and crime statistics are somewhat better than the national average, measures to improve public safety were key elements of Jobbik’s local election programs. In the latter settlement, refugees are also depicted as the main threats to public safety.

In all localities featured in the study, local governments had created their own law enforcement authorities, working in cooperation with the Police. Jobbik mayors and representatives allocated significant resources to setting up these bodies; in Dévecser a new tax was even levied to cover the expenses of the ‘field guard’. During his campaign, the mayor of Ózd promised to establish a police cavalry unit, as well as acquire quads and drones; nonetheless, for financial reasons these plans have not yet come to fruition. As opposed to other, non-Jobbik-led localities, Asotthalom chiefly uses its field guard to stop refugees and migrants - not to prevent the theft of agricultural products.

Roma interviewees complained about the law enforcement agencies such as the Gendarmerie, but also about police measures. In Tiszavasvári, strong penal measures were introduced in 2012; the police increased the frequency of inspections and started to hand out disproportionate fines undoubtedly aimed at the Roma population (e.g. 10,000 HUF fines for users of bikes with insufficient safety accessories, or fines for ‘endangering underage persons’ for parents of children who play 20 meters or further from their homes). Nor is this phenomenon unheard of in other Hungarian settlements.11

Tiszavasvári’s local government also signed a cooperation agreement - reportedly no longer in effect - with the Legion of Honour (Mihály Zoltán Orosz’s organization), causing panic and anger among the Roma. According to the former, the Legion were required to perform law enforcement duties, increase the efficiency of the child protection system, and propagate a healthy, drug-free lifestyle. Legionaries were also charged with preventing illegal waste disposal, the theft of wood and electricity, drug abuse and loan sharkering; however, they also unexpectedly showed up in neighborhoods to march and patrol in camouflage uniforms, or to film neighborhood residents. Their appearance destabilized inter-ethnic relationships, sowing the seeds of animosity between Roma and non-Roma and, incidentally, also legitimized the racist-extremist discourse about Roma. The heightened tensions that followed the measures in Tiszavasvári were inconvenient for party leader Gábor Vona who was trying to reposition Jobbik as a people’s party at the same time; consequently, cooperation between the local government and the Legion ended in early 2017.12

To sum up, Jobbik’s scapegoats are ‘lazy’, ‘untidy’, ‘anti-communitarian’ citizens and ‘criminals’: anyone who is not a ‘builder’ but a ‘destructive element’ of the city. The main job of local political leaders is to maintain ‘order’, and protect ‘builders’ from ‘destructive’ people. According to the politicians of Jobbik, anyone

---

11 Source: official statistics of the Ministry for Domestic Affairs. Available at: https://bsr.bm.hu/SitePages/Dokumentumlista.aspx?libraryName=ElkBunelkAdatok
13 Interview in Heti Válasz, December 1, 2016.
may be ‘destructive,’ regardless of race and skin color. However, as demonstrated above, mayors of the locales investigated were predisposed to connect the problems with minority Roma society with their ‘restore order’ slogan in their respective towns during their campaigns.

5. Conclusions

This study has described the scapegoats and enemy images consciously used by Jobbik mayors that anchor their local policies and political strategy. We have highlighted the broad range of enemy images, the way they shape policy initiatives, and the political goals behind choosing and consistently employing them. Whereas ‘scapegoat-based policy making’ was found to be present in all municipalities scrutinized, we found notable differences as far as its actual implementation was concerned.

The Roma still serve as the main scapegoat and enemy image for local Jobbik politicians. Despite the party's conscious strategy of moderation at the national level, the settlement-level appears to remain the ‘reservoir for radicalism’ for Jobbik. An anti-Roma stance is the party's key distinguishing mark, and is also of great importance for the voter base. In four out of the five Jobbik-led localities we examined, anti-Roma policies and rhetoric constitute a key element of the activities of Jobbik's local leaders. The most striking examples were Ózd and Tiszavasvári, but the Roma are in the crosshairs in Devecser and Ásotthalom too. Jobbik politicians act this way to unite their electoral base against a common enemy, divert attention from their own inability to solve complex problems efficiently, legitimize policy decisions, and support the feeling of superiority of the local non-Roma population. The scapegoating and enemy images of the Roma clearly mirror a far-right ideology based on nativism.

The refugee crisis had a significant impact on Jobbik’s enemy images, both at the national and local level. The enemy image of the Migrant reflects nativism and strongly identifies Muslims as enemies who pose a direct threat to both the local community and also to the nation, similarly to the Roma. This enemy image serves as founding principle of policy decisions in the field of symbolic politics, but also in public security (in Ásotthalom) and social policy (in Devecser). The strategy of portraying migrants as enemies is designed to divert attention from the problems of the localities and the inability of the local Jobbik mayor to solve these problems efficiently, while also competing with the government’s anti-immigration stance.

Scapegoating and making enemy images of communists involves identifying them with historical evils such as the Treaty of Trianon and historical mass killings in Hungary. By linking communists with the current opposition (both said to be pitted against nationalist ideologies), they are also presented as a current enemy. Accordingly, this strategy is designed to create a nationalist identity within the local community and to restructure local history. In addition, anti-communist sentiment might also disguise anti-Semitism, which otherwise does not appear in the policy
decisions of local Jobbik politicians. Anti-establishment narratives are mainly reflected by how local Jobbik politicians are antagonized by liberalism. Liberal cosmopolitan elites, just like communists, are perceived and portrayed to pose an indirect cultural threat and therefore serve as a basis for symbolic policies that are designed to help build a common, local, political identity, and to unite Jobbik’s own electoral base. Anti-communist sentiments were utilized by Jobbik in Devecser, while anti-liberal narratives related to the migration issue were mainly restricted to Ásotthalom. The LGBTQ community, an otherwise important enemy image for Jobbik at the national level, was identifiable only in Ásotthalom, which was the only locality that introduced discriminating policies against this group.

Our research also highlighted how changing political circumstances have changed the enemy images of the far-right. While the Roma remain an uncontested scapegoat and enemy image at the settlement-level, Muslim refugees and migrants, as well as liberal elites, have also become targets of Jobbik mayors. However, to what extent and in what form these enemy images are used depends on local peculiarities and the personal political interests and considerations of the local leaders. For instance, in Ásotthalom, situated at the Serbian-Hungarian border, with a negligible Roma population, the mayor employed a harsh anti-immigration stance to emphasize his ‘radical’ image and counter-balance (or even challenge) the de-radicalization strategy of the party chairman.

While Jobbik locally presents a rather radical face and group of politicians, local peculiarities also shape the extent of this display. Tapolca proved to be the most moderate among the municipalities researched, better reflecting the new national political line of Jobbik. Consequently, there is also local variation in to what extent the general observation of Akkerman and Lange (2012) - that the far-right becomes ‘domesticated’ after gaining executive power - is applicable at the local level; based on the findings of our fieldwork, the statement does not apply to most Jobbik-led localities. Except for in Tapolca, municipalities featured numerous policy measures based on scapegoated and enemy images of specific groups.

This research was designed to identify the face of the Hungarian far-right at the settlement-level, but the task is far from over. We conclude that scapegoat-based policy making manifested in every municipality, even though the actual scapegoat differed from settlement to settlement, based on local circumstances. Jobbik mayors face serious difficulties in the everyday implementation of scapegoat-based policies. Investigation of the localities has underlined that, regardless of the high expectations of locals and their own party, local Jobbik leaders are not miracle-workers: most of the problems of the localities are long-standing and structurally defined, offering little room for maneuver. Feeling the pressure, Jobbik representatives extensively use the tools of symbolic politics which clearly express their ideology, even if such scapegoat-based policy making does not yield substantial results, or if its outcomes are downplayed for legal or political reasons. Finally, the differences among the policies identified by the research, as revealed in the current paper, emphasize that understanding the personalized and context-dependent nature of local level politics is of utmost importance.
References


INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 63-87.


*INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 63-87.*


**Appendix**

Table 2: Overview of interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID (Settlement + No.)</th>
<th>Position / Occupation</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aasothalom01</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aasothalom02</td>
<td>Local councilor</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aasothalom03</td>
<td>Politically active</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>formerly MSZP, then</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aasothalom04</td>
<td>Former local councilor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aasothalom05</td>
<td>Local entrepreneur</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser01</td>
<td>High-ranking politician</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser02</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser03</td>
<td>Roma entrepreneur</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser04</td>
<td>Political activist</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser05</td>
<td>Teacher and politician</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devecser06</td>
<td>Roma musician</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd01</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd02</td>
<td>Local councilor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Fidesz / Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd03</td>
<td>Local politician</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd04</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd05</td>
<td>Local politician</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozd06</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapolca01</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapolca02</td>
<td>Local councilor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapolca03</td>
<td>Local councilor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapolca04</td>
<td>Local politician</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári01</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári02</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári03</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári04</td>
<td>Roma representative</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári05</td>
<td>Roma intellectual</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári06</td>
<td>Local councilor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Fidesz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári07</td>
<td>Local councilor</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári08</td>
<td>Regional development</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>formerly MSZP, now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári09</td>
<td>Local entrepreneur</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári10</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári11</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszavasvári12</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berhida01</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berhida02</td>
<td>School director</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berhida03</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JUSTYNA KAJTA *

Discursive Strategies of Polish Nationalists in the Construction of the Other. The Case of Muslims and Homosexuals

* [jkajta@wp.pl] (University of Wrocław)

Abstract

The paper explores the discursive strategies used by participants of Polish nationalist (radical right) organizations when they speak about others: Muslims and homosexuals. The article is based on the critical discourse analysis of 30 biographical narrative interviews with the members of three main Polish nationalist organizations: the National Radical Camp (ONR), the National Rebirth of Poland (NOP), and the All-Polish Youth (MW). Following the reconstruction of more general ways in which various categories of others are discursively constructed by narrators, the body of the paper focuses on two categories, Muslims and homosexuals, which appear most often in the narratives collected. The nationalists present themselves as the concerned defenders of both the European civilization as well as the Polish identity based on components such as religion (seen as the source of morality), tradition and history. Others are presented as a threat because of their otherness, claims and aspirations for power and dominance attributed to them. While Muslims constitute the embodiment of a cultural enemy who threatens the European (Christian) civilization, homosexuals are identified with liberalism seen as the danger destroying Polish identity and the traditional family.

Keywords: Nationalist Movement; Discourse; Strategies of Justification; Others.
1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increase in the presence and activity of nationalist, populist and right-wing ideas in the public space across Europe. We can observe the rise and spread of both right-wing political parties as well as extra-parliamentary organizations, which have become even more noticeable since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. The recent inflow of refugees from Syria and other countries to Europe has contributed to the strengthening of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourse and protests in different countries, including relatively ethnically homogeneous Poland. Taking into consideration the fact that the nationalist discourse has recently become more influential it seems to be especially important to deepen our knowledge about it by exploring its linguistic characteristics.

The article explores the discursive strategies used by the nationalists when they speak about others: Muslims and homosexuals. It is based on the analysis of biographical-narrative interviews with the members of three Polish nationalist organizations. I focus on firstly: the ways of constructing the other and secondly: explaining/justifying such categorization. While homosexuals represent others against which the nationalist mobilized in the 2000s quite well (personifying one of the threats attributed to the values of West European liberalism and left-wing), the anti-Muslim slogans became increasingly present in the organizations’ discourse only in the 2010s. Although there are more enemies mentioned by the nationalists (e.g. the political establishment, European Union representatives, the liberal media, left-wing activists), the paper focuses on these two cases in order to get better insight into the linguistic ways in which others are constructed.

The paper revolves around three questions: (1) how are Muslims and homosexuals described by the nationalists, (2) what traits are Muslims and homosexuals ascribed to, (3) how is the exclusion of Muslims and homosexuals justified (Wodak and Reisigl, 2003: 385)? The language narrators use to describe others reflects as well as creates their perception of them. That is why it is important to understand not only who is perceived as the other and what characteristics are assigned to him/her but also the arguments which are used to support such statements. Therefore, we are able to see how the nationalists construct both the image of others as well as their own. The discursive strategies used here serve as the justification for the individuals’ involvement and group activity. It lets us learn how nationalists defend their views and persuade other people of their rightness. The denial of racist and homophobic attitudes is interpreted both in terms of avoiding social stigma (Goffman, 1963) and, in accordance to the concept of new racism, post-racism (Lentin and Titley, 2011; van Dijk, 1992), in terms of the replacement of racist categories by cultural ones, such as the concept of the clash of civilizations.

In the first part, I present a short description of the socio-political context of the present activity of the nationalist movement in Poland. Secondly, I draw the methodology on which the article is based, including the assumptions of critical discourse analysis and biographical-narrative interviews. Thirdly, I describe the main enemies presented in the nationalist discourse which is followed by the focusing on two specific groups: homosexuals and Muslims. I analyze the main discursive
strategies which narrators use to name and characterize the mentioned others as well as justify their own views and opinions.

2. The Polish socio-political context

As many scholars state (van Dijk, 2008; Abell and Myers, 2011; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) the context plays a crucial role in discourse analysis. Hence, it is important to discuss the socio-political situation in Poland (and also in Europe) which provides the context for nationalist movement activity and discourse. As Daniel Płatek and Piotr Plucienniczak show (2017: 288), that in response to political and discursive challenges, between 1989 and 2013 the nationalist movement went through three phases of mobilization (marginalization: 1989-1999; institutionalization: 2000-2005 and radicalization: 2006-2013). While the former refers to the broader political context which influences ‘the opportunities and constraints offered by the political-institutional settings in which collective action takes place’ (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004: 201), the latter is understood as ‘the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s chance of diffusion in the public sphere’ (ibidem: 202). According to Płatek and Plucienniczak, marginalization results from weak discursive and narrow political opportunities, institutionalization from strong discursive and open political opportunities and radicalization from strong discursive and narrow political opportunities (2017: 293-294). Recently, political context has been changing which can be interpreted in terms of a gradual (and probably not yet completed and decisive) shift from the radicalization to the institutionalization phase. The presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015 show that there is a general new wave of right-wing attitudes in Polish society. The right-wing, conservative party, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) won the parliamentary elections and gained enough votes to form a one-party government. There is no left-wing party in the new parliament. Moreover, some of the members of the National Movement nominated by the third most supported organization, Kukiz 15’, have become members of the parliament as well.1

Both discursive and political opportunities now seem to be favourable for nationalist mobilization. Firstly, we observe a more general radicalization of the public discourse, including the spread of hate speech.2 While the rejection of otherness is

---

1 When in September 2015, the previous Polish government agreed to accept around 7 thousand refugees, the decision was strongly criticized by some right-wing and nationalist parties and organizations. It was described as a betrayal of both Polish society and other Visegrad states. Interestingly, anti-immigrant (mostly anti-Arab, anti-Muslim) statements were presented not only during the marches organized by radical nationalist organizations, but they were also formulated by some politicians, publicists and other public figures. On March 2016, after the terrorist attack in Brussels, the new Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, declared that Poland would not take any refugees for now. As she stated, the procedures are not prepared enough to provide security. During the parliamentary electoral campaign, the leader of the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), Jarosław Kaczyński, openly warned people against the immigrants who can be the source of the outbreak of an epidemic.

2 See more in the report Hate speech. Contempt speech. Report about the research on verbal violence towards minorities carried out by the Centre for Research on Prejudice in collaboration with the Stefan Batory Foundation (2017). According to the research examining Poland in 2016, gays and refugees were most often the targets of hate speech.
nothing new, circumstances favour such rhetoric to attract more supporters or at least address a larger audience. The refugees or more precisely, Muslims have become one of the ‘unwanted others,’ common enemy who constitutes a crucial (negative) actor in the nationalists’ discourse. Despite the former attempts to make the image of the nationalist movement more positive and avoid racist slogans in the past, recently the Polish nationalists present negative attitudes towards ‘others’ more openly.

Secondly, the new government seems to support or ignore the nationalists’ activity. When they organized the Independence Day March in 2015 under the slogan ‘Poland for Poles. Poles for Poland’ the Polish president, Andrzej Duda, sent them an official letter in which he thanked them for ‘contributing to building of identity and friendly ties connecting the whole Polish community’. Another example of greater permissiveness towards hate speech and crimes, as important elements of far right discourse, is the dissolution by the Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, of the Council for Counteracting Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, a governmental body which has existed since 2013.

While the aforementioned changes are of central importance for understanding contemporary nationalist discourse and practices, it is relevant to stress once again that the empirical research presented in the article took place in the period when the relationship between the nationalist movement and state authorities were more steeped in conflict and nationalism was depicted much more negatively in the public sphere. This, in turn, has some implications for the research design and the course of the study described in the next section.

3. Methodology

The article draws on the critical discourse analysis of the narrative-biographical interviews. Focusing on the identity of the participants of the contemporary nationalist movement in Poland, 30 interviews were carried out with members of the nationalist organizations: the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW), the National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR) and the National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, NOP) between 2012 and 2015. Some interviews were conducted by me and some by my students who participated in the field work research training ‘Activists and supporters of the national movement’. Theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 2009: 41) was used to select organizations and their members for the study. I started from the interviews with the representatives of the All-Polish Youth as it was the most visible nationalist organization. Next, in order to saturate the emerging analytical categories, I was trying to get access to the

---

1. The Independence Day March is a demonstration organized by nationalist organizations every year on November 11 (the Polish Independence Day).
2. The letter was published on the All-Polish Youth website: https://marszniepodleglosci.pl/list-prezydenta-andrzeja-dudy-do-organizatorow-i-uczestnikow-marszu-niepodleglosci/
3. See the report by the Lambda association for other examples of dismantling anti-hate crime policies, available at: http://lambdawarszawa.org/lambdawarszawa/poland-is-dismantling-the-hate-crime-policy-warn-civil-society-groups/
4. MW, ONR and NOP are three main and the most visible nationalist organizations in Poland. All of them refer to the Polish interwar nationalist movement and were established with the idea of continuing their ideological work. While MW and ONR are associations, NOP is registered as a political party.
members of other organizations as well as people who have different positions (e.g., members, local leaders) within them. Although the sampling procedure chosen does not make the sample representative (in any statistical sense), the material collected did give us some insight into how the discourse about the other is (re)constructed and expressed by individuals who are involved in the most important nationalist organizations in Poland. The structure of the interviews was the same as in the Fritz Schütze’s method (see: Schütze, 1992), which included an uninterrupted presentation of the whole life story in the first part of the interview, followed by specific biographical questions in the second part and problem-driven questions in the third part. It is crucial to note that otherness did not constitute a topic of the interview, but it was raised by some interlocutors with reference to various issues.

The analysis of discourse constitutes an important part of research on social movements (Lindekilde, 2014), in this case, the nationalist movement. It is through the use of language that the participants of social movements shape their identity, draw boundaries between we-ness and others, present their worldview and goals. Studies that explore how the notion of ‘otherness’ is created in the radical right/nationalist discourse are usually based on the analysis of official organizational statements, blogs or media content (Blee, 2007: 120-121). The paper contributes to previous findings by using the internalist perspective (Goodwin, 2006) and hence, analysing the interviews with the participants of the Polish nationalist movement. It gives us a deeper insight into the nationalists’ discourse and allows us to understand individual attitudes in the context of face-to-face talk.

Taking into consideration the variety of approaches to discourse analysis and the extensive literature on this topic, it would be impossible to present a detailed elaboration of all theoretical and methodological issues here. Therefore, I will only present crucial points concerning my own analysis. According to the Critical Discourse Analysis approach, discourse is understood as a social practice. It ‘implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 55). Critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in social and political contexts (van Dijk, 2008: 85).

What seems to be crucial in the analysis of the interviews with the participants of such a controversial movement as the nationalist one, is the set of extra-linguistic social variables and institutional settings of the specific situation of the statement (Abell and Myers, 2011: 233). It is important to understand that this level of context refers to the awareness of atmosphere and the relationship between the researcher and the informant. The frames of mutual expectations and notions as well as emotions play an important role during the biographical-narrative interviews when people are asked to share their life stories (Fontana and Frey, 2009). The interview situations can create such obstacles as the narrators’ carefulness and hence, avoidance of radical statements. On the grounds that the nationalists express their awareness of their negative image and hence, feel stigmatized or even marginalized, the interview can constitute an opportunity to modify that unfavourable notion. Some of my
interviewees appeared to censor their own opinions not only due to the possible notion about my views, but also due to the presence of a tape recorder. More than once I have had the impression that they focus mostly on positive dimensions of their activity and organization such as charity actions, meetings with veterans or commemoration of historical events/figures. As the destigmatization of the nationalists’ image is an important process of identity construction, they tell destigmatizing stories about their initial fear concerning their involvement in a nationalist organization which disappeared just after the first meetings with its members.

What is highlighted by the informants is that there are mostly students and well-educated (doctors, academics, lawyers) people in their ranks. Almost all narrators (28) who participated in the research are students or university graduates as well: history (11), European studies (3), political science (2), law (2) and singular cases of students/graduates in pedagogy, Polish philology, national security, international relations, environmental protection, medical sciences, mathematics, computer science and mechanics and machine design. Two other informants who are/were not involved in studies were a technical college student planning to study; and a graduate of vocational college. Generally we can observe a changed character of the nationalist movement. Bearing in mind the limitations of the sample, it still seems that while during the 1990s there were mostly skinheads, now the students constitute a relevant group within the movement. It connects with the educational aims of the organizations that would like to train new, patriotic elites. When we look at social class background (based on the parents’ professions), it can be said that most of the narrators come from the middle class – their parents are office workers and teachers. However, a better grounding of such observation would be needed in a representative sample research project taking into account other factors, such as income or education level (Janicka, Słomczyński, 2014: 62).

During the analysis of the interviews, I was inspired by the analytical approach proposed by Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl whose analytical schema consists of three dimensions: thematic contents, discursive strategies and forms of realizations (2003: 385). As regards the contents, I distinguished the discursive construction of the other as a main topic. It relates to such thematic areas as: the linguistic construction of differences (between us and them); the linguistic construction of Muslims and the linguistic construction of sexual minorities. In most cases I did not ask directly about their perception of others. Those themes occurred as the answers to such questions as: what do you like/do not like in your nation or what annoys you in the contemporary world? While analysing discursive strategies of others’ constructing I followed the relations of textual realizations: (1) How are others named and referred to linguistically? (2) What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to others? (3) By means of which arguments and argumentation schemes do nationalists try to justify and legitimize the exclusion of others? (ibidem: 385).
4. The picture of the nationalists’ enemies

Discussing the issue of the revival of nationalism in the time of globalization, Manuel Castells states that it concerns the reconstruction of identity based on nationality and against otherness (1997: 360). However, the concept of otherness does not have to be connected with ethnicity and nationality. Anybody, be they migrant, homosexual, feminist, post-communist politician and left-wing activist can be perceived as the other by nationalists. It is a consequence of the simple distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ which constitutes an important element of the collective identity construction (Taylor and Whittier, 1992). Before I present the specific discursive strategies of the otherness construction I would like to draw a general picture of different opponents who are visible in the nationalists’ discourse.

The analysis of the collected narratives, as well as observation of the current activity of the nationalist movement, suggest that the nationalists’ identity is based on the one hand on dissatisfaction and rebelliousness against the present and on the other - on being proud of the Polish history, tradition and heritage. The disappointment concerns both political-economic circumstances and social/cultural changes. The present situation is usually explained with reference to history where the chosen periods of the past are presented as the time of great ideals and authorities. Historical attachment involves a similar interpretation of some historical events, anti-communist attitudes, strong criticism and disappointment with regard to the Polish transformation after 1989, the need to remember specific historical figures (e.g. Cursed Soldiers - Żołnierze Wyklęci). What is crucial here is the fact that some of the narrators do not see communism as a closed chapter of history, but rather as a living enemy and a real opponent. Left-wing politicians and organizations are perceived as the carriers of this communist threat (Lipiński, 2009: 218). The nationalists have made the anti-communist rhetoric a crucial component of their identity. They use it as their symbolic resource and consider themselves as more anti-communist’ than other right-wing organizations. It involves criticizing the way of Polish transformation and perception of today’s politicians as post-communist elites. The narrators do not agree with liberal consensus which occurred after 1989 and appearance of such watchwords us freedom of choice, equal rights, minority rights, and tolerance in the public sphere. They criticize politicians which are presented as disgraced, deprived of ideals, hypocritical, focused on their own interests and dependent on European Union elites. Hence, according to the interlocutors, they are guided by ‘foreign’, not national interest.

1 It was a set of Polish resistance organizations and movements formed during the 40s. The term refers to various anti-communist milieus which fought against the Stalinist power after the World War II. The most of them ceased to exist in early 1950s as result of heavy persecution by communist authorities and Soviet forces. Their stories were silenced throughout the state socialism. It was only after the system change that various organizations, including nationalist ones, started to reveal the history of their struggle and demanded commemoration. Since 2011, March 1 became the National Day of Memory of Cursed Soldiers in Poland. The assessment of the role of the cursed soldiers in the post-World War II anti-communist opposition remains the subject of political and historical debates in which the arguments stressing their heroism and patriotism clash with the criticism of the civilian casualties of their fight, in particular among ethnic minorities in the post-war Poland accused of cooperation with Soviets.
Left-wing and liberal activists are criticized because of their involvement in struggles over the rights of minorities instead of supporting the economically disadvantaged groups. Moreover, they are presented as aggressive as well as supported (also financially) by the media and the elites. While the nationalists present themselves as defenders of the Polish identity, carriers of historical knowledge and concerned about the continuity of the Polish culture, the opponents seem to be naïve, unthinking, self-interested or mendacious. What is crucial, is that both Muslims and sexual minorities are presented in different ways - not as naïve, but rather as active and focused on their own (dangerous) interests.

5. Us and them: others

The narratives about others are usually followed by more general criticism of multiculturalism, the European Union is presented as yet another communist project and liberalization is understood as breaking up the traditional order. As I already mentioned, Muslims have recently become a broadly discussed group in the nationalists’ discourse and to be more specific, the most dangerous enemy. However, their theme is present in interviews which had been conducted long before ‘the refugee crisis’.

Taking into consideration the fact that Muslims constitute only a small percentage of the Polish population and to date only a few Syrian refugee families came to Poland, it is quite interesting that they are present to such an extent in the nationalist discourse. When writing about world risk society after 9/11 Urlich Beck states that ‘terrorist enemy images are deterritorialised, de-nationalised and flexible state constructions that legitimise the global intervention of military powers as ‘self-defence’ (Beck, 2002: 44). Similarly, it seems that they constitute the symbolic and transnational embodiment of the cultural other and imagined enemy constructed by the activists of nationalist movements. As Lentin and Titey state, ‘Muslim transnational disloyalty, arising from their inability to transcend the language and tradition of their “countries of origin”, or stoked by overriding transnational affiliations, mirrors fears about Jews’ lack of allegiance in the pre-war period. The traditional anti-Semitic view sees Jews as a nation apart whose true allegiance is always kept for their co-religionists’ (2011: 55). While anti-Semitism which used to be one of the core themes in nationalist discourse for a long time now is barely present, the Muslims are presented as the most dangerous group and threat to the Polish or even European identity.

The homosexual minority seems to have been one of the main opponents of the nationalists (Wrzosek, 2010) for a long time. While Muslims constitute the embodiment of a cultural enemy who threatens European civilization, homosexuals

---

1 The population of Muslims in Poland is estimated at about 25-35 thousand which represents 0.07-0.09 per cent of the total population of Poland. About one-fifth of them are ‘the descendants of the Tatars who were already settled in the country by the 13th/14th century’ (Pędziewiak, 2011: 170; 172).

2 Despite the fact that the narrators deny being anti-Semites and present such attitudes as the reaction to ‘inter-war circumstances’, there are some single (usually hidden) anti-Semitic statements in the interviews - they mostly refer to the past: Jews are presented as a greedy and ungrateful group whose aim is to deprive the Polish nation of its identity.

are identified with the danger of destroying the Polish identity which is defined through reference to family and pro-life Catholic values. Homosexuals constitute an opponent who is the embodiment of such phenomena as liberalism, relativism and postmodernism. As Agnieszka Graff states, ‘the word “homosexuality” functions in Polish nationalist context as a synonym of liberal project of united Europe’ (2008: 138). Homosexuality is associated by some of the informants with abortion, euthanasia and paedophilia – by creating a ‘package’ of different phenomena and presenting it as one, they draw a picture of unavoidable changes. According to that view, consent to gay marriages would be followed by liberalization of abortion law or paedophiles’ attempts to organize themselves. The nationalists’ aversion to sexual minorities involves anti-homosexual manifestations, blockades of Equality Parades and campaigns aiming at the promotion and defence of the traditional family.

Both Muslims and homosexuals are presented as homogenous groups which formulate various, unjustified demands towards the state. What is quite interesting is that they are always presented as a community – not as individuals. The individuals are mentioned rather as the examples of positive exceptions: stories about people who the narrators personally know and who assimilate and do not manifest their otherness. Additionally, there are no names referring to others’ appearance, physiognomy, but rather to their behaviour and demands.

Table 1. Discursive strategies of construction of Muslims’ image

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names (How are they linguistically named?)</th>
<th>Muslims, immigrants, Islam, minorities, Arabs, guests, strange culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics (What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?)</td>
<td>• There is no debate with them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coming to Europe, sitting all days in the coffee places, not working and living on welfare benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not wanting to assimilate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Being expansive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not understanding European values, democracy and basic human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Having different system of values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not acknowledging the host state institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Becoming a majority in Western Europe in 20-30 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author’s own research

Muslims are described with reference to the differences between their culture and the European civilization and values. There are no offensive names in the narratives, but the nationalists provide different (more subtle than in the homosexuals’ case) arguments in order to explain and justify their resistance to the Muslims’ presence in Poland or even Europe. They will be presented in more detail in the next part of the article. The analysis of the interviews shows that the language and the arguments presented by the narrators are much less radicalized and different from what we could expect and what was recently said/written by the nationalist
representatives during manifestations, on official websites and in the media. The narrators present Muslims as people with a completely different system of values, who follow their own rules and are settling *en masse* in Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Discursive strategies of constructing homosexuals’ image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Names (How are they linguistically named?)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Homosexuals, deviants, queers, sick people, homosexual lobby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics (What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Referring to sexual habits: abnormal behaviour, not natural, immoral, degeneration, deviation, illness, disgusting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Referring to their public action: demanding rights in order to dominate over the law and over others, promoting and manifesting sexual deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Jostling and achieving their goals one by one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Defining themselves with the reference to sex orientation (self-humiliation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Being a threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Having money and influences (having impact on the World Health Organization)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author’s own research

When speaking about homosexuals, narrators rarely use openly offensive epithets. The most common name is ‘homosexual’. After using the word ‘queer’ one of the narrators corrected himself quite fast, pointed out the tape recorder, smiled and mentioned political correctness. Such a situation should be analyzed and described as an important part of the extra-linguistic context of the statement. Even if he uses offensive terms in everyday life, the situation of being interviewed makes him change the language and somehow adapt to the particular context. As I have mentioned before, there are not so many offensive names in the narratives, but, on the other hand, ‘deviation’ is the most common category which appears when the narrators describe the characteristics of sexual minorities. The narrators put stress on abnormal and immoral nature of homosexuality, but first of all, on their powerful and dangerous influences.

6. Strategies of justification

Nationalists present different arguments for the justification of the exclusion of others. It is crucial to find out what discursive strategies are used by them as it helps us to better understand how they want to not only justify their views, but also persuade more general public of their rightness.

The first of such strategies is *emphasizing the possible discontinuity of civilization and tradition*. According to the nationalists, civilizations are assigned to a
specific geographical location and involve a specific culture. Multiculturalism is presented here as a possible risk of losing cultural uniqueness as well as the old, traditional order. More often, the narrators refer here to other cultures rather than the Polish one. What is quite interesting is that they focus mostly on food and travel experiences in their argumentations:

Eryk (ONR): By all means I support diversity of cultures, but each of them embedded in its own reality, right... that a satisfaction it is to go for example for... I don’t know, a romantic weekend... to Bruges and eat pizza or go to Venice and... eat Chinese soup, right...[...] For instance, I would not like to go to some European country and meet there... Arab, Islam, Turkish culture... it is not an attraction... we can learn about cultures, but... each of them in its own place, because only then it is complete, within the context, not bastardized and so on. [...] 

Andrzej (ONR): *I am not a racist, but* I don’t know... I think that not without a reason we have different colours of skin and the world looks like in this way... there are spaces where people with the same colour of skin live... and this colour is followed by specific culture... mixing that is not just a loss for... in fact all people lose because some individual, cool cultures die... I would like to go to Africa and see something like that... and McDonalds will soon be in Africa as well... the same with incoming people... today Europe... here [in Poland] it is still so-so, but in the West these Europeans are not able to say who they are... Europe means nothing for them other than the European Union.

The geographical mobility of others and their settlement ‘outside their cultural context’ is perceived as a risk for different cultures and identities. Similarly, homosexuality (first of all its presence in the public space) is presented as a turn against history and a threat to the traditional order. There is a strong opposition between normal, traditional families and abnormal, deviant homosexuals who destroy the long-established order based on Polish and Catholic values. What is relevant is that Catholicism is also seen as the most important source or morality – therefore, any phenomena which are incoherent with the religious norms, are seen as immoral.

Wiktoria (MW): What gets my goat...of course [the direction] in which Poland has been striving, that homosexuality will became something socially normal. I think that soon, in 15 years, if the national movement fails, [we will have a situation] that abortion will be completely possible, not as today – just in those three cases.

Andrzej (ONR): I think that it is a moral decay...in a nutshell, the world has been going to the dogs. And it will be such situation that even in that our supposedly Catholic state...we will have...and I am passing over queer marriages, homosexuality in general, the same with lesbians...but that there will

---

*The narrators’ real names were anonymized.*

be such strange situations with abortion, euthanasia, children’s adoptions, bringing them up, influencing their education. I think it is sick that the state is supposed to influence the education in that way...I do not know if you have heard that today it is deleted...there is a project of European history textbook in which painful facts will be deleted and there is no more place for history, objective science [...] we cannot live in falsehood, at some point someone will find out that past and it will affected [us] or we will destroy everything.

It can be argued that that nationalists shape their identities around ‘a set of fixed commitments, which act as a filter through which numerous different social environments are reacted to or interpreted’ (Giddens, 1991: 90). Giddens calls such people ‘the rigid traditionalists, in a compulsive sense’ (ibidem: 190).

The other discursive strategy is emphasizing the difference between us and them. It follows the previous strategy and refers to civilization, cultural differences and to different systems of values. It is a strategy mostly used in the discourse about Muslims and it involves forecasting the clash of civilizations. By linking the general crisis of the European values and attachment to Christianity with the influx of religious Muslims, the nationalists try to convince their potential supporters that without any anti-immigrant politics, Europe will be overtaken by Islam and will lose its fundamentals.

Tadeusz, a member of the All-Polish Youth, says that the emptiness left by Christianity (caused by the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and the dominance of left-wing and liberal groups which had overtaken the media) has been filled by Islam, which ‘does not understand European values, democracy and basic human rights’.

What is pretty interesting is the ambivalent attitude towards Europe – on the one hand, it is a positive point of reference as the civilization based on Christian values; on the other hand – contemporary, Western Europe (presented sometimes as a synonym of the European Union) is seen as the liberal political project breaking up with a traditional (good) order and a source of dangerous anti-values. While Tadeusz presents the vision of possible Islamization of Europe, he points to the distance between Poland and Western Europe:

Tadeusz (MW): Well, within 20-30 years Muslims will be the majority in Western Europe and the question is what Western Europe will do with that...will it let itself be dominated or will it take some radical steps, I do not know what will happen, I do not know what will happen there... the army will be on the streets...I do not know...there will be a dictatorship, the Fourth Reich in Germany...I do not know, there are different variants, right...we can border on caliphates, right, or on some emirates...instead of the United Arabic Emirates we would have Berlin Emirate or Caliphate Dresden.

Wojciech (MW): [...] it is impossible that two different groups coming from different cultures, I mean civilizations live in the framework of one society, one state. It is what Professor Koneczny proposed before the World War II...that

Interestingly, in the mentioned quotation the narrator presents democracy in positive way which is pretty incoherent with the nationalists’ criticism of that system.
point concerning civilizations...in which he stated that if there are two different civilizations, they will always fight each other. And today we have confirmation of that...when we look at things which are going on in Great Britain for example...where suddenly it has turned out that there is a huge group of immigrants, Muslims and they have problems with them. It is because those people [immigrants, Muslims] function in the framework of completely different value systems and so on. Different religion as well, right? And they start to fight each other.

In such a context, Poland is presented as a state which still has the chance to avoid the mistakes made by Western Europe which promoted the policies of multiculturalism. The real and, more often, imagined problems of Muslims’ integration in Europe are presented as the core case against these policies. Similarly to Inari Sakki and Katarina Pettersson’s findings, ‘members of Islamic culture are portrayed as culturally ideologically incompatible with Christianity’ (2015). What is quite interesting is that Muslims are presented with reference to abstract, collective categories (religion, civilization) rather than as individuals bearing specific, personal characteristics.

Another and related strategy of justification is connected with the emphasis on presenting the ‘facts’ about the experiences of other countries. The narrators present the differences between homogenous and relatively (still) safe Poland described by some as ‘the last bastion of Christian civilization’ and multicultural Western Europe which is not able to deal with immigrants and has lost its identity. The facts are presented as ‘objective truths’ and the role of the informants’ values and ideologies in selecting and interpreting them is to a large extent veiled:

Wojciech (MW): Recently, right, a few days ago... there were huge riots in Sweden... on the Swedish outskirts. With Swedes. Muslims did it because they just have different system of values... because they say that their religion should dominate... that they do not want to submit to the jurisdiction of courts, police and any other organs. For example, the Muslim community does not recognise the British courts and the British police in Great Britain. [...] The same in France... a few years ago... a few thousand cars were set on fire, there were regular fights with the police... Generally, Western Europe has been heading for war, civil war... religious and civilizational. [...] 

Wojciech, similarly to the other informants, presents the riots and fights with the police as provoked by Muslims and explains them by ‘just a different system of values’. What is more, the narrator presents it as a source of the predicted future war. Some nationalists mention that Europe will soon turn into a caliphate. By reference to the experiences of other countries and presenting them rather as a set of facts than as an interpretation, the narrators are able to present Muslims as dangerous and expansive strangers who follow a completely different normative system and do not respect European law. Similarly, some narrators refer to other countries in order to show the possible negative consequences of granting more rights to homosexual couples. One of the nationalists mentions the Netherlands and Germany as the
countries in which just after legalising gay marriages, zoophiles and paedophiles started to campaign for their rights. As he comments, as long as we [Poles] do not let the homosexuals have any new rights, we can avoid such situations. The mentioned ‘facts’ are not always true - they are just presented as empirical credibility of the arguments. For example, gay marriages were legalized by the German Parliament only in June 2017.

It is associated with the other argument against the demands of homosexuals or other minorities. Some narrators suggest that the Polish law protects everyone equally so any new rights for a given group mean privilege. Homosexuals are criticized as people who demand equality of rights because of their otherness which is called ‘an unimportant niche’. Many informants highlight the lack of grounds for their claims. According to them, it is rather an attempt to gain superiority over other people. The homosexuals are presented as people who want to be, or even already are, treated in a better way and use their sexual orientation to get into power. The important fact is that minorities are presented as active, not passive groups. Consequently, they are seen as being able to achieve their goals and become powerful. This strategy of presentation lets the nationalists justify the view that the minorities are problematic, take too much for granted and tend to have too much power in Poland, and therefore might destroy the Polish identity and heritage. At the same time, their own activism is seen as the needed reaction to others’ initiatives, a kind of defence of public space on ‘the majority norms and values’ behalf.

7. Denial of racism and homophobia

As I have mentioned above, the nationalists are aware of their negative media image and the still limited acceptance of their activity, and therefore they try to conduct a kind of destigmatization. These attempts involve focusing on the positive sides of organization activity, highlighting the change of people who are creating the movement (from skinheads to students) and stressing how the media lie about them. There is also a strong rejection of being labelled as fascists, Nazis and racists. Not only the need of destigmatization, which is manifested in distancing from other (‘more radical’) nationalists, but also the consciousness of binding norms and law concerning racism involves aversion to being identified with racializing practices (Billig 1988 in: van Dijk, 1992: 89). Despite the fact that most of the narrators openly criticize the meaning of tolerance, they are aware that their statements may be understood as ‘breaking the social norm of tolerance or acceptance’ (van Dijk, 1992: 89). As Teun van Dijk writes: ‘Denials of racism have both an individual and a social dimension. Not only do most white speakers individually resent being perceived as racists also, and even more importantly, such strategies may at the same time aim at defending the intergroup as a whole: “We are not racists”’ (1992: 89).

There can be different forms of denial: a negative attitude can be acceptable only when it concerns a specific feature of a given group, justification or mitigations, excuses, blaming the victim or reversal (ibidem: 90-91). To some extent all elaborated discursive strategies of justification could be seen as a denial of racism and homophobia. Referring to cultural differences and possible risks, nationalists draw a picture of others who are dangerous not because of their biology, but due to
behaviour and demands attributed to them. Similarly to other researchers’ findings, there is a common expression in some interviews: ‘I am not a racist, but...’ and after that the narrators justify their negative attitudes towards others:

Wojciech (MW): [...] we are not racists because it always comes to mind when you say nationalists. It is not racism. With respect to biology, right? We are not against anyone because of their biology. It is stupid, you know? That we are against them because someone is black. Someone is Mongoloid, someone is... I do not know... Italian or anything, right? Idiocy, totally. We... nobody has such views. If we are against... for example immigrants in our country... it is not because of their physiognomy, but because of their culture.

Wojciech, one of the members of the All-Polish Youth, uses a traditional concept of racism and associates racism with aversion to people because of their skin colour. However, he does not see anything wrong with justification of negative attitudes with reference to their culture. Some researchers write about ‘new racism’ or ‘post-racism’ (Lentin and Titley, 2011) what implies that there is a new nature of racism: ‘cultural norms, values, tradition and life styles of outsiders are now held to be problematic, rather than physiognomy.’ In the so-called ‘differentialist turn’ it is ‘racism, which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others, but only the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions’ (Balibar, 2007: 84). To add, ‘the more modern and subtle forms of ethnic or racial inequality and especially the “racism”, or rather “ethnicism” based on constructions of cultural difference and incompatibility, is seldom characterized as “racism”, but at most as xenophobia, and more often than not, as legitimate cultural self-defence’ (Baker, 1981; Dovidio and Gaertner 1986 in: van Dijk 1992). Since the narrators consider racism within the classical frames, exclusion of others due to their culture is not racist. Additionally, the narrators try to present themselves as not-racist or even as tolerant people by telling stories about their friendly or at least non-problematic relations with representatives of others. It seems that the main reason for that is to show that they are not against all immigrants/homosexuals, but rather that they are against those who manifest their otherness in a public space. It is an ostensible acceptance which depends on the degree of public invisibility of others:

Dominik (ONR): Once I met an Arab at the party... there were no conflicts, he has lived here [in Poland] since his childhood... he does not promote... he just does not force his own rules, he just knows that he is in Poland and there are some rules and he accepts them.

The same argumentation emerges out of the statements concerning homosexuals. Some narrators claim: ‘I do not care what they do in their bedrooms, I just don’t want to see them in public,’ ‘I just do not want a minority to attack the majority.’ ‘I just do not want my kids to look as this.’ There is a strong distinction between the private sphere and the public sphere. While the former
seems to be out of the range of the nationalists’ interest, the latter has to be reserved for Polish – and therefore Catholic – values.

Tadeusz (MW): [...] with MP Godson [Polish conservative politician of Nigerian origin] we can absolutely cooperate and build Poland because he is a man brought up in a Christian culture... and it is actually a great example... how the world is changing... that there is a man from Africa who comes to us and he teaches us what the sanctity of life means... what marriage is... that homosexual couples are not marriages and so on... and he defends it and he is not afraid... so such nationalism... such a nation... that anyone who feels Polish... who cultivates... who identifies with that.

The manifestation of readiness to cooperate or meet others is another and pretty interesting strategy of denying one’s racism. On the one hand, they present themselves as people who do not have problems with otherness, but on the other hand, they always add special conditions under which it is possible.

Interestingly, despite the fact that homophobia is not avoided as much as racism, strategies similar to the denial of racism can be observed in nationalists’ ways of talking about homosexuals. For instance, the National Rebirth of Poland member, Dariusz, says:

Dariusz (NOP): I don’t hate them, but similarly to the case of an alcoholic, I perceive him as a sick person, I don’t hate him, I do not want to shoot him or sterilise him and the same with homosexual – I don’t hate him, but I claim that he is sick and one should, according to John Paul II and his words in Memory and Identity, one should treat them, show them love, I mean, respect.

It is a kind of denial of homophobia. Justifying his opinion through a specific reading of the words of Pope John Paul II, Dariusz frames homosexuality as an illness, declares compassion instead of hatred and emphasizes that homosexuals deserve compassion, respect and professional medical help. Similar statements focus on the powerfulness of homosexuals who according to some narrators were able to (financially) influence the World Health Organization in order to stop homosexuality being considered as a mental illness.

However, the denial of racism, which is one of the well explored discursive strategies of the far right activists (van Dijk, 1992; Billig, 1988), appears not only when the narrators talk about otherness, but also when they explain the various challenges they have to deal with. For example, some of those who control the recruitment process put stress on too radical views of some of the candidates who mention in their application their positive attitudes towards Hitler, readiness to beat black people or leftists.

What is more, drawing boundaries between racists (them) and non-racists (us) can be linked with internal conflicts within the nationalist movement. There is a very limited cooperation between the National Rebirth of Poland (NOP) and the two other organizations. One of the All-Polish Youth members explains why he does not see any opportunities to work together with the NOP:
‘Because they are a bit... extreme. We are not as extreme a milieu as we are depicted... we are normal people. But the NOP is a kind... You can actually find both racists and different other people there... it is not for me. [...]’

Such statements play an important role in creating the organizational collective identity and positive self-presentation.

8. Conclusions

The aim of the paper was to present the main discursive strategies used by the participants of the Polish nationalist movement when they speak about others. The analysis focused on two specific categories of others: Muslims and homosexuals. Contributing to the debates on the changing nature of racists and homophobic attitudes among the activists of far right groups in various countries (Blee, 2007; Lentin and Titley, 2011; van Dijk, 1992), the analysis shows that the ‘otherness’ of both categories chosen is created with reference to differentialist terms (Balibar, 2007) connected with culture, civilization and tradition.

The main strategies of justification for the (desired) exclusion of others include: 1) emphasizing the possible discontinuity if civilization and tradition, (2) emphasizing the difference between us and them and (3) presenting the (imagined) ‘facts’ about the (negative) experiences of other countries in dealing with others. Therefore, others are presented by the narrators as a real threat both to the continuity of the European civilization based on Christianity and to the Polish identity having its foundations in the Catholic Church and the traditional family. According to the narrators, cultural differences (connected mostly with religion) constitute the main factor which makes the idea of multicultural societies impossible to succeed. Their attitudes reflect the core characteristics of ‘new racism’ and ‘post-racism’ (Lentin and Titley, 2011) which justifies the exclusion of others with the reference to the alleged incompatibility of cultural characteristics and life styles rather than merely phenotypical markers of those excluded (Balibar, 2007).

Referring to the Western countries’ experiences and predicting the clash of civilizations, the nationalists state that their criticism of others is well-justified and based on the need to defend the essence of the Polish nation rather than any racist attitudes or prejudices. Both Muslims and homosexuals are presented as groups which are actively influential and not ready to adapt to the extant traditional order. However, the nationalists’ language and arguments do not seem to be as radical as one could assume. Owing to the fact that they are aware of their negative image on the one hand, and the importance of political correctness and legal consequences on the other, they try to use subtle linguistic expressions and deny racism (understood by them in classical-biological terms) and homophobia. These discursive strategies make the Polish nationalists’ studied similar to the far-right activists studied in other countries (van Dijk, 1992; Billig, 1988).

In many cases, the nationalists whom I interviewed presented themselves as real patriots. As Aleksandra Kozłowska-Grzymała argues, ‘the statements which from the point of view of the multicultural discourse could be described as xenophobic and
racist, were presented in the ethno-nationalistic discourse as an act of courage, a testimony to true wisdom and patriotic duty’ (2009: 73). Therefore, they seem to be, unlike the leftists and liberal politicians, rational, aware of threats and worried about the Polish nationality and uniqueness. They place themselves in the role of defenders of tradition, history and Polish values. At the same time they try to regain control over the public sphere and make it more homogenous.

Taking into consideration the fact that the social and political context has been changing (e.g. by the new right-wing parliament in Poland, the influx of refugees into Europe, Brexit) it will be worthwhile to observe the changes of the nationalist movement discourse and its mutual relations with the public discourse as well as with the discourses of individual participants. So far, we can observe increasing similarities between the nationalist organizations and the Polish government in the perception of refugees (as potential terrorists and a cultural danger) and homosexuals (as a threat to the traditional order). What is more, the nationalist have started to create Ukrainians as another (economic) threat. Therefore, it would be important to continue the analysis and see what strategies are used in the discourse about them.

References


Pędzwiat, K. (2011) “The Established and Newcomers” in Islam in Poland or the Inter-Group Relations Within the Polish Muslim Community. In Góراك-Sosnowska, K. (ed.) Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe. Widening the


Abstract

In recent years, many theoretical and empirical analyses about the changing regimes of Central and Eastern Europe have been written, pointing out the authoritarian tendencies and radicalization in the region. Hungary is a significant case in the changing landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democracies. Although the general impression is that the government has such a strong grip on power that resisting it is futile, in fact, it only enjoys only the support of 30 per cent of Hungarian citizens. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect the opposition to be able to effectively mobilize against the regime. In reality, no political opponent seems to stand a chance of defeating it.

In order to explain why this is so, we focus on the way Orbán constantly creates images of ‘the enemy’ that keep alive an atmosphere of vigilance that blocks the efforts of critical actors to efficiently mobilize citizens. Since the political system in Hungary is highly centralized, the Prime-Minister’s speeches epitomize the logic and ideology of the regime. Our aim is to understand the mechanism through which the dominant political actors frame the enemy in a system of images, thereby creating an environment where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against them.

Keywords: Framing, Hungary, Orbán speeches, public discourse, enemy.
…hatred only eats away at a person’s intelligence and conscience, and an enemy mentality can poison the spirit of an entire people, lead to cruel and lethal internecine combat, destroy a society’s tolerance and humanity, and block a nation’s progress toward freedom and democracy (Liu Xiaobo – Nobel Laureate)

1. INTRODUCTION

Hungary’s right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democratic politics; for this, it is the subject of constant international criticism. Although there are numerous symptoms of the illiberalism of the government, in this paper we focus on the way the government uses enemy images to buttress its rule by linking internal enemies with external ones, thereby seeking to dominate framing strategies.

The tactic of using enemy images to create support is as old as politics. When Bodin (1576) discussed the topic, he referred back to the Romans who relied on such a strategy. Promoting the threat to a community from external enemies offers the perfect means for sideling domestic discontent and diminishing dissatisfaction about the incompetence of incumbents to properly govern a country. Bodin’s approach refers to the traditional view of the enemy, which is connected to warfare: here, the enemy is external, visible and clearly threatens the existence of the community. With the rise of the modern state, the boundaries between peace and warfare are much less clear. Electoral politics based on party competition tempts actors to rely on negative campaigns for triumphing over their adversaries, an approach which goes hand in hand with framing one’s competitors as enemies. Playing with the opponent-enemy distinction is becoming part and parcel of everyday post-cold war politics in Europe (Schwab, 1987; Szabó, 2004).

Although using enemy images has always been a part of politics, we nevertheless contend that it is important to analyze the mechanisms through which references to external enemies are linked with the identification of domestic critics as internal enemies – most likely working for foreign interests, using foreign support. During the past decade, Brussels, the European Union, the IMF, immigrants, foreign banks and speculators such as George Soros have been called the enemies of Hungary, and an increasingly belligerent tone has also characterized attitudes towards domestic opponents. Although this gradual radicalization of Hungarian politics has

1 Although the general impression is that the government’s strong grip on power makes resistance futile, in fact it only enjoys the support of 30 per cent of all Hungarian citizens. This 30 per cent represents 50 per cent of individuals certain to vote. Support for other parties lags far behind. For example, the second largest parties are capable of mobilizing only around 15-20 per cent of people certain to vote. Thus, even though the government is a long way from enjoying the support of two-thirds of voters, the opposition has not managed to get successfully organized or present a credible alternative. While numerous explanations are provided for this in the paper, we suggest that one reason is the difficulty of mobilizing citizens in the first place because this hinders the appearance and strengthening of new political organizations. For data about support for parties, see: Tárki: Formálódó Pártpreferenciák (Evolving Party Preferences) http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2017/kitekint/20170130_valaszas.html Accessed: 01-04-2017.
been pointed out by many (Biró-Nagy et al., 2013; Krekó and Mayer, 2015; Polyakova and Shekhovstov, 2016; Pytlas and Kossack, 2015) we contend that it is important to scrutinize the mechanisms of the construction of the enemy that this involves.

This article is therefore an exploratory study that seeks to analyze the use of enemy images in the recent main speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán before 2015. We intentionally limit ourselves to the period before 2015 because as of now (late 2017) the Hungarian government’s rhetoric is nothing but a permanent naming of new enemies who are attacking the country. Putting it differently, we contend that for studying the mechanism of ‘enemy construction’ investigation of a period when the rhetoric was not so intense is more appropriate than using a period when on every corner of Budapest one may bump into a giant anti-George Soros/immigration poster. In addition to studying this mechanism, we are also interested in whether the situation has always been similar (that is, did Orbán talk like this in his first speeches in 2010?). In answering these questions, it is important to highlight that do not seek to explain why a particular enemy image is chosen but rather to see how enemy images are used, what framing mechanisms Orbán relies on, and how internal and external enemies are linked rhetorically.

We believe that it is important to realize that one aim of the combative rhetoric of populist political actors is to undermine the legitimacy of opponents and thereby limit their opportunity to successfully mobilize against their rule. If a regime manages to frame its critics as ‘enemies’ and ‘foreign agents’, while at the same time citizens worry about showing their discontent, an environment may be successfully created where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against it. While recent protests in Hungary in support of Central European University and in opposition to the law against civil organizations suggest that there are still some citizens not completely discouraged from showing their discontent, it is important to see that the whole campaign against CEU and NGOs is the epitome of the logic of regime-buttressing through use of a nationalist rhetoric that identifies nation-threatening enemies both outside and within. By constantly identifying newer enemies, and by maintaining an atmosphere of vigilance and suspicion, the regime creates a Manichean domestic political divide that hinders critical actors from efficiently mobilizing citizens.

After introducing how ‘making enemies’ contributes to the domination of the public sphere, we describe the corpus we work with and the methods we use to study internal and external enemies. Next, we show how the two are gradually linked, and also illustrate the three important framing mechanisms/strategies in Orbán’s speeches, which we identify as ambiguity; links made to shared historical grievances, and allusions to conspiracies against Hungary. Finally, in our conclusion we add a few comments about Popper and his notion of the enemies of open society. We do so

---

1 A survey conducted by our research team in 2014 clearly showed that the fear of consequences significantly hindered citizen mobilization: around one third (35 per cent) of respondents told us that this fear plays a significant role in their staying away from protests (MTA-ELTE Peripato 2014).

because Orbán has recently picked Soros as the nation’s (and even Europe’s) arch-enemy; a man who is planning to import millions of immigrants into Europe. While this claim about Soros’s objectives is blatantly untrue – being pure populism – we nevertheless believe that Orbán’s opposition is not only rhetorical because his regime is founded on principles that outright reject the ideals of the open society promoted by Popper and Soros. In fact, we suggest that perhaps the illiberalism Orbán talks about is best captured by what Popper identifies as closed society or tribalism.

Finally, we quote here a passage by Popper that offers a penetrating insight into the way populist leaders of a closed societies maintain their rule. Discussing enemies of an open society, Popper pointed out that a popular leader, while preaching freedom, actually brings the people to tyranny and names ever newer enemies to buttress the legitimacy of their rule: ‘The people who have hailed him [the popular leader] first as the champion of freedom are soon enslaved; and then they must fight for him, in ‘one war after another which he must stir up […] because he must make the people feel the need of a general’ (Popper, 2013[1947]:42).’

2. CONTROLLING THE DISCOURSE BY USING ENEMY IMAGES

In recent years, voices suggesting that a new type of regime is being born in Eastern Europe, with the emergence of strong leaders, such as Viktor Orbán, have been getting louder. Many of these pieces of work find it puzzling that, following their 1989-1990 post-communist transition towards Western-type liberal democracy, these states today are shifting in a different direction. Csillag and Szelényi (2015) argue that the recently emerged strong leaders of post-communist countries are establishing managed illiberal democracies in which property relations are increasingly neo-prebendal in style. Varga and Freyberg-Inan (2012) identify these new systems as ‘selective democracies’, meaning that governing actors maintain democratic rule on the surface, but nevertheless rely on exclusionary strategies. First, opponents are presented as being excluded from the polity, then democratic rules ‘are applied to specific groups within it who have entrenched themselves in power’ (Varga and Freyberg-Inan, 2012: 351) Although these theories approach the issue from different angles, they have one element in common: they suggest that in order to succeed, these strong leaders need to control resources more firmly than their colleagues in Western-type democracies do. Although for Csillag and Szelényi, resources primarily refer to property (that is, control of ownership rights, and the power to allocate and redistribute resources), studies on mobilization tend to understand resources more broadly. In social movement studies, resources typically also include legitimation, prestige, networks and supporters. Along these lines, similarly to Varga and Freyberg Inan (2012), we also consider the ability to enter the political discourse and the ability to engage others in political debate as a resource, since it is a precondition of being

---

4 See: the longer quote later in the text.
5 In a neo-prebendal system of property relations, property is distributed by the political leader to loyal servants in the form of rewards for services, and thus can be taken back when the required service is no longer provided, or not in sufficient quality.
recognized as a legitimate member of the political community. Due to its constant naming of critics as enemies of the government – and foremost, as enemies of the nation –, a government can deprive its critics of their right to speak, and thus of the legitimacy to challenge its rule.

While democracies involve conflict and competition, political adversaries are usually considered opponents, not enemies. In fact, democracy is built on the recognition of ‘the other’ as a legitimate critic, struggling similarly for the well-being of the community, albeit having different ideas about how to create the common good. Yet, this is an idealized image as even in democracies actors can be tempted to challenge the legitimacy of their adversaries. The most powerful means of doing this is to strip them of their legitimacy by excluding them from the political community (Szabó, 2007; Schmitt, 2008).

A political community is typically understood as a collective of individuals who possess citizenship of a country, with this citizenship more or less overlapping that of the inhabitants of the country who share the same cultural or ethnic background. However, this definition of a political community is not clear-cut, and one of the main points of contestation in politics involves the definition of the borders and qualities of the political community (see for example: Anderson 2006; Schmitt 2008) and the creation of cohesion between those defined as its members. Social psychology studies also emphasize that the identification of common enemies may trigger group formation and group cohesion (see: Gerő et al., 2017; Oppenheimer, 2006). Referring to enemy images evokes strong emotions by suggesting that the internal core of members is threatened by an existential threat from outsiders, although not necessarily only from the outside because there may also be accomplices within. The two types of enemy – external and internal – have different roles in politics: the former serves as a threat, a form of oppression, while the external enemy calls upon the ‘community’ to act.

Although relying on enemy construction may provide strong legitimation for the politicians who rely on it, the danger is that once the threat is eliminated or disappears, politicians can easily lose the legitimacy they earlier obtained (Ferguson et al., 2014). Thus, politicians who rely on such rhetoric may feel the need to keep the image of the enemy alive by identifying or constructing either an unbeatable enemy – which is always at hand – or by finding ever newer enemies (Ferguson et al., 2014). Thus it is reasonable to assume that enemy construction is an ever-intensifying process.

Along these lines we formulate two assumptions to drive our analysis of Orbán’s speeches:

Assumption I. We assume that internal and external enemies are connected in the Hungarian Prime minister’s speeches. The subject of our interest is about the mechanisms and framing strategies used by Orbán to connect these two types of enemies.

Assumption II. We assume that, as Popper suggests, there is a need for incumbents to identify ever-newer enemies, and that the level of radicalization of rhetoric increases with time (it is one thing to have this general impression, but another to see if this is actually true of Orbán’s speeches: Orbán is known for his
double-talk, always tailoring his speeches to the audience. A "peacock dance" – as he once called the art of diplomacy).

3. THE ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES - METHODOLOGY

In our study we rely on frame analysis, an analytical approach developed by Benford and Snow (2000) for understanding strategic action by political actors. The approach involves interpreting collective experiences through a meaning-creation process. The authors identify three core framing tasks: the construction of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames: the first identifies the problem, the second the solution, the third tries to evoke the motivation for joining in the action that will lead to the solution.

To identify the indicators of the framing processes of the governing party, we turn to the speeches of Viktor Orbán, the acting Prime Minister of Hungary and president of Fidesz. Orbán is one of the founding fathers of the party and has served as its leader almost continuously throughout its 28-year history.

Orbán’s speeches contain all the framing elements listed above. Orbán is diagnostic when he identifies the problems of the past, and what Hungarians have inherited. This material includes both references to Hungarian history and typical mindset, but also the past eight years of socialist rule. The second frame involves descriptions of the unfolding dangers and challenges the Hungarian nation faces, from the encroaching of Brussels and the IMF to liberals and liberal ideas that threaten the future of Hungary. Finally, speeches tend to be visionary and prophetic avowals that call on supporters to be vigilant and suspicious, and to stick together because the enemy – frequently unspecified, perhaps hidden – is at the gates. Naming/creating enemies is simultaneously a component of both diagnostic and motivational frames: It identifies threats, and by personalizing them, is more effective at evoking strong emotions such as fear or hostility (Berkowitz, 1994).

As János Kornai claims, the political system in Hungary is highly centralized. ‘The executive and legislative branches are no longer separate; both are controlled by Prime Minister Orbán, who has positioned himself at the very pinnacle of power’ (Kornai, 2015: 35).

In such a centralized system, the public speeches of the Prime Minister epitomize the logic and the ideology of the regime. To examine enemy images we used a corpus of Orbán Viktor’s speeches. First, we collected all of the speeches held during 2010 and 2015 from the Prime Minister’s official website. We then selected 18 of them that were held on important occasions. Eight of these speeches were held...
on national holidays, nine at a sort of ‘summer school’ organized yearly for Fidesz’s supporters, while the final five were given at other Fidesz-organized events. These are speeches in which Orbán talks to the whole nation, and it is expected to identify the main threats that the nation faces in the future.

From these speeches we identified the actors (groups, persons, institutions, nations, countries) mentioned as threats to the community presented as an in-group (i.e. Hungary, Hungarian people, ‘Us’, European Christianity, Christians). Since the line between opponents and enemies is not always clear, each speech was checked by two of the present authors independently, who categorized the enemies as ‘internal’ or ‘external’ (or ‘both’).

After carefully reading Orbán’s 18 main speeches we turned to the full collection of all of Orbán’s speeches during the same period (N=489). Due to this process we were able to study how the concepts of the enemy identified in the 18 main speeches had been used in the larger corpus, and trace the dynamics of their occurrence. We tested the 18 main speeches and found that they were systematically among the most intense in terms of the frequency of reference to enemy and emnification. This is a crucial finding, because it justifies our analytical focus on these 18 speeches. This does not mean that Orbán did not identify different enemies in his other speeches. This could certainly be the case. However, as our aim was to capture the general dynamics and the way enemies are framed, the 18 speeches were thought to be sufficient (the case would have been different and our choice more difficult to justify if we had found that the other speeches were more intense, meaning that Orbán’s more moderate speeches were included in 18 we picked).

Second, we categorized the enemies that were specified as either external or internal enemies (Table 1). For example, Brussels, IMF, and Tavares were classified as external, while leftists or socialists (referring to the opposition) were deemed internal. However, some enemies could have been classified as both external and internal (‘speculators’ may be Hungarian or international, just as ‘liberals’ may refer to both Hungarian intellectuals and to European political opponents). In these cases, classification of the references was impossible, so we categorized these enemies as such (‘uncertain’). Below are some typical examples from Orbán’s speeches. In the texts we highlighted the enemies. These examples show the nature of the speeches we analyzed. However, at this point a caveat is due. While we located all the occasions that Orbán identified ‘enemies’ in the corpus of 18 speeches, not necessarily all these mentions included framing of the referent specifically as an ‘enemy’. For example, the

---

1 March 15: the national commemoration of the revolution and freedom war of 1848-1849, and October 23, the commemoration of the revolution in 1956.

2 Called the ‘Tusványos Free University’, symbolically held in a Transylvanian town. Orbán makes a speech at the summer university every year offering a vision based on a loose interpretation of large-scale social changes.

3 Each speech was coded by at least two of the authors. In the disputed cases, decisions were made in pairs.

4 2010 would have been an incomplete year since speeches were collected from only after the elections in April, 2010.

5 For example, the speeches given at the Summer Camp of Bálványos are the most intense from those given from 2012-2014, and the third most intense in 2015.
use of the word ‘civil’ is dualistic. It frequently refers to a civil organization that is ‘contributing to the national struggle’, as led by the government. On these occasions the reference to ‘civil’ has a positive connotation in Orbán’s speeches. However, when the word ‘civil’ is linked with – or the related organization is supported and financed by – liberals or foreigners, it refers to an enemy. The reason we have included in the table the frequency of mention of liberal/s in the 489 speeches is because liberal is negatively connoted in Orbán’s speeches, offering an effective way to capture the general dynamics of enemy-framing.

Table 1. Examples of enemies in Orbán’s speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Uncertain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>left</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>speculator/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialist/s</td>
<td>colonizers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strangers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norwegians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tavares</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first example, the left is identified as the enemy of the nation. For the first years of its rule Fidesz constantly referred to the crimes the left had allegedly committed during the previous eight years while it was in government. While this might normally only qualify the left as a (political) opponent, the quote below clearly shows that the left is more than that. It is actually allied with foreigners against the nation of Hungary:

‘Do not forget that the fallen left is always ready to incite against Hungary! It is ready to incite journalists, EU institutions, banks, cartels and multinational companies. They are ready to write reports like the Tavares report that spread lies about Hungary.’

It is important to point out that it is not made explicit in the text that the left is ‘the enemy’. What we find are statements that the left ‘incite against Hungary’ or ‘spread lies about Hungary.’ However, these strong words indicate that the left are against ‘Hungary’ (not just Fidesz), so we interpret such claims as meaning that the left are the enemy of the nation, and are not merely political opponents.

Also, ‘the EU’ sometimes refers simply to Europe or to a neutral political entity and sometimes to the international community to which Hungary belongs. However, on other occasions the EU stands for an encroaching force against which Hungary and the interests of Hungarians need to be defended. Speeches mention Brussels as well - among the ten-most-mentioned enemies in 2011. Brussels is clearly more of a negative actor, often associated with bureaucracy or unreasonable rules.

The second example is important as it links the present with historical grievances, and thereby links foreign enemies from the past – as they are preserved in national memory – with more recent ones; for example, Brussels. While the words themselves do not include reference to an ‘enemy’, the quote is difficult to interpret differently, also including references to notable revolutionary dates:

‘We do not allow foreigners to tell us what to do! Be they from Vienna in 1848, 1956 or 1990 from Moscow. And we do not today allow Brussels or anyone else to tell us what to do!’

The third quote is an example of how the US and liberals come up in the texts that link liberalism, foreign policy and threats to Christian national identity (notwithstanding flaws in the argumentation and other inconsistences, with the speaker frequently alluding to supposedly common-sense truths). It is also important to underline the fact that, from this time on, Orbán declares he will pursue an illiberal model of democracy, and that anything connected to liberals/liberalism represents the enemy:

‘We should be brave enough to say that liberal foreign policy is nothing but hypocrisy...it claims, putting it very simply that there is good - predominantly the US and its allies - and there is bad, which must be defeated. Yet, in the end it always turns out that it was only about money, oil, raw materials, something very different than it was claimed to be about at the beginning. [...] This is the essence of liberal foreign policy. [...] Now we have the opportunity that if we fight well in this debate, we can reclaim the respect and reputation of a national and Christian identity as opposed to a liberal one.’

We may connect this third quote with a fourth quote from Orbán’s speech, making the nature of the fight clearer. It is a fight between old and new – the latter referring to Fidesz’s nationalism, purported Christianity and a conservatism reminiscent from the inter-war period (although the content of this Christian conservatism remains extremely vague):

‘There is a permanent fight in Hungary between those who represent a new world – [who are] building the nation and economy according to new rules - and those representing old truths. One should not be surprised about this as

---

16 In the 18 main speeches we found 58 different enemies. Naturally, some of these are used synonymously and are often mentioned together (Brussels and the European Union, speculators and stockbrokers).
18 There are flaws in the argumentation and there are inconsistences, with the speaker frequently alluding to supposedly common-sense truths.
the old elite was made rich and powerful according to those old rules and truths.  

Finally, in our last quote Orbán talks about civil society and the struggle that has become increasingly intense. One could argue that the attack against CEU neatly fits with this logic: Soros is identified as the individual who is financing civil society and acting against the government.

‘I looked at civil society in Hungary apropos of debates over the Norwegian funds...and what I saw were paid political activists. Paid political activists sponsored by foreigners!’

From the enemy images discussed above, references to ‘liberal/s’ are always used with a negative connotation in speeches, symbolizing the arch-enemy. This situation provides a useful way of showing how speeches are becoming more ‘intense’ or radicalized. Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of occasions that the term liberal is stressed during Orbán’s speeches. The trend indicates that radicalization is certainly happening as the word ‘liberal’ is used more frequently in speeches. This process of radicalization, however, happens in leaps connected to electoral campaigns (in 2014), and to the campaign against immigrants in 2015.

Figure 1. Frequency of the term ‘liberal’ in Orbán’s speeches


* This campaign started shortly after the attack on Charlie Hebdo in 2015 and peaked in the summer of 2015. In 2016 and 2017 new campaigns were launched about immigrants and George Soros. For more information: Hungary’s Poster War on Immigration, BBC. Published online: 15/06/2015. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33091597 . Accessed 02/09/2017.
4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The first question we raised for this study asked about the relationship between internal and external enemies. In answering this question, we also aimed to identify framing strategies used by Orbán. On the basis of the 18 speeches by Orbán, we found that there is indeed a constant linking of internal and external enemies. Yet we found more. Namely, our analysis found that domestic enemies were mostly identified as enemies that primarily serve foreign interests. That is, it is foremost through their affiliation with foreigners that they have been turned into enemies. The following examples of quotes support this hypothesis of a link between internal and external enemies:

- ‘At the time of the transition they teamed up with foreign forces in order to play into the hands of foreigners, and to capture the wealth and resources of the country. Recently they changed their loyalty from Moscow to Tavares’
- ‘Those who could not undermine the renewal and progress of Hungary at home now try to do this in Brussels’
- ‘It is very important to make it clear – if our aim is to reorganize a national state instead of a liberal state – that here were are not dealing with civil actors. [...] these are not civil agents we meet with. [...] but political activists trying to promote foreign interests in Hungary (28th July 2014).’
- ‘During the past seven years, Hungary has experienced times when ‘those’ who made decisions about the most important developments in Hungary were paid by ‘others’.
- ‘We want Hungary to remain the country of Hungarians. This needs to be emphasized because there are ‘those’ who think about this differently.’

The first example refers to the time of transition, which is ironic in the sense that the country’s Westernization and joining of NATO were goals almost unanimously shared. No doubt numerous mistakes were made, but exactly what

---

remains hidden in the speech is the clear identification of the internal enemy (as if it were common knowledge; everybody knew who it was about). This reference to common background knowledge is seen most clearly in how enemies are not directly named but alluding to. One of the characteristics of Orbán’s speeches is that, although domestic enemies are occasionally named (for example, the left or ‘civils’), the primary internal enemy is not clearly identified. Instead of naming the internal enemy, it is referred to as ‘those’ who act against ‘us’: the ‘others’.

This rhetorical shift is winsome. By not naming ‘those’, the sense of ‘us’ is reinforced, because ‘we’ know who ‘we’ are referring to as our enemies – there is no need to point them out directly. This not only creates a touch of complicity between Orbán and his followers, but also allows every listener to freely interpret the term ‘those’ and pick their own scapegoat for modern Hungary’s ills (Russians, banks, liberals, feminists, etc.) and thereby join the new fight for the freedom of the nation. We return to the need for a new fight later, yet this ambiguity of naming the enemy we believe to be crucial. Namely, through this ambiguity the speaker calls supporters to be alert because certain actors become the subject of suspicion. These actors are working against the national interest, and despite their claims are actually traitors.

A pertinent example of this is the conflict between the government and some civil actors, following which the civil sphere was stigmatized. The actual case Orbán refers to is the government’s claim that certain civil actors were not independent but affiliates not only of political parties – which they should not be – but were actually using foreign money – here, money from the ‘Norwegian funds’ (Norway Grants) – to achieve political goals that were not in the interest of the Hungarian people. Being alert to such challenges is crucial, because, as Orbán argues ‘[...] freedom had its heroes, but also its traitors. All our revolutions were put down by foreign powers. And we also know that there are those who help foreigners.’ The important point to note here is the ambiguity and uncertainty that this framing creates. It suggests that one can never be sure. One should be hesitant, except for when clearly acting with the majority – which Orbán claims to be leader of. This fact, we believe, is contributing to stripping civil actors of their resources for mobilizing, as it is difficult to know if the actors who call for support are what they claim to be, or just enemies in disguise. This framing strategy we suggest calling the strategy of ambiguity.

The trope of fighting for the freedom and independence of the nation – frequently repeated by Orbán – works perfectly as the Hungarian national mythology

---

* By ‘the left’ Fidesz is referring to the Socialist Party and government that ruled the country for eight years – to the extent that the past 8 years have become a recurring trope in Fidesz’s rhetoric.


* However, there is an additional consideration here. Namely, the underlying Manichean logic contributes to the creation of an atmosphere where the normal politics of debate and discussion about particular issues becomes impossible, as all disagreement is interpreted as a general attempt to overthrow the regime. Thus, civil actors’ attempts at mobilizing citizens behind particular issues are blocked by the fact that they cannot recruit support for causes from those otherwise not fully committed in their opposition to the regime. Putting it differently, the regime manages to limit the chances for the mobilization of citizens around single issues.
is built on the necessity of constant struggle against oppressors, be they Turks, Austrians or Russians. It could be argued therefore, that with his speeches Orbán aims to touch on this shared point of reference, suggesting that the present is just the continuation of the fight Hungarians have been fighting for ‘eternity’. The title of Orbán’s speech: ‘We again need to go to battle’ offers a perfect example of this, with the title creating the general frame: Hungarians again need to fight: the speech elaborates on this in more detail. This historical continuity, or reference to the fate of Hungarians, is best captured by a sentence in Orbán’s speech from March 15, 2014, at the commemoration of the 1848 Revolution. In this speech, Orbán asks: ‘Can it be that we are fighting the same fight over and over again since 1848?’, promoting this trope of the necessity of fighting enemies to ensure the liberty of the nation. This process of framing enemies we called the strategy of making links to historical grievances.

However, the argument contained in these speeches occasionally goes further by not only 1) naming enemies - and thereby linking domestic and external agents, and 2) underlining the constant need for a fight for freedom, but also 3) explaining why these enemies of Hungarians do what they do. Namely, they - and in the quote below Orbán gives a perfect example of this by referring to the left - are working against Hungary because they do not like Hungarians and do not like them for being Hungarian. On the surface, this argument is circular and makes little sense; nevertheless it is an effective rhetorical move for undermining the legitimacy of the opponent:

‘In 2004 the left who in Hungary were inciting against Hungarians living in neighboring countries today would happily welcome illegal immigrants. These people, these politicians simply do not like Hungarians, and they do not like them for being Hungarian’.31

We interpret this method of framing enemies as reliance on a sort of soft ‘conspiracy’ theory, according to which there are enemies of Hungary out there who act against Hungary because they do not like ‘us’. Again, an allusion and vagueness, no specificity about the enemy, yet going beyond ambiguity by adding a hint of conspiracy. This framing strategy we call allusions to conspiracies against Hungary/i ans.

The second question we asked focused on the dynamics of naming enemies. We assumed that as time goes by, Orbán would need to name newer enemies, and his speeches would get increasingly radical. While our expectations were confirmed, we
were greatly surprised to find when rereading Orbán’s early speeches (e.g. his first speech in the period under analysis) that there was no reference to the need to fight. After Fidesz’ sweeping victory in the parliamentary election of 2010, Orbán’s first speech was about victory and the end of the fight:

“The fight we fought for freely defining our Hungarian future we end now with success. This fight ended with our victory; with the victory of those who fought in 1956; with the victory of those fighting for transition; that is, with the victory of free Hungarians in 2010 April [when Orbán won the elections]. In 1956 Hungarians defeated lies on the streets. Now in 2010 we have defeated lies, and given a final blow to the system of lies.”

The speech is shocking as it is the speech of a self-confident leader successfully ending the struggle, claiming that the days of prosperity and normal daily politics have come with no need to fight any more. There is nothing about enemies in the speech. The only combative element we find in this speech of March 2011 is that Hungarians are not going to allow outsiders to decide their fate - although Brussels gets mentioned analogously to Moscow for trying to dictate to Hungary. Thus, it would be wrong to claim that the speech does not indicate future conflict, but it explicitly declares that the fight is over.

Re-reading the speeches we were also surprised that those from 2010 and 2011 frequently included a touch of self-criticism. Orbán discussed how Hungarians lacked confidence, and were not united. Yet, as we move forward in time, the speeches turn against enemies, both external and internal; ultimately, with Orbán seeing himself in a fight with the corrupt, liberal West in general, including with hypocritical US foreign policy, Brussels, and George Soros.

What we get here is pure Occidentalism – as Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit (2004) point out in their short book on the history of anti-Westernism – which can easily be interpreted as a fight between proponents of a closed society against those of

---

2. “Being true to our oath, we did not tolerate Vienna to dictate to us in 1848, and we did not tolerate Moscow to dictate in 1956 and 1990. Even now, we will not let anyone from Brussels or from any other place dictate to us.” The original speech (in Hungarian) is available at: http://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/beszed/1848_es_2010_is_megujulast_hozott . Accessed 09/14/2017.
3. Some ‘terms’ and tropes that indicate this: disbelievers (huhogók); inclined to doubt, haunted by doubt (képtelékés, képtelkedés); sceptics, those who are discouraging us (lebeszélők); pessimism defeatism, making bad compromises (készülést, megalkuvást); self-defeating (önsorsrontó).
4. As an example see footnote 19.
5. The following absurd claim reveals that by now there is hardly anything or anyone that is not seen as an enemy. In a speech on September, 17, 2015, Orbán said: “The essence of all is that Europe today is ruled by liberals. There should be no misunderstanding, as conservatives are also liberals. Perhaps not honestly, but they cannot resist violence.” http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orbán-viktor-beszede-a-xiv-kocsmi-polgari-pikniken . Accessed: 01-09-2017.
an open society. The point here is not that the West, the US, or modernity do not have their deficiencies, and are not occasionally hypocritical or overly bureaucratic. But what is it that Orbán can offer instead? We know what he is fighting against (who his enemies are), but what is he fighting for? We suggest that Popper’s depiction of closed society gives us a clue.

Before turning to examining this in the conclusion, we here sum up our answer to the second question. What we can indeed see is the intensification and radicalization of Orbán’s speeches to the extent that they can be seen as a crusade for the remaking of Hungary and Europe based on purported Christian roots – i.e., the defense of Christianity, as Orbán sees it.

5. CONCLUSION

With this paper we intended to show how, by the creation of enemy images and portraying politics as a constant fight against enemies, the regime manages to undermine the mobilization potential of civil actors. We argued that the regime is dominant not only because of its better ability to mobilize material resources, but also because it creates a general environment of suspicion in which conditions for mobilization are heavily constrained. The regime attempts to undermine the legitimacy of its potential opponents – calling them enemies of the regime and the nation. To the extent the regime is succeeding the room for civil actors is shrinking radically, as they are now looked at with overwhelming suspicion that can paralyze, or at least seriously constrain, their opportunities. While much could be said about how the regime attempts to undermine the legitimacy of its opponents, in our paper we focused only on examining the way enemies are framed in Orbán’s speeches. As we expected, we found that internal and external enemies are linked, and that as time went by Orbán’s speeches became more radical/intense. In addition to this, we also identified three framing strategies used in the speeches: the strategy of ambiguity; making links to shared historical grievances; and making allusions to conspiracies against the nation. Furthermore, we were also surprised to see that Orbán’s early speeches were not so belligerent and even included a touch of self-criticism.

However, since 2010 much has changed in terms of the intensity of Orbán’s fight against its enemies, which reached a recent peak with the attack against George Soros and CEU, the university established in Hungary by Soros and the most important promoter of an ‘open society’ in Hungary. But what does Popper mean by open society? Reading Popper is inspiring, as the closed society he depicts seems to approximate the model Orbán envisions, and also because, as we highlighted earlier, Popper clearly pinpoints the fact that popular leaders tend to buttress their rule by initiating one war after the other.

According to Karl Popper, the main characteristic of an ‘open society’ is individualism. This means that citizens’ actions are driven by their own interests and wishes. This makes society an ever-changing place, with each individual trying to fulfil his or her ambition freely, remaining unsatisfied with the place allotted to them by the fate of being born into a particular type of family in a particular type of social setting.40

40 Orbán’s rigid system resonates in his practice of limiting social mobility – Hivatkozások, ha kell

In contrast to this ‘liberal’ concept of society, in a ‘closed society’ everybody knows their role within society, and also that ‘true happiness’ is nothing else but fulfilling that given role. Proponents of closed society ‘reduce people to mere cogs in an uncontrollable machine’ (Corvi, 2005: 52). Such a closed society need not be changed or developed since people are already in a state of ‘true happiness’. Such a society works on the analogy of an organism in which ‘there is no inherent tendency on the part of legs to become the brain’ (Popper, 1947: 153), and where ‘the institutions leave no room for personal responsibility’ (Popper, 1947: 152). This closed society is characterized by a state of tribalism in which there is no room for rational criticism, as society is built on unquestionable taboos.

In his book, Popper discusses Plato and his vision. He does not say that Plato had bad intentions. Popper firmly believes that Plato wanted to bring happiness to the people of Greece. However, he sought to do this by returning Greece to a state of tribalism (p. 163). We cannot say whether Orbán’s and Plato’s visions collide, or whether the former reads the latter. Nevertheless, Popper’s insight seems to be correct: a popular leader following such a path would constantly need to identify newer enemies to buttress its regime.

—

"Orbán’s claims to national unity actually allow for such a reading: He states that strength lies in unity: ‘In the past four years, we performed better because we were united. We are today the most homogenous country in Europe.’ [http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/Orbán-viktor-unnepi-beszede]. Accessed: 01-09-2017."
References


LUCA KRISTÓF *

Cultural Policy in an Illiberal State. A Case Study of Hungary after 2010

* [kristof.luca@tk.mta.hu] (Institute for Sociology, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

This work was supported by the Bolyai scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Abstract

In social sciences literature, numerous attempts have been made to capture the political essence and features of Hungary’s ‘illiberal’ regime but few were aimed at analyzing specific public policy fields in the illiberal democracy. This paper analyses the cultural policy of the Orbán regime, focusing on the role of ideology. A qualitative case study based on document analysis looks at the legitimizing function of post-communist traditionalism in a managed illiberal democracy (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). Governmental policy making in the field of culture is analyzed on two interrelated levels: (1) attempts to rewrite the cultural canon, and (2) institutional and financial changes. The results show that post-communist traditionalism serves as a discursive framework for the partial replacement of the cultural elite as well as the redistribution of cultural positions and resources, thus contributing to the creation of a new, loyal elite for the managed illiberal political system.

Keywords: Cultural Policy; Cultural Elite; Illiberalism; Post-communist Traditionalism; Hungary.
1. Introduction: illiberal democracy in Hungary?

Fared Zakaria in his famous article noted noticed already in the 1990s that, in contrast with Francis Fukuyama’s popular democratic teleology, countries that had recently undergone the process of democratization, did not turn into western type liberal democracies. Although these countries have institutionalized free and fair elections, they do not fulfil the criteria of rule of law, power sharing and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In consequence, the concepts of democracy and constitutional liberalism became more and more separated (Zakaria, 1997). However, at that time the label of illiberal democracy was reserved for countries like Argentina or Kazakhstan. Post-communist East-European countries were considered as ‘good students’ of democratization; and the most distinguished ones, like Hungary or Poland, were even forecast to reach the honored state of consolidated democracy (Higley and Lengyel, 2000).

After the millennium and the inclusive EU-enlargement in 2004 when 10 Eastern-European countries were admitted as member states of the European Union, less optimistic judgments were raised in and about the region, assuming a certain ‘backsliding’ and the ‘death of the liberal consensus’ (Krastev, 2007). At that time, the credit of being the ‘illiberal capital of the region’ was attributed to Poland under the first government of the Kaczyński brothers. However, after the fall of the Hungarian social democrat-liberal coalition and the victory of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz gaining a two-thirds majority in 2010, this dubious glory went to Hungary. Since then, a renewed interest in political science has turned towards Hungary and a growing body of literature analyses the essence and features of the ‘new Hungarian regime’.

The Orbán regime has been labelled, inter alia, populist democracy (Pappas, 2014), broken democracy (Bozóki, 2015), elected autocracy (Ágh, 2015), and mafia state (Magyar, 2013). Recently, Bozóki and Hegedűs have provided a comprehensive review of Hungarian literature and the state of debate about the Orbán regime (Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2017). They state that by now it is most commonly categorized as a hybrid regime, although some of the most influential authors do not share this view.

One of the sharpest critiques came from János Kornai, who sees Hungary’s latest political changes as a U-turn: a systematic destruction of democracy. In his analysis, he describes the processes of centralization and nationalization as ‘thousands of discrete changes moving to the same direction: to autocracy’ (Kornai, 2015). In the meantime, he admits that in spite of governmental attempts to limit cultural pluralism, intellectual life is thriving in Hungary.

Steady critics target the weakening of the rule of law (Bugaric, 2016) with retroactive legislation and occasional amendments of the constitution. The legitimacy of the new Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 is also controversial (Arató, 2012; Jakab and Körössényi, 2012; Majtényi and Szabó, 2011; Tóth, 2012). According to the analysis of András Körössényi, the most important characteristics of the Orbán-regime are the strong, unipersonal centralization of power, the strong claim to legitimacy, anti-pluralist and populist political visions, and the claim to ideological hegemony. The result of these features are new and autocratic elements in governance, even if the regime itself is not an autocracy because it still passes the polyarchy test proposed by
Dahl (Körösényi, 2015). Autocratic tendencies in Hungary are often compared to Putin’s regime in Russia. The most elaborated argumentation of the Putin-Orbán parallel is Ivan Szelényi’s concept of managed illiberal democratic capitalism (Szelényi, 2015; Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). Szelényi argues that in spite of their illiberal tendencies, these two regimes are still democracies given that their government has a mandate gained through elections. Though the free and fair nature of the elections is questionable, especially in Russia, elected leaders are still widely popular.

János Kis, on the contrary, argues that illiberal democracy is not a democracy anymore because it is legitimated only by the political majority, with the minority being marginalized (Kis, 2014). Somewhat similarly, Halmai argues that the regime is hybrid because even its institutional structure is not democratic (Halmai, 2014). Bozóki calls it ‘liberal autocracy’; an autocracy that respects some of the human rights (Bozóki, 2016). Bozóki and Hegedűs finally conclude that since 2014 at the latest, the Orbán regime is not a democracy but a centralized, personalized, illiberal, and antidemocratic hybrid (Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2017).

There is no concordance in political science literature whether the Orbán regime has a clear ideological orientation in the sense of a coherent vision of the good society (Downs, 1957). In a recent paper, Szikra grouped scholarly standpoints into three categories (Szikra, 2017). According to the first line of argument, political actions of the Orbán administration have no particular ideological orientation, but are driven by the pure interest of the ruling elite. This is the concept of ‘the mafia state’ (Magyar, 2013). According to the second approach, ideology is important but far from being coherent. Rather, a ‘bricolage’ method can be observed (Körösényi, 2015; Szikra, 2014). The third account is one of ideology-driven policy making (Mike, 2014; Csillag and Szelényi, 2015).

According to the concept of Csillag and Szelényi, the popular ideology of post-communist traditionalism/neoconservatism serves to legitimize the system of managed illiberal democratic capitalism. Post-communist traditionalism has its conservative elements such as ‘patria, church and the (traditional) family’. However, this Eastern European type of traditionalism cannot be regarded as a classical conservative ideology since it embraces etatism and does not fully respect individual liberties. The main characteristics of this ideology are the following: 1) socially conservative, 2) populist in the sense that it inspires social movements (culture wars) around socially conservative issues (like anti-LGBT), 3) differentiating between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor, 4) anti-immigration and generally opposing affirmative action, and 5) patriotic and religious (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). While the authors elaborate their concept mostly with regard to Putin’s Russia and Orbán’s Hungary, they note that actually the whole post-communist CEE region has proven to be receptive to this ideology: they mention, inter alia, Mečiar, Fico, Băsescu, Babiš, Lukashenko and Yanukovych. At the time of writing the article, in 2017, Poland under the Szydło-Kaczyński government is the most striking case of post-communist traditionalism.

1 Interestingly, while post-communist traditionalism is strongly anti-communist in its rhetoric, it sometimes refers to social phenomena typical of the Kádár era as ‘traditional’ (Dupcsik, 2012).
having become infamous for its planned but failed abortion ban (Bielinska-
Kowalewska, 2017; Korolczuk, 2017).²

2. Cultural policy in the Orbán regime: context and criticism

The aim of my paper is to analyze the cultural policy of the Orbán regime with
the help of the concept of post-communist traditionalism. In my analysis, I focus on
cultural policy understood as government efforts to subsidize and control the arts.
Since 2010, the ruling political elite has reallocated property rights, as well as public
and EU funds to new loyal economic elites who are much more closely controlled by
them (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). In the field of culture, a similar process may be
observed: the incumbent political elite aspires to the redistribution of cultural
positions and resources.

According to its definition in public policy analysis, cultural policy emerges
when agents of the political system intervene with the production, distribution and
consumption of cultural products, services and experiences. Cultural policy then
expresses a relationship between a political system and the cultural field (Vestheim,
2012a). In other words, cultural policy is an overlapping zone between the fields of
culture and politics (Vestheim, 2012b), which is structurally conflict-ridden because of
the different logic and interests of the two fields. In the cultural policy making process,
agents of the two fields negotiate the level and form of public support to different
areas of the cultural field. A variety of cultural policy models were first described by
Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989).³ In
their typology, Hungary (like most EU countries) fits into the architect model in which
an intervening state actively supports cultural production.

Discussing the relationship between cultural policy and the political system,
Gray emphasizes the impact of different forms of democratic arrangements on
cultural policy (Gray, 2012). Direct, representative and deliberative democracies are
each associated with different types of cultural policies. According to this terminology,
the Hungarian case could be classified as belonging to the ‘democratic elitist’
paradigm (Schumpeter, 1976). In this model, access and mass cultural participation is
hardly emphasized. On the contrary, by providing forms of institutional autonomy for
key actors, competing elite groups establish a situation where particular forms of
expertise are seen as the basis for making policy choices, and the lack of this expertise
disqualifies the masses (Gray, 2012: 512). This type of cultural policy model operates

² There is already some empirical evidence supporting the concept of ideologically driven policy making
in Hungary as well: Szikra, in her analysis on Hungarian social policy, carefully showed that post-
communist traditionalism is indeed present in public policy making, especially in the case of family
policy, although the restriction of abortion law has never emerged (Szikra, 2017).
³ Their typology included 1) the facilitator, i.e. a restricted state that leaves culture to the market and
private charity (e.g. the USA); 2) the patron state that plays the role of a rich Seigneur, supporting culture
and the arts for their own sake (Great Britain); 3) the architect, i.e. the intervening state, which, with
policy programmes, infrastructure and financial means actively supports cultural production, distribution
and reception; and 4) the engineer type of state that is associated with non-democratic political systems.
Many European states today represent a mixture of the facilitator and the architect models (Vestheim,
2012a). East European countries during the transition period shifted from the engineer to the architect,
or in the case of ex-Soviet countries, to the facilitator type (Rindzevičiūtė, 2012).
through arm’s length governmental organizations or quangos, and through forms of governance arrangements.

The Hungarian language does not distinguish between policy and politics. The expression ‘kultúrpolitika’ (cultural policy or politics) was associated with the ideological and political control and censorship of state socialism. Consequently, after the democratic transition, the term acquired negative connotations and the autonomy of culture was emphasized by all cultural and political actors (T. Kiss, 2015). However, it was also obvious that financial support of the state would remain indispensable (Marsovszky, 2003; Kiss, 2015). The solution included the foundation of formally autonomous arm’s length organizations, such as the National Cultural Fund. Nevertheless, each and every government has been accused by their political rivals of favoring their ideologically friendly cultural actors.

As for the context of the cultural policy of the Orbán regime, it is important to note that Hungarian society is deeply polarized politically and ideologically. Left and right self-identification is especially strong compared to the European average (Körösényi, 2013). Among the cultural elite, polarization is even stronger, as educated groups in general and intellectuals in particular are more involved in political participation and public debates than other social groups (Kristóf, 2011). ‘Culture wars’ (Kulturkampf) have been prevalent phenomena after the collapse of the Kádár regime in 1989. In contrast to the political elite, the cultural elite was not affected significantly by the regime change; most of its members ‘survived’ the transformation period (Kristóf, 2012; Szélényi et al., 1995). Consequently, two parallel narratives used to dominate Hungarian intellectual life (Kristóf, 2017): according to the left-liberal view, the recruitment of the late communist period’s cultural elite was primarily meritocratic, and cultural canons established in the transition period are culturally legitimate. According to right-wing intellectuals, leftist hegemony or dominance in culture is the product of 40 years of discretionary adverse selection, and even after the regime change conservative and nationalistic views remained unfairly repressed by the post-communist elite. Attempts to balance this perceived unfairness included mediawars and the creation of alternative cultural awards.4

The electoral failure of his first administration in 2002 was attributed by Viktor Orbán to the strength of the surviving post-communist elite. In the next decade, he was continuously working towards strengthening the economic and cultural embeddedness of his party. Every year, Orbán gathered his loyal intellectual and economic elite to an exclusive meeting in the countryside, in the village of Kötcse. Beyond networking and teambuilding, the highlight of these meetings has always been a speech by Viktor Orbán. In 2009 – already certain of winning the upcoming elections – he explained his thoughts on ‘culture’s future role’ to people who were going to be in important political positions in the coming years. In the absence of an official, written cultural policy program, this speech used to be the basis for the analysis of Orbán’s principles on cultural policy. Here, he described the function of cultural policy as creating and maintaining the political community. Thus, culture is not a distinct sphere separated from politics. According to the future prime minister, the evaluation of the cultural elite (especially in Eastern Europe) is always based on its

4 For example, an alternative version of the highest artistic state award (the Kossuth Award) was created for right-wing artists who were not appreciated by social-democratic governments.

INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 126-147.
political rather than cultural achievements, because cultural achievement is always a matter of debate and there are no universal standards to measure it. In the meantime, these debates on values should stay within the narrow circle of the elite and not go public. In the public sphere, politics should be defined by a central field of force not divided by value debates but ‘naturally’ representing national values. As it happened, Fidesz won the next elections by a two-third majority and got a second chance to realize its public policy vision.

Already the first Orbán government between 1998 and 2002 was heavily attacked for threatening the autonomy of the cultural field (Marsovszky, 2003). After 2010, the government’s cultural policy was interpreted by its critics as an attempt at political homogenization and a radical elite change (Bajomi-Lázár et al., 2013). Arguably, this political programme regards the notion of culture as exclusive, normative and having an ideological function. In an influential collection of critical essays (Magyar, 2013), using the post-communist mafia state concept, Bozóki summarized the main characteristics of the cultural policy of the Orbán regime in six points: 1) concentration of power and centralization, 2) limitation of self-government, 3) state capture; 4) delegation of tasks to the political clientele, 5) aspiration to the homogenization of culture, and 6) relying on the method of ‘punish and discipline’ (Bozóki, 2013). A more sympathetic analysis (Pápay, 2014) questions the aspiration of elite change and argues that cultural policy under the second Orbán government lacks a strong conception. Pápay emphasizes the plurality of power centers within the government, and the heterogeneity of cultural policy making as a consequence of responsive politics. In this framework, the most criticized actions are only symbolic gestures for conservative voters (Pápay, 2014). In a case study on theatre, I empirically demonstrated the process and consequences of elite change in one cultural field at least (Kristóf, 2017).

3. Analysis

Analyzing cultural policy, Vestheim points to four dimensions that are important to consider: 1) aims, norms and ideologies; 2) institutional structures, agents and interests; 3) access and participation; and 4) distribution of economic resources. Beyond explicit cultural policies, he also emphasizes the importance of ‘implicit’ cultural policies that represent a ‘hidden’ ideology that legitimizes power structures outside and inside the political system (Vestheim, 2012a: 496).

In my present analysis, I focus on the first point above, including ‘hidden’ ideology, but also examine its effect on the second and the fourth points. I analyze the cultural policy of the Orbán regime on two interrelated levels: 1) attempts to alter the cultural canon (i.e. the body of work that is considered to be most important for the national culture) and (2) institutional and financial changes. Focusing on the discursive elements of governance (Hall, 1993; Korkut et al., 2016), I try to detect whether there is an ideological drive behind the actions of the government aimed at changing existing cultural structures.

\[\text{See: http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2010-02-17/meg337rizni-a-letezes-magyar-min337seget/}\]
In my analysis, I follow an explorative qualitative case study research design (Yin, 2009). It is a single-case study; I examine the cultural policy of the Hungarian government and do not compare it explicitly with other country cases. However, the implicit cross-case analysis behind my study might be a comparison to the cultural policy of other EU member states that presumably do not display post-communist traditionalism (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). Methodologically speaking, Hungary has been selected as a deviant case within the European Union for my analysis. Within the category of single-case design, the type of my research is an embedded single-case study, in which I study cultural policy through multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009). The rationale of selecting the units of analysis was the following: I applied a mixed method research design. First, I collected the publicly accessible documents on the explicit and implicit cultural policy of the two Orbán governments between 2010 and 2016, focusing on art policy, and excluding broadly understood cultural fields such as cultural heritage or sport. The core texts of the analysis from the government’s part are the speech at Kötcse’ and the National Avowal. I also examined the regular cultural policy analyses of the government think-tank Századvég. I supplemented this document analysis with a secondary analysis of media interviews with cultural political representatives of the government between 2010 and 2016. As a second step, all the documents were collected and coded using Maxqda content analysis software. The logic of coding was looking for the elements of post-communist traditionalism (listed in the Introduction) in the texts. Certainly, not all the elements listed by Csillag and Szelényi were relevant for cultural policy making. Issues of immigration or the ‘undeserving poor’ were hardly related to cultural policy issues. But elements of social conservatism and culture wars against liberalism; anti-LGBT and anti-Semitism, patriotism and religiousness were frequently identified and coded. In the following section I analyze those actions of the government as analytic units, where, according to the results of the qualitative content analysis, post-communist traditionalism, the ideology of illiberalism, provided a discursive framework for policy making. These actions could be categorized into two groups: two of them (illustrations for the Fundamental Law and the National Library series) affected the cultural canon, while the other three (power delegation to the Hungarian Academy of Arts, and changes of directors at the National Theatre and the New Theatre) were more concrete, altering institutional or even financial structures. After exploring the analytical units, in the discussion I try to bring together the traditionalist elements of the cultural policy of the Orbán-governments and answer my research question.

---

* An analysis of media policy, though closely related to cultural policy, is also beyond the scope of my paper. It has already been analyzed in the frame of party colonization (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013), while a systematic analysis of reallocated property rights is still lacking.

† This document was dated from 2009; but later documents referred to it so frequently that it was soon revealed as a core text, so I included it in the analysis (logically it also belongs to post-2010 cultural policy, as it sets the trends).
3.1 Attempts at rewriting the canon

One of the widely recognized characteristics of the Orbán government is a strong claim to ideological legitimacy. The new Hungarian constitution of 2011 begins with a preamble entitled National Avowal, which contains many allusions to Christianity and national pride. For the popularization of the new Fundamental Law, a well-known Orbán-supporting intellectual and stage director Imre Kerényi was appointed as ‘deputy of the prime minister responsible for laying the foundations of reflective national constitutional thinking and for performing the duties linked to the preservation and development of cultural values.’ This long and entangled title has been a good target for irony in the Hungarian media, though, after a while, Kerényi has been commonly referred simply as the ‘deputy of symbolic issues’. With his appointment, a new position in cultural policy was created; the deputy of the prime minister was an outsider in the formal ministerial structure, his bureaucratic ranking is similar to a state secretary, but he is responsible only to the prime minister.

Kerényi’s first activity was to set up the ‘Tables of the Fundamental Law’ in public offices. These were solemn places where ceremonial copies of the new Fundamental Law were placed so that anyone could freely study them. His second idea – more specifically linked to cultural policy – was to commission paintings from contemporary artists on the most important events of Hungarian history from the last 150 years. The paintings were ordered as illustrations to the new Fundamental Law and were presented in a road-show across the country. The large figurative pictures covered, among others, World War I, the Holocaust, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and also some more recent political events, such as the police attack on peaceful protesters in 2006. The last piece of the series was titled ‘A New Constitution is Born’. The first reaction of art historians was to criticize the anachronism of commissioning historical paintings in the 21st century. Secondly, the aesthetic value of some of the paintings was contested. Another cause for criticism was the price paid by the government, much above market price. Beyond these, the selection of historical events was also questioned; especially if the police attack in 2006 can be paralleled to the counter-Soviet Revolution of 1956. In the case of this painting, questionable subject and questionable aesthetic value were brought together. As a reaction to critics, Kerényi admitted that the goal of this project was to challenge the existing canon, and he attributed the attacks to this challenge:

Here we can find a logically constructed, powerful system, where chain link after chain link is realized, certainly you don’t like it, because this is not the left-liberal canon.

1 http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf
2 After a year, the project was declared to be very successful and the ministerial order was repealed.
3 "The memory politics of the Orbán government are beyond the scope of this paper, here I am confined only to their visual representation in the painting series. One very controversial example is the monument erected by the Orbán administration, the German Occupation Memorial in Budapest, Szabadság Square, see: http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/controversial-monument-divides-hungarians-angers-jewish-community.
5 http://www.atv.hu/belfold/20111109_kerenyi_imre
The canon-rewriting program of the government was not restricted to the sphere of visual arts. The next project – initiated by Viktor Orbán and implemented by the deputy of symbolic issues – was the book series called National Library, a government-funded new edition of Hungarian classics. The criteria of the selection were, again, the rewriting of the existing cultural canon. As Kerényi put it even more explicitly:

The canon of the national right should be strengthened, against the left-liberal canon that had hegemony for over 61 years. That is why the help of the state is needed here. Every considerable political regime tried to represent itself in buildings, founding newspapers and television channels. Political regimes have a demand to represent. This could not be left to a private publishing house.

First, the Organization of Publishers criticized the project for its intervention into the publishing market. More serious critics targeted copyright issues: in some cases, literary property was unsettled, so several volumes of the National Library proved to be pirate editions. Kerényi attributed these problems to the hurriedness of the project and promised to settle copyright. In one case, he was unsuccessful, which resulted in dropping an important author from the series.

By now, 48 volumes of the National Library series have been published and about the same number are planned. Most of the books are unquestionable Hungarian classics. However, unlike in the case of the painting series, where the piece on Holocaust was painted by the reputed painter László Gyémánt, whose realization was completely mainstream and up to international Holocaust memory standards, the opening volume of the National Library was a saga by the controversial writer, Cecile Tormay, The Old House (written in 1914). Kerényi declared this choice as a symbolic act; the rehabilitation of the writer. Tormay was a popular and reputed writer of her time (even nominated for the Nobel Prize in the 1930s), but after WW II she was deleted from the literary canon because of her strong rightist orientation, irredentism and open antisemitism. After the collapse of communism, she was still not presentable. While other artists who were prohibited in the communist period as authors of ‘bourgeois literature’, like Sándor Márai, were re-added to the canon, Tormay, though republished, remained sub-cultural. It was only after the millennium, that she was rediscovered and – despite her known lesbian orientation – became an icon for the right-wing political community.

Nevertheless, The Old House is another book of hers, not the most famous and infamously anti-Semitic An Outlaw’s Diary. Imre Kerényi assured the press that he was not planning to publish the Diary in the National Library series.

The canon-rewriting activities of the government were clearly intended to provoke culture wars. Besides the cultural legitimization of the government’s political aims, the goal was also to challenge the existing interpretations of historical and literary canon. The cult of radical nationalist authors (many of them writing extensively on the

---

13 http://index.hu/belfold/2013/03/06/kerenyi_imre_a_farao_megbudasara_dolgozik/
14 Besides Tormay, other two ‘national radical’ authors, Albert Wass and József Nyírő played similar roles in the struggles around the literary canon: their inclusion in the school curriculum provoked intensive debates (see for example http://www.hetek.hu/belfold/201206/irodalmi_kanon_leporoljak). One author of this radical nationalist ‘triad’, Albert Wass, has been widely popular among readers already since the 1990s in his own right, without government efforts.

INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 126-147.
Trianon trauma) contributes to the patriotic-nationalist character of post-communist traditionalism.

However, the anti-Semitic character of the same authors is rather uncomfortable for the cultural government. Anti-Semitism is an element of the contra-minorities agenda that is most relevant in the Hungarian cultural discourse but least tolerated in the Hungarian public sphere (anti-immigrant and anti-Roma views are more mainstream). Accordingly, open anti-Semitism is not accepted by the government. Viktor Orbán himself declared zero tolerance against it on several occasions. Imre Kertész, writer of the Nobel Prize winning Holocaust memoir Fatelessness, was awarded with the highest Hungarian state order (Hungarian Order of St. Stephen) by the Orbán government. Director László Nemes Jeles was also immediately awarded by the government after his Holocaust-themed movie Son of Saul had won the Academy Award in the category of Best Foreign Language Film in 2016.

3.2 Institutional and funding changes

Political patronage in Hungary is rather extensive, not only in the bureaucracy (Meyer-Sahling, 2008) but also in the economic and cultural sphere (Kristóf, 2015). After every change of government, many positions in culture are redistributed, not so much out of ideological motivation as in the interests of the political clientele (Kristóf, 2017). However, in the case of the Orbán governments, ideologically supported political patronage attempted to restructure the whole system. In this section, I present three actions of the government shaping cultural institutions. The first one, power delegation to the Hungarian Academy of Arts even affected the Hungarian constitution, and significantly restructured the system of state support for the arts. The second action concerns the single position of the director of the National Theatre, which is of outstanding symbolic importance. The third action (New Theatre) shows how political patronage trickles down to the local level and allows a mayor to interfere with the artistic repertoire of a theatre.

Article X of the new Fundamental Law, after declaring that ‘Hungary shall ensure the freedom of scientific research and artistic creation’, as a new element, designates two institutions: ‘Hungary shall protect the scientific and artistic freedom of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Academy of Arts.’ Although this is a fairly liberal principle, it still aroused widespread criticism. The object of criticism was the Hungarian Academy of Arts. Why has the appraisal of a social organization, founded ‘to facilitate the prevalence and protection of the values of Hungarian and universal culture, the respect of the traditions of Hungarian arts and the birth of new and significant artistic works’ been so controversial? To understand this, one needs to be familiar with the history of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

---

15 Kertész was widely criticised for accepting the award, while the government was accused of cynicism, hypocrisy, etc. (see for example: http://magyarnarancs.hu/aszert/provokacio-es-menlevel-91403/?orderdir=novewko).
16 http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf
The Academy of Sciences (founded in 1825) is the oldest and grandest cultural institution in Hungary. Originally, it had an Aesthetics Subsection, but that was terminated by the Communist Party in 1949. After the fall of communism, reflecting the deep political-ideological division of the Hungarian cultural sphere, two Academies of Arts were formed in 1992, curiously both claiming anteriority. The Széchenyi Academy of Letters and Arts (SZALA) was founded as an institution affiliated with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The Hungarian Academy of Arts (HAA) was created as an independent social organization. SZALA did not officially identify with any worldview but was perceived as an association of liberal artists. By contrast, HAA proudly declared its ‘national commitment’ and conservative views. Double membership in the two organizations was never prohibited and still exists. However, HAA also expects national commitment and public activity from its members, beyond cultural achievement.

The founding president of HAA, architect Imre Makovecz had a significant reputation as a right-wing public intellectual. When Viktor Orbán (a liberal politician between 1989 and 1994) made his conservative turn, Makovecz played an important role among right-wing intellectuals to make Orbán accepted as the political leader of the right. He died in 2011 but his Academy got into the new Hungarian constitution and the succeeding president of HAA, interior designer György Fekete (belonging to the same generation as Makovecz, but much less widely-known and reputed) became one of the most influential actors in cultural policy.

Before 2011, the two Academies of Arts served only as reputational institutions: it was an honor to get into them but membership hardly meant more than symbolic resources. Moreover, their activities were not widely known by the public. However, constitutional recognition foreshadowed the increasing significance of HAA. Before long, it turned out that the government would like to delegate state functions to this cultural organization, re-established as an autonomous public body. To these delegated functions, the government assigned generous financial resources (see Table 1) and allocated a moderate (but yearly increasing) life-annuity for its Fellows.

---

18 Unlike in the Academy of Sciences, where full membership of the Academy includes a high life-annuity.
Table 1. State support for the HAA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Support (euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>330 thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>8.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>17.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>22 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Magyar Narancs

The first activity of the newly empowered HAA was the takeover of the Műcsarnok (Kunsthalle), the largest institution in Budapest designed for the exhibition of contemporary art. In the context of this takeover, HAA president György Fekete exposed his views on art and culture to the media, provoking indignation on the political left and criticism on the right as well. In a famous interview, Fekete declared that he did not believe in democracy and would not allow the exhibition of anti-clerical artwork in state-run institutions:

There must not be blasphemy in state-run institutions. [...] I don’t give a damn about this modern democracy, for it’s not modern and it’s not democracy. It’s not democracy, because it wants to put minority power over majority power. This is not democracy – it is anti-democracy. And in this, fascism, communism, this kind of liberalism – which I call ‘pseudo-liberalism’ I cannot take this into consideration.

The director of Műcsarnok – previously appointed by and loyal to the Orbán administration – resigned in response to the takeover by HAA. Left and right-wing artists together signed a manifesto to express solidarity with him, while Fekete, based on previous criticism coming from the churches, labelled him as a liberal.

The figure of György Fekete rapidly became a symbol of all the government’s allegedly anti-liberal and traditionalist cultural views. After his authoritative public statements on Christian and national values in culture, fears of attempts to cultural homogenization and even censorship were raised in the cultural sphere. However, Fekete is over 80 years now. His hardcore conservatism has not met with unanimous acknowledgement in right-wing intellectual circles either, not even at HAA. Some of

http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/megy-a-kukaba-95820


INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 126-147.
the most famous members (among others the internationally reputed opera singer Andrea Rost) protested by quitting the Academy. Still, Fekete completed his second term as president of the organization. At the time of writing this article he has already declared his resignation (in the autumn of 2017), and his successor, to be elected by the members of the Academy, is not known yet. In the past five years, in addition to valuable real estate in Budapest, HAA was given a say in the allocation of state funding via the National Cultural Fund (NCF) and it established numerous scholarships, awards and a research institute.

The restructuring of the National Cultural Fund concerned several fields of art. The NCF was founded in 1993 as an institution to facilitate the autonomy of culture. It is a state-run fund, financed by gambling taxes. The distribution of financial resources is based on a competitive basis, and therefore the question of who delegates the application reviewers is of key importance. Originally, half of the members of the review committees were delegated by cultural organizations, and the other half by the Ministry of Culture. In 2015, the delegation system was changed: one third of the delegates are now appointed by the Hungarian Academy of Arts, and the other two thirds are shared equally between cultural organizations and the ministry. The government argues that this shift is an expansion of cultural autonomy, since the cultural sphere now delegates two thirds of the committee members. However, cultural organizations strongly disagree with this decision, as they were not involved in it, and they regard HAA as an agent of the government.\footnote{On the protest letter of cultural organizations, see: \url{http://mno.hu/kulturpolitika/levelet-irtak-a-muveszek-a-lex-lekete-ellen-1313365}}

HAA also has influence over the distribution of state awards. The title \textit{Artist of the Nation}, the top state-funded artistic award in Hungary, is donated directly by the president of HAA. This award is intended for artists above 65 years for their life-work and accompanied by a life annuity amounting to 23 times the minimum pension. Seventy artists are allowed to hold the title simultaneously. Before the award was first distributed in 2013, guesses circulated in the media whether HAA would go on a ‘culture war’ and reward political loyalty rather than cultural achievement. However, the reception of the prize-list was rather positive. Though HAA rewarded a few of its own heroes and omitted some liberal icons like author Péter Nádas, film director Károly Makk, president of the rival art academy (SZALA), was among the recipients. Generally, the majority of the awards were distributed according to cultural achievement to artists who had nothing to do with politics or public intellectual activity.

Institutional changes were not restricted to delegating power to the Hungarian Academy of Arts. Theatre is a genre historically important for political power because of its direct effects and community experience. Moreover, unlike literature or other forms of art, theatre is controllable to a degree without censorship through state funds and appointment policy. Hungary basically has a state-funded company-theatre structure. All the larger Hungarian cities have their own local theatres with a permanent local company and, of course, Budapest has several theatres. Theatres are owned by local municipalities that have the right to appoint directors (jointly with the Ministry of Human Resources). Given this structure, the appointment of directors has never been just a matter of professional standards. It has depended on the party
affiliations of local governments. Since Fidesz won the municipal elections in 2006, most of the country town theatre directors have been replaced.

Similarly to the two Academies of Arts, there are two Hungarian theatrical societies, and theatres can be members of one or both. The two organizations have very similar names: the older one is the Hungarian Theatre Society (Magyar Színházi Társaság), while the younger one - founded in 2008 as a ‘counter organization’ - is named Hungarian Theatrum Society (Magyar Teátrumi Társaság). Founding members of this new society distinguished themselves from the elite of their artistic field, who typically started their careers or even gained their positions in the communist period. They echoed Orbán’s political vision about a specifically national approach, the importance of traditions and community in contrast with individualism and liberalism in the cultural field. The society’s president, Attila Vidnyánszky, nicely summed up the ideas of post-communist traditionalism:

Every theatre in which many ideas are present has a right to exist. But for a long time, certain issues were handled as taboos and despised, such as patriotism, faithfulness, self-sacrifice, and devotion to God.22

Newcomer right-wing theatre directors were affiliated with the Hungarian Theatrum Society, which rapidly acquired influence in the sphere. They have a say in distributing NCF grants and have started to build up an educational center to counter the monopoly of the ‘liberal’ University of Theatre and Film Arts in Budapest.

In the Hungarian cultural sphere, the two most reputed institutional positions are the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the director of the National Theatre (Kristóf, 2014). While the former is elected by members of the Academy and is therefore no political appointee, the director of the National Theatre is appointed by the government and has always been a target of political debate as a symbolic position representing the traditions and values of Hungarian culture. Since the end of the 1990s, this debate has been even more heated, focusing on the design and location of the theatre building.23 Since 2008, the National Theatre was directed by Róbert Alföldi, a reputed actor-director, who was the target of heavy attacks in the Parliament by the far-right party Jobbik during his term because of his alleged homosexuality and the ‘lack of national commitment’ in his artistic concepts. MPs of the ruling Fidesz party rejected these attacks and the cultural government let the director complete his official mandate. However, he was replaced at the end of his term with Attila Vidnyánszky, founding president of Hungarian Theatrum Society. Vidnyánszky, too, was an internationally renowned director, whose appointment followed more or less the same process as Alföldi’s assignment (with the outcome of the competition being predetermined by the current government). Still, Alföldi’s theatre was very successful, in terms of both critical reception and ticket sales, and the appointment of a new director induced a big cultural scandal. Even a few foreign theatre companies (including e.g. the Viennese Burgtheater) made a stand for the

---

22 http://index.hu/kultur/2013/12/12/ezer_nezopont_kell/
23 The old building of the National Theatre was ruined by the communist government in the 1960s. After the regime change in 1989, every administration had its own concept on the design and the location of a new, representative building. The first Orbán-administration in 1998 stopped an ongoing construction initiated by the previous social-democrat government and built up another, architecturally very controversial building at another site.
displaced director, and domestic theatre audience queued up for tickets as a political demonstration. Through this process, Alföldi became an iconic figure and one of the most important leftist public intellectuals. In this case, culture war was not initiated by the government but it still broke out. Critics could then refer to it as evidence for their claim that the government’s cultural policy aimed at a radical elite change.

Besides the National Theatre, there was another director’s appointment that generated an international media reaction in 2011. György Dörner, an actor known for his far-right views, was appointed by Budapest mayor István Tarlós director of New Theatre, an otherwise rather insignificant downtown theatre in Budapest. The text of Dörner’s application was leaked on internet, and gained attention for its unusually sharp anti-liberal tone:

I would also change the name of the theatre (New Theatre) because it now creates some false assumptions. It implies that everything that is new is valuable at once, though this is not true. Things that are new just for saying that they are new, can be fake or retrograde, especially in this degenerate, morbid liberal hegemony. If the municipality agrees, I would change the name of the theatre to Hinterland Theatre. Hinterland signifies the Hungarian nation suffering under social-liberal yoke.24

The assignment of Dörner provoked extensive protest, especially because he planned to associate with former politician István Csurka, who was named in the application as the future intendant of the theatre. Csurka was a reputed dramatist in the communist period who, after the collapse of communism, founded the far-right, anti-Semitic Party of Hungarian Justice and Life in 1993. Although by 2011 his party was virtually non-existent, and Csurka did not play a part in Hungarian politics any more, his involvement made Dörner’s assignment an item on international media, and the mayor of Budapest had to explain himself (though he declared he would not do so). The mayor argued that he favored Dörner because the applicant focused on ‘classical Hungarian drama, in a classical setting’, one would say, a classical traditionalist priority. Nevertheless, when the new director wanted to open the season with Csurka’s anti-Semitic drama (The Sixth Coffin), the mayor expressed his objections. Although in principle the municipality as the owner of the theatre does not have the right to interfere with its artistic repertoire, the controversial play was eventually not presented. Moreover, contrary to the plans, Csúrka himself was unable to work in the theatre as he died in early 2012. After his death, New Theatre did not have any scandalous premieres. It went more mainstream in its repertoire, although it did present two of Csurka’s other (not anti-Semitic) plays. Later, the New Theatre got into the news once more by giving place to a Christian Theatre Festival, where Imre Kerényi, the deputy of symbolic affairs, spoke publicly in a panel discussion about the ‘lobby of faggots’ in theatre education.

If I were the vice-king, I would take away the right of teaching actors and all the money from the University of Theatre and Film Arts. […] A new road should be found, one should fight against this force. This is, actually, the lobby of fags... one should create performances and especially schools against this!25

---

24 http://színház.hu/images/2011/hir/oktober/7/dorner_gyorgypalyazata.pdf (The municipality did not agree to change the name of the theatre.)

25 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPRXCdFxWl8
Professors of the University of Theatre and Film Arts protested in open letters demanding Kerényi’s resignation. The Minister of Human Resources hurried to declare that Kerényi’s words were his private opinion. Apart from this statement, no apology was made from the government’s side. Kerényi remained in charge, though much less in the foreground than before. Traditionalist ideology can be interpreted as a tool for displacing members of the old elite. This seems to be true of theatre and, to some extent, the Hungarian Academy of Arts. Besides the National Theatre and New Theatre, many other new, politically loyal theatre directors were appointed by local governments with the help of the newly established Hungarian Theatrum Society. However, most of the new appointees, once in charge, did not turn to anti-liberal or markedly traditionalist artistic concepts (Kristóf, 2017).

**Discussion**

My research question was whether the cultural policy making of the Orbán government was driven by the ideology of post-communist traditionalism (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). The content analysis has shown that in several cases, elements of the concept appeared on an official level in cultural policy as a discursive framework. Given the logic of cultural wars, it is not surprising that government actions selected in my case study as representative of post-communist traditionalism have at the same time been the greatest cultural scandals of the period studied. Nevertheless, my findings do not imply that the state attains a coherent illiberal propaganda in Hungary. The government initiated many other actions in the field of cultural policy without any hint of illiberal ideology. Rather, a double structure can be observed: representatives of anti-liberal ideology are typically not professional party politicians but former members of the political clientele, recently entrusted with delegated power by the prime minister. While the ministerial structure is responsible for the general management of cultural issues and maintaining institutions, symbolic issues and ‘culture wars’, along with the challenge of constructing a new elite, are assigned to the prime minister’s own loyal intellectuals.

Among the elements of the anti-liberal half of this double-structured cultural strategy, many characteristics of Csillag and Szelényi’s post-communist traditionalism/conservatism could be found (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). First and foremost, the discourse of patriotism-nationalism penetrates all the actions of this cultural strategy. The book series National Library was designed for the reinforcement of nationalist authors within the literary canon. The Hungarian Academy of Arts explicitly claims that it expects ‘national commitment’ from its candidates. New appointees to theatre director posts emphasize the same. It is a crucial element, given Viktor Orbán’s views on the function of culture, creating and maintaining the political community. Secondly, religious allusions are also present. Anti-liberal actors are speaking against liberalism in the name of Christianity, when they object to blasphemy or refer to the Christian cultural tradition. Nationalism is strongly linked to this narrative; based on the claim that Hungary is a Christian country, values of Hungarian culture are regarded as products of the Christian tradition, and hence sacred. The concept of sanctity penetrates cultural discourse in assertions like ‘great Hungarian
dramas are sacred pieces’ or the claim that the building of the National Theatre should be consecrated. Another noticeable element is occasional anti-gayism. Traditionally, this is the territory of far-right movements, which is the case in Hungary. Unlike in Putin’s Russia, there is no state-supported anti-gay propaganda, and Budapest Gay Pride is organized every year, though always with a far-right counter-demonstration taking place. The far-right parliamentary party Jobbik targeted the sexual orientation of the director of National Theatre several times between 2010 and 2013, while MPs of the ruling Fidesz party rejected these attacks. However, at least in one case, a governmental deputy used anti-gay rhetoric (‘lobby of faggots’) for the justification of his claims on institutional change. The last and even more controversial ideological element is anti-Semitism. It is not present in governmental rhetoric in an explicit form. Rather, authors of Holocaust-themed pieces with international reputation, such as Kertész or Nemes Jeles, are highly honored. Meanwhile, in implicit cultural policy, the government’s tacit definition of anti-Semitism is not inclusive: the principle seems to be that cultural achievement is separable from objectionable views, and not anti-Semitic works of anti-Semitic authors can be included in the cultural canon in order to strengthen the radical nationalist tradition.

Nevertheless, despite that in some of its actions the Orbán government uses post-communist traditionalist ideology, shifts made by the government do not constitute a coherent ideology-driven cultural policy. The results of incoherent governmental actions show that the main aim of the government is not an ideological homogenization of culture but the weakening of old elite structures and institutions to favor its own loyal cultural elite. Thus, anti-liberal rhetoric serves to provide a narrative framework for governmental moves aimed at eliminating old cultural structures with the goal of redistributing cultural positions and resources. This goal is implemented by 1) attempts to rewrite the cultural canon, 2) the occupation of existing elite positions in the cultural field, and 3) the founding new cultural institutions and positions, thereby creating or strengthening parallel/alternative structures alongside the existing ones in the cultural field.

Nevertheless, the case presented shows that the results of these governmental attempts were controversial as the government tried and backed down several times. Canon rewriting is one of the most difficult policy tasks. If a government is unwilling or unable to use the means of censorship, as in the communist era, it might be easier to include new authors in the canon than to eliminate others, as happened in the case of the ‘radical nationalist triad’. The process of institution building was more successful, but the constraints here are somewhat similar. If the government does not eliminate rival cultural organizations or censor oppositional cultural products, its opportunities are limited to increasing support to its loyal supporters, as in the cases of HAA, the Hungarian Theatrum Society and the NCF, and cultural diversity endures. 

Another limitation for the Hungarian government was that administratively empowered cultural organizations remained very loyal but did not use their delegated power to homogenize culture or expurgate left-wing artists. György Fekete does not play the role of a ‘cultural commissar’ as it was feared, and Imre Kerényi took a back

---

* A counter-example is Erdogan’s illiberal Turkey, where direct intervention and censorship is forging ahead in cultural policy (Aksoy and Şeyben, 2015).
seat. New organizations, founded or strengthened as a gesture to a right-wing intellectual circle, principally served only as payoffs to the political clientele. Nevertheless, the narratives of the political sides did not get closer to each other. What is perceived as cultural homogenization by the left is understood by the new elite as a process of heterogenization or pluralization against ‘liberal hegemony’. In spite of this, and beyond their anti-liberal attitude, members of the new cultural elite mostly aspire to general acknowledgement in the cultural field, which makes them support and reward cultural achievement regardless of its ideological content, as it was shown in the case study.

Csillag and Szelényi regarded post-communist traditionalism as a popular ideology appealing to ordinary people and used by the political elite to gain the sympathy of potential voters. The lesson of the second and third turns of the Orbán government is that Prime Minister Orbán is very successful in this, indeed using traditionalist concepts like anti-immigration and images of common enemies of the nation in a virtuoso populist way. Nevertheless, in the case of cultural policy, this populist use of ideology would not really work, because it is only the elite and not the majority of voters that are interested in cultural issues such as the activity of Art Academies. Why, then, is cultural policy making still important for the study of illiberal democracies? My case study showed that the relevance of cultural policy making lies in the successful creation of a loyal cultural elite for a managed illiberal political system. This resource redistribution process required the legitimizing function of post-communist traditionalist ideology, but it did not cause any deep or expansive traditionalist turn in the cultural field itself. The central field of force in Hungarian culture, envisioned by Viktor Orbán in 2009, has been created since then in institutional and financial, rather than in ideological, terms.
References


Halmai, G. (2014) Az Illiberális Demokrácián Is Túl (Beyond Even Illiberal Democracy)? *Élet és Irodalom*, 58(36), September 5.


INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 3 (3): 126-147.


Book Review


There is an amazing collection of publications considering the democratisation of post-communist countries that present different aspects of this process in detail. The Central European University Press published a collection of eighteen articles on Central European intellectual history edited by Michal Kopeček and Piotr Wciślik. This book, however, is rather different from previous publications. It tries to explain the peculiarity of transitional and future-oriented politics of historical optimism in Central Europe. It presents how long-lasting regional willingness of emancipation clashed with social, economic and political conditions of transformations that had been deeply influenced by Soviet ideologies and understandings.

The volume is a study of political thought in-between the Communist pasts and the Liberal futures. It discusses political visions of states and societies under construction, still post-communist, post-socialist, post-Soviet or postcolonial, but not yet consolidated as liberal democracies based on human rights protection, free market economy and the rule of law. Therefore, as the editors state, the objective was ‘to understand the added value of an intellectual history of post-socialism’ (p. 2) – even if the aim is not innovative, it is valuable to consider how post-communism may be theorised in a wider context of modernisation (Silova, 2010). As a result, the book delivers an insight into the construction of transitional political mythologies in Central Europe, and also discusses the way in which interpretations of the past and imaginations of the future were inspiring the political visions of the transitional elites.

Although the editors claim that they focused on drawing a portrait of post-1989 intellectual history in Central Europe, the book seems also to have some other objectives. In the introduction, Kopeček and Wciślik (pp. 4-8) present their perspective on transitional studies that focuses on dependencies between academic narratives, social imagination and projected futures. They claim that theory-building in Central European social sciences was a politicised process of describing ‘what ought to be’ rather than empirical and evidence-based investigations of ‘the peculiarities of the social, cultural and intellectual context of the individual polities’ (p. 7). It is easy to agree with their observation. Their argument goes beyond this critique – they continue with a quite biased statement that political science was not able to deliver an explanation of the transition as it was committed to pro-democratic teleology. On the other hand, they believe that sociology and social anthropology ‘were by definition
more critical to the transition policies and ongoing social processes’ (p. 8), thus scholars were able to observe the changes in the social structure and ‘to capture, describe and analyse crucial contemporary social and cultural phenomena with the larger historical development’ (p. 9).

Kopeček and Wciślik’s perspective on transitional studies leads them to a delimitation of the main areas of post-communist intellectual history in Central Europe. They include a dichotomy between the winners and the losers of transformations, strategies of capitalism-building, the formation of new elites, identity politics and rewriting collective memories. They consider this list as unfinished, and they claim the authors’ task was to ‘show how political ideas worked in this environment and how they originated, migrated, transformed and behaved within the region’ (p. 11). It is intellectually refreshing that the book attempts to deconstruct basic assumptions of transitional studies, but for a political scientist, it is hard to agree that the democratisation can be discussed without a general context of its objective: the establishment of a consolidated democracy. I think that the editors paid too much attention to the post-communist component of Central European identities, while they did not notice that these transformations were mostly fueled by future-oriented and hope-driven politics of optimism that has been limited in the book to ‘the transfer of allegedly well-tested liberal democratic and market-based economic model from the West to the East’ (p. 16). As a result, the constructed mosaic of ideas, ideologies and paradigms is explained as a cultural response to post-communist conditions and implementation of Western-like political and economic standards, while a focus on the inventing of possible futures and politics of hoping is rather reduced.

It is clear that motivations behind Kopeček and Wciślik’s book are not limited to a description of political and intellectual debates in post-1989 Central Europe. The editors introduce their understanding of the post-socialist transitions that discusses the transfer of ideas in the long-term perspective and the broader sociocultural context of regional dynamism. The book’s ‘hidden’ objective is to prove that intellectual history, not political science, can discuss transitional ideologies in a purely academic manner – however, its methodological framework is rather blurred, and the structure of individual chapters is different; thus, it is impossible to judge, if the declared superiority of intellectual history is justified. In fact, I believe that the book has not proved that political science is a less academic way to investigate transformations in Central Europe – the presented chapters are rather descriptive portraits of various ideological traditions in post-communist countries and neither research design nor applied methodologies are presented to the reader. The publication is an amazing source to understand ideologies, paradigms and values behind transitional policies, but its explanatory value is low. In general, the authors focus on answering the question ‘what?’ and thus they fail to inform the reader ‘why?’’. Of course, I understand that the editors want to describe their publication as unique, innovative or
groundbreaking, yet, it increases expectations towards the publication, and in this case, the expectations do not match the book’s contents.

On the other hand, there are some clear values of Kopeček and Wciślík’s book. It is well-structured, what makes the intellectual portrait of post-communist Central Europe clear and complex. The editors grouped chapters in five sections – the first four consider major ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, populism and the left) and the last one discusses politics of memory, politicised remembrance and strategies of dealing with the past applied in the region. Of course, the structure might still be questioned. The editors do not explain why the authors do not discuss nationalism as a separate ideology or why the section on leftists integrates both post-communist left and new democratic movements. Quite more controversial is the inclusion of the last section on post-1989 politics of memory. I have to emphasise that, as a researcher of transitional remembrance policy-making, I highly appreciate these four pieces, but as a political scientist I cannot understand the reason why this topic is discussed, while other ‘thematic clusters’ such as the myth of European (re-)integration, civic society-building, imaginations of the national ‘Ideal Self’, strategies of transitional justice, transformations of social justice and visions of common Central European identity are not included. The only presented explanation of this limitation cannot be recognised as a convincing argument, as the editors express their opinion ‘that the thematic field of >>politics towards the past<< was worth signalling out due to its defining nature for the political cultures and thus also intellectual history of post-socialism’ (p. 20). I argue that ‘politics towards the future’ are even more significant to understand transitional politics. Moreover, all remembrance narratives might be considered as future-oriented because they are channels of an identity-building (Wawrzyński and Marszałek-Kawa, 2017: 114-116; Wawrzyński, 2017: 295-298).

Assessing the reviewed book is tough. I am sure that Michal Kopeček and Piotr Wciślík have delivered a valuable and informative publication that can be described as a complex guidebook to the intellectual landscape of post-communist Central Europe. It offers educated and detailed considerations of ideologies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and some introduction to debates in Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. It includes a complex analysis of the (re-)emergence of constitutionalism in Central Europe by Paul Blokker and two comparative chapters on the politics of memory, the first on the remembrance of communists by James Mark, Muriel Blaive, Adam Hudek, Anna Saunders and Stanisław Tyszka, and the second on a regional regime of remembrance by Zoltán Dujisin. These all are significant and unquestionable values of Kopeček and Wciślík’s book.

However, as I mentioned before, the publication also has some shortcomings. Firstly, it is fueled by a dislike of political science and a belief that intellectual history is a more academic way to explain political transitions. Secondly, it is based on a vision of democratisation as a sociopolitical process that does not include the context of its
general objective – an establishment of the consolidated democratic regime. Thirdly, it lacks comparative perspective as just a few of the chapters offer any cross-national evidence or discussion. Fourthly, it is not clear how the research design was achieved, e.g. why there is no analysis of the Romanian post-communist left or Polish populist movements or conservatism and nationalism in former Yugoslavian countries. Moreover, why does the section on politics of memory only discuss the cases of Hungary and Slovakia whereas dealing with the past were also highly important political issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Poland, Romania and Serbia? Finally, the book’s title is quite misleading. The editors claim that the book considers ‘East Central Europe’, but some parts of the region are not discussed at all – the authors do not address the intellectual history of post-Soviet countries (Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine), the ambiguous framework of Austrian politics after 1989, or other post-Yugoslav countries. It is clear that there is very little of the East in their delimitation of ‘East Central Europe’ (Halecki, 2000; Magocsi, 2002).

Even if there are some aspects in which the reviewed publication may be criticised, I recognise it as a very informative and valuable contribution. It should be suggested as the obligatory reading for courses on the ideological landscape of post-communist nations. I highly recommend it to all scholars and students interested in democratisation in Central Europe or transitional studies. I believe this well-edited and well-published book fills a significant gap in the international literature on the post-1989 intellectual history and post-socialism in general.

Dr Patryk Wawrzyński (p.wawrzynski@umk.pl)
Interdisciplinary Centre for Modern Technologies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

References


Book Review

Democratization within the EU


The role Eastern European countries play within the EU raises many concerns and became one of the hot topics of European studies. In certain periods it seems that many of these countries are open to abolish certain parts of the democratic systems they built after the fall of the iron curtain and tend to return to their previous authoritarian course. The question how to effect these changes in a positive way becomes especially crucial if we also think about the EU as a community of values. Moreover, if we interpret the development of European cooperation like a set of positive spillovers from areas like the single market to fields such as justice and home affairs (JHA) or fundamental rights, one could argue that a negative spillover could also occur. Certain renitent countries could amend the framework of European integration, block development or perhaps even reverse certain achievements. Some of this negative spillover already got started when the UK received ‘permission’ to amend its social provisions system regarding foreign workers, thereby harming the basic rules of the single market (Germany also started to introduce similar measures), and continues through Brexit. These actions together with the refugee crisis have put the EU related democratic dilemma and fields like JHA into the center of disputes again. If we add the slow backsliding of the democracy of some Eastern European states, we can easily understand that finding the proper answers to the anti-democratic actions of latter countries could be of elementary importance for the EU to survive as a community. Luca Tomini’s book tries to give some hints in this direction, and I believe it is a valuable contribution to the disputes surrounding this topic in Europe.

The book contains seven major chapters (Effective control and proper exercise of the executive power: between democratic consolidation and Europeanization; Democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe: domestic factors, paths and outcomes, The external influence on democracy of the European Union: strategies, tools and limits; Building democratic and accountable governments; Ensuring integrity: between political behavior and policy-making; Accountability and integrity: between national paths and European pressures; Conclusions). It is not clear why corruption received extra attention in a special chapter, while other (especially social) problems received far less.

Nevertheless, the book is an interesting attempt to summarize the actions of governments in certain countries of the region. It presents an analysis to the reader about the major changes of governance in some Eastern European countries (like Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia). This analysis can be very useful for readers who do not know too much about these countries, and want to have a basic sketch. The author invested effort in collecting the relevant data and connecting it to major authors of political science like the works of Linz and Stepan, Schedler, and Huntington. However, it is not clear which of these works are used later when the country analysis
is made, and what is the definition and content of democracy the author uses. Finding one would be important since one could argue that many forms of democracy may exist, and a majoritarian form also conforms to basic democratic principles. For example, he writes, PM Orbán is ‘transforming Hungary in a majoritarian direction toward a delegative democracy’ (P. 160.). I personally think Hungary is not a democracy any more, at least if we accept the definition of Linz and Steppan the author mentions in the book (‘...if freely elected executives infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies.’) (P. 11.) A clear model should have been introduced in the book to show those basic elements of democracy that we want Eastern European countries to respect. Some background theory for the ‘delegative democracy’ the author mentions in the book would also be very useful. Without this framework, many authoritarian governments could claim that what they do is a simple form of majoritarian democracy, and there is nothing to criticize in their actions.

Criticism regarding the country analyzes in the book could be separated into two main categories.

First, the scope of countries is not convincing (the book concentrates mostly on Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria). Hungary is missing from the analysis, and only receives a little attention in the last part of the book. It deserves far more attention as its government created the first electoral autocracy (Schedler, 2006) within the EU. Hungary serves as a ‘hub’ for anti-democratic ideas and it was able to achieve many changes that authoritarian regimes in other Eastern European countries could only wish to introduce. All of the major laws were replaced, thereby creating a palingenesis (re-birth) of its legal system. Elections got distorted, the Constitutional Court became a useless institution with nonsensical judgments, other institutions of checks and balances were also abolished, a large scale system of oligarchs was created (partly financed with several billion euros of EU funds, pushing out foreign companies), most of the media became biased, propaganda is pushed at an extreme scale and ethnic racism transformed itself into official school segregation and xenophobia against refugees, only to mention a few tenets of the regime. Other social and economic changes were also in line with these actions. Furthermore, it is also problematic that countries like Romania or Slovenia are missing, too.

Second, even regarding those countries that are mentioned in the book, analysis stays at the level of descriptive introduction into the main actions of these governments. Such books are very important as the European public does not know too much about these countries, but as a result of superficiality, it causes a lack of sincere, deeper questions, such as why these countries behave the way they do? Why do corrupt governments that harm the democratic framework receive public support? What are the economic and social patterns (not governmental elements) that push these countries into an authoritarian direction? One could have some concern whether countries that never had proper democracies were able to build their own democracy if basic elements of such a system are not supported by the population. The author cites charts that prove that in countries like Bulgaria or Slovakia people support democracy. What people understand as democracy in Eastern Europe is basically different from Western Europe, and it makes less sense to claim they want
democracy, if they support authoritarian parties, clearly racist policies, or do not understand the problematic nature of attacking the system of checks and balances. One could also ask what we can learn from history. Can we teach democracy at all? If we accept the claim of social constructionism that social institutions, including the government, are created by individuals and their interactions, does this mean that these countries will remain stuck in their own historical-cultural path, thereby recreating their mistakes in the future, or can they break out of this circle? What are the tools (see e.g. Snyder, 2017) they should use to break out of their bad historical habits? In order to answer these questions, one should read and use the works of domestic scholars written in local languages (otherwise, the analysis can only rely on the limited scope of the literature in English).

Turning to the role of the EU, the author mentions that the adoption of EU actions was not transparent and consistent. Moreover, he also mentions that the EU was unable to affect Eastern European countries after they joined. However, the analysis of these problems is not deep enough. It could be criticized from two main points.

First, one could ask whether there exists a core of EU values at all. The EU has its serious democratic problems, even apart from the democratic deficit extensively discussed in the scientific literature for decades (see Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002). In many cases, it does not act like an independent organization, but as a confederation of states. As a result of the Council’s strong role, Member States have an extremely strong position and they can block any achievement or sanctions against a country - especially, if they cooperate like the Visegrad Four countries do. Decisions and their reasoning are not transparent, serious inconsistencies exist in handling countries inside or outside the Union. Moreover, even some members/institutions of the EU political organization are defending the anti-democratic actions of certain countries. A good example of this is the role of the European People’s Party in defending the Hungarian government in the European Parliament. Political opportunism is also present at a country level, which sends fundamental rights, checks and balances and rule of law as EU values into a twilight. A good example for this is the EU-Turkey ‘deal’ on refugees concluded in 2016, which went against many provisions of EU law and international law, and intoxicated the EU legal system with demagoguery. Many of such examples could be cited, from the missing Article 7 Treaty on the European Union procedures to a Charter on Fundamental Rights, which can only be applied against EU institutions and EU law, but not against Member States. What pressure could we expect from an organization that is so inconsistently organized? The system of the EU gives a lot of free space for political maneuvers to countries, and to me it seems this system was built intentionally to do so.

Second, after finding the values to defend, it could be important to check how EU actions and sanctions should work. In this sense, one could overview the literature on pressuring states and applying sanctions in the theory of international relations. EU policy papers, strategic documents can be cited in scientific publications, but apart from the apologetic arguments we find in them, their content can be seriously questioned. Such soft laws may be useful for cooperative Member States, but not
against non-cooperative ones. In sum, it would be nice to have at least some tools and guidelines which could possibly have some better outcome than present policies.

Over all, I strongly agree with the authors’ view that the EU could do by far more to lead Eastern European countries into the proper path of democracy. But first, we have to set clear purposes and outline what we want to achieve with them, and then determine the tools the EU could use. None of these basic decisions are adopted in the present form of European cooperation, which can lead to serious uncertainties.

Tamás Dezső Ziegler (Ziegler.Dezso.Tamas@tk.mta.hu)

References


Book Review


The integration of immigrants into their host societies is one of the most salient and controversial issues in many Western countries. Both the European refugee crisis in 2015 and the American presidential elections in 2016 positioned the topic of immigration at the center of political and public discourse. Unfortunately, participants in these debates frequently lack factual evidence to support their claims and tend to base their reasoning on emotional grounds instead. Reliable data derived from scientific research is therefore strongly needed.

The report The Integration of Immigrants into American Society responds to this need by providing up-to-date research data regarding American society. It was written by a panel of established scholars and offers a concise summary of a wide range of aspects of immigrant integration, including its legal, spatial, civic, political, socioeconomic, and sociocultural dimensions. The authors organize the report around the historical, legal, economic, and institutional context of integration.

The analysis draws on multiple data sources, most importantly on administrative data and governmental and non-governmental surveys such as the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey (CPS). Additionally, the authors extensively review the literature regarding each topic, putting a fair amount of emphasis on qualitative studies as well (e.g. regarding the effects of legal status on integration). We find the inclusion of historical aspects into the analysis to be of special merit.

The report starts by examining the legal and institutional context of integration. The authors point out that legal frames, and immigration law in particular, significantly impact integration trajectories by creating varying degrees of stability and opportunities for immigrants. In the United States, there are three levels of legal framework (federal, state, and local) with different responsibilities, and often with conflicting interests. For instance, while there is no centralized immigrant integration system in the US, and the majority of integration services are delegated to the state level, the federal government maintains most control over immigrant entry and exit.

The legal status of immigrants (permanent, temporary, discretionary, and undocumented) has a significant impact on the patterns and depth of their integration through moderating access to employment opportunities, higher education, social services, and health care. Many individuals move through two or more of these statuses during their lifetime, or even within a few years. Undocumented status is a particularly dynamic and fluid category, as many immigrants start with this status, and even more find themselves with it at some point.

The effect of legal status on integration intersects with other social markers such as age, gender, and national origin. Gender is probably the most salient factor as the vast majority of deportees are males (over 90 per cent). As most of them are the sole...
earners in the household, their deportation increases the household’s risk of poverty. Furthermore, the spouses of many temporary workers are prevented from accessing employment, which disproportionately affects women.

In public discourse, undocumented immigrants are often conflated with Latinos, which leads to racial profiling and discrimination, creating further barriers to the integration of these particular groups. For instance, the report quotes recent research which found that 91 per cent of deportees came from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, while these nationals make up only 73 per cent of the undocumented population. As to generation, different age groups face different challenges. Undocumented young immigrants may be unable to obtain a driver’s license or formal identification documents, which greatly affects their social life and socialization into adulthood (e.g. by denying them access to adult establishments). Moreover, recent studies have shown that even US-born children with undocumented parents are challenged by lower levels of cognitive development, slower educational progress, and higher levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms than the native population. Additionally, due to the heightened fear of deportation, long-term effects also include a weaker sense of American identity.

According to the multiple surveys described in the report, the majority of immigrants want to become naturalized citizens. The requirement for naturalization is five years of residence as a lawful permanent resident (LPR). However, evidence suggests that in reality this may be a longer process. In 2013, the median new citizen had seven years of residence as a LPR before her nationalization. Regarding political representation, the report clearly demonstrates that foreign-born residents are seriously underrepresented at all levels of government.

An interesting feature of the analysis concerns the spatial dimension of integration (Chapter 5). While the metropolitan areas of traditional gateway states (e.g. New York, Texas, California) still remain significant targets for immigration, the post-1965 ‘new immigration’ trends show an increased orientation towards new states (e.g. Alabama, Nebraska, South Carolina), as well as towards rural areas; the latter especially in the case of Latin American immigrants. The positive outcome of leaving traditional enclaves – where cultural and institutional support is ensured – is exit from segregated areas and the discovery of new opportunities, indicating that ‘social and spatial mobility presumably go hand in hand’ (p. 209). However, the lack of institutional support and the higher probability of encountering anti-immigrant attitudes in the new destinations are among the risk factors.

While we find the chapter on spatial integration promising and high-quality, some concerns remain. First of all, it would have been fruitful to describe the spatial distribution and characteristics of economic integration at the level of distinct administrative units (e.g. state, metropolitan-suburban-rural area, neighborhood). Furthermore, more detailed historical analysis would have provided a more refined picture of the evolution of immigration and the transition between the pre- and the post-1965 periods. For instance, the ‘hyperselectivity’ of Asian immigrants (i.e. their highly educated and highly selective background) and the weak(est), even undocumented, position of Latin Americans could have been interpreted from the perspective of spatial selectivity – involving migration costs as well as (prior) interstate contacts (see Portes and Böröcz, 1989 or Sassen, 2006). Moreover, while the analysis
is detailed in terms of race and ethnicity, and sometimes even by country of origin, the host society in most cases is considered to be populated by ‘native-born, white non-Hispanics’, with little reference to the significant native-born African American population. Finally, concerning the shift towards new destinations, it is not detailed whether those who are settling down in such places have previously lived in traditional immigrant destinations, and thus whether internal chain-migration is preceding ‘continuous migration’ (Solien de Gonzalez, 1961), or whether these immigrants are newcomers, which would involve a change in the composition of new immigrants, as well as a change in the links to the networks of enclaves.

The report measures socioeconomic integration by educational attainment, employment, earnings, and poverty rate by origin and generation. In general, post-1965 immigrants have higher educational attainments than their predecessors. However, education level significantly diverges according to origin (Asia and Africa sending a relatively higher number of immigrants with high educational attainment, while Latin America and the Caribbean are the origin of more immigrants of low educational attainment). The quite open labor market of the US facilitates quick integration into employment, even among the least-educated immigrants, which indicates that employer demand for low-skilled labor is high. However, the earnings of recent migrants are lower than the earnings of the native-born population, even though they increase with length of residency. Moreover, there is an important potential barrier to earnings mobility, namely skin color discrimination. The report reviews earlier research using the New Immigrant Survey data which found that, after controlling for education, English-language proficiency, country of origin, occupation, family background, ethnicity and race, immigrants with the lightest skin color still earned 16 to 23 per cent more than those with the darkest. These results confirm the ‘racial/ethnic disadvantage model of assimilation’ (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Glazer, 1993); the fact that race and physically visible ethnic differences are barriers to economic upward mobility. This ethnic disadvantage model may have social and cultural consequences, such as an increase in the importance of bounded solidarity, ensuring favorable economic conditions within the disadvantaged ethnic group, but hindering assimilation and integration due to ‘Constraints on Freedom’ and ‘Leveling Pressures’ (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).

Sociocultural integration is also covered by the report. The two main components are the acceptance of immigrants by the host society, and the cultural assimilation of immigrants. Regarding acceptance, a Pew Research Center survey described in the report showed that in 2013, 52 per cent of Americans believed that newcomers from other countries strengthen American society. Regarding cultural assimilation, immigrants’ attitudes about political and social issues (e.g., political ideology, same-sex marriage) were similar to those of the native-born population. English language acquisition is also a key indicator of integration. However, four and a half per cent of households in the US were ‘linguistically isolated’; i.e. no adult member spoke English at a high level. The largest proportion of such households were inhabited by Asians and Pacific Islanders, followed by Spanish-speaking individuals. Religion is another important factor in integration, providing a way for many immigrants to become accepted in the United States. In some cases, religious groups facilitated the upward mobility of the second generation. The report also cites
extensive data to demonstrate that immigrants, on average, are less likely to commit crimes than natives. Although members of second and third generations have higher crime rates than those of the first generation (the ‘immigrant paradox’), the rate is still lower than amongst the native-born, and assimilated immigrants (the ‘assimilation paradox’).

Our most important concern is that the authors only focus on the host society regarding sociocultural integration, thereby neglecting the perspective of immigrants (see, for instance, Phinney et al., 2001, in which immigrants’ willingness to maintain their own culture and values was also measured). Moreover, changes in spatial integration are also neglected. In relation to embeddedness and movement to new destinations, in the case of chain-migration it is quite reasonable to assume that the constraints of ethnic social capital (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993) ‘push’ better-performing immigrants out from enclaves to new destinations.

The report also elaborates the marital status of immigrants and their household structure. Ethnic racial intermarriages can bring together the different social networks of spouses, as well as build bridges between cultures. The proportion of ethnoracial intermarriage increases from generation to generation among immigrants. New media and online sites are also contributing to the breakup of the traditional marital market and decreasing the distance between ethnic groups.

The panel experts also make some recommendations for future research and social policy. They suggest that the U.S. Bureau of Census collect data about the birthplace of parents and the legal status of immigrants in their surveys, and that Congress create a survey to examine the undocumented population (Chapter 10). They also underline the importance of further research – for instance, for evaluating the impact of job-training programs for immigrants (Chapter 3) and identifying the reasons for the lag in the naturalization process of LPRs (Chapter 4).

To sum up, the report focuses on a salient contemporary issue, and provides a concise overview of the most recent research findings. It demonstrates, among other things, that in opposition to mainstream political and public discourse, immigrants in the United States are, on average, as similarly qualified and employed as the native population, while the crime rate for this group is significantly lower than that of the latter, especially so in the case of first- and less well integrated second-generation immigrants. Nevertheless, there are huge gaps between different immigrant groups, some of them outperforming the native population according to several metrics (e.g. educational performance, qualifications), while other groups lag behind. This contrasts with the European situation, where immigrants, on average, are much less well qualified and employed than the native population. However, both the EU and the US face several similar problems regarding immigration, including skin-color discrimination as regards labor market opportunities and earnings (ethnic disadvantage), and the detrimental effects of temporary statuses on integration and cognitive development (fear of deportation).

One major merit of this report is that it covers a wide variety of relevant features of the process of integration, ranging from the legal context to educational attainment and spatial differences. It also provides a historical overview of trends and changes. Even though the report focuses on analyzing integration into American society, it will
be useful reading for European researchers and policy-makers alike, as well as for the wider public who are interested in the process of the integration of immigrants.

Ákos Bocskor (akos.bocskor@gmail.com)
Phd-student, Corvinus University of Budapest; Researcher, MTA TK “Lendület” Research Center for Educational and Network Studies

Márton Hunyadi (Hunyadi.Marton@tk.mta.hu)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Minority Studies

Dániel Vince (dani.vince@gmail.com)
PhD student at Corvinus University Budapest

References


Authors’ Biographies

Ákos Bocskor is a PhD-student in sociology at Corvinus University of Budapest Institute of Sociology and Social Policy and a Researcher at MTA TK “Lendület” Research Center for Educational and Network Studies. He holds a master’s degree in Sociology and in English Language and Literature. His research interests include sociology of education, interethnic relations, qualitative and mixed research methods and critical discourse analysis.

Manuela Caiani is Associate Professor at the Institute of Scienze Umane e Sociali at the Scuola Normale Superiore (SNS) of Florence. In April 2017 she got the ‘Italian Abilitazione’ for Full professor in Political Science and Political Sociology. Her research interests focus on: Europeanization and social movements, right wing extremism and populism in Europe and the USA, political mobilization and the Internet, qualitative methods of social research, political violence and terrorism. She has been involved in several international comparative research projects (FP4, FP5, FP7) and coordinated research units for individual projects and grants (PRIN Project 2016-2019; Marie Curie 2011-13, FP7-PEOPLE-2009-IEF, n° 252957; Research Grant Jubi laumsfonds, ONB, Oesterreichische National Bank, 2010-2012, project n. 14035; Post- Doctoral TRA Fellowship, START Center, 2009, University of Maryland; Funding Award, CNR-Italian Research Council, 2005). She published in, among others, the following journals: Mobilization, Acta Politica, European Union Politics, South European Society and Politics, RISP and for the following publishers: Oxford University press, Ashgate, Palgrave.

Márton Gerő is an assistant lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Lóránd University and a junior research fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Besides he is an external member of the MTA-ELTE Peripato Comparative Social Dynamcis Research Group. Márton's primary research interest includes civil society, social movements, political participation and the politics of enmification.

Milan Hrubeš is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Philosophical Faculty of the University of Hradec Králové and a researcher at Institute of Sociological Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. His research interests include political language analysis, framing analysis and political framing.

Bulcsú Hunyadi (MA) is senior political analyst at Political Capital, a policy research institute based in Budapest, Hungary. He is the coordinator of the institute’s research program focusing on right-wing extremism, populism and radicalism. His research area includes far-right and populist argumentation, radicalism prevention, and anti-Roma and anti-Semitic sentiments. He has co-authored various studies and analyses in relation to right-wing extremism. He studied history, sociology and international relations at Pázmány Péter Catholic University and Andrásy University Budapest, and participated in various scholarship and internship programmes in Germany and Austria (e.g. International Parliamentary Scholarships of the German Bundestag, Civic Education in Action by the Federal Agency for Civic Education and the Robert Bosch Stiftung, Germany). He has been working at Political Capital since 2007.
**Authors’ Biographies**

**Márton Hunyadi** is Junior Research Fellow at Hungarian Academy of Science Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Minority Studies, member of Karl Polanyi Research Center for Global Social Studies and PhD candidate at Doctoral school of Sociology Corvinus University of Budapest. His main research interests include colonial/postcolonial and post-socialist migration, ethnic competition and developmental hierarchies.

**Justyna Kajta**, PhD candidate in Sociology, at Institute of Sociology, University of Wrocław (Poland). Her research interests concern qualitative methodology, discourse analysis, social movements, nationalism, social and political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Her doctoral dissertation focuses on the identity of the participants of the Polish nationalist movement.

**Kostas Kanellopoulos** is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Crete and the General Secretary of the Hellenic Political Science Association. He has taught at the Higher Technological Institutes of Piraeus and Patras and at the University of Athens and the University of Crete. His work on social movements, urban riots, political parties and political claims analysis has appeared in journals like *Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination, Greek Sociological Review, Social Movement Studies, Journal of Civil Society*, and in collective volumes in Greece and abroad.

**Alena Kluknavska** is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Centre for Nonprofit Sector Research, Faculty of Economics and Administration, at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic. In her research, she focuses on the extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe and the role of civil society, the media and social movements within public sphere.

**Akos Kopper** is Head of Department of European Studies at ELTE University Budapest and Researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His research focuses on civil society, politics and visuality and the international relations of the Far East. Since 2016 he is co-editor of the *Journal of International Relations and Development*, the official journal of CEEISA (*Central and East European International Studies Association*). His works have appeared among others in *International Political Sociology, East European Politics, The Pacific Review* or in *International Studies Review*.

**Dániel Kovarek** is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Central European University (CEU). He was involved in research projects of Corvinus University of Budapest's Centre for Elite Research, ones of Columbia University, Waseda University, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and, most recently, in the CUPESSE (Cultural Pathways to Economic Self-Sufficiency and Entrepreneurship) project, in which he employed qualitative data from in-depth interviews to scrutinize inter-generational value transmission in Hungary. His current research interest mainly lies in voting behavior, settlement and regional level politics, applications of micro-level polling data, as well as approaches of measuring parties' ideological and issue positions.
Péter Krekó is a social psychologist and political scientist, and an adjunct professor at the Social Psychology Department of Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences. He is the executive director of Political Capital since 2011. During 2016-2017 he worked as a Fulbright Visiting Professor in the United States at the Central Eurasian Studies Department of Indiana University. He focuses on the Hungarian far-right, Russian 'soft power' and political populism and extremism in Europe. He is the member of the presidential board of the Hungarian Political Science Association. He was the co-chair of the PREVENT working group at the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), and is currently an expert member of the EU RAN Centre of Excellence. He wrote his PhD thesis on the social psychology of conspiracy theories and defended it in 2014.

Luca Kristóf, PhD is research fellow at the Institute for Sociology, Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her main research interests include elite studies, the sociology of culture and social stratification.

Jiří Navrátil is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University. His research focus is on the study of collective action, civic engagement and political networks. He has published in Democratization, Studies in Social Justice or Social Movement Studies.

Piotr P. Plucienniczak is a sociologist, independent social researcher, activist and artist, member of Rozdzielczość Chleba art collective. His research interests include social movements, historical sociology and popular contention. After studying new left movements and extreme right in Poland, he is currently investigating social unionism.

Pál Susánszky is a reacrch fellow at the MTA ELTE Peripato Social Dynamics Research Group, and a PhD candidate at the ELTE University, Budapest. His primary research interests are in political participation, political inequality and social movements.

Dániel Róna, PhD is a political analyst. He is an Assistant Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of Political Science. His research focus is on political sociology, public opinion polling, far-right parties and xenophobic attitudes. He wrote his doctoral dissertation about the European far-right parties and, in particular, about Jobbik. He is a research director of the Jewish organization Action and Protection Foundation. In 2013, he won the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship grant. He was a guest lecturer at the University College London in February 2016. He won the Premium Post-Doctoral Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy of Science in 2017. In 2017 the Hungarian Political Science Association awarded him the Aurél Kolnai prize (for the best political science publication of the previous year in Hungary).

Gergely Tóth, Ph.D., is a researcher at MTA ELTE Peripato Social Dynamics Research Group. Since 2013 he has been working as researcher at MTA ELTE Peripato Social Dynamics Research Group, which department belongs to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. As a co-researcher he is responsible for the implementation of sophisticated statistical analyzes and data collections.
Dániel Vince is a PhD student at Corvinus University Budapest, where he researches the educational inequalities among privileged and less privileged students. He holds an MA degree in ethnics and minority policy from Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest.

Dr Patryk Wawrzyński is a post-doc researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Modern Technologies of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń (Poland). Political scientist specialised in the role of emotions in political communication, remembrance policy and nonverbal communication. The co-author of Politics of Memory in Post-Authoritarian Transitions (Newcastle 2017).

Tamas Dezso Ziegler is research fellow at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and a senior lecturer of the Faculty of Social Sciences (European Studies Department), ELTE University. He is specialized in EU law, especially justice and home affairs, single market regulations and EU private international law. He has held numerous visiting positions, stayed among others at Bergen University (Norway), Institute for International Legal Studies (Rome), Free University Berlin, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (Hamburg), Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (Lausanne), Fordham University School of Law (NY), Columbia University (NY) and the University of Aberdeen (UK). In practice he has been working for OSCE ODIHR and Baker & McKenzie, among other major law firms. His recent works include Balázs Horváthy & Tamas Dezso Ziegler: Europeanisation Of The Hungarian Legal Order – From Convergence To Cancellation? In: Reviewing European Union Accession - Unexpected Results, Spillover Effects, and Externalities. (Ed. Tom Hashimo & Michael Rhimes). Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2017.