Abstract

The paper analyses young people’s interpretation of the past, evaluation of the present and political behaviour patterns based on semi-structured interviews (n=60) conducted in two contrasting constellations of modernization, Sopron and Ózd. First the perception of the most pressing social and political problems, second the potential of political and civic actions are compared. Finally an attempt is made to outline a “hopeless” and an “indifferent” idealtype of political culture. Together they create the opportunity for both the birth of antidemocratic tendencies and the space in which they can evolve. In this sense they provide the preconditions for “mainstreaming the extreme” that is the incubation of radicalism in Hungary.

Keywords: political culture, modernization, radicalism, Hungary.

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From the point of view of democratic principles, the Hungarian transition can hardly be called a success story. Not only has the nationalistic, intolerant, antidemocratic semantics of the far right become part of the mainstream political discourses (Feischmidt et al., 2014), but also the basic principles of the rule of law have been ignored by the government since 2010 (Tóth, 2012). Even though these two phenomena differ in many ways, they are both symptoms of a modernization failure that is the distortion of political culture in post-transition Hungary (Sik, 2011). Most attempts at explaining the emergence of radicalism – similarly to the international literature (Rydgren, 2007) – in Hungary focus on the pull and push factors of radical semantics (Barkóczi, 2010; Csepeli et al. 2010; Grajczár and Tóth, 2011; Karácsony and Róna, 2010; Szele, 2012), while being unaware of the contribution of the indifferent masses in the process of spreading radical semantics. Others consider both the radical and the apathetic political cultures (Szabó, 2012), however miss the chance of elaborating the link between the two. In order to outline a more comprehensive picture exploring the interference of radicalism and indifference, the horizon of analysis must be expanded by understanding radicalization in its relation to the various challenges of modernization.

This paper aims at revealing the mechanisms resulting in the various distortions of political culture from the perspective of the ambivalent Hungarian modernization. From this perspective the tendency of “mainstreaming the extreme” is understood as the consequence of the interaction of various modernization failures: beside the constellations resulting in despair and anger fuelling radical political culture, those patterns of modernization are also investigated, which lead to indifference enabling the spread of antidemocratic attitudes. The notion of political culture has been elaborated by Almond and Verba (1963) as the outcome of the process of political socialization including the formation of the knowledge about the political system, the attitudes toward it and the political behaviour patterns. This approach refers to a dynamic model of political culture focusing on those mechanisms, which reproduce citizens as political actors.

Since the beginning, research studies on political culture and political socialization have found themselves at the border of several academic fields. Sociology (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Percheron, 1993), political science (e.g. Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Dalton, 1996), psychology (e.g. Renhson, 1975) or social history (e.g. Sears and Valentino, 1997; Thomas, 1979) equally found their way to the interdisciplinary questions of political and civic formation. While such a heterogeneous conceptual tradition has the potential of comprehensively grasping the various factors of political formation, it also threatens theoretical inconsistency. In order to avoid this danger, the analysis is embedded in a meta-theoretical framework capable of mediating between various disciplines, namely the critical theories of modernization (Sik, 2014). The aim of critical theory, as introduced by the classics of the Frankfurt School, is the critical evaluation of social processes based on multidisciplinary empirical evidence from a transcendental normative basis (Horkheimer, 1976). From Marx to Habermas this meant the parallel analysis of the phenomenological and system level of modernization (Habermas, 1985). Since the first generation of the Frankfurt School, critical theories have not only paid special attention to the questions of radicalization (Adorno, 1950; Habermas, 1990), but also interpreted it as a “pathological”
consequence of the very processes of modernization (Horkheimer and Adorno, [1944] 1972; Habermas, 1985).

Following this approach, the transformation of Hungarian political culture since the transition is critically interpreted from a modernization theoretical point of view by analysing the political socialization processes of young people. In order to understand the processes of political socialization from the broader perspective of post-transition modernization, two contrasting locations were chosen, Ózd and Sopron, where idealtypical patterns of political culture could be explored. 30-30 semi-structured interviews (length: 60-90 minutes) were conducted with young people between 16-25 years of age mapping their perception of the social and political spheres. The interviews were used as empirical tools for elaborating “case studies” of Sopron and Ózd. While case study methodology is surrounded by many controversies (Flyvbjerg, 2006), it is capable of realizing the goals of an interpretative sociology relying on “idealtypes” in a Weberian sense, with up to date methodological rigor (Thomas, 2011).

The chosen towns have similar population sizes, while having inverse social histories throughout the 20th century. Sopron and Ózd, as ideal typical scenarios of Hungarian modernization, represent two contrasting frames of the individual processes of political socialization. In a certain sense the horizon of modernity differs in these two places, which determines not only the relation to the past, but also the relation to the present and the future as expressed in collective memory, political identity and behaviour patterns. Accordingly the interviews made in the two locations express two contrasting phenomenological horizons and two consequent semantic universes. Firstly the interviews were individually coded (with the help of qualitative data analysing software), then the different patterns of narrating social and political issues were compared in the two locations enabling the construction of idealtypical political cultures and the elaboration of a diagnosis of time in post-socialist Hungary.

The ambivalences of Hungarian modernization

From a critical theoretical point of view, modernization is a paradox process including emancipatory tendencies and pathological potentials at the same time. In what follows, out of many theoretical perspectives, Habermas’, Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s diagnoses are taken into consideration (Sik, 2014). The pattern of actualized emancipatory and pathological potentials in Central European countries is affected by specific local factors. In what follows, some relevant diagnoses about the periods of nation building, state socialism and post-socialism are taken into consideration (Sik, 2015b). The

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2 On the one hand the two towns have similar population sizes (30,000), function (micro-regional centres) and position (both far from Budapest, the economic and cultural centre of Hungary). On the other hand they have a completely different, inverse geographical context (Sopron is near to the Austrian border, while Ózd is close to Slovakia) and also different histories throughout the 20th century, which result in contrasting social and political constellations in the present.

3 From a similar theoretical point of view the processes of memory transmission and political socialization were also analysed (Sik, 2015a).
constellations represented by the cases of Sopron and Ózd can be characterized as the mixtures of these various components. In this sense they have consequences not only for Hungary, but also for the other Central European countries characterized by a similar pattern of modernization.

According to Habermas, the key tendency of modernization is rationalization including the potential of improvement of the political public sphere, the democratization of everyday interactions and social institutions or the potential of subordination of lifeworld to market relations and the logic of bureaucracy, the consequent alienation, objectification and loss of meaning (Habermas, 1985). According to Giddens, late modernity is the age of uncertainty and risks, which threatens with ontological insecurity, identity crises and global catastrophes, while it enables individual and institutional reflexivity, new ways of identity construction, consumption, relationships or political participation (Giddens, 1991). According to Bourdieu (1998), modernity is based on the logic of fields, veiling and reproducing structural inequalities, while outlining naturalized interpretations of social differences and creating class habitus determining the set of accessible practices.

Obviously these universal characteristics of modernization are always embedded in local social historical context resulting in the various patterns of emancipatory and pathological factors. In Central Europe the process of modernization is inseparable from the difficulties of building nation states including national institutions, rites and identities. While in many Western countries the national identity was complemented by the identities of the bourgeois and the citizen, in Central Europe an obligate concept of the nation emerged (Trencsényi, 2011). Perceived as a metaphysically grounded identity, the nation was beyond criticism, which means that its exact interpretation and its consequences for the social world were not subject to debates based on argumentation and reflection. As a consequence, they grounded a dogmatic or hysterical political culture (Bibó, 1991). This means that early modernization was burdened with a dogmatic concept of nation limiting communicative rationalization (in a Habermasian sense), dominating the logic of fields (in a Bourdieuan sense), while providing a source for regressive identity patterns in late modernity (in a Giddensian sense).

After World War II, the emergence of a Soviet type state socialist dictatorship completely reshaped the social structure. The traditional forms of interpersonal and institutional interactions were demolished and replaced by ambitions towards totalitarian control on the part of the state party (Buchowski, 2001; Verdery, 1996). This period of “negative modernization” was transformed slowly during the consolidation period following the revolution of 1956. The state party gave up its claim for complete control and offered an implicit deal of civic privatism. In exchange for material security and a limited version of private freedom (Meyer, 2003), it expected popular withdrawal from public political life. This latent agreement led to the emergence of a new kind of duplication of social spheres. Society became divided into a “first society” integrated by the official party politics and “second society” including the unofficial public sphere and small scale profit-oriented economic activity. In the final decades of state socialism these two spheres interacted increasingly with each other, creating “hybrid” frames of interpersonal and institutional interactions, wherein ideological constraints also became part of negotiable issues.
This means that socialist modernization was also burdened with a dogmatic concept, namely the communist state ideology, further preventing communicative rationalization (in a Habermasian sense) and the expansion of reflexive institutions (in a Giddensian sense). On the other hand state socialist modernization partly decreased structural inequalities, partly predominated the fields (in a Bourdieuan sense).

The emancipatory transformations of the political and economic institutions occurred in this constellation. After a short euphoric period of renewal, the more painful social and economic aspects of the transformations appeared (Mrozwik, 2011). Furthermore, as the country integrated into global cultural and economic networks, the effects of late modernity – including the emergence of the “risk”, the “information” or the “experience” society – also strengthened, creating not only new horizons, but also new inequalities and tensions (Eyal et al., 1998; Ferge, 2002; Szalai, 2007). These difficulties reactivated those former strategies, which were habitualized during the paradox conditions of modernity and slowly started to reshape the new institutions (Ost, 2006; Koczanowicz, 2008; Sik, 2010). However, this does not mean that the state socialist heritage simply reshaped the post-transition constellation in its own image. Instead, the ambiguities of the transition resulted in a deep identity crisis, disillusionment and loss of faith in the values and possibility of an emancipatory modernization as such. This resulted in the increase of inequalities, an ambiguous communicative rationalization and difficult adaptation to the challenges of late modernity.

Similarly to other Central European countries Hungarian modernization in general is characterized by these local variants of universal emancipatory and pathological tendencies. In order to analyse political formation within these frames the observation of two contrasting constellations of modernization within Hungary, Ózd and Sopron was chosen. Sopron being a traditional commercial centre was heavily involved in the early processes of modernization. This means that the emancipatory (capital accumulation) and pathological (growing inequalities) potentials of instrumental rationalization were experienced since the 19th century. During the state socialist period, being close to the Western border of the Soviet bloc, Sopron became a heavily controlled, isolated town. This meant that neither the negative (limitation of communicative rationality and reflexivity) nor the positive consequences (industrialization, decrease of inequalities) of socialist modernization affected it significantly. After the transition Sopron once again found itself in a quickly modernizing state resulting in the emergence of new chances (Western job opportunities, consumption potentials, identity patterns) and new difficulties (uncertainty, risks, objectification, inequalities).

The social history of Ózd is somehow the inverse of Sopron’s. It dropped out from the first phase of modernization, thus it lacks any bourgeois or nationalist local traditions, while historically lagging economically. During state socialism Ózd got special attention from the state, as massive heavy industry investment took place in the city, which resulted in exposure to both the positive (material security, decrease of inequality) and negative effects (distortion of political culture, lack of post-material values, limitation of communicative rationalization and reflexivity) of state socialist modernization. Since the transition Ózd lost its economic basis and became one of
the most depressed parts of Hungary. It is excluded in many ways from the processes of late modernity, economic hopelessness (ontological insecurity) lead to ethnicized conflicts, identity crisis (limitation of reflexivity) and the expansion of the extreme right (regressive identity patterns).4

In sum, Sopron and Ózd represent inverse scenarios of modernization, which occurred across Hungary in a mixed form. The experiences of modernization are constitutive elements of a political culture in a sense that they frame the interpretation of social problems and desirable goals, while providing paradigms of collective action. In this sense the correspondences found in Sopron and Ózd are informative about the patterns of political formation in divergent constellations of modernization, which determine together the political climate in Hungary and in other Central European countries sharing the same social historical background.

The challenges of post-socialist modernity: the perception of social and political problems

The perception of social and political problems is embedded in the context of personal experiences. In this sense both their identification and evaluation depends on the difficulties young people face in their family, school, workplace or peer group. Following this logic, in this section, first the basic problems identified by young people living in Sopron and Ózd are analysed; second the consequences for political institutions and actors are evaluated.

Both in Ózd and Sopron many young people mentioned the problem of low living standards and the lack of adequate income. Of course a satisfactory economic situation is always relative; it is the result of a comparison to an actual or virtual reference group. Therefore it is not surprising that young people living in the two towns refer to completely different things, when talking about low living standards. In Ózd it means the lack of basic needs: ‘They live from month to month, because the money isn’t enough and there is no potential for work’ (Dabas, Ózd). In Sopron, however, young people mention less urgent needs, including either lack of money for extra tuition fees or independent flats: “I thought that I would be able to pay for my rent and tuition during the last year of college, but I got only 53 thousand forints and the rent was 45 thousand” (Emma, Sopron). In Ózd the lack of raw economic capital is at the centre of attention (in a Bourdieusian sense), while in Sopron the dissatisfaction with the possibilities of consumption is a terrain of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense).

This difference can be further explained by referring to those specific problems that trouble young people. In Ózd unemployment was mentioned by almost everyone as a fundamental difficulty crippling life chances: “When will we give work to those who need it? Let them take away the social benefits, but give them work in exchange!

4 Since 2014 the mayor of Ózd is the representative of Jobbik, the Hungarian extreme right party, whose ideology and political actions not simply neglect the principles of basic human rights, but also include an irredentist interpretation of the past, an oversimplifying, populist, ethnicizing explanation of the social problems and the proposing of authoritarian solutions (Karácsony and Róna, 2010).
Like before, when everyone was working” (Lexa, Ózd). In Sopron the central problem was the transformation of higher education, which at the time of recording of the interviews was strongly opposed by students through the organisation of demonstrations throughout the country. Many criticized the efforts of the government to force the students to either pay or to sign a contract that they would not leave the country for five years: “To be honest I don’t like this idea of a contract at all, because I understand that they want to keep the people in Hungary, but they shouldn’t do it like this, because it’s a really aggressive way of doing it” (Klaudia, Sopron).

Unemployment and tuition fees are perfect symbols for the most burning questions in the divergent constellations of modernization. In Ózd the main problem is extreme structural inequality, which cripples any sort of constructive countermeasures. In Sopron the most burning problem concerns the risks of individual careers, which can be handled in the frames of “lifepolitics” (in a Giddensian sense).

Beyond structural problems many young people criticised the political and economic institutions, which either do not function efficiently enough, or do not function as a system orientated by institutionalized principles - such as profit or the law – at all. In Sopron there is a special sensitivity concerning the high level of corruption and the lack of legality in economic and political life. This means that a great variety of different types of corruption or misconduct in public office are identified by them, including the dysfunction of jurisprudence:

I was hit by a car in February and the car drove off [...] a few months later I received a letter that they had closed the case, because they couldn’t prove if it was the suspect or not, even though it was unambiguous, because I recognized him. (Andrea, Sopron)

Also companies that “do not pay for services provided even though work is turned around quickly and correctly” (Tamás, Sopron) are mentioned. These indicate the presence of a civic and bourgeois identity, which is based on the principles of universal justice as the criteria of legitimacy (in a Habermasian sense). In Ózd these issues are not only mentioned less, but are also presented in a less elaborate frame. Corruption is treated as a general law, which cannot be altered: “The whole system is corrupt. And those who talk about this are either silenced, or in my opinion murdered, or paid off” (Mónika, Ózd).

The opposite can be said about the perception of crime and safety. Basically young people in both places have a negative opinion about the security of their town. However there are certain differences in the narratives. In Ózd there are detailed descriptions of actual incidents experienced by the participants:

Interviewer: Is it common for people to fight?
Respondent: Not nowadays.
I: How about in the past?
R: Every day.
I: Let’s say two families fought. And this wasn’t rare [...] The father of a kid was beaten up, so, just recently, he took revenge, so the other ended up in hospital. That’s why I don’t go out nowadays (Adrian, Ózd)
In Sopron, in contrast, narratives of crime are mostly second hand experiences and stories “heard”. Of course these kinds of stories often exaggerate and tend to generate panic. As they are not based on personal experiences the stories cannot be subject to counter-evidence proofs and may be instrumentalized by political forces interested in strengthening mass hysteria. This is exemplified by a rumour about “settling Roma people in Sopron”: “There used to be families, which were born and raised here, but these new ones, who were let’s say ‘moved in’ are really terrible. I was walking with my friend and these frightening figures approached” (Ecser, Sopron).

Social problems at the structural level and the functioning of systems constitute the basis for the perception of everyday and institutional democracy. The democratic or authoritarian experiences of family, peer group, school or workplace interactions play a crucial role in the political formation of young people, which was expressed in the rich and detailed narration of these relations. These interactions have the potential for allowing the experience of democratic communication and through it democratic general will formation. Without such experiences, democratic institutions and values are inaccessible, which makes them invaluable. As a general difference between the two locations it can be said that in Ózd the demand for democracy is not present on the horizon of young people. In school they almost exclusively reported the misuse of seemingly democratic forms of interactions:

I tried to express my opinion, but in school it’s impossible. Everyone wants to hear only their own opinion. At least in our class. When we were preparing for the students’ day everyone had to write down five ideas. I started to read mine, they were cool, but the teacher didn’t even let me finish, which made me feel quite bad. He said they were no good. Because he already had a plan in his mind, because he’s quite a selfish man! (Leonóra, Ózd)

In the workplace, respondents also expressed the need to obey the employer: “Well, in the workplace, basically you have to obey the boss. I consider working as a must. [...] I must endure certain things” (Mónika, Ózd). And in the family also several participants reported authoritarian relations: “Well, it usually goes the way – and I think it’s similar in other families as well – that the father is the head of the family. We do, as he says. He leads us and controls us” (Feri, Ózd). In Sopron however, a general claim for democracy was expressed by many respondents, which serves as a normative basis for evaluating social relations: “I think we usually discuss things in a democratic way. We are interested in each other’s opinion, obviously. We learn from each other this way, because if I don’t agree, someone might correct me, because they probably see it from a different angle” (Lilla, Sopron). Even in schools or workplaces, where hierarchical relations are more frequent, the demand for fairness emerges. According to Habermas the structure of interaction plays a decisive role in the democratic

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5 As these narratives express it, inter-ethnic relations have various difficulties if not complemented with mechanisms ensuring social cohesion (Cockburn, 2007).
competences, which means that in this sense the experiences of young people growing up in Ózd and in Sopron are in sharp contrast.

These everyday experiences of democracy also have a huge impact on the evaluation of political institutions. Even though in both places there is an almost exclusively negative perception of politicians blaming them for neglecting people’s interest, manipulating and dividing the country, there is great difference at the level of framing these stereotypical problems. While in Ózd these characteristics are mentioned usually as an unchangeable, natural state of political life expressing the opinion of a hopeless, disillusioned citizen, in Sopron they are stated as criticisms of the outraged citizen. The ignorance of politicians is interpreted in Ózd as a historical constant expressing the naturalization of helplessness and a consequent deprived class habitus (in a Bourdieuan sense): “In my eyes most of the politicians are defined as people who look after their own interests only. And it’s always been like this, throughout history” (András, Ózd). In Sopron, in contrast, this is seen as a correctable dysfunction expressing the claim of the politically empowered citizen (in a Habermasian or Giddensian sense): “The people who should be elected are not those who want to realize their personal goals and become rich, but those who are interested in the country, who want to end our suffering” (Lelez, Sopron).

The evaluation of political actors frames the interpretation of other questions, such as those concerning national identity. National identity in Hungary has been controversial since the transition. On the one hand myths about the unique talents of Hungarians prevail, while, on the other hand, the historical experiences of defeat and the discourses of underdevelopment or backwardness haunt the collective identity. Therefore national identities vary according to the local social constellations. In those places, where there is space for realizing individual potentials, one can go without a positive collective identity, which allows a more critical approach towards the nation. In those places, where the social recognition of the self is limited, there is greater need for a positive collective identity, which leaves lesser room for reflecting on the antidemocratic potential of nationalism. The differences between Ózd and Sopron express these correspondences.

In Ózd patriotism has a strong emotional charge expressing a return to the ontological concept of the nation that is a regressive answer to the challenge of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense). It is framed in the context of “Hungarian fate”, which must be undertaken on the individual level, notwithstanding hopeless local circumstances:

I like living here, because at the end of the day this is my home country, we were destined to be born here and we are Hungarian citizens. Well, it would be great here, only if there wasn’t this great hopelessness! (Feri, Ózd).

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6 Gingrich and Banks described how new forms of nationalism are used for self-legitimization by new radical right movements. These movements use them as semantics capable of translating the fears and uncertainties caused by globalization into tendencies threatening the nation itself (Gingrich and Banks, 2006: 17). In Ózd similar patterns were experienced, as the locally strong Jobbik’s nationalist interpretations reappeared in the narratives of young people.
In Sopron patriotism is much less significant. There it appears as a romanticizing emotion, which is, however, overwritten by the profound economic interest. In most cases aspirations to leave the country trigger this mechanism:

I: Is it important for you that such a thing as Hungary exists?
R: Well, it is. [...] We’ve got beautiful cities and countryside [...] and if I go to Somogy county and eat an apple, well then we know that’s ours, because it’s Hungarian!
I: OK, but you said that you want to move to Zurich...
R: Yeah... but my heart belongs here... Even if I have known since I was 11 that I will live in Italy. That’s my temperament! (Emma, Sopron)

This loose relation to national identity is explained by the actual chances of realizing individual goals and constructing identity through carrier (in a Giddensian sense). The differences at the level of evaluating public institutions and national identity result in contrasting political landscapes as well. In Ózd young people tend to distance from the sphere of mainstream politics. The two big parties, which have governed the country since 1994 – MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) and Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) – are both rejected. Moreover, this opinion is expressed usually in an emotionally charged tone. The Fidesz is treated as an ignorant party: “Fidesz – now I will express myself impolitely – doesn’t give a s**t about the problems of young people” (Lucilla, Ózd). The socialists are usually blamed for their incompetent and corrupt governance: “The socialists are demagogues blah-blah. They won’t achieve any results if you ask me, only take away money” (András, Ózd).

In Ózd, the rejection of the biggest parties and the emotionally charged nationalism together opens a space for identifying with the extreme right party, the Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary). Jobbik is at the centre of political discourses among young people. Almost everyone has personal experiences related to it, either on the street, or through others, which provokes emotionally charged reactions. Many young people find their communication convincing, which indicates the insensitivity to questions of authoritarianism or intolerance (in a Habermasian sense): “I think that only Jobbik cares about us, for you and for me. I don’t know much about your life, but I am sure that it would be better for us all, if they governed” (Emericus, Ózd). This however does not mean that everybody identifies with Jobbik. There are some, who condemn it for making only trouble:

There is one political organization, which generates the tension between the Roma and Hungarian people [...] and this resulted in quite a big problem in the town. [...] I am not an educated man, I am not a clever man, but even I understand that across the country, everyone could distance themselves from Jobbik [...] and when their representative talks, than all the other parties should ignore it. (Alexander, Ózd)

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7 About the growing popularity of Jobbik among young people see Feischmidt et al. (2014) and Szele (2012).
Furthermore many young Roma people, who constitute the target group of the party’s provocative, often racist, propaganda, reported strong fear generated by Jobbik and its paramilitary organizations, which held several demonstrations in the town:

If Jobbik organised a demonstration I would surely avoid it, because if the Gypsies gathered they would certainly kill us [...] They are capable of it. There have been enough examples, when Jobbik supporters, and Guardsmen, have murdered people. They burned the houses of families in Tatárszentgyörgy and murdered a little boy. (Hunor, Ózd)

In Sopron the political landscape is in a certain way the complete opposite of the one described in Ózd. There the two major political parties have strong bases, transmitted from generation to generation. Some had voted for the MSZP “because it’s a typical left party” (Adél, Sopron), while others preferred the Fidesz: “I was hoping that after the MSZP the Fidesz would better represent the interests of the country. That hope was fulfilled partly, but we still need something more to make things better” (Anita, Sopron). As the two big parties are at the centre of the political landscape of young people living in Sopron, the alternative parties have much less space. On the one hand this affects the perception of the alternative democratic parties, which – unlike in Ózd – at least appear on the horizon, even if they play only a marginal role: “Well I don’t have a favourite party, but I like the LMP (Politics Can be Different) [...] they talked well, at least didn’t talk crap, so they were attractive for me and positive” (Lelez, Sopron). On the other hand this affects the perception of extreme right political groups. First of all they appear much less in the narratives of politically informed young people. Second, they are commented on in a much more critical manner. Many young people state that the politics of the Jobbik is unacceptable, because of its racist nature:

R: Discrimination is the main reason. So the Roma... I know sometimes they do stupid things, but if the country really decided to educate them and trust their capacity to change, probably they could change, of course not within four years. [...] and this continuous labelling of Jewish people! I simply can’t understand it. They also suffered a lot, so I don’t understand why they should be exterminated.
I: Where do you hear these kind of ideas?
R: Jobbik. Of course not in the public sphere, but this prejudice is there...
(Adél, Sopron)

Having outlined the perception of social and political problems in the two towns, it is possible to analyse the impact of the divergent constellations of modernity on the different views. The most important detected challenges of modernization affect the perception of political life both at a formal and a substantive level. In Ózd the majority of young people perceive the present as a cruel, uncertain, hopeless period, which is characterized by the everyday struggle to provide their basic needs. These interpretations express the experience of the post-transition stuck of modernization,
aggregated by identity crisis. From this perspective a detailed picture of subordination becomes evident, including inequality, lack of recognition and personal experience of crime. As these experiences add up, the difficulties of a faltering/paused modernization are naturalized and ground a politically indifferent habitus (in a Bourdieuan sense). For a generation growing up in such a constellation the promise of democracy is discredited, the emancipatory potential of modernization in a Habermasian sense is inaccessible. As its principles are absent in everyday interactions, its institutionalized forms are emptied out.

This results either in a resigned approval of democracy, which is actually the alienation from it, or in the angry, frustrated rejection of the political sphere, which is on the one hand responsible for the suffering and, on the other, unchangeable. For many young people the way of escaping such a depressing experience of modernity preventing the realization of personal dreams, is an ontologically grounded, dogmatic national identity that is a regressive answer (in a Giddensian sense). This could serve as a potential “theodicy” in the sense that the greater goal of preserving the nation could give meaning to personal suffering and ease ontological insecurity. Of course this is just an option, and it is not one open to everyone. Those, who cannot engage with this kind of regressive handling of the identity crisis, are often turned off politics as is evident from the large number of those young people who are in complete semantic uncertainty. These correspondences appear at the level of the political landscape as well, which is based on the rejection of mainstream political forces and instead centred around the extreme right party. Either identification or condemnation of this extreme party indicates that, in this paused constellation of modernization the frames of representative democracy are suspended and politics becomes reminiscent of civil war.

In Sopron the majority of young people perceive the present from a completely different perspective. For them it is not basic needs, which are at stake, but the realization of individual goals, the consumption and the realization of their identity (in a Giddensian sense). The dividing line is not between unemployment or working, but between good and bad jobs. Therefore young people living in Sopron have a much less personal experience of inequalities and lack of recognition. For them these are the problems of others, or abstract systemic problems, which do not provoke strong emotional reactions. From this perspective democratic rights are treated as self-evident and natural, which can be applied as a normative basis in everyday interactions and institutional problems as well. Consequently national identity plays a less crucial role, as it is only an optional romanticized bonus, which is overshadowed by personal achievements. These experiences ground a political landscape where the political status quo is not questioned that is a habitus of the privileged classes (in a Bourdieuan sense). The big parties are in the centre, while those parties which are critical of the system get less attention and extreme parties are rejected. In this constellation, democracy is not viewed as a flawlessly functioning system either; however unlike in

8 Holmes describes the anti-Enlightenment tendency, which handles the uncertainties and anxieties caused by modernization by identifying with closed local communities “integralism” (Holmes, 2000: 3-4). According to our experiences – which are similar to other observations (Feischmidt et al., 2014: 87) – the political culture of the Ózdian young people can also be explained within this framework.
Ózd it is not rejected as such, instead it is criticized in the hope of improvement expressing a certain civic consciousness (in a Habermasian sense).

On the one hand this implicit trust in democracy is the result of the lack of economic traumas of the transition. On the other hand it is the result of historical heritage. The pre-socialist traditions of modernity and the lower impact of state socialist modernity both foster the emergence of a non-paternalist civic culture. The former provide patterns of an autonomous, civic mentality, which is based on dignity and the claim to respect. Based on such a mentality not only social problems can be criticized, but also extremist ideologies can be rejected. The latter provides immunity to patterns of behaviour, which were formed in the paradoxical socialization processes of state socialism. As the pact of material security for lack of democracy was always less embedded in the strictly controlled Sopron, so too its eroding effect is less damaging.

Reactions to the challenges of post-socialist modernity: ignorance, activism and radicalism

The most basic form of political activity in a representative democracy is participating in elections. Therefore it is a central question how young people relate to this symbolic act of democratic will formation. In Ózd the basic attitude towards the elections was uncertainty concerning both the meaning and value of voting:

I: You mentioned that you don’t like to vote. Have you ever voted?
R: Yes, once.
I: And how was it?
R: Well, a big nothing. [...] I thought I’d try it once but I can’t even recall which party I voted for, or why, but as I remember it didn’t win.
I: How did you decide which party you would support?
R: Well, whoever lied better to me through the media, maybe that was it. “This looks like a cool guy, hey let’s vote for him!” (Mónika, Ózd).

These opinions express an overall disillusionment towards elections, which does not have much significance as solutions to local problems are not expected from a new government: “People go to vote, but the government does as it pleases. It doesn’t matter who wins, neither of them is good, both have negative consequences” (Igar, Ózd).

In Sopron two characteristic opinions can be discerned. On the one hand many young people have a strong civic identity, which implies respect for the elections: “Yes, in a certain sense you can shape your own destiny by voting. They say that one’s freedom is limited only by the freedom of the other, but also the laws, whose makers - the government - is elected by me!” (Janka, Sopron). On the other hand many young people argue that voting is simply irrelevant, as one vote does not make any difference: “Well, I don’t think it’s really important to vote, because, you know, I would be surprised if it would be particularly me, who influences the results” (Klaudia, Sopron). This kind of opinion expresses a different type of passivity: while in Ózd the
source of ignorance is a loss of hope in democratic will formation through voting, in Sopron it is the unsatisfactory level of individual impact, which results in indifference. The former expresses a defeatist class habitus, while the latter expresses the habitus of the dissatisfied customer (in a Bourdieuian sense).

These patterns of relating to the institutional forms of decision making also affect other forms of political action, such as demonstrations. In this dimension – as a consequence of previously described patterns – there are significant differences between the two locations. In Ózd, where the institutional forms of democratic will formation are discredited and have lost their significance, demonstrations play a central role. Such forms of expressing one’s opinion – unlike the institutionalized, abstract elections – are collective rites in a Durkheimian sense (Durkheim, 2008). They generate “collective effervescence” and strengthen a neo-tribal collective identity, which resonates perfectly with the regressive identity patterns many young people in Ózd share.

There have been several demonstrations organized by the extreme right party or its satellite organizations. On the one hand these demonstrations attract many young people, despite being barely legal or even illegal:

Well I’m member of the Hungarian Guardsmen [...] and the police don’t like it that we were marching in uniforms and it frightens others and there many of us had our vests and clothes seized, so there were some conflicts because of this. (Csele, Ózd).

On the other hand many opposing young people are mobilized for these often dangerous occasions:

I participated in a counter-demonstration [...]as we were looking for the Roma block, first we were lost and ended up among the supporters of Jobbik. You should’ve seen that police protection [...] there was a really black skinned Roma couple among us and they were threatened by them, so we had to ask for the help of the police, it was so frightening [...] it was good to face these experiences. (Mónika, Ózd)

In Sopron, as the institutionalized forms of participation are better embedded, demonstrations have less significance. Most of the respondents consider demonstrations futile. As they do not provide opportunity for serious impact, they cannot contribute to the process of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense):

These protests against the government, I wouldn’t participate in them, because they are actually futile [...] thousands of people may go out, but it’s completely uncertain that it will have any impact on the government. If a few thousand people were demonstrating, well it would be different, because the proportion is different. But that. (Ferenc, Sopron)

Despite the fact that these various institutionalized or informal forms of activities are present in the lives of several young people, it should also be emphasized that the
majority of them were disinclined towards any sort of political or civic actions. However the argument for completely rejecting the political sphere differed in the two locations.

In Ózd young people articulated their frustrations and hopelessness due to the everyday failure of the political sphere. This often led to an angry rejection of politics and the diversion of personal responsibility that is an overall politically neutralized class habitus: “Politics doesn’t interest me. I think that it’s not my duty to solve these problems! Someone else can solve them, someone who is interested. But me, just leave me alone! I don’t care” (Adri, Ózd). In other cases respondents avoid talking about political issues as they feel helpless to change anything, which is the expression of the naturalization of subordination: “Sometimes I give massages, so we talk about this. About work. But not about politics. We don’t talk about that politics at all, because why would we?! It won’t be better just because we get angry, because there’s nothing we could do!” (Pálma, Ózd). In Sopron young people rejecting politics are less frustrated; they simply do not care about it. They rather focus on their identity projects and the individual solutions to their problems, which, unlike in Ózd, are available to them:

1: Have you ever thought of participating in any sort of activity? Given the fact that I see you are pretty well informed.
R: No, I never thought of that, because it doesn’t really interest me. You know I’ve got other things to do. (András, Sopron).

It is important to note that political ignorance is in a certain sense a liminal state: it may either evolve into lifelong passivity, activism or radicalism. From this perspective, the different reasons for political indifference imply different potentials. Frustrations experienced in Ózd, which are currently held back by a rejection of the political sphere, have the potential to turn into radicalism, while disinterestedness experienced in Sopron lacks this kind of potential. However this does not mean that it is completely safe. Disinterestedness produces moral indifference, the incapability to experience solidarity with the suffering “other”. Indirectly such insensibility may have a similar effect to frustrations in the sense that they make people susceptible to antidemocratic ideas and prejudices.

The reality of this danger is confirmed by the patterns of intolerance. Anti-Roma prejudices were equally present in the two locations, which indicates that the different types of alienation from politics may be accompanied by a similar lack of recognition, which is the basis of antidemocratic interactions (in a Habermasian sense). The differences appear only at a semantic level. In Ózd racist and antidemocratic political intentions are expressed without hesitation:

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9 Recently class based analyses of radicalization have become popular (Kalb and Halmai, 2011), whose conclusions are supported by the differences between the experiences of young people living in Ózd and Sopron. However, in our understanding, instead of a reductionist class approach, a more complex approach is needed, which reflects beside structural inequalities on the pathological and emancipatory potentials of rationalization or the newly emerging uncertainties, risks and challenges of identity construction.
Well, if I look around my neighbourhood and see this overbreeding, I think I would take a risk, well it’s difficult to say, but there was an example, there was a doctor, who wanted to sterilize the women after the third child. I think that wouldn’t have harmed. I would support this. (Csele, Ózd)

In Sopron however there is often a gesture of reluctance, expressing ambivalence about identification with extreme ideas:

I: You mentioned that you would prefer not to have them around. What do you think, where should they be instead?
R: I don’t know. Somewhere else. [...] maybe another city should be created for them.
I: There should be a city, where only they would live?
R: Yeah, only they would live there. There would be no problems and everything would be nice [...] But unfortunately, this is not possible. (Andrea, Sopron)

Following this overview of the potential reactions to the social and political problems, once again the impact of the divergent constellations of modernity on the different behaviour patterns can be analysed. Since in Ózd most of the young people are disappointed with the mainstream parties, parliamentary elections also had no particular significance for them. The mainstream parties’ abandonment of Ózd since 1989 was experienced as an act of treason and created an exceptionally distrustful atmosphere. In this atmosphere a frustrated ignorance was born as a result of the experienced extreme inequalities, which could in many cases turn into radicalism. In Sopron however, most of the young people take democratic institutions for granted. This means that they allow themselves the luxury of ignorance and disinterestedness, while focusing on individual ambitions and identity projects. Accordingly, they criticize representative democracy for not being effective enough, which means that it does not satisfy their individual needs appropriately. However they are not troubled by this so much as to be motivated to seek alternative political means, which expresses the lacking intention of participating in the public sphere. Instead they turn away from activism and remain satisfied with superficial criticism of social and political problems while withdrawing into their private lives. However ignorance has its own dangers: as it focuses on individual goals, it has the potential to eliminate solidarity, which opens the way for the tacit approval of antidemocratic tendencies.

10 In her analysis Miller-Idriss found that in Germany the damaged and silenced national pride is among the most important factors of youth radicalization (Miller-Idriss, 2009: 63). The patterns experienced in Sopron are close to this model: unlike in Ózd where radicalism was fuelled by experiences of inequalities, there the damaged pride may result in extremist attitudes.
**Incubating radicalism in Hungary**

Having analysed the perception of social and political problems and reactions to these problems, the main question may be approached once again: what do the examples of Ózd and Sopron tell us about the relation of modernization and political culture in Hungary? In other words, what kind of diagnosis of time can be elaborated based on these observations? It has been argued here that Ózd and Sopron represent two contrasting constellations of modernization framing various paths of political socialization. Accordingly, the Hungarian political culture can be characterized as a result of the interaction of these two idealtypical models.

The example of Ózd represents a constellation of modernization resulting in the emergence of a hopeless political culture in the sense that the personal horizon of expectations lacks any viable perspectives. As the job market is not seen as a fair, meritocratic environment, interactions are not seen as the terrain of mutual respect, structural subordination is naturalized and a helpless or frustrated habitus emerges (in a Bourdieuan sense). These characteristics create an environment, which is in contradiction with the principles of modernity and democracy that is an open society based on knowledge and the respect for dignity. Therefore in this constellation both the instrumental and the communicative rationality potentials of modernization are hindered (in a Habermasian sense), resulting in a lack of reflexivity and difficulties of identity construction (in a Giddensian sense). Moreover these factors are often complemented with the experience of ethnic conflicts or the turning to the ontological concept of the nation. As the traumatic experiences cannot be interpreted in any constuctive way, they either result in learned helplessness or in radicalization, which are the outcome of the adding up of various modernization disadvantages.

The example of Sopron represents a constellation of modernization resulting in the emergence of an indifferent political culture in the sense that the personal horizon of expectations includes not only viable perspectives, but also the lack of solidarity and ignorance of political dangers. Such a perspective is grounded by the encouraging experiences of job market and interactions resulting in a class habitus enabling reflexive identity construction (in a Giddensian sense). The individualized, reflexive horizon of expectations frames the perception of social and political problems and the potential reactions as well. In this context the key problems are those that hinder the realization of individual identity projects. Also these problems are perceived as abstract dysfunctions of redistribution, which could and should be handled at the system level. Such diagnosis may either result in identification with one of the mainstream parties, or in the turning away from politics depending on what is seen as relevant or irrelevant for personal life. In both cases however, there is a strong potential for indifference to those problems of social and political life, which do not affect individual prospects directly, such as growing inequalities and ethnic tensions. As exit strategies are always available, these difficult problems are more easily distanced through rationalization. In this sense young people living in Sopron despite their relatively advantageous modernization perspectives does not seem to realize the democratization potentials (in a Habermasian sense). Instead they focus on the questions of their individual identity construction while naturalizing the inequalities.
These two patterns of political culture in a certain way complement each other. While in the hopeless position tensions erupt, which generate actual – often ethnicized – conflicts, the indifferent position implies the ignorance of tensions and conflicts functioning as an incubator, allowing their escalation and aggravation. In this sense the combination of the two ideal types, characterizing Hungarian society as a whole, creates an extremely dangerous compound, which includes the opportunity for both the birth of antidemocratic tendencies and the space in which they can evolve. The interaction of these two patterns – originating fundamentally from the neglected challenges of modernization and transmitted through the distorted processes of political formation – enables the spreading of radical political views, which threatens the radicalization of the mainstream discourses, that is, the fading away of democratic principles and institutions. Even though such a frightening potential is probably the most prevalent in Hungary at the moment, it has consequences for any similar societies, as Ózd and Sopron are not unique cases, but the typical constellations of Central European modernity.

The above analyses also have some conclusion for the debates on the emergence of new forms of radicalism often fuelled by nationalist semantics. On the one hand contemporary radicalism is explained as a reaction to the processes of globalization (Gingrich and Banks, 2006; Feischmidt et al., 2014), which approach can be connected to the patterns in Sopron. Others interpret radicalization as the expression of the repressed class conflict (Kalb and Halmai, 2011), which approach seems to explain the patterns in Ózd. While the first approach attempts to understand the everyday embeddedness of radicalism, thus providing a phenomenological explanation for the attraction to extremist semantics, the second one focuses on unveiling structural mechanisms. In this sense these approaches are complementary in at least two senses: concerning their focus (everyday practices versus structure) and the broadest explanatory level (globalization versus class struggle).

As the present analyses show, sticking to one or the other approach may result in inadequate conclusions, as often the interaction between social spheres shaped by various frames is the key to understanding the social dynamics of radicalization. By inserting the question of radicalization into the context of modernization these difficulties may be overcome. A modernization theoretical approach grounded on general social theoretical level (such as Bourdieu’s, Giddens’ or Habermas’ theories) includes both the phenomenological and the structural level, while capable of interpreting both the processes of globalization and class struggle. In this sense it may provide a framework capable of synthesizing the inevitably one-sided diagnoses in a comprehensive approach. The elaboration of such an approach is particularly important, as globalization, class struggle, the everyday practices and structural coercion are all parts of the complex equation of radicalization.

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11 That explains why case studies focusing solely on radical cultures (e.g. Dechezelles, 2008) or the inter-ethnic conflicts framing radical cultures (e.g. Shoshan, 2008) remain inevitably one-sided: understanding the genesis and expansion of radical culture requires reflection on the non-radicals’ reaction to radicalism as well. If radicalism is actively contested, the political formation of radicals is framed completely differently (Vysotsky, 2013) compared to those cases, when the majority is indifferent, like in Hungary.
References


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