# Table of Contents

## Editorial Introduction

**Grzegorz Piotrowski**  
What are Eastern European Social Movements and How to Study Them?  
4

## Special Issue

**Ágnes Gagyi**  
Social Movement Studies for East Central Europe? The Challenge of a Time-space Bias on Postwar Western Societies  
12

**Elżbieta Cieżewska-Martyńska**  
The Meaning of the 1980s’ Anti-Politics’ Legacy within the Contemporary East-Central European Civil Societies  
38

**Nóra Anna Lantos and Anna Kende**  
From Same Starting Points to Moderate Versus Radical Solutions. Political Socialization and Values of Young LMP and Jobbik Party Political Activists  
59

**Tamás Rudolf Metz**  
“Competition for the Field” Movement Entrepreneurship of the Hungarian Incumbent Party Fidesz  
80

**Dániel Mikecz**  
80

**Olga Lavrinenko**  
Protests Against Fraudulent Elections in Belarus as Emancipation of the Parallel Civil Society  
80

## Research Note

**Oksana Dutchak**  
Unite or Fall: Labor Protests in Ukraine in the Face of the Crises  
103

## Book Reviews

**Juliane Sophie Stein-Zalai**  
168

**Gábor Tamás Molnár**  
173
Introduction

The idea for this issue emerged in Budapest during a two-day workshop on social movements in Central and Eastern Europe. The ideas behind this workshop (and thus this issue) was to discuss the specificity of civil mobilizations in the region and to contribute to academic debates ongoing since the transformation of 1989. Is there a regional specificity of social activism? Is, and if yes, how social activism is different from other parts of the world? Does this imply different theoretical and analytical approach? Other questions, closely linked to these are, how Eastern Europe is defined, characterized and constructed? How the eastern European context and environment affect social movements and mobilizations in the region? The main goal of this article is to present the main discussions among social movement academics and practitioners in the region and to deconstruct some of the clichés about grassroots activism in Eastern Europe that arose over the years.

What are we talking about?

Within common perception, Eastern Europe has undergone a political and social transformation to large extent due to social mobilizations, although levels of activism were not even within the region. When looking at the size of the dissident sectors prior to 1989 mobilizations, one not only sees variety in the sizes, but also that in most cases it is problematic to talk about mass movements that supported democracy, with the exception of Polish Solidarność [Solidarity] movement (Skovajsa, 2008).

Today, the dominant academic perception (to large extent shared by the activists) is that the levels of mobilization in Eastern Europe are much lower than in other parts of the continent (Howard, 2003). Most mobilizations were based on a growing disappointment towards the new elites (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999) because of the increasing economic cleavages. These feelings of disappointment are, according to Howard (2003), the main reason for civil society’s weakness in the region. As Kopecký (2003: 5) notes, even in comparison with other post-authoritarian states in Southern Europe and Latin America, Eastern Europe today stands out with “distinctly lower” figures of participation in voluntary associations and trust in both political institutions and civil society actors. The only significant mobilizations have been based on “disappointment towards the new elites”, often because of the increasing economic cleavages resulting from the post-1989 transitions and ‘shock therapies’ (Klein, 2007).
Besides the lower numbers in participation, are there any other significant characteristics of social movements in Central and Eastern Europe? Are there any characteristic features of popular mobilizations that can be linked to the specificity and history of the region? And are the above-mentioned diagnoses and assessments correct?

**What are social movements?**

There is a multiplicity of terms used in connection to social mobilizations, such as advocacy and interest groups, protest waves and cycles, social movement organizations, civil society organizations, NGOs to name just a few. Quite often the dividing lines between them are quite blurry, so are some of the definitions. One of the definitions of social movements developed by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (1999: 14-15) underlines that (1) social movements are informal interaction networks. They are never formed by an organization, but always by a plurality of organizations, groups, and individuals. (2) Interactions among them form a movement; they are kept together by shared beliefs and solidarity. In other words, social movement is cemented by collective identity that is shared across its constituent parts. (3) Social movements engage in collective action focused on conflict. They take part in political and/or cultural conflicts, and strive to promote or prevent a social change; (4) they also use a protest action repertoire meaning they act as actors engaged in non-institutional protest and direct action tactics, such as protests, blockades, occupations and physical confrontations with opponents.

The above mentioned approach that stresses the presence and importance of networks and the meaning of practices (such as direct action), is significantly different from more organizational/institutional approaches in political science that “conceptualized social movements as collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part.” (Snow et al., 2007: 11). Other scholars, using more cognitive-based approach, claim that: "[social movements are] those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents." (Tarrow, 2006: 2). It seems that in the case of Eastern Europe cultural context plays a far more important role in the formation and composition of the social movements, in particular when looking at the genealogy of social activism in the region and the rise of counter-cultural groups during the 1980s. Today’s social movements in Eastern Europe carry the burden of their genealogy but also of being associated with the activities of the dissident sector prior to the 1989 changes. Also, the labeling of social movements used in Eastern Europe is at times confusing: NGO

---

1 This article’s and this issue’s goal is to present social movements from the whole region of Eastern Europe, however numerous quoted academic works relate to the more narrowly defined Central and Eastern Europe, also known as East Central Europe, Central Europe etc. Being aware of the multiplicity of terms as well as the subtle differences between them, the discussion about these nuances lays beyond the scope of this article.
and civil society sectors are labeled interchangeably making the analysis of social activities in the region more difficult as scholars are balancing between cultural, network, and organizational approaches, each time presenting different results and outcomes.

**Types of activism in Eastern Europe**

Eastern Europe witnessed the emergence of nearly all kinds of groups and movements seen in other parts of the world, from the most common such as labor unions, environmentalists, antifascists to the most exotic and marginal ones such as hardliners, conservative punks or alco-vegans. Ondrej Cisař (2013) suggests organizing civic activities into four categories. The most obvious case is the *participatory activism* that compared to other types of mobilizations organizes fewer collective action events, as it relies on formalized and conventionalized interaction with the political system. One of the most recognizable forms of participatory activism, trade unionism, is often integrated into the policy process through institutionalized channels. They are incorporated into post-communist Europe after Western European models through i.e., tripartite (or bipartite) bodies. However, their representation of working-class interests is contested among scholars (Ost, 2005) as well as activists. In this case, the concept of a *weak civil society*, for years a dominant narrative describing social activism in Eastern Europe can be grounded in empirical material, when comparing numbers of protest events and protesters with other parts of world, as such activities have smaller support of the population in Eastern Europe, according to numerous Value Surveys.

An attempt to overcome the weak movements narrative was a concept being the second kind of mobilizations - the so-called *transactional activism* - characteristic for post-communist countries (Petrova and Tarrow, 2007). Instead of only focusing on individual participation, transactional activism is a particular form of activism based on inter-organizational exchange – transaction – of resources, know-how, and information. This type of activism can be observed mostly in environmental protection, women’s and human rights’ movements. The repertoire of actions can be associated with NGOs: lobbying, independent expertise knowledge, influencing public opinion and alike. Petrova and Tarrow (2007) explained the lack of mass mobilizations in the region with dominance of transactional activism, through which civil society actors rather seek direct contacts with politicians and the authorities to promote their goals instead of relying on mass mobilizations and massive participation.

It is observed that activists in Eastern European countries seldom use disruptive forms of protests, and that the authorities in general have a low tolerance and are less responsive to such repertoires of actions (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013: 257). Therefore *radical* groups that predominantly use direct action repertoire, protests etc. and remain an extra-institutional political force are underrepresented in the region. Cisař (2013) writes: “In postcommunist settings, this concerns especially radical Left organizations, which are unable to get any resonance for their anticapitalist demands discredited by the former communist regimes. On the other hand, radical Right
associations, especially racist and nationalist ones, seem to have greater resonance in the postcommunist world (e.g., Hungary, Poland, but also other states)" but for both strains “their demands usually fall outside what is generally regarded as socially acceptable”. (Cisař, 2013) The use of violence (attributed in particular to alterglobalists, anarchists and antifascists) or its potential use marginalizes some movements in an area that some (Kopecký and Mudde, 2003; Kotkin, 2009) call the ‘uncivil society’, characterized mainly by the use (or the will to use) violence.

The final type of activism, gaining popularity in the recent years in Eastern Europe is the Civic self-organization, consisting of collective action mobilized without the involvement of an organization or a group but relying on spontaneous mobilizations. The groups forming this type are focused on local claims and issues important for local communities and they are often short-lived and depoliticized. Many of these groups in Eastern Europe are urban-based and creatively interpret Harvey’s concept of ‘the right to the city’ and also ‘city as commons’.

Beyond these four types of activism, Eastern Europe has witnessed numerous spontaneous mobilizations for particular causes or associated with particular events such as the color revolutions in mid-2000s. These events mobilized many people, but left few structures afterwards; however their impact and the methods used link them closely to social movements (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). There were also many spontaneous mobilizations rooted in economic factors, especially in the early 1990s as a response to neoliberal economic reforms (Kubik and Ekiert, 1999 for overview of the Polish case). These mobilizations, although popular (in particular among workers) have not resulted in stable formations after the time of contention, especially after the economic demands of the protesters were met.

**Social movements and the Eastern European historical context**

The term Central Eastern Europe (or East-Central Europe or Eastern and Central Europe) is often used in order to signal the difference from both the Western part of the continent that consists of the ‘old’ members of the EU – in general capitalist states –, and Eastern Europe, which entails the former Soviet republics as well as the Balkans. The term emphasizes not only the differences, which appeared after the period of transition in 1989, but also from before this date, referring to the specific conditions of the communist regimes and stressing the difference between the Soviet Union and other communist countries of the region. This term, though, is not limited to the regions’ political and economic differences, as Paul Lewis argues, “conception of Central Europe was one developed by peoples, and eventually nations located between the greater powers and more extensive states of Germany and Russia. In this sense, the idea of Central Europe is one that is more political and cultural than geographic in origin. It is a region that lies in the middle of Europe... but geographica form has not been its most important characteristic” (Lewis, 1994: 8).

The distinction also refers to the ‘eastern backwardness’ (Āgh, 1998: 3) suggesting a close link between the region’s specificity and the post-socialist condition

---

2 Color revoultions is the name given to a series of social mobilizations and protests that emerged in different countries of the region, with the Ukrainian events being the most well-known.
within it. This creates tension, both because of the risk of marginalization due to its belonging to the East and because of the threat of ‘westernization’ and the loss of local - or regional - identity (Zarycki, 2013). This precaution may be observed within social movements as well: “situation of ‘westernization’ of social movements was perhaps not that obvious, as in the German gay and lesbian movement, where its members spoke about ‘friendly takeover’ or even ‘occupation’,” (Kleres, 2007: 180). Nearly all social movements and collective actions were diffused into Central and Eastern Europe either through processes of Europeanization at the time of the EU enlargement (Fagan and Carmin, 2011), building of advocacy groups in the early 1990s or through individual brokers.

The movement’s activists often share the notion of Eastern Europe being a periphery as well, and they indicate living in the peripheries as a challenge they have to face (Piotrowski, 2013). For instance in the ‘Platform for the Hungarian ATTAC Association’ – January 2002’, one of the points (11th) says: “significant part of the domestic entrepreneurial and financial capital - as usual at the peripheries - is extremely greedy and without restraint, in certain regards expressly cynical and anti-social. These groups find their political representatives of interest-enforcement in the political parties, too.” In many cases the activists explain the lower numbers of mobilized participants by not only being active in the peripheries, but also being peripheralized by other - Western - activists.

**Factors affecting social movements in the region**

There are few main challenges that are common for the various social movements in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the most common is the already mentioned low level of mobilization within the society. Regarding civil society, some authors point to the decline in mobilization after the enthusiastic time of the 1989 changes, social participation or trust towards social institutions that are (Howard, 2003) used for mobilizing people by the populist and right-wing political parties (Kalb and Halmai, 2011).

Another challenge for social movements in Eastern Europe is the problems they have with universalizing their claims that can be exemplified by the failure of the Global Justice Movement in the region (Krzemiński, 2006; Piotrowski, 2013). GJM failed to frame local issues and problems and to link the struggles with their counterparts from other parts of the world. Most of the mobilizations have a local character and nation-wide campaigns are rare. In the rare examples of social movements active in smaller towns, it is either for a local conflict (for example over environmental protection of a certain area) of a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) nature, or is it an action of a group coming from a big city. In the cases of environmental protests at Žengő peak (in Hungary in 2004, see Kerényi and Szabó, 2006) or in the Rospuda valley (in Poland in 2007/2008, see Piotrowski, 2015), local

---

3 ATTAC – association to promote the Tobin tax on financial operations, was one of the most widely known groups of the Global Justice Movement in the early 2000s and a number of local chapters were established all over the world (Kolb, 2004).

4 Source: http://www.attac.hu/cikk.php3?id_article=96.
citizens were neutral or even against the activists protesting for environmental protection of the area. Many of the groups are focused on problems in their neighborhoods rather than on national or regional policies that might cause these problems and the significance of urban movements is growing (Jacobsson, 2015).

Most of the social movements in Central Eastern Europe are limited to big cities, mostly capitals. Metropolitan areas provide both the proximate population necessary for protest actions and the audience to receive the claims of the movements that require from both sides (the activists and their audience) a set of cognitive tools and cultural capital in order to be part of the cultural and political exchange social activism is. Some of the movements are strictly connected with urban life: critical masses (McDonald, 2006) focus on problems of urban transportation and gather cyclists who riding together in big groups paralyzing the traffic. And because most people getting involved in social movements in Eastern Europe are young, proximity to high schools and universities determines the area of action. Also being an activist as well as the recipient of a protest action requires a specific set of cognitive tools and cultural capital to fully experience it.

Another of the challenges is the process of professionalization of some of the collective actors and the third sector in particular, when groups move from grassroots mobilization to rank-and-file organizations. Because of the dominance of the NGO model (with financing coming from big business, national governments and supranational bodies, such as the EU) many groups become economically dependent on grants. According to the critics (academic, but mostly of activists functioning in other types of groups), competition over resources allegedly leads to de-radicalization of the groups and de-politicization of their claims (for cases of environmental protection movement see Fagan and Carmin, 2011). The system of competing for grants for particular projects makes it more difficult for these groups to run long lasting campaigns. Grassroots social movements tend to be more independent and this autonomy is regarded as one of their main virtues; cooperation with actors is thought to undermine this independence. These independent social movements are occasionally antisystemic (sometimes inspired by anarchism), resulting in rejection of political parties as potential partners. Coalitions are formed within the same types of groups, with occasional support of marginalized extra-parliamentary political parties.

Many of grassroots social movements have strong ties with subcultures or countercultures. This process began in the mid-1980s and continued over the years, linking radical ecologists, anti-militarists, anarchists, squatters but also for example skinheads with music scenes and subcultural environments, such as punk rock. This linkage has two consequences: it challenges the reaching of broader audiences and making movements’ claims more visible. The second consequence is that it encloses social movements within their own environment (Greil, 1990). What often becomes most important is the orthodoxy of following principles rather than a strategic or pragmatic pursuit of policies or social change. It is also often the reason for not cooperating with other actors in the social sphere, such as political parties, which are the ‘enemy’ for subculturally oriented groups. For many actors being an activist becomes a lifestyle choice (Portwood-Stacer, 2013). Strict expectations towards newcomers result in a large turnover of participants and small numbers of activists.
Because of the socialist path and its rejection by the post-transitional elites, being defined as leftist became problematic in Eastern Europe. Because of the anti-communist sentiments, many types of left-oriented groups, such as the autonomists, have not emerged or are marginal in Eastern Europe. Struggles over the hegemony of language can be observed on the left-right axis. The same situation obtains with economic and social claims: right wing parties and groups have developed a broad range of claims that would be more appropriate for leftist movements in other contexts. This often leaves the social movements’ scene in the region distorted, as some parts (on the left side) seem to be missing.

**How does post-socialism affect mobilization**

On the assumption that Eastern European equals post-socialist, one of the main questions is what can be defined as post-socialism, and what are its key characteristics. The whole debate could be summarized by a question posed by Caroline Humphrey: ‘Does the category ‘postsocialist’ still make sense?’

Studying social movements, the relation to the previous regime and its ideological content seems to be the most important factor of post-socialism. Models of contestation of the late 1980s and early 1990s have created a specific model for contentious politics in the region that was a departing point for further developments. The post-1989 reality and the introduction of the NGO model, further developments connected to processes of Europeanization and the diffusion of some social movements into the region (such as the Global Justice Movement) all have their roots in the relation to the formerly existing socialist regimes but also protest cultures, some of which developed during the anti-communist struggles.

Some researchers suggest a limited time frame for the changes and transition period in Eastern Europe countries, claiming – as Steven Sampson (2002) – that we can no longer speak of postsocialism in the region, suggesting instead the term post-postsocialism, as an acknowledgement of the fact that the countries are not changing anymore at the rate they used to, even if their histories and past experiences still have a significant influence on peoples’ lives. Nevertheless the main discussions on social movements associate the characteristics of social mobilizations in the region listed before with the post-socialist transition. The processes connected with EU-enlargement that affected almost all countries in Eastern Europe (through direct expansion, changes in legal codes or by diffusion of social movement practices) are an imminent part of the post-socialist context (Fagan and Carmin, 2011).

Because of the aforementioned notion of peripherialism of Central and Eastern Europe, some of scholars make comparisons between the post-socialist condition and post-colonialism. As Katherine Verdery phrases it: “Just as postcolonial studies examines the representations of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in the colonial encounter, we might further explore the history of such representations in the socialist and capitalist worlds – each holding up the other as its nemesis, the image of all that can be evil. This imaginary has some postcolonial parallels in Western Europe’s ‘Orientalist’ constructs and images of the ‘savage’. We need to understand better how reciprocal images of ‘the West’ were made and propagated in both the communist and the colonial environments.” (Verdery, 2002: 17). This argument deserves a closer
consideration, especially in the context of the national independence rhetoric of some of the activists and social movement entrepreneurs, in particular in the context of discussions of diffusion of certain movements, tactics etc..

Today, more than 25 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the impact of postsocialism on social movement activists is obviously smaller. Some sociologists (Sava, 2015) are suggesting the emergence of a ‘second generation’ of activists in the region: focused on local issues, postulating the withdrawal from the post-politics towards more ideologized (both leftist and right-wing) actions. The rise of urban social movements and initiatives and the emergence of numerous movements that are not only focused on direct action and confrontation but more on community- and identity-building as well as organic work suggests a paradigmatic shift within social movements in Central and Eastern Europe.

With the above-mentioned arguments and discussions, the question whether there is a specific characteristic of social movements in Eastern Europe remains open. In many cases the inspiration, repertoire of action and organizational models for the movements in the region came from Western Europe and Northern America that could be one of the reasons for the movements’ underdevelopment in terms of numbers. Some of the specificities of modes of activism in Eastern Europe could be partially explained with the socialist past and to some extent to the post-socialist transformation. What is characteristic is that social movements in Central and Eastern Europe have few stable structures and the movements’ scene is weaker than in other, more developed movement environments. This results in a more dynamic picture and structure of grassroots activism making research on the topic far more interesting.

How to study social movements in Eastern Europe?

Since the 1970s, international research on social movements has studied how the political context affects movements’ developments and their possibilities to influence society. This is particularly the case within the theoretical approach that focuses on “political opportunity structures” (e.g. Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1996). Within this approach, it is often stressed that institutionalized politics create both opportunities and constraints for social movements, affecting their prospects to mobilize and influence politics and society. The factors identified as most crucial for whether movements succeed or not, are the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression, and the existence of conflicts amongst political elites, which potentially can lead to alliances between elite representatives and movement actors (McAdam, 1996). The changes in Political Opportunity Structures had a significant impact on the emergence and the shape of social movements in Central and Eastern Europe, especially at the time of the transformation of 1989.

There is, however, new research coming on the complex and sometimes even unexpected relations between movements and state actors, which urges movement scholars “to focus more on seeing how state, movement, and social groups and actors overlap and forge relationships, how those relationships shift, and how the arenas and institutions in which they are working shape them and their actions (e.g. Goldstone, 2003). Later years’ international theoretical developments within social movements
research can help to bridge the above-mentioned shortcomings in previous research. Researchers have lately shown a growing interest in the actual “outcomes” of movement mobilizations: for instance, political decisions and changes in public opinion or norms, but also changes in the routines and priorities of institutionalized political actors or the movements themselves (Bosi and Uba, 2009; Amenta et al., 2010). To use and develop these theories on social movement “outcomes” can thus be a fruitful strategy to identify the actual impact of movement activities and for understanding how social movements and institutionalized political actors mutually impact on each other.

In this issue the articles included touch upon all the points mentioned in this paper and cover almost the whole geographical region. In her piece, Ágnes Gagyi not only critically reflects on the discipline of social movement studies and the non-critical application of its principles to the social movements of the region. She also suggests including time and spatial shift to be included in the analysis of Eastern European social movements. Elżbieta Ciżewska-Martynśka in her paper points to the need of examining local histories of social struggles in analyzing contemporary social activism. Her suggestion is to look at the category of ‘anti-politics’ coined by dissidents from Eastern Europe (on the examples of Václav Havel, György Konrád and Jacek Kuron) to show not only longevity of the idea, but also that contemporary social movements can refer to regional heritage and roots. The other group of the papers relate to the characteristics of the activists themselves, whether it is their processes of politicization or socialization. The article by Nóra Lantos and Anna Kende deals with the experiences and developments of young members of the leftist LMP party and right-wing Jobbik in Hungary and looks for the factors that facilitate the political socialization of young people. Rudolf Metz presents the use of grassroots movements as incumbents of political parties in the Hungarian context and the dynamics within this process. Other papers reflect upon the relations between social movements and grassroots initiatives and political parties, whether it is the process of capturing social movements and their development towards political parties described in Dániel Mikecz’s paper based on a Hungarian case study. The paper by Olga Lavrinenko describes and analyzes the dynamics of protests against fraudulent elections in Belarus in 2010 and 2014 and the relations between these dynamics and the emerging civil society.

Finally, Oksana Dutchak describes attempts of alliance building in order to achieve stronger bargaining power by the Ukrainian labor movement.

In some cases the articles in this issue are first attempts to present some of the cases but the value of this issue goes beyond case presentation. The methodological plurality of approaches to the topics mentioned shows that social movement research in Eastern Europe is not only thriving, but also innovative and critically self-reflective and by editing this issue we are aiming at raising the voice of young social movement researchers from the region to contribute to more general discussions on social activism in Eastern Europe.
References


The paper claims that through its genealogy, Social Movement Studies (SMS) as a discipline incorporated a time-space bias on postwar Western affluent societies which defined the way it conceived of movements and their socio-institutional contexts. Two interrelated effects of that bias were the assumption that material claims belong to the past, and a focus on short-term contextual factors in movement dynamics. As a new wave of movements after 2008 raise material claims in Western contexts again, earlier frameworks of SMS are being transformed so as to capture the relationship of movements to long-term structural processes. However, a newly forming consensus that links new movements to the “crisis of democratic capitalism” seems to maintain the bias on Western experience. East Central European (ECE) countries, where austerity and democratization came hand in hand after 1990, hardly fit that picture. The paper asks whether new transformations within SMS, and an increased attention toward ECE movements due to their new proliferation provides a possibility for comparative perspectives beyond the time-space bias. It identifies a tendency in SMS of post-socialism to translate the time-space bias of SMS frameworks into a normative framework of development toward Western models (or lack thereof), which worked to obscure the long-term history of movements in ECE, as well as forms of popular politics and state-society relations different from Western models. The paper proposes a world-systems approach to the task of comparative understanding of movements in different contexts, and illustrates its possible gains through the conceptualization of new middle class movements in ECE.

Keywords: Social movements, Social movement studies, East Central Europe, Global, New middle class movements

1 During the preparation of the article, I benefited from the DoRa programme activity 2.2 financed by the European Social Fund of the European Union.
In the light of new movements after 2008, some notions of Social Movements Research (SMS) have come under reconsideration. In the form of a theoretical essay on that ongoing transformation, the paper asks how a new interest in East Central European (ECE) social movements may benefit from, and be part of that transformation of SMS frameworks. It argues that throughout its solidification as a discipline, SMS incorporated a time-space bias on the postwar development of Western affluent societies, excluding a broader perspective on long-term global historical developments—a bias which defined the way it conceived of state-society relations, politics, popular participation, and social movements. One of the main assumptions, based on the Western postwar experience, was that social movements are less linked to material conditions than “old” movements and their theories assumed. SMS came to focus on the immediate contexts and dynamics of movement development, and leave aside long-term structural patterns. New movements’ material claims today bring back the question of long-term structural processes into SMS questioning. Looking at new movements in ECE, however, a contextual bridging of Western and Eastern European long-term processes seems to be necessary. While previous research on ECE social movements tended to incorporate the time-space bias of SMS, and treat movements as either signs of catching up with the postwar Western model of development, or a lack thereof, the paper proposes a world-systems framework to make sense of the actual simultaneous relationship between Eastern and Western European developments. It illustrates the perspective provided by that framework through a conceptualization of the specificities of new middle class movements in ECE vis-à-vis contemporary Western ones.

**A time-space bias in the genealogy of SMS**

SMS has been codified and institutionalized as a relatively late branch in the history of modern Western social sciences. As Cox and Flesher Fominaya underline, the making of SMS as a discipline has been codified since in a story of origin, ritually repeated in SMS texts (Cox and Flesher Fominaya, 2013). This story served to solidify SMS as a coherent field, despite the diversity of disciplinary backgrounds in addressing the movement phenomenon.

In the narrative of that origin story, the birth of SMS as a systematic field of social scientific study is linked to the abolition of the psychology-based theories of collective behavior or “mass society” in the 1960’s (Le Bon, 1897; Smelser, 1963; Blumer, 1969), and, influenced by the inflow to university departments of young

---

2 For a treatment of the effects of such a time-space bias on the understanding of labor movement dynamics, see Arrighi and Silver, 1984.
academics involved in, or sympathetic to the 1968 movement wave, the reconceptualization of movements as structural, rational and organizational elements of democratic politics, worthy of systematic study (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001). The main steps of disciplinary evolution then, are conventionally identified in the subsequent formulations of Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT, McCarthy and Zald, 1977), political opportunity and political process theory (Eisinger, 1973, Tarrow, Meyer, McAdam), the introduction of cultural-symbolic elements as well as an emphasis on the self-constitutive nature of movements (Snow et al., 1986), and the formulation of the synthetic approach of dynamics of contention, partly in answer to criticisms to political process theory (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001).

To this mostly US-centered narrative, the element of European New Social Movement (NSM) theory is conventionally added. With the 1968 movement wave, European scholarship faced a surge of interest toward social movements by engaged or sympathetic academics similar to that in the US. Here, in a somewhat more organic connection to earlier critical theories due to historical reasons, researchers such as Frank Parkin (1968), Alain Touraine (1981), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) formulated an understanding of their contemporary social movements as different from “old” (labor) movements. Contrary to the latter, new social movements were understood as organized around immaterial, cultural and identity values. In assessing that difference, NSM relied on theories of a new, affluent middle class society, especially on the postmaterialism thesis of Ronald Inglehart (1977). Through its focus on immaterial, symbolic elements, NSM put a high emphasis on the self-constitutive nature of movements – something that was strongly linked to the ideas of communicative democratic organization in the line of late Frankfurt School theorist Jürgen Habermas, or of discursive theories such as in Michel Foucault.

As Hetland and Goodwin (2013) note, both the US and European originating moments of SMS were characterized by a key gesture of turning away from long-term historical and economic factors, and emphasizing instead the mechanisms of internal movement constitution, and its short-term, primarily political, context. This move, in both cases, was based on the insight that economic deprivation or class position alone does not cause movements. That insight allowed scholars to exclude long-term historical and economic factors from their main field of questioning. To determine when movements emerge, both the US SMS branch started by RMT, and the European stream of NSM, turned to the internal dynamics of movement construction, and its immediate interaction with its context. This approach made it possible for a specific methodological toolkit to be forged to address specifically the immediate dynamics of movement constitution in various contexts. In McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s canonic synthesis, the study of these dynamics was defined as the main object of SMS or “contention” research.

While the positive aspect of that genealogy of SMS is that it allowed for a distinct area of knowledge production on a specific object to be forged, one of its drawbacks may be that disciplinary debates on conceiving the object and its context in societal organization remained in the background. Contemplating the promises of a new wave of SMS attention toward Eastern Europe, one significant consequence of that limitation seems to be an unreflected time-space bias on Western modern societies which may lead to faulty generalizations. Besides general problems such as
defining the state, polity, democracy, civil society or the middle class in non-Western societies, that bias is present in the SMS origin story and its theoretical projections.

In both US and European contexts, the separation of the systematic study of social movements from long-term historical and economic causation happened in an era when, exactly and only in these two locations, the affluence of post-war Western societies made it possible for the first time in history for entire populations to participate in material welfare. It also created a so far unseen growth of US and European middle classes - a basis for their paradigmatic participation in non-material movements in 1968, the inspirational moment of both US and European SMS scholarship.

This context of affluence, and consequently, the relative lack of material focus in social movements, can hardly be generalized throughout space or time. Non-core countries faced lack of affluence and greater levels of social contention over material issues during the same period. Even within European movements, paradigmatic accounts of non-materialist middle class movements tend to obscure the strength of spontaneous strikes within the European Fordist industry throughout the late 1960's and early 1970's, which virtually repeated the effect of 1930-1940's strikes in the US, carving out strong labor rights, and putting a burden on the profitability of capital, which led to cost-cutting efforts from the late 1970's on (Silver, 2003). In the origin story of SMS, long-term historical and economic causation appears as something of the past - both in the sense of past theories (of deprivation or class struggle) already surpassed, and in the sense of “new” movements themselves not being any more centered on material issues. This timeline, too, has been harshly overturned by the raise of a new movement cycle, which, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, voices explicitly material requests in Western countries as well as elsewhere.

The transformation of SMS in the face of new movements

In response to the new cycle of mobilizations along material issues, today the field of SMS is going through significant transformation both in its academic structure and its content. In terms of internal academic structure of SMS, the new movement cycle brought a change comparable to that of the 1968 wave. Throughout the last few years, SMS has been expanding manifestly, under the influx of a new generation of scholars engaged and sympathetic to new movements. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the social groups of protesters threatened by precarization and (especially young) academic researchers threatened by precarization increasingly overlap. Similar to earlier moments when academic and movement interests overlapped, movements against academic precarity and higher education austerity reforms become part of the movement spectrum, while academic forums of SMS open themselves toward activists as audience and discussion partners (Cox and Fominaya, 2009).

The new movement context seems to be having a transformative effect on the very paradigms of SMS, too. Most significantly, the issue of economic claims reemerged as a focus of attention, due to its prevalence in new movements. Beyond empirical description of new movement claims, this fact brought the theoretical problem of how movements relate to economic conditions back to the forefront of
SMS. Addressing that question required a new emphasis on social structure, global economy and the relationship between democracy and capitalism. Due to those changes, tools derived from earlier SMS paradigms are combined with ongoing experimentation with frameworks from other social science disciplines. Probably the most emphatic amongst these experimentations has been the “bringing back” of the issue of capitalism to SMS (Hetland and Goodwin, 2013, Della Porta, 2015), engendering a plethora of disciplinary intersections with political economy (Streeck, 2014), world systems analysis (Silver and Karatasli, 2015), or Marxism (Barker, 2013; Cox and Nilsen, 2014).

Presently, that new process of experimentation does not provide a coherent picture. Diverging paradigms of various traditions are quoted without any authoritative conclusion of their significance to SMS as a discipline. And yet, the introduction of broader structural and economic causation factors, and the opening toward other disciplinary frameworks addressing those factors has already brought about a dismantling of the earlier SMS paradigm (e.g., as concluded by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly). There, the condition of carving out the specific object of SMS was the premise that structure itself does not cause movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), so the construction of movements is basically not linked to traits of structure, but to traits of movements, and immediate movement-context interactions. Accordingly, movements can be studied as phenomena in themselves, and compared across cases as such (as the “dynamics of contention” paradigm proposes). As SMS scholars experiment with other social science frameworks, their focus of questioning shifts from characteristics of the movement phenomenon as such to the movement phenomenon as element of various broader questions of social dynamics – e.g., the transformation of Western democracies under the impact of crisis, new movements and populisms (Della Porta, 2013b; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2013), movements as elements of democratization (Della Porta, 2014), or of class struggle (the 2014-2015 series of the Marxisms in Social Movements Working Group at the European University Institute). A third effect of the new movement context on SMS has been a turn toward historical-theoretical self-reflection. Opening toward other disciplinary paradigms dealing with questions of economy and social structure did not only bring additions to previous SMS paradigms, but also their critique. E.g., the lack of attention to the effect of the capitalist economy on movements has been thematized as a deficit of SMS (Hetland and Goodwin, 2013). Departing from the conventional story of SMS finally reaching objective scientific standards, founding paradigms are opened up for further inquiry and historical analysis, and SMS researchers think their own discipline and its cognitive tools within the same context of historical change in which movements operate. Cox and Flesher Fominaya (2013) demonstrate how the focus on the US academic context in the origin story hides the actual continuity of movement studies with earlier streams of social studies and critical theory in the European context, where social movements have always been conceptualized together with basic theorizing on politics, the state, or modern society. Cox and Nilsen reconsider the birth of Research Mobilization and New Social Movement paradigms within the context of political-ideological transformation of Western critical thought after Prague 1968, when the domination of Marxism gives place to an avoidance of Marxist paradigms (Cox and Nilsen, 2014). The relationship between research and activism is
increasingly problematized, and makes its way into the core of SMS questioning. This shift raises questions not only on how movements produce knowledge but also opens a broader field of reflection over researchers’ position in a historical space shared with movements (Cox and Fominaya, 2009).

**The expansion of SMS to East Central Europe: a challenge and an opportunity**

In the context of the above transformation of SMS, its extension to ECE seems to be timely and promising. After what has been widely considered as a lack of civil society and movement activity after the regime change, the new movement wave makes itself felt in ECE countries, too. After 2011, anti-austerity and anti-corruption mobilizations popped up in each country in the region, in some cases leaving significant marks on the political landscape, with two government changes in Romania and Bulgaria, a new 6% party in Slovenia, and a network of local movements winning several local elections in Poland. In face of that new activity, local and international scholars of ECE movements are pressed to reconsider previous understandings of the lack of mobilizations in the region, a process in which they meet the general challenge of reconsidering previous frameworks in SMS. The promise of such a reconsideration is fueled by a new wave of interest in ECE within SMS (e.g. Saxonberg and Jacobsson 2013; Pleyers and Sava 2015).

A limit to that reconsideration may be that that while earlier SMS frameworks are opened toward scholarly traditions dealing with social structure on a longer term in order to understand the change from post-material to material claims in Western movements, the spatial bias on Western countries remains unquestioned. In the treatment of the contemporary movement wave, this resulted in a widely consensual diagnosis according to which new movements are answers to a deficit of democracy brought about by the economic crisis. In this narrative, democracy has been expanding throughout the modern period, reaching from bourgeois revolutions to the incorporation of rights and material needs of full populations in the postwar welfare era. That level of democracy came under siege by neoliberalization, and later by increasingly autocratic measures of austerity. New movements claim “real democracy” and use tools of horizontal and populist politics to withstand that process, and reclaim popular sovereignty in the face of market forces. In line with this narrative, North American and European scholars speak about the end of democratic capitalism (Streeck, 2014), the crisis of democracy (Fraser, 2014), a need for left-wing populisms (Mouffe, 2014; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2013), and the potential of new movements in saving democracy (Della Porta, 2013a).

Looking at other global positions, the spatial bias of this diagnosis becomes obvious. Democratic capitalism with the incorporation of social rights of whole populations was characteristic only to the postwar period of affluent Western states. That story of democratization and its later decline through neoliberalization and austerity does not describe the historical experience of peoples in other positions of the same global history. Generalizing from this limited spatial scope may prove a major limit to understanding the relationship between the crisis and new movements in different global positions. The very notion of a new global movement wave, beyond
the mere empirical registration of a new proliferation of movements, is haunted in its conceptualization by a precipitous diagnosis of all movements in the “crisis of democratic capitalism” framework - an interpretation seemingly sustained by the diffusion of similar slogans and repertoires amongst movements (Della Porta and Mattoni, 2014), yet refuted by more in-depth studies placing local movements into local contexts (e.g., Guzman-Concha, 2012 on Chilean student protests; Anderson, 2011 on the Arab Spring; Gagyi, 2012 on ECE instances of Occupy).

Within the European Union, the “crisis of democratic capitalism” framework is strengthened by the vivacity of Southern European anti-austerity movements, and the political significance of the party coalitions which build on them. Especially through the Greek and Spanish cases, the latter became paradigmatic models for the social conflict and politics engendered by austerity (Katsambekis 2014; Tietze and Humphrys 2014). However, defining that conflict in terms of the “crisis of democratic capitalism” narrative, which, in the case of Southern Europe, focuses on the undemocratic nature of new austerity policies as “class war from above” (Radice, 2014), hides from view the experience of Eastern European member states, where similarly harsh measures of austerity have been the condition of post-socialist transition and EU accession. In the historical experience of those transitions, democracy came not before, but together with austerity, with problematic relations between the two which cannot be ironed out into a story where crisis and austerity bring democratic decline. Using the spatially biased “crisis of democratic capitalism” framework to make sense of present ECE movements would put serious limits on their understanding. To transcend that limit, the universality of the “crisis of democratic capitalism” framework needs to be “provincialized” (Chakrabarty, 2009), and the conceptualization of European postwar politics reintegrated in a global picture.

On the side of ECE SMS, too, several effects of internalizing the time-space bias of earlier SMS paradigms need to be transcended in order to understand the new proliferation of movements in their systematic interconnection with other new movements on the globe. Mirroring the time-space bias of SMS on Western movements, research on ECE movements from late socialism worked with the assumption that the experience of core countries is a universal model, and asked how ECE movements are doing in fitting that model. During late socialism, movements in socialist countries were framed by local dissidents, sympathetic Western activists and Western scholars as movements toward democracy (Máté, 1993; Bugajski, 1987; Bakuniak and Nowak, 1987). After 1990, the question of movements in ECE fit into the larger literature on post-socialist transition and democratization. Two main conflicts signaled in the literature were that between democratization and economic austerity (Przeworski, 1991; Ekiert and Kubik; 1998; Greskovits, 1998), and low popular participation vs. the proliferation of civil society organizations (McMahon, 2001; Howard, 2003; Tarrow and Petrova, 2007). In the conceptualization of both conflicts, researchers worked with the assumption that Eastern European societies will develop in a linear scale defined by earlier Western models - or if do not, differences from core models will be described as a backdrop in normal development.

This normative bias toward core models, together with a focus on short-term institutional factors, preconditioned a series of momentary typologies fast overwritten
by history. As East European countries did not actually “catch up” with Western models, but rather went through various waves of catch-up efforts and sliding back typical of semi-peripheral development efforts (Bórócz, 2012), various points of those dynamics were prematurely described as signs of greater tendencies, or types of post-socialist development. Such typologies needed correction as soon as the next wave of semiperipheral development dynamics set in. From liberal eminent, Hungary turned to be an exemplary of illiberalism. In Slovenia, the model of neocorporatist capitalism Greskovits and Bohle (2012) described as the socially most sustainable version of post-socialist market economies, came to be disintegrated by neoliberal reforms after 2008. Soon after Beissinger and Sasse (2014) concluded that their “end of patience” thesis does not work for Ukraine, as post-socialist disillusionment does not engender political mobilization due to institutional reasons, the Ukrainian crisis broke out. In my reading, such inadequacies do not signal individual authors’ mistakes, but rather a built-in incapacity of core-based, short-term frameworks to grasp the dynamics of non-core post-socialist development.

Another effect of incorporating the focus of SMS paradigms on affluent Western postwar democratic contexts was that the reception of SMS in ECE tended to look for movement phenomena similar to paradigmatic cases described by Western literature: environmental, feminist, anarchist, human rights, minority, trade union, alterglobalization and anti-war movements (Einhorn, 1993; Hicks 1996; Jehlička et al., 2005; Flam, 2001; McMahon, 2001; Ost, 2006; Vermeersch, 2006; Císař and Vráblíková, 2010; Navrátil, 2010; Piotrowski, 2011; Gagyi 2012). The search for movement types similar to Western cases was completed by a focus on movements identified as negative forms of the expected development: nationalist (Beissinger, 1996) or uncivil (Kopecky and Mudde, 2003). One result of the narrow focus on post-socialist, Western-type movements was a narrative according to which ECE traditionally lacks social movements in general, due to the suppression of civil society’s political involvement during state socialism (Howard, 2003). That narrative risked a complete historical dismissal of the various nationalist, populist, social democratic, fascist, communist, countercultural, millennial, ethnic, religious, and other movements which shaped the political landscape of the region throughout the modern period.

The focus on movement phenomena similar to Western models also worked to obscure forms of societal organization which do not fit those models, yet are constitutive of local societies’ social, economic and political organization - i.e. networks of kinship, nepotism and mutual help, forms of communal self-support, strategies of labor withdrawal (Seleny, 1993; Creed, 1995). Instances of rediscovery of popular politics on the communal level - such as in Jacobsson (2015): “Community organizations exist in Russia and other post-Soviet countries” - may be illustrative of the effects of bracketing the ongoing practice of community organizing from the relevant themes of research on popular politics, despite its significance as an elementary level of social survival and reproduction in contexts where neither the state or the economy provide guarantees for that.

As Charles Tilly noted in 1999 in his debate paper “Social movements here and elsewhere, now and then”, Zaldt’s definition of social movements is linked so tightly to the context of postwar Western democratic polity and high-capacity
redistributive state, that by his definition one would need to say that there are no social movements in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, despite the variety of ongoing social struggles (Tilly, 1999). To Tilly, this proves not the lack of movements in Kazakhstan, but the deficiency of Resource Mobilization Theory and the theories of democratization, democratic politics, and state structure incorporated in it. To make sense of movements in ECE, there is a need to redefine basic frameworks of SMS in such a way as to incorporate movement dynamics in global positions with political, social and economic structures different from paradigmatic Western cases. In a moment of transformation within the SMS field, and its challenge to tackle movements at various points of the globe, that challenge for ECE SMS may prove to be an opportunity for the field as a whole. In the remaining section of the article, I will draw out several principles which may inform the transformation of SMS frameworks so that they can address ECE movements simultaneously with movements occurring elsewhere, as part of an interconnected global history.

**Addressing East Central European movements in global context**

In order to transcend the time-space bias in previous paradigms of SMS, and forge tools to tackle movements in different points of the globe with a systematic perspective on their interconnection, the range of background assumptions incorporated into earlier movement theories need to be revisited. The comparative practice in SMS frequently relies on the assumption that the context of movements in terms of state, polity, and economic-social relations can be grasped in the same categories throughout different locations (Della Porta, 2013a). The conceptualization of these categories, however, is imbued with the experience of Western modernization. Definitions of such categories as state, sovereignty, democracy, formal and informal politics, “old” and “new” movements are abstracted from a limited scope of global history, and then generalized as definitions of the same phenomena everywhere.

Following from the above bias, forms of state-society and economic relations that do not fit generalized Western categories, cannot but be described as mistakes, deviations or pathologies (Grosfoguel, 2002). If movements are conceptualized as elements of a progressively ongoing democratization process, non-democratic movements cannot but be defined as irrational mistakes (Kopecky and Muelde, 2003). If movements are supposed to be tools of grassroots popular politics, fuzzy relationships between movements and parties can only be understood as pathologies of movement development (“captured movements”), and not as systematic elements of political life. Phenomena which fit Western definitions of movements will be described as “movements” in a sense that supposes a Western socio-political context, irrespective of their actual role in local society. Simultaneously, locally significant processes of popular politics will be omitted. Due to the time-space bias of the discipline, movement waves caused by systematic restructuring processes of the global economy will be sliced up in space, and categorized in time as different moments of the same (Western) history – e.g., “late” state-seeking ethnic and national mobilizations in ECE in times when those questions have been already settled in the West, “new” labor movements in China when labor mobilization is already defined as
“old” in Western countries. Traditions of global historical sociology and anthropology (Moore, 1966; Wolf, 1969; Tilly, 1999), postcolonial and decolonial studies (Chakrabarty, 2009; Quijano, 2000), or of world systems analysis (Wallerstein, 1974-1989; Arrighi 1994) have widely addressed that problematic, and provide conceptual toolkits and historical empirical knowledge to grasp the interconnected history of different social developments across the globe. Relying on these traditions, I will draw out several consequences of that perspective to illustrate its potential contribution to the conceptualization of ECE movements in a global sense.

Reconceptualizing macro-concepts of socio-political organization as elements of global history

To separate basic macro-concepts such as state, sovereignty, classes and polity will from their “paradigmatic” Western forms, and redefine them to cover the totality of global social experience does not only mean that a bigger variety of constellations will be incorporated into conceptual definitions, but also that the interrelations between various local social forms throughout global history will become part of their definition. In the world systems tradition, the term world system refers to this change of perspective: that the analysis takes as its basic unit the whole circle of significant interactions within various social organizations. For the modern period, that unit is the modern capitalist world system. To make sense of local economic, social and political forms, this approach looks simultaneously at their local characteristics and their interactions.

Looking at the notion of state, what this approach emphasizes is that in the formation of modern states in an interrelated process of global modern history, the dispersion of Western state institutions and the inclusion of a growing number of states into interstate agreements over sovereignty is paralleled by an increasing global distribution of labor and accumulation potential. In the interstate system, for some states that increasing distribution means higher potential to influence global processes, while for others, higher subordination to such organizer powers (Arrighi, 2000). State formation and sovereignty, despite similar categorizations or institutional forms, do not cover the same realities across different global locations. For analysis, that means that instead of comparing states as phenomena of the same type on a case-by-case basis, their different roles in global interaction needs to be taken into consideration.

Similarly, a consequence of this perspective will be to look at social groups in one state - e.g., local economic or political elites, local middle classes or local proletariat - as not the “same thing” across country and country, but as occupying functional positions relative to other groups within the world system. Typically, elites of semi-peripheral and peripheral countries will find their decisive power curtailed by their country’s economic and political dependence on the center. The employment and working conditions of the labor force in the peripheries will depend not only on their own bargaining power within local politics, but also on the priorities of the core economies they depend from. Class dynamics within states will take shape not only relative to each other, but relative to transnational alignments of coalitions and
opportunities within the whole space of the world system (Wallerstein, 1989: 80-125.; Amin, 1991). The fields of local socio-political relations, and social movements within them, will need to be analyzed according to the global dynamics into which their local constellations feed into.

Social movements have been addressed from that perspective by various authors (Wallerstein, 1989; Arrighi et al., 1989; Arrighi et al., 1990; Smith and Wiest, 2012; Chase-Dunn and Kwon, 2012). Probably the most illustrative study is Beverly Silver’s investigation of global waves of labor movements (Silver, 2003). Applying a long-term, global perspective, Silver traces how the effects of transformations in global production are followed by transformations of labor organization throughout modern history. Following the dynamics of global product and profitability cycles, movements for labor’s social rights appear wherever capital builds out major industrial structures, yet their lasting success depends on which point of the product cycle they appear in. While industries with new and profitable technologies in core positions are able to accommodate labor’s demands and keep their profit margins for longer periods, in more peripheral positions, where the same technologies arrive in a later point of the product cycle (not independently from labor pressure in core locations), the same type of movements can be less successful due to the lower profitability of their later position in the product cycle. Silver’s analysis illustrates the pitfalls movement research may run into, should it compare the fate of the same type of movements across locations without taking into consideration the whole scope of global industrial cycles they are part of.

Looking at the relationship between movement types and forms of social organization, a typical hardship of generalizing Western models is that social forms which in the Western experience are perceived as past, traditional, or non-modern, continue to preside over many other global locations. Consequently, oligarchic, religious, tribal or kinship organizations might appear as mistakes or pathologies, while in fact they form a systematic base of local social, economic and political organization. Decolonial authors argue that through the construction of global capitalist modernity, the distribution of forms of labor control was done according to a certain racial hierarchy, yet that distribution was obscured by an Eurocentric narration of modernity that exceptionalized white, free wage labor as the paradigmatic form of labor, and dismissed other (feudal, slave, debt) labor relations subservient to Western industrialization as “past” (Quijano, 2000). Global labor studies emphasize that even today, after multiple waves of industrialization on the peripheries, free wage labor is statistically but a fraction of the global reality of labor relations (Van der Linden, 2008). What follows from this is that if we are to look for movements related to labor or economic redistribution, we need to take into consideration labor and social relations different from canonic forms of Western labor history. As Wolf notes (1969), different forms of production and social organization, such as capitalist, tribute-paying and kinship-based organizations favor different forms and opportunities for political expressions. It might be the case that much of the popular politics that reacts to global labor relations cannot be found while looking for canonic (Western) forms of social movements in canonic forms of polities.
Reconceptualizing historical forms of ECE social organization as elements of global history: the example of new middle class movements

The practice of SMS on ECE to focus on movement phenomena similar to Western ones, and bracket other forms of popular politics, or to consider post-socialist movements as late/weak versions of Western movements, and dismiss the long-term history of ECE political movements, feeds into a broader tradition of understanding ECE forms of social organization as late, backward and pathological versions of Western history. This broader tradition, and its various consequences on categorizations of ECE social development, e.g., “backwardness”, “double society”, development as “form without substance”, or the East-West slope of civilizational worth, has been described and criticized as element of the hierarchies of global knowledge production by various authors (Todorova, 1997; Boatea, 2006; Borocz, 2006; Melegh 2006). I will only point at the element of “middle class” in ECE forms of social development to show how a reconsideration of basic macro-concepts in a global perspective would inform the understanding of local social movements.

Democracy and democratic movements have been largely associated with the presence of a proliferating middle class (Moore, 1966). In the SMS tradition, the most paradigmatic examples of modern movement activity are of democratic, middle class (non-materialistic) movements. The main challenge in front of SMS today, the new global wave of movements has often been addressed as a global movement of the middle class (Rohe, 2013; Faiola and Moura, 2013). Silver’s (2003) account of typical social dynamics throughout hegemonic cycles of the secular history of modern capitalism tells us that in periods of hegemonic decline, middle-class mobilization increases. In such periods, as the profitability of material investments falls, and capital turns to financial markets, financialization disrupts earlier structures of material production and commerce, and redistributes existing wealth in an increasingly polarized way. That reorganization pushes large sections of middle classes out of their earlier positions globally, causing their political alienation from earlier elite coalition partners, and a search for political tools to regain their positions. Middle class movements in earlier phases of hegemonic declines described by Silver feature characteristics uncannily similar to today’s movements: claims for (lost) democracy, complaints of nepotism, oligarchy, and a general decrying of illegitimate gain by elites, contrary to earlier gains accepted as legitimate (Silver, 2003). These general traits can be detected in both Western and ECE movements today. However, the mutual relationship between simultaneous movements in different locations requires a closer investigation of the mutual positions such groups occupy globally.

In ECE, besides second serfdom, self-supporting kinship-based agriculture, socialist “bound” full employment (Seleny, 1993), or waves of outward migration following the dynamics of global modernity, a typical characteristic of its modern class relations “irregular” from a generalized Western perspective has been the state-related oligarchic nature of its middle classes. In the global development of modern class structures, that has been a typical feature of non-core societies. In the integrated system of the world economy, central economies became the main markets of the world, making it possible for broad middle classes to proliferate, feeding from and feeding into those markets. Non-core economies of the same system cannot sustain
similarly broad middle classes, despite the ambitions of local groups for middle class life standards. Non-core middle classes rather typically act as narrower, oligarchic formations, securing their life standards through occupying higher positions within their country’s subordinate integration into the world market, and spending their incomes on products imported from central economies, thus contributing to core markets rather than their own (Arrighi, 1990). To be able to hold on to some profits from that integration, most often than not they will need protection from the state, often resulting in forms called, from a central perspective, corruption networks. It would be mistaken to describe ECE semi peripheral middle classes as the same sort of social formation as middle classes of the core, who, for some reason, are additionally oligarchic/corrupt as well.

In the history of ECE class and state formation, that oligarchic characteristic of local middle classes has been associated with their affinity toward political entrepreneurship, and the construction of extensive state apparatuses. As Andrew C. Janos put it, in the environment of relative economic backwardness, social groups aiming for Western middle class life standards tended to “use the institutions of states to accomplish what they had not been able to accomplish as economic entrepreneurs” (Janos, 2000: 133). That specific relationship between the economic ambitions and political movements of local middle classes, and the construction of rent-seeking state-related oligarchies is rather a systemic characteristic of the region’s global position, than an irrational mistake in normal grassroots movement development through party capture.

Finally, the relationship between local economic-social relations and local political ideologies in ECE might be considered “irregular”, too, in paradigms based on Western experience. As Janos (2000) demonstrates, contrary to the paradigmatic understanding of local politics as expression of local social relations, the political history of the region throughout the modern period mirrored varying relations of hegemony with external greater powers. Janos notes that institutional-ideological alignments with stronger external allies necessarily contained deviations from hegemonic models, following from the difference in local economic and social relations from those of hegemonic partners. Janos traces a recurrent pattern in ECE middle class political entrepreneurs to internalize political ideologies of hegemonic partners. As such ideological imports reflect not so much local social realities as the position and resource structure of local middle class political entrepreneurs, their political stances often impress local audiences as rootless or theatrical.

Looking at middle-class movements in ECE today, the above considerations might warn us from seeing local movements as versions of the “crisis of democratic capitalism” paradigm. While activists do refer to movements elsewhere as examples of their own paradigms (Bruner, 2011; Shenker and Gabbath 2011), new ECE middle class movements continue to feature traits that disturb such identifications. In their social and democratic claims, new ECE middle class movements reflect the above-mentioned tendency to internalize ideologies of external hegemonic partners. Differences between local realities and the ideologies quoted come to be expressed in the framework of a modernization lag (i.e. the success or failure of post-socialist catching-up projects), bound, in the context of new geopolitical tensions, with the
expression of present grievances in terms of Eastern vs. Western geopolitical alliances. (Gagyi, 2013 and 2014).

The effect of external sponsorship and framing on East European NGOs and movements has been the topic of empirical research and theoretical discussion (McMahon, 2001; Henderson 2003; Stark et al., 2006; Aksartova, 2006; Tarrow and Petrova, 2007; Císař, 2010; for an overview of the “cooptation debate”, see Císař, 2012). While that debate addresses differences in the contexts, function and organization of Western and Eastern European movements and NGOs, it does so within the framework of linear development toward Western models. E.g., the relative lack of social embeddedness of externally funded NGO activity features either as proof of dysfunction – since NGOs should, as in the Western case, work with wide civic participation –, or as proof of compensatory well-functioning within political contexts dysfunctional from the perspective of civic activity in Western terms. As Císař puts it: foreign-dependent social movement organizations “became relatively efficient advocates capable of challenging the prevailing social norms not in spite of their foreign dependency, but rather due to this dependency, which liberated them from the domestic political and cultural context often non-conducive to their goals” (Císař, 2010: 4). The focus on linear development toward Western models, while interpreting sets of characteristics of local movement and NGO activity in categories that have their referents in development tendencies or the lack thereof, may work to obscure the actual East-West relations at work in the specific forms of ECE middle class political activism. Maintaining that bias may hinder SMS to ECE in drawing the consequences of new ECE movements’ specificities on the conceptualization of new European middle class movements.

Conclusion

The article argued that the genealogy of SMS, codified in an “origin story” that helped solidify SMS as a discipline, is bound to a specific time-space context which informed the basic concepts of SMS. In the environment of postwar Western affluent democracies, social movement scholars conceptualized movements as the object of scholarly attention based on the types of movements and state-society relationships characteristic to those environments: identity claims instead of “old” material claims, a stable reliance of democratic rights, the availability of material resources, etc. This environment favored SMS tools which focused on short-term contextual and movement dynamics, and disfavored questions on the relationship of long-term structural processes and material claims. With a new movement wave in Western societies voicing material claims after 2008, the latter question came again to the fore of SMS interest. However, a recently forming consensus which links new movements to the “crisis of democratic capitalism” tends to maintain a bias on Western contexts. In contexts like ECE, where austerity came together with the wave of democratization after 1990, the story of democratic welfarism decomposed by neoliberal austerity does not help to disentangle the relationship between movements and structural processes. As a new wave of movements makes itself felt in ECE, too, and consequently, SMS scholars turn their attention toward the region, the paper asks about possibilities to
transcend the time-space bias implied in earlier SMS frameworks. Looking at the study of post-socialist movements in the region, it argues that the tendency to incorporate the time-space bias on Western postwar experience worked to define movement activity in ECE according to the level of correspondence with Western models of movement and civic activity. That focus on Western models and short-term dynamics worked toward a narrative of weak social movements (due to the socialist past), hiding from view the role of movement politics in the region’s modern history, as well as forms of popular politics and state-society relations not compatible with SMS codifications based on Western contexts.

The article proposes a framework based on the world systems approach to conceive of differences in state-society relations, politics, and social organization in a common global space. It uses the example of new middle class movements against austerity and corruption/oligarchies to illustrate how movements with the same slogans can be compared across contexts using that framework. While slogans and repertoires are similar, the position and function of local movements differ, due to long-term differences in the development of local middle classes, their relations to the state, and the long-term characteristic of East European politics linked to external stronger allies. The short proposition at conceiving East-West differences in new middle class movements within a world systems framework makes those differences appear not as effects of a time lag in a linear development toward Western models, but as simultaneous relations, embedded in a common, yet diverging history of modern development.

References


Císař, O (2008) *Politický aktivismus v České republice (Political Activism in the Czech Republic)*. Brno: CDK.


Fraser, N. (2014) *Democracy’s Crisis*. Presented at a lecture at Erasmus University Rotterdam, upon Nancy Fraser’s receipt of an Honorary Doctorate. November 7, Rotterdam.


Abstract

Drawing on the framing perspective in the study of social movements, the article discusses the possible links between the concept of anti-politics developed by Czech, Hungarian, and Polish dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s, and formal and informal initiatives of the East-Central European civil societies nowadays. It is argued that the historic notion of anti-politics should be applied in the contemporary research on social movements and on any other form of civil activism in the region since it has immense analytical and methodological importance. It allows researchers to recognize different traits of social activity and civil society specific to East-Central Europe, and explain them in a more comprehensive manner. Referring to the historical concept of anti-politics enables the researchers to identify and appreciate characteristic regional discourses, repertoires, and forms of protest in historical and contemporary social movements and to perceive the continuity between them. It also helps identify the mechanism of civil activism. The article’s argument is based on the writings of three dissident movement leaders, namely Vaclav Havel, György Konrád, and Jacek Kuroń. It is being explained how the concept of anti-politics worked as a collective action frame in the 1980s, and the examples of its legacies within the contemporary formal and informal civil activism are given.

Keywords: Anti-politics, East-Central Europe, civil society, social movement, frame analysis.
**Introduction**

The legacy of the democratic opposition and the Polish Solidarity movement in East-Central Europe has been discussed on multiple occasions. Yet, despite the abundant literature on the subject, there are at least a few issues that have been unsatisfactorily examined by researchers. One of them is the question of the influence exerted by ideas developed by dissidents and how these ideas shaped, directly and indirectly, the social and political landscape of the region, especially with regard to fields such as social movements and civil society. Investigations of these topics should mention the concept of anti-politics and the postulate of self-government stemming from it.Interestingly, the terms ‘anti-politics’ is used in social studies to describe and explain the current protests taking place across the globe, including the protests in East-Central Europe, but their distinct meaning, specific to this particular region, is either abandoned or forgotten. As Paul Blokker observed, ‘the earlier [pre-1989] recognition of the more radical sides to dissident thought, as expressed in notions such as civil society, self-government, and anti-politics, has been «tamed» in the predominant liberal reading of democratization.’ (Blokker, 2011: 221) In this article the concept of anti-politics will be re-examined, first by extracting its meaning from dissident writings of the 1970s and 1980s, and then by contrasting it with its widely used homonyms and demonstrating its usefulness as interpretive frame in studies of past and contemporary social movements. By making a distinction between Western and East-Central applications of this term, different traits of social activity and civil society in the region can be recognized and explained in a more comprehensive manner. This article is thus an attempt to answer the call voiced by Barbara Falk on behalf of some researchers to investigate ‘the contribution of dissident legacies to social and cultural patterns in democratic politics’ and ‘their influence on inherited social networks, informal institutions, research groups, think tanks, and even internally referential mental structures such as the «generation of 1989».’ (Falk, 2011: 347). Specifically, the article argues that the historic notion of anti-politics should be applied in the contemporary research on social movements and on any other form of civil activism in the region since it has immense analytical and methodological importance. It allows researchers to recognize different traits of social activity and civil society specific to East-Central Europe, grasp continuity and discontinuity between old and new social initiatives, and explain them in a more comprehensive manner. The article also discusses an application of the framing perspective as one of the possible ways of tracing these dissident legacies.

For the sake of clarity, the argument in this article is based on the writings of three dissident movement leaders, namely Vaclav Havel, György Konrád, and Jacek Kuroń, whose respective milieus of course included numerous other influential figures. This approach, however, may have obvious disadvantages when applied to other contexts. For example, focusing on the dissident elite does not do justice to the actual diversity of the dissident movement. Furthermore, it strengthens the bias towards history shaped by superheroes alone, ignores conflicts of ideas, is blind to social embeddedness and socio-economic representations, and, as such, this ‘superstar narrative’ is widely criticized by scholars (Falk, 2011: 342). Focusing on the ‘big names’ already known to the international audience has the advantage of making it
easier to present the argument, but we choose to do so with the awareness that the authors of the ideas are not as important as the ideas themselves. To paint a full picture of the dissident movement, researchers must include different discourses of resistance and resistance sources (especially in the particularly complex Polish case), however, writing a comprehensive history of dissident thought is not the intention of this article. Havel and Konrád developed the concept of anti-politics, while Kuroń wrote about the related ideas of self-government and self-organization. By self-government he meant an authentic participatory democracy, local government, and workers managing their own factories. Self-organization consisted in establishing independent institutions and informal groups of friends, where knowledge and experience could be shared without the control of the authoritarian state. The change was supposed to emerge from deeply moral attitude of the dissidents, which idea was also familiar to Havel and Konrád. Naturally, their thoughts cannot be considered the essence of the opposition’s intellectual output, and other ideas and intellectual traditions need to be studied and taken into consideration when speaking about the legacy of the dissident movement, e.g., non-violence, Christian moral teaching, the concept of human dignity, and human rights. As Alan Renwick correctly observes, anti-politics was merely one of the strategies (along with the pressure group approach and political opposition) employed by dissidents against the policies of the state, though the reality of the dissident movement appears to be even more complex than the author claims (Renwick, 2006). It is also worth noting that its value as a strategy was doubted by some of the opposition as early as the 1980s, while criticism of anti-politics intensified after 1989, both on the part of former dissidents as well as contemporary theoreticians of liberal democracy. Some examples of this critical stance include the initiatives of Janos Kis in Hungary, Aleksander Hall’s Young Poland Movement, the milieu of Marcin Król’s Res Publica journal, and other initiatives such as the Movement for the Defense of Civil Rights in Poland and the Movement for Civil Freedom in Czechoslovakia (cf.: Falk, 2003; Renwick, 2006). We will examine a few strands of this critique in a later part of this article. For now, let us emphasize the fact that anti-politics cannot be said to have been a dominating strategy, but it was an important one and served as a point of reference for – and left its mark on – other opposition projects.

The article’s argument develops as follow: firstly, we will discuss the frame analysis as a method helpful in tracing the dissident legacies. Secondly, we will provide the context of the anti-politics’ emergence and compare its East-Central European understanding with the popular understanding worldwide. In the next section we will analyze the writings of Jacek Kuroń, Vaclav Havel and György Konrád briefly in order to retrieve the East-Central European meaning of anti-politics from them. Then we will show how anti-politics has functioned as a frame. Finally, there will be examples provided indicating where the researchers may look for the dissident legacies.

Methodological comments

The terms ‘frame’ and ‘framing’ used in social movement studies come from Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1974). They are used to mobilize people around the
common definition of a problem and its potential solutions. They are defined as a ‘schema of interpretation’ that enable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ what is happening around them and in the world as such (Goffman, 1974: 21). Frames organize experience, guide action, simplify and condense aspects of the outside world in ways that are not only intended to ‘mobilize potential adherents and constituents,’ but also to ‘garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614). According to William A. Gamson, collective action frames are important in a social movement’s external communication (especially in mass-media coverage) and in the process of mobilizing consensus within the movement. The collective frames have three components: injustice, agency, and identity (Gamson, 1992; 1995: 90). Injustice refers to moral indignation, which is not just an intellectual judgment but also a ‘cognition laden with emotions’ (Gamson, 1995: 90). Agency means the awareness that ‘it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action’ (Gamson, 1995: 90). Identity is a process of constructing an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Gamson, 1995: 90). In the definition he proposes, Hank Johnston moves the emphasis away from mobilization processes towards strategic planning, cultural currents of international scope, and cognitive schema at the micro-level (Gamson, 1995: 218). The definitions and observations discussed above are the most frequently cited in the literature on social movements and will be employed in this article. In general, frames as mental constructs have hierarchically organized contents, are both individual and social, have both fixed structures and emergent processes, and are based on texts such as written documents as well as speeches, slogans, songs, and pictures (Johnston, 2002: 64-65). Because of its relationship with texts, frame analysis is linked with discourse analysis and ideologies, yet the former and the latter cannot simply be equated (cf. Snow, 2004; Ivancheva, 2007; Steinberg, 1998). The distinction between frame and ideology seems especially important from the perspective of this article. In social life, the relationship between them is problematic: sometimes ideology informs interpretive frames, while at other times ideology is a result of some interpretive frames. The general and unavoidably simplified observation one could make for the sake of this article would be that ideology represents a more stable and coherent set of values, beliefs, and goals than any frame usually does. Frames seem to be more flexible and spontaneous than ideologies, even if they are rooted in them or in any other generally held views defined by the cultural environment of a given social movement (cf. discussion in Steinberg, 1998; Snow, 2004). This distinction is important when speaking about dissident thought in East-Central Europe. The East-Central European dissidents had distanced themselves from any form of ideological thinking.

In order to move our reasoning further, two other methodological comments need to be made. First, the concepts of anti-politics will be treated here as similar to a Weberian ideal type, therefore, to some extent and for the sake of clarity of argumentation, the individual differences between empirical examples will be ignored. Second, anti-political frames were naturally not the only frames operational within the dissident milieu. For example, in the complicated Polish case, divergent ideological strands e.g., corporatist and individualist, liberal and socialist, more or less coexisted, and there were numerous competing narratives of the situation in 1980 and in 1989 as well, e.g., national uprising, workers’ revolution, religious gatherings, democratic self-
liberation, the 'return to Europe,' Westernization, and many others. In this article, it is argued that anti-politics was one of the most important, but not singular, frame in the region. In our view understanding how anti-politics functioned as a frame in 1980s will help us recognize and understand its potential legacies in contemporary social movements and other civil initiatives. One of the ways to achieve this would be to compare the frames of the historic dissident movement and the frames of the contemporary movements and other civil society’s agents. The aim of this article, however, is more modest. By reminding us of the historic concept of anti-politics and indicating the possible anti-political niches within today’s civil society, we would like to lay fundaments for the future research.

It should also be noted that the interpretive framing perspective, one of the theoretical trends in the social movements studies, employed in this article, has previously appeared in discussions on the legacy of the dissident movement. John K. Glenn III uses it in his book Framing Democracy (2001), devoted to the democratic transformations that occurred in Poland and Czechoslovakia, where he focuses his attention on the events of 1989 and applies the theory of social movements correctly, albeit superficially. The framing approach was also used by Mariya Ivancheva in her unpublished M.A. thesis (2007) and the article summarizing it (2011). In these texts, and in many others that do not directly address the theories of social movements, the concept of civil society is presented as the best summary of the events of the 1980s and early 1990s in East-Central Europe (cf. e.g., Cohen and Arato, 1994). Frames perspective is also applied in the article of Marek Payerhin and Ernesto Zirakzadeh on the First Solidarity Congress in 1981, where they argue for the utility of combining two approaches – one that focuses on frames imposed by leaders, and the other that stresses the role of intra-movement discord and decentralization (Payerhin and Zirakzadeh, 2006). Elżbieta Matynia used the John L. Austin’s idea of acting with words and performatives to describe and explain the dynamics of the 1989 events in Poland and the fall of apartheid in the South African Republic (Matynia, 2009). Matynia is far from applying frame analysis to the fall of communism but stresses the importance of naming collective and individual actions. Indirectly, her work may support the idea of paying a closer attention to frames used to guide social movements activities. This article takes as its interpretive frame not the broad idea of civil society, but one of its specific elements: anti-politics. Civil society is understood here as a network of the state independent, not for profit, both formal and informal civil initiatives. Social movements would be a part of civil society understood in this way. Anti-politics may be an attitude taken by a social movement or a non-governmental organization, a frame to mobilize and guide their members, and a strategy developed by citizens.

**Anti-politics in the East-Central European context**

Today, the term ‘anti-politics’ is usually applied to activities that contest official politics and economics. In this sense, ‘anti-politics’ is a word used to describe a broad spectrum of different phenomena, including voting abstention or voting for populist movements, all sorts of anarchist initiatives, street riots, sit-ins and new urban
movements, and, last but not least, any rhetoric undermining the importance of politics, political parties, voting, etc. It is not just a mere lack of interest in politics or indifference to it, which would characterize an apolitical attitude, but actual contestation. Using the term ‘anti-politics’ to describe the activities of non-governmental organizations (e.g., Fischer, 1997) or to discuss the boundaries and tasks of civil society is also fairly common. As we can see, many different symptoms of dissatisfaction, many forms of protest, and many social practices can get tied up in the ‘anti-politics’ narrative. Anti-politics as a concept certainly needs careful defining. Paul Blokker noted that one of the ways of understanding ‘anti-political politics’ is by ‘highlighting critical views on formal, instituted and instrumentalised politics, as for instance articulated in such movements as Occupy or the Indignados’ (Blokker, 2012: 4). Blokker, however, is aware of the many meanings of the term ‘anti-politics.’ He considers the concept of ‘anti-politics’ as elaborated by East-Central European dissidents as a ‘related’ and a ‘rich tradition,’ but also as one that is ‘not only about rejecting formal politics and elites, but involves a positive moment of self-organizing democracy, seeking individual and collective autonomy, and «living in truth»’ (Blokker 2012: 4). Blokker is right in pointing out these differences between the modern, Western understanding of anti-politics, and the ‘old’ and East-Central European one, yet in my view, the difference between the two is much greater and will be examined further in this paper. Evoking the idea of anti-politics 25 years after 1989 also means dealing with their social and political legacies, as well as the legacy of Communism, including the conformism and passivity it instilled.

In the narrow sense, anti-politics can be viewed as an idea with a handful of adherents. However, in the broader sense it is one of the constitutive phenomena of East-Central European dissidence, which should be examined from several perspectives. First, in relation to the ideals of Europe’s 1968 generation. Second, from the perspective of the dissidents’ own reflections and experiences, including their unsuccessful attempts at reforming socialism and confronting the authoritarian system. Also relevant to our understanding of the roots of East-Central European anti-politics are the attempts on the part of the dissidents to enter into dialog with the non-violence movement, the human rights movement, and, last but not least, Christianity. Dissident thought did not comprise a homogeneous set of ideas, and if we were to follow the request of its authors, we would not even call it political thought, as they themselves would reject the name. We would also be careful about using the very word “dissident,” as the interested parties had reservations about the term (cf. Havel, 1985), preferring instead to refer to themselves as the “democratic opposition,” before eventually succumbing to the linguistic custom of the West for the sake of mutual understanding. In view of dissident activities and their outcomes, anti-politics was clearly a contradiction in itself, for some commentators even a mystification of reality: the dissidents claimed that they were not engaging in politics, while at the same time being deeply involved in it and transforming it in the long run. This is one of the reasons why as early as the 1980s, and particularly after 1989, anti-politics as an ideal was rejected by some former dissidents: in their view, anti-politics is what one does when one cannot become a politician. Yet there were other reasons for abandoning the concept. Jerzy Szacki, for example, remarked that the main weakness of anti-politics was ‘its programmatic aversion to designing concrete political arrangements
that could be instituted after the fall of communism,’ as well as its language, which ‘from the start had been an obstacle to a clear understanding of its political message.’ It became anachronistic ‘much sooner than expected’ (Szaczki, 1995: 81). The rejection of anti-politics as a strategy was due in part to the criticism voiced by theoreticians of liberal democracy, who blamed anti-politics for the failures of new democracies. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, for instance, wrote about the anti-political style of the dissident movement, which, in their view, became a serious obstacle to the foundation of democratic institutions and attitudes (Linz and Stepan, 1996), while Gale Stokes spoke of ‘the negative political price Poland paid in the early 1990s for the positive virtues of the Solidarity movement of the 1980s’ (Stokes, 1993: 214; cf. Glenn, 2001: 204-5; Renwick, 2006).

Other sound arguments against the uncritical adoption of the anti-politics concept as a defining feature of the dissident movement as a whole spring from differences between East-Central European nations. The term ‘anti-politics,’ coined in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, has been seldom used in Poland. Poles spoke instead about ‘new evolutionism’ (Michnik, 1976), the self-limiting revolution, self-government, and solidarity, and the term ‘anti-politics’ would be applied to their efforts only post factum, as was the case with David Ost (1990). The dissident philosophy of Havel and Konrád was more about one’s personal attitude towards the authoritarian state and its institutions rather than action, whereas Poles generally emphasized the need for community organizing and reform. In this sense, and in greatly simplified terms, the Hungarian and Czech dissidents were rather individualistic and elitist with regards to their numbers, whereas the Poles were not quite as exclusive. Yet, on the other hand, as Renwick rightly puts it, the behavior of the Polish dissidents was often different than the ideas they proclaimed, and as such could be regarded as anti-political (Renwick, 2006: 305-313).

Highlighting national differences, e.g., the elitist character of the Hungarian or Czech dissident movements - in terms of their limited size and background, not their views on social equality - and contrasting them with the large numbers of Polish opposition circles, might create an impression that their ideas were not widely known and thus were not very influential. There is, however, some truth to that: their essays were first read by narrow circles of friends, even though the authors were already public figures, and the people who first read them in Poland would go on to become the future leaders of Solidarity. Sociologically speaking, in the Polish case, even if the term ‘anti-politics’ was not used by social movement activists themselves, there are numerous reasons why their actions and thinking could not only be examined from an ‘anti-politics’ perspective, but could actually be considered to constitute ‘anti-politics,’ something we will focus on and explain later in the article. In social reality, ideas do not easily disappear and often have unintended and unexpected consequences. Dissident thought became a reference point for the critique of new democracies, and this is an issue that begs further examination, particularly with regard to the extent to which anti-political ideas have informed the practices of East-Central European NGOs, grassroots organizations and protest movements, as well as their understanding of politics and civil activism.
Constructing the meaning of anti-politics

Jacek Kuroń

The choice of Jacek Kuroń as a representative of the Polish case warrants further explanation. There were many talented leaders who acted within an extensive and dense network of social movements and social initiatives. Standing in favor of him is the fact that he was an active figure, along with Adam Michnik, in the circles that kept in close touch with Vaclav Havel and Charter 77, and was not only an intellectual and politician (after 1989 he was four times elected a Member of Parliament and twice a Minister of Labour and Social Policy) but also, until his death, a social activist; although at the time he was not as well known abroad as Adam Michnik, he was very well known in Poland, and it was he who proposed the idiolect of Polish dissidence, the language that described its experience, hope and strategy (Gawin, 2013: 334). Compared to the writings of Havel and Konrád, Kuroń’s views stand out as radical.

In 1966 Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski coauthored the famous *Open Letter to the Party*, subsequently translated into English, French, German, and Italian, wherein they decried the Polish authoritarian party-state system from the perspective of far-left politics, and foretold the approaching social revolution. The publication of the *Letter* resulted in the arrest of its authors. After the events of 1970, new tendencies emerged in Kuroń’s political thinking. He adopted a more moderate attitude towards the potential revolution and the means of implementing change. Kuroń’s famous adage from that period, ‘Don’t burn committees: set up your own’, a call to abandon violent struggle against the offices and seats of Party power and embrace self-organization instead, also signified that any independent movement, any form of independent culture, any efforts to build free associations could be considered political opposition in and of themselves, and could expand public space and lead to a democracy more genuine than the one presided over by the Party (cf.: Ost, 1990: 64; Falk, 2003; Gawin, 2013). His words also meant that Kuroń expected more from society and its citizens, and valued it more than the state and the parties. He certainly had more confidence that social forces, rather than political or economic ones, would bring about the most desirable changes. He proposed the same strategy in 1980s, after the rise of Solidarity and the introduction of martial law. Influenced by his encounters with members of the Club of Catholic Intellectuals, he considered converting to Christianity, but ultimately settled on accepting certain tenets of Christianity as his personal philosophy. In 1982, he described himself as an adherent of ‘radical politics and moderate aims’ (Kuroń, 1984: 218) and remained faithful to that declaration, as well to the ideas of the left, until his death.

Unlike Havel and Konrád, the main idea permeating his writings from the period preceding the emergence of the Polish Solidarity movement in 1980 and few years after it was not anti-politics, but self-government and the promotion of an active citizenship. Therefore, the main argument of this subchapter will be based on his essays collected in *Polityka i odpowiedzialność* (*Politics and Responsibility*), published in London in 1984, in which he developed this concept. Kuroń’s writings, in contrast to Havel and Konrád’s, were the most concrete and laid down a complete program of
action along with recommended tactics. According to Kuroń, Polish dissidents had two goals: democracy and national independence. Kuroń did not use the term ‘anti-politics’ in his writing, but instead employed other concepts present in East-Central European political thought: living in dignity, living in truth, solidarity, self-government, true democracy, non-violence, etc. He is mentioned here, because his ideas and experience to some extent prepared the ground for the dissident and anti-political attitudes to emerge.

Self-organization, advocated so fiercely by Kuroń, translates into the establishment of social ties. He considered the fact that Poles were deprived of the normal political life implicit in a parliamentary democracy to be both a curse and a blessing. A curse for obvious reasons, and a blessing because the people could strengthen spontaneous interpersonal relationships, learn what true political engagement was about, and attach themselves to democratic ideals, which, paradoxically, was not that common in well-established Western democracies. Self-organization was considered a true weapon against the totalitarian state. The left wing of the Polish opposition would then stress the anti-totalitarian, rather than anti-Communist, character of their activities. In their thinking, democracy was opposed to totalitarianism, society to power, and self-organization to the state. In this context, the term ‘democracy’ denotes a system of values and self-government rather than a constitutional arrangement and a given political regime. The ambiguity of its use is further strengthened by the distance the Polish leftist dissidents maintained from representative and liberal democracy, seeing them as ‘Western’ (Gawin, 2013: 336). Kuroń’s thinking was rooted in Marxist ideas of praxis and was in dialog with the writing of Adam Michnik. The commentators also compare this call to Masaryk’s idea of ‘public work’ and to de Tocqueville’s idea of free institutions mediating between political and local levels of government (Falk, 2003: 187-8). Neither the attitude espoused by Kuroń nor the stance of the Solidarity movement can be described as anti-political in the sense of their refraining from formulating political programs, as they not only formulated such programs, but even encouraged citizens to act within the boundaries of existing law. However, these attitudes can be described as anti-political in the weaker, less radical sense: the goal, after all, was to provoke action on the part of society and to build institutions that were independent of the state, not to seize power (cf. Renwick, 2006: 311).

Vaclav Havel

‘Without exaggeration,’ writes Barbara Falk, ‘Havel’s essay «The Power of the Powerless» was the single most important theorization of the dissident movements in East-Central Europe prior to 1989’ (Falk, 2003:215). She quotes one of the Polish dissidents, Zbigniew Bujak, who said: ‘Reading it gave us theoretical underpinnings for our activity. It maintained our spirits (...). When I look at the victories of Solidarity and Charter 77, I see in them an astonishing fulfillment of the prophecies and knowledge contained in Havel’s essay’ (Falk, 2003: 215). When the future Czech president wrote his famous essay - at the behest of Adam Michnik, whose role as a Polish dissident began in March 1968 and who went on to become editor in chief of
the country’s largest and most influential independent newspaper – he was already well-known internationally as a writer and opposition activist. He rose to fame with his letter to Alexander Dubček on the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the letter, Havel called for the defense of the ideals of the Prague Spring and the concept of socialism with a human face. He was imprisoned numerous times.

In ‘Politics and Conscience’ Havel wrote:

‘I favour «anti-politics», that is, politics not as the technology of power and manipulation, of cybernetic rule over humans or as the art of the useful, but politics as one of the ways of seeking and achieving meaningful lives, of protecting them and serving them. I favour politics as practical morality, as service to the truth, as essentially human and humanly measured care for our fellow humans. It is, I presume, an approach which, in this world, is extremely impractical and difficult to apply in daily life. Still, I know no better alternative’ (Havel, 1987b: 155). ‘Yes, «anti-political politics» is possible. Politics «from below». Politics of man, not of the apparatus. Politics growing from the heart, not from thesis.’ (Havel, 1987b: 157).

The passages quoted above could be read as an echo of Aristotle’s understanding of politics as practical morality, and as moral virtue in action (see: Falk, 2003: 229). For some commentators, like Stanislava Gazurová, they also show a degree of affinity with Christian ethics (Gazurová, 2011). Havel’s understanding of anti-politics, discussed here in reference to his two famous essays: ‘The Power of the Powerless,’ published in 1978, and ‘Politics and Conscience,’ published in 1984, is embedded in the rejection of the ideological power of the post-totalitarian state.

Ideology, ‘a kind of bridge between the regime and the people’ (Havel, 1987a: 43), a lie that ‘runs through each person, though to varying degree’ (Falk, 2003:219), makes all citizens both victims and supporters of the system, because each of them, no matter how bitter it may sound, is capable of living within the lie. It misleads people into thinking that ‘the system is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe’ (Havel, 1987a: 43). Ideology also makes the escape from personal responsibility possible and provides a convenient excuse for personal passivity.

If politics is about lying, then anti-politics is about living in truth. It is the true power of the powerless. Living in truth is ‘a non-violent attempt by people to negate the system within themselves and to establish their lives on a new basis, that of their own proper identity’ (Havel, 1987a: 102). Living in truth is thus at the same time a call to civil disobedience and an ‘existential revolution’. Havel rejected the idea of the ‘political revolution’ not because it was too radical, but it was not radical enough, and thus completely inadequate. Issues more important than just political reconstruction were at stake. ‘The change would have to ‘derive from human existence, from the fundamental reconstruction of the position of people in the world, their relationships to themselves and to each other, and to the universe’ (Havel, 1985: 52). Anti-politics entailed involvement in pre-political activity. That, in turn, meant personal responsibility and the interpenetration of independent, underground society with the
official society of that time. The consequences of such an arrangement, as Havel believed, were unpredictable.

Just like any other motivating idea, anti-politics created a vision of a new society that would be built on its precepts. The new society borne out of living in truth would be characterized by plurality, diversity, self-organization, independent civic initiatives, and small-scale work (in Masaryk’s understanding). It would be something more than Vaclav Benda’s ‘parallel polis’ and Ivan Jirous’ ‘second culture,’ which, in Havel’s view, threatened to shut upstanding citizens in a ghetto. Living in truth must not lead to isolation. The new society would be open to everyone, it would be non-sectarian, and would of course not be based on ideology. An independent society has value in and of itself. The very fact that such an undertaking was occurring would already be meaningful. ‘After all, the parallel structures do not grow a priori out of a theoretical vision of systemic changes (there are no political sects involved), but from the aims of life and the authentic needs of real people’ (Havel, 1987a: 102).

One last thing worth noticing is Havel’s understanding of the relationship between the West and the East. He thought that both East and West were experiencing the same deep crisis of humanity. He wrote: ‘The post-totalitarian system is only one aspect (…) of this general inability of modern humanity to be the master of its own situation. The automatism of the post-totalitarian system is merely an extreme version of the global automatism of technological civilization’ (Havel, 1986: 115). The only difference between East and West lies in the social and political forms that the crisis takes. Havel continued: ‘There is no real evidence that Western democracy, that is, democracy of the traditional parliamentary type, can offer solutions that are any more profound. It may even be said that the more room there is in the Western democracies (compared to our world) for the genuine aims of life, the better the crisis is hidden from people and the more deeply do they become immersed in it’ (Havel, 1986: 115-116). Havel thought that no Western democratic mechanisms ‘could make society proof against some new form of violence’ (Havel, 1986: 117).

György Konrád

In Hungary, the intellectual opposition was formed mostly by economists and social scientists, among whom the best known outside Hungary was probably the writer and urban sociologist György Konrád. The most striking thing about his writing is his elitist and solitary view of the dissidents’ role, which appears to have stemmed not from personal beliefs as much as his ascertainment of his own condition and external circumstances. Through his friendship and collaboration with the sociologist Iván Szelényi, with whom he published ‘The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power’ in 1974, Konrád learned of the ideas of the Budapest School. He was also friends with Miklós Haraszti. Banned from publishing in Hungary, Konrád spent the 1980s traveling through America, Australia, and Western Europe.

Unsurprisingly, according to Konrád, politics was all about power and only about power. ‘Any approach to politics is bound to fail if it strays far from the standpoint of that political genius Machiavelli, who explained power by saying that power wills itself and that the prince wants not only to gain power but also to keep and
enlarge it’ Konrád wrote in 1982 (Konrád, 1987: 93), and then explained: ‘for the rest of us who are not politicians, the less power a politician has, the better – the less we have to fear from him’ (Konrád, 1987: 94), because ‘there lives in every politician more or less of the delirium that was Hitler’s demon’ (Konrád, 1987: 95). Politics means fraud, bureaucracy, unnecessary regulations, war, and the absence of democracy. Politics is what happens in a nation-state. Politics inevitably invokes ideology, which means living within a lie. Konrád’s idea of politics was clearly rooted in his experience of the authoritarian state, Communism, and the Cold War, but it could, at least to some extent, be applied to any set of circumstances. The remedy against politics perceived in this particular way was obviously anti-politics.

Konrád’s perception of anti-politics was congruous with Havel’s to a significant degree. For Konrád, as Falk observes, ‘antipolitics is both noun and verb, vision and action, moral force and political strategy’ (Falk, 2003: 301), ‘both means and end’ (Falk, 2003: 303); ‘primacy of local over central, individual over collective (…), democracy over its alternatives, and politics over economics’ (Falk, 2003: 306). What separates him from Havel, however, is the concept of civil society that appears in his essay. He wrote:

‘… antipolitics is the ethos of civil society, and civil society is the antithesis of military society. There are more or less militarized societies – societies under the sway of nation states whose officials consider total war one of the possible moves in the game. Thus military society is the reality, civil society is a utopia’ (Konrád, 1987: 92).

Konrád was deeply concerned with the realities of the Cold War and the bipolar model of the world. According to him, ‘only antipolitics offers a radical alternative to the philosophy of a nuclear *ultima ratio*’ (Konrád, 1987: 92). Reading it from this perspective, Falk is right when she states that ‘Konrád’s notion of anti-politics can be compared with the social movement activism of the New Left, as well as postmodern decentralized political action, reliant upon overlapping and multiple identities and bases of resistance’ (Falk, 2003: 302). Yet in his famous essay, Konrád distanced himself from social activism. He wrote: ‘thinking people are needed. We are peacemakers, not revolutionaries’ (Konrád, 1987: 113). ‘I do not believe that a new Central European identity will arise on the wings of emotionally charged movements, even mass movements, with the stormy popular tribunes and revolutionary personalities that typically go with them,’ he explained (Konrád, 1987: 114) and added: ‘No thinking person should want to drive others from positions of political power in order to occupy them himself.’ (Konrád, 1987: 120). His main audience at the time were intellectuals like himself.

Konrád’s understanding of ideology is parallel with Havel’s and will not be discussed here at length. Much more interesting are his ideas about the possible future society. Konrád advocated for a specific kind of liberal democracy. The democracy he proposed would be based on self-organization and self-government. ‘Self-management is the question of questions’, he wrote (Konrád, 1987: 143), describing it as a core Central European characteristic: ‘the demand for self-government is the organizing focus of the new Central European ideology’ (Konrád, 1987: 196). He postulated a
return to the ‘true’ meaning of democracy as genuine citizen participation, perceiving democracy in substantive rather than procedural terms. He considered it ‘more important and more basic than the reform of income and property relations’ (Konrád, 1987: 189). The change that would bring about the ideological neutrality of the state, the multiparty system, and self-government would have to start from the bottom up. A social change would bring a political one into effect; ideological pluralism within society would result in the establishment of political pluralism. ‘Self-management means that representative democracy spreads from the political sphere to the economic and cultural spheres as well. It means that democracy is the prevailing principle of legitimacy in the factory, in the research institute, in every institution – not Party rule or corporate rule’ (Konrád, 1987: 139). This ideal of ‘greater democratism’ is consonant with Kuroń’s self-organization (Falk, 2003: 303) and is certainly inspired by the Hungarian Workers’ Councils of 1956. As in Havel’s writing, Konrád’s work also contains the idea of a ‘third way’ that would lead to a post-Communist and post-capitalist society (Konrád, 1987: 140; cf. Kuroń, 1984). Strongly advocating for many different direct democratic solutions, including self-governing factories and cities, Konrád turned to liberal democracy with the view that ‘real reform is possible only in liberal democracies, where the majority, after hearing out the views of the minority, can act to change laws’ (Konrád, 1987: 188).

Václav Havel and György Konrád coined the term ‘anti-politics’, while Jacek Kuroń and his friends paved the way to it. They certainly had one thing in common: a strong distaste for the politics of the authoritarian socialist state. Their critique stemmed from different sources and led to different conclusions. Their goal was to keep moral clarity, and in order to do so, they recommended either staying away from any form of politics (Konrád), living in truth and dedicating oneself to organic work (Havel), or engaging in community organizing and trying to influence politics from this angle. Moreover, they discovered that ‘established patterns of political thinking from the past or borrowed from Western societies would not work in the conditions of real socialism,’ as noted by Jerzy Szacki (1995: 78). They were looking for specific solutions to their specific problems, the problems of the East-Central Europeans, while acknowledging that the challenges they were facing were just different manifestations of the crisis afflicting the modern world (Havel, 1985). As stated above, Havel and Konrád refused to identify themselves with any traditional orientation within the political thought spectrum. In Szacki’s opinion, their ideas cannot simply be reduced to ‘just another version of the «organic work» program,’ since it would ignore the original character of their concepts and would fail to ‘appreciate its hidden radicalism and the fact that its architects were not seeking to withdraw from politics but rather to find a way of engaging in it that would be adequate to the situation of «post-totalitarian» society’ (Szacki, 1995: 78).
Anti-politics as a frame

Having reconstructed the meaning of anti-politics to members of opposition movements at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, we should consider how it served as an interpretive frame, how it motivated members of social movements, and what strategies it provided them.

Anti-politics as a collective action frame contained all three components mentioned by Gamson and discussed in section 1 of this article. Injustice was defined by constant state surveillance, legal obstacles to civil activism and self-organization, unlawful actions perpetrated by the authorities, persecution of independent intellectuals and religious people, and, less importantly, by poor economic conditions. Yet the greatest injustice was that people were detached from themselves and forced to live within a lie about their human identity and potential. Since injustice was defined in these existential terms, agency had to be defined at this level as well, and it meant non-violent, moral revolution that would lead to self-organization, self-government and ideological pluralism, and in the future, to a democracy that would be direct rather than representative, a unique East-Central European achievement.

Satisfying human needs (psychological, spiritual, cultural, and political ones, in this order) was found to be more important than satisfying economic necessities. Anti-politics as a frame also succeeded in creating strong identities. ‘We’ were people of good will: democratic, non-politicians, people who tried to live in truth, the representatives of society. ‘They’ were politicians and all those in power, ideologists, violent people (cf.: Payerhin and Zirkakzadeh, 2006). The division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ should not, however, be understood in terms of simple populism, for at least several reasons. Firstly, the dissidents themselves made efforts to distance themselves from populist movements long before 1989, emphasizing their cosmopolitan values, as was the case in Hungary with the split between the népi and demokratikus ellenzék (Falk, 2003: 125–129). Secondly, the term ‘we’ did not refer to any specific social group: it applied neither to the workers nor the intellectuals, while the concept of the nation, which was important in such mass movements as Solidarity, was not particularly compelling to Havel or Konrád, much less to Kuroń. The ‘we’ had fluid boundaries: anyone could become a part of the group as long as they experienced an ‘existential revolution’, even a former member of the system. Finally, the goal was neither to seize power in the state nor to seek emotional revenge. ‘We’ very often meant simply ‘society’, ‘society against the state’. The commentators of the Polish democratic opposition wrote that ‘the agent or the subject of the transformation must be an independent or rather a self-organizing society aiming not at social revolution but a structural reform achieved as a result of organized pressure from below’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 32). Michnik’s ‘new evolutionism’ and Kuroń’s ‘self-limiting revolution’ represented thus ‘a strategic and normative break with the revolutionary tradition whose logic was understood to be undemocratic and inconsistent with the self-organization of society’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 32).

1J.K. Glenn III also described civil society as a collective action frame using the three elements listed by Gamson (Glenn, 2001).
Why were these frames successful? First of all, because their architects, renowned public figures, managed to combine a respect for people’s individual experiences and definitions of the problem with their own program for action. The opposition leaders were able to transform their previous narratives (like Jacek Kuroń, they succeeded in shedding their revisionist ideas and moved towards a universal language of dignity, truth, self-organization, and the fight against totalitarianism). The frames they offered resonated both with the audiences’ prior beliefs, worldviews, and life experiences, as well as the existing cultures of the region (Williams, 2007). Frame alignment (‘the linkage or conjunction of individual and social movements organization interpretive frameworks’, Snow et al., 1986: 467) took the form of frame bridging (the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem, Snow et al., 1986: 467; cf. also della Porta, 2006: 73-85). The leaders of the dissident movement took into account the other groups’ interpretations of the situation that already existed within their societies. At first, these interpretations did not appeal to the dissidents, but they gradually came to see their utility. A good example of that process is the establishment of relationships with Christian organizations and the adaptation of their idiolect. Konrád wrote: ‘The autonomy and solidarity of human beings are the two basic and mutually complementary values to which the democratic movement relates other values. To that extent, it stands close to the Judeo-Christian ethic’ (Konrád, 1987: 124).

On the other hand, this universal, essayistic language, full of mobilizing ideas, that at once had been a source of the dissidents’ strength and success, turned out to be their biggest weakness after 1989 due to the lack of a comprehensive program of action, not one that would put the nation on the road to the democracy but one for action within the democracy already in place. According to Szacki, the shunning of politics at the beginning of the 1980s was later viewed as a ‘tactical necessity’ (Szaczki, 1995: 77) stemming from the fact that ‘the opponents of communism had no real power at their command’ (Szaczki, 1995: 78). When it became clear that they actually had some influence on politics, the ‘new evolutionism’ and ‘organic work’ narrative was quickly replaced with that of the ‘self-limiting revolution’ (Szacki, 1995: 78). Certainly, anti-politics was much more than just a ‘tactical necessity,’ but the anti-political frame proved to be more suitable for mobilizing people than for directing their actions.

Adherents of the new liberal democracy, among whom there are many former dissidents, are another source of anti-politics critiques. They questioned its usefulness as a basis for a liberal democracy. Despite its anti-ideological aura, the idea was far from neutral in matters of politics (Szacki, 1995: 81). This observation has had at least two consequences. Firstly, ‘anti-politics’ lost its allure because of the vision of politics and a good life it entailed. This vision turned out to be not entirely compatible with the liberal public philosophy that refuses to take a stand on moral issues, and wants to appease conflicts rather than feed them. Secondly, the activism it supported (in the Polish case) was not well received by the new post-1989 elites who, for the sake of social and political stability, as well as economic reforms, preferred a technocratic government to the unpredictable nature of participatory democracy. These and many other voices demonstrate a certain anti-politics fatigue, given that it seems to have been...
The historical anti-political frame and contemporary East-Central European civil society

An examination of anti-politics in its historical sense provides a stepping-stone for the adequate description and explanation of the dynamics at play in the local protests of today. It is true that new concepts and forms of politics, anti-politics, and post-politics have emerged since the early 1980s but the aim of this article is neither to enter into a dialogue with them or with contemporary philosophy, nor to apply their categories in the analysis of contemporary social movements, much less to determine which of these concepts is correct and most desirable. The primary aim is to shed light on the fact that the ideas and interpretive frames of the past may prove crucial to the understanding of contemporary social movements in East-Central Europe, while also identifying the places where that legacy is most apparent today, and, finally, to initiate a discussion on the mechanisms behind that influence, which is much more interesting than the mere statement of fact regarding the popularity of former interpretive frames. In summary, when faced with a declared lack of interest in politics or when observing the trend towards the creation of extra-political enclaves, both the scholar of contemporary East Central-European NGOs and the researcher of social movements must ask herself to what extent the phenomenon at hand is an expression of contemporary global tendencies, and to what extent is it an expression of local patterns and values.

The research quoted in this article demonstrates the presence of anti-political ideas and attitudes in East-Central Europe and indicates some possible niches where we could look for dissident legacies, always carefully examining their origins and character. These legacies encounter ambiguous comments and are perceived both as an asset of the region’s societies and as their weakness. In this part and in the previous section of the article, we focus on the experience of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, though East-Central Europe has witnessed many protests in recent years. Their enumeration and discussion exceeds the scope and aim of this article.

In terms of ideas, the legacy of the dissident movement is difficult to trace, but there are fields where we could find its mark more readily than in others.

Firstly, we could take a look at some informal and formal initiatives that stemmed directly from the dissidence movement. Here, a good example of the informal initiatives might be some of the protests of the 1990s and 2000s lead either by the former Solidarity members or inspired by the Solidarity’s eclectic social program. The protesters and their demands of the radical participatory democracy and workers’ self-management of their factories were publicly condemned, and the majority of the former dissidents distanced themselves from the protesters. The protesters’ demands were radical and indeed not very popular. On the other hand the supporters of these protests considered the public attitude as a betrayal of the dissidence ideals (cf. Ost, 2005; Górski, 2007).
Another example of this type, but more formal than the former one, is certainly the third sector, the network of NGOs and urban movements. This part of civil society has been formed, to some extent, by former dissidents and the new generation of activists, the latter often related to or molded by the older generation, and is playing an increasingly important role. Interestingly, some studies show that some NGOs demonstrate an ambiguous attitude towards official politics, and, naturally, the question arises whether this attitude is the effect of the general post-political mood or the legacy of the dissident movement. (e.g., Katarzyna Jezierska’s ongoing studies of the Polish NGOs). There are also attempts at building identities of movements using at least parts of the legacy of the dissidents as a foundation, as in the case of the new Polish leftist group, Krytyka Polityczna (Political Critique) which has published the writings of Jacek Kuroń and organizes conferences dedicated to him and his work.

Another field where we could look for traces of anti-political legacy is the broadly understood public discourse and public debate. Some authors talk about the oversymbolization of politics, and symbolic overheating of the public debate (Kubik, 2015). When describing the legacy of the Polish Solidarity movement in the public discourse, Jack Bielecki noticed, for example, that ‘the value discourse was evident in both the post-communist and the post-solidarity forms. (...) In both contexts, politics was largely framed in a language of morality, identity and value, infused with a mission mentality.’ (Bielecki, 2015: 80-81; Brier, 2009: 75-78). Bielecki also argues that discourse structured in such a way made ‘difficult [for Poland] the passage to «normal» politics based on interest representation and political compromise’ (Bielecki, 2015: 91). At the macro level, the frame ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ still present in the first decade after 1989 and crucial to understanding the post-Communist divisions in Polish politics, has been gradually replaced with the frame ‘us’ versus ‘us,’ marking the post-Solidarity divide between those ‘faithful’ to anti-politics and those adapting to a more pragmatic vision of public life. When speaking about public discourse, we should mention the efforts to shape it in terms of civic republican ideas of the common good, civic associations, endorsements of self-rule and autonomy by some of the participants (Blokker, 2011; Dryzek, 2000; Cizewsk, 2010). Republican dimensions of dissident ideas cannot be directly translated to anti-politics in Western terms, but can be related to the politics of anti-politics as practiced by East-Central Europeans.

The third field in which the dissident legacy can be observed is the critique of post-Communist politics and societies. In this case, not only does it provide ‘a critique of the present, but also a political model of reshaping it’ (O’Dwyer, 2014: 182). This critique has its own repertoire, which could also be discussed from an anti-political perspective. One example of such a critique will be described here at length.

Anti-politics appears in relation to the commemoration of the events of 1989 among civil society groups, mostly student organizations like Opona and Inventura demokracie in 2009. Parallel to the official celebrations, these nonprofit groups organized happenings that combined art and theater, marches, and educational seminars to present personal stories of those who had lived under Communism. They organized a traveling exhibition, meetings with politicians, and an international conference. Inventura demokracie issued an anti-political-style manifesto in which they demanded ‘a proper reflection on our Communist past’ because ‘even today we have to expose new and stealthy forms of totalitarianism and react to them.
appropriately.’ This is crucial as the ‘participation in the public sector becomes more and more distasteful’ (see O’Dwyer, 2014: 184). Instead of withdrawal into the private sphere, the authors proposed political engagement and civic control over politicians, among whom only Vaclav Havel is ever considered a positive character. Their actions were dedicated to young people, ‘the so-called first free generation.’ Bernhard and Kubik observed that the students’ commemoration of the fall of Communism organized in 2009 ‘did not invoke the «heroic» version of Czech history, but its Švejkian rendition, albeit combined with a public stance inspired by the Havelian spirit of «anti-politics»’ (O’Dwyer, 2014: 287). This revival of anti-politics, according to Conor O’Dwyer (2014), invoked dissident ideas and tactics in order to form ‘a moral critique of post-communist Czech democracy and, in particular, the political class, regardless of party affiliation. Czech politicians were, in this view, hypocritical, self-serving, and untruthful – in short, unworthy of the ideals of the revolution. In this way, these civil societal groups attempted to use the past as tool to change the political present’ (O’Dwyer, 2014: 182-183). The anti-political attitude among Czech NGOs and other grassroots organizations did not falter with time. O’Dwyer recalls that during the Velvet Revolution, the Civic Forum, comprising different anti-Communist groups, refused to be labeled as a political party. When, in 1990, it ‘did run as a party in the first free elections, its campaign was marked by self-mockery, irony, and willful amateurism.’ As one observer wrote, ‘Having long endured a politics imposed from above, full of insufferably wooden rhetoric, elaborate ceremony, and self-important men in cheap suits and slicked-back hair, they [Civic Forum] decided the only antidote was to make this campaign into a carnival’ (Horn, 1990: 11). In 2009, carnival and mockery would again be deployed against the political class’ (O’Dwyer, 2014: 182).

Lastly, we could investigate the presence of anti-political ideals in the contemporary civil activism that not refers directly to the former dissident movement. Ivancheva considers alter-globalist movements and new social movements that subvert the political process, parties, and state institutions to be just such a field (Ivancheva, 2007). In the case of Hungary, the legacy of opposition ideals can inform a reanalysis of the protests of the 1990s, described by András Bozóki (1996), as well as the protests that have occurred in recent years, such as the so-called Budapest Autumn of 2014, which did not display anti-systemic features, but involved the participation of a variety of social groups that did not represent any specific party and had gathered in the name of universal civic values (cf. Szabó and Mikecz, 2015). In the case of Poland one might reflect on the uses of anti-political rhetoric within anti-ACTA protests (Jurczyszyn et al., 2014).

**Conclusions**

Were dissident ideas meaningless, were the declarations of serious contributions to ‘the culture of self-determination for individuals, for groups, for the nation, and for the continent as a whole’ (Konrád, 1987: 124) mere boasts? Or maybe they were ‘truly original conceptions’ that ‘not without reason (…) aroused a lot of interest, even enthusiasm, far beyond the confines of the region.’ Does anti-politics really have ‘all of
the makings to assume a lasting place in the history of political thought and emancipation strategies’ (Szacki, 1995: 81)? Certainly, the other option is close to the reality and the specific character of East-Central European civil societies and the ideas that formed them must find a more important place in social movement studies. The anti-politics of the 1980s was a result of the situation in which East-Central European countries had found themselves and the subject of dialog between the East and West, but also a lesson that the East wanted to teach to the West, reminding the latter about the foundations of democracy. It was a Utopian project whose prospects for success were questionable from the very start. It disappeared as an interpretive frame along with the change in political circumstances, but since then it has served as a handy tool (cf. Swidler, 1986) and often unacknowledged point of reference for subsequent protests on matters both political and non-political. Thus looking back to it enables us to identify and appreciate characteristic regional discourses, repertoires, and forms of protest in historical and contemporary social movements. It also allows us perceive the continuity between them. Finally, it helps identify the mechanism behind the intermingling of historical and regional content, resources, discourses, and practices with contemporary content, discourses, and practices born in the region but frequently borrowed from outside. For these reasons, it is crucial that we account for anti-political legacy in the study of manifestations of contemporary civil society in East-Central Europe.

**Primary Sources**


References


Abstract

In line with the general tendency in post-communist societies, several waves of youth research reported the low interest in politics amongst young people in Hungary from late 1990s until 2010 (Csákó et al., 1999; Bognár, 2010; Gazsó and Laki, 2000; Örkény, 2000; Gazsó and Szabó, 2002; Szabó, 2009). However, two political movements emerged that successfully attracted young supporters and managed to enter the Hungarian parliament in 2010: LMP, a center-leftist party, and Jobbik, a radical rightist party.

In-depth interviews with four young LMP and four Jobbik activists were carried out to examine how different agents of socialization contributed to political participation, and the influences that determine whether one or the other path is chosen, i.e., a democratic, leftist, or a radical rightist one. Informal socialization agents, such as the family and peer influences and political events played an important role in political socialization, while the influence of formal agents, such as school education was missing. The groups shared the same events as clues to their political awakening. In spite of starting from their shared generational community, they chose different solutions according to the ideologies stemming from their political socialization.

Our results about the lack of institutional influences on political socialization indicates the relevance of fostering future changes in the role of schools in conveying norms for democracy.

Keywords: Political Socialization, Youth Activism, Political Participation, Post-communist Hungary.
Introduction

Political participation amongst the youth in Europe and specifically in post-socialist Hungary

The decrease of political participation - in the form of voting and party activism - amongst young people is an important topic of investigation all over Europe, considering that participation is particularly important in determining the quality of democracy (Merkel and Croissant, 2004; Svetlozar, 2005). It is especially relevant for Eastern and East-Central European new democracies with post-communist heritage seeking improvement and stabilization of the quality of democracy, though political participation amongst the youth is even more limited in these countries (Robertson, 2009). Youth research on political participation looks at three basic forms of political participation in general: involvement in formal/institutional politics (e.g., voting, party activism), informal/protest activities (e.g., participating in demonstrations or new social movements) and civic engagement (e.g., doing voluntary work) (Chisholm and Kovacheva, 2002). The observation of a general decrease in formal/institutional participation in both established and new democracies has been widely supported by empirical data (Rose and Munro, 2003; van Biezen, 2003; Whiteley, 2011). The question is whether it reflects a crisis for democracy, or the transformation of participation amongst the youth: as we clearly see that young people choose new, and more informal forms of activism, like protest activities instead of party activism (Forbrig, 2005; Kovacheva, 2005; Robertson, 2009). Several studies suggest that the latter explanation is valid in Western democracies (Dalton, 2000; Norris, 2003), but this does not seem to be the case in Eastern, post-communist democracies. In these countries both formal and informal forms of participation remained low amongst the generation raised after the democratic transition, despite the fact that they do not even have personal experience of the socialist era (Wallace and Kovacheva, 1998; Robertson, 2009).

Despite the importance of investigating this generation in post-communist countries to understand their relation to politics and to reveal possible ways of mobilizing them, there is a lack of empirical work focusing on this question (Robertson, 2009). We would like to fill this gap with this qualitative case study carried out in Hungary amongst young party activists of two new Hungarian parliamentary parties. Our aim is to understand the influences that lead to conventional forms of activism in a context of general low level of political participation. Furthermore, we are interested in the differences between the political socialization of those choosing a democratic, leftist path and those opting for a radical rightist one.

Hungarians were characterized by a low level of all forms of political activism in comparison with the European average until the early 2010’s (Szabó and Kern, 2011).\(^2\) The European Social Survey 2008/2009 shows that party membership was the

\(^2\) This trend of low levels of protest activities has changed recently: there were some examples of mobilization amongst the youth against measures of the Fidesz government; e.g., student protests in 2012, mass street protests against a proposed Internet tax in 2014, and various protest actions against the government’s anti-immigrant campaign in 2015.
lowest amongst Hungarian youth – besides Polish youth – in the 28 countries of the EU (Szabó and Kern, 2011). Research has consistently found that young people are indifferent toward and reject the world of politics (Csákó, et. al., 1999; Gazsó and Laki, 2000 and 2004; Örkény, 2000; Gazsó and Szabó, 2002; Szabó, 2009; Bognár, 2010).

Within this context of low political interests, two new movements managed to become parliamentary parties in the 2010 national elections and gain popularity amongst young supporters: LMP (Politics Can Be Different) and Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary). LMP declared itself as a green, liberal-leftist party, founded in 2008 with the purpose of reforming Hungarian politics, while Jobbik, a patriotic party founded in 2003, offered a radical right-wing alternative. The ratio of young supporters of LMP under 30 years of age was 43 per cent, while of Jobbik it was 40 per cent (Sik, 2011). They are still the most appealing parties for university and college students: 35 per cent would vote for Jobbik, and 25 per cent would choose LMP (Szabó, 2015).

The present study

We carried out semi-structured in-depth interviews with young activists of LMP and Jobbik in 2012 to explore their political socialization through their personal stories of activism. Our aim was to understand how their political socialization led them to political participation in a post-socialist society where this form of activism is especially rare, even with the increasing support of these parties amongst the youth. Additionally, we were interested in their decisive influences that made them join either a moderate, left-wing, or to a radical right-wing party.

We used open-ended research questions to fit in with our method of using semi-structured interview allowing an analysis of the phenomenon in its complexity, and enabling patterns to emerge from the texts. However, we used the literature on political socialization and political participation as reference points for our interview guideline, coding and analysis.

Our research questions were the following: (1) What are the roles of agents of political socialization in becoming party activists? (2) In what ways do agents of socialization determine whether a moderate left-wing, or a radical right-wing path is chosen? (3) What are the commonalities in the mobilization of the activists based on their generational community?

Thereinafter, a theoretical framework of political socialization followed by a description of the political context of the study is provided. Subsequently, we introduce the methods and then the results supported by quotes from the interviews. Finally, we conclude our findings in a common discussion and conclusion section.
Political socialization theory constitutes the central focus of this study. Political socialization is a lifelong interactive relationship between the person and the politicized society (Szabó, 2009). It is also the developmental processes by which people acquire political cognition, attitudes, and behaviors (Powell and Cowart, 2013). Agents of socialization convey relevant information and reference points that help people construct their own opinions and values in the social world (Bar-Tal and Saxe, 1990). Political socialization is a lifelong process, but childhood and adolescence play the most important roles in the formation of political attitudes through both political and non-political influences (Muxel, 1992; Deth and Abendschön, 2011; Szabó, 2009). Identity formation is a basic element of political socialization, as socialization is about the construction of identity (Percheron, 1974). The connection between political socialization and identity formation becomes apparent especially in the investigation of the effects of education (Adams, 1985). Therefore, we also focus on the effects of schooling.

Through the interaction between the person and different agents of socialization, these influences can serve as the basis of social identity construction, affirming a sense of belonging, perceived similarity and control (Turner, 1982). A frequent division of agents of political socialization is a distinction between family, school (teachers and peers) and mass media/political actors (Bognár, 2010; Giddens, 2006; Nagy and Székely, 2010). A survey about the political socialization of an older generation, which was socialized in the socialist system in Hungary, revealed the significant effects of historical traumas of the Horthy-era and the Rákosi-era in political preferences (Karácsony, 2005). However, these traumas had less effect on the younger generations who were raised after the transition. They do not necessarily take the preferences of their parents, but choose their own ways, and mass media and party political agents would be more important influences for them, than family (Karácsony, 2005).

Agents of socialization can be grouped into non-formal and formal, namely non-institutional and institutional agents (Adams, 1985; Szabó, 2009 and 2010). The non-formal factor contains everyday interactions, personal experiences with family members, peers and teachers, but also media effects and cultural influences, and so-called “basic themes” that refer to value-patterns and the basis of collective identities. In contrast, formal factors of socialization are institutions, e.g., schools, church, different organizations, and parties themselves, including their youth divisions. The function of formal agents is to integrate people in the social and political system, teaching them how to behave as (active) citizens and yielding norms and the recognition of democratic functioning (Szabó, 2009). There is clear evidence of the connection between education and democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963: 315-324). Although early findings suggested otherwise (Langton and Jennings, 1968), more

---

3 Regency with the leadership of Horthy, 1920-1944
4 Stalinist regime between 1945 and 1956
recently there is a consensus about the great relevance of formal socialization for democracy (Niemi and Finkel, 2006), via increased knowledge (Dassonneville et al., 2012), democratic and open school climate (Campbell, 2008; Flanagan and Stout, 2010), and teaching human rights (Torney-Purta, et al., 2008). Furthermore civic education has proved to have long-term effects on adult life (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008; Torney-Purta, 2004). Formal socialization agents play an important role in more established democracies, while in post-socialist countries the efficiency of schools and other organizations tends to be low and less dominant (Szabó, 2009) giving more space to non-formal agents of political socialization. This fragmented model of political socialization is typical for Hungary (Szabó, 2009 and 2011). After the transition youth “disappeared” from organized political society, as neither political parties nor civil organizations ever even addressed them (Szabó and Kern, 2011). This resulted in a lack of proper political socialization of the youth in Hungary. In addition, the informal role of the family lost its importance (Somlai, 1994), whilst peer influences gained more significance (Szabó, 2011) creating a tendency that young people discuss political issues more with peers, and less with parents and teachers (Csákó, 2005). Several social scientists share their concerns about the low efficacy of schools as formal agents of socialization in Hungary: instead of taking up this responsibility, teachers (in agreement with parents) exclude politics from formal education (Csákó, 2005). A recent case study on the connection between quality of civic education and authoritarianism amongst the youth\(^5\) confirmed that the democratic regression in Hungary is due to the failure of civic education, in contrast to post-socialist Poland that has a more successful education for democracy.

Democratic and national basic themes are historically embedded in society and can be overarching frameworks of non-formal socialization serving as the basis of collective identities, e.g., party-supporter identities (Szabó, 2009). In Western democracies, the democratic theme expressed in strong citizen socialization in education is central, and post-materialist values connected to it can be strong predictors of new movement participation (Inglehart, 1990). In contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, the nation is the main theme through which societal problems are articulated, and can effectively mobilize emotions and communities (Szabó, 2009). These themes can be core elements in both the early and late political socialization, conveyed by family models in informal ways, while at the same time, they can also be the basis for either liberal or conservative ideologies that are conveyed by political parties, and political actors, as formal agents of socialization.

We chose the age cohort between 20 and 30 years, as a generation raised after the transition that is ideal to investigate the influences of both post-communist heritage and democratic trends in the socialization. The post-communist heritage hindered activism amongst this generation by their alienation from politics compared to youth in Western democracies (Robertson, 2009). Besides belonging to the same age cohort, it is also relevant to consider the construct of generation in the view of Mannheim, referring to common socio-political influences, as crucial in political

\(^5\) The study was based on the results of CIVED 1999, a cross-national study of civic education practices and outcomes, conducted in 28 countries in the late 1990s, and the comparisons provided by 2002, 2006 and 2010 waves of ESS on voting behavior amongst the same countries (Fesnic, 2014).
socialization and participation. According to Mannheim (1952), members of a generation share the same social experiences stemming from a common historical-societal context, and as a result, they share patterns in their political thinking and political awakening (Pilcher, 1994).

The context of the emergence of LMP and Jobbik in Hungarian politics

By the late 1990s, a decade after the transition from the socialist system, Hungarian politics reflected a polarized struggle between the conservative right-wing Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) and the left-wing-socialist MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party). However, the power-balance between them was broken in 2006, after a scandal involving MSZP’s prime minister that led to a sudden loss of popularity of the government and to the rise of Fidesz.⁶

In the 2010 elections, Jobbik achieved support of 16 per cent of the votes cast, increasing to 20 per cent in 2014. Jobbik declares itself a radical right, conservative and Christian-nationalist party, but denies being racist or extreme⁷. However, they reject basic Western values on an ethnic/racist basis, as is typical of far-right parties (Filippov, 2011).

LMP, a green leftist party declaring participatory democracy, economic sustainability and social equality⁸ entered the Parliament in 2010 with seven per cent support that decreased to five per cent by the 2014 elections.⁹ The party had internal debates over their leftist or centrist identity,⁴ and as a consequence of their inner struggles, LMP split into two in November 2012. However, our data was collected prior to their split. LMP has similar characteristics to other anti-establishment reform parties in Central Europe: these parties are considered to be moderate alternatives in the parliamentary elections, while Jobbik as a populist radical right party is often considered as a danger to democratic functioning (Hanley and Sikk, 2013).

Method

Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were chosen as a method to investigate participants’ personal stories of activism. The relevance of this method is justified by the fact that youth participation research is mainly based on quantitative studies that

---

⁶ Fidesz won the elections holding a two third-majority in parliament in the elections of 2010, and was re-elected with nearly the same rate of mandates in 2014. In their rhetorics they greatly build on the national theme and national identity that was a successful strategy enabling them to build a wide supporter basis (Szabó I., 2009).


highlight relationships between variables, but more qualitative case studies are needed to capture the process behind mobilization or the lack of it (Kovacheva, 2005).

The richness of texts and the depth of qualitative analysis enable us to find answers to our open-ended research questions despite the low sample size, which is usual in similar qualitative research (Nasie et. al., 2014). Data was collected in the spring of 2012. Four activists of LMP and four activists of Jobbik participated in the research ($N = 8$). We contacted a youth party member by phone and then used snowball sampling to recruit more participants. As being a case study with non-representative sampling, generalizability is limited, but it still has the capability to allow insights to the process of youth mobilization.

The age criterion for the participants was 20-30 years. Jobbik participants were more homogeneous in terms of age; they were between 20 and 22 years, while LMP supporters were 22-28 years old.

The gender distribution was equal in both groups. All participants attended higher education, or already had a higher education degree. They were all raised in Budapest, and worked there as activists. Participants were involved in different types of activism: three of them worked for the party professionally, while the other five activists supported the parties as volunteers. All of them identified themselves as activists and their commitment to their party was high.

Table 1 shows the summary of basic information of the interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LMP activists</th>
<th>Jobbik activists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Szilárd, 23, male</td>
<td>János, 21, male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family background: culturally right-wing</td>
<td>Family background: culturally right-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>László, 28, male</td>
<td>Tamás, 20, male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family background: culturally right-wing</td>
<td>Family background: uncertain voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna, 22, female</td>
<td>Orsolya, 22, female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family background: left-wing</td>
<td>Family background: culturally right-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Réka, 25, female</td>
<td>Flóra, 21, female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family background: left-wing</td>
<td>Family background: culturally right-wing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Information on the interviewees

Interviews took place in a calm environment that was neutral to all participants. All the interviews were carried out and transcribed by the first author, and analyzed by both authors. Voluntary participation with informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality were assured, the names used in the paper are fictitious. We followed the interview

---

11 It means a somewhat different position for the two parties, as Budapest is a traditionally liberal city, where LMP has a relatively higher support than Jobbik amongst the youth in comparison with other parts of the country, where the opposite trend is true (Szabó A., 2015).
The guideline used previously in a study about human rights activists (Kende, 2011), tailored to the specific attributes of party political activists.

The interview consisted of three main parts. In the first part, participants were asked about the main issues that they consider important problems in the world to identify their basic world views and ideologies. In the second part, they were encouraged to talk about their most memorable experiences as activists, and the way they turned to politics and to their parties. They were asked about the influences of their childhood, adolescence and recent past, family, peer and schooling, political and media effects and circumstances of joining the parties. In the last part, they were asked about more abstract themes, such as their goals and their relation to their own activism, and politics in general.

Interviews lasted three to four hours on average. Thematic content analysis was carried out using Atlas.ti 5.5.9, a content analysis software package that enabled us to structure and systematically analyze texts with manually assigned codes. “Thematic analysis is still the most useful in capturing the complexities of meaning within a textual data set, and it is also the most commonly used method of analysis in qualitative research.” (Guest et al., 2012:11). We also employed some elements of the interpretative phenomenological approach, as a set of case studies are under in-depth analysis driven by the assumption that the personal interpretation of studied phenomenon can grab the essence of the studied theme (Smith, 2004).

Codes were constructed both top-down based on the literature on political socialization and bottom-up from the interview texts. Examples for the literature-based codes are National and Democratic basic themes, and the codes for the agents of socialization: Family, School, Political actors/Media. Codes emerging from the texts were Events of 2006, Sustainability, Goals, Community and Problems. Results with the codes of Community and Problems are not discussed in this paper. In the process of analysis, we manually assigned codes to thematic parts of the texts.12 Citations were grouped and displayed according to the codes, to help the thematic overview of the text and interpretations. The process of analysis was to collect quotes under each thematic code by the software, re-read them one after the other multiple times while writing memos, and identify patterns based on the similarities and differences within and between codes, identify code-combinations and the patterns of their occurrence, and finally make comparisons between quotes of LMP and Jobbik activists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code family</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agents of socialization</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Mention of family members, opinions or influences, memories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School</td>
<td>References of school memories, including contact with peers and teachers, any school influences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Coding was carried out by the first author, and multiple re-reads of the re-structured units of texts by both authors.
Results

As our largest units of analysis were the different agents of socialization, we present our findings organized under the headings of the sub-themes of socialization. We present the agents of socialization in chronological order in the activist career: family, parties and political events in early socialization, school, and finally parties and political events in later socialization.

Family

Family as a political reference point appears in all interviews, although the influence is not necessarily direct or described as deterministic. In the interpretations of these patterns, we used the constructs of biographical continuity and conversion (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). Continuity refers to the situation in which the chosen ideology of the activist is in accordance with his/her family’s political orientation, while conversion refers to turning against family patterns. Interviews showed examples of both. Appearance of basic themes in family socialization is discussed later.

Continuity

Biographical continuity could be observed in five interviews. Three Jobbik activists showed the most salient family influences: an internalization of conservative-national values and national identity. János emphasized a very direct impact from his grandfather, with whom he had a close relationship, and whose memories of the Horthy era and the issue of Hungarians living in other countries the respondent
listened to from his early childhood. His grandfather with a strong national identity functioned as a model to look up to and to follow. Interestingly, his parents did not represent this model at all, and in his closer family circle, there were no models for political participation.

‘It was good to listen to my grandfather about these things. I felt that what he said is credible from every point of view that we should take care of Hungarians stuck outside of Hungary, I agreed with. I don’t know why, I felt that it must be important and that is right, we are Hungarians, they are too, it’s obviously an important thing. I think he had a big influence on me, that this approach evolved in me.’ (János, 21, Jobbik)

‘I know that it sounds pathetic, but I would dedicate my life to help the nation to develop, progress, and survive.’ (János, 21, Jobbik)

Orsolya also showed direct influences of the family: her closest relatives contributed to developing a strong national identity and to become politically active as well. In her case, both values and models of doing politics came directly from her family background.

‘For example, when I asked something in a family debate, they didn’t tell me, “oh darling, you are too young for that.” They explained everything to me. My parents have a nationalist sentiment too, and it’s important for them too, being Hungarians. This was my upbringing.’ (Orsolya, 22, Jobbik)

Flóra is another example besides János, whose closer family involvement in politics was low, but nevertheless the family conveyed some conservative values and patriotism, which had a great impact on her political socialization: she mentioned tight family ties, tradition, and “respect for her heritage” as values she internalized in the family.

“Actually I think that my formative experiences are connected to my parents, unintentionally. ....I think if they knew that it’s because of them that I’m here... they would definitely not be happy that they caused it, actually...So I think that it was them who put patriotism in me, unintentionally.... But they succeeded in that.” (Flóra, 21, Jobbik)

As demonstrated above, the national theme and national identity were salient in three out of four cases stemming from family influences. The fourth Jobbik activist interviewed was influenced by Jobbik as a party in his national sentiment, so his case is discussed later in the article.

We can talk about continuity in the case of two LMP activists, however, with fewer direct family influences in comparison with Jobbik activists, but the presence of specific values. Anna described a model of political awareness and opinion formation in her family, where parents were liberal and left-wing, and the value of tolerance and critical thinking encouraged her to get involved in politics. However, she could not
name a direct, willful influence from her parents. She emphasized solidarity and openness to diversity, as basic values she internalized very early, which seemed natural to her.

“My mom doesn’t really do politics, just passively, my father does so more actively. So I don’t think that would be the reason that it happened. Surely, it was present in my upbringing, but not explicitly, not with a strong influence. Still, it evolved in me somehow. I always had Roma classmates, I have a university mate, who is gay, I have friends who are gay, so it’s not a problem for me, and never has been.” (Anna, 20, LMP)

Réka came from a left-wing, open-minded family, but she denied the influence of political preference in her family, as politics was not an important topic to them. Similarly to Anna, she mentioned solidarity and benevolence as values conveyed by her family in an indirect way.

“On the one hand, our uncle, who was disabled, often visited us, and I have seen how to help others since my childhood. When we went somewhere in the city with mum and we saw, say, a blind man with a white stick, then we went there and learned how to help... So these things I surely internalized.” (Réka, 25, LMP)

Conversion
Conversion was identified in two LMP activists’ stories with right-wing family backgrounds. Both of them described their families’ orientation as determined by historical traumas and anticommunism and both of them sympathized with the right-wing conservative party, Fidesz, in their early stages of activism. Fidesz was the biggest opposition party at that time, in 2006. Later, they realized that Fidesz could not meet the demands they made about politics.

László mentioned the stories he heard as a child from his grandmother about the family’s losses suffered in the socialist era as early influences that made him interested in history and politics. Effects of anticommunism were important to him until his late adolescence, but later these influences faded away as he was in search for his own political community.

“Events of 2006 pushed me toward doing politics. Then I had to realize, that I couldn’t believe in Fidesz for some reasons.” (László, 28, LMP)

“This feeling of happiness that you are searching an open-minded way, and waiting for something that you are really looking for, and finally, you realize that you get it.” (László, 28, LMP)

Similarly to László, Szilárd reported a culturally influenced rightist preference in his family. Besides this, he mentioned that his father was a model in his attitude toward politics as well. However, when he too, changed his preferences from right wing to left...
wing, peer influences, and his parents “liberal upbringing style”, not forcing him to choose any directions also became important reference points.

“Recently my mum has been saying that I became left-wing just to annoy them, just from a child’s defiance. But it is not true; they just say it as a joke. What I am pleased about, that this interest, it was typical of my father, and I took up this interest from him, I could see it in him.” (Szilárd, 23, LMP)

All LMP interviewees emphasized values of solidarity and diversity; however, these values were not always connected to the articulation of an overarching democratic theme. Sustainability, a core concept for the party, was emphasized by two of the four activists, indicating that this is not necessarily a shared basis of identity for them, either.

Parties and political events in early socialization

Political protests in 2006 triggered by the so-called “Őszöd-speech” appeared as a highly important turning point in the mobilization of the interviewees. The recording of a confidential speech of the socialist Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, in which he said, “we lied to the people” was disclosed, causing outrage, and a long wave of violent demonstrations. Radical right protesters attacked the building of the national television ending in a brutal struggle with the police. These events were memorable and emotionally intense for the entire society, and it turned out to be a very important point for the activists involved in this research, leading to their political awakening and eventually their political engagement.

The activists from both groups perceived the events in a similar way: it was a trigger for their political commitments, bringing the realization that there is an urgent need to change politics, and they are responsible for bringing about this change.

It was the early stage of their mobilization - they were high school students at that time - and there were only slight differences in their opinions, but ideological frames were already identifiable in the appraisal of the events. As a common point, they all condemned the speech, but reported different emotional reactions: some reacted with outrage (László from LMP, Flóra and Tamás from Jobbik), one reacted with fear (Orsolya from Jobbik), some talked about keeping an emotional distance or were more permissive (Szilárd and Anna from LMP).

“When you see that the world is so unfair that the prime minister could do this without getting punished. You try to understand it, but it does not fit in your world view. And it is like a teenage rebellion, you rise up, you go to Kossuth Square, or other places.” (Flóra, 21, Jobbik)

Tamás, who did not have strong political family influences, experienced the disappointment and outrage of his parents who previously voted for the Socialist Party. He and his parents began radicalizing at the same time, reinforcing each other in their choice and commitment for Jobbik. It is interesting to note that without
conservative family values and national sentiments, his socialization was connected exclusively to the political events and political agents like Jobbik itself.

“... it was a turning point for them that this Gyurcsány is not a good guy, and that was why I started to care about these things. And that was why I started to pay attention to the events of October 2006, to see how far people get when they stand up against the system in this way.” (Tamás, 20, Jobbik)

“I look at Jobbik to understand why I started to deal with this, because I can see that these values [nationalist sentiment] are constructive.” (Tamás, 20, Jobbik)

Jobbik and LMP activists differed in their perception of the violent acts of the protesters. Jobbik activists justified the radical actions by the necessity to engage in such actions, arguing that the situation was unacceptable, and there was no other way to react. No Jobbik supporters interviewed were critical about the violence of the protests. At the same time, LMP supporters were more critical about violent actions; two of them considered them as an unacceptable form of protest. The reason for this difference can be the ideological community Jobbik activists shared with the radical right protesters, while LMP activists did not identify with them.

“I saw what was happening on television, and I thought that it was obviously not by chance that people sacrificed their freedom and bodily integrity just to protest. Actually, I was interested in why this was happening.” (Orsolya, 22, Jobbik)

“My first memories are when rightists tried to smash the building of the national television. I had a very negative opinion about them because protest always meant a peaceful thing to me. The whole thing shocked and scared me, and I didn’t understand, why it was good for them.” (Anna, 22, LMP)

School: formal (institutional) and informal (teacher and peer) effects

Schools enter the analysis on multiple levels; both on the formal/institutional level via education and general norms, and on an informal level via personal interactions with teachers and peers. Schooling as a normative, formal agent of socialization did not seem salient in the interviews. Some teachers appeared to convey an informal influence, but these were expressed mostly in indirect ways. An interesting comparison occurred between two interviewees in which one was tacitly encouraged, and the other discouraged to express political opinions by their teachers at school. Flóra from Jobbik described a class community in her Christian high school where almost all of her classmates expressed radical right-wing orientations. This was an open secret in the school that teachers implicitly tolerated.

‘Actually, just this, like “Pistike, please do not sleep in class, I saw on the news that you were very energetic yesterday”, these kind of funny comments
occurred, but nothing like punishing anyone, just because they were in the news. At the same time, it was really an open secret, when you see ten members of a class in the news that wow, there is something about them.’ (Flóra, 21, Jobbik)

Their commitments were strengthened by the events of 2006, as they saw the models of protesting masses and the possibility to join them. They experienced these events, i.e., going together to Kossuth Square to protest, as teenage rebellion.

“When, for example, two of my classmates participated in an evening protest, and the next day they would tell us their experiences. And then, wow, it must have been cool, let’s go out this afternoon, let’s see, and things like that. Actually, it might be that we pulled each other that I was there and you were not, but I never felt that it was the reason why I joined.” (Flóra, 21, Jobbik)

At the same time, in another high school, Anna from LMP listened to her teacher telling stories about his participation in the 2006 protests during the history class, that made almost all of the students enthusiastic, making her feel excluded as a member of a minority who remained silent.

“He told us that he was outside protesting in the 2006 waves of demonstration, and told us, how to fight with the police. He talked about it in class, we were seventeen, and about four of us sat silently and tried not to pay much attention, while the others encouraged him, and asked him, and expressed how good it was. And this was very negative to me, because I don’t think a teacher should act like that, and it probably determined how I saw that side...” (Anna, 22, LMP)

These effects of conformity amongst peers and group norms seemed relevant in political socialization, especially when they were informally encouraged by the teachers. These examples show that teachers who are normally seen as conveying institutional norms by their pupils can assert an informal influence as well, blurring the boundaries between formal and informal socialization effects.

Peer influences as informal agents of political socialization appeared important in even more interviews. For example, the political conversion of Szilárd was a result of his debates with his peers from high school.

“And we always had debates about it [politics] in high school, very interesting debates. And you can’t get by the Öszöd speech. That experience determines the approach to politics of this generation, how that scandal broke out and public talk started about it.” (Szilárd, 23, LMP)

László mentioned his fights with his peers too, and the recognition of family influences in this early socialization, realizing that most of his high school peers seemed to borrow their political preferences from home, including him. Critical
reflection on these influences seemed to be important for László in his story of finding his own party preference later.

On the other hand, the normative, formal effects of education were missing. Only one LMP interviewee, Réka, mentioned that the promotion of a voluntary work program in their school gave her the chance to direct her attention to civil activities that later led to her engagement in the professional work of LMP. Nevertheless, this sole example demonstrated that schools could theoretically play a role in political socialization, even if these examples were practically missing from the interviews.

**Parties and political events in later socialization**

Actual mobilization and joining the parties was very similar for all interviewees. 2006 turned their attention to politics, building upon the values from their early socialization, which they compared to the preferences of their peers, and finally, during their higher education years, they started to look for a community that expressed their values. In this period of searching, all of them went their independent ways. They collected information on the Internet, visited party gatherings, and followed the parties’ actions and politicians, so parties as formal socialization agents appeared in their stories. Media and personal experiences strengthened their identification with the party, and the associated beliefs that these parties are worth joining because through them they can make a change.

“What convinced me to join was the outcome of the EP elections. When I saw that Jobbik reached 1.5%, I saw that this is something effective, many people stand beside it, and it is reasonable to join.” (Tamás, 20, Jobbik)

Common perception of the political crisis in 2006 led to interviewees’ shared activist identities and the basic goals they articulated. The similarities appeared in two of their basic missions that they recalled in almost identical ways: one was to work for a society where people can lead a higher quality of life and can live together in harmony. The other aim was to “wake up the people”, and make them more sensitive to politics, to make public life fair and trustworthy. These commonalities support the idea of their togetherness as a generation (Mannheim, 1952).

“What should somehow turn people back to politics to make them realize that politics is not bad. If it is done well, it is a very good and important thing. Politics is not guilty. Politics is everywhere, even in the lives of people, and they can change it.” (Anna, 22, LMP)

“We should somehow turn people back to politics to make them realize that politics is not bad. If it is done well, it is a very good and important thing. Politics is not guilty. Politics is everywhere, even in the lives of people, and they can change it.” (Anna, 22, LMP)

“We should wake up the people, show that you are not just a machine, you have your own thoughts that you can express. We are not just voting machines.” (János, 21, Jobbik)
Discussion and conclusion

1st research question: The roles of formal and non-formal socialization agents in mobilization.
Family influence was strong, as patterns of continuity, parents and grandparents as models for political opinion formation supported this well-established effect of family influence on political commitments (Bar-Tal and Saxe 1990; Liebes et. al., 1991; Jennings et. al., 2009). However, in some cases family effects were limited: conversion took place in the political commitment of some activists coming from culturally right-wing background, showing that historical traumas do not have a determining effect on this generation (Karácsony, 2005). Instead, the crucial role of peer debates, personal experiences with teachers as authority figures and perceived peer norms were demonstrated, highlighting the excessive influence of informal experiences in the lack of perceived school norms. Our data highlighted the absence of formal schooling effects (Csákó, 2005; Szabó, 2009; Bognár, 2010; Szabó A. and Kern T. 2011). Before joining the parties, a formal influence of the parties through their rhetorics, and actions became salient.

2nd research question: Determining agents of socialization in the choice for LMP or Jobbik.
Conversion did not occur amongst Jobbik interviewees: instead, family effects were pronounced in inheriting the importance of the national theme. In contrast, open-mindedness and solidarity were LMP activists’ common values that all of them mentioned, but they did not name such explicit family or party influences, as Jobbik activists did. We conclude that neither the democratic theme, nor the “green” ideology constituted such central aspects of the identity of LMP activists, as national identity was for Jobbik activists.

Differences in ideologies and identities were expressed even at the time of their common political awakening, leading Jobbik activists to identify more with the radical rightist protesters in 2006, and LMP activists to feel more controversial about them. LMP as a party cannot build on a deep-rooted pre-existing identity as Jobbik as a party do. A strong sense of national belonging, and nationalist sentiments rooted in the family socialization can be a powerful reason to choose a radical extreme right path. Furthermore, Jobbik seemed to be efficient in being a formal agent of socialization to their activists even without nationalist sentiment stemming from the family.

3rd research question: Common points of mobilization based on the shared generational community of activists.
The common political awakening of all the activists in 2006 supported the basic connection between the activists regardless of their family backgrounds. Goals of the activists can be interpreted by their generational community (Mannheim, 1952; Pilcher, 1992), as they all agreed that they have to elicit changes in society, wake up the people and involve them more in politics. The circumstances of joining the parties and their basic motivations for activism were also very similar. However, their different interpretations on the radical forms of protests in 2006 already reflected their different early socialization, paving their path to their different party choices.
Although previous research dealt with the problem of the lack of political involvement amongst young people (Csákó, 1999; Szabó, 2009; Bognár, 2010; Szabó and Kern, 2011), no research investigated the “other side”, the special group of young party political activists in Hungary. Our qualitative case study provided the opportunity to analyze the effects of different agents of socialization on mobilization within the complexity of personal activist careers. As we worked with a small sample, we cannot outline generalizable patterns of comparison of the two groups, but demonstrate the manifestation of political socialization and political awakening in individual activist careers.

We observed the absence of a formal socialization effect of school in the interviews: there were hardly any examples of perceiving school as an institution that conveyed clear values, norms, or the education for democracy. Instead, interviewees reported informal experiences with peers and teachers that became important reference points in their political socialization. This raises the question: in what ways should schools convey values of democracy and concepts of citizenship to students, and what differentiates these ways from personal political opinions that should stay out of school?

All the activists shared a generational community. They are members of the generation of the political crisis in 2006, when they started their active search for political alternatives, which met their personal and political needs.

In contrast to previous findings on the low level of political participation amongst the youth in post-communist countries (Robertson, 2009), we found that post-communist heritage – notwithstanding that reflected in the awareness of family traumas and the lack of political engagement by parents – did not hinder political participation of the interviewees. Instead, national identity amongst Jobbik activists, and the value of solidarity amongst LMP activists gained through informal socialization were enough basis for them to react to the political crisis of 2006 with their pre-existing ideologies. This suggests the importance and mobilizing effects of political crises in the political awakening of the youth on one hand, and the great importance of all informal, interpersonal influences on the other. Our findings underline the danger of the lack of efficient socialization for democratic values in schools, and the more pronounced mobilization potential of national identity in the context of post-communist Hungary. Nevertheless, we also argue that there is a possibility for change if informal and formal tools of socialization for democracy are properly understood and addressed.

References


LANTOS, N. A. AND A. KENDE: FROM THE SAME STARTING POINTS TO MODERATE VERSUS RADICAL SOLUTIONS


Abstract

This paper discusses movements created, initiated and maintained by political parties: a quite neglected area of social movement studies. Between 2010 and 2014, the biggest demonstrations were pro-government marches in Hungary. The engine of pro-government actions was the movement of the Civil Cooperation Forum (CCF) implicitly founded by the incumbent party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance. The purpose of this article is to analyze this relationship within a constructivist analytical framework. Through intertextual analyses I will draw up the narrative of the movement focusing on four key challenges (constructing identity, strategic visions, organizational tactics, appropriate and persuading communication). I will demonstrate how independent the movement is. After the descriptive case study, two hypotheses will be generated about the political parties’ reason for launching a movement entrepreneurship; and the citizens’ motivation for participating and expressing their preferences between elections through a collateral organization like CCF.

Keywords: Social Movements, Political Parties, Collateral Organization, Consent Mobilization

1 I thank my colleagues from the HAS Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Political Science, Department of Democracy and Political Theory, who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the research, although they may not agree with all of the interpretations/conclusions of this paper. I would also like to show my gratitude to Zoltán Balázs, Márton Bene, András Körössényi, Dániel Mikecz, David Winerother and Steven Kiss for their comments on an earlier version of the manuscript; any errors are my own and should not tarnish the reputations of these esteemed persons. I am also immensely grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the editors for their insights.
**Introduction**

Between 2010 and 2014, the biggest demonstrations in Hungary were pro-government marches. Such activism is particularly striking in contrast to experiences from Western European countries, where the number of party-sponsored protests is relatively low; however it is not decreasing. (Hutter, 2013) The centre of events was the movement of Civil Cooperation Forum (Civil Összefogás Fórum, CCF) created indirectly and implicitly by the party Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance. Thus the following questions have arisen immediately: How do CCF and Fidesz connect to each other? How was this top-down mobilization set up? Such movements are not easy to be conceptualized. Despite an increased interest in political discourses, it is surprising that so little empirical and theoretical research has actually been conducted on captured movements (e.g., Smith, 1976; Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976; Garner-Zald, 1987; Maguire, 1995; Rucht, 2006; Hutter, 2013; Piccio, 2015). The organizations captured/initiated by parties/governments are usually mentioned as ‘pseudo-movements’ (Smith, 1976: 336; e.g., labor unions), ‘quasi-movements’ (Kolinsky-Patterson, 1976: 12; e.g., peace movement in Italy), government organized non-governmental organizations (e.g., Russian youth movement Nashi “Ours”) or ‘astroturf’ (fake grassroots) organizations (e.g., Tea Party). These notions do not just have negative prejudices, but they are also too vague, contradictory and controversial notions to use systematically.

The problem is rooted deeply in the distinction between “good/real” and “bad/fake” movements applied implicitly in social movement studies. The “good”
movements are fitted into a bottom-up (grassroots) perspective of the political process. According to the conventional view, ex-ante existing movements have three options for entering politics. Firstly, they could transform into political parties (movement parties) such as some green, new left, and feminist movements have done in the past (Gunther-Diamond, 2003; Kitschelt, 2006). Secondly, they could have an impact on established parties (on their organization and policy visions) such as ecologist, feminist, or single issue movements (Piccio, 2015). Finally, they could even capture a party (Kriesi, 2014) as the Christian Right continuously intends to do with the Republican Party (Green et al., 2001). In contrast, the “bad” or “populist” movements are a top-down phenomenon (directly or indirectly) founded and promoted by political or private actors (political parties or business companies) to form public opinions.

Overstating theoretical conflict has highlighted that these movements need a comprehensive and stable conceptual ground. Sartori’s (1970) concept formation called “ladder of abstraction” could easily be denuded of normative boundaries. To create high-level categories the researcher can maximize extension and minimize intension of the concept. At the lower levels, (s)he can focus on the special attributes that make these movements different from the others.

Avoiding the normative conceptions, the study relies on Mario Diani’s (1992) conceptual synthesis. I define social movements (broadly) as non-conventional, extra-institutional and informal networks of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political conflict, on the basis of shared collective identities.

More specifically, I borrow the concept and typology of collateral organizations introduced by Thomas Poguntke (2005b) to describe the relationships between the party and other organizations. According to this party-centric perspective the parties use these organizations to create or recreate linkages to various groups of potential voters (Lawson, 1988; Poguntke, 2005a). Four types of collateral organizations are discerned: the independent, the corporately linked, the affiliated, and the ancillary organization. In Poguntke’s institutionalist approach the main differences between these forms are the extent of the overlapping membership and organizational autonomy. The difference regarding party dominated organizations is that ancillary organizations have dual membership in contrast to affiliated organizations, in which the membership is just partially overlapping. According to Poguntke’s (2005) framework CCF would be an affiliated or ancillary organization, even though it has not got either explicit organizational links to the party or minimal autonomy. Thus I pertinent to NSM (New Social Movements) theory to account for them as well. ’(Pichardo, 1997: 413, 1. footnote) ’Within the recent literature on social movements, one of the more accepted ‘truths’ has been that small citizen groups in the so-called ‘new social movements’ represented a social force much stronger than that of more established organizations.’ (Hjelmar, 1996: 177) I will follow Castells’ practice: ‘Since there is no sense of history other than the history we sense, from an analytical perspective there are no ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ progressive and regressive social movements. They are all symptoms of who we are, and avenues of our transformation, since transformation may equally lead to a whole range of heavens, hells, or heavenly hells. (...) And yet, this is our world, this is us, in our contradictory plurality, and this is what we have to understand, if necessarily to face it, and to overcome it.’ (2010: 4)
will use Poguntke’s typology within a constructivist perspective (della Porta and Keating, 2008; Kratochwil, 2008). The difference between party dominated collateral organizations is the strength of the relationship. In other words: affiliated organizations have wider autonomy for their own actions than ancillary ones.

In this paper, I will inquire into the CCF movement and its relation to Fidesz focusing on critical points to create and keep a movement alive. I expect that the CCF provides answers to these questions:

- **Who are we? Who are our enemies?** - Identity, “we” and “they” are constructed out of a fountain of fluid and amorphous myths, symbols, and thoughts. In this process the movement creates its own world view, which not necessarily reflects the real world.
- **What do we want to achieve?** - Strategic visions are designed by imagination. The main goals of the collective actions must be clear and well defined.
- **How do we want to achieve it?** - Organizational tactics are adapted to optimize the exploitation of resources. Thus the organizational forms and maneuvers must be suited to political competition and environment (opportunity structure).
- **Why do we want to achieve it?** - Persuasive communication convinces the citizens to participate and to identify themselves with the movements, aims, and means.

The uniqueness of answers formulated by CCF shows the movement’s independence from Fidesz. In other words: the more freely the movement creates its own world, the greater distance the movement can keep from the political party to act *in the name of the party*. From another direction, if the movement does not have its own answers or the decisive will to give its own answers, the movement will be more integrated in the party’s background. Consequently, the movement can act only *with the party*.

I will focus on the movement’s narratives (Polletta, 1998) and the world they have created, believed in and not on the interpretation of outsiders who might have opposing interests. The analysis of these activities relies on four types of evidence: publications (Civil Ethical Codex, CEC and National Social Contract, NSC), speeches, interviews, and general news found on the website of CCF (civilosszefogas.hu, ca. 540 posts between 2009 and 2015). The CEC is a general ethical collection for “national” civil society, which includes general instructions for collective action. The NSC is the product of personal and national consultations and civil recommendations. Both books are sponsored by the National Cooperation Fund (Hungarian governmental civil fund) and the Foundation for a Civic Hungary (a foundation of Fidesz).

Finally due to negligence of this topic bordered by social movement and political party studies, the descriptive case study induces two theoretical problems: Why would an incumbent party form a new enterprise in an extra-institutional arena? What leads citizens to express their preferences between elections through a collateral

---

8 The constructivist approach is not new in movement studies (See, inter alia, Oliver, Jorge and Strawm, 2003: 225-234.; Hjelmar, 1996; Castells, 2010).
The case study generates two hypotheses to provide possible answers to these questions. I interpret this entrepreneurship as a form of “consent mobilization” (Beer, 1992), which is not a new strategy just an unconventional, extra-parliamentary one. In addition, I assume that the activists’ motivations come from their partisan commitment and identity (Flesher Fominaya, 2010; Klandermans, 2014; Polletta and Jasper, 2001) rather than material incentives.

The paper is presented in five sections. Section 1 highlights the characteristics of CCF’s movement identity. Section 2 discusses their goals, claims, and policy/politics/polity changes. Section 3 shows the movement’s organizational challenges, internal solutions and external linkages. Section 4 inquires into the communication that persuades the supporters to identify themselves with the movement, to accept the strategic visions and organizational tactics of the movement. Section 5 takes into account the limitations and implications of the research while also offering two theoretical propositions about movement entrepreneurship of parties and the motivation of activists.

The case of CCF

Who are we? Who are the others?

Establishing identity is always a dual activity. It includes not just the question of “who are we?” but also the question of “who are the others?” The CCF has paid particular attention to constructing a community aiming to embody the “real” civil society, the people, and nation who govern.

We are the “real” civil society

The CCF was built on a decentralized mass movement of Civic Circles (polgári körök) founded directly by Fidesz to reorganize and extend the party’s background after the lost elections in 2002 (Halmai, 2011). Since its foundation in 2009, the movement of CCF aims to strengthen the Hungarian civil society, represent its interests and values. Due to the bottom-up image, political parties and profit-oriented organizations cannot join and the promotion of any other political movement or political party is not tolerated in protest events (civilosszefogas.hu, 3.5.2009). 9

In the narrative of the movement, civil society is the driving force behind democracy and a synonym for freedom. Independent from other sectors, civil society seeks to balance between political, economic actors and society. They control the state, but protect the state from outsiders (multinational corporations and European Union) as well. However, CCF is not just a member of civil society. It claims to be civil society itself to coordinate and mobilize the civil society.

For CCF, being civil or civic means being communitarian “citoyen”, “patriotic” and not individualist bourgeoisie. Thus the movement expects a complete metamorphosis of individuals:

‘The key is in the man. The individual man must rise up against himself, and if he has freed himself from shackles of his soul, he must join to the others – this is what is called soul exchange today.’ [Italics added] (civilosszefogas.hu, 22.03.2010)\(^{10}\)

In this sense, civil society is based on active participation, duty for the community and moral steadfastness. This is what the movement calls “civilitics” (civilitika), which means civil politics.

In contrast, the oppositional NGOs are not considered true civilians by the group, because they are much closer to the sphere of politics.

‘It is also likely, that the organizations, who define themselves as civil so far, will explicitly enter onto the stage of politics and run for elections as parties. The question is if such civil organizations are real civilians, in other words if they are independent form professional politics (...). The answer is Janus-faced: on the one hand the laws allow for the so-called social organizations to become parties at any time (...). On the other hand, however, these organizations are presumably founded with the secret goal to transform into a party with an ideal timing after assessment of their strength and networking.’ (CEC, 2012: 66)

“Fake” civilians’ behavior is characterized by individual ambitions and a constant struggle for power. In contrast, “real” civilians deal with true, pure and important public issues. CCF asked the left-wing movement called Milla (Egymillióan a magyar sajószabadságért, One Million for Press Freedom) not to believe in economic and political interest groups and join CCF. After the movement (Milla) was captured by the former Prime Minister (PM) Gordon Bajnai the picture has changed dramatically:

‘From where could the slogan of “people have been disillusioned with parties” be familiar? At a time, a Nazi leader called Hitler had come to power in such a way, that he was always saying that over and over again. The fake civil overture before the announcement of forming a party evokes associations, because Mr. Bajnai also began with attacking parties.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 01.21.2013)\(^{11}\)

According to their narrative the anti-government protesters are hired as soldiers, partisans, rivals of democracy, to support failing politicians to regain power. Their activism sponsored by foreign funds (Soros Foundation, EEA–Norway Grants) gives only rise to panic and permanent hysteria in the name of overthrowing the government.


We are the people, the nation, who governs.

“Let the people decide!” – sounded the call, when the Bajnai cabinet was set up in 2009 due to a constructive vote of no confidence. Substantially the movement as the only representative of civil society has the privilege to negotiate with the government. ‘Cooperation of the government and the people is such as the leaven in the bread.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 07.02.2012)12 For instance, Zsolt Semjén (leader of the Christian Democratic People’s Party, minister without portfolio and Deputy Prime Minister) signed the first Social Contract on behalf of the newly formed government in 2010. After the ratification of a new constitution (called Basic Law) in 2011, CCF saluted the members of parliament (MPs), who supported the new constitution. They also engaged in some consultations with ministers delineating suggestions gathered from civil society. In addition, they explicitly support the government’s official public consultations (postal questionnaires).

Even though the movement expects organizational independency from civil society, they have repeatedly emphasized that being a civil actor does not necessarily entail being neutral as well.

‘Despite the naturally existing party sympathies the NGO undertakes his civil, civic nature (...) [But] being civil is not used as a springboard to become a party. (...) [T]his independence does not mean partisan neutrality: the party sympathy confessed by the organization is not a sin, but openness, a virtue.’ (CEC, 2012: 13)

‘The civilian is not a party soldier, for individual and communal interests do not contract to the applying functions of parties and government.’ (CEC, 2012: 15)

However, the movement signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Administration and Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture, and with some grocery and general merchandise retailer chains as well (CBA, Coop). Moreover CCF received financial support of 40 million HUF from the Foundation for a Civic Hungary to strengthen the citizens’ cooperation. The movement declared explicitly, that such support contributes to a common purpose of both sides and so they cannot be expected to be self-limiting in giving and using such support.

‘Support for the civilians is a general thesis: the subvention is equally important for both the proponent and those who are being supported. Who gives – does so with an explicit purpose and it aims to fulfill the publicly formulated and approved programs. Who receives – deserved it, and demonstrated capability and reliability previously. It is not charity. Under no circumstances could it mean the self-conditioning gesture of the promoter. The support is clearly a defined and self-imposed goal for both of them.’ (CEC, 2012: 85)

The government’s critics from inside or outside of the country became adversaries of the movement as well. Despite the fact that at the elections of 2010 Fidesz won a two-third super majority, CCF declared clearly that the battle is won but the war is far from over yet. Later, the war narrative became permanent: ‘Our troops are at war’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 26.05.2011). They have fought against rival MPs, other politicians, or former PMs. Two “self-defense and educational” campaigns were addressed directly at them:

‘They have ruined the country together’ – the poster shows former PMs Gyurcsány and Bajnai supported by the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) which alludes to Bajnai’s new political formation (Together 2014).
‘They deserve no more chances’ – the CCF campaigned with this slogan in the parliamentary elections of 2014. The poster shows Gyurcsány, Bajnai, Attila Mesterházy (the leader of MSZP at that time) and Miklós Hagyó (former deputy mayor of Budapest and member of the Parliament, who was arrested on suspicion of extortion and breach of fiduciary responsibility) as prisoners with a clown.

Similarly, the biggest demonstrations of CCF have been the multiple Peace Marches (Békemenet) with slogans on its lead banners like:

‘We are not going to be a colony!’ (January 21, 2012, Budapest) – Reference to the Orbán government’s conflicts with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union (estimated attendance: max. 400,000).
‘We Will Not Remain Debtors—The Homeland Is One!’ (October 23, 2012, Budapest) – Reference to paying off the 2008 emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund and exiting the European Union’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (estimated attendance: max. 400,000).
‘Bajnai - Gyurcsány: Together They Destroyed the Country!’ (February 5, 2013, Gyula) – Reference to the former left-wing PM Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai supported by MSZP (estimated attendance: max. 30,000).
‘Those Who Are Aggressive Are Frightened. We Are Not Frightened!’ (October 23, 2013, Budapest) – Reference to incidents of breaking a model statue of PM Viktor Orban (similarly to pulling down a Stalin statue during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution) in an opposition demonstration. (estimated attendance: max. 400,000).

14 For estimated attendances I used numbers given by the webpage of Peace March (bekemenetegyesulet.hu), which are most likely over-estimations, but show the weight of the events. For the estimated attendance figures in media discourses more specifically see Bene’s study (2014).
These messages reflected partisan and government politics explicitly. According to László Kövér, Speaker of the National Assembly and one of founding members of Fidesz, the Peace Marches defend the country. CCF cited even the PM Viktor Orbán ‘if a few hundred thousand Hungarians did not stand at the crossing gate (...) then there is a possibility of not staying alive in this period.’ (NSC, 2014: 54).

The movement was really active in defending the government from global actors called economic and financial oligarchies, “super empires” by CCF, and protecting the civil society from effects of mass media labeled as brainwashing by the “lackey media” by CCF.

‘With occupying and invading troops camouflaged as civilians the giants of the bank sector built an institutional system similar to the empire of Nero, which is equivalent to dictatorship such as communism and Nazism.’ (CEC, 2012: 15)

According to CCF, the “satanic” empires (IMF, USA, current EU, Bilderberg Group) take a stand against the classical view of democracy preparing modern slavery and trying to overthrow the Hungarian government. The movement repeatedly initiated negotiations with the IMF and sent open letters to several European and American politicians\(^\text{15}\) aiming to change their opinions about Hungarian government politics.

The CCF does not tolerate internal enemies either. Rivalry and differences of opinion between members of the movement are not tolerated. More specifically, the movement tries to avoid the negative consequences of the “divide and conquer” strategy of adversaries.

‘If the person cannot convince companions with rational arguments about his counter opinion and the others cannot gain him over to the correctness of their point of view. The person can stand ethically convicted of leaving the organization. Staying in the organization is a destructive activity, and attacking the organization externally because of personal grievances is unethical behavior.’ (CEC, 2012: 20)

In a recent case this problem had arisen. The CCF posted an announcement on its website, in which they deprecate Gábor Bencsik, the chief editor of the pro-government journal of Hungarian Chronicle, and organizer of the Civic Circle, and the Peace Marches to criticize the government and incumbent politicians’ self-enrichment responding to the new wave of scandals:

‘The CCF rejects the emerging phenomenon of the ‘Stockholm syndrome’. We could not have become the victim of instigating post-communist and neo-liberal

\(^{15}\) For example José Manuel Barroso, the former President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, André Goodfriend, former Chargé d’Affaires of Embassy of the United States to Hungary, Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, and President Barack Obama.
world vision and value system, which is intending to take us hostage.’
(civilosszefogas.hu, 04.12.2014)\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{What do we want to achieve?}

On the face of it, the CCF had a clear and detailed strategic vision in the first years. The movement saw that Hungarian civil society is openly “political”, therefore the goal was organizing a policy-centered civil sector. ‘Playing a leading role among civil organizations, the CCF has already stepped onto the road of policy questions.’ (CEC, 2012: 109) In the first Social Contract\textsuperscript{17} (civilosszefogas.hu 10.09.2009)\textsuperscript{18} they declared six main points on what they expect from the government:

1. Constitutional responsibility and accountability of the executive branch (e.g., a more “traditional” form of no-confidence vote).
2. Stronger role for the current President of the Republic, who has the exclusive and factual right to dissolve Parliament.
3. Commencement of preparation for a future bicameral parliament.
4. Increasing the autonomy of local governments and ensuring the representation of provincialists such as civil associations in local government bodies.
5. An Administrative Court (as a special court).
6. Strengthening the institutions of direct democracy and disposing their conditions precisely.

Most of these proposals (with the exception of administrative courts) have not been fulfilled by the government. Moreover the movement has created round tables (for health care, social, culture policies) to prepare policy suggestions for the government, but the results have not been made public. Eventually, their policy-centered (foreign currency loans, discriminating state language law of Slovakia, school meals etc.) mobilization causes have almost disappeared since 2012.

In most of its posts the CCF emphasized actual political issues. They have not formulated criticism about the politics and policies of the government, even though, for instance, the civil sector got less financial support (Ca. 1.3 billion HUF / 4.2 million Euro) from the state in 2012 than in former years (Ca. 3.4 billion HUF / 11 million Euro). In contrast, when the plan of an Internet tax was withdrawn by the government after mass protests in 2014, one of the movement’s spokespersons (in fact, leaders), Tamás Fricz commented the decision: ‘Well done, Viktor Orbán!’ (civillosszefogas.hu, 04.11.2014)\textsuperscript{19}. Essentially the movement has become reactive and drifted with the flow of politics. They explicitly supported István Tarlós in his two campaigns to be elected Major of Budapest. Moreover they support the deep personnel changes in the administration. All in all, the movement has lost its ability to

\textsuperscript{17} The original text was not available at the time of this research work.
\textsuperscript{18} https://civilosszefogas.hu/a-civil-osszefogas-tarsadalmi-szerzodese (Accessed: 30-01-2015)
reach and create its own policy goals, which makes the movement’s initiatives subordinate to the government and Fidesz.

How do we want to achieve it?

The movement of CCF is well organized and well prepared to maximize the resources of its political environment. The movement has become the center of a network of protest events, actions and other organizations. They organized the previously mentioned Peace Marches, the Intellectual Defense of the Nation and founded the Civil Cooperation Conference (Civil Együttműködési Tanácskozás, CCC) and the Civil Cooperation Public Benefit Foundation (Civil Összefogás Közhasznú Alapítvány, CPBF). The CCC consists of communities of trans-border Hungarian regions and the CCF itself with the aim to stimulate cooperation in the Carpathian Basin. The place of its foundation was symbolic: the Parliament’s chamber of the former upper house in 2011. The financial background of the CCC and CCF is provided by CPBF, which creates a legal personality for the movement. These organizations are not the same, but their activities point in the same direction. Officially, the CPBF coordinates the movement, but its real core is a group of CCF’s leaders.

Moreover CCF and some right-wing Polish civil organizations founded the Patriotic Europe Movement in 2012 to respond to the criticism of the Hungarian government by EU actors. According to this movement’s credo, they are aiming to facilitate the Europe of values and nations instead of the power of money and the bureaucrats’ Europe.

After the elections of 2014 the circumstances of pro-government actions have changed. Public support for the Fidesz government decreased; some new scandals and new waves of protest events with new anti-government (antitax) narratives arose. The idea of another Peace March arose among supporters of the movement, but it was considered ill-timed by the movement’s elite. However, it was made clear that Fidesz never gave any instructions not to organize a Peace March, nor to postpone one. Fricz and Csizmadia describe the affair in the following way.

‘It is not worth it to organize a Peace March against them, because, as they say, eagles do not hunt flies. In the recent weeks protests organized by more or less civil groups have become more active indeed; their occasional violent and aggressive actions are deeply reprehensible. But just because of them it is not worth it to organize a Peace March procession. They are not an organized political force, even though the rest of the world tries to help them in many ways’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 13.11.2014).²⁰

‘The Peace March is the means to national sovereignty, identity and the right of subsidiarity. We do not intend to show off force and as light cavalry take apart provocation in the streets. The Peace March has won the esteem of society, its

---

power counts as ‘heavy artillery’, reasons for deploying it are determined only by what lies in the name of the movement.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 16.12.2014)\textsuperscript{21}

The movement proclaimed civil radicalism in 2009, which means the reconstruction of civil society as a fourth branch of government. In opposition, the movement opposed redefining the relationship of the state and civil society. However, after 2010 they initiated a similar institutionalization in the civil sector. The quasi-leader of the movement, László Csizmadia, who has a formal/informal position in every organization related to CCF, became the president of the National Civil Fund, the Hungarian governmental civil fund, which was reorganized and renamed as the National Cooperation Fund in 2012. As a result, the CCF as the representative of civil society became institutionalized and formally connected to the state and the government. However, the movement was quite antagonistic toward this topic:

‘[I]t must be emphasized, that the independence of the civil society has not just legal-constitutional, but also financial and substantive requirements as well. It’s important that the distributional mechanism of public funds serving civil organizations being neutral and transparent (...) [I]t is at least as important. The civil society will not became the echo of state, rather it is an independent and autonomous discourse with the state on shaping goals, themes, conflicts and dialogues of civil society.’ (CEC, 2012: 93)

‘This is dangerous, because the civil sphere of a given country could easily turn from being truly independent to just formally independent, seemingly autonomous, but in fact, under the influence of political parties and governments controlling it as their tool.’ (CEC, 2012: 97)

With the overlapping organizational network and institutionalized linkage to the state, CCF is able to utilize and monopolize the resources, (seemingly) able to maximize the number of reachable participants, followers, and able to give ever newer impulses to mobilization, which makes their campaign almost permanent.

\textbf{Why do we want to achieve it?}

At first glance, persuasive communication is the weakest point of CCF. Without any doubt the leaders of the movement, who are mostly political scientists, columnists or lawyers, are not great orators. Their mainstream communication has relied almost exclusively on printed media. After 2012 most of their posts were either open letters or essays taken from newspapers (even in scanned form). As opinion leaders, they focused on constructing public opinion and not the collective actions of the movement.

Despite the lack of sufficient reasoning, the appropriate answer (to challenges of persuasive communication) is essential for keeping the movement identity alive, achieving its visions, and making sense of organizational tactics. The answer to the

“why” comes from outside of the movement. In 2010 the CCF was already eager to stand by the new PM:

‘The new Social Contract is signed (...). He [PM Viktor Orbán] undertook to take the lead, and asked us to follow him. It is a serious statement, a beautiful and difficult pledge and much to ask for. He needs us.’ (civilosszefogas.hu, 24.06.2010)22

The party leadership and government dominated the reasoning of aforementioned movement activity. Previously mentioned messages of protests suited the communication of the party and the government. Moreover the Peace March is usually attached to partisan events (mass meetings, commemoration of government) with speeches delivered by PM Viktor or others from the top rank of the party. Essays, speeches and the two books of the movement were just supplementary in their nature and clearly not enough to mobilize. These are more likely to underline existing party massages rather than to create their own ones.

Summary of the Findings

The world is full of existent forms and ideas already created (Schabert, 2005: 242-244). Thus complete independence and essentiality in creating an own identity, objectives, and organizational entity cannot be expected from any movements (and from parties either). They can borrow or even inherit ideas (Castells, 2010: 7) and organizations. In short, a movement can never truly be created freely. Even though movements (just like any other political actors) try to push and stretch these boundaries by trial and error.

Looking at the case, CCF (seemingly) does not even try to step onto this route. The movement was born into the world fed by the political right wing, especially by Fidesz after 2002. The movement’s identity is broader than expected. Literally, the movement occupied the civil sphere and bridged the gap between civil society and government. Identity cannot change dramatically. Deciding on who is our enemy and friend was running in parallel with the political challenges and background of Fidesz. At an early stage, the movement had clear and strong initiatives, but later on their strategic vision served and followed government interests. Formally, dual membership does not exist, but the CCF has institutionalized initially and externally creating linkages to society and the state. Despite their dominant position, the network depends heavily on the government and the party. Their reasoning (persuasive communication) relies on partisan commitments letting the party control the mobilization.

If unconventional/extra-institutional and conventional/institutional worlds exist as assumed by many scholars (Hutter, 2013; Joyce, 2002; Kalyvas, 2009), then the activities of the movement would overlap in these spheres to different extents (see Figure 1). The figure illustrates the construction of CCF and the stratification of the

relationship between the movement and the party. The movement does not have the opportunity and/or the proper will to be created more independently. In another perspective, Fidesz could stabilize and recreate, redefine its linkages to groups of potential voters. Moreover this border has nearly completely vanished in the narrative of CCF. However, the movement can act more freely in organizations and network building than in the other critical points; this relationship seems to be very close without any formal organizational connection. As a consequence of this seemingly inseparable relationship, the movement stands closer to ancillary organizations than to affiliated ones.

Figure 1: The stratification of relationship between Fidesz and CCF

**Discussion**

In this descriptive case study, I made an attempt to investigate the top-down relations of Fidesz and CCF through four activities. My questions were: *How do CCF and Fidesz connect to each other? How was this top-down mobilization set up?* The research relied on analysis of texts and documents published by the movement to show its relations to the party and dependency or interdependency in constructing its actions. The results made clear that: CCF has no autonomy or enough political will to construct its own reality. Findings demonstrate the overlapping construction of this collective action, which is a more complex relationship than simple institutional connections. However, movements as ancillary organizations of parties could be extraordinary and strikingly particular; the case study shows the possible deepness of the relation between a party and a movement.
The findings implicate two theoretical problems: (1) the parties’ reason for launching a movement entrepreneurship of parties; (2) the citizens’ motivation for participating and expressing their preferences between elections through a collateral organization. Here, assisting future research I introduce two hypotheses to provide some possible explanations.

Hypotheses No. 1: Such movement entrepreneurship of parties is a strategy for reconstructing their background (realignment).

In present-day politics, which is characterized by presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Webb et al., 2012), partisan de-alignment (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), declining parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) and legislatures (Flinders and Kelso, 2011) the role of political movements and extra-institutional, non-conventional political activity has become re-valuated and collective actions get more attention than ever before. Due to the transformation of mass parties into catch-all and cartel parties the conventional political actors had slowly lost the monopoly and ability of mobilization between elections. Simultaneously, new movement parties have arisen over and over again as rivals. Conventional political actors lack legitimacy, or their legitimacy has become more contingent and personalized.

Spin-off entrepreneurship is not a new strategy. In the 1960s, Samuel H. Beer (1990) had already seen that the main task of conventional actors (modern politics) is “consent mobilization”. This idea reflects the growing political contingency (namely declining legislatures), the delegating legislative power to the executive, and the strengthening new group politics (Beer, 1990: 62-71). In short Beer asks how can political trust and legitimacy be restored in changing political environments characterized by the proliferation of new non-conventional (i.e., movement parties) and weakened old actors (classes, mass partisan heritages etc.). Mobilizing consent is more than the periodical electoral authorization, because the decisions are made after the elections (Beer, 1990: 76). It assumes a permanent campaign for maintaining the majority in the legislature and making citizens accept the politics and policies of government.

The ‘vacuum’ of legitimization, contingency, which is caused by previously mentioned tendencies, has made consent mobilization even more intensive and necessary. If there are no other options for cost-effectively achieving political aims, political contests will easily find their way to the streets creating new formations to control popular consent. As conventional arenas of politics, legislatures dominated by parties cannot fulfill their role anymore. Thus the parties have expanded the arena borders by reoccupying, invading, and dominating the space (i.e., streets) which was abandoned by mass parties. The modern parties came from the street, why could they not return?

Hypotheses No. 2: Citizens commit themselves to party captured movements to express their identity.

The results show that party dominated movements and mobilizations are for demonstrating preferences and sympathies for a particular party. Conventionally, movements emerge from social or political conflicts, which directly (but not equally) affect citizens. Their goal is to change this situation. Without partisan interpretation, party dominated mobilization does not possess clearly defined conflicts and goals;
however, these tasks do not have primacy in this case. The already existing commitment and partisan identity are far more important for mobilizing people. Partisan slogans, badges and flags tell us that identity precedes the event. In other words, the participants know where and why they are going; they are already ready to accept the narratives about conflicts and aims. Collective identity better captures the pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize. Identity is an alternative to material incentives has become a secondary element in mobilization dominated by parties.

The contingency of politics has another antecedent and consequence. From the side of citizens, conventional institutions lose not just legitimacy, but also the ability to provide collective identity (cognitions shared by members of groups) (Castells, 2010). Identity is usually described as a place in society. People occupy many different places; however ever fewer places can be shared collectively. Thus a new, alternative collective identity has been re-valuated.

Identity processes play a crucial role in the dynamics of mobilization. It has been used extensively by social movement scholars to explain how social movements generate and sustain commitment and group cohesion over time. (See, inter alia, Fominaya, 2010; Klandermans, 2014; Polletta and Jasper, 2001) Moreover Klandermans (2014) shows that the more someone identifies with a group, the higher the chances are to take part in collective action on behalf of that group. Group members urge them to support and defend their group. The partisan identification could easily become a self-generating process. The strong identities usually implicate a backlash, as those portrayed as the enemy may be angered or frightened into counter organization. The debates are characterized by strong emotional loadings to separate the liked in-group and the hated out-group. Consequently, the so-called movement/counter-movement dynamics (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Zald and Useem, 1987) generated even further polarization and radicalization (as examined in the Hungarian case: Körösényi, 2013).

References


CCF. (2013). *Civil Etikai Kódex (Civil Ethical Codex)*. Debrecen: Méry Ratio Kiadó.


Körösényi, A. (2013) „Political Polarization and Its Consequences on Democratic Accountability.” *Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 4* (2) DOI: [http://dx.doi.org/10.14267/issn.2062-087X](http://dx.doi.org/10.14267/issn.2062-087X)


Website of CCF: http://civilosszefogas.hu

Changing movements, evolving parties: the party-oriented structure of the Hungarian radical right and alternative movement

Abstract

Two parties gained seats in the Hungarian parliament for the first time in the general elections of 2010. Both of these parties had a strong movement background, which seemed to be more obvious in the case of the radical right Jobbik, but the green LMP party also had strong ties to the Hungarian alternative movement. In this article I analyze the structural changes of the movements, which resulted in the dominance of the party-oriented structure. First, I look at the transformation of these movements from the democratic transition in 1989 until the 2010 elections. In the second part of the article I analyze the national context structure, the external environment of the movements. I conclude that in case of the green-alternative movement the new electoral opportunities, the shortcomings of political consultation and the lack of strong allies favored the party-oriented structure. For the radical right movement the expanded access to the party system, the ineffective policy implementation capacity of the state and the repression by the authorities pushed the movement’s structure to the party-oriented model.

Keywords: Social movements, Movement parties, Radical right, Green movement, Jobbik, LMP.
Introduction

The structural conditions of the emergence and success of new parties is an established field of political party research (Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Ignazi 1996; Tavits, 2006; Bolleyer and Bytzek, 2013). In the case of movement or new politics parties, the presence of a strong social movement is also regarded as a structural condition, which facilitates the emergence of parties (Kitschelt, 1989; Kaelberer, 1998; Burchell, 2002). However, with a few exception (Odmalm and Lees, 2007), less research was conducted on the party formation as a strategic option from the aspect of a social movement. The party systems of the countries in Eastern Central Europe were regarded recently unstable with a volatile electorate, where the elite and political entrepreneurs have a more important role in party system development than social movements (Lane and Ersson, 2007; Tavits, 2008). Still, as the Hungarian case illustrates, bottom-up political initiatives can achieve electoral breakthrough in the region. In 2010 two new parties, the ecologist LMP (Politics Can be Different) and the radical right Jobbik entered the Hungarian parliament as the result of the general elections. The aim of this article is to understand the internal dynamic of party formation of social movements, that is the move towards the party oriented model as the dominant organizational model of the movement. Thus, instead of focusing on the success of LMP (Fábián, 2010) and Jobbik (Karácsony and Róna, 2011; Kovács, 2013) as political parties, this paper deals with the transformation of the movements themselves from the democratic transition until the 2010 parliamentary elections. This transformation is a key element of the success of the movement parties LMP and Jobbik. I will also analyse the circumstances, i.e., the political context structure (Rucht, 1996) which influenced the institutionalization of the two movement actors. Under movement I understand a complex set of mechanisms, which mobilizes the networks of activists, supporters, and organizations, which acts for the sake of social-political change. This political action depends on the collectively constructed interpretation frames, identity and mutual solidarity (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 20). The movement parties are among many other social movement organizations in this setting, though they are the most prominent. This also includes, that the emergence of Jobbik and LMP doesn’t involves the total disappearance of the social movement; nevertheless it implicates the loss of valuable resources for the movement.

In the case of Jobbik, for the general public the existence of a strong movement background seems to be indisputable, but there were also many activists of the Hungarian global justice movement among the politicians and supporters of the LMP. The institutionalization of the LMP was preceded by many years of civil work, thus the party could rely on those intellectual assets, activist networks and mobilization experiences, which were accumulated during such protest actions as the demonstrations against the Iraq war in 2003, the protests against a NATO radar installation on the Zengő peak or the cyclists’ marches in Budapest known as Critical Mass. Political pundits and outsiders criticized the LMP for the lack of clear messages and a political program, however, the organizations, which were at the birth of the party already possessed coherent, elaborated social and political claims. Ecopolitics has its own history in Hungary, even from the time of the democratic transition.
Despite the inner debates of the Hungarian global justice movement, ecopolitics could not be connected closely to any political bloc even before the formation of the LMP.

The Jobbik was transformed from a social movement organization into a political party, which - like the Western European radical right parties - are major mobilizers of the radical right movement. In contrast to the LMP, the party was already formed by the time of mobilization push in 2006. Many different social movement organizations participated in that protest cycle, however none of them threatened the key role of Jobbik and the party status monopolie in the movement. Both parties have an anti-establishment character. In the case of the LMP it derives from the stance of ecopolitics, according to which the global problems cannot be solved with the politics of the old left-right cleavage. While at Jobbik the harsh anti-establishment position comes from the new radical right character of the party.

According to the typology of Gunther and Diamond, both parties fall under the category of movement parties (2003), which are at the fluid border of political parties and social movements. Conventionally, the left-libertarian (e.g. German Greens) and the post-industrial extreme right parties (e.g., Austrian Freedom Party) are classified as movement parties. The debut of the movement parties is closely related to the defects of representation, the incapacity of established political parties to channel the voice of citizens (Ignazi, 1996: 533). The structural transformation of production, employment and education in developed Western societies liberated the individual from traditional social bonds and left a broad space for self-fulfillment. This change to post-industrial societies created new desires to un-conventional forms of participation and a new political agenda focusing on issues of post-materialism. On this social bases could emerge the so called new social movements in the late ‘60s and ‘70s, which stabilized the post-materialist political cleavage and carved out a space for the Western-European left-libertarian, ecological or New Politics parties that first appeared in the ‘70s (Kitschelt, 1988). The first direct European Parliament election in 1979 meant an electoral breakthrough for green parties in Belgium, Germany and France. However, the green parties could not reach the threshold in 1979, but the still inspiratory result paved the way for the German, French, and Dutch greens to enter the European Parliament in 1984 and later into their national assemblies as well (Rootes, 1994). These parties were organized along the post-materialist cleavage and their constituency had basically middle and upper-middle class origin. After the institutionalization, these parties still had an intellectual character, which is the reason why they can be referred to as cadre parties (Paastela, 2008: 72).

In Eastern Europe, environmentalist groups have been active during the democratic transition and green issues were on the agenda as well. Stressing environmental problems could be useful for different opposition groups as catch-all issues and also as a “training ground” for activists. This catch-all nature also meant that environmentalism did not appear in its pure nature, but interconnected with other issues, like human rights, peace, or nationalism. In the absence of a green “master frame”, due to the professionalization of activists and as economic reconstruction and social issues proved to be of more concern to the population, environmentalism became marginalized (Rootes, 1197: 335, 342). While the Czech greens could enter the national parliament in 1992 after an obscure electoral coalition, which resulted in the loss of two-thirds of their membership (Jehlicka and Kostelecky, 1994: 167), the
majority of green parties in Eastern Europe could not grasp the momentum of ‘89. The 2000s however, saw a revival of green parties in the Czech Republic and in the Baltic countries, which could also be ascribed to the emergence of the international global justice movement. The electoral success of the LMP in 2010 can fit this later trend.

The post-industrial transformation created not only a broadened space for self-realization and for the individual choice of identities, but produced a higher level of uncertainty and alienation through the devaluation of those traditional social relationships like family, kinship and within smaller communities. The insecurity produced by the atomization of society favored the desire for more order, tradition and security (Ignazi, 1996: 557). This other outcome of the post-industrial change, i.e., a growing neoconservative mood in Western Europe with the general decline of the party as such, party de-alignment and an increasingly volatile electorate fostered the third wave of the radical right in Europe in the late ‘80s and the appearance of a new type of radical right parties. Therefore, these new party genres can also be understood as an answer to the post-materialist revolution, since these are similar to the left-libertarian and ecologist parties in terms of strong engagement and identity politics. Contrary to the parties of the old radical right-wing, the new radical right-wing parties do not have fascist imprinting, but have a stronger right wing anti-system position (Ignazi, 1992). An ideal type of the new radical rightwing parties was/is the French Front National. The success of FN at the 1984 European election also meant a breakthrough of new radical right-wing parties. A new master frame developed by FN stressed anti-immigration, cultural differences and ethnopluralism, instead of purely racial issues. Thus the FN could successfully avoid the accusation of racism and stay in the gray zone between the extreme and the conservative right. Moreover, the populist, anti-political-establishment feature of the new master frame of FN allowed it to criticize contemporary democratic institutions without being stigmatized as anti-democratic. This new master frame was later adopted by the whole party family of new radical rightwing parties elsewhere in Europe (Rydgren, 2005). While the immigration agenda could not be fully exploited in Eastern Europe, a new formula of radical right can be detected in Eastern Europe as well, most notably in the case of the Bulgarian Attack or the Hungarian Jobbik, which have lead to much attention by Western journalists and pundits especially in the latter case. However, compared to Western Europe, the differences are not as great as is often assumed, neither can either part of Europe be treated homogeneously in this matter (Mudde, 2005: 260)

Although the new radical right-wing parties have not yet reached relevant government positions in Western and Eastern Europe, due to the tabloidization of public discourse, the economic crisis and their learning capacity, the new radical right-wing parties can still be significant in European politics (Mudde, 2013).
1. The transformation of the Hungarian radical right and the green-alternative movement

1.1 A brief history of the radical right movement from the ‘80s

That kind of radical right, which gives the social basis of Jobbik is a relatively new social phenomenon in Hungary, since it differs from the radical right before and after the Hungarian democratic transition in terms of organization, patterns of mobilization, and means of framing. In the following I give a brief review of the three different types of the Hungarian radical right, which also shows its chronological transformation. It is important to note though, that these forms also existed simultaneously.

1.1.1 Skinhead subculture

In Hungary the first skinhead groups, which followed the Western European examples first appeared in the late ‘80s (Bernáth, et al., 2005: 80). These were based typically on urban youth subcultures such as gangs and so these groups had a strong inner cohesion and strongly differed from the majority of society in terms of dress and habits. Violent actions committed in small groups against foreign students and Roma people were typical (Szabó, 2009: 268-269), though in the case of early skinhead groups a coherent political worldview cannot be discovered. Their political orientation was defined by their resistance against the official ideology of the communist Kádár regime, by western examples, and by conflicts with other urban youth subcultures.

The skinhead subculture expanded immediately after the democratic transition in 1989-1990, and turned more political thanks to political entrepreneurs, who desired to gain political influence with the help of the subculture. As a consequence and also as a cause of the clearer political orientation the skinheads became more professionalized. Apart from the smaller gangs those groups gained significance, which managed their domestic and international relations (Blood and Honor).

The skinhead subculture gained its political character due to the restrictions of the Kádár system, but otherwise it was similar to other youth subcultures. The subcultural nature wore out during the politicization at the time of, and after the democratic transition. The skinhead movement exhausted due to the change of the legal environment, the stricter reaction by and because of the aging of the members of skinhead groups. Besides these factors the dissolution of the subcultural identity had a significant effect as well. As politicians tried to use the skinheads for their own political goals, and as the costs of belonging to the subculture sank the most important asset of the subculture, the credibility was endangered.

1.1.2 Folkish radicalism

After the democratic transition another important actor of the Hungarian radical right was the internal right-populist opposition of the government faction’s parties. The genesis of the folkish-right radicalism was an essay of István Csurka published in the weekly newspaper Magyar Fórum (Bárány, 1994). This essay was a peculiar re-
interpretation of the democratic transition, which gave the basis of the right-populist movement’s master frame of the Hungarian society and politics.

The main organization of the folkish-right radicalism was the political party MIÉP, which consciously used explanations of the political-social situation resembling the folkish-urban dispute in the inter-war period in Hungary, allowing the use of the folkish-radical label. Not only the generational gap, the different interpretations of adversaries and of society, the level of political consciousness separates the skinheads subculture and the folkish-radicals, but the patterns of organization as well, since in this case the core of the organization was a political party: first the MDF and later the MIÉP after the secession of the folkish-radicals (Table 1).

The political explanations of the folkish-radicals meant an adequate reading for many people to understand the social problems after the democratic transition, the political solutions proved to be too abstract to be a tangible, acceptable political program. The dominance of the political party MIÉP and chairman István Csurka within the folkish-radical movement made it inflexible, made the debates on the control of resources harsher and finally the folkish-radicals became insignificant. From the aspect of the whole radical right, it was the folkish-radicals who elaborated the interpretation frame that is still valid today. This frame gives explanations of the democratic transition. Apart from the ideology, the folkish-radicals established the cultural-symbolic infrastructure of the movement, which proved to be necessary for the development of the new radicalism and of the Jobbik party.

1.1.3 New radicalism

The emergence of the third type of the Hungarian radical right is the result of a generational shift and the change of the organizational patterns, action forms and interpretation frames of the movement. By the new millennium the cultural background of the folkish-radicals around the MIÉP party had solidified. A set of publishers, journals bridged the gap between the governing right-wing conservatives and the radical right. The political folklore of the radical right fulfilled the same role, which offered involvement and orientation beyond the official politics, similar to the lifestyle politics of the new social movements. Besides the cultural infrastructure, the movement’s network was broadened by the organizations, which liked to give space for political actions primarily for younger radical activists. These organizations first worked with the MIÉP party, but later also against it.

The movement changed not only in terms of organization logic after the new millennium, but in the nature of collective action as well. Compared to the earlier period spontaneous, not registered and violent protests took place more often. The first of such kind of event was the so called “Elizabeth-bridge battle”, when the protesters blocked the transit at the Elisabeth-bridge in order to achieve the recount the votes of the 2002 parliamentary elections by the national election agency. Four years later the disclosure of the “Ősződ-speech” of the socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány triggered an extraordinarily violent protest wave (Szabó, 2007: 169-171). In his speech, which was held exclusively for the members of the socialist parliamentary faction, Gyurcsány admitted that they had lied about the financial situation of the country.
The events in 2002 and of the “hot autumn” in 2006 changed not only the repertoire of collective action and the policing of protest in Hungary, but strengthened the radical right movement as well (Szabó, 2009: 282). The participation on protest events and permanent occupation of public spaces increased the cohesion of groups and individuals reinforced the movement’s collective identity and the internal solidarity by the clear identification of adversaries. As a consequence of police brutality during the “hot autumn” in 2006 interesting phenomena appeared, namely the radical right civil rights protection and citizen’s ethos. This kind of civil rights protection relies on liberal principles of law, but it applies those in a particular way, only in the cases of the supporters, activist and allies of the radical right movement.

Máté Szabó describes the events of 2006 as a “postmodern riot”, which illustrates the eclectic character of motivations, strategies, and goals of different groups and individuals participating in the protests during the “hot autumn” (Szabó, 2007: 186-187). This kind of diversity can be traced not only during the protest events, but it is a main feature of the whole movement. It can be stated that the radical right became a real movement after the new millennium: a network of loose networks intertwined by the collective identity and internal solidarity elaborated during collective protest actions. The permanently constructed interpretative frames identify the objectives, targets, and adversaries. The polyphony, the aestheticization of politics, which pervades individual life-strategies, the political folklore as an essential part of the movement and the new communication technologies made recruitment easier. This also contributed to the opportunity for the radical right to break out from political quarantine. The radical right cannot be identified with only one group, but it is the tissue of different and sometimes only indirectly linked political, social and cultural phenomena. This is also the main reason why we do not use the term “extreme right” in this paper, since that label would hide the real nature of the movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Forms of collective action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skinhead subculture</td>
<td>subculture, rival subcultures, foreign students, Roma people</td>
<td>violent actions committed in small groups, rock concerts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folkish radicalism</td>
<td>political party and its satellite organizations, Jews, foreign financial circles and their domestic servers</td>
<td>party rallies, legal demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New radicalism</td>
<td>movement network, movement culture, multinational companies, Roma people</td>
<td>spontaneous and registered demonstrations, violent protests, cultural events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Transformation of the radical right movement in Hungary

1.2 The alternative-green movement in Hungary

Similar to the radical right, the beginning of the green-alternative movement can be traced back to before the democratic transition in 1989. Moreover, those transformations can be discovered as well that preceded the formation of the political party and its entry into the Hungarian parliament.
1.2.1 Green opposition of the Kádár regime

The lack of political ecology in mainstream politics does not mean that environmentalism would be fully absent from Hungarian political life. The ecological movement was an important breeding ground for civil initiatives since the mid '80s as more space in the public sphere was liberated (Szabó, 1998: 124-125; Pickvance, 1998: 75-76). The individual strategies proved to be inefficient in order to overcome the deepening socio-economic crisis, therefore re-emerged the collective forms of searching for alternatives. Besides the ‘transmission belt’ organizations (Ekiert and Kubik, 2014: 47), i.e., the pseudo-movements embedded into the monolith power structures, already before the democratic transition new, authentic forms of self-organization arose. The issues of these movements (environmentalism, international peace) were similar as those of the western new social movements. With the help of these “soft” issues it became possible to express the general dissatisfaction with the Kádár-system, without challenging its principles.

One of the main mass movements at the dawn of the democratic transition was the Duna-circle. Their main issue was to hinder the building of the Bős-Nagymaros hydroelectric power plant, which could have harmed the ecosystem of the Danube Bend. However, after the transition environmentalism did not become a major political question. The last technocrat government before the democratic elections changed the official standpoint in the question of the hydroelectric power plant, and so the conflict became a legal dispute between the Hungary and Czechoslovakia, hence the integrative power of the issue declined. With the onset of the formal negotiations between the opposition and the representatives of the communist party, the questions of the new constitutional system proved to be more important than any of environmental issues.

The alternative movement in Hungary – just like in West-European countries – criticized the patterns of bureaucratic modernization, the colonization of the “life-world” by the “system”. A major difference was though, that while the western environmentalists defined themselves vis-à-vis the “old” politics that was based on representative democracy, in Hungary all of those groups that claimed the autonomy of social subsystems or searched for alternative paths of modernization created one platform. That is why such a huge industrial investment like the Bős-Nagymaros hydroelectric power plant became a cardinal political conflict at the time of the system change in Hungary. However, the case of the hydroelectric power plant could not turn into an integrative issue for the alternative movement as nuclear energy in West Germany did. Because of the lack of ecological conflicts and due to the general consensus on environmentalism green issues did not play a significant role in the first elections (Waller and Millard, 1992). To put it simply, environmentalism did not evolve into green politics.

1.2.2 Environmentalists of the ’90s

After the democratic transition the environmental groups lost political significance, since in the democratic framework the political parties became the main channels to express claims, interests and political values. With the emergence of political parties
the green groups also lost some of their leaders and supporters (Pickvance and Gabor, 2001: 110). Moreover, due to the new environmental standards claimed by the European Union and with the help of development funds, the technocrat aspect of handling environmentalist issues became dominant. Without countrywide ecological conflicts and comprehensive protest campaigns the environmentalist sector institutionalized rapidly. As a consequence professional advocacy groups and think tanks and not political parties or loosely organized social movement organizations turned out to be the major actors. The environmental groups of the ‘90s are the bearers of the so-called transactional activism (Petrova and Tarrow, 2007). Transactional activism is about relying on relationships with non-governmental actors, political and civil organizations, decision makers and the media. These networks can serve as resources of mobilizations and so as substitutes for mass support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Forms of collective action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green opposition of the Kádár regime</td>
<td>network of intellectuals</td>
<td>protests, think tank activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>socialist modernization models</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists of the ‘90s</td>
<td>civil organizations</td>
<td>transactional activism, lobbying, think tank activities, local protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government environmental policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian global justice movement</td>
<td>social movement integrated in the global movement network</td>
<td>spectacular protests, think tank activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neoliberal globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Transformation of the green-alternative movement in Hungary

1.2.3 The Hungarian global justice movement

The real change for the green, or in a broader sense for the radical left-libertarian movement, came with the new millennium. The protests in Seattle, Genoa, and Prague against the international economic regimes and neoliberal globalization made the global justice movement visible to the global public. These events had their effect in Hungary as well: a new type of environmentalist movement and activism emerged (Harper, 2006: 13-14; Kerényi and Szabó, 2006). According to this movement the environmental problems are rooted in the system of global redistribution and economic control. However, the global justice movement in Hungary could not involve as many supporters as similar groups did in Western-European or South American countries.

Important social movement organizations were the Védegylet (Protect the Future), which functioned as a green think-tank, the Zöld Fiatalok (Green Youth) followed the patterns of lifestyle politics of the international movement and the Hungarian branch of the international organization ATTAC. Next to the new organizations the Humanist Movement and the Humanist Party also had an important role in the Hungarian movement. The Hungarian global justice movement was divided on the question of the applicability of the left-right political categories. This dispute had an effect on the self-determination of the movement’s identity and on the possible alliances. ATTAC promoted the utilization of the “left” category, while the green activists like the Védegylet and the Zöld Fiatalok liked to avoid such categories.
According to them a new type of politics could be discredited with the old political labels.

The examples of the global movement were not the only factors which helped the Hungarian global justice movement to mobilize and form a collective identity: there was a major environmental conflict, the Zengő case, as well (Scheiring, 2006). According to NATO agreements Hungary was to build a radar station at her southern border. The left-liberal government chose the Zengő peak as the place to build the station. Activists chained themselves to the trees that were to be cut down, lay on the ground in front of the bulldozers and held a nonstop watch to prevent trees being cut down at night. The struggle of the activist bore fruit and the radar station was not built on the Zengő peak. Moreover, this success reaffirmed the movement's collective identity, strengthened the network, bonds between activists and as a consequence it led to institutionalization of the green alternative movement. In 2009 those organizations and activists, who participated in the Zengő conflict founded the ecologist party, the LMP. It is important to note, that the leftist wing of the movement did not engaged in the Zengő conflict, which facilitated the institutionalization of the green wing and defined the profile of the LMP at the same time.

Table 1 shows the three distinct types of the radical right movement according to organizational structure, issues and forms of collective actions. Table 2 shows the similar dimensions in the case of the green-alternative movement. Three distinct types could be distinguished in both cases. The fulfillment of the movements ended before the movement parties would enter the Hungarian parliament.

2. Political opportunity structure, political context

According to the political process model of the resource mobilization theory, the success of mobilization is the matter of the organizational “readiness” of the community, the level of insurgent consciousness in the movement’s mass base, and the structure of political opportunities (McAdam, 1982: 40). The concept of political opportunity structure was elaborated by Peter Eisinger (1973): political protest tend to occur in semi-open or semi-closed systems, since in a fully open system there is no need to protest and in fully closed ones the individual costs would be to high due to oppression by law enforcement.

The formal political institutional framework, the informal political processes and prevailing strategies, and the distribution of power are all part of the political opportunity structure (Kriesi et al., 1997: 52). In another categorization political opportunities are a matter of widening access to political participation, the loosening of political blocs and conflicts among the elite groups (Tarrow, 2011: 164–165). It also possible to move beyond the political processes and explicitly political institutions. The probability of political protest is increased by “expanding cultural opportunities (McAdam, 1996: 25). These are the contradictions between social values with high normative power and the general social practices, the “suddenly imposed grievances”, the dramatization of the vulnerability and illegitimacy of a given
political system and a comprehensive master frame, with which challengers can map their grievances and claims.

Instead of political opportunity structure, Dieter Rucht uses the concept of context to define that environment, which offers opportunities for the movements. In his theoretical framework the cultural and the social contexts also have an important role besides the political one. Similar to other authors, who describe the political opportunity structure, the political opportunity context is defined by the following factors: the openness of the political system and access to the policy making process, the policy effectiveness of the authorities, the alliance networks of a movement and the conflict system, which involves the movement’s adversaries (Rucht, 1996: 188–191). The context system also defines the dominant organizational pattern in the case of a given movement genre and in the whole social environment as well. According to Rucht, the possible schemes are the grassroots, the advocacy, and the party oriented model. A dominant model does not exclude different organizational patterns in the same society, since one social movement can involve grassroots organizations, advocacy groups, and political parties as well. To give an example from our Hungarian cases: in the ‘90s the advocacy model dominated the green-alternative movement, while the radical right movement was characterized by the party-oriented model at the time of folkish radicalism (Table 3). In the grassroots model, the structure of the movement is decentralized and loose and there is more emphasis on radical protest politics and informal networks. The interest-group model is characterized by advocacy activity and formal organizations. Formal organizations have a pivotal role in the party-oriented model as well, and the focus is on electoral process and party politics (Rucht, 1996: 188). As Rucht put it, the political opportunities form the movement structure, i.e., the dominant model of organization, which influences the strategies of the movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skinhead subculture</th>
<th>grassroots model</th>
<th>Green opposition of the Kádár regime</th>
<th>grassroots model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Folkish radicalism</td>
<td>party-oriented model</td>
<td>Environmentalists of the '90s</td>
<td>interest-group model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New radicalism</td>
<td>grassroots model</td>
<td>Hungarian global justice movement</td>
<td>grassroots model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-Jobbik movement</td>
<td>party-oriented model</td>
<td>post-LMP movement</td>
<td>party-oriented model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Variation of the dominant movement structure

According to Rucht’s hypothesis, there are more resources available to an organization if decision-making is open, the authorities’ effectiveness in implementing policies is lower, the alliance networks are stronger, the adversaries are weaker and the value structure of the society is more consonant. On the other hand, in this scenario the movements’ structures are more formalized, i.e., they follow the patterns of the advocacy and the party-oriented model – which is crucial from the aspect of party formation (Rucht, 1996: 191–192). Rucht compared the French, the West German and American feminist and ecologist movements on the basis of this scheme. He
concluded, that the French movements are following the party-oriented, the Americans the advocacy models, while in West Germany all three models can be found. In France lobbying is not a very effective tool, therefore for challengers it is worth it to found a new party, which can meet strong institutional obstacles, but the disillusionment in traditional parties gives a chance for a breakthrough. In the political system of the United States it is not feasible for new parties to enter the legislature even at the state level. However, lobby and advocacy activities have an old tradition in the American political culture, thus the advocacy model is dominant in the case of the feminist and the ecologist movement as well (Rucht, 1996: 199–201). In West Germany the movement sector is strong, the federal polity, the public administration, and constitutional courts at the state level enable more room for advocacy. On the other hand, the federal system encourages the foundation of new parties, since there are more arenas for political competition, while political parties are traditionally dominant in German politics. As Rucht compares the characteristics of the context structures of the three analyzed countries, he stresses the importance of access to decision-making and the party structure, the policy implementation capacity and the presence or absence of allies and opponents. In the following section, the paper analyzes the political context along these variables.

If we want to understand the circumstances of the institutionalization of the radical right and the green-alternative movement, i.e., the party formation of Jobbik and LMP, we have to consider, that the political opportunity context is in a permanent state of change, and the movements themselves also have an impact on their environment. The external factors, which are influencing the radical right and the green-alternative movements, are different. This is an obvious fact in the case of alliance networks and the adversaries of the movement, but state policies can also have different impacts on the movements, since their core issues and claims vary as well.

2.1 Party system and openness of decision-making

In general terms, the Hungarian party system did not favor newcomer parties (Enyed, 2006) or independent candidates. The Hungarian election system, which was in effect at the time of the 2010 general elections, could not be labeled as a simply majoritarian or proportional one, but as a mixed-member majoritarian system. In the two-ballot system citizens voted for territorial party lists (20) and for single candidates as well. In order to establish a territorial list, parties needed to have candidates at least in one-quarter of the single member districts of that larger territorial district, moreover, lost votes in single member districts were allocated to the compensation list (Benoit, 1996: 68-169; 2003: 10). These were important incentives for political parties to establish candidates in single member districts. The whole system favored political parties at the expense of independent candidates, and proved to be closed, since no new parties could enter parliament until the 2010 elections. As the election system is generally closed and the nomination procedure urges new challengers to establish an effective organizational structure, a broad network of activists, as the five percent threshold does in Germany (Rucht, 1996: 201). At this point however it is important to note, that by the 2010 general elections there was a considerable frustration with the
traditional and especially with the reigning parties in the electorate. This opened new opportunities, more access to the party system for challengers i.e., the LMP and the Jobbik. The liberal coalition partner of the socialists, the SZDSZ was already at the verge of dissolution at the time of the elections, which meant more support for the green-alternative LMP. In general terms, movement entrepreneurs enter the arena of party politics, if the barriers are low, if electoral success seems to be a realistic prospect (Kitschelt, 2006: 282).

Various acts and government decrees regulated the participation of civil organizations in the decision-making process. Despite the many options of participating in the decision-making processes, a study relying on expert interviews emphasizes the shortcomings of the system. The procedural part of these acts is not regulated properly, which hinders effective participation. Moreover, the civil organizations do not have the opportunity to take part in formulating alternatives, but they only have the option to make comments about already prepared proposals. Sometimes the whole process is reduced to mere information giving (Bela et al, 2003).

While the closed election system is an objective factor for both social movements, the green-alternative movement has more access to decision-making process, if only with some barriers. On the other hand, the radical right movement does not aim to put policy recommendations on the agenda, but to change the criminal law and the whole constitutional system. Obviously, this latter could not be the subject of political consultation with the reigning left-liberal coalitions between 2002 and 2010.

2.2 Policy implementation capacity

The effectiveness refers to those issues, which are in the center of the movement's agenda and claims. If the state is unable or unwilling to handle these problems, that can push the movements to elaborate more formalized structures. Ultimately, such issues can form the main agenda of a new political party. Policy failure has a different nature of the two movements. In the case of the Hungarian radical right movement, the ban of the Hungarian Guard can be identified as examples for the "extremist" protection of citizens’ rights (Hajnal, 2010: 15). This means, that the policy implementation failure is not a single case, but a systematic phenomenon, which is the consequence of the counterproductive protection of those who are breaking the norms of the current policy. While the Hungarian Guard, the paramilitary organization of Jobbik was banned by the Hungarian authorities, due to the protection of right to assembly, this ban could not really go into effect, which proved the weakness of the state vis-à-vis the radical right movement. From the aspect of the context system, the situation of the Roma minority has a more important role though. In this case it is not about the “extremist” protection of citizens’ rights, but the latent and manifest anti-Roma sentiments in Hungary (Halász, 2009: 492) was exploited by radical right as it was translated to criminal and welfare issues and policy recommendations and so demonstrated the policy ineffectiveness of the state. Regarding the alternative movement, specific fields of policy failure cannot be identified. However, the policy systems of Central and Eastern European countries are dealing with such structural problems, which are different from the general deficiencies of bureaucratic systems and are unique in the case of post-communist
regimes (Hajnal, 2006: 152–153). The defects of policy implementation capacity of the state are obvious in the light of international practices of environmental policies.

2.3 Allies and adversaries

At the time of the two terms of the left-liberal coalition between 2002 and 2010 both movements gained some support from the opposition. In the case of the radical right, politicians of the Fidesz party participated at the events of the “Hot Autumn” in 2006 and at the foundation of the Hungarian Guard paramilitary wing of Jobbik. The green-alternative movement got some support from the Fidesz press at time of the Zengő conflict. The green-alternative movement had support from external actors as well, as prominent representatives of the global justice movement (Noam Chomsky, José Bové) attended the events of the green-alternative movement. The principal adversary of the radical right movement was the left-liberal government, while the green-alternatives rejected the whole political establishment, though by its very nature a social movement, they had more conflicts with the government than with the opposition.

3. Conclusions

Both the radical right and the green-alternative movement went through a transformation process related to their success after the new millennium. The radical right is not limited to the Jobbik alone. Though the Jobbik is the most visible part of the movement, with a decisive effect on the dynamic of the radical right, there are many other organizations, informal groups, and political and cultural initiatives that constitute the movement. After the advocacy activity in the 1990s, the green-alternative movement was inspired by the global justice movement in terms of issues, symbols, and protest repertoire. As a consequence, a new type of activism appeared which could give comprehensive political interpretations and attracted new supporters. However, identity politics was an important innovation not only in the case of the green-alternative movement, but also in leisure activities and historical reenactments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>radical right movement</th>
<th>green-alternative movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>access to party system</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access to decision making</td>
<td>closed</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy implementation capacity</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allies</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opponents</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The political opportunity context in respect of the two movements

The dominance of the party-oriented model can be understood through the analysis of the opportunity context (Table 4). According to this, the frustration with the reigning socialist and liberal parties opened the closed party system to new challengers. Since the election system still favored political parties instead of independent candidates, newcomers should concentrate their resources and move to
form parties with countrywide networks. The system of political consultation gave some access to the decision making process for the environmentalist civil organizations, though this only allowed for expression of consent or disapproval, but provided no opportunity to formulate alternative proposals. This raised the role of advocacy model in the green-alternative movement, but it also led to the realization that real involvement in the decision-making can only be achieved with a political party as an institutional framework. This latter element is the most important incentive for the green-alternatives in the party formation. For the radical right movement this kind of political consultation does not grant real opportunities, thus the civil organizations of the radical right aim not to practice advocacy activities, but to achieve a certain cultural hegemony. The policy ineffectiveness in Central and Eastern Europe is a given condition for both movements, but in the case of the radical right, these policy failures and the incompetency of the state were more obvious. There have been some instances of overlap between the moderate and the radical right. There was no official cooperation, though the radical right movement did not receive much criticism from the side of the right wing parties. On the other hand, the stricter reactions of the left-wing government pushed the radical right to the party oriented model. From time to time the green-alternatives confronted government agencies and municipalities, but there was no such administrative repression as in the case of the radical right. The green-alternatives also lacked strong domestic allies, but they received more support from European green parties and the international global justice movement.

In the case of the green-alternative movement the new electoral opportunities, the shortcomings of political consultation, and the lack of strong allies favored the party-oriented structure. For the radical right movement the expanded access to the party system, the ineffective policy implementation capacity of the state and the repression by the authorities pushed the movement’s structure to the party-oriented model. Moreover, behind the success of the movement parties lies also the transformation of the movements, the fulfillment of movement networks and interpretative frames.

References


Abstract

In the authoritarian regimes dissident social activists are not recognized as agents who are capable of participating in decision- and law-making processes. In addition to the factual deprivation of political rights, representatives of the dissident social movements experience cultural deprivation of esteem from the entire society, since the majority of people in authoritarian regimes as a rule do not intend to protest against authoritarianism, perceiving the social order as legitimate and, consequently, the struggle against authoritarianism as illegitimate.

As the result of such rigid conditions, social activists are experiencing pressure both from the state and from fellow-citizens who do not recognize them as actors struggling for the ‘common good’. Therefore, it is possible to claim that in authoritarian regimes social movements are not embedded into the broader civil society, but represent rather a parallel civil society, which possesses its own identity and source of emancipation.

This claim was confirmed by findings of my research, which was conducted from a sample of social activists with application of the Biographical-Narrative Interpretive Method (BNIM). BNIM was applied for the purpose of reconstructing ethically-oriented recognition and instrumentally-oriented redistribution dimensions of the social struggle in the context of Belarusian consolidated authoritarianism.

Keywords: civil resistance, recognition, redistribution, emancipation, parallel civil society.
Introduction: Redistribution vs. Recognition dimensions of the social struggle

This paper undertakes the task to explore redistribution and recognition dimensions of the protest mobilization under the conditions of the Belarusian consolidated authoritarian regime with the examples of the ‘protest squares’ of 2006 and 2010, with the purpose to find how these dimensions of social struggle are presented in the social struggle of Belarusian dissidents. Undoubtedly, the two ‘protest squares’ remained in the contemporary history of Belarus as the most noticeable episodes of civil resistance to the authoritarian state. The waves of public outrage in both cases were caused by the cases of massive electoral fraud in the presidential elections. Finding their expressions in the mass political protests organized at the main squares of Minsk, civil resistance represented ethically-oriented attempts of emancipation from the powerful authoritarian system and recognition of the dissident social actors’ identity, rather than instrumentally-oriented demands of power redistribution.

From a theoretical point of view, I propose to explore these two contradictory approaches to the studies of protest mobilization. The first one is instrumental, structural, institutional, while the second is ethically-idealistic, socio-cultural and non-institutional. The first approach, connected with the set of political opportunity structure (POS) (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1994, 2013; Kriesi, 2004) and resource mobilization (RM) theories (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978), implies that social actors decide to mobilize on the basis of rational calculation, weighing potential benefits and losses of unconventional models of participation. Favoring structural conditions, such as the opening up of the relatively closed political system (Eisinger, 1973); the openness/weaknesses of the political system (Kitschelt, 1986); perceived liberalization of the regime (Tarrow, 2013); anticipation of the support from other disadvantaged social actors (Tilly, 1978); and low repressive capacity of the system (Della Porta and Filicuole, 2004) also determine the probability of protest mobilization, providing a rationale for involvement in the collective action. The second approach to the protest mobilization studies discussed in this paper is a ‘socio-cultural’ approach (Habermas, 1984, 1996, 1999; Castells, 2012; Honneth, 1995; Fraser, 2005; Offe, 1985; Touraine, 1981, 1983). This approach certainly undermines the grounds of the structurally and instrumentally oriented approach to the issue of protest mobilization.

In contrast with the first approach, representatives of the second one reject instrumental rationalism (Habermas, 1984) and redistribution demands (Honneth, 1995) as the main explanations of the protest mobilization. These theorists call for the principally new societal project embodied in the New Social Movements (NSM). In the macro-sociological sense, NSM project is certainly anti-structuralist, since it calls for the sociology of action, where social actors (not social structure) define relations between each other (Touraine, 1981). Decentralization, expressed in the network structure of the contemporary social movements and usage of the new technologies for self-organization with the purpose of mobilization decrease the governmental control capacity over social movements’ activities (Castells, 2012).
In this first part of the paper, the two dimensions of the social struggle are discussed, revealing the gap in the literature on studies of protest mobilization in the Belarusian authoritarian regime. In the second part of the paper, the discussion of the main definitions used in the paper (civil society, parallel civil society, social movements, opposition) is provided with the purpose to define where Belarusian dissidents are placed among this variety of definitions.

The third part is devoted to the comprehensive description of the methodology chosen for conducting the empirical part of the research. In choosing the strategy of interview data gathering, I follow the guiding principles of the Biographical-Narrative Interpretive Method (Jameson, 2005; Rosenthal, 1998; Wengraf, 2006), since I am particularly interested in how the interviewees make sense of their social struggle. BNIM is based on a constructionist approach to the interview data, and, therefore, allows reconstruction of the redistribution and recognition dimensions of the social struggle, exploring which is prevailing among the social actors in Belarus. The qualitative principles of data gathering in my research are supplemented by the quantitative principles of data analysis: the unit of analysis is not the respondent, but his/her statements. Since each respondent is a carrier of many statements, this at least increases the magnitude of the primary analytical units array, making this array statistically significant. I decided to withdraw from longer quotations, presenting analysis at the aggregate level, since the size of the article is restricted and data reduction is essential to comply with editorial requirements.

The fourth part of the paper contains analysis of the electoral situations of 2006 and 2010, focusing on the legal and political context in which the electoral campaigns unfolded, claiming that the political opportunity structure during that time was extremely closed, and, therefore, that mass protest mobilizations were not expected. Finally, in the conclusion, the results of the qualitative interviews’ analysis are discussed. As the result of analysis, it was revealed that the ethically-oriented motives (80 per cent of statements) prevail over instrumentally-oriented (20 per cent of statements) (Table 1), allowing characterization of the social struggle as struggle for the recognition of the dissident actors’ unique identities, previously denigrated by the authoritarian system.

Redistribution and recognition approaches to social struggle in social theory

Overall, according to the POS and RM approaches, social actors mobilize, when they perceive that the political opportunities structure begins to open, providing an opportunity window for outsiders to enter the field of political struggle with their own demands. Besides this, social actors calculate to what extent their participation in the protest actions will be beneficial for them, estimating potential benefits and losses of this participation, and if the benefits outweigh losses, they are likely to engage in protest actions.

This approach to social movements’ mobilization was sharply criticized, because of its focus on invariant structural determinants, mixing up structural factors
with non-structural, neglecting non-structural factors and the role of agency in social change (Gamson and Mayer, 1996; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999).

Gamson and Mayer (Gamson and Mayer, 1996) suppose that the main drawback of POS is its catch-all character. Since this concept is too broad, completely different aspects of social movement environments (political and cultural) are often referred to this concept. The methodological fallacy in applying this theory is concluded in the fact that in trying to explain everything by the introduction of a cluster of variables, this theory risks explaining nothing. For the different purposes of research, political opportunity structure could be methodologically introduced as cluster of dependent, intervening or independent variables (Gamson and Mayer, 1996: 275-276).

The cultural dimension of social movement activity, often neglected by POS theorists, needs particular attention, since every movement appears in certain cultural environment, which means that not only political institutions and variance of relationships between political actors influence social movement activity, but also the history, political culture, ‘cultural climate’, zeitgeist prevailing in the country where this movement is appearing. Another important issue is emphasizing the smaller, issue-specific opportunities instead of a dichotomous ‘Big Opportunity’, which is usually used by most scholars working in this tradition (Gamson and Mayer, 1996: 282).

Similarly to Gamson and Mayer, Goodwin and Jasper (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999), criticize POS for its broad and catch-all character, which involves tautology and triviality. They argue that if the POS concept includes every factor related with environment (X variables), where social movement (Y variable) operates, the causal relations between them (X leads to Y) seem to be rather obvious (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 31). Goodwin and Jasper reject the invariant modeling of POS, proposing to acknowledge the diversity of elements shaping collective actions, including interactions between culture and agency, emotions and strategizing. According to them, the weaknesses of the POS approach come from the strong biases toward ‘structure’. So many causal variables and mechanism are referred to using the label ‘structure’ that this tool becomes unreliable from a methodological point of view. When ‘structural’ factors (i.e., factors assumed to be relatively stable over time) are analyzed as the main and only determinants of social movement activity, other ‘non-structural’ factors are often neglected or also analyzed as ‘structural’.

It is interesting that Goodwin and Jasper criticize not only the POS approach to the studies of protest mobilization, but also the ‘cultural framing’ analyzed by Gamson and Mayer as a necessary complementary dimension of protest mobilization studies. According to Goodwin and Jasper, ‘cultural framing’ is tautological to the same extent as POS (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 43-44). Moreover, ‘cultural framing’ (understood as identities, grievances, shared goals) together with ‘mobilizing structures’ (understood as organizations and advocacy networks) build a circular argument, since social movements themselves could also be defined through these terms as ‘organizations and advocacy networks, which share collective identities, common grievances and goals’. In this way, the logical error appears in the way that causes of mobilization are mixed up with pre-existing characteristics of social movements.
To overcome the conceptual and methodological drawbacks of POS, they recommend following several principles, the main idea of which is a proposition that empirical variation requires conceptual variation. Different kinds of movements require different kinds of approaches, and POS is not always a necessary framework of analysis. In a similar way, emphasizing the collective identity is not required for all types of movements (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 52).

The guiding principle of the recognition approach for studies of social struggle is understanding the social conflict as an attempt to get the conditions for self-realization back. This understanding of the social conflict strictly differentiates from the mainstream understanding of the conflict as the struggle for redistribution of the resources, and symbolic or political power. The political-philosophical debate between Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser (Honneth and Fraser, 2005) accurately touched these controversial issues. Fraser introduces a two-dimensional concept of justice, which includes both perspectives of recognition and redistribution, while Honneth stands for the recognition-centered approach to social justice. But what is most important, is that despite differences between the two approaches, the recognition concept is present in both. By proposing a two-dimensional model, Nancy Fraser does not question the importance of the concept of recognition. However, she introduces dimension of redistribution analyzing social conflicts more in political science terms, in comparison with Honneth, who is clearly a moral philosopher.

As a rule, scholars who study protest mobilization in the Post-Soviet countries concentrate on the variations of the first approach (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009; Bunce, 2003; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a, 2006b; D’Anieri, 2005, 2006; Karatnycky, 2005; Mitchel, 2004; Silitski, 2005a, 2006b), trying to evaluate to what extent the ‘electoral revolutions’ (a term, introduced by McFaul, 2006) were successful or why some of them failed. If post-elections protests had relatively successful outcomes (as in the case of Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005), scholars sometimes compare them with the wave of revolutions in Central Europe that occurred from 1988 to 1992 (Aslund and McFaul, 2006; Karatnycky, 2005; Silitski, 2005a), even calling the revolutions of 2003-2005 ‘a second wave of revolutions’, which had effects on the democratization of these states comparable with the democratization effect of the first wave of revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a).

Generally, the above-mentioned research studies had chosen an institutional approach to the study of protest mobilization, evaluating the ‘electoral revolutions’ as the peculiar feature of pseudo-democratic political regimes. I avoid usage of this concept, since it is too tendentious to call post-elections protests revolutions, even if those protests gathered large numbers of participants and had an influence on regime change. In any event, the term revolution can be applied only in the case of significant systemic transformation (for example, transformation from a command to a market

1 Axel Honneth elicited three conditions essential for self-realization and identity-formation: a) love and basic self-confidence; b) respect for human rights and dignity, which is established legally and institutionally; c) solidarity and self-esteem in the sense of recognition of the agents, previously demigrated as the contributors to the common good (Honneth, 1995).
economy), while the aftermaths of the post-election protests did not in fact bring any systemic transformations.

As for the second approach to the protest mobilization in the Post-Soviet countries, there is a certain gap in the scientific literature regarding this issue. The phenomenon remains understudied and, therefore, the present research is probably the first attempt to explore both the instrumentally-oriented redistribution and ethically-oriented recognition dimensions of the social struggle in the context of Belarusian consolidated authoritarianism, by the example of protests against the fraudulent presidential elections of 2006 and 2010.

‘Civil society’, ‘parallel civil society’, ‘social movements’, ‘opposition’: Where can Belarusian dissidents be placed?

I evaluate the ethically-oriented social struggle for recognition pursued by Belarusian social activists as emancipation of the nascent parallel civil society, which could contribute to the democratization of the authoritarian regime and also to the creation of a postmodern-type civil society in Belarus. Among a number of civil society definitions, it is possible to distinguish three main characteristics of the postmodern-type of civil society: 1) civil society as a third sector, opposed to both the state and the market (Żuk, 2001); 2) civil society as a sphere of polity, where individual and collective actors, relatively autonomous from the state, try to articulate their values and interests (Linz and Stepan, 1996); 3) civil society as a political society, i.e., as a sphere of contest for public power (Kopecky, 2003).

What should be emphasized here is the autonomous character of individual and collective actors’ functioning, actors who compose civil society in all three definitions, and their controlling functions. When we evaluate the situation at the aggregate level in Belarus, it is possible to claim that there is no civil society in the above-mentioned terms. Formally, over two thousand registered non-governmental organizations are active in Belarus, but they resemble Soviet-type quasi-NGO organizations. Such Soviet-type organizations could not be referred as civil society, since they completely lack any autonomy from the state. Moreover, they do not implement controlling functions over the state. They rather function as the regime’s legitimation toward internal and external observers, receiving grants from governments and, overall, do not make any demands for regime democratization, since they are embedded in the system and have financial and status interests.

---


3 According to the Ministry of Justice, these official quasi-non-governmental organizations are represented by sport organizations (525); charities (349); culture and leisure clubs (295); youth groups (178) etc. Besides this, there are 82 registered foundations, 22 associations; 35 professional and labor unions. (Golovanov and Slizhevsky, 2010: 34).
Besides these registered quasi-non-governmental organizations, there are also organizations that are not able to obtain a registration, because of their anti-governmental nature, aimed at a contribution to the transformation of the regime from authoritarian to democratic. For these independent and as a rule non-registered organizations, the quasi-non-governmental entities can not be the partners in the creation of the postmodern type of civil society, since being non-autonomous and not controlling the state they contradict the very notion of a post-modern civil society.

Evaluating the situation with civil society in Central Europe, Grzegorz Piotrowski emphasized that in the Central European Countries ‘the call for the autonomy of civil society was in fact the call for freedom and the creation of parallel and independent structures as a means to achieve it’ (Piotrowski, 2009: 171). This is exactly a direction in which Belarusian dissidents are going. Therefore, despite the concept of ‘parallel society’ having a specific Central European connotation connected to a larger extent with the heritage of Vaclav Havel, Vaclav Benda, and Adam Michnik, it also could be placed in the contemporary Belarusian context.

Belarusian dissident circles create a parallel civil society, differentiated from any official pro-governmental and pro-authoritarian structures. This ‘parallel society’ contributes to the formation of wider protest movements, which hypothetically could achieve regime change. Besides this, dissident circles lay the cultural foundations of the future civil society of a democratic regime. Similar to the samizdat, they have alternative publishing sources 4 and alternative mass media 5, which became available mainly because of technological development (Internet, satellite television). Thanks to these independent sources of information, citizens have the opportunity to feel that they belong to the group of differently-thinking people, which also maintains their identity.

Overall, the protests against fraudulent elections of 2006 and 2010 illustrate the linkages between dissident circles and wider protest mobilizations and even allow claims about the existence of a ‘dissident social movement’ in Belarus. In order to make points of differentiation between social movements and civil society actors (NGOs), proposed by Piotrowski (Piotrowski, 2009: 184-185), it is relevant to apply the term ‘social movement’ in relation to the Belarusian dissident activists. Firstly, looking at the source of funding, Belarusian dissident activists are not relying on state funds. Moreover, they are not able to get any, because they are not registered as official third sector. Secondly, they have an undoubtedly confrontational attitude toward the state. Thirdly, they politicize their claims and protests against fraudulent elections, thus representing cases of politicized mobilization. Fourthly, they have a strong collective identity and that is why I introduce ‘recognition’ theories (Honneth, Habermas) into this paper.

---

4 They publish books in Poland and Lithuania.
5 Newspapers, mainly circulated in the Internet (Nasha Niva, Belorusskiy Partisan); information portals (Naviny.by, charter97.org); radio (Radio Racyja, Evropeyskoye Radio dla Belarusi) and satellite TV channel Belsat, based in Warsaw, but can be watched in Belarus using satellite dishes and receivers.
The ‘Struggle for recognition’, conceptualized by Habermas and Honneth, represents a source of collective identity formation. A claim for recognition is indisputably connected with the intention to give back the conditions for self-realization, which are restricted in the authoritarian regime. Therefore, following the logical chain, my reasons for calling the Belarusian dissident circles a specific type of social movement will be as follows. Claims for recognition, which create the sense of belonging to the wider groups of morally outraged people, were expressed in the protests against the fraudulent elections. Protests against fraudulent elections were inspired by the dissident circles, which spread the information about the high probability of electoral fraud in both cases, and invited dissidents to come to the squares. Common in both cases was a sense of belonging to the wider group of people, who share the same claims for recognition and, therefore, a common identity. These people came to the squares not only to support certain leaders, but to support certain ideas and express their claims for recognition as a group of people sharing values which differentiate from the mainstream.

At the same time, it should also be pointed out that those social activists, who call themselves ‘opposition’ in Belarus, from the clear political science view, cannot be called that. In democratic regimes the opposition fights for power and redistribution, while in authoritarian regimes, where opposition is unable to win elections, they rather fight for ethical demands of recognition. Therefore, I prefer to use the term ‘dissident social activists’, or ‘dissident social movements’, although sometimes in the text I also use the term ‘opposition’ when referring to people who oppose the regime or define themselves as opposition.

**Principles of data collection and analysis**

For the interviews I chose people representing the most active groups of social struggle for the reason that they verbalized specifics of their political group easier; therefore it facilitates ‘extraction’ of axiological materials. The narrative interview begins with SQUIN – Single Question Aimed at Inducing Narrative(s). In my case this single-question reads: ‘Can you please tell me the story of your life, describing all the experiences and events which were important for you and induced you to begin your social struggle?’ This question initiates a set of follow-up questions when my informants begin to tell the stories concerning their participation in the events of 2006 and/or 2010. I asked to them to speak about motives (ethical or instrumental), which drove them to take part in the protest actions and, their expectations and impressions from these events, I also asked them to reconstruct the sequence of events and the development of the situation after the elections of 2006 and 2010. When I conducted interviews I paid particular attention to the description and analysis of the POS made by informants, trying to identify, whether the POS was perceived as opening up or not.

**Settings.** The principal of sample formations is snowball sampling. For the purpose of network finding, initial acquaintances among Belarusian social activists, who fleeing
abroad after the events of 2006 and 2010, bring a sufficient contribution to the sample formation on the principle of snowball. Among initial acquaintances the following were people affected by the regime: two opposition leaders; a former political prisoner; a journalist; and a sociologist who were forced to emigrate because of power oppression against them and the companies, where they worked.

Overall, I conducted 13 interviews according to the principles of Biographic-Narrative Interpretive Method. The average duration of the interviews was 180 minutes. All interviews were conducted in Warsaw: some of the interviewees resided there on a temporary basis, others were just visiting the city on a business or for other reasons. I was trying to recruit people with different professional backgrounds, ages, and genders, from ideologically different social movements, as well as people not attached to any movements in order to reduce the selectivity bias. The only necessary condition for recruiting a person was participation in the post-elections protests in 2006 or/and 2010.

**Research focus.** I operationalized the construct of ‘ethically-oriented motives’ through the argumentation type of the respondent, in which the following patterns of justifications occur: 1) participation with the aim to re-establish/defend the respect of the human rights and dignity; 2) participation with the aim to re-establish/defend the self-esteem of the person, previously denigrated by the system; 3) participation as expression of the solidarity with previous two groups.

However, to prevent the potential threat of exemplary chosen instances, I introduce a rival construct of ‘instrumentally-oriented’ motives, characterized by the occurrence of the following patterns of justifications: 1) participation in the protest actions with the aim to get some benefits from the government; 2) participation in the protest actions as a part of larger PR-campaign; 3) participation in the protest actions without expression of the solidarity with denigrated groups, but with the aim of supporting concrete leaders.

**Elections, electoral fraud and protest mobilization in 2006 and 2010.**

Analysis of the legal framework in which social activists operated during the electoral campaigns of 2006 and 2010, indicates that the authorities made all possible efforts to criminalize any anti-governmental protest actions and activities of the dissident groups. Overall, it is possible to define three types of amendments that negatively affected dissidents groups: 1) amendments to the Criminal Code, concerning activities of the non-registered organizations; 2) amendments to the Electoral Law, concerning the voting rights, procedures of agitation and electoral observations; 3) amendments to the Law on Mass Assemblies, concerning the organization and conduct of rallies, picketing and other mass assemblies.
1) Amendments to the Criminal Law. The House of Representatives (Belarusian parliament, which consists of deputies absolutely loyal to the president) adopted amendments in December 2005 to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus. Several new articles were introduced into the Criminal Code. According to article 193, activity on behalf of an unregistered organization is punishable with two years of imprisonment. Article 293 (Mass disorders) was supplemented by a third part, according to which training or other forms of preparation for participation in ‘mass riots’, or financing of such events is punishable with six months to three years of imprisonment. The Criminal Code was also amended by the new article 369 (Discrediting the Republic of Belarus), where the notion of discrediting is refers to any ‘false’ (from the official viewpoint) information about the political, economic, social, military, or international situation of Belarus. Such activities are punishable with imprisonment of up to two years.

2) Amendments to the Electoral Law. According to the amendments, people who are kept by a court verdict in a state of deprivation of liberty, were deprived of active and passive voting rights (article 4.1). It was also determined in article 35 that only registered political parties, NGO activists, and labor collectives could be nominated to the electoral commissions. International observers can work at elections only if they are invited by the authorities (article 13). Article 45 (regulating agitation procedure), which repeats the amendments to the Law on Mass Assemblies, is presented below.

3) Amendments to the Law on Mass Assemblies. The fixing of the significant restrictions on freedom of assembly was amended to Articles 5 and 6 of the Law on Mass Assemblies. According to these amended regulations, it is necessary to obtain permission from the local authorities to organize a meeting with constituencies in the framework of an electoral campaign. Organizers of such events are obliged to finance the police services (safeguarding of the meetings), ambulance (which should be on duty at the meeting), and cleaning the territory after the event.

Elections of 2006: high repressive capacity of the system and extremely closed POS.

It was against such a background that the presidential campaign unfolded. On December 27, the Central Electoral Commission registered initiative groups of eight potential contesters, who were allowed to collect signatures to be nominated as candidates. In the end, only four of the eight potential contesters collected more than 100,000 signatures necessary for registration. Only these candidates were allowed to participate in the elections. The list of candidates included incumbent president Aliaksander Lukashenka, Aliaksander Milinkevich (candidate nominated by Congress of Democratic Forces), Aliaksander Kazulin (Belarusian Social Democratic Party), Siarhey Haydukevich (pro-presidential Liberal Democratic Party).

---

6 All legal documents could be accessed through on-line database:
http://etalonline.by/?type=card&regnum=Hk0600139
To describe the political stances of these candidates briefly, Aliaksander Lukashenka traditionally called for preserving the authoritarian stability expressed in the paternalistic welfare state, which attracts mainly socially disadvantaged people and pensioners. Siarhey Haydukevich was not differentiated from Lukashenka, since Haydukevich always filled the role of Lukashenka’s ‘sparring-partner’. In practice, Haydukevich’s Liberal Democratic Party has nothing in common with liberal democracy. Participating in elections, Haydukevich legitimizes the electoral process for external observers by creating the illusion of a moderate alternative candidate’s presence.

Aliaksander Milinkevich (leader of the ‘For Freedom’ movement) was elected as a candidate by the Congress of Democratic Forces in 2005. The central point of Milinkevich campaign was the idea of Belarusian integration in Europe. He supposed that the European option for Belarus could guarantee democratic transformation of the country (and all derivatives from that, such as respect for human rights and free and fair elections) and maintenance of sovereignty in the face of pro-Russian influence.

Aliaksander Kazulin (who was at that moment a leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party) did not participate in the Congress of Democratic Forces, preferring to act as an independent candidate. The main message of his program was the necessity to renovate the power apparatus. In general, Kazulin did not emphasize the issue of Belarusian integration into Europe, in comparison with Milinkevich, for whom this issue was central. Despite the fact that Milinkevich behaved in a restrained and calm way, and did not condemn Kazulin directly because of his decision to run for president, people from Milinkevich circles did not welcome the decision of

---

7 Description is based on data from open sources (Belarusian independent mass-media and information portals) and represents the author’s own observation and analysis.


Predvybornaya kampaniya v Belorussii vstupila v final'nyu stadiyu (The election campaign in Belarus has entered the final stage). Retrieved from http://lenta.ru/articles/2006/02/20/four/ Accessed: 01-06-2015


8 In the case of present research, informant #8 (a person, who cooperated with Milinkevich closely) spelled out his concerns about splitting of the opposition electorate by the several candidates.
Kazulin to begin an independent campaign, supposing that participation of the several candidates from the opposition in the elections would create a more comfortable situation for the current regime, since several candidates split the electorate. As my informants noted, during the electoral campaign, opposition candidates encountered numerous instances of the notorious ‘administrative resource’ usage. Representatives of the opposition candidates were not allowed to collect signatures in student dormitories, because administration simply did not let them into the building, while representatives of Lukashenka and Haydukevich were welcomed. Observers also told about the cases when people were forced to sign for Lukashenka. Those people who supported opposition candidates also faced pressure, including threats of dismissal from their workplace or expulsion from their university.

Besides this, management of business companies and directors of educational establishments gave their employees and students instructions how to vote in advance, threatening negative consequences if they would not follow these instructions. By March 19th, 31 per cent of constituents had voted by absentee ballots.9

The quality of the electoral process deteriorated during the counting of vote cast. Independent observers from OSCE evaluated negative counting procedures in 50 per cent of cases.10 Among the violations noted were failures in completing the established procedure, presence of unauthorized persons in the commissions, manipulations with protocols of voting results, and improper handling of complaints. Nearly 70 per cent of precinct election commissions did not announce the number of votes cast for each candidate before drawing up the protocols.

Official results indicated that Lukashenka received 83 per cent of votes, Milinkevich – 6.10 per cent, Kazulin – 2.2 per cent, Haydukevich – 3.5 per cent, and 5.2 per cent voted against all candidates.11 The opposition did not agree with the official results, also making claims about dozens of violations and the unfairness of the contest. After the elections, supporters of the oppositional candidates came to Oktyabrskaya square to express their disagreement with the official results of the elections.

Kazulin and Milinkevich delivered speeches at a rally, saying the elections were fraudulent, not reflecting the will of the people. They demanded that democratic elections be conducted on July 16, 2006. A tent camp was organized, and the rally lasted more than four days. Despite the fact that during the first five days the government permitted these actions to continue, the police regularly detained protesters who were leaving the venue of the rally or returning there. They were reported to prevent people from bringing protesters supplies, warm clothing, and blankets.12 Despite the policing of protest, many protesters continued their actions

12 Description of the protest event based on evidence given by informants # 2, 7 and 9.
until police officers dispersed the tent camp and arrested the remaining participants. Within a week after the rally, 500 to 1 000 people, including Kazulin, were detained.

Finally, Kazulin was sentenced to five and a half years of imprisonment for three counts: two counts of ‘malicious hooliganism’, and one count of ‘organization of group activities violating public order’. He was pardoned by Lukashenka in 2008 due to the pressure of Western economic sanctions on the Belarusian regime. After his release from prison, he withdrew from political activity. Milankevich lives in exile in Poland, trying to coordinate European and Polish humanitarian programs for Belarus. He has distanced himself from politics, preferring involvement in cultural diplomacy. He often comes out to the conferences in support of Belarusian political prisoners, visits EU institutions and national parliaments, calling for a more active position from the EU on the issue of Belarusian authoritarianism.

Elections of 2010: greater dispersion of the opposition and pseudo-opportunities

All restrictive measures, introduced into the Criminal Code, the Electoral Law, and the Law on Mass Assemblies in 2006, continued to act without any degree of mitigation. Some degree of liberalization concerned only providing airtime on state television for opposition candidates and allowing them to organize election campaigns without obstacles from the side of local authorities and state security services. Overall, ten candidates (including Lukashenka) participated in the elections in 2010. Among them, eight candidates – Rygor Kastuseu, Ales Mikhalevich, Uladzimir Niaklyaeu, Andrei Sannikau, Mikalay Statkevich, Yaraslau Ramanchuk, Vital Rymasheusky and Dzmitry Vuss could be evaluated as opposition candidates.

Sannikau, a former diplomat and Niaklyaeu, poet and novelist, accumulated the greatest amount of resources for their election campaigns. Their campaigns were widely covered in the independent media. These candidates attracted journalistic attention, largely due to the stature of their previous achievements. Niaklyaeu, who launched a campaign ‘Tell the Truth’, was widely known in Belarus as a poet and novelist. He largely attracted voters who, on the one hand, were tired of politics and political conflicts that were considered an immoral phenomenon, but on the other hand, continued to consider themselves opposition-minded people. The main points of his program included modernization in all spheres of society, development of small and medium-sized businesses and privatization in the economic sphere; as well as constitutional reform, and the development of self-government in the political sphere.

Sannikau launched the campaign ‘For a European Belarus’ and attracted primarily those voters, for whom Belarusian integration into Europe was the issue of paramount importance. In his program, Sannikau proposed constitutional reform, limiting the president’s powers. Sannikau’s economic program involved the liberalization and modernization of the economy, however, it was less developed in comparison with the economic parts of the programs prosed by Mikhalevich and Ramanchuk.

---

13 Description is based on data from open sources (Belarusian independent mass-media and information portals) and represents the author’s own observation and analysis.
Ales Mikhalevich, who had previously collaborated with Milinkevich circles and worked for his headquarters in 2006, acted as an independent candidate in 2010. He largely focused on economic issues, somehow distancing himself from the socio-cultural issues. The main ideas of the program were increasing economic freedoms, optimization of business procedures, separation of business from state power, and reducing the tax burden. His program was also in tune with the program of Yaraslav Ramanchuk, a Belarusian liberal economist. Ramanchuk focused on the idea of reducing the tax burden and the modernization of the Belarusian economy.

Two other similar programs were proposed by Kastuseu and Rymasheusky. These candidates paid more attention to socio-cultural issues in their programs, as compared with Mikhalevich and Ramanchuk, who concentrated on economic issues. The program of Kastuseu, representative of the Belarusian People’s Front (the oldest movement in Belarus, formed in the late eighties), was permeated with the ideas of ‘saving the Belarusian nation’. Among the political demands for the realization of this idea, he put the constitutional reform, reform of the security services and carrying out lustration. His economic program included land reform, the development of small and medium-sized businesses, economic integration with the EU, the introduction of the new currency. Kastuseu was the only candidate who emphasized in his program the idea of keeping Belarusian language as the only state language for the administrative procedures.

Program of Rymasheusky, candidate of Belarusian Christian Democracy, was founded on the idea of building the economy and politics based on Christian values. Political demands of the program included the fight against corruption and the development of self-government. Among the economic components of the program, it is possible to distinguish the development of medium-sized businesses, although, in general, the economic program of the candidate was weak.

Statkevich, former Army officer, nominated by the Social Democratic Party, focused on issues of education reform, and labor laws, as well as the modernization of the economy. In his program, he noted that his goal was to show voters that there is an alternative for the current government. But, overall, his program could be evaluated as a weak in both economic and political dimensions. Dzmitry Vuss, an entrepreneur, proposed a program, which consisted of mostly economic propositions (increasing pensions, creation of a more simplified taxation scheme, development of agro-industrial production). Vuss was not connected with any political forces and participated in the elections rather with instrumental purposes of self-promotion, which probably was necessary for him to enter the field of political struggle.

My informants noted that compared to the previous elections, candidates were provided with more opportunities to campaign, but, at the same time, opposition leaders realized that authorities had their own plans and strategy for the campaign. For example, informant 5, who worked in the electoral headquarter of one of the candidates, asserted, that despite the opposition candidates appearing on the state television for the first time in many years, his colleagues from headquarters did not perceive these developments as a positive sign, because one of their colleagues, an opposition journalist, was allegedly assassinated by the regime secret services. Factually, Lukashenka somehow slackened the pressure for a while with the aim to
demonstrate that Belarus had begun to liberalize. Such measures were necessary for him to attract additional funds from Western financial institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund).

On election day, the illusion of liberalization had been dispelled. The Central Election Commission announced that Lukashenka got 79.67 per cent of the votes. According to official figures, Andrei Sannikau, runner-up, scored only 2.43 per cent. The other candidates received less than 2 per cent of the votes. The OSCE observation mission documented violations at 46 per cent of polling stations.

About 30 thousand people gathered at Independence Square in front of the Government House by the evening of December 19. People came to take part in the protest rally despite threats from the authorities, who warned that participation in the protest action after the elections would be treated as terrorism. Authorities claimed that foreign intelligence agencies prepared provocation after the elections, and the protesters themselves were willing to apply violent methods of struggle.

When the results of the voting were announced, and the protesters knew that according to official estimates, Lukashenka was far ahead of all his competitors, a few dozen masked men began to smash windows of the Government House on Independence Square. While the rest of the demonstrators were peaceful, law enforcement officials began a crackdown on the rally, beating protesters indiscriminately, and even detaining passers-by on the streets adjacent to the square.

On December 20, it was officially announced that Aliaksander Lukashenka had won the presidential elections. The Belarusian authorities presented the events on Independence Square as an attempt by the opposition to overthrow the legitimate government. In his speech in the parliament, Aliaksander Lukashenka claimed that the opposition was preparing a coup.

Overall, more than 40 people were accused of organization or participation in mass disturbances, including six presidential candidates. Five of them: Uladzimir Niaklyaeu, Mikalai Statkevich, Andrei Sannikau, Dzmitry Vuss and Vital Rymasheusky were sentenced to various terms of deprivation or restriction of freedom. Ales Mikhalevich was detained in March 2011, but managed to flee abroad soon after he was released from the KGB remand prison on condition of not leaving the country. After leaving Belarus, Mikhalevich was granted political asylum in the Czech Republic.

This short description and analysis of the 2006 and 2010 electoral situations allows for assuming that ethically-oriented demands of recognition drove social actors
to rise against the authoritarian system under the pretext of fraudulent elections, since the political opportunity structure in fact did not promise liberalization and, therefore, if to analyze the protest mobilization in the framework of political opportunity structure theories, these mobilizations simply could not occur, since the initial conditions were too restrictive and consequences of participation promised to be too negative. Therefore, with a high degree of probability it is possible to claim that the rational calculation of the cost and benefits of participation in the protest actions should prevent social activists from taking part, if they are pragmatically-minded activists, who understand that losses in the case of participation outweigh the benefits.

**Conclusion and Discussion: Representation of the Social Struggle Patterns in the interview data**

Social actors reconstructed ‘the stories of their struggle’ during the interviews, in which they described their perception of political opportunity structure before the elections of 2006 and 2010, and their vision of the civil resistance against the consolidated authoritarian regime. Thanks to cooperation with social actors, it was elicited how the protests against fraudulent elections represent the social struggle. As was found, protests constituted the emancipation of the participants in these events. Actors did not perceive the regime as legitimate because they felt a threat to their dignity from the side of the system. Overall, the struggle was one of a socio-cultural character, rather than of a political character, since actors aspiring to the recognition of their identity, whereas aspiration for power did not determine their actions.

The interview data array gave reasons for approximate distribution of similar responses on a three-point scale which included a minority type of response, an approximately equal type of response, and a majority type of response in each dimension of demands, which were coded in the third section of this paper as instrumentally and ethically oriented types of responses.

During the interview data analysis, it was revealed that the ethically-oriented motives (80 per cent of statements) undoubtedly prevailed over instrumentally-oriented (20 per cent of statements) (Table 1), allowing characterization of the social struggle as a struggle for recognition of the dissident actors’ unique identities, previously denigrated by the authoritarian system. Overall, the minority types of responses referred to the universe of demands coded as ‘instrumentally oriented motives’. In this universe of answers were, 1) participation in the protest actions with the aim to force some beneficial measures from the government did not appear among the statements; 2) participation in the protest actions as a part of larger PR-campaign appeared in 15 per cent of statements and 3) participation in the protest actions without expression of the solidarity with denigrated groups, but with the aim of supporting the concrete leaders – among five per cent of statements.

In the ethically-oriented universe of answers, 1) participation with the aim to re-establish/defend the respect of the human rights and dignity appeared in 40 per cent of statements; 2) participation with the aim to re-establish/defend the self-esteem of the person, previously denigrated by the system – 25 per cent of statements and 3)
participation as expression of the solidarity with previous two groups – 15 per cent of statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethically-oriented type of response (morality, 'values', 'mission', 'autonomy', 'human rights', 'dignity', 'solidarity', 'emancipation')</th>
<th>Instrumentally-oriented type of response ('interest', 'benefits', 'profits', 'PR campaign', 'leader', 'protest as a tool', 'opportunity window', 'redistribution')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense of human rights and dignity</td>
<td>Defend self-esteem of person, previously denigrated by the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of the solidarity with previous two groups</td>
<td>Getting some benefits from the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A part of larger PR-campaign</td>
<td>Supporting of the concrete leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Distribution of the respondents’ statements (ethically and instrumentally-oriented types of response)

In regards to ‘social desirability bias’, which could be a crucial problem in studies of differences between ethical and instrumental dimensions of social struggle, it was easy in my research to approach this problem, because in Belarus participation in the protest actions is socially undesirable and an unacceptable form of behavior regardless of the motives which drove social activists to choose this form of behavior. Therefore, my respondents acknowledged the fact that they had chosen an undesirable form of behavior, justification of this choice is free from any intention to give a socially desirable answer. Any type of protest behavior justification, even ethically-oriented, will be socially undesirable in a Belarusian context.

Placing these results into the social context of authoritarianism, it could be concluded that participants in the protests mobilized after the fraudulent elections factually represented a nascent parallel civil society, which is not embedded into the official authoritarian structures and contains ethical demands for the democratization of the system, making it oriented toward human rights and dignity.

However, an instrumental type of motivation was also presented in the respondents’ statements and it was connected with intentions to support ‘opposition leaders’ and attracting the attention of the wider population to their activities. In 2006, when the ‘united opposition’ agreed to nominate Aliaksander Milinkevich as the single candidate, it looked very promising for social activists, who supposed that mobilization of support for the ‘united opposition’ candidate could be a sufficient resource for regime change.

Interviewees who participated in the post-elections protests in 2010 also believed in some degree of regime liberalization, assuming that even in the case of protest mobilization’s failure they would not have been repressed. Therefore, participation in political protests for them was a rational decision: the losses of participation did not outweigh the benefits. The fact that seven opposition candidates
were registered was evaluated by the social actors as the opening of the political opportunity structure.

As long as there are activists willing to resist the system’s domination, the potential of social struggle still remains. The further perspectives of the social struggle will to a larger extent depend on the development of the regime. In the case of liberalization, socio-cultural dissident circles will get a chance to transform their struggle for recognition into the articulated political claims, becoming a real political opposition, operating in the institutional dimension. Otherwise, they will preserve their socio-cultural character.

Nowadays, the political claims of most of them are too abstract and have rather symbolic significance, rather than the elaborated programmed claims, which could be realized in the short and medium term perspective. Internal conflicts, such as failures in negotiating and making a broader coalition, will also influence the character of their struggle. Social activists might lose the chance to enter the field of ‘normal’ politics even in the case of regime liberalization, if they will not acquire the ability to negotiate, thus building a united opposition.

References


LAVRINENKO, O.: PROTESTS AGAINST FRAUDULENT ELECTIONS IN BELARUS AS EMANCIPATION OF THE PARALLEL CIVIL SOCIETY


LAVRINENKO, O.: PROTESTS AGAINST FRAUDULENT ELECTIONS IN BELARUS AS EMANCIPATION OF THE PARALLEL CIVIL SOCIETY


Abstract

Ukraine is facing changes of a significant scale. Caused by external and internal factors and processes, these changes will influence the socio-economic and political reality of the majority of Ukrainians. The character and degree of the changes are yet to be defined in the political struggle inside the country. Do workers, as the biggest social class, have the potential to press for their interests in the face of a spiraling crisis? In this article we tried to answer this question by analyzing labor protests in the country. Our research of empirical material of the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion database shows that labor actors have significant bargaining power on local issues but lack coordinated and relatively large-scale mobilization, hence, can hardly influence state-level politics. Being scattered and defensive, lacking solidarity among themselves and without support from allies, workers have few chances to succeed in promoting their agenda. Some possible logical and empirically supported solutions to increase labor bargaining power in this context are also suggested in the article.

Keywords: Labor studies, Protest, Trade union, Mobilization.
Together we stand, divided we fall.
Pink Floyd. ‘Hey You’.

Introduction. Out of the crisis in the interest of the majority?

The majority of Ukrainians work for wages. No matter their class position, this means that their lives are significantly, directly, and objectively influenced by labor legislation and practical organization of labor relations within the society.

Ukrainians have been living in the context of a political and economic crisis\(^1\) which has been unfolding in Ukraine since the end of 2013. Protests against the government’s decision to postpone further integration with the EU started in November 2013 in Kyiv and spread all over the country, becoming more one for civil liberties and against the government. Escalating violence ended with more than one hundred people killed (protesters and state forces) in three months and a change of government. The events continued with mobilization against the new government in the South and East of the country, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, so-called ‘anti-terrorist operation’ of the new government against increasingly militarized protests and self-proclaimed separatist authorities in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, culminating in a de facto war, in which several thousands have already been killed. All these events have been inevitably causing a deep economic recession, as well as economic and political instability.

In the context of this recession and instability, in the prospect of radical neoliberal reform, presented as inevitable by the government, the question of the bargaining power of labor becomes literally of vital importance for wage workers of the country. Their (in)ability to counterbalance the pressure of capital and elites will be of remarkable importance to shape the state reforms, policies, and their impact on the society in the nearest future.

Proceeding with ratification of the Association Agreement with the EU was among the demands of the biggest protest mobilization in Ukrainian history and which was signed\(^2\) in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests, can also change labor legislation in Ukraine in the near future. And those changes will mostly not be favorable to labor’s interests. For example (Kravchuk, 2014), according to some documents signed with the Agreement, it is recommended for the Ukrainian government to allow collective dismissal, to decrease maternity leave, and to increase working hours to 48 per week. According to Ukrainian legislation, normal duration of work cannot exceed 40 hours per week. According to EU legislation, duration of working week cannot exceed 48 hours, including overtime. Even after adding 120

---

\(^{1}\) Referring to political crisis we mean political instability (expressed by, for example, separatist tendencies) and polarization of society, leading to de facto exclusion of oppositional positions from parliamentary politics. Referring to economic crisis we mean economic recession, which can be expressed in many metrics, but let us name one: GDP declined from approx. 180 billion US dollars in 2013 to approx. 130 billion in 2014;

\(^{2}\) The political part of the Agreement was signed on 21\(^{st}\) of March 2014, the economic part on 27\(^{st}\) of June.
overtime hours per year (allowed by law) to the Ukrainian norm, EU norms allow longer working weeks\(^3\).

On the other hand, there is also conditionality, pressed for by the International Monetary Fund, seemingly unavoidable because of the unprecedented budget gap, caused by a decrease of the economy, war expenditure, loss of territories, minimum welfare to be provided for internally displaced people\(^4\), and so on. The government had already increased utility costs radically – since the 1\(^{st}\) of April 2015 people should pay 72 per cent more for central heating, tariffs for electricity will become 3.5 times higher by 2017. Planned privatization, cuts in budget spending and other conditions to get the credit, had already encouraged some observers to label the government’s reforms as ‘shock therapy’.

Presented as unavoidable and even desirable by the government and their supporters, all these reforms can cause great damage to the social conditions of ordinary people, leaving those of the big owners untouched or even improved. At the same time some experts and politicians point that there are other ways out of the crisis, which would distribute its costs more evenly. Among those could be a writing off or default on state debt, taking money out of the off-shores, progressive taxation, etc. (Nechyporenko, 2015). It is obvious that these suggestions are against the political mainstream inside the country and at the international level. They are, no doubt, also directly against the interests of the oligarchs in power. To have any chance to go against such a significant opposition inside and outside the country, a strong actor or alliance of actors is needed to proceed with these or any other reforms of a sort.

Can workers become such an actor? Or can they take a significant part in any coalition of actors, pressing for reforms in their interests? These questions can be answered with a closer examination of labor protests in recent years to understand their current and possible potential to become an independent actor or form a coalition which can voice their demands. The protest event analysis approach to existing empirical material, used in this paper, allows us to study labor protest dynamics, issues, tactics, actors, etc., in order to answer these research questions.

We will now discuss several theoretical issues further and present major empirical information to answer these questions. First of all, we write about problems with labor studies in Ukrainian academia to understand why labor issues, including those of labor protests, have been significantly under-researched in the country. Besides simple understanding, such information can help to try to overcome the discussed problems and move researchers closer to answering the research questions. A summary of the available studies is presented in this part of the paper, and the promising new source of empirical information on labor protest is introduced. Second, we specify what we understand as labor protest while working with and

\(^3\) Additionally, according to Ukrainian legislation, duration of weakly continuous rest should be no less than 42 hours. According to EU legislation – only 24 hours. Also in Ukraine all workers have the right to have breaks during their working day, if their work is compatible with it. In the EU, workers who work less than 6 hours do not have such a right.

\(^4\) According to UNHCR information on 21\(^{st}\) of May 2015, there are almost 1 300 000 internally displaced people in Ukraine, who left their homes because of the annexation of Crimea and de facto war. In fact, this number refers to registered people; the real number is most probably higher.
making an analysis of the empirical data. Third, we proceed with an analysis of the empirical data, trying to fill some major and significant gaps in knowledge about labor protests in Ukraine in order to answer the research questions. We present and interpret different aspects of labor protests, including who, how, and with what issues tries to defend labor rights – in order to understand the potential of labor protests in the country. Finally, we draw conclusions on this potential of labor actors to defend labor interests and point to several possibilities to strengthen their bargaining power in the current context of their struggle.

**Studies of labor problems and problems with labor studies in Ukrainian academia**

To answer questions on the potential of labor mobilization, one should study labor protests in Ukraine. However, a thorough review of relevant sources shows that labor protests have not attracted sufficient attention from Ukrainian scholars for many years, and some of the best pieces have been produced by foreign researchers. Below we try to understand the reasons for this situation in Ukrainian research and suggest ways to mitigate it.

There are three main problems with study of labor protest in Ukraine. The first one is a general lack of attention to workers, their structural position, dynamics, and different aspects of their life and struggle. The second problem refers to attitudes to workers, their potential to struggle, potential of this struggle to influence society and an evaluation of this influence. The third problem is the lack of systematic reliable sources about labor protests in Ukraine. Let us discuss these three problems.

A general lack of attention to workers, their structural position, dynamics, different aspects of their life and struggle cannot be grounded in the absence of the object of studying, because workers, according to different definitions and approaches, constitute the vast majority or close to the majority in Ukraine (Simonchuk, 2005: 9-12). Subjective approach of self-identification suggests their proportion to be near 49 per cent. Statistics on owning the means of production versus working for wages point to as much as 87.6 per cent of waged labor.

One also cannot speak of absence of struggle – in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union the country saw labor mobilization of, at least, branch level (Pan’kova and Ivashchenko, 2006), because of the past system breakdown, instability of the present, and uncertainty of the future.

Historical changes influenced workers directly and sufficiently, decreasing their number dramatically. As studies suggest, 13 million workers left the labor market (Simonchuk, 2005: 18) from 1985 till 2003. Almost 60 per cent of them were manual workers and more than 25 per cent – industrial workers. In other words, every second

---

5 In June 1993 strikes in the Eastern part of the country – the most industrialized region with leading mining industry – involved miners, industrial and state workers, with several hundreds of thousands participants. Worth mentioning, is that autonomy of the region was among the demands of the protesters. In February 1996 miners’ strikes in both the Eastern and Western parts of the country mobilized even more workers.
waged worker left the official labor market. This can obviously be considered as one of the major structural transformations of the society.

Hence, one cannot say there was no material to study workers or that material was not important. One can say quite the opposite – it is hard to understand those transformations and their outcomes without studying workers. But lack of academic interest, moreover – the dramatic decrease of academic interest in labor is obvious. Elena Simonchuk sums up this situation⁶:

‘Till the beginning of 1990ies workers’ class was the major object of interest for soviet sociologists. On the one hand, this was ideological paradigm, but on the other hand – workers’ class really was a social power – being the biggest professional group in the name of which the party spoke and the state governed. However, by now – only 15 years later – this notion practically disappeared from the eyesight of mass media, politicians and sociologists.’ (Simonchuk, 2005: 5)

Why had this dramatic decrease in native scholars’ interest in labor studies happened since independence of the country? Mihai Varga (Varga, 2011a) examines major sociological journals of Ukraine and Romania to discover that there were almost no articles on labor rights, conditions, protests, workers life and structural position. He explains this by stating that scholars probably are closer to elites of the country and feel averse about studying workers and different aspects of their life. Here the author probably speaks not of objective structural position, but of subjective attitudes and discourses. Fashion, political and research conjuncture can be another name for those reasons. They can be better understood if placed in more general national or even international context. Anastasia Riabchuk formulated her argument as following:

‘Working communities are represented both in Western and post-Soviet mass media as ‘ghettos of unemployed’ […], grey depressive districts, and workers – as anonymous mass, as ‘sovok’ or ‘anachronism of communism’ […]. Hence, one can speak not only about economic marginalization (misdistribution), but also about discriminative stereotyping (misrecognition) of workers.’ (Riabchuk, 2007: 109)

Of course, scholars live within this discourse and are influenced by it; hence, their work is also influenced. And here we directly approaches the second problem of labor studies in Ukraine, which refers to attitudes of workers, their potential to struggle, the potential of this struggle to influence society and evaluation of this influence in academic research.

Writing about Ukrainian workers, scholars often conclude that they no more are a significant political actor and can only adapt in the current society (Simonchuk, 2006: 40). At the same time they point to a lack of such an adaptation potential (Riabchuk, 2007: 13), refer to worker identity as that of the previous century

---

⁶ Here and further translations from Russian and Ukrainian were done by the author.
(Pan’kova and Ivashchenko, 2006: 247), asking whether there is a future for labor struggle in Ukraine and concluding that ‘the sun has set on labor’s political power’ (Kubicek, 1999: 83) and even making thesis that there is a serious ‘problem unions may pose for democratic politicians interested in free market reforms’ (Kubicek, 2002: 606).

Such an attitude of different degree is predominant among Ukrainian scholars (Varga, 2011a; Simonchuk, 2005: 6). Of course, there are exceptions of more balanced perception of labor position within the society, mostly being represented by foreign scholars (e.g. Mandel, 2004), but Ukrainians are also making progress in turning their attention to workers. Collective of Commons: Journal of Social Critique can be named as an outstanding example. First developing their research activities around Commons web-page7, they continued with paper journal, now consisting of nine thematically composed issues, the fourth one is on class exploitation and class struggle.

And the last, but not least significant, is the problem of lack of reliable data on labor protests in Ukraine. It is no coincidence that most of the studies of labor protests in Ukraine can be classified as socio-anthropological researches (Mandel, 2004) or case-studies (Varga, 2011b; Popovych, 2012; Atanasov and Riabchuk, 2012). The majority of scholars operate with statistics of one or another kind to support their arguments, mostly referring to official statistics on socio-economic parameters of the country or on international organizations’ data, such as International Labor Organization or World Bank. To evaluate labor bargaining power they also use national data on trade union participation density and strike days (e.g., Crowley, 2004).

International organizations mostly do not gather or estimate specific data on protest mobilization, tactics, actors, etc. Ukrainian official statistics are simply unreliable. First of all, data of the Ministry of Interior on protests in the country is based on such an unsystematic and awkward methodology that it shows nothing on the real situation (Ishchenko, 2010). Their definition of assembly is unclear and inconsistent; collecting of information raises more questions than gives answers and is simply unreliable. On the other hand, one could consider National Statistic Agency as a major source, taking into account the purpose of the Agency work and how often its information is used to study other socio-economic parameters. Moreover, they provide specific data – statistics on labor strikes. They take this data from official information on official strikes. However, this data shows nothing except the fact that it is almost impossible to organize an official strike in Ukraine. In some years when the Agency saw zero strikes, there actually were several dozens of them all over the country, the majority being labor strikes (Dutchak, 2013). Another problem is that workers obviously can and do defend their rights in other kinds of protests, such as demonstrations, pickets, rallies, and so on.

Hence, because of these three main problems of labor studies key questions remain mostly unanswered. What are the dynamics of labor movement in Ukraine? What actors take part in the collective struggle of labor? What issues do they argue for

---

or against? And turning to our major research question - what is their potential to defend labor rights and to promote labor-friendly policies in the context of war and austerity discourse?

Analysis of the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Database (UPCD) which contains results of systematic monitoring of protests, repressions and concessions in Ukraine since 2010, provides rich material to answer many questions. Based on the methodology of protest event analysis, gathering information from daily monitoring of news published by more than 190 regional, national and activists’ webpages, this database captures a broad scope of characteristics and dynamics to proceed with well-grounded analysis of labor protest in Ukraine.

**Conceptualization of labor protest for empirical analysis**

UPCD Project uses special monitoring programming which gathers relevant news information from more than 190 national, regional, and activist web-media. Then coders proceed and input information into the system which creates the database. The database includes all actual protest events - no matter the issues and number of participants - which happen in the territory of Ukraine (CSLR, 2013). It also includes negative reactions against protests, positive responses on them, and other repressions, targeting oppositional or critical activities other than protests. The database contains multiple parameters and characteristics of these events, including their form, participants, targets, and demands. The final version of the database is uploaded on the web-page of the Project yearly (CSLR, 2010-2013).

What do we speak of while speaking of labor protests in UPCD? To proceed with analysis we are going to shift attention from the issue of labor class to the issue of labor rights and labor actor. This trick can help to put aside those complicated debates whose protest we are going to call labor protest - protest of waged labor, protest of industrial workers, protest of physical labor or self-identified as workers. We speak of protests with combined definition - with demands for labor rights and protests of organized labor. To separate these protests from the general pool a three-level algorithm was used.

1) Separation by issues. Here we automatically considered as labor protests those protests during which participants demanded immanent labor issues, which can be raised only by labor or labor-lobbying group. One was ‘labor rights’ - demands for labor rights and demands against violation of labor rights (trade union rights, safety of work environment, illegal dismiss, etc.). Other two issues were ‘wage arrears’ and demands for ‘wage increase’.

2) Separation by issue and actor. Here we used a two-step separation. First, we chose protest events by labor significant issues which can be demanded by other organized protest groups (stockholders, consumers, neighborhood, etc.). They included ‘company closure’, ‘insufficient financing’, ‘privatization’, ‘nationalization’, ‘raiders’, and ‘unemployment’. Second, among them we chose those, in which labor actors participated. Labor actors included ‘teachers’, ‘journalists’, ‘workers’ and so on. Hence, we considered as labor protests those protest events where labor significant issues coincided with labor actors.
3) Actor-based case-by-case revision. Among those protest events which fail to be considered as labor protests by now, we chose protest events with labor actors participating and revised them case-by-case to consider which of them could have relation to labor interest.

Negatives reaction and positive responses to these protests were considered as related to labor protests.

Two important remarks should be made in this conceptualization. First, speaking about actors of protests events, according to methodology (CSLR 2013), we speak of groups, defined by observer or self-defined. This observer can be a journalist or a coder – either actor was referred to as ‘teachers’ in the media, or media translated actor’s self-identification as ‘teachers’, or a coder identified him as ‘teachers’ through non-printed sources (video, photo materials). In any case, here labor actor is closer to self-identification and social identification than to any other type of defining labor actor.

Another important remark should be added on limitation of the data. We understand that several years of data are obviously not enough for a far-reaching generalization and final conclusions. However, these years provide material for cross-sectional data-grounded observations on key questions about labor protests in Ukraine. With this remark in mind, we proceed to answering those questions.

**General characteristics of labor mobilization in Ukraine**

To understand the potential of labor mobilization in the current situation, one should, first of all, look at labor protests general dynamics. In the period 2011-2013 labor protests as protests’ for labor rights and protests of organized labor constituted a significant part of protest events in Ukraine, ranging from 7 per cent in 2012 to 10 per cent in 2011. Hence, the number of labor protests in Ukraine had been steadily growing from 2011 and up until the Euromaidan events. Even in 2013, the year of the Euromaidan, 8 per cent of protests were classified as labor protests.

Moreover, according to the data of the UPCD project, the period of January-October 2013 (before the Euromaidan mobilization) corresponded to an absolute and relative record of labor protests since 2011. During this period labor rights were defended on at least 331 protest events which constituted 11 per cent of all protests events. In other words, in the period from January to October 2013 the issues of labor rights were broached in one of ten protest events. This number is bigger than during any whole year of protest monitoring. In 2012, according to the monitoring data, there were 255 labor protests (7 per cent of all protests) and in 2011 there were 231 labor protests (10 per cent of all protests).

---

8 Though the UPCD Project started in 2010, methodology of the project was significantly changed in the following year. Among other things, changes were related to coding of actors and issues. These changes allow us to make an analysis of the whole period of monitoring only with some restrictions. And because of them, continuous analysis of labor protests since 2010 does not make much sense – because labor protests are selected on the basis of actors and issues.
One can emphasize that increasing mobilization for labor rights in 2011-October 2013 was part of the more general tendency in socio-economic protests. During this period socio-economic protests constituted relative majority of all the protest events. In 2011 60 per cent of all the protest events had at least one socio-economic demand. In 2012-2013 this proportion decreased to 43 per cent. But from January till the 21st of November 2013, socio-economic issues actually constituted 56 per cent of mobilization, winning back the absolute majority. However, during the Euromaidan events this dominance was predictably changed, bringing ideological (62 per cent), political (58 per cent) and civic liberties (52 per cent) issues to the front stage from the 21st of November 2013 and until the end of the year. In this period only 10 per cent of mobilization was related to socio-economic issues.

Hence, being a stable and significant part of protests in Ukraine from at least 2011, since the beginning of the Euromaidan in November 2013 labor and other socioeconomic protests declined sharply, giving way to ideological and political issues. Fragmented data from 20149 suggested the recovery of labor protests only at the end of 2014.

A closer look at the general dynamics of labor protests during the monitoring period, as shown in Figure 1, suggests some predictable decreases of mobilization in winter

---

9 Because of unprecedented mobilization in November 2013 - February 2014, when there were three times more monthly protests than ever before, and because the mobilization wave did not decrease to its pre-Euromaidan scope for months, data from 2014 was still incomplete when this analysis was made.
and summer time. Specific peaks are related to specific protest campaigns and rare branch mobilizations.

The biggest peak in March 2011 was the result of a coincidence of teachers’ protests for wage increase, and the oppositional ‘Automaidan’ campaign, participants of which criticized basically all large-scale initiatives of the government, including the Labor Code Project.

In 2012 there were two peaks of labor protests – in May and in the end of the year. The May mobilization was the result of both 1st May activities mostly of parliamentary leftists (the Communist Party of Ukraine) and other groups and organizations of leftists and of a mobilization of the latter together with liberal allies for the freedom of assembly and against the Labor Code Project. The end of the year mobilization was mostly related to protests of workers of communal enterprises about wage arrears because of insufficient financing of regional budgets from the central government. That was the year of the football championship Euro 2012, taking place in Ukraine and Poland, and that was the year of parliamentary elections. Both could contribute to a money shortage in the central budget.

The end of the year mobilization fluently continued into 2013, contributing to the record mobilization of the pre-Euromaidan months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2011</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2012</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2013</th>
<th>All protests, 2011</th>
<th>All protests, 2012</th>
<th>All protests, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>3630</td>
<td>4823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Geographical distribution of labor protests in Ukraine (2011-2013). Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Database Project

Another aspect, which can contribute to understanding the labor mobilization potential, is the regional distribution of labor protests. It can point to possible structural economic peculiarities, expressed in the geographical unevenness of the

---

10 The teachers’ campaign was organized by their trade union all over the country with a demand for a 20 per cent wage rise. The government acceded to this demand.
11 The ‘Automaidan’ campaign refers to an oppositional campaign against the government and its initiatives. It took its name from widely used protest tactics of motorcades. This tactic was also widely used in 2013-2014 during the Euromaidan protests, turning into a more or less established and coordinated initiative and later – into an officially registered organization, or rather several regional organizations.
12 The Central macro region includes Kyiv, few protests from region Ukraine (all-Ukrainian protests or protests where location cannot be identified at all) and protests in Web (hackers’ attacks).
mobilization distribution, which can influence the current mobilization potential in combination with processes and structural changes in the Ukrainian economy in crisis. Looking at the regional distribution of labor protests in Ukraine in Table 1, one can notice two things. First, there is no significant stable difference between the Eastern region and the rest of the country, as one could expect, taking into account the concentration of industries in the East of the country. Though in 2011 there were significantly more (37 per cent) protests in the Eastern region, the majority of them were not explicitly related to industrial conflict and this difference disappeared in the following years. Regional variations in the long run are most probably related not to industrialization of any of the regions, but to peculiarities of the biggest protest campaigns.

Second, in 2013 one can observe a significant concentration of labor mobilization in the Central region – 41 per cent. This can be explained both by geographical peculiarities of local labor campaigns and by increasing appeals to the central government, for example, in protests of communal workers against insufficient financing by the central government. The latter, however, is just a hypothesis and needs further research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of protesters</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2011</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2012</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2013</th>
<th>All protests, 2011</th>
<th>All protests, 2012</th>
<th>All protests, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;10</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;100</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1000</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>3630</td>
<td>4823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Number of participants in labor protests in Ukraine (2011-2013). Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Database Project

Analysis of the number of participants contributes to the general picture of labor protests and their bargaining power. Table 2 shows that, excluding the biggest protest events (with more than 1000 participants), labor protests mobilize slightly more participants than protests in general, providing fewer protests in the category ‘up to 10 participants’ and outperforming in categories ‘10-100 participants’ and ‘100-1000’ participants. This is probably caused by the fact that labor protests are often protests by the whole personnel of enterprises, which are usually tens or hundreds of people.
Protest tactics used by labor actors, should also be interesting for the general image of labor bargaining power. Analysis of labor protests’ tactics in Table 3 shows two definite peculiarities. First, actors of labor protests are less frequently violent; they are less likely to attack property or people than protesters in general. Second, actors of labor protests use confrontational tactics significantly more often. This fact is not hard to explain, taking into account that confrontational tactics are those that apply direct pressure on protest targets, but do not apply direct violence (CSLR, 2013). Confrontational tactics include blockades, confrontation, sabotage, civil disobedience and, among others – classical workers’ strike tactics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2011</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2012</th>
<th>Labor protests, 2013</th>
<th>All protests, 2011</th>
<th>All protests, 2012</th>
<th>All protests, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontational</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>3630</td>
<td>4823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Tactics of labor protests in Ukraine (2011-2013). Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Database Project

Now, let us turn to the direct and visible outcomes of labor protest dynamics, mobilization and tactics combined in their bargaining power. Table 4 clearly shows that during the whole period of monitoring labor protests were less often repressed and reached their aims more often than protests in general. Moreover, there was a slow but stable tendency of decreasing numbers of negative reactions per 100 labor protests, while the number of negative reactions per 100 protests in general obviously increased during the Euromaidan campaign year, being almost three times higher than that of labor protests. The number of positive responses per 100 protests, on the contrary, was significantly higher for labor protests than for protests in general – at least twice as high as in every single year of monitoring.

These peculiarities of targets’ reactions on labor protests, however, are good news for waged workers only at first sight, because there are complex reasons why labor protests are less often repressed and are more often successful. Among these
one can name the focus of labor protests on local short-term demands, the absence of large-scale, complex, radical claims, and no real threat to the interests of their targets or country’s authorities of different levels. In other words - no political power, as perceived by those in power. Labor bargaining power, relatively greater at first sight, can point to their actual weakness in real political impact.

**Issues, tactics and participants of labor protests in Ukraine**

To understand labor protests mobilization potential in the current situation, one should also analyze the issues which mobilize workers in the country. Looking at what they are fighting for, one can reach the conclusion that labor protests in Ukraine are mostly defensive. Every year since 2011, the leading single issue was wage arrears. Payment of wages was among the demands of 35 to 47 per cent of labor protests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block of issues</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic</td>
<td>Wage arrears</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor rights</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Company closure</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raiders</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>N.a.</td>
<td>N.a.</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro- or anti-boss</td>
<td>N.a.</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insufficient financing</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage increase</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Against government, local authorities or their</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic liberties</td>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological</td>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>231</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Issues of labor protests in Ukraine (2011-2013). Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Database Project

Table 5 demonstrates that, as in all the previous years of monitoring, in 2013 wage arrears were the most common issue for labor protests in Ukraine. It was among the issues in 45 per cent of instances of labor mobilization.
30 per cent of labor protests in 2013 were related to the general issue of labor rights. On these, protests actors demanded improving labor conditions, social payments, protested against illegal dismissals, or unofficial payment for their labor. From the beginning of 2013, one can observe a considerable increase in protests against company closure – the percentage of these protests increased from 13 per cent in 2012 to 19 per cent. Protests against raider seizure of enterprises and unemployment get fourth and fifth place respectively. All this data can point to an absence of improvement in the economic situation of waged labor before the Euromaidan protests, despite loud but absolutely unrealistic declarations from the highest officials on, for example, immediate liquidation of wage arrears.13

Hence, the majority of labor mobilization, with some bright and quite successful exceptions, consists of local, scattered, mostly defensive struggles for local issues. One can conclude that such a majority is a bad sign for the mobilization potential, which should go beyond local and scattered protests if labor were to claim any significant impact on state-level policies.

Offensive demands for wage increases constituted a significant part of labor protests only in one year of the monitoring period – in 2011 – reaching 16 per cent of labor protests. Most of those 16 per cent consisted of the above mentioned successful large-scale Ukraine-wide mobilization of teachers with demands to increase their wages. This was a rare example of a coordinated mobilization of labor actors across the country with the help of trade union mobilization potential.

Another example of non-scattered and non-local labor protest was oppositional mobilization in 2011 during the ‘Automaibdan’ protest campaign, when issues of labor rights were among the demands of the multiple actors, participating in protests against governmental policies. Trade unions, oppositional parties, different NGOs and initiative groups formed the more general agenda which included labor rights. More specifically – they criticized the Labor Code Project proposed by the party in power and criticized by trade unions and labor activists for attacking labor rights in the country. Though it is hard to measure the outright success of such mobilization14, we call it successful because labor issues were put on the agenda of a large-scale and broad oppositional protest campaign.

It is obvious that what distinguishes these successful large-scale protest campaigns is the involvement of organized allies – trade unions in the case of the teachers’ mobilization and oppositional parties, organizations and groups in the case of the ‘Automaibdan’ protests.

---

13 On 12th of November 2013 President Yanukovych made a point-blank demand to liquidate wage arrears by the end of the year (http://uapress.info/uk/news/show/10615 Accessed: 18-09-2015.).
14 The Labor Code Project, heavily criticized by some trade unions, labor activists and politicians was not passed in the Parliament that year and has not been passed yet. But this fact is not directly due to the 2011 ‘Automaibdan’ campaign. It is more likely caused by more or less regular (though by far not as large-scale as the 2011 ‘Automaibdan’ mobilization) mobilization of labor, leftist and trade union activists for years.
However, as Figure 2 demonstrates, generally mainstream protest actors have low interest in labor protests. Since 2011 political parties participated in maximum 17 per cent of labor protests while their participation in protests in general varied from 30 to 36 per cent. Those 17 per cent correspond to the 2011 oppositional ‘Automaidan’ campaign, mentioned above. More leveled participation can be observed on the side of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their support of labor protests peaked at 20 per cent, while their general protest involvement varied from 17 to 29 per cent in the observed period. That 20 per cent maximum also corresponds to 2011 ‘Automaidan’. Only trade unions were involved in labor protests more than in protests in general. In 2011, they participated in 30 per cent of labor mobilization, while generally they were involved in 2 to 7 per cent of events. Their maximum involvement corresponds to the 2011 teachers’ mobilization, organized by trade unions all over the country. The ideological aspect of labor allies is quite telling, showing two to three times more involvement in labor mobilization from radical leftists than from radical rightists.

However, in the absolute majority of cases workers defended their rights on their own. Fragmented information from 2014 suggests a dramatic decrease even of existing organized support of labor protests. In the situation of the defensive, mostly scattered labor struggle, lack or even loss of support from the political mainstream and other potential allies, workers critically need bargaining power to represent their interests and to fight for them at state or branch levels in the face of the upcoming neoliberal transformation. One option is to organize themselves quickly and well enough to react to a rapidly changing and labor hostile environment. This is not very likely to happen, taking into account the hard and controversial history of unionism in Ukraine (Mandel, 2004; Atanasov and Riabchuk, 2012). However, existing organized
labor actors can do their best in uniting existing organizations, creating one, more powerful actor out of several smaller ones. They can also use the experience of voicing their interests and demands in broad oppositional protest campaigns.

**Concluding remarks. Unite or fall?**

Basically, this research is an attempt to close the gap of knowledge on labor protest in Ukraine and to understand whether ordinary people in Ukraine have significant bargaining power in the form of collective labor actor to press their interest in the face of spiraling crisis.

In the period of 2011-2013 labor protests constituted a significant part of protest mobilization in Ukraine. However, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, a frozen conflict war in the East of the country, concomitant with ideological patriotic or separatist mobilization, and suppressed socio-economic protests, including protests demanding labor rights. And, as fragmented data from 2014 suggests, signs of possible increase in mobilization for socio-economic issues arrives only in the end of 2014.

Analysis of labor protests in Ukraine in recent years suggests that there is no big potential for labor protests to mobilize allies. Parties and NGOs do not put labor issues high in their protest priorities. There is no mainstream or potentially mainstream political party which addresses workers and their interests. The previous opposition, which supported labor issues in the 2011 ‘Automaidan’ protest campaign, got to power after Euromaidan and it looks as if they have nothing to say in support of labor now.

The neoliberal agenda of the new government and supporters of their economic policies, including media, liberal intellectuals, and international agents contribute to the general labor hostile discourse, in which workers are related to ‘anachronisms of communism’. War in the East of the country, besides patriotic mobilization, brings fear of separatism, spies, agents of the FSB, a fear which is already being used by the government to label oppositional mobilization.

Hostility to explicitly leftist rhetoric, reinforced by support of the previous government by the Communist Party of Ukraine and related to (as yet unsuccessful) attempts of some actors to proscribe communist parties and successful attempts to proscribe communist symbolism in the country, have put other obstacles in the way of potential labor friendly discourses and alliances.

However, there are two chances that labor interests may exploit. One can be represented by new actors, who can emerge in the situation of instability, caused by war, political struggle between newly empowered elites and the inevitable mobilization to follow austerity policies. However, there is no guarantee that new actors or alliances of actors will be progressive.

---

15 In April 2015 the Parliament passed the law ‘on condemnation of communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols’.
Another chance was demonstrated in the teachers’ trade union mobilization of 2011. Trade unions have some potential and should not be put aside completely. Moreover, in the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 one can observe repetitive mobilization of miners in Western and Eastern Ukraine, organized by trade unions – blocking of roads, strikes, rallies with protest against wage arrears and demands to solve systematic problems of the coal industry in the country. One should remember that it was precisely the miners and their unions who were in the vanguard of labor mobilization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is yet to be seen whether they have the potential left to mobilize other branches or independent unions to press for a common interest.

References


Book Review


Just as the vision of a united, democratic, and legitimate European Union (EU) has become blurred in the wake of the euro crisis, so has the European flag on the cover of the volume “Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress” edited by Olaf Cramme and Sara B. Hobolt. In fact, the fading stars on the cover aptly depict the problem that this edited volume addresses: the growing uncertainty about the EU’s political sustainability. Bringing together leading scholars from the fields of political science, political economy, and law, the volume takes stock of the new governance structure and the internal divisions that the euro crisis has triggered, and investigates the implications for democracy and legitimacy in the EU.

The recent increase in economic and fiscal coordination at the European level in general and EU crisis management in particular have drawn fierce criticism for eroding democracy in the EU. The book approaches this complex and topical subject in two steps: the first part examines the political consequences of the crisis, while the second explores the prospects for a more legitimate and democratic EU. As the editors explain in the introduction, the twelve chapters in the collection contribute to three current debates in the field, namely, those on the presumed structural flaws of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the EU’s response to them, the ability of politicization to reduce the EU’s democratic deficit, and the future of European integration between the poles of federalism and collapse.

The first part of the volume begins and ends with a broader account of the political consequences of the crisis. Fritz W. Scharpf convincingly shows that the political legitimacy of the present euro regime is extremely fragile, whereas Frank Schimmelfennig examines how the euro crisis has affected differentiated integration. The other chapters, by contrast, scrutinize the political consequences of the crisis with regard to distinct political actors. They elaborate on EU citizens’ complex attitudes toward the EU in the context of the crisis (Sara B. Hobolt), the Europeanization of the national political debate in the media (Hanspeter Kriesi and Edgar Grande), the difficulties that political opposition faces in times of executive-dominated emergency politics (Jonathan White), and the increasing involvement of national legislatures in EU politics (Tapio Raunio).

In the second part of the book, the prospects of the EU becoming more democratic and legitimate are discussed. The first and the last chapter offer innovative readings of European integration. Waltraud Schelkle presents an insurance view of monetary integration, contrasting it with optimal currency theory. Contrary to the popular opinion that it is the diversity of EU economies that is to blame for the woes of the Eurozone, Schelkle highlights the merits of that very diversity in coping with the interdependences generated by EMU. To enhance the long-term stability of EMU, she argues, fiscal surveillance must be combined with both macro-prudential financial
regulation and a set of risk-sharing mechanisms such as a fiscal back-up for the bank resolution fund, Eurobonds, and the European Central Bank serving as lender of last resort not only to financial institutions, but also to governments. Similarly thought-provoking is Sverker Gustavsson’s contribution, which contends that political liberalism needs to be restored in order to sustain the informal pact of confidence the EU relies on. According to Gustavsson, this requires that problem-solving capacity (i.e., ‘fate control’), legitimate opposition (i.e., the availability of distinct policy options) and legitimate protectionism (i.e., member countries’ ability to choose their social model) are safeguarded.

As to the other contributions in the second part, Simon Hix gives an informative, succinct overview of the elements of the new EU economic governance structure and compares two reform options to provide democratic legitimacy to the emerging “macroeconomic union”. Catherine E. de Vries as well as Damian Chalmers and Mariana Chaves investigate the current state of democracy in the EU. Whereas the latter portray the increasing bypassing of the formal legislative processes at the European level and the consequent impairment of democratic agency, de Vries examines the supranational and intergovernmental channels of electoral democracy in the EU, finding that they work better than commonly believed. Providing a broader context to these findings, Andreas Follesdal reviews the usual arguments about the democratic deficit of the EU and concludes that, drawing on federalist theory, new democratic standards need to be developed to account for the asymmetric polity of the EU.

The different focuses and approaches of the individual contributions notwithstanding, overall, they convey the impression that the democratic deficit and the legitimacy problems of the EU have intensified in consequence of the crisis. Opinions on the prospects and remedies for a democratic and legitimate Union differ considerably though. At one end of the spectrum is the analysis of Scharpf, who suggests that the EU in its current form is an inherently fragile political construction that is unfit for more public dialogue on its politics and policies. At the other end, by contrast, the further politicization of EU politics is considered essential for the survival of the present EU regime. However, while Raunio and de Vries argue that it is national parliaments that should be given more weight in EU policy-making, Hix holds that it is citizens who should become more strongly involved, e.g., by means of referenda.

Another lesson of the book is that the euro crisis “has challenged many existing preconceptions and long-held-assumptions within the EU” (Cramme and Hobolt: 5), which is reflected in several contributions. Schimmelfennig, for example, argues that the euro crisis has produced more integration (among euro area countries) and more differentiation (between euro and non-euro area countries) at the same time, which runs counter to existing theoretical accounts. Most strikingly, many contributions challenge the widely held view that a both politically and economically sustainable EU relies on uniform rules and member states’ convergence toward a common social and economic model. Instead, the authors make the case for taking differentiated integration seriously (Schimmelfennig, Follesdal) and allowing for more diversity in economic models (Scharpf, Schelkle, Gustavsson). While this would counteract the increasing EU interference with democratic choice at the national level, which is
commonly considered one of the most important problems for democracy in the EU today, it also raises a set of new questions regarding democratic politics in the EU, such as the legitimacy of a single European Parliament, as Schimmelfennig (132-133) aptly points out.

What makes the volume a stimulating and valuable contribution to the field is that it brings together fresh perspectives on the issue of democratic politics in the ever-changing EU. For instance, one may look at EU politics through the lens of politics without rhythm, as suggested by White, or apply the concept of political liberalism to the EU polity, as advocated by Gustavsson. Even if most proposals for a more democratic and legitimate EU unfortunately remain rather general, the views presented in the volume prompt us to think in new ways about the future of European integration.

Another considerable strength of the volume is its thematic comprehensiveness. It combines contributions that, drawing on standard concepts of European integration studies and political theory, address more general, fundamental questions about the EU’s political sustainability with case studies that scrutinize questions of legitimacy and democracy in the EU from the perspective of specific actors. Furthermore, the volume is diverse in methodology in that it makes use of counter-factual reasoning and a variety of empirical data, such as public-opinion polls, party positions, newspaper articles, economic indicators, and EU law. Together this adds up to an encompassing and mostly profound account of the current state and prospects of democratic politics in the EU.

At the same time, the plurality of approaches and topics makes it difficult for the reader to keep track of the arguments advanced in the book. In fact, the major shortcomings of the volume are the scanty integration of the chapters and the lack of guidance for the reader to find her way through the book more easily. Firstly, the volume seems to lack a clear common conceptual framework or vision. It remains unclear what, apart from a broad common topic, holds together the individual contributions, which hampers the integration of the arguments. Secondly, and closely related to the first point, some chapters make no reference to other contributions or the introduction to the volume, which is surprising given the thematic overlap between the chapters. Thirdly, the volume would have benefited from a concluding chapter that recalls the different trains of thought and integrates them into a broad view. Admittedly, the introductory chapter provides an integration of the arguments. Nevertheless, at the end of the volume the reader asks herself what answers the volume as a whole provides to the questions that are raised in the introduction, such as in what ways the crisis has affected democratic politics in the EU. Lastly, the structure of the book does not strike the reader as entirely plausible. As many contributions address both the political consequences of the crisis and the prospects for a democratic and legitimate EU, the division of the book into these two parts is at times confusing. Moreover, the order of the chapters in the second part appears somewhat counter-intuitive. Hix’s chapter, for example, may have served as a proper introduction to the second part as it gives an overview on the new governance structure, which constitutes the natural starting point for any meaningful discussion on democratizing the EU down the road. Folledal’s revision of the arguments commonly mounted in the democratic deficit debate and his case for new democratic standards,
by contrast, seems better suited for concluding the second part than Gustavsson’s contribution does. This weakness, however, could be remedied if the introductory chapter outlined the setup of the chapters and explained the rationale behind it.

The above criticisms aside, Cramme and Hobolt’s volume makes an important and timely contribution to both the theoretical development and the empirical analysis of democratic politics in the EU. Providing a comprehensive analysis of the causes, consequences, and possible solutions to a European Union under stress, it advances a highly topical research agenda in the field of European integration.

Juliane Stein-Zalai (Stein-Zalai.Juliane@tk.mta.hu)
Institute for Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary
Can policy uncertainty caused by external shocks lead to technocratic delegation and consensus seeking through a different, non-partisan political rationality? How do crisis-driven policy solutions influence long-term institutional development? *Power without Rules* is an important addition to these puzzles which could also serve as a base for further research in this area. Sebők’s work directly relates to the key questions of technocratic autonomy and democratic deficit that are particularly relevant today as the institutional effects of the recent economic crisis are being assessed.

Although it presents several results in a mid-length format, the book still feels focused as all parts fit into an overarching structure. The first two of the seven chapters introduce the topic, the approach and the structure of the book. *Power without Rules* employs a meso-level, positive, non-formal approach. Its main contribution is the development of the theory of crisis-driven delegation that builds upon new institutionalism but is interdisciplinary in nature, due to its use of exogenous economic factors. The primary purpose of the book is not testing hypotheses, but developing a positive theoretical framework and finding the corresponding methodological solutions for its empirical testing.

Chapter three contains the theoretical base and conclusions. This begins with a comprehensive assessment of the sources, limits and levels of technocratic autonomy. The author then discusses the dual effects of crisis led delegation: in times of crisis not only does the socio-economic importance of the state increase, so do the influence and available resources of non-elected technocrats within the state. The volume builds upon the delegation theory of Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and its model of technocratic autonomy. The key theoretical contribution here is an inversion of that theory, where instead of political uncertainty, policy uncertainty is emphasized in explaining delegation. This *theory of crisis-driven delegation* claims that policy uncertainty can change within a given policy area due to external factors, such as financial crises, and that these changes promote technocratic delegation. It also assumes the self-interested behaviour of political actors, but claims that policy considerations might overrule traditional party rationality.

The author derives three hypotheses from his theory, all of which describe politicians’ behaviour. During a policy crisis politicians prefer trustee institutions over the adoption of detailed legal solutions (*organisational preference hypothesis*), ex ante restrictions take a back-seat in favour of ex post control (*control preference hypothesis*) and decision makers exhibit political consensus seeking, the degree of
which depends on policy uncertainty and the stakes involved (policy dominance hypothesis).

Chapter four develops the methodology of studying delegation in crises. The author operationalises the dimensions of delegation in order to make the hypotheses empirically assessable, then conceptualises and operationalises the explanatory factors: policy crises, policy uncertainty, political uncertainty (through the concept of effective veto points) and political consensus. This section is intended to be a base for future empirical studies, possibly with a large-N approach involving several countries, time frames or policy areas. The methodology is developed convincingly as it openly deals with alternatives and explains its choices in a reflexive manner. The empirical research in the book focuses on the area of financial policy, but the framework could be applied to other areas.

After laying the theoretical and methodological foundation, in chapter five the author employs different empirical approaches to test the hypotheses with varying depth and external validity. All included studies utilise the political uncertainty based explanation of Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) as a control, comparing its explanatory power to that of crisis-driven delegation. Although its primary goal is not assessing the hypotheses, the case selection allows it to claim some external validity without relying on a large sample or having to quantify all relevant aspects. This inventive use of qualitative approaches is one of the main strengths of the book.

The first empirical pillar aims at the mechanisms of crisis led delegation, while taking crisis as a constant factor. It centres on seven historically and institutionally similar West European countries in the first months of the 2008 financial crisis. The analysis draws on the legal measures of crisis management and the behaviour of parliamentary elites. This first study concludes by affirming that the changes were consistent with the three hypotheses, while clearly being driven by the exogenous shock from the financial system.

The second empirical sub-chapter is a study of Hungary during the 2006-2010 electoral cycle. By carefully defining the temporal boundaries of the financial shocks, this broader timespan allows for a comparison of exceptional and regular modes of politics. The analysis utilises indicators for the discretionary power of government both before and during parliamentary decisions, the lengths of pieces of legislation and parliamentary consensus. Comparing the two time frames by these measures, the change in politicians’ behaviour brought about by the crisis corresponds to the predictions of the organisational preference, control preference and policy dominance hypotheses. The author also emphasises the important role of the Parliament in crisis management. Contrary to the popular notion of the government dominating legislation, ‘blank cheque’ delegation was fairly limited, and interest groups within the governing parties have proven to possess major influence.

The third empirical pillar consists of three case studies: the establishment of the US Federal Reserve, the evolution of financial policy institutions in the US from 1913 to 2008 and the Japanese financial crisis of 1992-2003. The case of the FED serves as a peek into the black box of crisis policy. Drawing on this, the author extends the causal chain of policy development proposed by Baumgartner et al. (2011).
second case shows the explanatory potential of the theory of crisis-driven delegation over longer time spans. The final analysis of the Japanese financial crisis offers a geographical and cultural extension of the base study. The author concludes that in this case the theory of crisis-driven delegation offers a more convincing explanation for the timing, scope and forms of delegation than the competing theories.

Chapter six provides an enumeration of the book’s theoretical, methodological and empirical results. Beyond that Sebők integrates his theory into the broader framework of the punctuated equilibrium theory of institutional development. This allows for better explanations of the interplay between short and long-term institutional development. According to the author, delegation associated with crises can prove to be more permanent than temporary, possibly acting as a critical juncture in institutional development. In times of crises the equilibrium might differ from the prediction of Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1999) model, and this state can crystallise leading to different long-term equilibrium paths.

The final chapter lists possible implications of this research for broader contexts: those designing institutions should be aware of their resilience in times of crisis, as temporary provisions often prove to be more permanent than expected. This leads us back to one of the theoretical starting-points of Power without Rules: the difference between politics in its normal and exceptional states. Delegation tips the balance between democratic and non-democratic elements in a polity. The resulting dominance of the technocratic side leads to a democratic and trust deficit in society. To combat the overgrowth of technocratic autonomy, guarantees of temporariness, so called sunset institutions could prove to be essential.

This concise and clear-cut book contributes a lot to institutional development scholarship while reaching its research goals, as well as providing additional considerations for future inquiry. A bit more explanation would have been beneficial when assessing theoretical implications and the way this theory fits into institutional development in general. Also, as the text follows the research design very closely, it offers little additional context or story. This is not so much a flaw as the author’s editorial decision, yet it limits the book’s audience to those in related scientific fields, although it would be interesting for a broader public, too.

I would recommend this volume to three specific groups of readers. Due to the focus on financial crises, scholars of financial policy may be especially interested in the empirical studies. Teachers or students of political science will find this book an excellent example of good research design and execution, because of its exemplary structure, reflexivity and successful utilisation of a range of empirical approaches. Professionals researching the effects of crises on political institutions, and specifically scholars of delegation and technocratic autonomy will make great use of Sebők’s theoretical and methodological groundwork.

Gábor Tamás Molnár (molnargabortamas@gmail.com),
Master’s degree candidate, Corvinus University of Budapest
References
